Over the past decade the international community has paid more attention to emergency preparedness to improve the quality of its response to crises. Self-examination has been a part of this process. The 1996 inter-agency evaluation of the humanitarian response in Rwanda pointed out that aid agencies lacked consistent working definitions of preparedness measures and contingency planning. The report noted that it was important to conceive preparedness broadly to include the advance placement of key technical and logistics staff and adequate mapping and communications equipment.[6]

Some progress has been made, and is reflected in an increase in the number of professionals with emergency-response expertise on humanitarian rosters. User-friendly and efficient emergency procedures and clear standards and guidelines have been instituted. Emergency supplies have been stockpiled, with stand-by purchase arrangements and delivery mechanisms that can be activated rapidly to ensure rapid deployment. Such pre-positioning occurs at the international and regional levels, though the latter tends to have more limited stockpiles.[7] UNHCR has its international stockpiles in Copenhagen and Abu Dhabi and a few regional ones in Africa to cover 500,000 people. Required items can be airlifted within 48 hours in the event of an emergency.[8]

For an emergency involving half a million people UNHCR can deploy between 60 and 125 international staff, depending on the needs and capacities of governments, host communities and partner organizations.[9] Such teams ideally possess the required technical expertise, experience, language skills and gender balance and can be mobilized within 72 hours.[10] This enhanced capacity was well-demonstrated by the rapid response to the tsunami of 2004. However, delays in responding to the crisis in Sudan's Darfur region and the influx of refugees into neighbouring Chad demonstrate that gaps remain.[11]

Early-warning mechanisms and contingency-planning processes provide situation-specific preparedness at the national and regional levels. The contingency-planning process envisions different scenarios on the basis of possible political developments and potential displacement patterns. These are then combined with estimates of staffing and technical need, funding requirements and a demarcation of the responsibilities of different agencies. Lines of authority and communication are specified to ensure smooth coordination. Early warning mechanisms have failed in the past because they were based upon most likely, rather than worst case, scenarios.

Though of crucial importance, the maintenance of a high level of preparedness requires the diversion of resources away from ongoing activities. This can be particularly onerous when agencies face funding shortages and no major emergencies are visible on the horizon to provide immediate justification for the diversion of resources. The dilemma of choosing whether resources should be allocated to emergency-response mechanisms or to regular functions surfaces time and again. It was seen during the Kosovo emergency, when budget cuts had a negative effect on UNHCR's emergency capacity.[12]

Ideally, early warning would lead to interventions that mitigate conflict and halt human rights violations. During the 1990s, alongside its humanitarian operations, UNHCR played an increasingly important role in international political negotiations and exerted leverage over states.[13] Since 2000, the early-warning task force of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has been at the forefront in keeping track of political developments that could require high-level interventions.

The government of the country affected by an emergency has the primary responsibility and authority to coordinate and direct international assistance. As was highlighted in the response to the Asian tsunami, the international community does not always adhere to the principle of subsidiarity – whereby larger multilateral institutions do not take on tasks that can be adequately performed by local or regional organizations – during the initial stages of the humanitarian effort.[14] International humanitarian organizations are expected to meet basic needs when governments cannot – or will not for political reasons.[15] This calls for efforts to strengthen the preparedness of regional and sub-regional organizations, which can also operate as part of an effective early warning system.[16]

Historical overview

Nature of the response

Notes

6. J. Eriksson with contributions by H. Adelman, J. Borton, H. Christensen, K. Kumar, A. Suhrke, D. Tardif-Douglin, S. Villumstad and L. Wohlgemuth, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Synthesis Report, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen, 1996, p. 52.

7. Fritz Institute, 'Logistics and the Effective Delivery of Humanitarian Relief', San Francisco, 2005, p. 9.

8. UNHCR, 'Strengthening UNHCR's Emergency Response Capacity', p. 7.

9. Ibid., p. 5.

10. Ibid.

11. United Nations, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations, General Assembly Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/60/87-E/2005/78, 23 June 2005, p. 6.

12. A. Suhrke, M. Barutciski, R. Garlock and P. Sandison, 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response', Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, Geneva, 2000, p. x.

13. G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, p. 14.

14. UNHCR, 'Strengthening UNHCR's Emergency Response Capacity', p. 6.

15. S. Vieira de Mello, 'Empowerment, Responsibility and Accountability', in Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Humanitarian Action in the Twenty First Century, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, New York, 2000, p. 11.

16. G. Dunkley, M. Kunieda and A. Tokuri, 'The Tokyo eCentre and Jakarta Partnership: Evaluation of UNHCR's Contribution to Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning and Disaster Management in the Asia Pacific region (2000-2003)', Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, Geneva, 2004, pp. 7-8, 46-7.