In her book The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s, Sadako Ogata describes UNHCR's initial hesitance to accept military cover for its humanitarian activities and its subsequent recognition of the importance of such support. Without it, UNHCR would not have been able to get supplies to displaced people in central Bosnia, undertake the Sarajevo airlift or make airdrops to besieged towns and villages.[37] Similarly, in Afghanistan in 2001, relief agencies found that working with the military benefited displaced populations: the WFP was able to position millions of metric tons of food in surrounding countries, truck them inside Afghanistan and thereby avert widespread famine. In Liberia in 2003, UN troops helped UNHCR to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons from public buildings in Monrovia to proper camps or settlements.

But humanitarian involvement with the military comes at a price. For the ICRC the cardinal principles of impartiality and neutrality, which aid agencies are bound to uphold, are compromised by 'blending' humanitarian action with military operations. NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières have pointed out that unless military and humanitarian action are separate, humanitarian workers can become identified with one side to the conflict, endangering both aid deliveries and humanitarian staff. Reportedly, camps of displaced persons in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia became military targets when NATO involved itself in setting up tents and providing camp security. In Afghanistan, humanitarian workers were put in danger when Western military forces, wearing civilian clothes, did humanitarian and development work.

Nonetheless, it has become clear that the complete independence of humanitarian and military action is not possible in most emergencies, and may even prove perilous to the displaced populations the international community is trying to protect. In the words of Major-General William Nash, a veteran of the Balkan wars, 'Although the demand for independent humanitarian action is admirable, more important is an effective strategy to assist those who are in need'.[38] The importance of humanitarian, development and military actors working together has led UN agencies and a number of NGOs to call for better communication with military actors, including sharing of information and joint planning and strategizing. Currently, the United Nations is studying how best to organize 'integrated missions'.[39]

Since the 1990s, UN Security Council resolutions have called upon peacekeepers to undertake a variety of protection responsibilities for the internally displaced, ranging from facilitating the delivery of relief and establishing and maintaining secure humanitarian areas to ensuring protection in camps, monitoring and reporting the conditions of the displaced and enabling their safe return home. Whether in the Balkans, the DRC, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Timor Leste, peacekeepers have been specifically charged with providing assistance or protection to internally displaced persons. Most recently, African Union troops have been called upon to enhance security for internally displaced persons in Darfur, Sudan (see Box 7.2).

But the record has been mixed. Whereas peacekeeping forces have generally been effective in preventing mass starvation by ensuring delivery and distribution of food through logistical support, they have been less effective when it comes to protecting the physical security of the internally displaced and other affected populations. In most cases, UN forces have not had enough troops to provide adequate protection, clear mandates to allow them to engage in robust action or the necessary training and equipment to do their jobs adequately. The lack of political will in the Security Council often contributed to this outcome.

An outstanding exception was Iraq in 1991, where multinational forces succeeded in creating a safe haven for internally displaced Kurds under attack in the wake of the Gulf War. This refuge existed for more than a decade. But in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the overrunning of the 'safe area' of Srebrenica in 1995 stands as one of the most ignominious examples of the international failure to provide protection to internally displaced persons. So too is what happened in Kibeho, Rwanda that same year, when UN forces stood by while several thousand internally displaced persons in camps were killed by the Rwandan army. Worse yet, earlier in this decade UN peacekeepers in the DRC and Sierra Leone were raping and sexually exploiting internally displaced women and children they were supposed to protect – using humanitarian supplies as bait.

Despite these well-publicized failures, there remain many instances where peacekeepers have provided security for displaced populations in internal conflict situations. East Timor, where a multinational force saved many lives and enabled the return of tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, is a good example. In Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique and Rwanda, peacekeeping troops effectively facilitated the return of displaced persons. A 2004 report on the role of peacekeepers with internally displaced persons identified impressive 'best practices' in different countries in protecting the internally displaced.[40] In particular, military training has begun to focus on how to protect internally displaced persons, greater efforts are being made to deploy civilian police, protection mandates have been strengthened, and in some instances peacekeepers have taken a bolder approach toward protecting civilians. The United Nations also has begun to implement its 'zero tolerance' policy toward sexual exploitation.

But fundamental problems remain. Most internally displaced persons in need of protection are in Africa, yet most of the UN peacekeeping missions deployed there are understaffed and without sufficient resources. Even in the DRC, where 16,700 troops are on the ground, the mission is reported to have insufficient resources to fulfil its mandate, which includes protecting internally displaced persons in camps. Moreover, developed countries with well-trained, experienced and heavily-armed troops have been proving increasingly unwilling to offer their forces or resources to UN operations when their national interests are not at stake – currently less than 10 per cent of peacekeepers come from Western armies.[41] Nor is there agreement among the major powers on creating a standing UN force that could be rapidly deployed in emergencies both for prevention and protection. Heads of government at the World Summit urged only the 'further development of proposals' to build up reserves for rapid deployment, although they endorsed a standing police capacity which could prove valuable in protection.[42]

Military intervention and humanitarian relief alone, however, are but stopgap measures. They can never substitute for the political settlements needed to resolve the conflicts that produce internal displacement. When peacekeepers and humanitarian workers are left on the front lines without efforts to resolve these conflicts, they can even unwittingly prolong them. Therefore, strong leadership is needed both from UN headquarters and from the international community to manage and mediate disputes and lay the foundation for transitions out of conflict.

Institutional arrangements: the 'collaborative approach'

The road ahead

Notes

37. S. Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s, W.W. Norton & Co., New York/London, 2005, pp. 50-171.

38. Major-General W. L. Nash (Ret.) at a meeting on 'Independent Humanitarian Action: A Thing of the Past?' Brookings Institution, 16 April 2004.

39. See for example a recent study commissioned by the UN, prepared by E. B. Eide, A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent and K. von Hippel, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, May 2005.

40. See W. G. O'Neill, A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally Displaced, Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, April 2004, pp. 6-7, 8-9, 24-39.

41. M. Lacey, 'UN Forces Using Tougher Tactics to Secure Peace', New York Times, 23 May 2005.

42. United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 92-3.