Latest news feedThe State of the World's Refugees 2006 - Chapter 3 Adressing refugee security: Developing responses
Some of the security threats outlined above are of long standing. However, in recent years there has been more awareness of the interconnectedness of various threats as well as a more concerted effort to address them. Conceiving of security as a shared concern also means conceiving of it as a shared responsibility. Under international law, a state is obliged to ensure the physical protection of all those who reside within its borders – refugees included – and it remains the responsibility of the host state to prevent the militarization of refugee-populated areas. At the same time, the security of refugees and their hosts is also a collective endeavour, both to prevent dangerous situations from occurring and to stop their escalation.
The principle of shared responsibility for refugee security among all multilateral and bilateral actors was inscribed in UNHCR's Executive Committee Resolution 58 of 1987, when international concern was focused on armed attacks on refugee camps.[18] Recent years have seen further acceptance of this principle both in multilateral forums and in operational practice. This acceptance can also be seen as a response to new concerns such as terrorism or sexual and gender-based violence, all of which threaten the security of refugees in multiple ways. At its worst, however, it can mean an outsourcing of state responsibility to international actors.
Enlarging the multilateral mandate
Since the early 1990s and the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda in particular, security has become a bigger issue in refugee assistance. At the United Nations, this shift is reflected in Security Council resolutions 1208 (1998) and 1296 (2000), which directly address the security and neutrality of refugee camps.[19] Among other things, these resolutions establish the legal parameters for authorizing action under the UN Charter, which could involve the deployment of international military forces and monitors to address insecurity in camps. In line with expanded notions of security, the resolutions also aim to link up humanitarian, political and military activities.
Security has also been the subject of informal discussions among governments following UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report on the causes of conflict in Africa and his two reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.[20] During this process states have called on UNHCR to provide advice, training and technical assistance to host states to help them discharge their responsibilities to refugees.
UNHCR's Executive Committee concluded in 1993 that the organization 'may monitor the personal security of refugees and asylum seekers and take appropriate action to prevent or redress violations thereof.' Security Council Resolution 1208 also stressed the need for refugee-hosting countries to develop institutions and procedures to implement the provisions of international law. The resolution repeatedly called for the location of camps away from borders to prevent the involvement of refugees in the conflict from which they fled.
Furthermore, in 2002 UNHCR's Executive Committee called on the agency to develop mechanisms to ensure the demilitarization of refugee camps. The Rwandan emergency in the mid-1990s pushed this enlarged security agenda forward by bringing home the security challenges confronting refugee operations in the absence of an existing security apparatus, be it of the host government or the United Nations.
The 'ladder of options' and beyond
Wherever armed elements or combatants might be present, assuring the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum and of the areas hosting refugee populations involves a range of measures. These include disarming and demobilizing armed exiles, preventing the flow of arms between refugees, protecting refugees from attack and intimidation, and separating combatants or war criminals from refugees.
There are various ways in which the international community has tried to address this challenge, most prominently by developing the so-called 'ladder of options'.[21] The ladder represents an assessment-and-response tool. It describes a series of possible and ideally multilateral responses to escalating threats to the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and to the security of refugees and humanitarian personnel. These threats are then dealt with by a continuum of measures ranked in order of their 'soft' or 'hard' nature, depending on the local context. Most of these measures represent different ways to assure separation and exclusion of persons who – mainly because of their continuing involvement in military conflict – cannot be defined as refugees.
The 'soft' measures of the ladder include preventive and corrective steps which build cooperation with national law-enforcement mechanisms. 'Intermediate' measures include international support for national security forces and the deployment of international fact-finding missions and observers as well as international police forces. 'Hard' methods involve the use of regional or international military forces.
Under the harder measures, once a mandate is secured, regional and international military forces may perform a number of roles alongside national military forces. Their activities may range from monitoring and intelligence-gathering to reconnaissance and situation assessment. They may also be involved in the separation, disarmament and demobilization of combatants; border control; camp-perimeter security; and the training of national military forces.
These measures have both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the presence of military forces in a refugee camp undermines the humanitarian and civilian character of the camp and may increase the risk of it becoming a military target. On the other, the presence of a well-disciplined and well-equipped military force in the vicinity of a camp may act as a deterrent against attack and the militarization of the camp.
The deployment of ECOMIL (Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia) troops in August 2003 had an immediate impact, reducing security fears in and around the camps for refugees and internally displaced people in the vicinity of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. It secured the camps and forced armed militiamen to withdraw. Arguably, the rapid deployment of humanitarian and security personnel in and around refugee-populated areas during the initial phase of a humanitarian emergency helps deter armed elements from infiltrating the population or targeting refugees. The ECOMIL troops were eventually replaced by international civilian police officers.
In Nepal, the introduction in 2003 of a well-equipped security force in the area around refugee camps has reduced the movement of unidentified groups at night and prevented attacks on the camps. In Uganda, on the other hand, the lack of a fully effective military force in the north of the country has allowed the Lords Resistance Army rebels to attack settlements of refugees and internally displaced people.
The use of international civilian police (CIVPOL) monitors, authorized under the UN Charter to train and assist police in ensuring camp security, is one way the international community can support refugee security when it cannot be guaranteed by the host state. CIVPOL monitors may be deployed – without the express permission of the host state – as part of a multinational peacekeeping or peace-building force. However, they will be less effective if the host state does not acknowledge their mandate. The United Nations authorized such monitors for Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Mozambique and Somalia. CIVPOL officers were involved in these interventions as advisers, monitors and instructors. Later, in Kosovo and East Timor, CIVPOL was replaced by armed law-enforcement officers with full executive authority, including the right to use deadly force.[22]
The aim of the ladder of options is to enhance the effectiveness of responses to security threats in refugee situations. In practice its application has been largely restricted to operations which fall broadly under the 'soft' end of the ladder. Frequently, due to the absence of states with the capacity or willingness to engage themselves, so-called 'security packages' have been implemented by UNHCR in consultation with host governments and some bilateral donors. In the best-case scenario such programmes are aimed at building and sustaining the capacity of a host state to provide and promote refugee security. However, where relationships among all actors deteriorate, these measures may introduce new security problems.
During the Rwandan refugee crisis in the mid-1990s, UNHCR hired a contingent of Zairean soldiers to support security in the Congolese camps. The move was initially successful; later, however, these troops became embroiled in the conflict as well. In Kosovo, UNHCR issued guidelines for quasi-national security forces, and in the late 1990s more formal arrangements to improve refugee security based on security packages were concluded, first with Tanzania and then with Kenya and Guinea. These experiences paved the way for similar strategies in other countries, among them Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, most recently, Chad.
Broadly, the aim of security packages is to reduce the level of insecurity and criminality in refugee camps and safeguard their civilian and humanitarian character. The packages increasingly contain specific references to a reduction in sexual and gender-based violence. They are linked to the deployment of specially trained police officers both in and around refugee settlements who collaborate with international Field Safety Advisors (FSAs). The FSAs also liaise with the law-enforcement authorities at the district and regional levels on all security matters, monitor the deployment of police officers and their performance, and participate in the training of new police contingents. Ideally the underlying agreement with the host government also includes commitments to instruct both refugees and hosts on the refugee-related laws and regulations in the country as well as international refugee law. Security packages may be linked to provisions for joint screening and the separation of armed combatants from refugees.
The responsibilities of police in such packages include the disarmament of refugees prior to their admission to camps; the maintenance of controls to prevent the entry of arms into camps; and the identification, arrest and prosecution of criminals. The hope is that their presence alongside humanitarian actors may deter criminal or rebel activity, besides providing recourse to law when crimes are committed. Law-enforcement personnel may include national police, paramilitary forces and refugee security guards. Where such a presence does not exist, the problems are all too apparent. In Nepal, it is very difficult to get the police or members of a joint-security force to a refugee camp at night – the area around the camps is considered too insecure.[23] With the police reluctant to show up, crime in the camps has increased.
Another challenge is that of aligning police practices with protection. It has been shown in both Guinea and Tanzania that when security forces are trained to understand refugee law and issues related to sexual and gender-based violence they are better able to provide camp security. Codes of conduct for the police are used to define appropriate behaviour and contribute to greater accountability within the force.
With proper supervision and training, security mechanisms that involve refugee guards, wardens, patrols and watch teams can be highly effective. But such teams can be successful in maintaining security and order only if their roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, and they have good relations with the host country's law-enforcement authorities. Refugee participation is seen in a system of refugee security volunteers (Sungu-sungus) in Tanzania, community-watch teams in Liberia and a neighbourhood-watch system in Ghana.[24]
In Zambia, which hosts Angolan and Congolese refugees, neighbourhood-watch programmes have led to a reduction in crime, the identification of armed elements and improvements in aid distribution. In Sierra Leone, the active cooperation of Liberian refugee wardens with the local police has improved camp security. Overall, refugee security mechanisms function effectively when they complement or supplement the general law-enforcement system of the host country. However, if not monitored properly, both such refugee-empowerment initiatives and the introduction of external police could lead to vigilante justice or harassment of less-powerful refugees.
In this context, attention must be paid to the criteria by which activities may be judged detrimental to the civilian and humanitarian character of camps in order to prevent arbitrary arrest or punishment. Finally, such programmes cannot succeed without continuous coordination, exchange of information and monitoring of performance.
Defining obligations and strengthening the rule of law
Because of the sometimes very different interests of the many actors involved in refugee security, statements of intent are essential if policies are to be effective. Indeed, they are an essential tool in defining obligations and responsibilities and in formalizing the commitments of all actors involved. Such declarations are generally followed by agreements outlining the rights and responsibilities of the various parties. They also provide a means by which international bodies can define the extent of their support for a host country. That support may include developmental and financial components, such as provisions for training, protection workshops, the payment of allowances and the donation of vehicles and communication equipment. The statements also reaffirm the host state's responsibility for promoting the best interests of the refugee population.
When primarily financed internationally, security packages help to acknowledge and reduce the burden on the host government. However, international funding can also create dependence on the part of the host state, sometimes generating unrealistic expectations. Moreover, in some security packages operational and legal lacunae have been identified in the processing of separated combatants and the management of facilities.
Ultimately, policing alone does not provide effective security, and the range of issues linked to security packages has expanded. UNHCR is now engaged in helping with reform of the legal sector and prisons in various countries. Measures under the soft end of the ladder are increasingly used to deal with the daily issues of physical protection relating to crime, low-level violence and harassment, particularly of women. At the same time, UNHCR is focusing less on issues related to the exclusion of those deemed not entitled to protection and separation of combatants. This is partly due to the political and practical difficulties associated with exclusion and separation processes, but it also reflects an awareness of the broader range of security threats affecting refugees and their hosts. This awareness was heightened following revelations of sexual violence and exploitation of refugee women and children in East and West Africa. Those revelations made it painfully evident that a security package has to be complemented by protection and community-service activities.
The deployment of poorly paid and undisciplined police and security forces may exacerbate security problems, sexual abuse and the looting of relief supplies. State capacities to safeguard refugee security cannot therefore be enhanced without bettering the quality of law enforcement and the judiciary and promulgating appropriate legislation. The judicial system has two primary roles: it continues and concludes the work of the police and it checks for potential flaws or abuse, tackling problems that may arise. The rule of law provides an impartial arbitrator in what are frequently emotionally or politically charged environments. Both refugees and locals are more likely to feel that justice is done if they have access to a fair and impartial judicial system.
Beyond training and material support, in some cases accessibility to justice has been improved by the introduction of mobile courts which convene periodically in a camp, or through the construction of new courts close to refugee-populated areas. In this respect there is a need to ensure that refugees are aware of their rights and the appropriate channels to turn to when these rights have been disregarded. They must also be made aware of their obligations to conform to the laws of the country of refuge and abstain from actions that would compromise the security and neutrality of their camp or settlement.
 Security and refugee protection |
Notes
18. J. Crisp, 'A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya', New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 16, UNHCR, Geneva, 1999, p. 13, footnote 36.
19. United Nations, Resolution 1208 adopted by the Security Council at its 3954th meeting on 19 November 1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1208 (1998), 19 November 1998; United Nations, Resolution 1296 adopted by the Security Council at its 4130th meeting on 19 April 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1296 (2000), 19 April 2000.
20. UNHCR, Regional Symposium on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum, Refugee Status and other Locations, Pretoria, Southern Africa, 26-27 February, 2001, p. 2, www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/global-consultations.
21. UNHCR, 'The Security, and Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and Settlements', Executive Committee Doc, EC/49/SC/INF.2, 14 January 1999, pp. 2-4; UNHCR, 'The Security, Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and Settlements: Operationalizing the "Ladder of Options",' in Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.19, no. 1, 2000, pp. 93-8.
22. W. Lewis, E. Marks and R. Perito, 'Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations', Special Report 85, US Institute of Peace, April 22, 2002, p. 3.
23. UNHCR, 2004 Annual Protection Report: Nepal, p. 2.
24. R. da Costa, 'Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum', Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Department of International Protection, UNHCR, June 2004, p. 63.
HTML PAGE CONTENTS
The complete digital edition of The State of the World's Refugees 2006 – including maps, photos and statistical annexes not reproduced in these pages – is available in pdf format via the main Table of Contents page here.