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Nations in Transit 2009 - Kazakhstan

by Bhavna Dave

Capital: Astana
Population: 15.5 million
GNI/capita: US$9,600

The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Bank Indicators 2009.

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

	1999- 2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Electoral Process	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75
Civil Society	5.00	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50
Independent Media	5.50	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.50
Governance*	5.00	5.00	5.75	6.25	6.25	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25
Judicial Framework and Independence	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.00
Corruption	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Democracy Score	5.50	5.71	5.96	6.17	6.25	6.29	6.39	6.39	6.39	6.32

* Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects.

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

Executive Summary

Having held the top office since 1989 under Soviet rule, President Nursultan Nazarbaev has continued to build a strong and personalized presidential system by extending his patronage over the country's key political institutions, media, judiciary, administration, and business. The adoption of a new Constitution in 1995 conferring unchecked powers on the presidency, further amendments granting special rights to the "First President" – including removal of any term limits – and the emergence of a one-party system under Nur Otan, which bears his name and controls all seats in the Parliament and the regional administration, have consolidated the authoritarian regime of Nazarbaev and dimmed the prospects of democratization under his leadership. A personality cult centered on the president has intensified since Nazarbaev secured a 91 percent vote in the 2005 presidential elections.

Exercising personal patronage to disburse resources, power, and privileges to family, friends, and clients, Nazarbaev has also allowed much economic freedom to the country's budding entrepreneurs and offered rapid career mobility to the growing class of skilled professionals, technocrats, and top bureaucrats. A sustained 8-10 percent growth rate fueled by rising oil exports during 2002-2007 has enabled him to exert top-down political and ethnic control while delivering relative prosperity and stability to the population and mustering considerable electoral and popular support as a result. But since late 2008, an economic slowdown and a growing financial and banking crisis have emphasized the enormous and widening gap in accumulated wealth between the ruling elites and the country's ordinary citizens, an imbalance that is likely to stir popular discontent.

Notwithstanding its impending takeover of the 2010 chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Kazakhstani government has not taken a single convincing step toward promoting democratic rule, aiding political liberalization, establishing genuine tolerance, or creating conditions for the functioning of an independent media and civil society.

National Democratic Governance. Despite the pledge made to the OSCE in November 2007, the one-party Parliament failed to pass any substantive amendment to reverse or limit the authoritarian system under the patronage of the president. Rather than aiding the development of a legal-institutional framework that allows for political competition and democratic participation, Kazakhstan has relied on employing rhetoric of democratization while removing all legal barriers to establishing a lifelong presidency for Nazarbaev. A narrow circle of kin, clients, and powerful financial groups and a limited stratum of government officials, technocrats, and entrepreneurs have benefited the most from Kazakhstan's resource wealth and economic growth. The failure to introduce any amendments that would illustrate its commitment to democratization as a future OSCE chair means that Kazakhstan's rating for national democratic governance stagnates at 6.75.

Electoral Process. Despite the realization that gaining the chairmanship of the OSCE depended heavily on Kazakhstan holding genuinely competitive, free, and fair elections, the 2007 Mazhilis (lower house) polls resulted in the Nur Otan party, headed by the president, capturing all seats in the Parliament. By requiring all candidates to be elected on a party list alone, and setting a high 7 percent electoral threshold for political parties, the ruling authorities have closed all avenues for independent candidates to contest elections and made it very challenging for a genuinely competitive multiparty system to emerge. The absence of legal channels available for independent candidates or other political parties to partake in the formal political process and institutions of representation not only illegitimates them, but disadvantages them in any future electoral contest. The amendments at the end of 2008 requiring second-party representation in the Parliament attest to the attempt to create an "authorized" opposition. Owing to the failure to introduce the promised amendments to legislation on political parties, electoral competition, and the legislative framework that has erected and consolidated a one-party system, Kazakhstan's rating for electoral process remains at 6.75.

Civil Society. Kazakhstan has used its success in attaining the OSCE chair for 2010 to portray itself as a democratizing state, committed to promoting civil society and the nongovernmental sector. The removal of limits on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving state funding has facilitated the disbursement of such aid through government-organized NGOs engaged in social and infrastructure development. Parliament passed controversial amendments to the existing Law on Religion that place numerous restrictions on minority religious groups by labeling them "nontraditional" and "sects" and grant further surveillance powers to the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, together with the National Security Service, over activities of religious congregations, the opposition, and independent NGOs engaged in civil rights advocacy. Owing to the failure to adequately consider criticisms of the OSCE, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, domestic NGOs, and minority religious groups in passing these amendments, Kazakhstan's rating for civil society remains at 5.50.

Independent Media. Kazakhstan's media are privately owned but entirely under the control of major financial groups affiliated with the regime, although they are engaged in a keen competition with one another. While the government has initiated minor amendments to the highly restrictive Media Law, it has not yet offered any significant liberalization to this law or to the criminal code, both of which contain numerous provisions that criminalize criticisms of the president and leading government figures. Although the Office of the Prosecutor General and Ministries of Justice and the Interior continue to censor, ban, and criminalize criticisms of leading figures, minor amendments to the Media Law and a small reduction in libel cases suggest a marginal improvement in Kazakhstan's independent media rating from 6.75 to 6.50.

Local Democratic Governance. In Kazakhstan's unitary administrative framework, the central government exerts top-down control over the regional and local levels of government, with the president maintaining full control over the appointment of all heads (akims) of regions and districts. Nazarbaev has steadfastly refused to consider demands for the election of akims or to allow further regional autonomy. Although the constitutional amendments in 2007 granted a greater voice to local legislators in the appointment and removal of akims, the dominance of the Nur Otan party at all levels of governance effectively nullifies the formal powers granted to local bodies. Therefore, Kazakhstan's rating for local democratic governance remains at 6.25.

Judicial Framework and Independence. Under the country's strong executive system based on presidential patronage, the judiciary, like the legislative branch, has remained loyal to the regime and protected the interests of the state and its functionaries rather than those of individuals, minorities, and the weaker strata of society. In 2008, a significant increase in funding allocated to the judiciary led to an improvement in professional training, technical infrastructure, and wage levels to reduce corruption. Furthermore, an OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) report in 2008 noted that the new continental model of jury trials adopted in 2007 has positively impacted the administration of justice. Yet despite the important reforms taking place, the level of public trust in the judiciary remains very low. Improvements in criminal law as attested to by the introduction of jury trials, and increased levels of state funding, along with OSCE/ODIHR and U.S. Agency for International Development programs to improve the judiciary, have demonstrated small but significant steps forward in Kazakhstan's judicial independence. Kazakhstan's judicial framework and independence rating improves, with some caution, from 6.25 to 6.00.

Corruption. Corruption is systemic and entrenched in the rentier behavior guiding the appropriation, control, and distribution of key resources by the ruling elites. All inquiries into official corruption are handled by the prosecutor general and the financial police, appointed by the president, working in conjunction with the Ministries of Justice and the Interior as well as the National Security Service. Controls over the media and judicial system make it impossible for ordinary citizens or independent NGOs to file corruption charges against high-ranking state officials. Charges of corruption, misuse of office, or criminal activities are routinely levied against individuals engaging in open criticism of the president or the regime. The top officials entrusted with the task of combating corruption have been widely criticized for misusing their positions. Therefore, Kazakhstan's corruption rating holds at 6.50.

Outlook for 2009. Kazakhstan's aspirations to emerge as the fifth-largest exporter of oil by 2015 were dwindling as 2008 drew to a close. The government has already allocated US$10 billion to its failing banks from the US$27.6 billion in the national fund set up as a stabilization and welfare fund from oil revenues. Kazakhstan's banks will likely face further financial injections with the combined effects of global recession and the mortgage and credit crunch.

With its economic growth down to about 5 percent in 2008, the Nazarbaev regime is confronting a growing economic crisis that threatens to undermine the prevalent stability. Rising discontent among Kazakhstan's middle classes could be exacerbated by the influx of the rural unemployed to urban areas and put into question the regime's ability to deliver stability and well-being to its population.

As Kazakhstan joins the OSCE troika comprising its outgoing, current, and future chair, it has launched the state program Path to Europe, geared to enhance its strategic and technological partnership with Europe and to improve its institutional and legal base by using the positive experiences of the European Union. Having failed to adopt any legislation in 2008 for aiding the development of a multiparty system and amending its highly restrictive legislation on media and political parties, the government has pushed amendments requiring the Parliament to have a minimum of two parties and may order fresh elections in 2009.

Topics: Political parties, Independence of judiciary, Freedom of expression, Corruption, Elections,