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Situation Analysis: Sierra Leone

After a relatively quiet period, the security situation in Freetown began to deteriorate sharply on 8 October 1997 when a Nigerian Alpha Jet flying under the auspices of the regional security organisation, ECOMOG, bombed the military headquarters at Cockerill Barracks. Ostensibly trying to hit a helicopter gunship that had been "harassing" ECOMOG troops, the attack drew swift retaliation from Sierra Leone's ruling Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

Heavy fighting broke out between the AFRC and ECOMOG in the area of Jui/Kossoh Town and spread to other areas around Freetown resulting in the closure of the main road out of Freetown and the establishment of new checkpoints throughout the city. Heavy shelling by ECOMOG troops continued over the next ten days. The Kissy and Mt Auerol/Fourah Bay College areas of Freetown were hit, and the Sierra Tel complex in the Signal Hill area was bombed, temporarily knocking out national radio and television. Wellington/Kosso and Calaba Town were shelled repeatedly, and the army base at Benguema was bombed. Each fly-over was matched by AFRC anti-aircraft fire, mostly to little effect.

There was significant population movement away from vulnerable areas, either into central Freetown or up-country via the precarious peninsular road. Heavy traffic and poor conditions on this road resulted in repeated accidents, including an overloaded trailer plunging off a narrow bridge and killing more than 65 passengers.

The Nigerian Alpha jet also bombed the areas of Port Loko, Kenema and Makeni. Near the southern city of Bo, there was fighting at the Nigerian base in Gondama where the Nigerians were reportedly displaced from their camp and retreated into the bush with the Kamajohs.

There were reports of young men being mobilised to fight the Nigerians and mid-month, during the bombardment, the army was picking up soldiers in Freetown and depositing them at the front-line. Unicef estimates that approximately 5,000 child soldiers have been recruited by various factions since the May 1997 coup, most having been abducted.

Casualty figures from the ECOMOG bombardment were estimated to be more than 50 in Freetown alone and massive civilian demonstrations against Nigeria resulted. Nigeria House, although unoccupied, was stoned by Freetown youth. The population remained confused by the bombardment, viewing it as unprovoked aggression by the Nigerians. Indeed, the mandate of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) does not allow for the use of force until sanctions have been exhausted. However, the junta was not able to use the bombardment to mobilise public opinion in its favour.

Embargo and Sanctions

The United Nations Security Council officially endorsed oil, arms and travel embargoes against the Sierra Leone junta at the start of October. Humanitarian supplies are exempt from the blockade. The specifics of the sanctions have not been ironed out, and the embargo is permeable by road from Guinea. ECOMOG continues to enforce the sea embargo around the port area, although a Ukrainian ship under AFRC escort managed to evade the embargo and deliver arms and ammunition to the junta.

AFRC is imposing its own "embargo" against the ECOMOG forces at Lungi, attempting to cut them off from urban supplies by preventing traders from leaving Freetown by boat to deliver goods to the airport area, which is separated from the Freetown peninsula by estuary. ECOMOG maintains control of the airport, and continues to re-supply by air, but the AFRC has significant anti-aircraft weaponry and some secured positions around the Lungi area.

Although the embargo does impact the most vulnerable of the population, limiting availability of rice and milk and driving prices of staples up considerably-sugar and flour have more than doubled in price since the coup-the major problem is purchasing power rather than availability. Although now in the traditional "hungry season", there are not signs of significant malnutrition among the general population, although there will be areas of concern. According to an ICRC food security survey undertaken in August and September and covering Kailahun, Kenema, Moyamba, Bombali, Tonkolili and Port Loko, "food production and its resultant availability to the population is certainly better than last year and in many instances better than pre-war. The major limiting factor in these past months is the poor marketability for cash crops."

Diplomacy and Peace Accord

With un-sanctioned military action by ECOMOG, continued looting and harassment of civilians by armed men in Freetown, and an upsurge in the numbers of internally displaced persons, signs of peace and resolution were distant and shaky. But to the surprise of most regional observers, the Committee of Five-consisting of high level representation from Guinea, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Liberia-met with the junta who agreed to a peace plan and a 6-month time table for the restoration of the ousted government. Prior to meeting with the ruling junta, the C-5 met with rebel leader Foday Sankoh in Abuja, gaining his endorsement of negotiations and a hand-over plan, and pre-empting any charges of exclusion from the RUF components of the AFRC.

The negotiations, held in Conakry on 22 October, came on the heels of strong and repeated rumours of a split within the AFRC leadership, with the hard-line RUF aspects being unwilling to hand-over power. The AFRC is said to be weary and willing to hand-over to civilian rule. This delicate power balance will continue to be the deciding factor in the peace efforts.

The C-5 communiqué calls for:

• an immediate cease fire

• the reinstatement of President Kabbah by April 23, 1998

• the continued enforcement of sanctions

• the demobilisation of all combatants (1-31 December)

• the provision of humanitarian assistance (to begin November 14) and return of refugees and IDPs (to begin 1 December)

• immunity for leaders of the coup

• modalities for broadening the power base

Both sides agreed to continue discussions on the details of the above. Additionally, the active participation of Foday Sankoh in the peace process was not ruled out. Meanwhile, President Kabbah was working on a 90-day programme to purse upon his restoration to power, outlining plans of a "more representative and democratic government". He said that Sierra Leone would need a Marshall-type plan in order to rebuild the country's shattered infrastructure.

The restoration to civilian rule will become increasingly dependent on the will of the RUF to concede power and demobilise, and the role of Foday Sankoh in the process is crucial. The RUF have had a productive five months since the coup, and are not likely to budge from their new position of strength without clear motivation. There is a fundamental lack of trust of the Nigerian components of ECOMOG and a disarming of the military is realistic only if done by non-Nigerian forces.

Although the announcement of the peace plan was met with great relief and resulted in dancing at some checkpoints and the "happy fire" of guns in the air, the general population is guardedly optimistic. Although the mass exodus from Freetown stopped, there were not large numbers of residents returning to the city either. In fact, the number of people both fleeing from and returning to Freetown was roughly equal. Many citizens had a "wait and see" attitude, with some displaying hope for the first three months of the plan only.

Liberia/Kamajohs

Liberia closed its doors to Sierra Leonean refugees on 22 October, deploying police and immigration along the border. There are some 20,000 Sierra Leonean refugees residing in camps near border towns. Liberian President Charles Taylor vehemently denied assisting or arming either side in the conflict. After the ECOMOG bombardment, he denied ECOMOG use of Liberian airspace and airstrips for offensives manoeuvres into Sierra Leone, saying that any military action would have to be "explicitly sanctioned" by ECOWAS and have the approval of the UN Security Council.

The kamajohs did not immediately respect the cease fire and were active after the announcement, particularly around the areas of Bo and Kenema. The kamajohs control much of the area between Kenema and Zimmi. The kamajohs say they are taking their orders directly from their de facto leader, Sam Hinga Norman, who is said to be annoyed that the role of the kamajohs went unacknowledged in the peace plan. With signs they have been re-supplied, and their numbers swollen from recruitment over the past five months, the kamajohs could become a destabilising force on their own. (See ICG Situation Analysis, May 1997)

Economy

The economy remains at a standstill, and is almost completely informal under the tightened embargo. Under the Kabbah regime, 70% of the country's income came from custom duties. With the embargo making official imports non-existent, the government's monthly income in June was zero. In July it rose to $38,000 after the re-opening of the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank. In the four months of this year prior to the coup, the government's average monthly income stood at $760,000.

However remote the signs of economic stability are, they have been enough for a trickling of Lebanese businessmen to return to assess potential opportunities within the precarious power structure. At least two foreign-owned businesses have re-started operations, including the Sierra Leone brewery, jointly owned by Heineken and Guinness, and the Seaboard Flour Mill, a US interest.