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Report to the Japanese Government on the Situation in Sierra Leone

Description:A Report to the Japanese Government by the International Crisis Group
May 1996

Introduction

The following report, commissioned by The Japanese Government, offers an account of the changes that have taken place in Sierra Leone in the past six months and The International Crisis Group's (ICG) involvement in the transition. ICG carried out a thorough assessment of the situation in Sierra Leone in November and December, 1995. The assessment concluded that Sierra Leone was in crisis, but that it had a window of opportunity to halt the spiralling violence and disorder in that elections were to be held. ICG supported the elections, advocating that solution to Sierra Leone's crisis was legitimate and good government that could address the causes of the countries problems. From the conclusions of this assessment and since the success of the elections and the transition to democratic government, ICG devised a project with a small group of Sierra Leoneans called The Campaign for Good Governance. The Campaign sets out both to assist the new government and to strengthen civil society.

Report on Field Team Assessment, January, 1996

BACKGROUND

This report is based on a two-month mission to Sierra Leone by an ICG field team comprising David Shearer and Alice Jay. The mission brief was to produce an assessment of the main factors contributing to the crisis situation prevalent in the country. From this assessment a role for ICG is defined prescribing three areas of operation.

The assessment is based on conversations with various parties in the capital, Freetown. We met with John Benjamin, Secretary of The Supreme Council and John Karimu, then Minister of Finance from the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC); European Community country representative, John McClintock; British High commissioner, Ian McCluney and American Ambassador, John Hirsch and their staff; UN Special Envoy Ambassador Dinka and Dr. James Jonah at the Interim National Electoral commission (INEC); World Food Programme representative, Mohammed Diab; World Bank representative, Dr. Sahr Tongu; UNICEF, UNDP and DHA staff; ICRC representatives; Medicins Sans Frontieres, Action Internationale Contre la Faim (AICF), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARE, Africare, Concern Universal, and CARITAS country representatives; university professors; local NGOs; and Presidential candidates from various parties. Much of our analysis stems from first-hand experience of the situation upcountry in the conflict areas. We visited Bo, Kenema and Kono and also neighbouring Liberia. We met with the Executive Outcomes Commander in Kono; members of the Lebanese community; Church representatives; local and international NGO regional staff; traditional leaders and hunters and displaced people.

For many, the situation in Sierra Leone will seem familiar: years of successive undemocratic and corrupt governments, an absence of social investment and extreme and widespread poverty. More recently, brutal violence between a rebel force, tapping widespread disillusionment, and a largely untrained and undisciplined army have added to destabilisation.

Although it shares many of the characteristics of those found in other "failed states", the situation in Sierra Leone has some unique features which it is important to understand fully before attempting to propose solutions.

THE CURRENT CRISIS:

The Armed Conflict

Civil conflict began in Sierra Leone in 1991 when insurgent forces, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), launched attacks in the south and east of the country. Led by Fodah Sankoh, a charismatic ex-army photographer the RUF consisted of a small group of Sierra Leoneans, supported by Charles Taylor's forces and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. The RUF has grown in strength, often through forced recruitment. They exploit the frustration felt by groups of uneducated, unemployed youths, with no prospects for advancement. Resentful of the way in which a Freetown élite has enriched itself at their expense, these disillusioned bands of young men already possess anti-government sentiment and provide a fertile recruiting ground for the RUF. The rebel movement's numbers have also been swelled by the addition of disparate groups which see violence as a means of solving local disputes.

The philosophy and political objectives of the RUF are difficult to ascertain. No clear agenda has been outlined beyond a call for justice and equality and a general opposition to the government and foreign troops. The RUF has its roots in the years of centralised corruption and neglect of the APC government, but its animosity is now directed against the NPRC which, it considers, blocked its own passage to power.

At the beginning of the conflict, RUF forces from Liberia and Burkina Faso waged a campaign of terror in which brutal atrocities were committed. Later, as they grew in strength, so did the attention they received. By late 1994 / early 1995 the action of the rebel forces had spread to cover large areas of the country, culminating in attacks on the rutile and bauxite mining operations and occupying a position 40 kms from Freetown. Foreign hostages (aid workers as well as employees of mining companies) were taken, some being held for up to five months in RUF camps. A highly mobile force, the RUF can cover 20-30 kms a day by foot through jungle terrain. Today, the RUF is reckoned to have a well-disciplined nucleus and to have several thousand combatants based in 4 -5 bush camps in the south eastern and central regions of the country.

In 1992, in response to earlier RUF gains, the Sierra Leonean army (SLA) dramatically increased its size from a largely ceremonial force of around 3,000 to some 13,000 soldiers. Recruitment was largely random, with the admission of criminals and unemployed street youths to bolster numbers. They were given minimal training before being armed and sent up to the front. Owing to public spending cuts they were often not paid leading them to loot from civilians. Having failed to contain the rebel threat, foreign troops were drafted in from Nigeria, and Guinea and followed by the Gurkhas. Most recently, Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African "security company", seemingly financed by a major British mining company, Branch Energy, have been brought in. These South African mercenaries now protect Freetown and maintain security in the diamond district, keeping both the RUF at bay and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) under control. Using attack helicopters and sophisticated radio equipment, EO has launched attacks on RUF-held areas. EO also undertake some training of the SLA. EO has a history of working in Angola with diamond firms and the Angolan government selling military force for commercial returns.

There is a sense that with a collapse of government, the vacuum could be filled by a scenario in which private commercial companies govern certain areas with their own army providing employment, foreign exchange and policing.

The violence in Sierra Leone has not been confined to conflict between two organised factions. The SLA high command seems to have lost control of its soldiers necessitating the intervention of foreign forces. Poorly supervised rogue elements, particularly from within the army, and cross-border bandits have used force to thieve diamonds, locally-produced food stocks and attack food convoys. The distinction has become blurred between RUF and SLA combatants and the appellation "sobel" (soldiers by day rebels by night) is generally applied to any aggressive forces. There are rumours of collaboration between elements within the SLA and the RUF, and battles being deliberately staged. The activities of these "sobels" have terrorised the local populations.

In 1996, the conflict between the RUF and the SLA continues with frequent and violent attacks on civilians. There is no doubt that those benefiting from the war have an interest in perpetuating it, at the expense of the civilian population.

Dismal Economic Situation

UNDP ranks Sierra Leone as one of the world's five most impoverished countries. The majority of the population are subsistence farmers. Ironically, Sierra Leone possesses an abundance of resources, including gold, diamonds, bauxite, rutile (titanium dioxide), and is a producer of coffee, rice and cocoa. However, the enormous wealth generated from these exports has served to enrich government officials, international mining companies and businessmen, many of whom are Lebanese. The granting of mining licenses and Customs and Excise duties have provided the main source of revenue for the government, but smuggling is rife and it is estimated that US $200 million of diamonds each year are illegally exported. Furthermore, the revenue that is collected has often not found its way into the treasury. Officials have used their positions to accumulate personal wealth and in so doing they have sold out their authority. One anthropologist has described Sierra Leone's governments as a "kleptocracy, a government of thieves, in which looting the country's assets became the state's very "raison d'etre" (Opala, 1994). Sierra Leoneans are aware that they have been denied access to the wealth of the country which is so apparent. Most affected is the large pool of youth who are disillusioned and distanced from government and traditional authority.

Sierra Leone also belongs to that group of countries classified by the World Bank and IMF as "Severely Indebted Low Income Countries". In 1990, the proportion of total external debts to exports was 549.1 percent. Today, the countries foreign debt is around $870 million. Austerity measures imposed by an IMF credit have strapped the government financially resulting in public spending cuts and a devaluation of the currency in turn fuelling inflation. Public employees, including soldiers, told us that salaries were cut and often not paid. In general, the public are increasingly unable to afford basic goods.

Years of economic mismanagement has resulted in a plethora of severe socio-economic problems. Fewer than 40% of Sierra Leoneans have access to health services and there is poor provision of other social services. Education provision has suffered and the illiteracy rate is around 80 percent. There has been little investment in human resources or job creation. USAID estimates that there is 80 percent unemployment and 10 percent under-employment.

The economic situation has worsened with the war. Major mining activities were closed following attacks and looting. Most importantly, in January 1995, the Australian and American owned company, Sierra Rutile, and Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company, a bauxite exporting company owned by Alusuisse, shut down operations. Sierra Rutile is the worlds largest producer of titanium dioxide. These companies were previously major employers in the region and provided the government with about half of its export earnings. Both companies are considering resuming operations in Sierra Leone, but not before a destroyed infrastructure can be rebuilt and there is a return to some degree of stability. It is probable that Executive Outcomes will be hired as their security to "protect" the area.

Some diamond mining has continued and smuggling increased, facilitated by networks of army officers and rebels and the closing of certain border checkpoints. In the last six months there has been a resumption of diamond mining by an estimated 27 companies in the Koidu area under the protection of Executive Outcomes. Branch Energy has been given a kimberlite mining concession in the Koidu district. Providing the security and monopolising the diamond business may mean that this company has a very strong hold on any future government.

The production of rice, cocoa and coffee, important staples of the economy, has been seriously disrupted by the conflict. Terrorised farmers have fled their lands and food distribution has been virtually halted due to the insecurity of the road network. Export earnings have collapsed and the country, traditionally a rice exporter, now imports more than 25,000 MT of food aid.

The government is virtually bankrupt and dependent on World Bank and IMF loans. It appears that most of the revenue goes to servicing the war.

Humanitarian Emergency

An estimated 50,000 people have been killed since 1992. There are 200,000 Sierra Leoneans refugees in Guinea and a further 20,000 in Liberia. The total displaced population is now estimated at some 1.8 million, one quarter of Sierra Leone's 4.2 million population. People from the south and east have sought refuge from the violence in regional centres, notably Bo and Kenema, as well as in Freetown, where they are imprisoned in besieged towns, with attacks occurring 3-4 km beyond town limits. Away from their land and unable to farm, they depend on humanitarian assistance, which is frequently disrupted by attacks which lead to road closures lasting for long periods of time. There is widespread malnutrition, estimated by ICRC to be as high as 70% in some areas. The displaced population generally reside with relatives or in bush camps though there are a number of displaced camps. They claim to want to return to their homes, but fear further harassment and atrocities. There are fears that this forced migration will accelerate the already rapid urbanisation of Sierra Leone society increasing the risk of longer-term economic problems.

The need for emergency humanitarian aid continues and grows in line with the conflict, but there has been emerging reluctance among donors to send aid whilst supply lines continue to come under attack. The UN humanitarian offices are lacking. WFP continues to supply food and UNICEF is involved with some relief, but the activities of many of the other agencies which focused more on development work are confined to Freetown. Leadership in the UNDP is weak and considered by most observers to be too close to the NPRC government. The co-ordination of humanitarian aid is carried out through NARECOM, (National Rehabilitation commission), a government headed structure. NARECOM is poorly resourced resulting in little effective co-ordination. With government forces themselves responsible for some attacks, information on the security situation is practically worthless and few substantive issues are discussed. DHA has acknowledged the weaknesses and has dispatched an emergency unit to assist. It is hoped that leadership can be strengthened and new strategies put in place. NGOs are providing essential relief work in Freetown and the main regional centres.

Collapse of Governing Structures

In the last 25 years, there has been a series of one-party dictatorial regimes. Neither the Parliament nor the Supreme Court proved to be efficient or independent and since 1992 both have been suspended. Criticism, a free press and political opposition has been suppressed. Leaders have focused on bolstering their own popularity and have done little to foster a sense of national identity or national pride.

The traditional tribal structures, the mainstay of society in Sierra Leone, are in danger of disintegrating. Siaka Stevens eliminated the elected district Councils and replaced many hereditary Paramount Chiefs with individuals under his own patronage thereby disrupting local traditional structures and removing both their respectability and accountability to their regions. The RUF has targeted and undermined traditional social leaders to destabilise authority and demonstrate their strength. This has occurred specifically in areas where paramount chiefs have been replaced by APC substitutes. Thus, alongside the virtual collapse of State authority, there has been a decline of confidence in moral and traditional authority. Fear is widespread. Fear has only been allayed where the local communities, distrustful of the ability of government forces to defend them from attacks, have organised local defence groups using the skills of traditional hunters.

ANALYSIS

The crisis in SIERRA LEONE is not the "rebel war", as many proclaim. The crisis is years of bad governance and economic mismanagement. As the assessment above shows, Sierra Leoneans have never experienced responsible government. The wealth of the country has not resulted in economic growth. Inequity between the few in a position to exploit the resources and the majority who go without is extreme. There is widespread resentment and a loss of faith in government and politicians. Most affected is the large pool of youth who are disillusioned and distant from government and traditional authority. The war, then, is the result of the acute political and economic crisis and sustained violence has exaggerated the crisis and created a humanitarian emergency. The international community must acknowledge this as the crisis and support the government to reverse these trends.

The NPRC did not bring an rapid end to the war and corruption, as promised in 1992 and the January 16th coup reveals that weak governance continues. Entrenched bad governance has to be reversed and accountable governmental structures must be installed and encouraged. Any new government will need to demonstrate a strategy that includes as evidence of:

1. Good governance:

• a sustainable peace agreement

• the re-establishment of functioning government institutions

• a strong civil - military plan, including demobilisation and rehabilitation of combatants and the re-training of police and soldiers

• upholding the rule of law, observing human rights and strengthening the judiciary

• provision of services in education and health to reach all areas of the country

• establishing political leadership

2. Economic revival:

• fiscal accountability

• encouraging the return of foreign investment and ensuring that this is regulated in a manner consistent with Sierra Leone's financial and economic requirements

• employment creation, specifically provisions must be made for unemployed young people and soldiers demobilised from the Sierra Leone army and the RUF

3. Nation Building:

• encouraging a revival of Sierra Leone's latent cultural heritage

• promoting a sense of national identity and historical consciousness

• establishing a national communications system

CURRENT POSITIVE INITIATIVES

Before the January 1996 coup, there were positive elements emerging that would lead to an environment in which the causes of Sierra Leone's present crisis could be addressed. Elections were scheduled to transfer power to civilian rule, moves towards peace negotiations had been initiated, and regional peace seemed viable. Brigadier Bio, the new leader of Sierra Leone made a statement to the nation on Wednesday 17th January laying out a plan which continues the initiatives for change. We will continue to monitor progress and support the following initiatives:

Transition to civilian rule / Elections

Elections are scheduled to be held on February 26, 1996. The Interim National Electoral commission (INEC), headed by Dr. James Jonah, has led the process. Dr. Jonah is well respected and gained the confidence of the previous government and the other political parties. The military government had lost credibility and had been persuaded to relinquish power and hand over to a civilian administration. It was feared initially that the coup would interrupt the promised transition, but indications so far reveal that the new government is going ahead with the election timetable. The public are clamouring for a responsible, elected government and the establishment of a democratic state. The hope is that the RUF will agree to enter into negotiations with a legitimate government to bring about a cease-fire, so that soldiers can be demobilised and security restored.

There are shortcomings with the electoral process, but most of the interested groups, including the 15 political parties, INEC and donor governments are in favour of proceeding. Without the elections, it is feared that the crisis will continue and deepen. In order to be as free and fair as possible the following problems must be closely monitored:

• The security situation and the fear of further violence during the elections.

• With continuing violence in some areas, there will not be universal registration of voters. Concern has increased in recent weeks as the registration process was failing and only an estimated 30% had been registered. Bio has pronounced that the dates for registration can be extended until the end of January.

• There is concern that some government ministers were attempting and will attempt to obstruct free and fair elections. Those that instigated the coup may not want to loose power and they fear reprisals from an incoming administration. Two incidents reveal Ministers interference:

1. The NPRC rewrote the electoral decrees drafted by INEC, removing many of INECs independent powers and omitting much of the legislation considered necessary for free and fair elections

2. Minister John Karimu, leader of the National Unity Party and Secretary of Supreme Council John Benjamin remained in their government positions even though they were running an election campaign. Furthermore, there was evidence of foul play by the NUP in the registration process. Bio reinstated INECs independent powers and relieved those ministers manifestly involved in party politics of their positions.

• There does not appear to be a natural leader among the Presidential candidates. None of the political parties has set out in detail in its manifesto how it is going to address the country's long-term problems. Furthermore it is feared that, in place of skilled politicians addressing these problems, government positions could be filled with sycophants who expect patronage in return for their support during the campaign.

It is important to realise that elections and a new government are not the solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. Political freedom is not in itself an answer to the widespread poverty and violence, more they are a necessary precondition for change.

Negotiations

The UN Special Envoy Dinka, The Commonwealth Secretariat, the ICRC, the OAU, a UK based NGO, International Alert and other individuals have all attempted to bring the RUF and the NPRC to the negotiating table over the last year. Communication with the rebels has not been easy. International Alert and ICRC gained entry into the RUF camps, but otherwise only occasional and erratic radio contact had been made until recently. Following an RUF request for humanitarian aid, the government has forbidden ICRC from going back to the camps. One hundred captured RUF combatants have been taken prisoner and a delegation of high-level RUF officials, captured in November, is also being held.

Initially, the RUF was unwilling to negotiate with the NPRC on the grounds that it was not a legitimate government. They also refused to accept Ambassador Dinka as mediator whom they criticised for being too close to the government. However, talks were initiated by the UN and the OAU in early December, possibly indicating a less intransigent position on the part of the RUF. Reports are that the preliminary conversations were positive. Bio announced the new governments commitment to negotiations without preconditions.

A negotiated peace and cease-fire are unlikely to halt the widespread violence in Sierra Leone. However, they constitute a first step in re-establishing law and order. Until there is a cease-fire, all violence in the country will be attributed to the RUF, high levels of government militarisation will be justified and the "sobel" led armed gangs will continue to loot with impunity.

Regional peace

The recent peace agreement in Liberia, so long as it is upheld, reduces the chance of further destabilisation across the Sierra Leone-Liberian border.

WHY ICG SHOULD ENGAGE IN SIERRA LEONE

ICG can add value

ICG's assessment reveals that, despite the involvement in a range of initiatives by individuals, local and international NGOs, and representatives of the international governmental community, there is no overall framework or strategy confronting the crisis in Sierra Leone. ICG's presence in Sierra Leone can add considerable value as an independent, non-political, non-partisan organisation. It can support local initiatives and, through the board, influence governments around the world, the UN, the international community and the media. Linking local and international players focused on attaining good governance, ICG can have influence.

In Sierra Leone, as in other countries where we have worked, organisations have focused on the immediate problems rather than the causes of the crisis. The international community should begin to concentrate its efforts on developing and supporting governments to be responsible. Without such support, the welfare of the population relies on the erratic efforts of humanitarian agencies. The real challenge for ICG is to lead the international community into this arena.

Sierra Leone can recover culturally and economically

SIERRA LEONE is a coherent nation state where the people consider themselves Sierra Leonean. The majority of the population shares a common language, Krio, and the country's borders contain its ethnic groups intact. Ethnic divisions between the two dominant language groups - the Temne of the north and the Mende of the south, are not a causative factor in the violence. There has been little of the tribal conflict that has characterised other African crises.

Economically, Sierra Leone has the potential to be self-sufficient and with its rich mineral deposits it is reasonable to assume that there would be healthy foreign investment in the country. Thus there is a positive environment for the restoration of responsible government.

The people of SL need and merit international recognition

SIERRA LEONE has not been a priority for international governments or relief agencies. International attention has, on the whole, been in the form of media coverage which has tended to stress the anarchic nature of the war and has acted as a disincentive to donors considering providing strategic support. The reason why the UN suggested ICG's involvement in SL was to focus attention on the country. ICG has done this and will continue to do so.

A FUTURE ROLE FOR ICG

ICG can most effectively assist by encouraging democratic and accountable systems of government. An identifiable gap in addressing Sierra Leone's crisis is the lack of co-ordinated attention to the future of a newly elected government once it comes into power.

The new government will have a narrow window of opportunity. Unless it has the ability to establish itself as a legitimate administration with the confidence of the people and the international community, there is likely to be widespread disillusionment and a slide into further crisis.

ICG can take a lead role in strengthening civil society and encouraging effective and responsible government. ICG can facilitate bringing together the different players who can both push for and lend assistance to the new SL administration to make it function effectively and responsibly.

There are three contributions that ICG can make towards the restoration of peace in SL and the prevention of a further crisis:

First, ICG can monitor what is going on in SL.

Secondly, ICG can continue to bring influence to bear on the international community, through the Board.

Thirdly, ICG can contribute to the creation of a strong civil society in SL, by supporting local initiatives.

Monitoring

An ICG SL team would establish ongoing contact with the players involved in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. ICG SL team would gather information through regular meetings with the parties where the input of each body and organisation towards reconstruction would be outlined. ICG SL team would facilitate dialogue between local and international, governmental and non governmental bodies. ICG SL team would monitor the activities of the main players and assess whether goals of good governance, economic revival and national building are being achieved. Through monitoring, gaps would be identified where attention is insufficient. Periodic assessment reports would be written based on this monitoring.

To achieve this:

ICG should again send a small team to SL and set up a local contact group. ICG should set up a group in SL comprised of Sierra Leoneans and international staff. They will monitor the situation, co-ordinate local activities, and recommend to the ICG Board what steps need to be taken to influence the international community. Sierra Leoneans with relevant experience have expressed enthusiasm for the idea and their willingness to participate.

International Advocacy

Members of the Board and other experts would advocate and promote steps that will encourage the international community to support the long term reconstruction and development of SL. The first steps to assist SL's process towards stability and good governance are supporting immediate initiatives such as:

• the transition to civilian rule. Although it is probable that there will be more contentious developments around the elections and for logistical reasons they might be postponed, adequate funds must be raised to ensure that the election is able to go ahead. The process must be publicly supported and monitored to guarantee, as far as possible, that elections are free and fair.

• Emergency humanitarian budgets need to be maintained or, if possible, increased. The emergency response is poorly co-ordinated. DHA has acknowledged the shortcomings and is strengthening UNDP; however, DHA needs to take a lead role not just a supportive one.

• Encourage negotiated peace efforts.

In the medium term, where issues are seen to have a regional perspective, ICG could bring together leaders to address regional reconstruction. For example themes such as disarmament and demobilisation, the firm establishment of countries political and economic borders, and regional economic agreements could be discussed.

To achieve this:

ICG should identify and establish a small group of ICG Board members and experts on SL and issues pertaining to the crisis in SL. Contact has been made with academics at Oxford and London Universities who are interested in being involved with such a group. The first meeting of this group and the assessment team should be held as soon as possible. They should discuss and define each stage of the strategy and act as advisors to ICG's project in Sierra Leone.

Support to local NGOs

ICG would encourage a local NGO movement made up of human rights organisations and minority groups who can work with the new government and act as a watchdog and by strengthening civil society, enforce good governance.

To achieve this:

The ICG SL team would provide financial and capacity building resources to non governmental bodies and promote programmes that seek to strengthen a civil society. The ICG SL team would also, co-ordinate visits and seminars led by international experts with a view to sharing experiences gained in other countries which have undergone successful transitions from collapsed societies to stable functioning democracies.

To go forward with these three areas of operation, ICG should seek funds for a minimum one year commitment to SL.

Update: Progress since ICG's December 1995 assessment

1. Initial field assessment and report completed and sent out.

2. Dialogue ongoing with governments with diplomatic presence in SL; academic SL experts; International financial institutions (World Bank and IMF); international mining companies; international NGOs; and the press.

3. Funding applications have been sent to Charity Projects, the ODA, the New Zealand government, the US government and the States of Jersey.

4. Board Response: Individual members of the Board have acted on the recommendations from the Interim Report on Sierra Leone sent out in December:

• Morton Abramowitz and Senator George Mitchell have affected change in US policy to Sierra Leone. After their discussions with US Government officials, a threat that the USAID Sierra Leone budget would be halved, has been withdrawn and a new programme has been set up.

• Olara Otunnu agreed to lead a sub group of the Board that will monitor ICGs engagement in Sierra Leone.

• Max Jakobson and Paer Stenbaeck are approaching the Finnish government to request contributions for the election fund in Sierra Leone.

• Marianne Heiberg is approaching the Norwegian government to request contributions for the election fund in Sierra Leone.

• Leo Tindemans and Mark Eyskens are approaching the Belgian government and EU to encourage contributions for the electoral fund and the increase humanitarian aid.

• Gianfranco Dell'Alba has also agreed to approach the EU with regards to the same issues.

• Peter Kooijmans approached the Dutch Ministry for Cooperation and Development to seek contributions for the elections.

• Malcom Fraser is approaching the Australian government for contributions to the election fund.

• Ed Turner inspired CNN to make a half hour documentary on Sierra Leone which was broadcast on January 13th and 14th.

• Margaret Jay encouraged BBC assignment to do a programme on Sierra Leone. ICG briefed the producer and the film team travelled to Sierra Leone on January 14th.

• Max Jakobson has undertaken to write a piece on Sierra Leone for the New York Review.

• Other journalists in Europe have stated their intention of focusing on Sierra Leone prior to and during the election.

Addendum to Assessment Report: Transition to Democracy. May, 1996

On February 26, 1996, Presidential and parliamentary elections took place in Sierra Leone. Attempts were made by the outgoing government to postpone the elections and there was scepticism up until voting day as to whether or not they would be allowed to take place. However, in-spite of shooting and violent attempts to disrupt the polls both in rural areas and in Freetown, hundreds of thousands of people went out to vote. 60 percent of those that were registered, voted. After the first round, five of the thirteen parties won seats in parliament, but their was no overall winner of the Presidency (no one candidate got more than 50%). In the second round, on March 15, Ajmad Tejan Kaba of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) won the run off for the presidency. On March 29 the military government handed over power to the first democratically elected government in over 25 years. There was an atmosphere of euphoria throughout the country when the civilian government took power and people celebrated their victory over the military regime.

The President has now appointed his coalition cabinet and the new Parliament is sitting. Mr. Kaba met with Fodah Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, in Abidjan at the end of April and there was an agreement to hold the ceasefire and to continue peace negotiations. With peace talks underway and a legitimate government in place, the future in Sierra Leone looks more hopeful and expectations are high.

The new government must promptly bring an end to the conflict and restore peace and stability in order to maintain the support of the people that elected it into power. Many of the politicians are new to government and even those that have served before are working under a new constitution, written in 1991, under which they have new responsibilities and limitations. The new administration has a difficult task to achieve. It is not just a peace agreement with the RUF. Sierra Leone requires an overall strengthening of government and a programme for demobilisation, education, health and creation of employment in order to ensure that the new democracy is sustainable.