• Text size  | | |
• Email this document
• Printable version

ICG in the Balkans, Past Present and Future

ICG'S MISSION IN BOSNIA

Since February 1996 the International Crisis Group (ICG) has been engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of the international effort to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Based in Sarajevo, ICG staff have monitored progress towards implementation of the peace accords, identifying potential obstacles, alerting the international community to the existence of such obstacles and advocating strategies for overcoming them. At all times ICG's priority has been to assist the international community, including all those organisations involved in implementing the peace agreement, and to identify and pre-empt any threats to the peace process before they have a chance to re-ignite the conflict that ravaged the region between 1991 and 1995.

THE NEED TO MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

More than 14 months after the DPA ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the guns remain silent but little else has been achieved. The civilian provisions of the peace process are in crisis. By ICG's reckoning, the only two objective criteria by which to measure the success of DPA implementation, beyond whether the cease-fire is holding, are the number of those indicted by the International Tribunal for Crimes in Former Yugoslavia who have been arrested and the number of displaced persons who have returned to their homes. The record on both counts is extremely poor.

Nationalist leaders were given a fresh mandate last September in what were clearly fraudulent elections. Since the September vote, Bosnia and Herzegovina's joint, national institutions, whose creation was used by western governments as a reason to justify the holding of national elections, have come together in name though not in substance. Moreover, Bosnian Serb obstructionism has so far blocked adoption of key legislation necessary to begin the reintegration process and revitalise the economy.

Despite the conclusions of December's London Implementation Conference which referred specifically to the need to attach clear conditions to economic aid, the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina appears determined to start giving money to Republika Srpska despite the failure of the entities leaders to co-operate with implementation of the Dayton accords. Given the European Union's experience of the divided Croat-Bosniac city of Mostar, where more than 270 million DM - close to 5,000 DM per person - was invested to no avail, such a policy is likely to be both costly and doomed to failure.

While an end to the killing has taken events in Bosnia and Herzegovina off the television screens and the front pages of western newspapers, the conflict has not been resolved and may yet spill over into bloodshed again. Indeed, unless the international community takes immediate and resolute action, we believe there is a real possibility that the DPA will go down in history not the basis for a lasting peace in Bosnia but rather as one of the most expensive cease-fires in history.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ICG'S BOSNIA PROGRAM DURING 1996-7

Since opening its Sarajevo office in February 1996, ICG has assumed a unique role among NGOs active in Bosnia and Herzegovina by serving both as the leading watchdog of the international community and authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and as a valued source of information, advice and ideas. While ICG does not shrink from offering criticism where criticism is due, it is best known and sought after for its analysis and constructive recommendations, based on close knowledge of the country and its leaders, solid field research and a bold problem-solving approach. In all that it does, ICG seeks to promote compliance with the basic principles of the DPA, including the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes, arrest of war criminals, restoration of a multi-ethnic society characterised by tolerance and respect for minority rights, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ICG's Bosnia team includes two international lawyers and six experienced policy analysts, one of whom is Bosnian and several of whom have lived in the region for several years and/or speak the local languages.

The international and Bosnian media now routinely seek ICG's comments about breaking developments as well as major policy debates. ICG staff write for a number of influential publications, including the Economist and International Herald Tribune, and have been interviewed by the BBC, CNN, NBC, CBC, NPR, RFE, and other broadcasters. Most recently, ICG was featured in a CBS "60 Minutes" TV segment on indicted war criminals (broadcast in April 1997). The local Bosnian press regularly reproduce substantial parts of ICG reports and ICG staff are interviewed on local radio and TV every month.

The ICG Bosnia Program's most significant achievements to date can be summarised as follows:

Elections

• By exposing fraud in the conduct of last September's national elections, ICG was instrumental in convincing the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), charged by the DPA with supervising and conducting the elections, to postpone the holding of municipal elections until conditions for elections could be improved. The municipal elections were initially postponed from September to November 1996, and then to September 1997. ICG has also revealed flaws and inadequacies in the OSCE's preparations for elections, in a number of cases unveiling evidence of cases of fraud and other serious irregularities.

• ICG produced five separate reports on the conditions for the September 1996 elections and on the conduct of the elections themselves. These reports were quoted, often extensively, in more than 400 wire service reports, newspapers and journals in Bosnia and around the world.

• ICG was influential in having the terms of office for national, entity and cantonal representatives elected at the September 1996 poll limited to two years, thus opening the possibility for non-nationalists to gain influence at these levels in two rather than four years' time.

• ICG has worked closely with the OSCE to help improve the procedures for municipal elections now due in September 1997. It helped redraft rules and regulations with the goal of eliminating gaps, tightening controls, and preventing fraud and other forms of abuse. It also provided the OSCE, in response to specific requests, with suggestions on how to structure the Brcko and Mostar elections and how to encourage the installation, post-election, of winning candidates who are ethnically in a minority in the municipality where elected.

Promoting the Use of Economic Assistance as a Leverage for Compliance with DPA

The international community's main source of influence over authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina is economic assistance (given the limited uses to which military carrots and sticks can be applied). Yet, while the principle of conditioning aid on compliance with the DPA is generally accepted, there is disagreement as to how it should be applied in practice, and some donors have subordinated the principle to other, bilateral objectives. Aid conditionality can only be effective if there is consensus as to how it should be applied and uniformity in its actual application. ICG has worked to persuade leaders of the international community and other opinion and policy makers of the wisdom and effectiveness of strict economic conditionality.

• ICG commissioned a seasoned international economist to develop a cogent, principled defence of the wisdom and effectiveness of conditioning aid to Bosnian authorities and companies on DPA compliance.

• ICG has consistently urged the use of economic conditionality to achieve certain fundamental aspects of the DPA, in several reports and in meetings with policy and opinion makers.

The Brcko Arbitration

Brcko, the most intensely contested strategic target during the 43-month war, remains the flashpoint most likely to re-ignite hostilities between Bosnia's two sub-state entities (the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska). Which entity was to have jurisdiction of Brcko Town was the one territorial issue left undecided by the DPA. The matter was referred to an Arbitration Tribunal which decided, in February 1997, to leave jurisdiction with the Bosnian Serbs (who comprised only 20% of the pre-war population but now, as a result of "ethnic cleansing", comprise more than 96%). Brcko Town will now be subject to a weak international administration for one year after which, in March 1998, the Tribunal will revisit its decision. In theory, if the Bosnian Serb authorities substantially fail to comply with their obligations under the Award and the DPA, the Tribunal could decide to award the Town to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Brcko Town will receive considerable international assistance to rebuild homes, stimulate the economy, and jump-start minority returns.

• ICG published two comprehensive studies of the Brcko dispute, in August 1996 and January 1997, making recommendations which the Arbitration Tribunal adopted in part: the Tribunal retained jurisdiction for a period of one year (ICG had recommended five years); and decided to leave open the possibility of awarding Brcko Town to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICG had recommended that Brcko Town be awarded now to the state).

• The day after the Brcko decision was announced, ICG published a statement underscoring the importance of compliance, and offering recommendations on how to compensate for the decision's shortcomings. The ICG statement was fully reprinted in the Bosnian press and widely reported in the international media.

• Within the first days of the arrival of Brcko's international Supervisor, ICG sent him a memo recommending a series of concrete steps to take in order to monitor the parties' compliance with the Award and the DPA and to stimulate minority returns. In addition, ICG provided him with a well-researched summary of the companies doing business in Brcko Town, identifying those which should not receive any assistance (owing to the likelihood that their owners or managers will obstruct minority returns) and also identifying those which merit assistance, owing to their records of non-discrimination and sound business management.

Mostar

Within the Bosniac-Croat Federation, the area wracked by the most intense ethnic tensions has been the city of Mostar, previously multi-ethnic, now divided into Croat-controlled west Mostar and Bosniac-controlled east Mostar. Few Bosniacs or Serbs remain in west Mostar, from which more than 80 Bosniac families were forcibly evicted during the past year. On 10 February, increasing tensions culminated in the shooting by Croat police into a crowd of unarmed civilians, killing one pensioner and wounding several.

• ICG investigated this incident first-hand and published a detailed account and recommendations within 3 days. The report was reprinted by the Bosnian press and, because of its timeliness, prompted firmer statements by members of the international community than might otherwise have been expected.

• ICG issued a report in April 1996 urging that the Mostar election scheduled for May 1996 be postponed because conditions and election preparations were far short of those needed for a free and fair poll. The report was credited as a major reason for the election's postponement and the subsequently successful poll.

• ICG has continued to monitor the situation in Mostar and, owing to good relations established with local and international authorities and media during the pre-election period, has been an active participant in discussions about how to respond to various incidents.

Support for State Sovereignty

• The parliaments of the two sub-state entities have been working on privatisation laws for all assets previously owned by the former Yugoslavia. Under international law, these assets clearly belong to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the successor to the former Yugoslavia. ICG became concerned that, in the head-long rush towards privatisation, no attention was being paid to safeguarding the financial viability of the state and its institutions.

• ICG published an analysis, written by international law experts on state succession matters, setting forth the arguments for concluding that the assets belong to the state under well-settled principles of international law and that the DPA did not reverse that presumption. This paper has stimulated considerable interest and debate among Bosnian government officials, World Bank and US Treasury representatives and others working on the privatisation issue. As a result of ICG's paper and advocacy, attention is now being devoted to how best to safeguard the state's financial viability, and to ensure that the state's sovereignty over the assets is recognised in law. Inter alia, this will make it more difficult for either entity to break away from the state.

Accountability and Arrest of War Criminals

The arrest and prosecution of people indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are crucial preconditions for building genuine peace and reconciliation. Displaced persons cannot be expected to return to their pre-war homes in areas from which they were ethnically cleansed while the rule of law, not to mention the murder of their families and neighbours, is so flagrantly ignored.

• ICG has focused considerable international diplomatic and media attention on the need to arrest and deliver to the Hague those indicted by the International Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.

• ICG actively solicited the support of prominent individuals and key NGOs in securing needed resources and staff for the Tribunal.

• ICG prepared a substantial assessment of the first year of the DPA's implementation, with specific recommendations as to how the international community should and could more effectively hold accountable authorities at all levels of government, political leaders, police and military for obstructing the DPA and committing war crimes. These recommendations, and the media coverage they received, helped shape the international community's approach and the outcome of the London Implementation Conference in December 1996, especially on the issue of the arrest of war criminals.

Support for Independent Media

• ICG assisted alternative media, especially in Republika Srpska, by linking them with international funding sources, in order to promote media outlets capable of countering ultra-nationalist propaganda from the main media sources. In the lead-up to last September's national elections, ICG provided direct support to two new alternative newspapers in Banja Luka.

• ICG prepared a report surveying the state of local media in Bosnia and Herzegovina and recommending to donors ways to more effectively promote professionalism and independence, especially in parts of the country where the independent media is weakest. ICG staff and Board members have met with donors to focus attention on its recommendations and discuss appropriate follow-up action.

• ICG has assisted the OSCE's Media Experts commission (MEC) in developing procedures and policies for promoting free and responsible media. In particular, ICG helped develop guidelines on inflammatory statements, call-in shows and physical intimidation, and helped persuade the MEC to expand its membership to include independent journalists.

Return and Reintegration of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Since the signing of the DPA, only some 250,000 out of more than two million displaced person have returned to their pre-war homes, very few from outside the country, and almost all to areas where they belong to the majority ethnic group. During the same period, some 80,000 people have been displaced from areas where they were in the minority. 1997 is a crucial year for breaking the return and reintegration logjam. If substantial progress is not made during this year before the international forces (SFOR) leave Bosnia, the prospect for returns and reintegration thereafter will be severely curtailed. Without reintegration, the centrifugal political forces may prove impossible to resist, dooming Bosnia to inevitable and de jure disintegration. The consequences will be further conflict and a growing humanitarian disaster, including new mass population movements.

• ICG embarked on a major assessment of the international community's programs to promote returns and reintegration in Bosnia during 1996 with a view to drawing lessons from the experience. A report on ICG's findings and recommendations will be published in April 1997.

• ICG made a substantial contribution to efforts to persuade Serbs to remain voluntarily in Sarajevo during the transfer of authority in February 1996 by providing much needed support to a local Serb civic group.

• Through its Board of Trustees, ICG appealed for support for the commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, helping secure the necessary funding for the commission's work, especially during the initial six months of its operation. In addition, ICG assisted the commission in the development of its guiding principles.

• ICG assisted the Property Task-Force of the Office of the High Representative in the development of guiding principles for amending war-time property ownership and usage laws which discriminate against displaced persons and are contrary to DPA. ICG also provided support to the OHR in developing a strategy to convince the legislature to amend the laws, and a litigation strategy to bring about the necessary changes through the courts should the legislatures fail to do so.

• ICG provided logistical support to the Federation Mediator Dr. Christian Schwartz-Schilling during his missions in the country, accompanied him during his missions as part of the delegation, and assisted with the follow-up to the meetings and agreements reached. A main component of the Mediator's effort has been the promotion of conditions conducive to the return and reintegration of displaced persons.

• The presence of some six million unexploded shells and land mines strewn across the country poses a substantial deterrent to returns. In April, ICG will issue a report examining why de-mining efforts during 1996 fell so far behind projected targets, and recommending concrete steps for increasing the likelihood of success of efforts undertaken in 1997 and thereafter, stressing the need for sustainability and coherence.

Reports Published in Sarajevo

To date, the following reports have been produced in Sarajevo:

1. Eastern Slavonia

2. Analysis of the International Police Task Force (14/05/96)

3. Security, Repatriation, Elections and Reconstruction (01/04/96)

4. Military Security post-IFOR (15/04/96)

5. Bosnia Policy Framework Report (20/04/96)

6. Conditions for Democratic Elections in Bosnia (22/05/96)

7. The Political Crisis in Republika Srpska (23/05/96)

8. Elections in Mostar (28/05/96)

9. ICG Statement on the Elections in Bosnia (05/06/96)

10. An Independent Six Month Review of the Dayton Peace Accords (13/06/96)

11. Inside Radovan's Republika - The Struggle for Power in Republika Srpska (11/07/96)

12. Political Lessons from Mostar Elections (13/07/96)

• Technical Lessons from Mostar Elections (13/07/96)

13. Electioneering in Republika Srpska (08/96)

14. Why the Bosnian Elections Must be Postponed (14/08/96) (69Kb)

15. Brcko Arbitration - Discussion Paper on the Future of the Northern Bosnian Town of Brcko (08/96)

16. Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (22/09/96)

17. Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation (24/11/96)

18. Brcko Arbitration: Proposal for Peace (20/01/97)

19. Grave Situation in Mostar: Robust Response Required (13/02/97)

20. State Succession Report (20/02/97)

21. Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina (18/03/97)

22. Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina (30/04/97)

Additional Bosnia papers:

• Internal Report 1 - Eastern Slavonia (30/04/96)

• The European Union Administration of Mostar (13/06/96)

• Mostar Weekly Report (20/06/96)

• Eastern Slavonia (28/06/96)

• Brcko Arbitration - Discussion Paper on the Future of the Northern Bosnian Town of Brcko (08/96)

• Recommendations to get the Dayton Process Back on Track (13/11/96)

In addition, the following reports are in progress and will be published in April:

• The de-mining effort

• Repatriation and reintegration of displaced persons

[click here for current reports...]

ICG BOSNIA STAFF

The current professional team consists of the following, with their nationality indicated in parenthesis:

DirectorHrair Balian (US, Lebanon)

Legal AdvisorSandra Coliver (US)

Senior Political AnalystChris Bennett (UK, US, Slovenia)

Media Relations/Political AnalystAnna Husarska (Poland, France)

Political AnalystRandolf Ryan (US)

LogisticsSenad Lulo (Bosnia)

In addition, three Bosnian support staff are currently employed as receptionist/interpreter, office assistant, and driver.

PRIORITIES FOR THE PERIOD AHEAD

Accountability and Reconciliation

Without a broad reconciliation process in Bosnia, the wounds inflicted during the war will not heal even if the international community's effort to address the symptoms are successful. Such efforts may produce a temporary semblance of stability, but the first spark may again ignite passions and return the country to conflict and humanitarian catastrophe.

The need for a reconciliation process has been largely ignored by the international community. Even when some attempts at reconciliation have been made, efforts have been insufficient, superficial, and uncoordinated. Without a broader approach to reconciliation, repatriation and reintegration will simply not occur in the numbers anticipated, the question of the missing will not attract the attention it deserves and the war crimes issue will not be brought to a successful conclusion.

ICG will develop a program of action for reconciliation which should include the following elements:

• first and foremost, accountability for crimes committed - a speedy punishment of the principal perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, ending the vicious cycle of impunity;

• the possibility of establishing a "Truth commission" to address the culpability of thousands of individuals who have committed lesser crimes during the war without the necessity to punish them all - ICG will examine the experience in South Africa and elsewhere and draw relevant conclusions for Bosnia. (There has already been some preliminary discussion among a few leaders of the international community in Bosnia as to the possibility of establishing such a commission);

• a speedy resolution of the question of the "missing" including exhumation and the identification of remains in mass graves;

• the removal and identification of bodies remaining in the open and proper burial;

• proper memorials for the victims so that survivors have an opportunity to mourn; and

• the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law must be an important component of any reconciliation program.

ICG has already started work on a number of the elements discussed above as detailed above.

Return and Reintegration of Displaced Persons

The following six months are crucial for breaking the return and reintegration logjam. If substantial progress is not made during the next year in the return and reintegration of displaced persons before the international forces (SFOR) leave Bosnia, the opportunity may be lost forever. And without reintegration, the centrifugal political forces may prove irresistible, triggering the disintegration.

In this submission, ICG proposes a bold return and reintegration strategy.

Promote Returns to Brcko

The period ahead presents a window of opportunity, possibly the last, to promote the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to Brcko. Significant international efforts, led by an American Deputy High Representative, will be devoted to creating the economic, security and political conditions to encourage returns. Even though under special treatment, if the return program to Brcko is successful, it could have the potential of becoming a model for how to motivate minority returns and build a tolerant, multi-ethnic municipality. But equally, it could be a wasted opportunity or, at worst, a disaster that becomes the flashpoint for renewed conflict between the former warring factions.

In order to encourage returns to Brcko, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), in consultation with other key agencies, must develop and implement a co-ordinated strategy for loans, investments, housing repairs, infrastructure reconstruction, improved security arrangements, comprehensive registration of displaced voters, and fair and representative elections. The challenge is especially daunting since substantial progress must be made on all of those fronts by March 1998 (when the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal is due to decide whether to award Brcko permanently to Republika Srpska). The Brcko Deputy High Representative will not begin work until the end of March 1996. Most staff will not be on board until April and donors have not begun to put together a funding plan or made firm funding commitments. To add to difficulties, no serious work has yet begun on developing a plan for finding adequate, alternative housing for the displaced people currently living in Brcko, let alone for encouraging the return of the pre-war residents.

ICG plans to undertake a substantial project to promote the return of pre-war residents to Brcko and the return of displaced Serbs currently living in Brcko to their pre-war homes. The project will include three main components:

• Brcko Arbitration Tribunal to Develop Benchmarks for Compliance

Under the terms of its February 1997 award, the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal will consider "requests for further action affecting the Award" and, in particular, it may order that the Town of Brcko be made a special district of Bosnia and Herzegovina if there is not "satisfactory compliance with the Dayton Accords and the development of representative democratic local government".

The possibility that the administration of Brcko Town could be removed from Republika Srpska is a major source of pressure to encourage compliance with the terms of the Award and the Dayton Accords generally (forming a crucial complement to the substantial economic package that serves as the main inducement). For the pressure to work, it must have, and be understood to have, real bite. For this to be the case, all parties at the outset must understand the criteria by which compliance will be evaluated. "Compliance with Dayton" is too broad too suffice; rather, the Tribunal should, within the next several months, draw up a series of benchmarks that must be achieved if it is to issue a finding in March 1998 of "satisfactory compliance with the Dayton Accords and the development of representative democratic local government".

ICG plans to develop a set of benchmarks, in consultation with the Brcko Deputy High Representative, for use by the Arbitral Tribunal. These benchmarks will represent concrete, measurable targets. To develop them will require research as to what is feasible. ICG will propose that failure to meet the benchmarks should constitute a presumption of non-compliance, which may be rebutted by information explaining why the benchmarks could not be achieved despite efforts made in good faith.

Benchmarks will include measurable targets concerning the following areas: restructuring and re-training of the Brcko police; freedom of movement; resettlement of displaced persons currently residing in Brcko; return of pre-war residents; a fair and comprehensive voter registration process; conditions for free and fair elections; non-discrimination in employment, education and social services; and protection of security and other human rights of minorities. In the final analysis, the most important benchmark will be the return of displaced persons to Brcko.

• OHR to Establish a commission of Inquiry to Determine Responsibility for Violations

The Arbitral Tribunal's award states that the Tribunal "expects to receive ... regular reports from the Supervisor ... appraising current conditions in the relevant area as they may bear on the need (or not) for further actions from the Tribunal". (Award, par. II.C, p. 43.)

It is crucial, if the Arbitral Tribunal is to be able to evaluate compliance with the Award and DPA, that the Brcko Deputy High Representative prepare reports, which establish the facts and assign responsibility, concerning all situations that appear to involve non-compliance with the Award and DPA. In some instances, the facts may be straightforward; however, in most instances, facts and responsibility are likely to be disputed.

Accordingly, ICG will recommend that the Deputy High Representative establish a Brcko commission of Inquiry that will investigate allegations of substantial non-compliance and determine responsibility therefor. ICG plans to develop a proposal for such a commission, and work with the OHR and other authorities to ensure its success. Once the commission is established, ICG will support it in every way that it can, in particular, by bringing allegations of non-compliance to the commission's attention and providing it with evidence.

• Strategy to Encourage Displaced Persons Now Living in Brcko to Return to Their Pre-War Homes

A key step in promoting returns of pre-war residents to Brcko is finding adequate accommodation for Serbs displaced from elsewhere and currently residing in Brcko. The most durable and cost-effective solution is to make it possible for those displaced Serbs to return to their pre-war homes. At least 7,000 Serbs currently living in Brcko are from the Sarajevo suburbs.

ICG has recently embarked on a project to facilitate the return of Serbs to Sarajevo, which it plans to pursue at least through the end of 1997. ICG made a substantial contribution to efforts to persuade Serbs to remain voluntarily in Sarajevo during the transfer of authority in February 1996. Through that work, ICG developed credibility with Serb civic organisations based in Sarajevo and the suburbs. ICG is working with those organisations to develop a strategy to encourage voluntary returns, which it will then seek to have implemented by the relevant Sarajevo and Federation authorities, international organisations, and donors.

• Eastern Slavonia

ICG is concerned that the rights of the more than 100,000 ethnic Serbs now living in Eastern Slavonia, at least half of whom lived in other parts of Croatia during the war, should be fully respected by the Croatian Government. If their rights are violated, and if the Government does not take significant steps to allay their fears, they are likely to leave in large numbers. It was reported that, in the month of February, 1,800 families (some 7,000 people) left Eastern Slavonia, most of them for parts of Republika Srpska. These people, to the extent they are able to do so, are moving into vacant homes of people who left Republika Srpska during the war. Clearly, the movement of large numbers of Serbs from Eastern Slavonia into Republika Srpska, especially in the Brcko area, would put an enormous strain on an already severely overtaxed housing stock, not to mention an economy in shambles and very limited social services.

ICG currently is in the process of researching a report on the situation of the ethnic Serbs now living in Eastern Slavonia, with a view towards making recommendations to the Government of Croatia and the international community concerning steps that must be taken to satisfy the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia that their rights will be fully respected and to assist those who are displaced in returning to their pre-war homes. ICG expects to issue the report in April, and will continue thereafter to press for implementation of the recommendations, monitor the changing situation and write reports when warranted.

Encourage De-Mining Effort

A major impediment to the return of displaced persons, especially to farming areas, has been the slow progress made to date in de-mining. While it now seems that fewer hectares may be contaminated than originally estimated, there is no dispute that the legitimate fear of mines, and injuries caused by them, has rendered large areas of land and homes unusable.

In the first three months of 1997, ICG staff devoted considerable time to researching the reasons that de-mining efforts during 1996 fell so far behind projected targets. Before the donors conference in April, ICG will issue a report that surveys the problems and makes concrete recommendations, particularly addressed to the international community, as to what is required to make the 1997 de-mining season a success and to build the structures necessary to ensure that de-mining will proceed systematically and effectively, even after the international organisations reduce their support.

Throughout 1997, ICG will work with the lead organisations and the relevant Bosnian authorities to implement its recommendations. The failure of organisations even to achieve the targets, let alone to develop a co-ordinated strategy, during the 1996 de-mining season, underscores the need for continuing ICG involvement.

Conditionality of Economic Assistance

While conditioning economic assistance on compliance with the central tenets of the DPA (in particular, tolerance of other ethnic and religious groups) is a well-accepted principle of US policy, it has not been similarly embraced by all bilateral donors. For this reason, ICG commissioned an international economist to develop a cogent, principled defence of the wisdom and effectiveness of conditioning aid to Bosnian authorities and the private sector on DPA compliance. This report is in the final stages of completion and will be published in April 1997. ICG believes that it will persuade sceptics of the wisdom of pursuing a co-ordinated policy of aid conditionality and will also be useful in clarifying the benefits of aid conditionality for humanitarian and other organisations that are sympathetic to the policy in general but lack the reasoned arguments to defend the policy to critics.

ICG plans to take forward its work on aid conditionality through three projects:

• Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations

ICG plans to develop a manual on aid conditionality for use by humanitarian organisations and donors that apply aid conditionality in their work. The manual will include guidelines for different sectors (housing reconstruction, schools, hospitals, social services) on how to structure projects so that (a) the Bosnian implementing authorities and partners understand the conditions of the assistance from the outset, and (b) the project can be suspended if there is substantial non-compliance. Guidelines will also address different levels of non-compliance, and how to respond to violations at each level. The manual will bring together reports of "success stories", where aid conditions were used effectively to promote multi-ethnic co-operation or tolerance, as well as failures, where aid conditions back-fired, in order to illustrate what to do and not do. The manual will also include suggestions on how to support local authorities or businesses which go out on a limb to support returns and reintegration, and will caution against measures, such as inappropriate publicity, that could compromise co-operating partners.

• Reports on Companies and Authorities in Target Municipalities

ICG plans to produce short reports on the companies and authorities in several of the UNHCR's target municipalities that are likely to be considered for substantial amounts of assistance and low-interest loans in the coming 18 months.

ICG has already produced a report on Brcko and plans to look at Sipovo, Konjic and Bratanuc. ICG will collect information about construction and other companies that submit bids for projects, examining the likelihood that they will comply with conditions that require non-discrimination and promote returns. ICG will particularly examine companies whose management changed since 1991, because these companies will not have records of performance that can be used to predict their likely future performance, and because their new managers may well have been involved in ethnic cleansing and benefited from it. Such managers are more likely than others to obstruct compliance with conditions of multi-ethnic tolerance and returns because they have a personal stake in preserving their ill-gotten gains. Similarly, ICG will examine the records of authorities who are likely to be involved in implementing projects or influencing the conditions relevant to returns, such as law enforcement, media and employment.

• Recommendations Regarding Concrete Applications

While there may be general consensus on the principle of aid conditionality, there often is confusion or outright disagreement on how to implement the principle in particular contexts. ICG plans to work with economists and other experts to develop concrete recommendations for appropriate conditions, and then to work to develop donor consensus for those recommendations.

For instance, one recommendation that ICG is currently exploring is that assistance (grants and loans) for housing reconstruction should be conditioned on concrete measures to protect the existing housing stock. Municipalities where houses are destroyed would lose assistance for housing projects unless they could demonstrate that they had taken all reasonable measures to investigate the crimes, apprehend the culprits and deter such acts occurring in the future. Donors could transfer money that they would have given to such municipalities to the commission established under Annex 7 of the DPA or, could create a fund to compensate owners of the destroyed property.

ICG also recommends that assistance for housing reconstruction and other projects that benefit residents of a municipality should be conditioned on the implementation of property laws in ways that do not discriminate against any ethnic or other identifiable group. The OHR already accepts the principle that aid should not go to authorities in entities that fail to repeal discriminatory property laws; ICG plans to work for the next step, namely, that aid to particular municipalities should be conditioned on implementation of non-discriminatory housing and other property policies (regardless of the adequacy of the laws in theory).

Elections

ICG will continue to devote its attention to the election process and to conditions for free and fair elections because fair elections are the primary means by which the influence of the ultra-nationalist parties (or, in the case of the SDA, the ultra-nationalist wing) can be reduced. Gains by moderate opposition parties at the municipal elections will substantially improve the climate for return and reintegration of displaced persons who would find themselves in the minority if they return. The municipal elections now scheduled for 13 and 14 September 1997 are likely to be the last elections that are organised and supervised by the international community. They thus offer a crucial opportunity, that should be fully utilised.

• Refugee Registration and Voting Procedures

An important step in encouraging the return of refugees is to make it possible for them to register and to vote. They face several obstacles:

First, they must understand how to register. This year the process will be more complicated than last, primarily to discourage pressure on refugees to vote in "intended places of residence" advantageous to one or another of the ruling parties. One result is that refugees who wish to vote in an intended place of residence will need to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina to register. They will need clear information about the process, and some of them will need measures to ensure their safe passage and return.

ICG and OSCE have developed a productive working relationship with a view to the municipal elections. Apart from working to tighten loopholes in the draft regulations for the elections, ICG also has input on a regular basis on other issues relating to elections and the involvement of displaced persons, including how to organise elections in Mostar and Brcko.

A second problem refugees will face is the possibility that some host countries will use a refugee's application to vote or his or her return to Bosnia and Herzegovina for registration purposes as a ground to commence deportation proceedings against them. ICG will work to persuade host countries that they should not in any way burden the right of refugees to vote by making it more difficult for them to stay in a host country while awaiting improvement of conditions in their pre-war home areas.

• Disqualify Candidates who Violate the DPA

The elections present another opportunity which should be fully exploited: candidates for office may have their candidacies terminated by the Election Appeals Sub-commission (EASC) if it can be demonstrated that they have obstructed the conditions necessary for free and fair elections. Examples of such obstructionism might include encouraging or tolerating ethnically or politically motivated violence, participating in discriminatory job dismissals, making statements that challenge the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, failing to arrest war criminals whom they have a clear obligation to arrest, or putting pressure on voters to register in certain areas or vote for certain candidates.

Such officials are the main impediments to returns, especially of those people who would find themselves in the minority. The powers of the EASC offer an extraordinary opportunity to remove them.

In July 1996, the EASC disqualified seven SDA candidates for the Cazin municipal council who were found to have been responsible for the physical attack on Haris Silajdzic (the leading Bosniac opposition candidate for the Presidency). Thereafter, in the remaining nine weeks of the campaign, they disqualified only an additional two candidates. The primary reason for the small number of disqualifications was the small number of well-documented complaints. Indeed, to provide evidence sufficient to justify the termination of a candidacy, evidence must be compiled to a more rigorous standard than generally is found among the reports of the various monitoring organisations.

ICG intends to work with the monitoring organisations and political parties and, where necessary, conduct its own investigations, to document serious abuses of the PEC Rules and Regulations in an effort to remove from office those officials who pose major impediments to minority returns.

• Ensure that Minority Members of Local Governments Will Be Installed in Office

The international organisations responsible for elections and security (OSCE, OHR, SFOR and IPTF) all acknowledge that opposition party and minority candidates who win elections will face formidable obstacles to taking their seats in local governments, especially where the opposition forms a majority of the municipal council but the ruling party still controls the police. The OSCE and OHR have each made statements that it is not their responsibility to ensure elected officials can take their seats. If elected officials are unable to work in their municipalities without fear for their safety, how can their constituents be expected to return? ICG will work to develop support for a strategy aimed at enabling newly-elected minority officials to perform their functions, as a necessary step to encouraging their constituents to return. Conditioning economic assistance to municipalities with the installation in office of minority candidates could be one element of such a strategy.

Recommendations for Repatriation and Return

ICG currently is in the midst of reviewing the past efforts of the international community, led by the UNHCR under pressure from refugee host countries, to encourage internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their pre-war homes. The purpose of the review is to draw lessons regarding what should and should not be done in the future, with a special focus on the pilot projects, the return to the Zone of Separation (ZOS) program, and spontaneous returns. The next phase of research will be to review the UNHCR's plan for repatriation and returns during 1997, issued in March.

ICG is working on a report with recommendations to UNHCR on how best to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and protect the rights of those whose pre-war homes are in areas where they now are in the minority. ICG will also review the incentive packages offered by various host countries to encourage refugees to return, in order to make recommendations concerning minimum, adequate incentives packages. ICG will encourage host countries to seek durable solutions, and to support temporary accommodation only as an emergency measure of last resort.

ICG also will attempt to persuade SFOR and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to develop a more robust policy concerning the maintenance of internal security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Obviously, security is one of the most important concerns of refugees and internally displaced persons who think of returning to their pre-war homes. ICG has been involved in discussions with the highest levels of SFOR about their obligations to provide security for returnees. ICG will continue these discussions, and will also provide information and arguments to its Board members to enable them to raise their concerns with the NAC. ICG will prepare a briefing paper by international law and military experts on the obligations under the DPA of the contact group governments to maintain internal security when necessary.

Support of Institutions Promoting Return and Reintegration

ICG plans to continue to provide support in 1997 for several institutions that work to realise the conditions necessary for return and reintegration.

• Support to the Federation Mediator

ICG has worked extensively with the office of the International Mediator of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Christian Schwartz-Schilling, a German Member of Parliament and member of the ICG Board of Trustees. During the past year, ICG assisted Dr. Schwartz-Schilling directly on several missions - on each occasion, ICG staff formed part of Dr. Schwartz-Schilling's delegation, provided all logistical support, and assisted with follow-up. Each mission focused on a priority basis on conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Dr. Schwartz-Schilling has requested ICG to assist his missions during the coming year.

• Support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and Arrest of War Criminals

ICG has concluded that, before displaced persons can be expected to return, persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal, especially those who continue to exercise real power and sabotage the international community's effort to reintegrate the country, must be arrested and surrendered to the Tribunal. However, despite the obvious absence of co-operation by local authorities of Republika Srpska, Croat-controlled parts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Croatia, the international community has failed to resort to the only option remaining - to order the international SFOR to search, arrest, and surrender the indictees to The Hague. Moreover, the international community has failed to provide the Tribunal with adequate resources to perform effectively.

Throughout the past year, ICG embarked on a number of initiatives to support the Tribunal and to convince the international community of the need to arrest those indicted by the Tribunal. These efforts included an information campaign to convince the international community to condition all economic assistance to the DPA parties on their full and good faith co-operation with the Tribunal, and to take more resolute action to discharge their duties to arrest persons charged with genocide, grave breaches and war crimes.

While ICG's campaign for full-faith co-operation with the Tribunal was widely reflected in the international media and pressure is mounting on the authorities, to date none of the authorities have fully complied with the Tribunal's orders, the Tribunal's resources are still not sufficient, SFOR still refuses to arrest the indictees, and the great majority of those indicted by the Tribunal are still at large.

ICG will continue this campaign during 1997 through a public information campaign, research on outstanding legal questions, and advocacy to link economic assistance with co-operation with the Tribunal.

• Support for commission for Real Property Claims of Refugees and Displaced Persons

The commission, established under Annex 7 to the DPA, plays a key role in promoting durable solutions to the housing crisis by deciding on claims of displaced persons for real property lost involuntarily during the war. Since April 1996, the ICG has provided consistent support to the commission, by helping it to raise its first half-year budget and develop its guiding principles.

In January 1997 the commission decided that, as a matter of first priority, it would devote its efforts to establishing the right of possession as opposed to the right of ownership, leaving the latter to a later time. ICG has been urging the commission to address as early as possible the ownership rights of people who are displaced and cannot return to their homes owing to well-founded concerns about safety and discrimination. ICG has proposed that the commission develop its capacity so as to assist such property owners in entering into rental agreements with current occupants. These arrangements would protect the property rights of displaced owners who are unable to return to their homes now, but want to keep open the possibility of returning when the political situation improves. The commission's Executive Director is receptive to the proposal, and has asked ICG to develop it further. ICG plans to enlist the services of a consultant to elaborate a concrete proposal for the commission's implementation.

• The Independent Media

The media in Bosnia and Herzegovina have played, and continue to play, a pernicious role in fanning the flames of hatred and ethnic cleansing. Before and in the early days of the war, the media, by broadcasting false and deceptive information, played a decisive role in developing the fears and hatreds that made possible aggressive war, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Now the media continues in many parts of the country to be used as a powerful tool to complete ethnic cleansing and discourage returns. The media play a particularly important role in discouraging cross-IEBL returns; because in the absence of cross-IEBL telecommunication facilities, the media constitutes the only source of information available to most people regarding conditions in the other entity.

Until displaced persons have access to objective information about conditions in their home area, they are unlikely to return. As long as the media act irresponsibly by using inflammatory language and inciting contempt for others, their audiences (or the extremist elements of them) will feel encouraged to manifest their hatreds and fears.

ICG continues to work to develop independent media and professional standards of journalism, focusing on developing media that cross the IEBL and on independent media especially in the Republika Srpska where the alternative, let alone independent, media are far weaker than in the Federation.

This March, ICG published an extensive report on the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina that made recommendations to donors on how more effectively to support independent media and professional standards of journalism. ICG plans to work to implement these recommendations together with local journalists, identifying those media that are most deserving of support, and also bringing to the attention of donors information about media that militates against the provision of further support.

During the coming year ICG will also continue its work in support of the Media Experts commission (MEC), and the Media Development Office (MDO) of the OSCE (which serves as its secretariat). ICG has already provided assistance to the MDO in drafting guidelines on radio and TV call-in shows that air inflammatory statements, and has been invited by the MDO to provide training to its staff and to assist it in drafting guidelines on inflammatory or defamatory speech, on the one hand, and legitimate criticism, however offensive or exaggerated, on the other. ICG's Legal Advisor is well-qualified to provide such advice, as she previously worked for five years for a freedom of expression organisation, and has written or edited two books and several reports on international and European standards concerning freedom of expression, including media freedom, and its limits. ICG expects to provide on-going advice to the MDO and MEC in developing its policy and public information materials.

ICG EXPANSION INTO YUGOSLAVIA

ICG plans to extend its focus to include events in neighbouring Yugoslavia. To a large extent, the future stability of the Balkans region hangs on the outcome of current ethnic, political and economic tensions in Serbia. The recent protests against the Milosevic regime in Belgrade and the somewhat less publicised flare up of ethnic tensions in Kosovo create both new opportunities and new risks to regional stability which require careful but decisive handling by the international community. Against this backdrop, ICG intends to initiate a new project in Serbia designed to contribute to the development of more coherent, co-ordinated and effective international policy responses. The project will provide ICG with the capacity, first, to monitor events in the country more closely; secondly, to provide decision-takers with clear and practical strategies designed to prevent new crises developing; thirdly, to deploy members of the ICG board with a view to mobilising international support for prompt and appropriate preventive action.

Project objectives

1. To monitor developments in Serbia and provide regular analytical reports to the ICG board, the media and the wider international community;

2. To put forward practical proposals for preventive action designed to prevent the development and escalation of crises and strengthen peace, stability and democracy both in Serbia and the region;

To mobilise support from governments, international organisations, NGOs and others for ICG's policy proposals;

3. To identify local organisations and groups within Serbian civil society requiring additional financial, physical or human resources, or some other form of assistance and to help attract the necessary support from international donors;

4. To build public support for international engagement in Serbia and for measures designed to maximise the opportunity to encourage greater democracy in Serbia while minimising threats to regional peace and stability.

Methodology

A Serbia Project Officer will be employed to carry out the functions associated with the project. He or she will be based at ICG's Sarajevo office but will spend a significant amount of time on assignment inside Serbia:

• gathering information;

• identifying local partners with whom the international community might engage; and

• seeking a variety of perspectives from local and international stakeholders.

The officer will be responsible for providing regular reports on both the general situation in Serbia and on specific problems requiring local or international attention. The reports will provide readers with an in-depth analysis of relevant issues and a set of policy proposals aimed at international decision-takers. Copies of these reports will be sent to members of the ICG board, governments, international organisations and other relevant agencies. When appropriate, copies may also be made available to the media for public dissemination. Members of the ICG board will play a leading role in bringing ICG's findings to the attention of relevant officials and world leaders.

The candidate selected for this position will possess, among other attributes, excellent analytical and communication skills. ICG is confident that a high-calibre individual can be recruited from the large pool of journalists and analysts who have worked in the former Yugoslavia during and since the war.

ICG BOSNIA/YUGOSLAVIA PROGRAM BUDGET

The ICG Bosnia Program core budget for the period 1 April 1997 through 31 March 1996 totals US$949,000 (detailed in Appendix 1). In addition, the Yugoslavia expansion budget totals US$88,095 (detailed in Appendix 2). The combined Bosnia and Yugoslavia Program budget totals US$1,037,095.

APPENDIX 1

ICG BOSNIA PROGRAM CORE BUDGET
1 APRIL 1997 TO 31 MARCH 1998

(all figures in $US unless otherwise stated)

Item Details Total Annual Budget ($'000s)

Salaries

Expatriate and senior staff 488

Local and junior staff 42

Consultants 21 551

Fringe benefits

Per diem allowances Dm40 per diem for 7 expatriates 60

Accommodation DM1,050 per month for 8 senior staff 59

Travel allowance $1000 per head for 7 ex-patriates 7 126

Travel

International 6 x $2,000 for Director and other staff to visit US, plus 6X $1000 to visit Europe, plus misc $7000 25

Local $1,000 pm for all staff 12 37

Equipment

Miscellaneous items 2

Rent and utilities Sarajevo office rent DM 3,200 pm plus utilities 29

Telephone Sarajevo office 48

Vehicle running costs Petrol, maintenance etc 36

Office supplies Printing, stationery, other supplies 38 151

Other expenses

Insurance Vehicles and group travel 10

Publicity 6

Miscellaneous 6 22

Contribution to London staff salary costs 60 60

TOTAL 949

Currency conversion rates: DM 1.7 to $US 1.00/$US1.55 to £UK1.00

APPENDIX 2

BUDGET FOR YUGOSLAVIA EXPANSION
1 APRIL 1997 TO 31 MARCH 1998

(All figures in $US unless otherwise stated)

Salary of Serbia Project Officer$60,000

Supplementary employment costs:

Accommodation allowance @ US$475 per month;

Per diem @ US$23$14,095

Travel

Land travel between Bosnia and Yugoslavia
plus air travel to London and Washington
for advocacy meetings $ 8,500

Publications

Copying and dissemination of reports$ 3,000

Advocacy costs

Board member presentations, travel etc.$ 2,500

Advocacy costs

TOTAL$88,095