SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

After consultations between the Regional Bureau for Africa and the (then) Central Evaluation Section, the following terms of reference were agreed for an evaluation review of the Repatriation or Movement Phase of the Mozambique Repatriation Operation, to be supplemented at a later stage by an evaluation of the Reintegration Phase:

·               The overall objectives of this part of the evaluation will be (1) to examine the extent to which lessons learned from previous related evaluations were incorporated into the planning process for the Mozambique repatriation, (2) to identify additional lessons learned from this operation, and (3) to examine the relevance of those lessons to the planning and implementation of repatriation programmes elsewhere in the world.

·               The review will examine, inter alia, the range of repatriation methods used in this operation, including spontaneous, semi and fully organised return, as well as different modes of travel, including train, truck and boat.  Cost-effectiveness of the various options will be reviewed, taking into account the political parameters.

·               Original planning assumptions will be assessed against actual accomplishments, in particular with regard to the effectiveness of efforts made to minimise investment in logistics in favour of productive expenditure on initial reintegration activities.  Linkages made between movement and initial reintegration, in the both planning and implementation phases, will be also be examined.

·               The operation will also be examined from a structural perspective, focussing particularly on linkages between Headquarters and the field, links between countries of first asylum and the country of origin, as well as regional coordination.  The use of human resources in this operation will also be assessed.

The terms of reference were referred to and accepted by the Branch Offices in the region, one of which, BO Harare, suggested that the following areas of concern also be addressed :

-               Review of the VRF and its use.

-               Evaluation of tripartite agreements and negotiations leading to these agreements.

-               Registration for voluntary repatriation

-               Computerization of registration results

-               Information campaign

-               Mine awareness campaign

-               Durable solutions for especially vulnerable individuals

-               Post-creation and deployment of staff

It was further agreed by BO Maputo[1] that the evaluation of the repatriation phase should concentrate on countries of asylum ‘without leaving Mozambique out entirely’.

The evaluation was conducted through discussions with the Coordinator and other staff members at UNHCR Headquarters and by two field missions, to Tanzania and Malawi between 11 and 23 March 1995 and to South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe between 18 April and 8 May 1995.  Both missions involved extensive field visits as well as interviews with government officials and NGO representatives as well as UNHCR staff.  Cooperation and hospitality was excellent throughout and the advice and guidance received was, needless to say, invaluable.

All the terms of reference set for the review have been addressed - some, inevitably, more exhaustively than others - in the course of this report.  A number of proposals and suggestions have been made which, it is hoped, will assist in the planning and implementation of future repatriation operations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(1)           The main thrust of this report is contained in separate chapters on each of the six countries of asylum - Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - and on the country of origin of the refugees, Mozambique.  The rationale for considering each country separately is explained in paragraphs 10 to 23 below.

(2)           In the course of the evaluation study, however, a number of more general issues were identified for separate examination, namely the Plan of Operation, Coordination and Management and Fund Raising.  The conclusions reached on each of these subjects have been briefly summarised below along with those on each of the seven countries concerned with the repatriation.

(3)           In general, the outcome of the evaluation amply confirms the accepted view that this was a highly successful operation which reflects great credit on all concerned.  Any criticisms made must be viewed in this light and are, in any case mostly country specific as well as relatively minor by comparison with the tremendous achievement of the operation as a whole.

(4)           In terms of ‘lessons learnt’, the main areas can be briefly stated thus :

(a)           The appointment of an overall coordinator is fully justified in the context of a complex repatriation operation of this kind but is likely to be most effective if the coordinator is given executive directing powers.

(b)           There are arguments in favour of replacing the traditional division of responsibility within UNHCR between the respective Branch Offices in countries of asylum and the country of origin by a system of unified control over the actual repatriation (but not the reintegration) process.

(c)           The pace of organised repatriation should reflect the absorptive capacity of the country of origin and be determined accordingly rather than on the movement capability of the individual country of asylum.

(d)           Careful and extensive forward planning is a vital ingredient in the success of operations of this kind and has a major role to play in creating donor confidence as well as in ensuring sound implementation.

(e)           A systematic, informative and credible fund-raising strategy which is responsive to donor requirements and keeps donors fully informed of operational developments and budgetary changes is crucial to the successful funding of a repatriation programme.

(f)            Staff must be deployed to the field in sufficient numbers and in good time before operations commence.  Most operational failures and omissions are the direct result of an inadequate staffing response; normal recruitment procedures are too lengthy and cumbersome and emergency procedures may be required.

(g)           Repatriation programmes are managed most effectively when operational decisions are taken in the field, as near as possible to the actual site of operations.

N.B. This principle applies to virtually all field operations and programmes, not merely those concerned with repatriation.

(h)           UNHCR should aim at more consistent, and therefore more credible, repatriation statistics even if total accuracy cannot be achieved.

(i)            An assured and adequate food distribution on return to the country of origin is the single most important item of relief assistance in a repatriation programme of this kind.  Sporadic failures in the food distribution system, while understandable in the light of the immense logistics difficulties encountered, were probably the programme’s greatest operational deficiency from the refugees’ point of view.

(j)            Some phases of the operation were probably unduly rushed in order to meet target dates or political deadlines, such as national elections.  While it is commonly said that the humanitarian should follow the political agenda, this should not be at the cost of preparedness in the country of origin for the refugees’ return.

(k)           In the interests of full accountability and equal treatment of implementing partners, there should be no exemptions from compliance with the mandatory standard clauses of UNHCR operational agreements and the waiver granted to IOM in 1992 should be withdrawn.

(l)            The proper disposal of assets and, to the extent possible, the restoration of the environment in the country of asylum, should be integral features of any repatriation programme.

(m)          An advisory Voluntary Repatriation Unit should be established at Headquarters to prepare and assist with the implementation of standard procedures and guidelines for repatriation operations in general.

These lessons and others are elaborated in the main body of this report.  The following paragraphs summarise the report’s main conclusions on both general and country-related issues.

The Plan of Operation

(5)           Every stage of the operation benefitted greatly from the results of careful and extensive planning at both Headquarters and field level.  The success of the operation clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of the planning process.  The only major component of the Plan of Operation which had to be abandoned was the concept of a travel grant for self-certified return; in all other respects, it was remarkably accurate in its analysis and forecast of events.  Nevertheless, the detailed implementation of the Plan showed wide divergences of approach between different countries of asylum which might have been avoided had more power to secure greater uniformity been vested in the Coordinator.

(6)           The May 1993 Appeal, which derived directly from the Plan of Operation, was a major factor in engendering donor confidence and in securing funds for repatriation over the three-year period of the Appeal.

Coordination and Management

(7)           Within the overall framework of the Regional Bureau, it would have been better for the Coordinator to have had executive authority to direct the operation.  It would also have been logical to override the traditional UNHCR division between the responsibilities of Branch Offices and make a single authority - the Coordinator - responsible for the management of the repatriation  operation from refugee camps to final destination.

(8)           A considerable body of technical competence in the mechanics and logistics of repatriation has now been developed and should not be lost.  The creation of a small advisory Voluntary Repatriation Unit at Headquarters would help to preserve the knowledge and experience accumulated over successive repatriation operations in the past and would provide a focus for the planning and administration of future repatriation programmes.

Fund Raising

(9)           The excellent donor response to funding needs for the Mozambique repatriation can be attributed in large measure to the systematic, informative and credible fund-raising strategy which was adopted for the operation.  Donors were regularly informed of operational needs and budgetary changes, a process which could be developed even further in the future.  There was excellent cooperation between the Fund-Raising Service, the Coordinator, the Regional Bureau, the Public Information Section and the Field Offices concerned and this contributed greatly to the quality and quantity of information with which donors were supplied.

Country Summaries

(10)         The repatriation to Mozambique was, in a number of respects, unique.  It involved the return of some 1.7 million refugees from no less than six adjacent countries of asylum over a time span stretching from late 1992 to the middle of 1995.  The number of refugees for whom UNHCR was responsible in individual countries of asylum varied greatly, from over a million in Malawi to figures in the region of twenty thousand in Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.  The number in South Africa was never precisely ascertained.

(11)         The methods adopted by UNHCR for the physical repatriation of refugee populations ranged from road and rail to lake crossing and voyage by sea.  Even air transport was at one stage contemplated for vulnerable groups returning from Zimbabwe but was never actually used.  The great majority of the refugees, principally from Malawi but also from every other country of asylum to a greater or lesser degree, returned spontaneously by the simplest method of all - on foot.

(12)         Before repatriation, refugee communities in countries of asylum had been accommodated in camps in agricultural settlements or had settled spontaneously among local population groups.  UNHCR assisted refugees in all three of these categories to return to Mozambique, either by the organized repatriation of entire camps or settlement populations or of vulnerable groups, including those who were too far from home to travel on their own.  Another method used, especially in Malawi, was so-called ‘assisted spontaneous repatriation’ which generally consisted in making transport and nothing more available for those who wanted to go home.

(13)         Despite a number of common elements such as the machinery of the Tripartite Commission and the use of the Voluntary Repatriation Form or VRF for registration purposes, each Branch Office adopted its own repatriation systems and methods.  The VRF, although more than adequate for a wide range of purposes relating to the reabsorption of returnees in their country of origin, was mostly used - except by Branch Office, Harare - simply as a travel document and as evidence of eligibility for assistance on return.  The size of the repatriation ‘package’ varied from country to country as did logistic arrangements and the use of computerised techniques.  Given the great differences in the repatriation environment between countries of asylum, any attempt to impose greater uniformity would probably have been unwise.  The length of the operation also varied greatly from country to country - the entire period of (roughly) three years in the case of Malawi at one extreme or only three months in the case of Tanzania at the other.

(14)         All these and other disparities have meant that, for evaluation purposes, it has proved impossible to treat the operation as a single unified whole.  Repatriation from each country of asylum has been treated separately in its own country chapter and these together with a chapter on the country of origin, Mozambique, have been grouped together as a distinct part of this report.  Each country chapter contains, however, a good deal of detail of special interest to the relevant Desk at Headquarters and the concerned Branch Office but which the more general reader may not wish to follow.  The ensuing summaries are therefore aimed at providing a very brief statement of the principal lessons learnt from each country’s share of the operation; a fuller statement can be found in the ‘conclusions’ section of each country chapter.

Malawi:                  1992-95                 1 million + repatriated

(15)         The Branch Office did excellent work in facilitating, promoting, organising and assisting voluntary repatriation.  Nevertheless, it was the refugees themselves who played the predominant role and contributed most to the operation’s success.

The policy of ‘food consolidation’ was an inevitable necessity if the ‘revolving door’ syndrome was to be avoided.  But the strict criteria for the policy - an assured and regular food distribution on the Mozambique side - were not always met.

(16)         The country of origin, not the country of asylum, should dictate the pace of any repatriation which UNHCR has the power to regulate.  This important principle was not always observed, particularly in relation to ‘assisted spontaneous repatriation’.  In general, however, cooperation and coordination between UNHCR Malawi and UNHCR Mozambique were good, especially at field level and any tensions which arose were a natural consequence of different concerns at the repatriating and receiving ends of the operation.

South Africa         January 1994-April 1995 32,010 repatriated

(17)         On its own terms, a highly successful operation which helped to create a secure base from which the UNHCR Regional Office can operate in future.  Nevertheless, there were unsatisfactory elements - the size of the caseload was never clearly ascertained, the numbers repatriated fell far short of expectations and at the end of the exercise no one could say how many refugees were left in South Africa.  Only the roughest test of eligibility could be applied.

Swaziland              October 1993-June 1994  16,000 repatriated

(18)         A well-conducted and successful operation mainly by railway and with relatively few logistic problems.  The ‘repatriation package’ was particularly generous as was the baggage allowance but these may have assisted greatly in reconstruction in Mozambique.  The statistics relating to refugee numbers in Swaziland are -even by UNHCR standards - unusually confused.

Tanzania               June 1994 - October 1994                11,400 repatriated

(19)         As an exercise in orderly and organized repatriation in difficult logistic circumstances, the operation was an unqualified success.  There were, however, delays in providing essential staff and equipment and UNHCR was fortunate in having an experienced and efficient NGO presence to rely on.  It can also be argued that, given the extremely fragile infrastructure on the Mozambican side, the timetable was too rushed.

Zambia                   October 1993 - December 1994       19,927 repatriated

(20)         A smooth, successful and well-conducted operation, greatly aided by a strong NGO presence.

Zimbabwe              June 1993 - May 1995       117,702 repatriated

(21)         Another extremely successful operation, meticulously planned and executed with greater use than elsewhere of computerised registration and related techniques and special consideration for vulnerable groups.  However, the repatriation of the spontaneously settled Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe, which followed that of those resident in camps, was advertised and carried out over an extremely short time span, mainly in order to meet the wishes of UNHCR in the country of origin.  A longer and much less hurried operation might have given more refugees the opportunity to go home.

Mozambique         1.7 million received and reintegrated

(22)         UNHCR Mozambique had to undergo a challenging transformation from a small Branch Office with a single modest Sub-Office to a major operational centre with three Sub-Offices and field offices in all the main areas to which repatriating refugees returned.  The transition - through no fault of the Branch Office - took far too long and not until mid-1994, when half or more of the refugees had already come back, were staffing requirements reasonably met.  Resources were often strained to the limit and emergency staffing procedures would have been justified.

(23)         Despite many logistic problems and a fragile governmental infrastructure, every effort was made to provide adequate reception facilities and to restore basic services after many years of civil war.  Throughout the repatriation operation, the Branch Office sought to assert the principle that the country of origin must determine the rate of repatriation (other than unassisted spontaneous return, over which UNHCR can obviously have no control).  This principle was generally observed, but some difficulties arose, particularly in the case of “assisted spontaneous” repatriation from Malawi.

THE PLAN OF OPERATION

(24)         The origins of a planned approach to the repatriation of Mozambican refugees are summarised in the Introduction to Part I of the May 1993 Plan of Operation.  The first major initiative was a joint UNHCR/UNDP/Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) mission to Mozambique in March 1992 to begin preparations for the basic framework of the operation.  The mission was funded by the Norwegian Government and was said to be the first of its kind in UNHCR's history, embracing as it did participation by representatives of the donor community, the NGO movement, bilateral aid agencies and the UN system.  Be that as it may, for the actual composition was a good deal narrower that this might imply, the mission did recommend an integrated and coordinated approach to the operation, a conclusion which was endorsed at the so-called Nordic Conference in Oslo on 22 June 1992.  The mission also defined the main planning parameters to be addressed from target groups to implementing mechanisms and funding strategies.

(25)         Few things are easier, of course, than to bandy over-used words such as 'integrated', 'coordinated' and 'strategy'.  Nevertheless, the Oslo resolutions did, as the Plan of Operation pointed out (para.8) provide a real start in the planning process and led directly to the preparation of the policy framework document presented to the Donors' Conference in Rome in December 1992.  This in turn provided the basis for the overall plan which was drafted at a regional workshop on repatriation held in Malawi in late January 1993 and which finally appeared in published form, along with an Executive Summary, in May 1993.   Simultaneously with the publication of the Plan, the Fund Raising Service issued its first Appeal for the Repatriation and Reintegration of Mozambican Refugees, dated 3 May 1993, drawing heavily on the Plan of Operation and calling for contributions of US$203.4 million over the three year period 1993-95.

(26)         18-21 January 1993, shortly before the January 1993 regional repatriation workshop, a regional meeting of protection officers was also held in Maputo to consider a draft Protection Plan of Action and to adopt a standard approach to the protection issues which the operation would have to face.  The principal elements of the protection plan were incorporated into the legal framework and provisions of the Plan of Operation, covering such fundamental questions as Tripartite Agreements, promotion of and registration for voluntary repatriation, Voluntary  Repatriation Forms (VRFs), the right to return, property rights and physical security.  Reading the draft protection plan long after the event, it seems an admirable attempt to identify problems and provide a basis for generally applicable procedures and solutions.

(27)         However, the protection plan was not without its critics.  One Branch Office in particular - Zimbabwe - expressed disappointment at what it considered a failure to address protection-related issues and was especially critical of the draft Tripartite Agreement which it said 'leaves more issues open for dispute than it provides for mechanisms and solutions for very likely problems'.[2]  The Branch Office had suggested a much more detailed document covering a number of major operational issues and submitted its own version to Headquarters on 16 December 1992[3].  Nevertheless, it was eventually obliged to accept a Headquarters' version and this was signed between the three parties on 22 March 1993.  It was identical in all respects save one - provision for refugee representatives to visit Mozambique, which was omitted - to the specimen Tripartite Agreement which subsequently appeared as Annex II to the May 1993 Plan of Operation.  A proviso to the conclusions of the January 1993 meeting of protection officers that Tripartite Agreements  could incorporate country specific requirements was therefore not invoked.[4]

(28)         The genesis of the overall Plan of Operation for the repatriation of Mozambican refugees can also be traced to a meeting in Geneva, to which the Branch Office Representatives from Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were invited, between 18 and 21 May 1992.  The main purpose of the meeting was to consider the implications for UNHCR programmes of the severe drought in southern Africa but among the other items on the agenda was "Repatriation:  Preparatory Arrangements before mass repatriation".

(29)         The meeting commented that earlier mass repatriations - Ugandans from south Sudan in 1986, Ethiopians from Somalia in 1991, Sudanese from Ethiopia in 1991 - had developed unnecessarily into emergency situations because UNHCR had ignored the warning signs and waited until the last moment to act.  It urged immediate action to prepare for repatriation in both Mozambique and asylum countries including the following range of activities:

1.             Data collection on the refugee caseload, areas of origin, distance from the border.

2.             Transport and logistics requirements.

3.             State of roads, especially in Mozambique.

4.             The need for de-mining.

5.             Identification of entry points, transit and reception centres.

6.             The role of other UN agencies and NGOs.

7.             Coordination between Branch Offices  - the design of a comprehensive Plan of Operation.

8.             The need for Tripartite Agreements, similar to the Malawi one and the strengthening of the Mozambique Branch Office.

(30)         Resource needs were identified: Durable Solution teams in each Branch Office, a major purchase of radio/telecommunications equipment, extensive regional travel by repatriation staff (to be authorised by Representatives, not Headquarters) and the appointment of a Regional Coordinator within the Desk 'at the appropriate time'.[5]

Finally, mention should be made of the full country chapter plans of operation which each Branch Office prepared and which are referred to in paragraph 12 of the Plan of Operation.  These are impressive documents - that for Malawi, prepared jointly with Branch office Mozambique goes back to 1990-91 and has 27 substantive pages with 28 appendices.  Branch Office Mozambique subsequently produced its own 33 page Contingency Plan covering repatriation from all countries of asylum except South Africa.[6]  The Zimbabwe plan of March 1993 covers every aspect of repatriation during the registration, pre-departure and movement phases in a comprehensive document of 54 pages.

(31)         These country plans were obviously too long to be included in the overall Plan of Operation but constituted the basis for Part II of the Plan - Country Activities - in which the programme needs of each country of asylum and the country of origin were summarised, except in the case of South Africa where only a country profile could be provided at this stage.  They must have contributed greatly to the wider picture and to the practical and realistic nature of the Plan.

CONCLUSIONS

(32)         The Plan of Operation and the Executive Summary and Appeal derived from it were clearly major assets in persuading donors that repatriation to Mozambique was an activity worthy of their support.  The fact that funding the operation was never a problem is itself a tribute to their worth.  The Plan was also remarkably accurate in its analysis and forecasts of events and in the time frames which it suggested (paragraph 50) for operations in the different countries of asylum.

(33)         The only significant ingredient of the Plan which - mercifully, as it turned out - did not materialize was the proposal for self-certified return with a travel grant for refugees falling within the organised repatriation operation but able to return home without transport assistance from UNHCR.  This category was expected to come principally from Malawi (para.32 of the Plan) and to depart with the expiry of care and maintenance assistance (para.66).

(34)         The travel grant would include components to cover transport costs for the refugees and their belongings to their destination in Mozambique and 'costs for overnight stays and food during the journey'.  How these would be calculated was not elaborated in the Plan but a glance at the relevant paragraphs, 93 to 99, is sufficient to demonstrate how complicated the arrangements would have been and how much nightmarish accounting might have been required.  For budgetary purposes, Malawi Kwacha 100 per head of family and 50 Kwacha per family member was estimated (para.164) for Malawi and an average of US$27 per person for Zimbabwe (para.202).  Zambia did not anticipate using certified self-repatriation (para.182) to any extent and Tanzania did not specify what cash grant would be paid but said that the practice of refugees making their own transportation arrangements would be encouraged.

(35)         Presumably the idea of a cash grant for self-repatriation derived from the generally positive experience of a similar system for Afghan refugees in Pakistan which was introduced in 1990 and reached its peak in 1992.  A later evaluation of the Pakistan programme[7] concluded that 'encashment has served as an effective catalyst for large-scale spontaneous repatriation' and had 'demonstrated the potential for using cash to support refugee choice'.  This evaluator can only record his opinion that, in the Mozambican context, it would have been a disaster.  Quite apart from the complicated administration involved, the introduction of cash grants would very probably have killed spontaneous repatriation in the sense of unassisted return, since what refugee would want to take himself and his family home without assistance once he knew that UNHCR would pay him to do so.  The result would have been an enormous increase to no useful purpose in programme costs.

(36)         Fortunately, this was quickly realized[8] and the authorities in countries of asylum eg Zimbabwe, also objected to the scheme.  By the time of the January 1994 Progress Report, UNHCR had concluded that 'the system of paying cash grants to refugees in order to encourage them to repatriate may not be suitable for this operation'.  A major planning mishap had been averted.

(37)         In retrospect, it could also be argued that the Plan, while acknowledging that spontaneous repatriation would continue, underestimated its extent.  But this is a pointless criticism, wise only after the event.  Also in retrospect, the argument over the terms of Tripartite Agreements seems a storm in a teacup, since the atmosphere in which repatriation took place was cooperative throughout all countries of asylum and in the country of origin and no significant disputes took place.  This is not to say, however, that there is not a case for greater particularity in individual country circumstances and some of the ideas in the Zimbabwe draft were definitely useful - such as, for example, recognition in the country of origin of the juridical status and qualifications of refugees.  But the divergencies from the accepted model were not great and there are also arguments in favour of a generalised and even vague approach.  The golden rule, as in so much else, is that there is no golden rule.

(38)         In conclusion, there is one point of overriding importance to be made.  Few, if any, earlier repatriation operations can have benefited from so much meticulous and extensive planning at both field and Headquarters' levels.[9]  The fact that, as the three Representatives who came to Geneva in May 1992 had urged, an emergency approach was avoided and that - with only minor hiccups - the operation was so successfully conducted is a direct tribute to the effectiveness of its planning.  This was no mere public relations exercise;  the beneficial results of careful planning showed themselves at every stage and reflect great credit on all concerned.  It is heartening to see that the same attitude is being taken towards the operation for repatriation to Angola.

(39)         One final note of caution.  One Branch Office has pointed out that, whereas the regional standardisation of such aspects of the operation as registration, computerisation, pre-departure assistance, the needs of vulnerable groups, mine awareness and others was emphasized during the initial planning stage and the Plan of Operation contained many guidelines towards a regional approach, there was in practice little follow-up and Branch Offices developed their own individual policies and methods.  This led to wide divergencies and little uniformity between the six countries of asylum.  In the opinion of the evaluation mission, this might have been avoided had authority been vested in the Coordinator to ensure that, to the extent possible, regional uniformity was achieved.

(40)         But standardisation for its own sake or for the appearance of tidiness serves no purpose and should only be applied when real benefits are likely to result.  It is hard to be confident that greater standardisation would have led to a more successful operation.

COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT

(41)         A Coordinator for Southern Africa was appointed within the Africa Bureau in September 1992, specifically to coordinate the repatriation and reintegration of refugees returning from neighbouring countries to Mozambique.  Apart from this, there were no precise terms of reference, no line management responsibility, no executive authority and consequently no special unit in support.  The Coordinator had no staff, apart from a secretary who arrived four months after his appointment.  His principal operational links were with Desk V within the Bureau, which covered both the country of origin and all the countries of asylum save Tanzania and, in the case of Tanzania, with Desk IV.

(42)         This is a familiar pattern and one which has in the past proved a recipe for disaster.  That it was far from a disaster in this instance, but rather a considerable success can be attributed to three  factors.  In the first place, the Coordinator’s lack of authority was at least mitigated by the fact that his area of intervention - the Mozambique repatriation and reintegration - was clearly defined.  He was fortunately not merely given a vague but all-embracing brief to ‘coordinate’ UNHCR activities in a given geographical zone, a task which of its nature invites defeat, but was at least given a precise sphere of activity within which to function.  In the second place, his personal attributes of drive, enthusiasm, diplomacy and persuasive power proved more than equal to surmount the challenge.  His was a constant presence, travelling, exhorting, accelerating, reconciling, exercising in the best possible way, as Walter Bagehot said of the British monarchy in happier times, “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn”.  In the third place the Bureau, the Desks and the Branch Offices in the region all did their utmost to strive for the operation’s success.  Moreover, key staff within Desk V had invaluable recent experience in the region and of repatriation operations elsewhere.

(43)         The fact remains that, in management terms, to ask someone to coordinate an operation without operational authority is a contradiction and is likely, in most circumstances, to lead to confrontation when he (or she) exceeds his mandate, and ineffectiveness when he does not.  Far better, if a coordinating role is considered necessary - as it certainly is when repatriation from six countries of asylum is involved - to appoint someone with genuine executive powers over the operation within the overall framework of the Bureau.  This in turn implies the allocation, where necessary, of supporting staff and of authority vis-à-vis Representatives in the field[10].

(44)         This issue of authority is intrinsically of considerably more importance than the question, which seems to have been extensively debated, whether the post of Coordinator should have been established at Headquarters or in the field.  The answer to the one question probably turns, in any event, on the solution to the other.  For a Coordinator without authority, the best central forum may well be Headquarters with - as has been the case in the Mozambique operation - frequent missions to the field.  Assignment to a field duty station (and which, with seven to choose from?) might only serve to exacerbate any possible source of friction, always a danger when respective roles and responsibilities are ill-defined.

(45)         On the other hand, for a Coordinator or equivalent with executive powers and on the obvious and well-tested management principle that the closer an enterprise is administered to the site of operations the better managed it will be, a field assignment is more appropriate. Had this principle been adopted in the case of Mozambique, it would have been preferable to establish the Coordinator’s presence at a centre with a good regional communications network but away from either of the main capitals involved, i.e. not in Maputo or Lilongwe, so that neither of the principal actors would feel that the Coordinator was ‘breathing down his neck’.  The Regional Office in Johannesburg, had it been created in time, would have been an obvious possibility or even, for the closest operational involvement, Blantyre in Malawi - the nearest practical central point to where the great majority of the refugees had sought asylum and to where they would return.

(46)         The existence of a Coordinator with executive authority implies the power to supervise and in the last analysis, to overrule individual Representatives on the overall direction of the programme, at least so far as the process of repatriation is concerned.  After a great deal of thought, this evaluator has come to the conclusion that in mounting a repatriation operation, the traditional division in UNHCR between Branch Offices can be more of a hindrance than an asset.  The reasoning is clear.  Repatriation is essentially a single logistic process, involving the voluntary movement of large numbers of people from a temporary residence to their former permanent place of abode.  There is no good operational reason why overall responsibility for that process should be divided between two sets of people, whether UNHCR or implementing agency personnel, once the national boundary is crossed between the country of asylum and the country of origin.  There is implicit recognition of this fact in the incorporation in Tripartite Agreements of provision for simplified border procedures, cross-border travel authorisations and the like.

(47)         But this recognition does not go far enough.  The fact remains that, in UNHCR, responsibility shifts at a certain reception point along the road from one authority to another in a manner which is quite irrelevant to the needs of the individual repatriating refugee, who only wants to be taken in safety and dignity to his or her final destination. The best way surely to ensure that the refugees’ needs are properly met at every stage of the operation is to place it under a single unified control.  This requires in turn that field staff on both sides of the national boundary are responsible to a single managerial authority - the Coordinator - for all aspects of the movement from refugee camp to final destination.

(48)         This concept needs, of course, to be thought through a good deal more thoroughly than is possible in this report.  It does not remove the responsibility for close liaison and consultation between the Coordinator and the Representative in the country of asylum, who remains responsible for all aspects of the refugees’ welfare other than those relating to the process of repatriation, from registration to departure.  It does not impinge on authority for reintegration, an ongoing process which is clearly the responsibility of the Representative and the national authorities in the country of origin.  It is not so very different, in terms of practical realities on the ground, from what has in fact been happening through close cross-border cooperation between UNHCR field personnel on both sides of national frontiers.

(49)         There has been, nevertheless, a good deal of tension between the UNHCR Branch Offices in the country of origin, Mozambique, and the main country of asylum, Malawi.  This is common knowledge and has been commented on elsewhere.  Whatever other reasons there may be for the difficult relationship between the two offices, one must surely be that, on the issue of repatriation, the interests of the country of asylum and the country of origin can never be the same.  However much both may genuinely be seeking to attain a common goal, there is an inevitable element of burden-shifting involved.  For the country of asylum, a refugee repatriated is a problem solved; for the country of origin both in terms of short-term relief and longer-term rehabilitation and reintegration, it is an added problem to be tackled.  The refugee moves, so to speak, from the one Representative’s ‘out’ tray to the ‘in’ tray of the other.  The more reason, therefore, to put the process of repatriation under an independent, impartial third command able to operate equally and impartially on both sides.

(50)         Two other management points.  In all of the five countries visited during the evaluation mission, the standard of performance, energy and dedication of international, national officers and  local staff has been most impressive as has that within the Bureau at Headquarters. From a comparative, if subjective, perspective, it seemed significantly higher than would have been the case ten or twenty years ago.  The high esteem in which UNHCR is held generally in the region supports this view.  A considerable body of technical competence in the mechanics and logistics of repatriation has been built up which should not be lost.

(51)         The second point follows from the first.  Repatriation has become a technically sophisticated and complex process, involving difficult logistic and transportation problems, computerised registration, detailed manifests, advanced communication systems, intricate liaison mechanisms with police, immigration customs and other services and much besides.  As the most desirable of all durable solutions and with new challenges, such as Angola, directly ahead, it would surely be worth creating at Headquarters a small, advisory Voluntary Repatriation Unit which would assist with the operational planning of repatriation programmes and, if necessary, with the  setting-up of appropriate administrative mechanisms in the field.  Such a Unit could be established either in the Division of International Protection or the Division of Programmes and Operational Support - (perhaps the latter, since the key function is operational preparation and support rather than legal advice although this would not be excluded).  The necessary expertise to staff it is readily available from those who have so successfully planned and implemented the Mozambique repatriation.

(52)         Some of the many issues with which the Voluntary Repatriation Unit would be concerned are:

1.             Tripartite Agreements and associated procedures covering amnesties, guarantees of safety, immigration and customs formalities, cross-border travel authorisations, training of national officials, and family reunion, transit centres.

2.             Promotion/information campaigns (radio, leaflets, meetings, information on the country of origin)

3.             Transport and logistic methods

4.             Telecommunications systems

5.             Voluntary Repatriation Forms, content, computerisation, usefulness in country of origin (their use in the Mozambique context was mostly limited to providing documentation for travel purposes and evidence of eligibility for assistance in Mozambique).

6.             Strategies for dealing with vulnerable groups.

7.             Baggage entitlement, the provision of food, family kits, currency exchange procedures.

8.             Health arrangements - vaccination etc.

9.             Phase-out, handover and environmental restoration in countries of asylum.

10.           Staffing, training, team-building in the field.

11.           Mine awareness campaigns

12.           Reintegration measures in countries of origin (schools, roads, clinics, water supplies, agriculture, community services, NGO participation, capacity building for government  services and institutions).

The aim would be, as far as possible, to prepare standard repatriation ‘packages’ and guidelines which, with modification to suit local conditions, could be used speedily and effectively whenever a new repatriation operation was envisaged.

(53)         Finally, a plea nevertheless for flexibility in meeting the organisational needs of future repatriation operations, changing or adapting the structure to meet the situation rather than trying to make the situation conform to an existing structure.  And remembering always Alexander Pope’s dictum of two hundred and fifty years ago - “For forms of government let fools contest, whate’er is best administered is best”.

FUND RAISING

(54)         UNHCR’s fund raising strategy for the Mozambique repatriation was based, to a far greater extent than had been the case in many earlier funding situations, on the preparation and dissemination to donors of a comprehensive and detailed operational plan.  This was based on the many drafts which Branch Offices in the region had prepared, on the framework document prepared for the Donors’ Conference on Mozambique in Rome in December 1992 and on a final draft prepared at the regional workshop on repatriation held in Malawi in January 1993.  The regional workshop also took into account the conclusions of a regional meeting of protection officers which had taken place in Maputo earlier the same month.  The entire planning exercise lasted at least a year.

(55)         The result was a 56-page (excluding annexes) Plan of Operation which, together with a five page executive summary, formed the supporting documentation for a formal appeal to donors issued on 3 May 1993[11].  Although the initial appeal was for a 1993 requirement of US$55 million, it was made clear that the operation would have a three year span up to 1995 and a breakdown of the overall financial requirement of US$203 million was provided by year as well as by country and sector of activity, the only provisional budget being one of US$12million for South Africa, pending a comprehensive assessment.  It was also made clear that needs would be revised  to reflect operational realities and, indeed, in September 1993 an update was issued reducing the estimated need for 1993 to US$45 million of which US$31 million had already been received.  Despite the reduced estimate, however, US$51.5 million was contributed during 1993 (including a carry-over of US$3.4 million from 1992).

(56)         The message to donors was, therefore, that, in return for a long-term commitment to a massive operation requiring separate annual budgets for the country of origin and six countries of asylum, they could be assured that these budgets had been realistically assessed and would be regularly and realistically reviewed.  Problems and delays would be admitted[12] and progress fully reported both by UNHCR Headquarters and in the field.  Indeed, UNHCR Mozambique published its own Special Newssheet at intervals from September 1993 onwards as did UNHCR Malawi with regular updates under the headline ‘ZIKOMO MALAWI’.  Donor representatives in key countries in the region were given a systematic and ample flow of information to enable them to report comprehensively to their capitals, with probably as much and possibly even more influence than their counterparts at diplomatic missions in Geneva.  Be that as it may, however, the Fund Raising Service in Geneva took the trouble to organise in 1994 a mission to Malawi and Mozambique of a number of donor representatives including the head of Canadian CIDA and the senior US State  Department official for Southern Africa, something which it appears had never been done before[13].

(57)         A full Progress Report on 1993 and programme projections for 1994 was published in January 1994 and distributed on 8 February with the 1994 Appeal, now totalling US$102.8 million - a substantial increase over the figure of US$82 million originally forecast for 1994 at the time of the May 1993 Appeal.  Surprisingly perhaps, the 1994 appeal did not contain any explanation for the increase of over US$20 million, relying presumably on the earlier warning that needs would have to be revised.  The 1993 Plan of Operation did not contain any detailed breakdown of projected annual expenditures by sector or country, whereas a brief account of the main areas in which funding requirements had increased might have helped donors to a better understanding of how operational realities had evolved.  This is not a criticism but a suggestion as to how the tremendous strides already taken in the direction of detail and transparency might have been taken a step further.

(58)         The High Commissioner returned from a two-week visit to Mozambique, South Africa and  Zimbabwe in mid-March 1994 and wrote immediately to donors urging their support for the 8 February Appeal, backed by the unequivocal statement that “I am greatly encouraged by what I have seen”.  There could hardly have been a more powerful endorsement, an opportunity eagerly taken and exploited to the full.

(59)         Two further Progress Reports on the operation were issued in June 1994 and January 1995 respectively, although neither referred directly to funding needs.  However, the January 1995 report was published concurrently with the 1995 Appeal which now extended the programme to a final conclusion of both repatriation and reintegration operations in June 1996.  It called for the provision of US$56.9 million over an eighteen-month period, of which by far the greater share - US$45.6 million - was for the first time, to be spent on reintegration activities in Mozambique itself.

(60)         But the 1995 Appeal also indicated that 1994 contributions had totalled only US$73.4 million, including a carryover of US$13 million from 1993 and cancellations of US$6.6 million.  Actual donor contributions amounted to only US$53.9million, an apparent shortfall of almost US$50 million (or almost half) of the overall requirement of US$102.8 million or nearly US$30 million if the carry-over and cancellations are included in the contributions figure.  Nothing in the Appeal  or its associated documentation suggested any adverse consequences from the shortfall and no scaling-down of requirements had been announced.

(61)         In February 1995, the Public Information Section at Headquarters issued an excellent Special Report “Mozambique - Back on Track” showing donor contributions for 1994 at US$53,787,391 against a 1994 Budget of US$51,071,192 implying a reduction in 1994 needs of almost exactly half since the 1994 Appeal and, in the light of such a substantial cut, no funding shortfall but instead a modest surplus of actual donor contributions during the year.  The Special Report also gave a 1995 budget figure of US$42.7 million, whereas there is no breakdown between 1995 and 1996 in the 1995 Appeal.

CONCLUSION

(62)         All this is a little perplexing and suggests that more still needs to be done to make the donors fully aware - at least on paper - of the reasons for major budgetary changes and their implications for the programme.  Documentary material was, of course, supplemented by regular oral briefings of donor representatives both at Headquarters and in the field so that adjustments and budgetary details may well have been explained in the course of these briefings.

(63)         The fact remains that, in terms of adjusted requirements, the funding response to the Mozambique repatriation and reintegration operation has been exemplary[14] at a time of exceptionally heavy Special Programme needs elsewhere (notably in the former Yugoslavia).  This can be accounted for not only by the inherent popularity of durable solution programmes, especially voluntary repatriation, but also by the sustained, coordinated, honest and informed fund raising campaign which has underpinned the entire operation.  The quality of this campaign reflects a very high level of cooperation between the Fund Raising Service, the Regional Bureau, the Coordinator for Southern Africa, the Public Information Section and the concerned UNHCR Field Offices in the region.

(64)         The same approach is being used for the repatriation and reintegration of Angolan refugees for which a 30-month appeal for the period up to December 1997 was issued in June 1995.  The appeal document states, on page 12, that ‘donors will be regularly informed of operational developments and the inevitable refinement of project planning and budget revisions as work proceeds’.

(65)         The lessons learnt from this evaluation are (I) a systematic, informative and credible strategy, with clearly stated performance targets linked to budgetary needs, was developed for the Mozambique operation and is already becoming a model for programmes of this kind, and (ii) the value of this strategy could be enhanced even further if the inevitable refinement of project planning and budget revisions were more fully explained when major changes in budgetary needs take place.  The prime source of the explanations should be the Fund Raising Service.

(66)         One final happy thought. However one calculates the figures - and the reintegration phase still has nearly a year to run - the operation must have cost much less than the US$203 million originally projected.  US$150million would be a reasonable guess.

MOZAMBIQUE

(67)         UNHCR first established a presence in Mozambique immediately after independence in June 1975, mainly to handle the first repatriation of more than 500,000 Mozambican exiles and, until their repatriation in 1980, had also to care for a sizeable caseload of Zimbabwean refugees.  Thereafter, the Branch Office declined in importance until by 1986 total annual expenditures were significantly less than one million dollars and the staff of the office consisted of only 3 professionals (including one JPO) and 5 GS personnel.  A Sub-Office in Tete was opened in 1987 to deal with returnees from Malawi but its capacity for movement was severely restricted because of the civil war and some early plans to accommodate repatriates in so-called ‘safer area’ settlements never developed significantly.  A Field Office was opened in Chimoio, Manica Province in 1988.  In spite of these developments, UNHCR Mozambique remained essentially a small office with limited resources until the repatriation operation began in earnest in 1992/93.

(68)         Mozambique is a large country covering a total land area of 784,095 square kilometres, smaller than Tanzania but greater than Zambia, Zimbabwe and, of course, Malawi.  Even by African standards - the colonial legacy at its worst - it has a ridiculous shape, grotesquely elongated with the capital - Maputo - in the extreme south and 40 percent of the population living in the two provinces of Zambezia and Nampula in the north.  Of an estimated population of 16 million, some four million were internally displaced by the drought and by the conflict between the Frelimo government and Renamo.  The great majority of those displaced were resettled, together with some 200,000 demobilised soldiers, between late 1992 and the end of 1994.  By the end of 1994 also, the vast majority of the almost 1.7 million Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries had returned home.

(69)         The Mozambican administrative structure is fragile at best.  Responsibility at government level for the reception and registration of returning refugees is vested in UNHCR’s counterpart authority, Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados (NAR), which first opened an office in Tete in 1987 and from 1992 onwards spread into all provinces, except Nampula and Inhambane where there are very few returnees.  By early 1995, it had 200 staff altogether - with financial support from UNHCR - with field offices in returnee-receiving districts and registrars at entry points.  Relations with UNHCR have been consistently good.

(70)         According to NAR, it now works with about 100 NGOs on returnee assistance programmes of one kind or another.  Much of this must be a recent development; according to UNOHAC (the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination in Mozambique), there were in October 1993, 46 out of Mozambique’s 128 districts which had only 0 to 3 NGOs, 42 with 3 to 5 and 40 with 5 to 14.  Those with between 0 and 3 included much of Tete and Gaza Provinces, all of Manica and Niassa Provinces and nearly all of Cabo Delgado - all areas with returning former refugees.  By early 1994, however, UNHCR itself had signed agreements with over 40 operational partners, including NGOs, for support in the repatriation and reintegration process.  Among the international  NGOs involved were World Vision International (WVI) in food distribution to returnees, MSF, SCF and others in support of the health system, LWF and others in infrastructural development.

(71)         As elsewhere, however, UNHCR’s response to the need for increased staffing levels was painfully slow.  This was exacerbated in the case of Mozambique by the fact that, even before the October 1992 Peace Accord, the staff of the Branch Office had been inadequate.  As repatriation gained momentum thereafter, the situation became desperate.  That is how the DHC put it in his mission report of 18 June 1993 - he went on to say “the full component of international and local staff will not be in place till August”.  This was a far too optimistic forecast.  Despite the increases in staffing which had been approved by the PPR in March 1993, the Branch Office was able to state as late as February 1994 that, of 55 international and 202 local posts which had been approved, only 33 international and 84 local posts had been filled.  The vital Tete Sub-Office had only two international staff during the first half of 1993, by the end of which over 260,000 refugees had returned to the Province from Malawi, while in districts such as Angonia - which had been denuded during the war years - almost the entire population now consisted of spontaneously repatriated refugees.  By February 1994 also, while eight field offices had been established, critical staffing gaps remained.  The Sub-Office at Quelimane, which was split off from Tete[15], was not opened until May 1994 and a UNHCR presence in Lichinga was not established until February 1994, in Pemba until March 1994, in Mandimba in March 1994 and Morrumbala in May 1994[16].  The Cessna 402 aircraft allocated to Sub-Office Quelimane and which rapidly became an operational necessity, did not arrive until 11 July 1994.

(72)         More examples of inadequate or late staffing arrangements could be cited, including that of the Branch Office, where a new Representative did not arrive until late in May 1993 after a hiatus of about a year.  The situation in Mozambique was particularly serious in that

(a)           a major UNHCR presence had to be established from so low a base and without a nucleus of experience on which to build;

(b)           the Branch Office had to deal with the reception and welfare of repatriates from six different countries of asylum and their reintegration into Mozambican society[17], whereas the countries of asylum were concerned with the repatriation process only and with such on-going care and maintenance obligations which remained until repatriation was completed;

(c)           the governmental and NGO structures were considerably weaker than in any of the countries of asylum, communications were extremely difficult and many areas inaccessible, particularly during the rains.  The transportation of returnees and the distribution of food and other assistance items faced constant operational handicaps including, for example, the poor quality and limited availability of trucks;

(d)           The Branch Office had progressively to assume responsibility for local administrative systems and units such as a Contracts Committee, Property Survey Board, APPC, Assets Management System and Medical Insurance Plan while its own organisational capacity was still in the process of being developed[18].

(e)           The official language of Mozambique is Portuguese, making it necessary that a substantial proportion of international staff with representational or field duties to perform be reasonably fluent in that language.  This obviously made recruitment more difficult and resulted in the appointment of some staff members with little or no prior African experience (although they appear to have performed most creditably just the same).

(73)         In summary, it is fair to say that the Mozambique Branch Office was not adequately equipped with the necessary staff establishment to carry out its repatriation/reintegration task until at least the middle of 1994.  By the end of 1993, however, over 650,000 refugees had already returned to Mozambique and the pace of repatriation actually increased during 1994.  An Inspection Mission to the region led by Mr Walter Koisser in July 1994 concluded that (page 2 para.9) : “it took too long for the organisation to establish the network of field offices required for timely implementation and effective monitoring of repatriation and reintegration activities.”

(74)         This is, of course, a complaint echoed elsewhere in the region but it became particularly serious in the difficult and conflict-ridden circumstances of Mozambique.  Its general nature does lead one to ask, however, whether the emergency recruitment procedures which had been adopted in the crisis situations of the Gulf and the former Yugoslavia might not legitimately have been extended to this, the largest repatriation operation ever in the African continent and probably the most complex on any continent considering the number of countries of asylum, their differing natures and the immense logistic problems to be overcome.  While a line has to be drawn somewhere between emergency and non-emergency situations, operations of this urgency and magnitude surely justify an emergency recruitment response, combined with the use of bench-mark job descriptions for standard field posts.

(75)         Most of activities of the Branch Office, its Sub- and Field Offices in Mozambique have been concerned with the reintegration aspect of the operation or at least with activities, such as the initial distribution of seeds and tools or of food until the first harvest, which lie on the border between repatriation and reintegration.  These activities are not directly the subject of this evaluation but they illustrate what has been the Branch Office’s main concern of principle throughout the operation and which is referred to elsewhere in this report - namely that the country of origin should always be the focal point of any repatriation, should ultimately control the pace of any UNHCR involvement in the repatriation process[19] and that resources should flow from the countries of asylum to the country of origin as care and maintenance programmes in the former diminish in size while operations in the latter correspondingly increase[20].

(76)         Given the enormous scale of spontaneous repatriation from Malawi in particular to Mozambique, the common acceptance of these principles might not have had much overall effect on the reintegration effort but would certainly have contributed to better understanding between the Branch Offices involved.  The most basic elements of the reintegration package were under considerable strain from the beginning - the September 1993 update on Repatriation and Reintegration estimated that “the distribution of food reaches only a limited number of returnees (some 40 percent) and this may even be lower in some of the border areas”.  In the most inaccessible areas, such as northern Morrumbala district of Zambezia Province or much of the Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces, the extent of the coverage achieved is problematic although the number repatriated to some particularly isolated parts of Mozambique were relatively small.  Nevertheless, up to early February 1995 UNHCR Malawi repatriated to Mozambique in an organised or ‘assisted spontaneous’ fashion a total of 128,340 refugees, a figure little more than 10,000 greater than the total repatriated from Zimbabwe and, especially since many were vulnerable cases, a reintegration caseload that could not simply be allowed to fend for itself.

(77)         In other countries of asylum, notably South Africa and Zimbabwe, the principle of full consultation with the country of origin over numbers was always accepted in relation to the repatriation of spontaneously settled refugees, a procedure which was closely analogous to ‘assisted spontaneous’ repatriation in that transport assistance only was provided and precise numbers could not be calculated in advance.  But the numbers sent in any particular convoy can always be controlled through the amount of transport provided and, in the case of Malawi, it would have been relatively easier to hold people back since the great majority came from camps in which they could for a little longer have remained.

(78)         These matters have been discussed elsewhere, notably in the Chapter on Malawi, as has much else which concerns the country of origin and its role.  The principle of the country of  origin as focal point is a sound one and should remain the basis on which future repatriation/reintegration operations are conducted.  Without under-estimating the amount of genuine and valuable cross-border consultation that did take place, it could have been more effectively applied - particularly during the mid-1994 phase of ‘accelerated’ repatriation - during the repatriation from Malawi to Mozambique.

CONCLUSION

(79)         UNHCR Mozambique entered the repatriation operation as a modest-sized, under-staffed and under-provided Branch Office with an ‘inferiority complex’ which it has never entirely shed.  After a slow start, it has made enormous strides but would have benefited greatly from a much stronger staffing and logistic base early in 1993 at the latest rather than in late 1993 and 1994.  Given the fact that reintegration is in the long run a much more demanding task than the physical process of repatriation, as well as being crucial to the operation’s ultimate success, emergency staffing procedures would have been justified at least for Mozambique, if not for the countries of asylum as well.

(80)         The principle of the country of origin as the focal point for all UNHCR activity, including the pace of organised repatriation, could have been better observed in terms of coordination with the major country of asylum, Malawi, and should be adhered to in future repatriation operations.

(81)         It might be added that the distinction between repatriation and reintegration for evaluation (or any other purposes) is largely an artificial one.  Planning for reintegration - the restoration of basic services, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and the like - needs to begin before repatriation and, in terms of essential services, implemented before the returnees arrive.  Successful reintegration projects act as a ‘pull factor’ to encourage further repatriation while a lack of reintegration activity can be a powerful deterrent.  The ultimate success or failure of a repatriation programme must be judged by the success or failure of reintegration.

PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS

(82)         There has been one earlier evaluation of the work of UNHCR Mozambique in the repatriation and reintegration of refugees.  This was carried out in November 1994 by ETC International[21], on behalf of the Royal Netherlands Government, on the basis of a field visit to Mozambique between 1 and 13 November 1994, including the preparation of the evaluation mission report.  The report is highly complimentary of UNHCR and its work in Mozambique but can in no sense be judged a rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of UNHCR programmes.  It advises the Dutch Government to continue its financial support and to “seek ways to enhance financial control, management and reporting capacity in UNHCR to reflect best modern management practice” without, however, any very clear statement of what this practice might be.  The report’s main concern seems to be what will happen after UNHCR pulls out.

MALAWI

History and Background

(83)         In numerical terms, the other five countries of asylum pale into relative insignificance by comparison with Malawi.  Crossing the border between Mozambique and Malawi has always taken place and, given the nature of the frontier between the two countries and the close ethnic ties between the people on either side, will certainly continue.  But the armed conflict in Mozambique led to a substantial influx from June 1986 onwards, until by September 1987 some 279,000 Mozambicans had sought refuge in Malawi.  The influx continued at a varying pace throughout the years that followed, until by late 1992 a peak population figure of 1,058,492 had been reached, the highest single monthly arrival figure of 60,000 being reached in November of that year (drought being a major cause[22]).  But even by 1990, the refugee numbers of over 800,000 amounted to more than 10 percent of the country’s population and - at the time - the largest refugee population in Africa and the third largest in the world.

(84)         The UNHCR Branch Office at Lilongwe was opened in 1987, followed by a Sub-Office in Blantyre and Field Offices in the main areas of refugee concentration - Lilongwe itself covering Mchinji and Nkhata Bay,  Dedza, Ntcheu , Nsanje, Mangochi, Mwanza, Chikwawa and Mulanje.  The refugees were either settled among the local population or accommodated in camps spread out between twelve Districts, mainly in the Central and Southern Regions.  WFP supplied food to extended delivery points at Lilongwe and Blantyre, while the Malawi Red Cross Society handled the distribution of both food and non-food items in the camps.  By early 1993, there were over 130 distribution centres and over 1000 distribution points.  In 1993, UNHCR had 22 implementing partners for its care and maintenance programme, including a number of the best known international NGOs but with a number of local NGOs as well.  The UNHCR budget reached its peak of US$28 million in 1992 and was still at US$27 million in 1993.

(85)         By the early 1990s then, there was an established Branch Office, a well-managed operation and a care and maintenance programme second to none at the time.  Excellent relations had been maintained with the Government, which - after many years of deliberate isolation from UNHCR[23] - had at last welcomed a UNHCR presence, acceded to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and enacted its own liberal refugee legislation in the Refugee Act of 1989.  A National Joint Operations Committee (JOC) coordinated refugee assistance and the focal point for the refugee programme - initially in the Ministry of Health - was the Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation in the Office of the President and Cabinet.

(86)         But the voluntary repatriation of the Mozambican refugees was never off the agenda.  There had always been some spontaneous repatriation and a constant movement to and fro of refugees, particularly those from Tete Province who would cross back to Mozambique to cultivate and then return, as the May 1993 Plan of Operation put it (page 26 para.155) “to the relative safety of Malawi where they were part of UNHCR’s assistance programme”[24].  A Tripartite Agreement for voluntary repatriation was signed between UNHCR, the Government of Malawi and the Government of Mozambique on 21 December 1988, over four years before Tripartite Agreements were concluded with any of the other countries of asylum.  The agreement was not in the form subsequently adopted as standard but covered all the major issues such as the simplification of border procedures and laid particular emphasis on the preparation, by the Tripartite Repatriation Commission created by the Agreement, of repatriation plans.

(87)         Four meetings of the Commission were held between April 1989 and July 1990.  At the July 1990 meeting, Malawi and Mozambique jointly presented a draft repatriation plan and a so-called ‘final’ draft of this document was issued in January 1991 (there had been at least six successive drafts and revisions in the light of comments received from both governments, other UN agencies, the donor community and NGOs).  In common with other country plans, it was overtaken by events but the work put into it was far from wasted - the identification of exit/entry points and transit centres within Mozambique was an essential preparatory measure, to give but one example.  Nevertheless, a key element of the plan that repatriants would initially move, not to their home destinations but to ‘safe areas’ or settlement locations in Mozambique (pending final return to home areas) never materialised and one must doubt that it could have been a feasible method of repatriation, except in a very limited way.

(88)         The detailed planning for repatriation which took place in Malawi, as elsewhere, well illustrates the Branch Office’s commitment to voluntary repatriation as the ultimate durable solution throughout the years when the major emphasis had necessarily to be on care and maintenance operations.  There had always been some degree of repatriation activity, inevitable in a context of constant cross-border movement - 8,092 repatriated by UNHCR during 1989 and 1990 and, according to Mozambique Government figures - which must be highly suspect given the context of the times - 200,000 spontaneously returned from neighbouring countries, the vast majority from Malawi.  Still it is gratifying that a Canadian CIDA evaluation of UNHCR in August 1992[25] recorded that :

“UNHCR is confident that the vast majority of refugees in Malawi want to return to their homes and will repatriate as soon as it is safe for them to do so ...... the strong conviction that the refugee situation is temporary is a major reason for the perceived (and real) success of the programme in Malawi.”

(89)         Other studies were not as sanguine.  A report prepared for the US Embassy and USAID/Malawi in November 1990[26] concluded, based mainly on interviews with local leaders, that ‘the refugee situation is no longer a temporary one’ and ‘most Malawians believe that they face a long-term refugee situation’.  The authors did not, perhaps, fully appreciate the extent to which Malawians had a vested interest in stressing to aid agencies the horrors of their long-term plight but, prior to the Peace Accord, few would probably have shared UNHCR’s confidence in an eventual mass repatriation.

SPONTANEOUS REPATRIATION

(90)         In fact, repatriation began only slowly after the signing of the Peace Accord and refugees were still entering Malawi - 60,000 altogether in the months following the Accord, although this was mainly as a consequence of the continuing drought rather than the civil war.  Then the pace of repatriation began to gather momentum following a good harvest, until by September 1993 over 250,000 refugees had returned to Tete Province alone, principally from Dedza and Ntcheu.  In November 1993, movements increased dramatically until, in the words of Branch Office Malawi[27] “with the discontinuation of general food distribution in Dedza and Ntcheu and adequate and regular distribution in the adjoining Mozambican districts of Angonia and Tsangano, refugees returned in droves”.

(91)         These movements were entirely spontaneous in character - organised repatriation of vulnerable groups did not begin until the end of January 1994.  Refugees returned to Mozambique as and when they wished, without registration or Voluntary Repatriation Forms (VRFs) and without surrendering their ration cards before departure.  Branch Office Malawi listed among the contributory factors behind spontaneous repatriation the signing of the Peace Accord, the refugees’ perception that peace was continuing, a good harvest and availability of food in Mozambique, improved access roads to areas of origin and the effect of the dry season in improving roads and making rivers passable.

(92)         Of significance also must have been the discontinuation of food distribution referred to above, which began in Dedza and Ntcheu at the end of November 1993, when it was considered that three-quarters or more of the refugees had already returned to Mozambique, and was progressively extended to other areas thereafter.  The euphemism adopted to describe this procedure was ‘food consolidation’ but it was consolidation only in the sense that the distribution of basic rations was restricted to a smaller residual population and to fewer and fewer areas as the great majority of refugees in particular settlements or camps were seen to have gone back to Mozambique.  In other circumstances, the cutting-off of rations has been rightly considered a coercive measure introduced (usually by inhospitable host governments) to compel refugees to return to their country of origin and thus the antithesis of everything UNHCR stands for in safeguarding the principle of repatriation as a voluntary act.

(93)         In the Malawi context, however, with many thousands of refugees living in areas immediately adjacent to the Mozambican border - a substantial section of the main trunk road from Lilongwe towards Zomba and Blantyre runs along the border in Dedza and Ntcheu districts - food consolidation became inevitable.  Many refugees who had already repatriated to Mozambique continued to return to Malawi to collect their rations at each fortnightly distribution and would doubtless have continued to do so indefinitely had they been permitted to do so[28].  The discontinuation of food supplies in Malawi once the preponderance of refugees had repatriated, was essential if this cross-border activity was not to continue forever and if the residual population were to be persuaded (not forced) to ‘take the plunge’.

ORGANISED AND ASSISTED SPONTANEOUS REPATRIATION

(94)         A particular focus of tension between the UNHCR Branch Office in Malawi and the Branch Office in Mozambique has been the practice, initiated by BO Malawi, of ‘assisted spontaneous repatriation’.  The Branch Office has explained[29] that, as spontaneous repatriation gained momentum in late 1993 and early 1994, it was noticed that vulnerable categories of refugees and those whose places of origin in Mozambique were not easily accessible were being left behind.  From this unsatisfactory situation was born, in the words of the Branch Office, ‘the idea of organised/assisted repatriation for these groups’, an idea which was endorsed at the 8th meeting of the Tripartite Commission on 28/29 March 1994.

(95)         In fact, the concept of organised repatriation had clearly been present from the earliest days of planning for voluntary repatriation in the late 1980s and had already started in other countries of asylum, beginning with the first Zimbabwe convoys in June 1993 and followed shortly after by organised movements from Swaziland and Zambia.  There was nothing controversial or contentious about this and, except in Malawi, it was the only form of repatriation with which UNHCR was directly associated.  In Malawi and South Africa, organised repatriation involved principally the movement by buses, trucks or rail of vulnerable cases and others who were unable to travel unassisted; the first convoy of 41 individuals took place from Dedza on 31 January 1994.  In addition to movements by road or rail 2,527 refugees were transported by ship across Lake Malawi from Nkhata Bay in April and May 1994.  The majority of movements, however, were either (I) by road from camps in Mwanza District to Nsanje, an average distance of 275 km and then by bus to Mutarara in Mozambique or by boat across the Shire River to Megaza transit centre en route to Morrumbala or (ii) by rail from the area of Nyamithuthu camp to Nsanje and thence to the border by bus or by boat to Megaza.

(96)         BO Malawi statistics record that a total of 128,340 refugees had returned to Mozambique under organised/assisted repatriation arrangements up to the end of February 1995[30].  There is no breakdown in these figures between organised repatriation on the one hand and ‘assisted spontaneous’ repatriation on the other and the distinction between the two is not always easy to draw.  Nevertheless, the ‘assisted spontaneous’ movements became particularly controversial at certain points in time and sources in BO Malawi have described them to the evaluation mission as embodying a concept which their counterparts in Mozambique either did not, or refused to, understand.  One response from Mozambique characterised assisted spontaneous repatriation as ‘dumping at the border’ a reaction which seems also to have been evoked by some of the ‘organised repatriation’ movements by road or rail.

(97)         If we define assisted spontaneous repatriation as the provision of facilities aimed at helping those who are moving of their own accord to do so in dignity and safety, then a prime example is the so-called ‘Lower Shire Boat Repatriation Exercise’ which began operations in July 1994.  Until that time, refugees returning to Morrumbala District in Mozambique crossed the Shire River by means of traditional dug-out canoes, which could safely carry only a few passengers and limited baggage and ran the risk of capsizing if over-loaded.  The alternative route by road was 1,200 km in length.  Under implementing arrangements between UNHCR and the American Rescue Committee (ARC) and with funding support from October 1994 onwards from the US Department of Defense, five locally built boats were provided to operate from crossing points at Nsanje, Tengani and Chiromo.  The Nsanje crossing involved a three-hour trip down river to Megaza in Mozambique and a four hour return, making seven hours in all.  From Tengani and Chiromo, simple river crossings of a few minutes only were involved.  Each boat could carry up to 50 passengers and fairly substantial quantities of luggage, including bicycles and furniture.

(98)         Most of the early boat crossings fell in the category of organised rather than assisted spontaneous repatriation in the sense that refugees were taken, for example, by bus to Nsanje from the Mwanza camps and thence by boat to Megaza transit centre in Mozambique for onward transportation to their final destination, often via another transit centre in Morrumbala town 45 kms further distant from Megeza.  They were registered for departure and their ration cards withdrawn prior to leaving their camp in Malawi.

(99)         By 6 October 1994 - prior to a  brief suspension of the programme following an outbreak of bubonic plague in Mozambique - 7,642 returnees had crossed by boat to Mozambique through the UNHCR/ARC operation, of whom 5,146 had gone via Nsanje and the remainder via Chiromo or Tengani.

(100)       By late November 1994, however, and continuing through the early months of 1995, difficulties and differences arose.  These were part of a wider picture, with UNHCR Mozambique complaining that many more refugees were being repatriated than had originally been agreed[31], objecting to erratic movement patterns and repatriation during the rainy season when roads in Mozambique were impassable and expressing grave concern at a 25-26 February 1995 distribution of 3-months rations to the residual caseload in Nsanje district which, it feared, might precipitate a mass movement to Mozambique just when conditions for the reception of repatriants were at their most precarious[32].  A good deal of heat and cable traffic was generated, with UNHCR Malawi insisting, inter alia, that it had never contemplated large scale repatriation during the rainy season and that the justification for a longer food distribution period was, as on earlier occasions,  to discourage those who had already repatriated to Mozambique from returning to Malawi on distribution days to try and collect the rations to which they were no longer properly entitled.  It emphatically did not imply that Malawi was expelling the remaining refugees to Mozambique.

(101)       The significance of the boat exercise in this context is that, at least in its latter stages, it represents in microcosm the issues on which opinions diverged between BO Malawi and BO Mozambique.  Feeling so strongly that refugees should be dissuaded from returning until May 1995 when the rains would be over, UNHCR colleagues in Mozambique found it difficult to understand in February and March that the crossing point at Nsanje remained open with three boats regularly available for the use of refugees wishing to cross the Shire River to Megaza. Given its attitude that, to quote a UNHCR Maputo cable of 24 February 1995, “it is unwise to repatriate refugees during the rainy season .... road travel inside Mozambique is difficult and often impossible .... it is onerous and difficult for refugees to reestablish their houses .... the rainy season is the time of high malnutrition rates ....”.  BO Mozambique clearly felt that assisted movements should be suspended and the boats taken out of service.

(102)       BO Malawi, on the other hand, always insisted on the spontaneous nature of the repatriation movements and on the likelihood that repatriating refugees were perfectly well aware of conditions on the other side of the river and would cross when they wanted to whether UNHCR - sponsored boats were or were not provided.  Certainly, when the evaluation mission visited the Nsanje crossing point on 18 March 1995, boats could be observed crossing in both directions and one old man interviewed briefly on arrival from Mozambique said that conditions there were ‘good’.  The boats continued to operate during the rainy season and by mid-March some 15,000 in all had been repatriated by this means.  By the end of March 1995, UNHCR Mozambique estimated that all the refugees expected to arrive via Megaza had already done so, while 95% of the returnee caseload to Morrumbala District was believed to have returned in 1994.

(103)       Organised repatriation movements by truck or rail had virtually come to an end by December 1994 - the IOM internal transport operation via Mutarara in Mozambique came to a halt on 17 December when the rains made roads impassable and was not to be resumed, if at all, until mid-May 1995.  According to UNHCR Mozambique, this so-called ‘Mutarara Special Operation’ had assisted 93,613 refugees to return home by the end of 1994[33] by transporting them from the Villa Nova entry point bordering Nsanje district to their various destinations in Mozambique.

(104)       Organised (or was it assisted spontaneous?) repatriation by road also brought periodic tensions and misunderstandings.  For example, on 7 May 1994 the Field Officer, Milange in Mozambique complained that assisted arrivals totalling 2,867 persons during the previous week had exceeded by 100% the target figure communicated to his counterpart in Malawi in pre-movement consultations and that local transportation and reception facilities were severely strained.  Some 6,000 spontaneous arrivals had taken place over the same period, adding to the problem of absorption.  There were other complaints concerning overloaded buses and excessive numbers arriving on a single day.  By 14 May, however, Field Officer Milange was able to report that the situation was under control and that coordination between Field Offices on both sides of the border was improving.

(105)       It is important to put these and similar problems into a true perspective.  May 1994 was a peak movement for repatriation, and handling capacity on all sides had reached its limits - Milanje and Northern Morrumbala were receiving an average of more than 1,000 returnees each day and between early May and early June over 138,000 refugees returned spontaneously or with assistance from Malawi to Mozambique.  Overall, the great majority of the 1.06 million refugees who were in Malawi when the refugee population was at its very peak in February 1993 repatriated spontaneously without assistance of any kind and most organised or ‘assisted’ repatriation took place smoothly and with full cooperation on both sides.  Perhaps the underlying cause of tension and mistrust between the two Branch Offices was a feeling on the part of UNHCR Mozambique that the pace of repatriation (particularly when it seemed to have been deliberately accelerated by food consolidation and the provision of additional transport for assisted spontaneous return in the middle months of 1994) was being dictated by the country of asylum rather than by the country of origin of the refugees.

(106)       In a sense, as one senior desk officer has suggested, both sides were right.  As a matter of principle, the pace and logistics of repatriation must be determined by the absorptive capacity of the country of origin and this principle was carefully observed in all the other countries of asylum.  On the other hand, numbers elsewhere were relatively insignificant compared to those in Malawi and, except in Zambia, the refugees for whose repatriation UNHCR assumed direct responsibility were generally accommodated in camps or settlements far from the Mozambiqe border. Only in Malawi did the great mass of refugees have the option of making their own way home, often to areas with which they had maintained close contacts during their years as refugees.  In short, the refugees repatriated themselves and UNHCR’s role was mainly to ensure through, for example, food consolidation that, having gone, they stayed.  There is no doubt, however, that by early 1994 the emphasis, from UNHCR Malawi’s point of view, had changed from facilitating repatriation to actively promoting and, indeed, accelerating it.  At an extraordinary coordination meeting on 23 May 1994, the UNHCR Representative for Malawi “emphasised the importance to seize this opportunity to accelerate the repatriation process”.  He cautioned all concerned not to confuse assisted spontaneous with organised repatriation and to act accordingly.  Nevertheless, as has been remarked earlier, the distinction between the two is not easy to draw but seems to lie, if anywhere, in the relatively unregulated and unpredictable size and frequency of assisted spontaneous movement.  This in turn created the reception and absorption difficulties of which UNHCR field staff in Mozambique complained and which they believed could easily have been avoided had their counterparts in Malawi not been under pressure to “repatriate at any price”.

(107)       For all the conflicting pressures in the field, the mechanisms established for coordination between UNHCR Branch Offices, the two governments and operational partners on both sides of the border were at least as well developed between Mozambique and Malawi as with any other country of asylum.  The Tripartite Commission held eight meetings between April 1989 and March 1994 (although it seems to have lapsed thereafter and there was a gap of over a year between the sixth and seventh meetings).  NGO representatives were invited to attend as observers from the fifth meeting onwards.  Cross-border district coordinating committees met  sporadically and National Coordinating Committees were established in Malawi in June 1990[34] and in Mozambique in July 1990.  Most importantly, UNHCR Malawi/WFP/UNHCR Mozambique held frequent coordination meetings, eight in all up to the end of March 1995, supported on issues of detail by a joint Malawi/Mozambique Repatriation Task Force during late 1993 and the first half of 1994.

(108)       The deliberations and conclusions of all these bodies are fully recorded.  While they do not, by and large, reveal the frustrations and resentment that occasionally erupted, they do demonstrate that overall a high degree of coordination, cooperation and mutual understanding was achieved.  The basic lesson to be learnt, was perhaps best expressed in the following words in a report by the Field Office, Lilongwe on the organised repatriation to Niassa Province from Nkhata Bay :

“Another learning experience of the repatriation is the importance of careful planning and constant review of the progress in an organised repatriation.  The operation also showed the importance of working as a team in that there were a number of agents with different specific tasks but all aimed at one purpose and goal”.

(109)       The Nkhata Bay operation successfully moved an entire caseload[35] of 2,492 refugees back to Lago District in Mozambique by ship between 30 April and 13 May 1994.  The repatriation plan had been approved by the National Coordination Committee in February and pre-departure activities had begun in March.  A number of NGOs, particularly the Norwegian Refugee Council, were fully involved and there was close cooperation with the Government authorities on both sides.  The exercise appears to have been a model of its kind and the description in the final report of the various planning and operational phases which led to its success should be required reading for those planning future operations of a similar kind.

(110)       Assisted repatriation from Malawi to Mozambique finally came to an end with the so-called ‘final assisted movement’ from the remaining Nsanje District camps to Mutarara and thence to final destinations in the Tete, Sofala and Zambezia Provinces between 22 May and 13 June 1995.  Over this period, a total of 41,115 returnees were moved by UNHCR and - in Mozambique - by NAR, using directly hired transport in the form of buses, trucks and two boats for the Zambezi  river crossing, mainly for those whose final destination was in Sofala Province.  There was no IOM involvement and, despite heavy rain, periodic overcrowding with up to 2,000 inhabitants at the Bauer Transit Camp in Mutarara and the fact that two boats proved insufficient (one was frequently out of order), the operation appears to have been a great success, with excellent cooperation on both sides.  A peak figure of 3,349 was moved from Malawi to Mozambique on a single day - 7 June.  Happily, in the words of the Field Officer, Mutarara, repatriants were arriving “with huge stacks of food”.

INFORMATION

(111)       The need for refugees in Malawi to be properly informed about all aspects of the voluntary repatriation process and, in particular, about conditions in Mozambique was constantly stressed.  The minutes of Tripartite Commission meetings from 1989 onwards contain many references to ‘the need to publicise the possibilities for repatriation’ (April 1989).  Between 27 December 1989 and 10 January 1990, the Malawi Minister of Local Government together with representatives of the Mozambique Government and UNHCR visited all the refugee camps in Mulanje, Mangochi, Ntcheu and Dedza districts ‘to acquaint refugees’ with the purpose of the Tripartite Commission and to sensitise them to the possibility of returning to Mozambique in safety and dignity.  The need for high-level delegations from both countries and UNHCR was again emphasised by the Tripartite Commission’s working group in July 1993 and a 1994 report pointed out that “virtually every planning document written over the last two years concerning facilitation of voluntary repatriation from Malawi contains some reference to the need for a mass information campaign”[36].

(112)       Visits by Tripartite Commission members to refugee camps and areas, although regularly described as an important information tool, seem after the beginning of 1990 to have taken place only infrequently and then by relatively low-level delegations.  In a meeting with the Mozambique Embassy in Malawi, the evaluation mission was told that there were too few visits by Mozambican delegates to the refugees.  The first official published notification to the refugee community that ‘those who wish can now go home to Mozambique’ was only signed on behalf of the Tripartite Commission on 29 March 1994 and issued in April 1994, rather late one might think with little more than half of the peak refugee population then remaining in Malawi.  By that time also, a substantial degree of food consolidation had already taken place and there seems no doubt that this was generally taken by the refugees to mean that it was time for them to leave[37].

The Tripartite Commission message was read over the radio in Malawi in different languages[38] and distributed in the camps as posters.  It was supplemented by an informal refugee information network initiated by SCF (UK) in collaboration with UNHCR between January and July 1994.  This was designed to disseminate information collected by refugees themselves on conditions in Mozambique from those who had crossed the border and returned to Malawi.  While needing to be applied with caution, the network had obvious merits, not least the ability to provide area-specific information as a general information pamphlet could not do.

(113)       The lack of area-specific coverage was one of many criticisms of UNHCR’s information activity made by the SCF (UK) report referred to above.  The report criticized the fact that the 29 March 1994 message from the Tripartite Commission was ‘late in the extreme’ and added that the broad nature of the information provided meant that it was not always accurate - citing a report from the UNHCR Field Officer in Mangochi that refugees who had returned to Mozambique ‘particularly after the information packs were distributed in April 1994' were coming back to Mangochi for lack of food.  More seriously, the report suggested that the issue of the information bulletin signalled ‘a change from unbiased information towards low-key propaganda.’  It is certainly true that, by early 1994, UNHCR representatives at joint meetings with the Government were giving assurances that, for example, while the voluntary nature of their decisions would be respected, the repatriation message would be strongly conveyed to refugees.

(114)       There were other SCF (UK) criticisms and generally the report is fairly jaundiced in its attitude to UNHCR and officialdom generally.  A more temperate view might be to agree that the bulletin was certainly late in being issued, given that so much repatriation both from Malawi and other countries of asylum[39] had already place but that SCF (UK) probably underestimated the extent and accuracy of the information already available to the refugees via their own channels and cross-border movement and promoted by the SCF (UK)-sponsored informal information network.  Nevertheless, bearing in mind the statement in UNHCR’s own January 1994 Progress Report (page 14 para.81) that “much more attention will have to be paid this year to a good mass information campaign to ensure that refugees are aware of developments in Mozambique”, more might have been done and earlier to disseminate information on particular areas in Mozambique and on the situation vis-à-vis food availability, roads, schools, health services, water supply and mines.  This presupposes, however, the availability of accurate information from UNHCR in Mozambique which, until it strengthened its presence there in late 1993 and early 1994 (mainly the latter), was far from being the case.  Only the Milanje Field Office was opened in 1993 (September) and Mandimba and Morrumbala not until March/April 1994.

(115)       Finally, it should be mentioned that the information needs of international agencies, NGOs (although these often had their own information packages), diplomatic missions, government departments and the like were met by a Branch Office Malawi publication, “Zikomo Malawi”[40] of which there were five issues covering the “boom”repatriation period between 9 May 1994 and 30 September 1994.  Unlike the information bulletin, which was distributed to the refugees in Chichewa, Chisenna and Portuguese as well as English, ‘Zikomo Malawi’ appeared in English only and, while giving useful publicity to the repatriation process, was not intended as an information vehicle for refugees or circulated within the refugee camps.

MINE AWARENESS

(116)       The fact that the bulk of the repatriation from Malawi was spontaneous did not prevent a mine awareness campaign being mounted among the refugees, on similar lines to campaigns in other countries of asylum.  In March 1993, before the major wave of repatriation was under way, UNHCR approached the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to become its implementing partner in a Land Mine Awareness Programme (LMAP), an appropriate choice since IRC had previously been involved in mine awareness campaigns in Thailand and Pakistan and had played a major role in refugee assistance in Malawi since 1987.  Concurrently, UNHCR secured the support of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the NGO primarily responsible for demining in Mozambique itself, as consultants.

(117)       The programme required two separate approaches: formal instruction in the camps and an informal mass-information campaign in those areas where the refugees were integrated with the local Malawian population.  Between September 1993 and June 1994, the LMAP trained a total of 180 instructors and 28 supervisors who worked in 17 refugee camps in the Southern region of Malawi training an estimated 380,000 refugees.  According to IRC, however, substantial funding was never secured for a mass information campaign in the central districts where most of the refugees who had integrated in Malawian villages were located.  Apart from the display of posters and the distribution of other materials, little could be done before the massive waves of repatriation from those districts to Mozambique took place.  Fortunately, the areas mainly in Tete Province  to which they returned were considered to have been relatively lightly mined.  IRC’s own records of mine victims show reports of only 30 cases from 1987 onwards including 8 deaths, although there is no suggestion that these figures are exhaustive.

(118)       In summary, one has to conclude that probably less than half of the refugees repatriating from Malawi had much systematic exposure to the mine awareness campaign and that only those in camps were covered in a comprehensive way.  On the other hand, refugees repatriating spontaneously from other countries of asylum - Tanzania, Zimbabwe - had virtually no mine awareness instruction and the total number covered by the Malawi programme was much greater than elsewhere.

ENVIRONMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Environment

(119)       In every country with a sizeable refugee population, UNHCR must be concerned with the impact on the environment and, once the refugees repatriate, with the disposal of the physical assets associated with the care and maintenance programme instituted to assist them.

(120)       In other countries of asylum hosting Mozambican refugees, the environmental impact was limited by the establishment of camps or agricultural settlements and, of course, by the much smaller number of refugees.  Similarly, the disposal of assets - although conscientiously attended to in each case[41] - did not constitute a major problem.  In Malawi, however, the environmental and ecological consequences of the presence of over a million refugees, many of them living in so-called ‘open settlements’ alongside Malawian villages or in open camps, were enormous.  A complex physical infrastructure had, moreover, been put in place to provide for refugee needs and represented a major asset either to be used for the national benefit or left to waste.

(121)       To its credit, UNHCR Branch Office in Malawi recognised the environmental problem from the start.  The rate of deforestation - 150,000 hectares or 3.5% of the national forest cover - is the highest in southern Africa with the great majority of people deriving their total energy needs from wood.  This rate was undoubtedly aggravated by the presence of the refugees who cut most of their fuel requirements from the scarce wood resources of the areas where they lived, as well as using forest products for the construction of shelter and other domestic needs.  UNHCR therefore launched a reafforestation programme in 1988 and by mid-1994 had spent some $2.8 million on the planting of 8146.84 hectares of forest in refugee-hosting districts.  The German Government has also provided substantial funds through UNHCR for the development and conservation of national resources in refugee areas.  Project activities have also included erosion control, the production of fuel saving stoves and training.

(122)       This effort, however commendable, has been only ‘a drop in the ocean’.  At its peak, the refugee population was denuding the forest cover at the rate of 22,000 hectares per year while UNHCR was replacing it at an average rate of 1,300 hectares per year - the shortfall is only too visible in the vicinity of any of the major refugee hosting sites[42].  The Branch Office has been doing its utmost to interest other potential donors, such as the EC and UNDP, in assisting the Government of Malawi in incorporating forestry and other needs into their country programmes[43] and regards this as an integral part of its approach to repatriation and the achievement of a durable solution to the refugee problem.  This is an important lesson for any voluntary repatriation operation; the range of activity undertaken must extend far beyond the mere physical process of repatriation to the restoration of the environment in the country of asylum as well as the successful reintegration of the refugees in their country of origin.

(123)       One more example - others could be given - of the environmental impact of refugees in Malawi is the damage sustained to the road system by the constant transportation of relief supplies, particularly on secondary and district roads which were not designed or constructed to carry heavy traffic.  The volume of relief goods being carried an average of at least 50 kilometres from reception point to camp distribution centres, reached more than 180,000 tons annually, causing severe damage to road surfaces, bridges and culverts affecting not only access to refugee centres but the normal transportation of agricultural produce from Malawian farms.  UNHCR has maintained a total of 1,073 kilometres of road in recent years and, although this has been phased down with the departure of the refugees, maintenance has continued in Nsanje District in 1995.

Infrastructure

(124)       After food and transportation, the highest single item in the Malawi care and maintenance budget was health - implemented at its peak by the Government and six NGOs, of which only one, MSF, was left in Nsanje by March 1995.  But 800 Ministry of Health staff were still employed on the refugee budget, and country-wide there were a total of 19 hospital wards, 91 staff houses, 17 dispensaries, 14 maternity units and 36 other structures which had been built under UNHCR auspices to meet refugee needs and were to be handed over to the Government.  In education, there were 437 classrooms and furniture to be handed over to the Government, which hoped to use these school facilities for the national education programme.  A total of 1,428 water points of various kinds had either been capped or handed over to the Malawi Water Department.

(125)       Great care has been taken by Branch Office Malawi over the phase-out modalities involving these and other assets, as well as many project vehicles and large numbers of supporting staff.  Hand-over plans to government ministries have been prepared and discussions initiated with other international agencies, not only UNDP and the EC, but also UNICEF - particularly as concerns the water and health sector - and others.  There is no need to elaborate here (and a formal handover to the Government has already taken place) except to reiterate the importance of an orderly phasing-out of relief assistance and the disposal of assets to the best advantage of the host nation which has borne the burden of the refugee presence.  UNHCR Malawi has rightly discharged these responsibilities as an integral part of the repatriation process.

(126)       One final point - it is extremely important that phase-out arrangements and negotiations be conducted with great sensitivity and diplomacy, particularly where the host government is concerned.  The departure of the refugees means loss as well as gain to the host society and the need to assume responsibilities and administer assets which have hitherto been handled by external agencies may come as both a challenge and a shock.  There is a natural desire to ‘squeeze the lemon’ for every last drop of aid before it is too late.  Future good relations may well depend on the spirit and manner in which the phase-out process is carried out.

(127)       The Government of Malawi has remained extremely anxious to secure continuing support for the restoration of the environment and the maintenance of the physical assets which are now its responsibility to administer.  These hopes and expectations are far beyond UNHCR's capacity to realise and must be left in the long term for development agencies to meet under the so-called transition from refugee aid to development - usually effected with disappointing results.  Any evaluation must conclude, however, that UNHCR has been alive to the issues and has done all it could.  Indeed, it was largely in the spirit of offering some infrastructural support that UNHCR undertook the rehabilitation in 1994 of a section of railway line to transport refugees under 'assisted spontaneous' arrangements between Nyamithithu and Markha on the Mozambique border - a purchase of goodwill at relatively little cost[44], although it seems doubtful whether much more of the railway link will be made operational  in the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION

(128)       Despite the burden of a caseload of over a million Mozambican refugees, UNHCR in Malawi had  distinct advantages in the task of initially facilitating and then promoting their voluntary repatriation.  There was already - quite unlike the situation in Mozambique - a developed network of Sub and Field Offices, a strong NGO presence, a cooperative government and an orderly and law-abiding community of refugees.  Care and maintenance facilities had been developed to an impressive standard.

(129)       There were no serious protection problems in Malawi.  The government machinery was generally honest and efficient and, although it had made nine reservations, Malawi was faithful to the letter and spirit of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol and the OAU Convention.  There was no hostility towards the refugees, most of whom shared an ethnic heritage with their Malawian cousins.  A repatriation training workshop originally planned for July/August 1993 for UNHCR staff, government officials and NGOs was never held, presumably for the simple reason that it was not needed .

(130)       Within the Branch Office, a Senior Repatriation Officer arrived in August 1993 to support the Representative in directing the repatriation programme.  A total of 7 International and 5 National Officer posts for the repatriation operation in Malawi were approved in May 1993 with supporting GL staff (mostly in telecommunications).  The lack of protection problems (see above) meant , however, that one P3 Protection Officer post for Blantyre never materialised while the other Protection Officer post was used mainly for the Nkhata Bay repatriation and the urban caseload.   The reinforcement of repatriation capacity was further enhanced by the simultaneous appointment by WFP of an Emergency Officer to deal with repatriation issues.  Later WFP established a regional project to allow flexibility in food allocations between Malawi and Mozambique, which proved invaluable to the introduction of food consolidation by making it reasonably possible to ensure that food distribution was only stopped on one side of the border when it was regularly available on the other.  Teamwork between agencies was excellent. Joint UNHCR/WFP  Malawi/Mozambique meetings were regularly held;  the evaluation mission has the record of eight such meetings between late 1993 and March 1995.  Cooperation between the two agencies most intimately concerned with voluntary repatriation was therefore constant and close.

(131)       In the view of some participants in the process, mid-1993 marked a transition in the role of Branch Office Malawi from facilitating voluntary repatriation to actively promoting it, influenced no doubt by the Deputy High Commissioner's mission to Mozambique between 6-12 June 1993 after which he urged 'a complete and rapid transformation of our programmes in the asylum countries and in Mozambique into a fully-fledged repatriation operation'.  (DHC's Mission Report 18 June 1993 page 3 para 12.)  Most significant of all, however, must have been the example of spontaneous repatriation that refugees returning to the Angonia and Tsangano Districts of Tete Province had already set, with lesser numbers returning to Macanga and elsewhere.  In June and July 1993, over 70,000 refugees returned to Angonia District alone.

(132)       It was therefore - and this is the principal (and obvious) lesson from the Malawi experience - the refugees themselves who played the predominant role in repatriation from Malawi and who made the largest single contribution to the operation’s success.  This is agreed by all involved and to make the point is not in any way to belittle the excellent work of the Branch Office in facilitating, promoting, organising and assisting the repatriation process.  For example, an admirably concise and precise repatriation plan was issued by the Branch Office's Repatriation Unit on 19 April 1994 covering all forthcoming organised and assisted movements of vulnerable and other cases, including the operation from Nkhata Bay.  But it serves as a reminder to all of us that refugees are human beings with as great a capacity to make up their own minds as anybody else and will not wait for UNHCR or any other agency to arrange for them things which they have already decided to undertake themselves.

(133)       The two most controversial aspects of the operation were (I) food consolidation and (ii) assisted spontaneous repatriation.

(134)       Food consolidation was defined in the course of a joint UNHCR/WFP food assessment in the Angonia/Tsangano areas of Mozambique and adjacent to Dedza and Ntcheu between 20-22 September 1993 as "food distribution ceases on the Malawi side in a context of an assured and regular food distribution on the corresponding Mozambique side".

(135)       The ungainly acronym coined to describe the concept was EFMCM or "Ensure Food in Mozambique and Consolidate in Malawi".  Had there been no food consolidation, there seems no doubt that a 'revolving door’ syndrome would have been perpetuated - as, indeed, had already begun - and that the Government of Malawi would have insisted on the cutting off of rations had UNHCR/WFP on both sides of the border not taken the initiative themselves.  An inevitable policy, then, although one which was open to misinterpretation and which, in some eyes, raised questions about the truly voluntary nature of the repatriation process.  It was certainly a message to the refugees, if they needed it, that it was time to go home and no clear arrangements appear to have been made to meet the case of refugees who did not wish to repatriate and elected to remain in Malawi instead.  One has also to say that 'an assured and regular food distribution on the Mozambique side' does not always seem to have been provided as a result of poor road communications and the like, so that the strict criteria for the policy were not consistently met.  Finally, the most recent consolidation decision of all in Nsanje District, when the 25-26 February distribution of a 110-day ration was announced as the very last, was the subject of an initial serious misunderstanding between the two Branch Offices.  The situation was clarified at a joint UNHCR/WFP Malawi/Mozambique meeting on 27 March 1995 but better communication could probably have avoided misapprehension from the start.

(136)       'Assisted spontaneous repatriation' was also a cause of tension, Branch Office Malawi regarding it as distinct from the organised repatriation of (mainly) vulnerable groups.  Only the vulnerable cases were repatriated on the basis of Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRFs), while assisted spontaneous repatriation was regarded as merely the provision of transport by road, rail or boat to help refugees do what they would otherwise have done, but with more difficulty, on their own.  To Branch Office Mozambique the distinction was specious - UNHCR Field Offices in Mozambique, it believed, had a responsibility to manage the reception and onward movement of 'assisted spontaneous' returnees in just the same way as that of organised groups.

(137)       This divergence of opinion was clearly illustrated in the minutes of a meeting between Sub-Office Tete and Branch Office/Sub Office Malawi representatives at Blantyre on 9 May 1994 to discuss the need to suspend assisted spontaneous repatriation to Mutarara District following the discovery of  land mines on the Mutarara-Villa Nova road.  To Sub-Office Tete, the need for suspension was axiomatic but, while UNHCR Malawi  concurred, it obviously had misgivings as the following extract from the minutes of the meeting shows:

'The Malawi side, while appreciating the above-mentioned statements, made the following observations:

The assisted spontaneous repatriation was designed to facilitate and accelerate the voluntary return of those refugees who were relocated by UNHCR from their points of entry to camps further inside Malawi.  These refugees have repeatedly expressed their wish to return to Mozambique should transport be made available.  The Tripartite Commission at its 8th meeting endorsed the proposal and decided that bus shuttles, railway services and boats at Shire and Ruo crossing points should be provided on an ad hoc and flexible basis.  The whole assisted spontaneous repatriation operation was not intended to be an organized repatriation.

The acceleration of voluntary repatriation has been viewed as vital to the timely return of Mozambican refugees to their country in order to register and participate in the forthcoming election and the reconstruction of Mozambique.

That the general announcement to refugees regarding the conditions in Mozambique has generated an immediate positive response for return.  Branch Office, Malawi has been under tremendous pressure from refugees to accelerate assisted spontaneous repatriation.

The key to the success of this operation was its flexibility and the ability to move the returnees further inland enabling them to reach their villages of origin at the shortest time possible.

The abrupt suspension of the Mutarara-bound shuttles created problems in Malawi, particularly for those refugees who had demolished their dwellings in readiness for departure.  The congestion precipitated by the suspension created potential health and sanitation hazards in temporary shelters.

It is, however, hoped that the demining of the Charre-Villa Nova stretch will be expedited to enable Branch Office, Malawi to honour its contractual obligations with transporters".

(138)       The irritation evident in the Malawi side's response was clearly exacerbated by the fact that Sub-Office Tete also asked that, when assisted spontaneous repatriation resumed via Villa Nova, it should initially be limited to 500 individuals per day and that to northern Morrumbala District it should be put on hold because the road network was non-existent and most areas were inaccessible.  The conclusions of the meeting did not reflect agreement to either of these requests.

(139)       One need not elaborate further or exaggerate the problems.  As one senior UNHCR official in Malawi pointed out to the evaluation mission (and as we have noted elsewhere) the respective Branch Offices had different, even conflicting, agendas so that some disagreement was inevitable - Malawi's perceived task was to facilitate, promote and, at times undoubtedly, to accele