The Darfur emergency has been called the world's 'worst humanitarian disaster' by UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland. It is a case study of how difficult it is to protect internally displaced persons when their own government has caused the displacement and fails to comply with UN resolutions to provide security. As in Bosnia and Herzegovina a decade earlier (see Box 7.1), the international response in Darfur has largely focused on providing emergency relief. There are more than 11,000 humanitarian workers on the ground in Darfur, but fewer than 100 staff with protection responsibilities, and only a few thousand lightly armed African Union troops with a weak mandate for protection. Recalling how in Bosnia and Herzegovina civilians watched the aid trucks roll in while their neighbours were gunned down, Secretary-General Annan in April 2005 asked: 'Are we now going to stand by and watch a replay in Darfur?'

The crisis in Sudan's western region began in 2003 with an attack on government military outposts by insurgents of the Fur, Masselit and Zaghawa tribes. Their immediate grievance was government favouritism toward Arab herdsmen who were increasingly encroaching on black African farmlands. More fundamentally, the rebels saw an opportunity in the ongoing north-south peace process in Sudan to demand for Darfur the same power and wealth sharing arrangements that black African tribes in the south and centre of the country were obtaining from the Sudanese national authorities.

The government response was swift and brutal. With helicopters and troops supported by Arab militias (the Janjaweed) on the ground, the military set upon the three black African communities, killed up to 70,000 men and deliberately drove from their homes more than 2 million people, most of whom became internally displaced, while 200,000 became refugees in neighbouring Chad. Janjaweed militias then burned their villages, poisoned the wells and killed animals in a scorched-earth campaign reminiscent of the tactics used in earlier years against the black African tribes of the south.

From 2003 to the present, the number of deaths from starvation, disease and violence in Darfur is estimated at more than 350,000. Almost 2 million people live in squalid camps, totally dependent on international aid and with little or no prospect of returning home due to the insecurity and destruction in their homeland areas. Although overall violence has decreased, military and Janjaweed attacks on black African farming communities and camps of internally displaced people still continue.

International assistance with little protection

The main international achievement to date has been to assure the delivery of humanitarian relief. In July 2004, the UN Security Council demanded an end to the government's obstruction of humanitarian organizations. In an unprecedented move, the UN Secretary-General and other international leaders travelled to the area to reinforce the point. As a result the government lifted most of its restrictions on humanitarian organizations and signed an agreement with the United Nations. By the end of 2004, large-scale famine had been avoided, epidemics contained and malnutrition reduced among many of those in the camps for displaced persons. Food distribution and healthcare were also enhanced. Humanitarian organizations were criticized for being slow to react to the emergency, but by mid-2005 the number of people receiving international food aid exceeded 2 million. However, aid agencies continue to lack access to hundreds of thousands in rural areas under insurgent control.

Far less progress has been made in the area of protection. When the government refused to comply with Security Council requests to stop attacks on the civilian population, little or no effort was made to enforce the resolutions. The government failed to disarm the Janjaweed, cease helicopter assaults on villages or end the forcible returns of internally displaced persons to their home areas. In addition, some armed groups have been actively seeking to hinder relief and monitoring activities. Yet the Security Council failed to agree on sanctions other than symbolic ones such as travel bans and asset freezes. A no-fly zone was not introduced, nor was a UN protection force created. Arab and Islamic governments opposed pressure on the Sudanese government, while China, the main foreign investor in Sudan's oil industry, threatened to use its veto. Russia, a key supplier of arms, also opposed strong action. Even the United States and European Union did not wish to press the Sudanese government too far, fearing that doing so could jeopardize the signing and implementation of the peace agreement between north and south ending two decades of civil war.

A regional solution

In the absence of international willingness to act, the African Union came forward to try to stop the violence. Indeed, 'African solutions for African problems' became a rallying cry and also proved more acceptable to the Sudanese government. Initially, the Union sent in several hundred unarmed observers under the banner of the African Mission to Sudan, or AMIS, to monitor the April 2004 ceasefire between the Darfur rebels and the government. But it also expanded its forces and mandate in response to the violence against the civilian population. Specifically, it sent in troops and police to contribute to enhancing security throughout Darfur. It indicated that it would monitor and verify security around camps of displaced persons and in areas of their return, protect civilians under imminent threat, protect humanitarian operations and, through its visible military presence, try to deter armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.

But the language was couched in caveats. AMIS was supposed to protect civilians, but only if it had the resources and the military capability. In fact, it was able to field only 2,700 military observers, troops and police to Darfur (an area the size of France) and could deploy police in only one camp. It has few aircraft or vehicles to transport its police and troops, and insufficient communication facilities and other basic equipment. It has plans to expand its forces to 7,700 by September 2005 and to 12,300 by the spring of 2006, and Western countries have pledged funds and logistical support. But the process is slow, the numbers are small, and the mandate far from robust.

Nonetheless, where AMIS has been present Janjaweed forays into camps of displaced persons have diminished, as have militia attacks on villages and sexual assaults against women gathering firewood and water. AMIS has also enlarged humanitarian access by escorting aid convoys, which in 2005 came under increasing attack, and plans to accompany international human rights observers on their monitoring missions.

International protection mechanisms

In July 2004, the Security Council called for the deployment of human rights observers to Darfur to report on violations, provide assistance to victims and work with local authorities and other actors to enhance the security of civilians. But by March 2005, only 16 were reported to be on the ground, together with 26 international staff with protection responsibilities. By the end of June, the number had risen to 41, but many were reported to have little experience in protection work, were not deployed around the country and often could not travel to areas of conflict where serious violations were occurring. All these factors highlighted the need to reinforce the capacity of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to respond rapidly and effectively in humanitarian emergencies.

Since no UN agency had a protection responsibility for internally displaced persons, none came forward to take the overall lead in the area of protection in all three provinces in Darfur. When the United Kingdom's Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, visited the area in June 2004, he found 'confusion and poor delivery' and observed that 'even now [after more than a year], internally displaced persons are not being protected adequately.' Similarly, UN evaluations acknowledged the failure of the collaborative approach to bring protection to internally displaced persons in Darfur. One notorious example was the management of the camps of displaced persons. The Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was unable to find any agency ready to manage the camps in Darfur. OCHA therefore had to turn the responsibility over to NGOs with little prior experience in camp management or protection and insufficient staff.

The Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin, wrote in the Forced Migration Review of May 2005 that 'it is obvious that UNHCR is the organization with the most experience and capacity to protect and assist persons displaced by armed conflict who are in camps or to organize IDP returns . . . Indeed, it is difficult to understand why there should not be at least a presumption that the High Commissioner for Refugees should assume responsibility in such situations.' Today, UNHCR is the lead agency for the protection and return of some 700,000 internally displaced persons in West Darfur, while IOM was given responsibility for North and South Darfur. But IOM's lack of a protection mandate and experience has led some to suggest that UNHCR should assume the entire responsibility.

Human rights advocates believe that the Security Council's decision to refer individual perpetrators of crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in Darfur to the International Criminal Court will help deter violence against civilians. However, the Sudanese government has rejected the Security Council decision and at the moment there is no assurance that perpetrators of genocide will actually be prosecuted by the court.

Opportunities

Despite the absence of strong international mechanisms to rely upon in internal crises such as Darfur's, there are still positive developments to build upon. One is the North-South peace agreement of January 2005, which offers the possibility of a political resolution of the crisis. The accord provides for the sharing of power and wealth between the Arab government in Khartoum and the black African tribes of the south as well as with other ethnic groups at war with the government. Were the African Union and the United Nations to persuade the government and rebels to extend this agreement to Darfur, it could help resolve the issues at the root of the conflict. Sudan's new unity government, installed in July 2005, has promised to promote a fair and just settlement in Darfur. The designation of Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, as the African Union's Special Envoy to South Sudan has also raised the prospects for peace.

Strengthening the African Union's protection role offers another opportunity to address the crisis. Expanding its forces and mandate could not only enhance security for the displaced but also make possible their return; it would enable them to plant and grow crops and thereby reduce their dependency on international aid. This will require substantial resources and technical support from major donors, but without such steps, the Darfur crisis could become, in the words of Suliman Baldo of the International Crisis Group, 'another never-ending conflict in which donors spend large sums feeding the displaced but otherwise fail to protect civilians and to address the underlying political causes.'

Box 7.1 Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina

Box 7.3 Should UNHCR become a 'displacement agency'?