The Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004 destroyed lives and coastal communities across the Indian Ocean. Minutes after an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale occurred off the west coast of northern Sumatra in Indonesia, the first large tsunami hit nearby shores with devastating effect. It struck especially hard between the towns of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh in the province of Aceh. Triggered by the same earthquake, a massive upward shift in the seabed also caused tsunamis to strike coastal communities in parts of eastern India, Malaysia, the Maldives, south-western Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand before reaching the coast of Africa. The damage to life and property was terrible: some 290,000 people were dead or missing, and more than 1 million displaced across 12 countries in the Indian Ocean. A third of the victims were children.

News of the disaster – which left some 5 million people in immediate need of assistance – sparked an extraordinary mobilization of resources. Governments, private citizens and corporations and NGOs in the affected countries and beyond were quick to respond with offers of money, supplies and manpower. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) alone reportedly received US$2.2 billion. The United Nations estimated that some US$6.8 billion was pledged towards post-tsunami relief and recovery, with US$5.8 billion coming from government sources and the rest from corporate and private donations.

The international machinery for the coordination and delivery of relief in complex humanitarian emergencies was revved up. A report to the UN’s Economic and Social Council noted that 16 UN agencies, 18 IFRC response teams, more than 160 international NGOs and many private and civil-society groups were involved in delivering emergency relief. The large number of organizations involved posed tremendous challenges for the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In some areas the sheer scale of the destruction posed formidable logistical difficulties. In many cases, relief operations were undertaken, at least in part, by national or foreign military forces using their own transport and equipment. Thirty-five different armed forces were involved in the relief effort, and in Indonesia and Sri Lanka the UN Joint Logistics Centre assisted in the coordination of military support.

Unsurprisingly, relief efforts had to be tailored to different situations in the affected countries, each with its own pre-tsunami political and socio-economic conditions. In the Maldives, where some 5-10 per cent of the population was initially displaced, the limited presence of UN organizations or international NGOs in the country prior to the tsunami presented challenges for those seeking to mobilize international assistance. In Somalia, where the greatest destruction to life and property occurred in Puntland, a self-declared autonomous region, the lack of a central government complicated relief efforts. The importance of military-strategic considerations in some of the worst affected areas, most notably Aceh, the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and to some extent in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India added another dimension to the emergency response.

While disaster relief is not part of its mandate, UNHCR joined in the emergency response to the tsunami. The sheer scale of the destruction and the fact that many of affected populations were of concern to the organization prompted the move. Responding to requests from the UN Secretary-General and UN Country Teams, UNHCR concentrated on providing shelter and non-food relief. In Sri Lanka, UNHCR’s presence in the country prior to the tsunami allowed for a comparatively swift and sustained humanitarian intervention – including efforts focused on the protection of internally displaced persons. In Somalia, where some 290 people died and some 54,000 were displaced by the disaster, UNHCR and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme were primarily responsible for coordinating the provision of shelter and non-food relief. The UN’s Children’s Fund and the World Food Programme coordinated much of the other emergency assistance.

In Aceh, UNHCR established temporary field locations in the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, and three other hard-hit towns on the west coast. It withdrew from the province on 25 March 2005, the official expiry date for the emergency phase as declared by the Government of Indonesia. (UNHCR has since been invited to return to assist the Indonesian Government in the rehabilitation of the province, as outlined in a memorandum of understanding signed in June 2005.)

A range of protection concerns were identified in the aftermath of the tsunami, including access to assistance, enforced relocation, sexual and gender-based violence, safe and voluntary return, loss of documentation and restitution of property. The tsunami response also underlined weaknesses in the areas of shelter, water and sanitation and camp management. Problems of coordination among NGOs, and between NGOs and UN agencies, pointed to the need to strengthen local and regional capacities.

The protection of displaced populations was especially urgent in areas of protracted conflict and internal displacement in Aceh, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, there was concern for some affected populations whose governments declined offers of international aid, such as the Dalits (formerly known as untouchables) of India and Burmese migrant workers in Thailand; it was feared they might be discriminated against and their protection needs compromised. In short, the broad range of challenges across a dozen countries in the aftermath of the tsunami underlined the importance of effectively protecting affected populations and defining the obligations of local and national governments – as set out in the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Box 1.1 Globalization and migration

Box 1.3 Protection for victims of trafficking