A multitude of international organizations offer protection to internally displaced persons and help them with aid for reintegration and development. First come the various UN agencies, ranging from UNHCR to UNICEF to OCHA. Others in the field are the ICRC, the International Organization for Migration and many NGOs. The overall UN response is the responsibility of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, who heads OCHA. Since 1997 he has served as the United Nations' 'focal point' for internally displaced persons. In addition, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons serves as principal 'advocate' for the internally displaced.

Under this 'collaborative approach', all agencies share the responsibility for responding to situations of internal displacement. The system was decided upon by default. Neither the political will nor the resources existed to create a new agency to address the needs of the internally displaced. Such a new entity, it was feared, would duplicate the work of other agencies and almost certainly meet with opposition from governments that object to international involvement with their displaced populations. A second, frequently suggested option – the enlargement of UNHCR's mandate to enable it to assume the responsibility – was also rejected (see Box 7.3). The scale of the problem, it was argued, was too large for one agency. Even the 'lead agency' option, in which one agency assumes the main role in the field (see Box 7.1), was largely sidelined by the collaborative approach, which substituted coordination by the Emergency Relief Coordinator at headquarters and by Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) in the field.

Most UN and independent evaluations have found the collaborative approach inadequate to the task and difficult to implement.[25] Critics charge that UN agencies regularly resist coordination and that there is no real centre of responsibility for the displaced in the field. 'Co-heads are no-heads,' quipped Richard Holbrooke, former US Ambassador to the United Nations, after visiting camps for internally displaced persons in Angola.[26] Critics also point to the lack of predictability, since the different agencies basically pick and choose the situations in which they wish to become involved on the basis of their mandates, resources and interests. For instance, most agencies rushed to South and Southeast Asia to help those displaced by the 2004 tsunami, but only a limited international presence could be mobilized for northern Uganda, where tens of thousands of children are at risk each night of abduction or maiming. The Humanitarian Coordinator lacks both the authority and resources to assign responsibilities. His only tool is persuasion. But can 'persuasion without authority over budgets and operations' be sufficient, asks Georgetown University's Susan Martin.[27]

In response to these widely publicized deficiencies, a special office was created in OCHA in 2002, devoted exclusively to internal displacement. Upgraded to a division in 2004 – the Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD) – and with staff largely drawn from the different international agencies, it has sought to ensure that UN agencies in the field, under the leadership of RC/HCs, develop and implement a strategic action plan to meet the needs of internally displaced persons. To help with this, the IDD put together a policy package on the internally displaced which all the major agencies and NGOs agreed to.[28]

But ensuring the implementation of action plans around the world soon proved to be beyond the capacity of one small non-operational office. The cooperation of the powerful operational agencies was needed to develop and carry out the plans. Yet there was no agreed division of labour among agencies, so that at the beginning of each new emergency it was unclear which agency or combination of agencies would become involved and which responsibilities they would assume.

To rectify this, the IDD came up with a proposal for a 'sectoral' approach, whereby agencies would be expected to carve out areas of responsibility (e.g. protection, camp coordination and management, emergency shelter, nutrition, water and sanitation) based on their expertise, and fulfil them in emergencies.

The most challenging sector by far is protection. While agencies regularly provide food, medicine and shelter to internally displaced persons, they are not well equipped to defend the physical safety and human rights of those endangered. Providing material aid while ignoring the fact that the displaced are being beaten, raped or killed too often leads to the tragic description of the victims as the 'well-fed dead' (see Box 7.1). Where national protection does not exist, international agencies may be called upon to set up early warning systems, negotiate access with governments and insurgent groups, deploy staff among threatened communities and protect women and children from rape and abduction. They may also be called on to arrange relocations and evacuations, intercede with authorities to assure that the displaced are not forcibly returned to conditions of danger, or accompany the displaced home.

These initiatives go beyond the mandates and expertise of most international field staff. Still, many are trying to enhance protection by reporting protection problems, becoming more engaged with the displaced and designing assistance programmes in ways that reinforce protection. They have also been working more closely with displaced communities to build the latter's coping skills. But the dangers are considerable. In some emergencies in recent years more aid workers have been attacked or killed than peacekeepers. This has sometimes led to assistance by 'remote control' (i.e., through local organizations) which has diminished protection, whether in Chechnya, Iraq or Somalia.[29]

Only two agencies, the ICRC and UNHCR, have a specific legal mandate to carry out protection work. But even here there are limits. ICRC cannot always become involved in situations below the threshold of armed conflict – and sometimes is denied entry into conflict areas. UNHCR's mandate focuses primarily on refugees and restricts its involvement with the internally displaced under criteria which can range from a specific request from the Secretary-General and the agreement of the state concerned to adequate resources or a 'link factor' to refugees.

Given UNHCR's long experience in protecting uprooted populations (see Box 7.3), on 12 September 2005 the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee assigned it lead responsibility for the protection of the internally displaced (as well as responsibility for camp management and emergency shelter). Its enlarged protection role will require it to ensure that joint steps are taken by all agencies in the field to enhance the security of the displaced. Special partnerships will be needed with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has largely stayed clear of operational engagement with internally displaced persons, and UNICEF, whose protection role with internally displaced children could be strengthened. A protection policy paper adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee sets forth in detail the protection steps international agencies can take.[30] Currently under discussion are ideas for 'protection coalitions', 'interagency mobile protection advisory teams' as well as a 'protection standby force'.[31]

UNHCR will also have to navigate a collaborative system that often resists involvement with the security and human rights of internally displaced persons. As the Brookings-OCHA study, Protect or Neglect, found, the majority of RC/HCs, who direct the collaborative response in the field, are reluctant 'to advocate for the rights of the displaced in an effective and assertive manner'.[32] Many fear that doing so could compromise their relationships with governments, threaten relief programmes or even lead to their expulsion. Moreover, RC/HCs in many countries report to Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who often put political concerns over humanitarian and human rights objectives.[33]

Despite the obvious limits on the role outsiders can play in providing protection, how the humanitarian community deals with this major gap in the international response system will in large measure determine whether the collaborative approach will be successful or whether alternative arrangements will be needed.

The effectiveness of the collaborative approach will also depend on adequate resources. The UN's Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for emergencies now targets internally displaced persons. But the amounts allotted are often insufficient, and when it comes to protection and human rights initiatives, woefully inadequate.[34] Donors often lavish aid on areas of the world in which they have strategic interests, such as Afghanistan, the Balkans or Iraq, but seriously underfund humanitarian crises, especially in Africa, where the needs of vulnerable populations may be far greater.[35] Calls for international trust funds for emergency action and post-conflict reconstruction continue to be under discussion. In 2005 the World Summit approved the expansion of the UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) to enable UN humanitarian organizations to receive 'instant' funds when a new disaster strikes and to inject 'equity' into the system.[36]

Applying the Guiding Principles

The role of the military

Notes

25. See United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, which reports on the results of four major studies on the collaborative approach, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/77, 4 March 2004, paras. 24-33.

26. R. Holbrooke, 'Forgotten people: a borderline difference', The Washington Post, 8 May, 2000.

27. S. Martin, Refugee Women, 2nd edition, Lexington Books, pp. 154-5.

28. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations of Internal Displacement: Guidance for UN Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams, September 2004.

29. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, No Refuge, pp. 42-3.

30. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Policy Paper Series, No. 2, New York, United Nations, 2000.

31. S. Bagshaw and D. Paul, Protect or Neglect: Towards a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p. 10, www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/
protection_survey.htm.

32. S. Bagshaw and D. Paul, Protect or Neglect, p.4.

33. R. Cohen, 'UNHCR: Expanding its Role with IDPs', Forced Migration Review, Supplement, October 2005, p. 10.

34. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, No Refuge, pp. 65-6, and S. Bagshaw and D. Paul, Protect or Neglect, pp. 75-6.

35. Refugees International, 'Funding shortfalls plague global humanitarian response', 13 June 2005.

36. J. Egeland, 'Towards a stronger humanitarian response system', Forced Migration Review, October 2005, p.5.