• Text size  | | |
• Email this document
• Printable version

Punjab Human Rights Update

 

1.   BACKGROUND

Repercussions from two pivotal events in 1984 still resonate through the Indian Punjab: the storming of the Golden Temple at Amritsar by Indian troops, and the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards a few months later, which led to days of anti-Sikh rioting, especially in New Delhi. After 1984 the militant struggle for an independent Sikh state of Khalistan gained considerable momentum, and in the ensuing years thousands were killed in Punjab by both militants and security forces (Journal of Democracy Oct. 1993, 60-61).

This struggle has taken place within the context of India's larger fight to maintain control over several other ethnic fractures and armed separatist movements, most notably in Kashmir and Assam (Inter Press Service 18 May 1993), and to contain longstanding Hindu-Muslim tensions which are currently threatening the secular democratic foundations of the country (FEER 9 Sept. 1993, 28; Journal of Democracy Oct. 1993, 64-68).

Sikhs make up only 2 per cent of India's population (FEER 9 Sept. 1993, 20) but form 55-60 per cent of the population of the Punjab, with Hindus forming 36-45 per cent (Kohli 1990, 355-56; Journal of Democracy Oct. 1993, 60; The New York Times 26 Oct. 1993). Nearly two-thirds of the Punjabi Sikhs are of the Jat caste of prosperous landowners (Kohli 1990, 355-56), important in an area known as India's breadbasket (UPI 11 Apr. 1993; Le Monde 19 Feb. 1992). Sikh political strength has traditionally been concentrated within the Sikh political party the Akali Dal and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), a religious organization that controls Sikh temples (Kohli 1990, 356-57), but militant Sikh fundamentalism gathered strength in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The use of chemical fertilizers during what has become known as the Green Revolution brought a new prosperity to Punjabi society, but also brought western influences that were perceived as challenging traditional Sikh values. As well, radical methods of advancing the Sikh cause became acceptable to more people after the Akali Dal's failure to peacefully negotiate with the central government for greater Sikh autonomy (Kohli 1990, 359-64). From the beginning

Jat Sikhs formed the base of support for groups advocating an independent Khalistan (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993d, 25).

This period saw the rise of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a charismatic Sikh religious leader who openly encouraged terrorist acts in the name of creating Khalistan, the "Land of the Pure," and who used the holiest Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, as a headquarters and "armed bunker" for his operations (Mulgrew 1988, 76-82). Indira Gandhi's Operation Bluestar, an armed assault on the Golden Temple in 1984 which resulted in the deaths of Bhindranwale and according to official figures another 492 "civilian/terrorists," has entered the Sikh consciousness as the most profane sacrilege possible (ibid., 80). When Gandhi was assassinated later in the year by her two Sikh bodyguards, anti-Sikh rioting, most seriously in Delhi, raged out of control for days. Estimates of the death toll range from the official figure of 2,733 to over 6,000, with Sikh property damage topping $250 million (ibid., 86-87; People's Union for Democratic Rights Nov. 1992, 10-11; From the Lawyers Collective June 1993a, 6).

The July 1985 Rajiv Gandhi-Sant Longowal Accord, which promised important concessions to the Punjab, briefly lessened tensions in the region, but the failure of the accord after the August 1985 assassination of Longowal by militants doomed the region to years of continuing violence (Le Monde 19 Feb. 1992; India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 36; Kohli 1990, 369; Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 174). President's Rule was imposed on the state in 1987, and the death toll in fighting between the militants and security forces rose yearly: 2,500 in 1988, 3,000 in 1989, and 4,500 in 1990 (ibid., 177).

Seeking to reintroduce local rule, the central government attempted to run national and state assembly elections in May and June 1991, but cancelled them late in the campaign after 24 candidates were assassinated (ibid., 199). At the height of their power the many militant groups exercised a considerable grip over the Punjab. They were blamed for widespread acts of terror, especially the targeting of perceived opponents, who included civil servants, politicians, journalists, businessmen, other prominent individuals and ordinary Hindu and Sikh civilians. Militant groups have also engaged in indiscriminate attacks apparently designed to cause extensive civilian casualties, in some cases firing automatic weapons into residential and commercial areas (ibid., 175; also see Country Reports 1992 1993, 1134; Amnesty International May 1991, 7).

According to Amnesty International, women and children were among the victims of such attacks (Amnesty International Dec. 1993, 154). The militant groups also sought to forcibly impose fundamentalist Sikh values on Punjabi society:

Rebel "moral re-armament" groups closed down all liquor, and meat shops as well as beauty parlors, and forced government officials to conduct all business in the Punjabi language. State-owned radio and television also were terrorized into broadcasting only in Punjabi, and newspapers were forced to carry the militants' propaganda. Scores of journalists who opposed the insurgency were killed, as were vendors and deliverymen for their newspapers (The San Francisco Chronicle 12 July 1993; also see The Economist 22 May 1993; FEER 1 Apr. 1993).

The Punjabi legal system had difficulty dealing with the Sikh militant threat (C.J. International Nov.-Dec. 1990, 17). Despite the extraordinary police powers granted by national security legislation (see section 3.1), convictions of suspected terrorists remained rare because of the power of militant groups to intimidate judges, witnesses, police officers and their family members (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1139; Kohli 1990, 373; Amnesty International May 1991, 7, 55). Human rights monitors reported that security forces were instead operating outside the law in combatting suspected militants by staging faked "encounter" and "escape" killings, torturing and intimidating suspects' family members, and holding alleged militants in detention for prolonged periods without charge or trial under national security legislation (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 35-167; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 170; Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 30-34, 59-60; ibid. May 1991, 41, 44-45; Country Reports 1992 1993, 1134, 1136).

2.             SITUATION SINCE JUNE 1991

2.1              February 1992 Elections and the Aftermath

After the violence of the aborted 1991 elections, protection for candidates was considerably improved (Le Monde 19 Feb. 1992; Libération 17 Feb. 1992; Los Angeles Times 20 Feb. 1992), but February 1992 elections for the state legislature and for seats in the national parliament were still marred by a boycott by several Akali Dal factions (The Economist 28 Feb. 1992), and by terrorist violence and intimidation (India Today 29 Feb. 1992, 100; La Presse 17 Feb. 1992; AFP 19 Feb. 1992). Voter participation was estimated at around 25 per cent or less (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1143; The Economist 28 Feb. 1992; Libération 21 Feb. 1992; Los Angeles Times 20 Feb. 1992; FEER 1 Apr. 1993), and the Congress Party emerged victorious with the support of only 9 per cent of voters (ibid.).

President's Rule was withdrawn after the February 1992 elections (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1143). At this time the new Chief Minister Beant Singh reportedly gave Punjab Director General of Police K.P.S. Gill wide discretion in the fight against Sikh militants (India Today 30 June 1993, 90-91; ibid. 15 Apr. 1993a, 39; The Economist 22 May 1993), with a resultant escalating series of police campaigns designed to destroy the militant groups using whatever means deemed necessary (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 170; India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 36-40; also see section 2.3).

In the months that followed, Gill and the Punjab police, aided by other security forces, reportedly were able to seriously damage many of the main militant Sikh groups (India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 37; ibid. 15 June 1993, 46-53; Inter Press Service 29 Apr. 1993; Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993). While some sources claimed the show of force by police had restored the "balance of terror" (India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 39), others later reported that the most pressing problem in the Punjab is continuing police use of terror despite the reduced militant threat (The New York Times 26 Oct. 1993; The San Francisco Chronicle 12 July 1993). Still other sources, including Gill himself, cautioned that the militant threat could well resurface (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993a, 17-20; ibid. 8 Oct. 1993d, 28).

2.2 Security Forces: Composition and Authority

Reports indicate that there are currently about 60,000 police in the Punjab, nearly double the number of a few years ago (India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 38; Jeune Afrique 9 June 1993; The San Francisco Chronicle 12 July 1993; The Economist 22 May 1993). Army presence in the state is generally numbered at 100,000-150,000, with another 50,000 paramilitary troops (The San Francisco Chronicle 12 July 1993; Inter Press Service 18 May 1993). Among the paramilitary forces are the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the National Security Guard, "an elite force mainly recruited from the army and police" who are known as the "Black Cats" (Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 79; ibid. May 1991, 4). Numbering about 1,000 in 1990, they are said to be especially active in search operations in border areas (ibid.). A May 1991 Amnesty International report also indicated that

since 1986 the Indian press has persistently carried reports that the police have used under-cover groups consisting of criminal elements, former or serving policemen with criminal records, or former armed separatists won over during detention, in counter-insurgency operations. Sometimes nick-named "cats", these irregular forces have been charged with obtaining intelligence about armed Sikh groups and arresting and even killing suspected leaders of those identified on police lists. All reports indicate they have been licensed to act with impunity (ibid.).

One report indicates that a category of "special police officers" has been created as part of the new counter-insurgency strategy. This category is made up largely of previously unemployed low-caste mazhabi Sikhs who receive Rs 35 a day (about Cdn$1.50), are provided weapons and are "given a licence to kill" (India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 38; also see The Economist 22 May 1993). A large number of these special police officers were said to have been used during the February 1992 elections (Xinhua 17 Feb. 1992).

Amnesty International reports that "since May 1990 all security forces in Punjab have operated jointly under the command of the state's director general of police" (Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 29). Under the constitution, responsibility for the police rests with individual states (Blaustein and Devamithran Oct. 1990, 166; Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 79), but the central government maintains key responsibilities and controls, especially through paramilitary groups and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), all of which report to the Ministry of Home Affairs (ibid.; Diaz 1989, 172; Country Reports 1992 1993, 1133).

World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems indicates that police departments in India are more advanced in their communications development than in other aspects of modernization, such as the use of helicopters and airplanes in police work (Diaz 1989, 173). By 1989 police in every city and large town reportedly had access to a control room with radio links to patrol vehicles, a system that was "functioning reasonably well" (ibid.) The report also indicates that most police stations across the country are linked by a radio-telephone communications system that now includes computer database facilities (ibid.). However, a more recent report by Dr. S. Subramanian, former director-general of both the Central Reserve Police Force and the National Security Guard, indicates that "a national data bank containing identification particulars, the modus operandi and the organisational network of criminals" has yet to be created (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993c, 24).

2.3          Counter-insurgency

Many reports indicate that one key to the security forces' apparent success in combatting Sikh militantism in Punjab was the decision to allow police to use whatever means deemed necessary to achieve victory (India Today 30 June 1993, 90-91; ibid. 15 Apr. 1993a, 39; The Economist 22 May 1993). K.P.S. Gill was quoted in India Today as saying

We made the message clear: you shoot at us, we shoot at you. And then you have one option: surrender, or die. We declared open season on terrorists. We made it a Punjab Police fight. No force from outside could have done it (India Today 15 Apr. 1993b, 43).

Gill went against standard counter-insurgency tactics and concentrated on strengthening the Punjab police rather than relying mainly on the military. In addition to the use of low-caste mazhabis as special police officers, Jat Sikhs were heavily recruited by the police force in order to cut into the militants' support and provide accurate local knowledge in rural areas (India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 37-38). During operations the police were used on the front lines to make arrests, with army and paramilitary forces providing backup (ibid.). Major militant leaders were targeted, and many did not survive. Gurjant Singh Budhsinghwala of the Khalistan Liberation Force (Amnesty International Dec. 1993, 12), reportedly wanted for a thousand killings, was himself killed by police in July 1992; five other suspected militants who later met to choose his successor were also killed (UPI 4 Aug. 1992; Reuters 3 Aug. 1992). Prominent militants Sukhdev Singh Babbar and M.M. Partap Singh Sabra of the Babbar Khalsa International were killed in August 1992 (The Toronto Star 14 Aug. 1992; Documentation Réfugiés 18 Aug. 1992), prompting the surrender of some 71 militants, including senior leader Gurdeep Singh Sivia, who in a public ceremony denounced the separatist cause (The Toronto Star 13 Aug. 1992; UPI 12 Aug. 1992). In February 1993 another top militant, Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, who had founded the Bhindranwale Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTFK), was killed in a gun battle following a huge police operation, prompting still more surrenders (India Today 31 Mar. 1993, 56-57; UPI 28 Feb. 1993).

The war between militants and security forces had for some years been fought on the family level: in 1991 over 130 police family members were killed in militant attacks (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1134; AFP 13 Aug. 1992), and police harassment of militants' family members has been documented (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 36; Amnesty International May 1991, 18). Militants escalated attacks against police and their families in the summer of 1992 primarily in reaction to the July and August police attacks on militant leaders noted above (Documentation Réfugiés 18 Aug. 1992; UPI 16 Aug. 1992; Country Reports 1992 1993, 1135; Amnesty International Dec. 1993, 12-13). The "family" nature of the battle divided villages throughout the region. While increased police recruitment of Jats cut into militant strength, police with families in danger felt an extra incentive to destroy the militant threat (India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 38).

At the same time, militant "depredations," which included terrorist attacks against civilians, both Sikh and Hindu (La Presse 12 Mar. 1992; ibid. 1 Nov. 1992; AFP 9 July 1992; Xinhua 2 Dec. 1992), abduction, rape, and forced marriage of women to militants (Amensty International Dec. 1993, 15), extortion and corruption, were an important factor in the public's loss of confidence in the militant cause, and thus contributed greatly to police success (FEER 1 Apr. 1993; Journal of Democracy Oct. 1993, 61; Inter Press Service 29 Apr. 1993). Frontline reports as well that as militant groups became more desperate to recruit new members, they turned to lower castes, which alienated the landed Jats who formed the militants' chief base of support (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993d, 25).

Once security forces were able to show some success in combatting the militants, people were more willing to come forward as informers (The Economist 22 May 1993; Jeune Afrique 9 June 1993). Police also pressured militants who had given themselves up to provide information, leading many to fear reprisals from remaining militants (India Today 15 June 1993, 48). Informers reportedly can have the power of life and death over others, and police have been criticized for killing people on the basis of false information (ibid. 15 Oct. 1992, 43).

Several reports indicate that Gill has been operating a large, unaudited fund that provides cash rewards to security forces who capture or kill wanted militants (Amnesty International May 1991, 5; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 170; India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 39; ibid. 15 Oct. 1992, 44). Iqbal Singh of the Khalistan Liberation Force, for instance, who was killed by police in June 1993, reportedly after a two-hour gun battle in the industrial district of Jalandhar, carried a reward of US$32,000 on his head (AFP 25 June 1993). Critics have charged that the profit motive has contributed to police excesses in the hunt for militants (India Today 15 Oct. 1992, 44; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 170).

Security forces have been increasingly vigilant about closing the border with Pakistan to stem the flow of arms to militants and cut off escape routes (FEER 1 Apr. 1993; India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 38; The Economist 22 May 1993), although Gill has recently stated that efforts to bring in arms from Pakistan have been increasing (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993e, 28). Several reports suggest that the Punjab police have begun routinely operating outside of Punjab. Amnesty International recently reported

an emerging pattern involving Punjab police acting in plainclothes outside Punjab, using cars without numberplates and apparently operating illegally without the knowledge of the police in the state concerned. Their purpose is to abduct suspected Sikh militants whose arrest and detention they subsequently deny (Amnesty International 14 Oct. 1993).

After one alarming incident, police from bordering Haryana state asked the Punjab police "not to kill anyone in Haryana without proper legal authority" (India Today 15 Oct. 1992, 43). There has also been a recent case reported of Punjab police tracking down Sikh militant suspects in Hong Kong, then arranging for their return through international channels (ibid. 15 Oct. 1993, 18), as well as the arrest in Thailand of a leading Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan member by Indian police (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993a, 19). Police claim that as many as 500 terrorists have fled the Punjab in the past two years, and that many of them have gone abroad using false papers (India Today 15 Oct. 1993, 18).

Specific anti-militant campaigns launched in recent years by security forces carried such names as Operation Black Thunder, Rakshak II, Night Dominance and Final Assault (India Today 15 Feb. 1992, 15; ibid. 15 Apr. 1993a, 40; AFP 2 Dec. 1992). Many of these campaigns involved systematic cordon and search operations in areas of rural Punjab. Describing one such operation, reporter Harinder Baweja related the arrival of troops at dawn in a village in militant territory, the assembling of all men in the village, their separation according to age, and the systematic questioning, especially of younger males, followed by a search of all dwellings (India Today 15 Feb. 1992, 14-15). According to Baweja, by early 1992 the security forces had already "cordoned off 394 villages, sent out 10,961 patrols and laid 4,754 ambushes," killing 34 top militants and arresting 1,600 (ibid., 15). Baweja also reports that these operations by security forces included visits by medical staff to provide such services as first aid and cataract operations in an effort to win village support (ibid.).

Such civic projects have officially come under the aegis of Operation Healing Touch, which was launched by Gill in April 1993 in an effort to create an atmosphere of goodwill and healing and convince remaining Sikh militants to surrender (UPI 11 Apr. 1993; India Today 15 June 1993, 53). Some reports have indicated an unofficial amnesty granted to minor militants who turn themselves in. According to one report, "those who lay down their arms are given small doles by the government, assisted in finding jobs and used by police in their campaign against separatism" (UPI 28 Feb. 1993). By June 1993 over 850 militants had surrendered in the state (India Today 15 June 1993, 48).

2.4                Militant Groups: Composition and Strength

Sikh militant groups for years have been characterized by factionalism, "short-lived alliances and murderous infighting" (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 174; also see ibid., 28). Among the main groups have been factions of the Khalistan Commando Force, Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Liberation Force, Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan, the Damdami Takshal and numerous Panthic Committees (ibid., 173; Jeune Afrique 9 June 1993; Amnesty International May 1991, 10).

Precise information on militant Sikh groups has often been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 172). However, several sources indicate that militant strength has been considerably reduced (FEER 1 Apr. 1993; India Today 15 Apr. 1993a, 36-40; Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993; The New York Times 26 Oct. 1993). As well, both Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER 1 Apr. 1993) and the The Economist (The Economist 22 May 1993) cite Punjab police statistics to indicate a considerable easing of tensions in the region, and point to a lessening of militant activity, although police counter-insurgency campaigns are ongoing:

1991        1992        1993(Jan-Mar.)

Civilians killed
by terrorists          2,094       1,226       7
Police killed           497          252          17
Terrorists killed    2,177       2,113       270
Terrorists captured              1,977       1,502       24
Terrorist surrenders             ---            537          255

A December 1993 Amnesty International report indicates, however, that "although the level of political violence has been reduced this year," the pattern of violence - attacks on police, officials, politicians, journalists, as well as rival Sikh groups and civilians - continued (Amnesty International Dec. 1993, 12).

Frontline has recently indicated that "if most militant groups are now organisationally crippled, the fact remains that small groups of highly skilled terrorists continue to have the resources to hit hard" (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993a, 17). The Khalistan Liberation Force, Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan, and the Babbar Khalsa are said to be the three largest groups still in operation, although new militant alliances are also being formed (ibid., 19-20). Frontline also reports that the Babbar Khalsa International is slowly rebuilding but that the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) has been "decimated," although KCF militants have reportedly linked up with other groups (ibid., 17-18).

Most militant leaders have reportedly moved out of Punjab, with many now based in Pakistan (ibid., 18-19; also see ibid. 8 Oct. 1993c, 23). Militant violence has apparently followed them. In September 1993 eight people were killed in a car bomb explosion in Delhi aimed at Maninderjit Singh Bitta, president of the federalist Youth Congress (I). Bitta survived his twelfth assassination attempt since the early 1980s. Three separatist Sikh groups claimed responsibility for the attack, with a chief suspect being the Khalistan Liberation Front (India Today 30 Sept. 1993, 19; The New York Times 26 Oct. 1993; Frontline 8 Oct. 1993a, 17; ibid. 8 Oct. 1993b, 20-23). In the weeks following the attack some 150-250 people were detained or arrested by police in Delhi and Punjab in connection with the explosion (AFP 16 Sept. 1993; Asiaweek 22 Sept. 1993). Earlier, in Uttar Pradesh in June 1993, Sikh militants from the Khalistan Commando Force killed 11 people in three different villages. Reuters reported that because the militant movement had been virtually wiped out in Punjab, the guerrillas had moved elsewhere, "particularly [to] the Terai region of Uttar Pradesh, where many Sikhs have formed farming communities" (Reuters 10 June 1993). Frontline similarly reports that the Khalistan Liberation Force has dispersed its members to Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh (Frontline 8 Oct. 1993a, 18).

According to Gill, Sikh militant groups, with the backing of Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, are in the process of becoming smaller, more skilled units which will increasingly employ "classical" terrorist tactics, such as using explosives to strike targets of particular importance, with random attacks against civilians becoming more rare (ibid. 8 Oct. 1993e, 28). There is a fear among Indian security forces that Pakistan is encouraging an alliance of Sikh, Kashmiri and Muslim militants to create instability within India (ibid.; ibid. 8 Oct. 1993a, 19).

2.5                Everyday Life

Several sources have pointed to indicators that life has become less violent in Punjab. In addition to the previously mentioned police statistics showing a sharp decline in deaths related to the insurgency and the high voter turnout in recent elections, correspondents have reported a revival of some after-dark activities considered too dangerous while the militants were strong: people feel much freer to work the fields, use the roads and socialize at night. Correspondents have also reported greater variety in school uniforms than previously allowed by the militants ( In 1991 Amnesty International reported that Panthic Committees "issued a 13-point program, which ordered that traditional Punjabi dress (salwar-kameez) should be worn by all girls at school. Mrs. Nirmal Kanta, headteacher at a government secondary school at Rajpura near Patiala, argued that many of her school's pupils came from poor working class families and lacked the means to immediately adopt traditional dress, and appealed for two weeks to do so. On 17 December 1990 she was killed at school, during prayer time, in the presence of her pupils. The Babbar Khalsa claimed responsibility, saying she was killed for 'disobeying their orders'" (May 1991, 10).,) the return of dogs to rural villages (militants had killed many to keep them from barking at night), the return of elaborate wedding feasts which had previously been banned, and a dramatic increase in property prices (Inter Press Service 29 Apr. 1993; The New York Times 26 Oct. 1993; The Economist 22 May 1993; Jeune Afrique 9 June 1993).

Kanwar Sandhu, writing in India Today, cautions that ten years of strife and 25,000 deaths "have taken such a toll that the climb back to sanity, to coping, to achieving normalcy in the ordinary functioning of day-to-day life, is going to be an uphill task" (India Today 15 June 1993, 46). Commenting on the healing process in Punjab, he states that "at times, the tragedy seems grim beyond words. An entire generation seems to have been destroyed, leaving the very old looking after the very young" (ibid., 51). In a single school in Amritsar for children of police officers, 220 had lost parents to the violence. According to Sandhu, many young militants who have surrendered now face unemployment because of their past:

The surrenders have ... brought to the fore the tragedy of the misguided lives of the young militants. Most confess they were either influenced by the macho trend, wanted to settle personal scores or make easy money.... These boys are in urgent need of rehabilitation but at the moment there seems to be no clear government policy on absorbing them into the mainstream. Many are opium addicts and require systematic treatment. The police are keen to insulate such youths to prevent them from relapsing into terrorism and are wary of sending them to jails where they would be exposed to hardened criminals or get a chance to reorganise themselves. At the same time, the police would do well to restrain themselves from using the surrendered militants as pawns (ibid. 48-49).

One press report indicates that Sikhs who fled Punjab to Delhi in the mid-1980s are now reluctant to return, even though the government claims the situation has calmed considerably (Xinhua 5 July 1993). Government incentives reportedly include grants, transport allowances, bank loan facilities, reserved real estate prices, "allotment of fair price shops and permits for plying mini buses," but many people are still wary of the security situation and have refused the offers (ibid.).

In Journal of Democracy Robert L. Hardgrave Jr. writes that despite "the restoration of self-government and the continued police campaign against the militants ... the specter of terrorism remains to haunt any return to normalcy" in Punjab (Journal of Democracy Oct. 1993, 61). Other sources point to the threat of unfettered police power, which is contributing to a lasting sense of fear in Punjab (The Economist 22 May 1993; The New York Times 26 Oct. 1993; Jeune Afrique 9 June 1993; Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993). According to one of the harshest critics, the use of state terror has replaced "law" with "order" (FEER 1 Apr. 1993).

3.                HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

Militant Sikh groups have long been associated with human rights violations in Punjab (see sections 1., 2.3 and 2.4). The following sections focus primarily on human rights concerns associated with government and security forces in Punjab, and where relevant, in India as a whole.

3.1     National Security Legislation

For several years, critics have accused Punjab security forces of misusing special powers granted under national security legislation to combat the threat of terrorism and secession. Amnesty International argues that the Indian constitution and penal code provide substantial laws to protect individual rights in India, but that these safeguards are often unobserved and do not apply to prisoners arrested under special legislation (Amnesty International May 1991, 49; also see ibid. Mar. 1992, 81).

Amnesty International also reported in March 1993 that particular members of the international human rights committee set up to supervise India's implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) concluded that many of the Covenant's provisions did not seem to be applied to India; that provisions of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (notably the wide powers to shoot to kill without accountability), of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act and of the National Security Act contravened important rights provided in the Covenant; ... that there was a great discrepancy between Indian constitutional and legal provisions and violations of these laws and existing legal safeguards in actual practice; and that widespread police abuses-such as torture, killings of detainees in custody and arbitrary killings-did not appear to be adequately investigated and punished (Amnesty International Mar. 1993, 3).

3.1.1    Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA)

The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) is currently in wide use throughout India (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1138). In Punjab some 13,535 people were officially held under the TADA in March 1992 (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1138); by October 1992 the government figure had dropped to 8,768 (Amnesty International 1993, 154). In March 1993, however, the official figure was 14,457 and Amnesty International reports that "unofficial sources say several thousand more are held without trial..." (Dec. 1993). Section 3 (1) of the act defines a "terrorist act" and section 4 (2) defines "disruptive activity" (see Appendix) (India, TADA 1987). According to Amnesty International, the definitions are so broad that the terms "encompass any act, including the peaceful expression of views, which questions the sovereignty or territorial integrity of India or which supports any claim for secession" (Amnesty International May 1991, 51).

The act allows for detention without charge or trial for up to one year under section 20(4)(b) (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 153; Amnesty International May 1991, 50). Those actually charged can, according to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, be detained indefinitely under the act while awaiting trial (LCHR July 1992, 145). According to the TADA, the punishment for committing or facilitating terrorist acts (section 3) or disruptive activities (section 4) is a fine and from five years to life imprisonment (India, TADA 1987; Amnesty International May 1991, 51). However, under section 3 (2), if a terrorist act results in a person's death, the punishment for such an act is death or life imprisonment and a fine (ibid.; India, TADA 1987). In specific situations outlined under section 21 (see Appendix), the traditional presumption of innocence is denied and the burden falls on the accused to prove that he or she is not guilty (ibid.; Amnesty International May 1991, 52; Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 155). Section 16 of the act stipulates that trials are heard by a special court in camera unless the public prosecutor applies to hold proceedings or part of the proceedings in open court (Amnesty International May 1991, 51-52; India, TADA 1987). Amnesty International indicates that this is a matter of concern because "[t]rials heard in camera necessarily lack important legal safeguards available to defendants tried in open court" (May 1991, 52). Further, the identity of witnesses may be kept secret under provisions of Section 16 (ibid.; India, TADA 1987). Section 10 of the TADA indicates that courts may sit anywhere, including in prison (ibid.). According to Country Reports 1992, under the TADA,

a confession made to an officer above the rank of superintendent of police is admissible as evidence, provided the police have "reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily." Press accounts and reports by human rights groups indicate that police brutality in extracting confessions under this law is common (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1136; also see Amnesty International May 1991, 53; LCHR July 1992, 145-46).

The TADA also does not require authorities to bring a detainee before a judicial magistrate; an executive magistrate, answerable to the state's Home Ministry, is sufficient, although "lawyers working on civil liberties cases in Punjab told Amnesty International that police or prison officials frequently inform the magistrate that the security situation does not allow the detainee to be brought before him" (Amnesty International May 1991, 50; also see LCHR July 1992, 145). As well, the TADA reportedly makes bail and appeals more difficult to obtain than is usual under Indian law under Section 20(8) (Amnesty International May 1991, 50; LCHR July 1992, 145).

3.1.2       Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act

The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act has been criticized for granting security forces a virtual licence to kill (Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 60). Section 4 of the act states that

any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may ... fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons... (India, Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act 8 Dec. 1983).

The act also allows entering and searching without a warrant and the arrest of people suspected of having committed or being about to commit a crime (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 42), and section 7 of the act grants security forces virtual immunity from prosecution:

No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act (ibid.; also see Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 60).

3.1.3            Other National Security Legislation

Other pieces of national security legislation extend or reinforce the police powers outlined under TADA and the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act. The National Security Act (NSA) provides for up to two years of preventive detention in Punjab without trial "on loosely defined security grounds" (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1138; Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 152). Under subsection 8.(1) detainees must be informed of the grounds for detention within five to ten days of arrest, and under subsection 11.(1) must be presented before an advisory board within seven weeks (India 27 Dec. 1980). According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "the NSA dispenses with the normal requirement of Indian criminal law that every detainee should be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest" (LCHR July 1992, 145).

The Punjab Disturbed Areas Act reportedly extends the power to use lethal force to magistrates or police officers, while providing protection from prosecution similar to that found in the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 42-43). As well, the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act (TAAA), like TADA, provides for special courts to be held in camera in "terrorist affected areas," allows for the use of unidentified witnesses, and provides for the reversal of the burden of proof "when a person accused of committing an offense can be shown to have been in an area when firearms or explosives were used against the security forces" (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 157; India, The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 31 August 1984).

Despite the reported lessening of the terrorist threat in Punjab, the national security legislation remains in effect (Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993), and according to a political science professor specializing in Asian studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, will likely continue to be used in Punjab for some time (Tepper 5 Nov. 1993). Critics contend that the special powers embolden the police to ignore the law when convenient and engage in the use of torture, extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses with impunity (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 158; Amnesty International Mar. 1993, 3; Country Reports 1992 1993, 1139).

3.2       Reported Abuses by Security Forces

3.2.1                Disappearances, "Escape" and "Encounter" Killings

Security forces in Punjab have long been accused of extrajudicial killings of suspects, which are then reported as disappearances, escapes or deaths in an "encounter" or gun battle with security forces (Amnesty International Apr. 1993, 1; ibid. May 1991, 4-5; Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 4-5). Amnesty International states that "state complicity in such practices is evident from a clear pattern of official cover up," indicating that inquiries into "disappearances" are often ignored (Dec. 1993, 25). Country Reports 1992 provides a typical scenario for a faked encounter killing:

police take into custody suspected militants or militant supporters without filing an arrest report. If the detainee dies during interrogation or is executed, officials deny that he was ever in custody and claim he died during an armed encounter with police or security forces. Afterwards, the bodies reportedly are sometimes moved to distant police districts for disposal, making identification and investigation more difficult (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1134-35).

Kanwar Sandhu writes in India Today that faked encounter killings by police are common, and that "many of the cases of killing of militants as reported by the police, and dutifully carried by newspapers, are plain disinformation" (India Today 15 Oct. 1992). Two Amnesty International surveys of the Indian press seem to corroborate this trend: in 1989 and 1990, 351 "armed encounters" between police and Sikh militants were reported, with 644 militants killed as opposed to only 41 police (Amnesty International May 1991, 44), while Punjab press reports between January 1991 and February 1993 showed that in 169 armed "encounters," 266 suspected militants had been killed without a single police casualty (ibid. Apr. 1993, 6).

Kanwar Sandhu also writes that the alleged policy of summary executions in fake encounters has the blessing of important government officials (India Today 15 Oct. 1992). Director-General of Police K.P.S. Gill, however, denies that police kill people in faked encounters, stating that "the law is very clear on how much force I can use in chasing down and capturing somebody. If he resists, if he fires, I can fire back. If he has killed people, I can kill him" (India Today 15 Apr. 1993b, 43). Gill also reportedly states, "my orders to my officers are clear-stay within the law. Still, if an officer has done something wrong, it is between him and his maker" (ibid.).

Police statistics indicate that the number of suspected terrorists killed by police fell considerably in the first quarter of 1993 (see section 2.4). During the heavy period of counter-insurgency campaigns in the months following the February 1992 elections, however, "extrajudicial killings and disappearances of civilians and suspected militants escalated" according to Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 170). As well, in April 1993 Amnesty International reported that faked encounter killings by police were continuing, and that relatives of suspected militants could also be victimized (Apr. 1993, 1). Far Eastern Economic Review quotes former Akali Dal state legislator Inderjit Singh Jaijee, chair of Movement Against State Repression, as stating that

the killings are now on a mass scale.... Formerly, the police were killing only the militants. Now, anyone suspected of having sympathy for the militants is killed, or disappears. They just pick up a boy or girl, anyone they like and take them away. The police have a free hand, with zero accountability (FEER 1 Apr. 1993) .

In a recent example, a 14 October 1993 Amnesty International Urgent Action reports on the abductions of Mokham Singh, secretary of the Babbar Akali Dal political party, and his wife Gurnham Kaur. Gurnham Kaur was reportedly taken first by armed police in June 1993; initially authorities stated they had her in custody, but now she cannot be located. Singh was reportedly taken by men in plain clothes on 4 October 1993 and was still missing ten days later.

Similarly, in January 1993 Kulwant Singh Saini, a Punjab advocate who had defended many suspected militants, disappeared in police custody along with his wife and child. The case inspired protests and strikes by Punjab lawyers. The police denied any involvement, but reportedly put forward conflicting stories about what happened. In February 1993 Singh's car was pulled from a canal, but no body was found (FEER 1 Apr. 1993; From the Lawyers Collective June 1993b, 25-26).

As an example of a suspicious "escape" report, Amnesty International documents the case of Gurdev Singh Kaonke, a former Sikh high priest who was reportedly in ill-health and was last seen being taken from a police station in January 1993. After a petition from his wife, a Punjab and Haryana High Court search party failed to find him in police custody:

On 3 January [1993] the police reported that Gurdev Singh Kaonke had "escaped" from police custody the previous night when he was taken by police in a party to seize weapons near Kanian village.... The police claim their party was ambushed by militants and that during an exchange of fire Gurdev Singh Kaonke escaped with handcuffs on, "under cover of darkness." But he is not known to have returned to his family and his body was never found (Amnesty International Apr. 1993, 4).

3.2.2   Arbitrary Arrest/Prolonged Detention Without Trial

Allegations that Punjab security forces regularly practice arbitrary arrest as a form of harassment, and that detainees can be subject to illegal custody and prolonged detention without trial, have persisted for several years (Amnesty International May 1991, 13; Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 6; India Today 15 Oct. 1992). Amnesty International reported in 1991 that security forces often arrest people without identifying themselves, showing warrants, stating the grounds for arrest, informing relatives where they are taking the suspect or even registering the arrest at a police station (Amnesty International May 1991, 13). Further, the human rights group stated that detainees could be

held in illegal detention for weeks and sometimes months, without any record of their arrest or their place of detention. Although the detention of some was eventually acknowledged, particularly after habeas corpus petitions were brought, such legal remedies have, in other cases, remained entirely ineffective and police officials have continued to deny knowledge of arrest or detention or else claimed that the person in question had "escaped" (ibid., 34).

Journalist Kanwar Sandhu estimates that at any given time Punjab police are illegally holding 200-300 people in secret detention, thereby avoiding the judiciary either through false stories or denial that they know of a detained person's whereabouts (India Today 15 Oct. 1992).

Young Sikh males and family members of suspected militants have been targeted for arbitrary arrest and detention in the past (Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 6; Amnesty International May 1991, 18), and according to a representative of Asia Watch, continue to be targeted (Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993). Amnesty International further reports that many young men are taken into custody arbitraily, the main factors prompting their arrest being their religious affiliation (muslim or Sikh), sex, age and place of residence if within areas associated with the activities of armed secessionist groups. Records are often not kept of people arrested (Dec. 1993).

3.2.3         Torture

A March 1992 Amnesty International document entitled India: Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody reports that torture in detention continues to take place throughout India, and is believed to have caused many deaths in custody (Amnesty International Mar. 1992 30-34). The practice can be difficult to document, however, as the usual witnesses to torture are security forces personnel who would rather conceal evidence, and lawyers and torture victims are reluctant to make official complaints for fear of reprisals or further harm (ibid., 9, 33-34).

According to Amnesty International, 1985 and 1989 commissions of inquiry found evidence of extensive use of torture in Punjab (Amnesty International May 1991, 20). Common torture techniques cited by Amnesty International include rolling heavy logs over a person's thighs, forcing legs as wide apart as possible, the use of electric shocks, upside down suspension, beatings and inserting chili powder into sensitive body parts (ibid., 20-22). Amnesty International also reported in its 1993 annual report that "women were often raped in police cells and army custody" (1993, 155). Sources indicate that Punjab security forces are still making frequent use of such practices (Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993; Jeune Afrique 9 June 1993; Country Reports 1992 1993; 1136; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 170).

3.2.4                Impunity from Prosecution

In September 1992 Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao was quoted as urging Indian security forces to not engage in extrajudicial killings or use other illegal or excessive violence in enforcing the law; he also announced that "action had been taken against more than 230 security personnel following such allegations in regions such as Punjab and Kashmir" (AFP 14 Sept. 1992). In February 1993 K.P.S. Gill reportedly announced he would review the conduct of some 400 police officers suspected of "excesses," although the review was cancelled within days out of fear of harming counter-insurgency operations (Amnesty International Apr. 1993, 6). Gill has since stated that he moves quickly when reports of human rights violations are made. In April 1993 he reportedly told India Today, "I have dismissed more policemen than anybody else in Punjab. The moment a specific complaint comes, I act" (15 Apr. 1993b, 43).

According to critics, such dismissals or suspensions remain the most severe punishments meted out to security forces for having committed human rights abuses (Amnesty International Mar. 1993, 9; ibid. Feb. 1992, 3; Asia Watch Aug. 1991, 7). However, the U.S. State Department reports that in 1992, along with 135 dismissals and 75 premature retirements in Punjab, there were three cases of senior officers receiving jail sentences, although no details of the cases are given (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1140).

In addition to the protection from prosecution provided in national security legislation such as the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act and the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3), Amnesty International claims that police, executive magistrates and public servants are also protected by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that prior permission from the government employing these officials is required before they can be prosecuted (Amnesty International Mar. 1992, 60). Amnesty International also contends that throughout India

the police regularly resort to a range of techniques to cover-up instances of custodial violence: failure to register complaints, acknowledge detention or to apply other legal safeguards; denial of responsibility; falsification of judicial records and post-mortem reports sometimes by having them carried out at police hospitals; intimidation of witnesses and complainants; and influencing police inquiries by having them conducted by police from the same branch and delaying their outcome and prosecutions. It is not only police who use these methods; they can often rely on the active complicity of medical doctors, executive magistrates and other officials who contribute to cover-ups by writing false reports or suppressing evidence of police torture (ibid., 61).

In one case reported by Amnesty International in April 1993, a Sikh woman was reportedly beaten to death by police and villagers were pressured to state that the death was "due to buffalo blows," which cause of death eventually appeared on the hospital's post-mortem (Amnesty International Apr. 1993, 4). K.P.S. Gill demoted the local station house officer over the incident, but no further investigation or punishment has been reported (ibid.).

The most oft-cited case said to illustrate police and official impunity in the Punjab is the state's inefficiency in investigating officers and officials who reportedly incited and encouraged the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, in Delhi and elsewhere in India. A 15 September 1993 India Today article charges that the Home Ministry and the Central Bureau of Investigation have been using bureaucratic and legal manoeuvres to delay release of the Jain-Aggarwal committee report, which reportedly implicates Congress Party members and some 300 police officers in the riots (India Today 15 Sept. 1993 30-32; Reuters 13 Aug. 1993). Numerous committees have now studied aspects of the 1984 riots, but many of them have simply given rise to more committees (From the Lawyers Collective June 1993a, 6; People's Union for Democratic Rights Nov. 1992, 1-5). The official death toll is 2,733, but so far only three murder cases covering 20 deaths have succeeded in securing the convictions of 15 people; about 128 people in all have been convicted for their participation in the riots (India Today 15 Sept. 1993, 32; see also From the Lawyers Collective June 1993a, 6; People's Union for Democratic Rights Nov. 1992, 10-11). Over 120 cases have ended in acquittals, mainly for lack of evidence and lax prosecution; reportedly none of these acquittals was appealed (ibid., 11).

The government has spent some Rs 152 million (Cdn$6.9 million) to compensate victims (Rs 10,000 [Cdn$450] for death, Rs 1,000 [Cdn$45] for injury, and Rs 5,000 [Cdn$225] for property damage). As well, new properties were found in Delhi for 1,900 families, and nearly 12,000 families were relocated to Punjab, with nationalized banks providing loans initially at 12.5 per cent interest, although a court decision later lowered the rate to 6 per cent (People's Union for Democratic Rights Nov. 1992, 2-3).

3.3  Media Censorship

Although the Indian press is often outspoken in its criticism of the government, reports indicate that media censorship can be strong in Punjab. Broad interpretations of the Official Secrets Act were used on many occasions during the February 1992 elections to censor materials thought to be favourable to militant groups (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1140; Committee to Protect Journalists 1992, 144). As well, Chief Minister Beant Singh has threatened to use national security legislation to arrest reporters (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1140; see also India Today 30 June 1993, 90). At least one journalist was arrested under the National Security Act in 1992 (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1140), and journalist and human rights activist Ram Singh Biling was reportedly missing and presumed dead after last being seen in police custody (Committee to Protect Journalists 1992, 144).

To the end of 1992, militant groups also exercised considerable pressure on media outlets in Punjab to report on their side favourably and to use the Punjabi language. In May 1992, for instance, militants beheaded M.L. Manchanda of All-India Radio in order to force the station to not broadcast government programmes and to use only Punjabi (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1141; Committee to Protect Journalists 1992, 148). By February 1992, Hind Samachar, the largest newspaper group in the Punjab, had reportedly lost 68 staff and distributers to militant violence since the early 1980s, and had turned their headquarters into a bunker protected by 60 guards as well as state police and paramilitary forces (Time 10 Feb. 1992).

4.    FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In September 1992 the government of India announced the formation of a national Human Rights Commission (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 169; The New York Times 14 Oct. 1992). Statements from government representatives, however, led many to believe that the commission would not independently investigate and report human rights violations, but would instead be used to defend the government's record before international and domestic groups (The Economist 16 July 1993; From the Lawyers Collective June 1993a, 4-6; The New York Times 14 Oct. 1992).

The Human Rights Commission was reportedly debated in parliament and finally established by executive order in September 1993, to be chaired by Justice Mishra, who had headed a widely-criticised inquiry into the 1984 Sikh massacres (Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993; FEER 14 Oct. 1993, 15; People's Union for Democratic Rights Nov. 1992, 5). A representative of Asia Watch stated that the mandate of the commission has still not been clarified, although it appears the commission will not be empowered to investigate alleged human rights abuses by security forces personnel (Asia Watch 29 Oct. 1993; see also From the Lawyers Collective June 1993a, 4-6; The Economist 16 July 1993).

Some sources are still concerned about a perceived growing potential for political and social instability within India as a whole. The International Human Rights Organisation (IHRO), based in Ludhiana, Punjab, has expressed concerns over the "near collapse of India's political setup," with a weakening of the judicial system, the press and elected legislatures in the face of increased police powers, especially in troubled areas like Punjab and Kashmir (IHRO Dec. 1992, v). Kushwant Singh, a former member of the Indian parliament, has written about another concern: the rise in Hindu fundamentalism, particularly alarming in his view because Hindus make up 85 per cent of the population. According to Singh, further episodes like the deadly communal rioting over the destruction of the Muslim mosque at Ayodhya in December 1992 and in Bombay a month later could destroy India's delicate secularism and bring on the disintegration of the country (FEER 9 Sept. 1993, 28).

Robert L. Hardgrave Jr. has also written about these issues:

In India, in a political culture of mutual distrust and increasing violence, the dangers are legion. India's democracy is challenged by communalism, excessive caste consciousness, and separatism. But in the state response to these challenges, India confronts yet another dilemma-weakening the very values of individual liberty that are at the core of its democratic commitment. In its attempts to quell endemic unrest and the challenge of terrorism, India has enacted a plethora of laws that have become instruments of repression; police and paramilitary abuses seem to get worse while all sorts of other violations of human rights are reported with numbing frequency. But for all the challenges, pressures, and dilemmas to which India is exposed by virtue of its plight as a multicultural state, Indian democracy, sustained through ten elections, still shows remarkable strength and resilience (Journal of Democracy Oct. 1993, 68).

APPENDIX

A complete copy of The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) as published by Delhi Law House, Delhi 1992, is available at Regional Documentation Centres.

REFERENCES

Agence France Presse (AFP). 16 September 1993. "Wanted Sikh Rebel Killed as Police Step up Blast Probe." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 25 June 1993. "Top Sikh Militant Killed by Indian Security Forces." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 2 December 1992. "Indian Troops Kill 21 Sikh Rebels as 'Final Assault' Gets Under Way." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 14 September 1992. "Indian PM Asks Security Forces to Respect Human Rights." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 13 August 1992. "Sikh Rebels Attack Police Again in Punjab." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 9 July 1992. "Onze personnes, dont huit militants sikhs, tuées au Pendjab." (NEXIS)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 19 February 1992. "Un mort et 12 blessés dans une explosion au Punjab." (NEXIS)

Amnesty International. December 1993. India: 'An Unnatural Fate,''Disappearances' and impunity in the Indian States of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. (AI Index: ASA 20/42/93). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International. 14 October 1993. Urgent Action. (AI Index: ASA 20/40/93). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International. April 1993. India: Three Reports of Deaths in Custody and 'Disappearances' in Punjab. (AI Index: ASA 20/19/93). London: Amnesty International Publications.

Amnesty International. March 1993. India: Examination of the Second Periodic Report by the Human Rights Committee. (AI Index: ASA 20/05/93). London: Amnesty International Publications.

Amnesty International. 1993. Amnesty International Report 1993. New York: Amnesty International USA.

Amnesty International. March 1992. India: Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody. New York: Amnesty International USA.

Amnesty International. February 1992. India: Response to the Indian Government's Comments on Amnesty International's Report on Punjab. (AI Index: ASA 20/25/91). London: Amnesty International Publications.

Amnesty International. May 1991. India: Human Rights Violations in Punjab: Use and Abuse of the Law. (AI Index: ASA 20/11/91). London: Amnesty International Publications.

Asia Watch, Washington, DC. 29 October 1993. Telephone interview with representative.

Asia Watch, Washington, DC. August 1991. Human Rights in India: Punjab in Crisis. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Asiaweek [Hong Kong]. 22 September 1993. "Punjabi Unrest."

Blaustein, Albert P. and Joseph A. Devamithran. October 1990. "India," Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Edited by Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications.

C.J. International [Chicago]. November-December 1990. Mahendra Pal Singh. "India: Democratic Changes and Police."

Committee to Protect Journalists. 1992. Attacks on the Press 1992. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992. 1993. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Diaz, S.M. 1989. "India," World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems. Edited by George Thomas Kurian. New York: Facts on File.

Documentation Réfugiés [Paris]. 18 August 1992. "Inde."

The Economist [London]. 16 July 1993. "Human Wrongs in India."

The Economist [London]. 22 May 1993. "India: Peace at Last in Punjab." (NEXIS)

The Economist [London]. 28 February 1992. "Punjab Does It."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 14 October 1993. "India: Human Rights Panel."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 9 September 1993. Khushwant Singh. "The Coming Indian Crack-up."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 1 April 1993. Hamish McDonald. "India: Punjab Pacified."

From the Lawyers Collective [Bombay]. June 1993a. "The National Commission on Human Rights: Boon or Charade?"

From the Lawyers Collective [Bombay]. June 1993b. "The Unexplained `Disappearance' of Advocate Kulwant Singh Saini."

Frontline [Madras]. 8 October 1993a. Praveen Swami. "Strategic Shift: A New Order of Threat."

Frontline [Madras]. 8 October 1993b. S.K. Pande. "Shock in Delhi: The September 11 Blast."

Frontline [Madras]. 8 October 1993c. S. Subramanian. "Combatting Crime: Counter-intelligence, the Key."

Frontline [Madras]. 8 October 1993d. Praveen Swami. "Peace in Peril: Punjab Back to the Days of Terror?"

Frontline [Madras]. 8 October 1993e. "On the New Terrorism: Interview with K.P.S. Gill."

Human Rights Watch. December 1992. Human Rights Watch World Report 1993. New York: Human Rights Watch.

India. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), 1987. (As published by Delhi Law House, Delhi, 1992).

India. The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984. 31 August 1984.

India. The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act, 1983. 8 December 1983.

India. The National Security Act, 1980. 27 December 1980.

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 October 1993. Ramesh Vinayak. "Targeting Militants Abroad: Punjab Police Intensify Their Overseas Operations."

India Today [New Delhi]. 30 September 1993. R. Pathak. "A Marked Man for Life: Bitta Escapes Another Assassination Attempt."

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 September 1993. Manoj Mitta. "1984 Riots: Shielding the Politicians."

India Today [New Delhi]. 30 June 1993. Kanwar Sandhu and Ramesh Vinayak. "Beant Singh: Gaining Legitimacy, but Losing His Cool."

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 June 1993. Kanwar Sandhu. "Punjab: Picking up the Pieces."

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 April 1993a. Shekhar Gupta with Kanwar Sandhu. "K.P.S. Gill: True Grit."

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 April 1993b. Shekhar Gupta and Kanwar Sandhu. "Pakistan Has Lost."

India Today [New Delhi]. 31 March 1993. Kanwar Sandhu. "G.S. Manochahal: How the Trap Was Laid."

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 October 1992. Kanwar Sandhu. "In Fighting Terrorism, the Police Are Increasingly Transgressing the Limits of Law."

India Today [New Delhi]. 29 February 1992. Ramesh Vinayak. "Congress(I) Candidates: Banking on Bullets."

India Today [New Delhi]. 15 February 1992. Harinder Baweja. "Operation Rakshak II: Double Edged Sword."

International Human Rights Organization (IHRO). December 1992. Indo-US Shadow Over Punjab. London: IHRO.

Inter Press Service. 18 May 1993. Rahul Bedi. "India: World's Largest Army Fights Enemy Within." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service. 29 April 1993. Rahul Bedi. "India: Peace Returns to Punjab Where the Mood Today Is Upbeat." (NEXIS)

Jeune Afrique [Paris]. 9 June 1993. Tirthankar Chanda. "Inde: Échec au séparatisme sikh."

Journal of Democracy [Washington, DC]. October 1993. Robert L. Hardgrave Jr. "India: The Dilemmas of Diversity."

Kohli, Atul. 1990. Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). July 1992. Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

Libération [Paris]. 21 February 1992. "Penjab: amère victoire du Congrès."

Libération [Paris]. 17 February 1992. Patralekha Chatterjee. "Le Pendjab boycotte le scrutin de New Delhi."

Los Angeles Times. 20 February 1992. Mark Fineman. "Few Defy Sikhs to Vote in Punjab." (NEXIS)

Le Monde [Paris]. 19 February 1992. Bruno Philip. "Les 'fous du Khalistan': Au Pendjab indien, les separatistes sont prêt à tout pour saboter les elections du 19 février." (NEXIS)

Mulgrew, Ian. 1988. Unholy Terror: The Sikhs and International Terrorism. Toronto: Key Porter Books.

The New York Times. 26 October 1993. Edward A. Gargan. "Though Sikh Rebellion Is Quelled, India's Punjab State Still Seethes." (NEXIS)

The New York Times. 14 October 1992. Edward A. Gargan. "India Rights Group's Cry: Police Rape and Torture." (NEXIS)

People's Union for Democratic Rights. November 1992. 1984 Carnage in Delhi: A Report on the Aftermath. Delhi: People's Union for Democratic Rights.

La Presse [Montréal]. 1 November 1992. "Punjab: Massacre sikh."

La Presse [Montréal]. 12 March 1992. "Punjab: Massacre sikh."

La Presse [Montréal]. 17 February 1992. "Inde: Punjab-violences."

Reuters. 13 August 1993. "Indian Police Indicted for 1984 Delhi Riots." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 10 June 1993. "Indian Sikh Rebels Kill 11 in Revival of Violence." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 3 August 1992. "Indian Police Kill Five Sikh Militants." (NEXIS)

San Francisco Chronicle. 12 July 1993. Rahul Bedi. "Separatists on the Run in India; New Administration Brings Hope to Punjab." (NEXIS)

Tepper, Elliot. Professor specializing in Asian studies, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa. 5 November 1993. Telephone interview.

Time [New York]. 10 February 1992. "Publishing at Their Peril."

The Toronto Star. 14 August 1992. "Sikh Militants Avenge Leader by Killing 9 More Police Kin." (NEXIS)

The Toronto Star. 13 August 1992. "Sikh Separatists Shoot Dead 10 in Punjab Raids." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 11 April 1993. "Operation Launched in Troubled Northern India to Restore Peace." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 28 February 1993. Ravi Sharma. "Sikh Leader Killed in India." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 16 August 1993. "Indian Separatist Violence Leaves at Least 34 Dead." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 12 August 1992. "Sikh Separatist Leader, Militants, Surrender in India." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 4 August 1992. "Landmine Kills 7 Border Guards in India." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 5 July 1993. "Punjab Refugees in Delhi Reluctant to Return." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 2 December 1992. "16 People Shot Dead by Militants in North India." (NEXIS)

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 17 February 1992. "Roundup: Election Campaign in India's Punjab State Ends (Part I)." (NEXIS)

Topics: Human rights,