Changes in the humanitarian sector in the 1990s, such as the bilateralization of aid, uneven funding, an increase in operations in conflict areas and a proliferation of actors have had a significant impact on the nature of humanitarian response. While

the overlap between humanitarian and political agendas has always shaped relief responses, a shift towards greater unilateral interventionism in some countries has led to greater synchronization of their political, military and humanitarian objectives.[38] In some cases decisions concerning emergency responses have been driven by media attention and public opinion.

Funding

The post-Cold War era witnessed a major restructuring of aid budgets among principal donors, partly due to demands for more transparency regarding public expenditures. Generally, international emergency response has remained the preserve of large Western agencies and the United Nations. In some Western countries attempts at greater coherence between political and humanitarian action has led to significant changes in humanitarian policy.[39] Indeed, in some cases humanitarian assistance has been used as a tool of state policy rather than to support conflict prevention and resolution.[40]

As a result of the linking of states' political and humanitarian agendas, total aid budgets have increased since the beginning of the 1990s – but the proportion available to multilateral agencies has gone down. The demands for increased accountability and the conflation of political and humanitarian agendas have prompted some donors to use aid funds to promote their own visibility, especially at the field level. Indeed, the tendency of many donors to work outside the UN system in the Kosovo crisis is widely believed to have had a negative impact on multilateral humanitarian institutions.[41]

Meanwhile, disparities in funding seriously question international impartiality. Aid budgets have multiplied where states' strategic and humanitarian interests overlap, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, while they have been squeezed in other crisis areas. For instance, in the Kosovo emergency of 1999 the quality and quantity of aid delivered far outstripped that provided to refugees in many African countries.[42] The impact of state interests on humanitarian response was also illustrated by the case of Iraq, for which a funding appeal was launched at a time when other equally – if not more – urgent crises were under-funded.[43]

In addition to contingency planning, preparedness and joint needs assessments, the principal mechanism for achieving a multilateral coordinated response is the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Consolidated appeals are consistently under-funded, even though donors declare their commitment to the process. In 2004, only 60 per cent of humanitarian assistance requested by the CAP was actually received.[44] Moreover, the high degree of earmarking of funds by donors precludes the allocation of resources in proportion to need. This forces UNHCR and other UN agencies to constantly reprioritize their proposed activities at the cost of adherence to their respective mandates, and on occasion introduces or increases competition between agencies.[45]

For their part, donors have important concerns about the effectiveness of responses and the lack of institutional learning, leading to demands for greater accountability. This has resulted in more evaluation studies, as well as numerous manuals and guidelines on good practice.[46] Some of these evaluations have adopted a participatory approach, including consultations with refugees and humanitarian workers at different stages of the process.[47] Ultimately, however, the accountability agenda must be driven by humanitarian principles and the needs of displaced persons rather than donor interests.[48]

The role of the military

The increased role of military forces in humanitarian emergencies has been received as a mixed blessing. In many emergencies such forces have turned out to be crucial in getting help to insecure and difficult-to-access areas. Military forces tend to be highly skilled, organized and well equipped. During the Kosovo crisis, they took on the critical task of constructing shelters for the large number of refugees. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, local and international military forces were hailed for their assistance in helping get aid to those affected by the disaster.

Authoritative coordination by military commands can facilitate a rapid response, then gradually make way to a consensual one driven by the host government and humanitarian actors. Partnerships with military actors can be of crucial importance to ensure security and direct access to affected populations, as well as to separate militants and other elements that pose a security threat. Increasingly, such operations are conducted in failed (or failing) states which are experiencing high levels of insecurity.

But the linking of humanitarian agencies with military forces has resulted in a dilution of the former's neutrality in insecure and politically charged environments. Humanitarian workers have been facing more violence and intimidation. Between July 2003 and July 2004 at least 100 civilian United Nations and NGO personnel were killed.[49] Such violence often triggers the suspension of operations and evacuation of humanitarian workers, halting the critical flow of aid. Since the presence of humanitarian agencies often affords civilians a degree of security, attacks against aid workers have consequently reduced this basic level of protection.[50]

Nature of the response

Challenges ahead

Notes

38. A. Harmer and J. Macrae, 'Humanitarian Action and the "Global War on Terror": A Review of Trends and Issues', HPG Briefing Paper, no. 9, Overseas Development Institute, London, July 2003, p. 4.

39. J. Macrae and N. Leader, 'Shifting Sands: The Search for "Coherence" between Political and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies,' HPG Report 8, Overseas Development Institute, London, August 2000, p. 4.

40. Ibid.

41. J. Macrae and N. Leader, 'The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,' HPG Briefing, no. 1, Overseas Development Institute, London, July 2000, p. 5.

42. A. Suhrke et al., 'The Kosovo Refugee Crisis', p. x.

43. A. Donini, L. Minear and P. Walker, 'The Future of Humanitarian Action: Mapping the Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises', Disasters, vol. 28, no. 2, 2004, pp. 260-72.

44. OCHA Business Contributions to the UN Emergency Relief Efforts: An Orientation Guide. ochaonline2.un.org/OCHAonline/ochabusinessguid
/Impact ofCrises/tabid/296/Default.aspx 14/10/2005.

45. J. Borton et al., 'Support to Internally Displaced Persons', pp. 17-18.

46. For example, in 2000 the Sphere Project published a handbook, The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, which was revised in 2004.

47. G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst, 'Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance in Emergency Situations', Working Paper No. 56, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, Geneva, 2002, pp. 4-5.

48. United Nations, 'Humanitarian Response Review', an independent report commissioned by the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York and Geneva, 2005, p. 9.

49. C. Buchanan and R. Muggah, 'No Relief: Surveying the Effects of Gun Violence on Humanitarian and Development Personnel', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 2005, pp. 7-9.

50. Ibid.