The brutal campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' waged in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Balkan wars caused the largest uprooting of populations in Europe since the Second World War. Three months following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence in 1992, the number of Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons soared to 2.6 million. While media coverage was extensive and humanitarian assistance quick to reach needy populations, the international community proved reluctant to address the root causes of the problem or to act militarily to stem the fighting. Instead, it concentrated on sustaining an enormous emergency-relief operation, led by UNHCR. This emphasis on material relief undoubtedly saved many lives. But it did not prevent the forcible uprooting of people from their homes, mass murder and mass rape; nor did it thwart the establishment of concentration camps in which displaced men were starved and beaten as a prelude to 'ethnic cleansing'.

The Bosnia operation was one of the largest relief initiatives ever undertaken. Between 1992 and 1995, UNHCR and its partner NGOs delivered approximately 950,000 metric tons of humanitarian assistance to 2.7 million beneficiaries. UNHCR's role expanded from that of an agency whose sole purpose was to secure asylum for refugees and prevent involuntary return to one of providing humanitarian assistance to large numbers of internally displaced persons and other war-affected people. For the first time, it was called upon to operate in an active war zone where its staff faced unprecedented security risks. The effectiveness with which UNHCR handled this role prompted many subsequent calls for it to enlarge its mandate and take on the protection and assistance of both refugees and internally displaced persons in emergencies (see Box 7.3).

But UNHCR also came under heavy criticism. The organization thought that if it maintained a 'presence', it would be able to effectively monitor human rights abuses and offer protection to vulnerable populations. While it did manage to take a number of steps to protect the civilian population, its presence did not, and could not, stop the atrocities. Moreover, when it helped evacuate people from life-threatening circumstances it was accused of being an accomplice to 'ethnic cleansing'. Critics also charged that UNHCR's involvement with in-country protection was enabling neighbouring states to stem refugee movements into their countries, although hundreds of thousands of Bosnians were given temporary refuge in European nations.

The humanitarian relief effort was also seen as an alibi and excuse for the international community, allowing it to be seen as doing something without actually having to confront those carrying out ethnic cleansing. Security Council resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina – all 46 of them – failed to address the underlying causes of the conflict, concentrating instead on sustaining the humanitarian operation and on creating UN-protected safe areas – without, however, giving the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the mandate, equipment or resources to defend adequately the six Muslim enclaves created. The failure to protect displaced persons in the safe areas was epitomized at Srebrenica, when UNPROFOR stood by as Serb forces overran the safe area and marched off and murdered at least 7,000 Muslim men and boys.

This horrific event became a rallying cry for those opposed to the notion of 'helping people where they are' and who rejected out-of-hand the creation of safe areas in subsequent wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ironically, in those wars safe areas might have been better defended and saved many lives.

It was not until July 1995 that the international community finally undertook the type of decisive military action that was required in the Balkans. When the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in November of that year, approximately 1.3 million Bosnians remained internally displaced. Since that time, an exceptional international effort to implement the right of displaced people and refugees to return to their homes has resulted in 1 million returns. However, the plight of a significant number of internally displaced persons remains unresolved, in particular those who would be minorities in areas of return.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was a cauldron of experience from which four lessons can be learned. The first is that a humanitarian effort should never be allowed to serve as a substitute for political or military solutions. Protection should be a prerequisite for assistance, since it makes little sense to provide emergency relief to besieged populations only for them to be killed by belligerents. The second is that the trauma of Srebrenica should not be allowed to paralyse all future initiatives to try to protect people in their own countries. Safe areas should be considered for displaced persons when military forces have the capability to protect them. The vast majority of people in most emergencies cannot get out of their countries and need international protection as badly as, if not more than, refugees. Third, a lead humanitarian agency to take charge in an emergency could be useful in dealing with displaced populations. That UNHCR was able to act swiftly and deal comprehensively with all affected populations, whether refugees, internally displaced persons or others, has been thoroughly documented. The fourth and final lesson is that far greater attention must be paid to preventive measures. If the international community had spent as much time devising a plan to stop the war as it spent distributing aid, fewer people would have been uprooted and many more lives could have been saved.

The road ahead

Box 7.2 Darfur: the challenge of protecting the internally displaced