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| Title | Afghanistan: Copy of the trip report of the Canadian mission in Islamabad, Pakistan, describing its visit to Kabul |
| Publisher | Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada |
| Country | Afghanistan |
| Publication Date | 1 February 1997 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | AFG26326.E |
| Cite as | Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Afghanistan: Copy of the trip report of the Canadian mission in Islamabad, Pakistan, describing its visit to Kabul, 1 February 1997, AFG26326.E, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6acc0c.html [accessed 5 June 2012] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
Please find below a copy of the trip report prepared by the Canadian mission in Islamabad, Pakistan, describing its 28 January 1996 visit to Kabul. This report was emailed to the DIRB on 4 February 1997 by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa.
Trip Report - Kabul, Afghanistan:
On 28 January 1997 there was a 1-day review of development activities there (because of security concerns only 1-day visits are now allowed). Key points noted include:
a) the front line between Taliban/Dostom forces was about 60 km north of the city. Kabul itself was quiet and there was little evidence of soldiers on the street.
b) during the course of the visit we drove 35-40 km north of Kabul. Dozens of villages were emptied and many destroyed. There was much evidence of recent fighting including destroyed military equipment. Taliban soldiers were much in evidence.
c) northern fighting is creating thousands of IDPs who are flowing into Kabul - some are also moving towards Jalalabad and Peshawar. In Kabul IDPs are being housed in empty schools (schools close in Kabul during the November-April period due to the cold) and are receiving emergency rations from the WFP. Overall handling of the IDP problems appear delegated in full to the international agencies as the Taliban authorities do not appear to have engaged in this area of civic management. At present there appear to be between 1.2-1.5 million inhabitants of Kabul.
d) Kabul itself is extremely poor and cold, with limited supplies of food. The northern districts of the city have been completely destroyed during the fighting. There is little employment: most people survive by a mixture of selling their belongings on the street and international assistance.
e) most NGO projects that focused on income generating activities for women in the Kabul area have restarted. Visits were made to a carpet weaving operation (originally a Canada Fund project and now also receiving WFP assistance) and a sweater-knitting project: both projects are operating at full capacity. This is the case with similar WID-oriented projects in other parts of the city. The Taliban authorities have in practise loosened their restrictions on women's employment in Kabul (and, as we know from other Canada Fund projects, in most other areas of Afghanistan as well, except for Herat). These small projects are important for several reasons including the assistance that they provide to some distressed women, the value they have as a learning mechanism for the Taliban, and their capacity to utilize wool and other rural products that would have no other market were it not for the small artisanal operations. It was noted that most carpets produced and some of the knit-goods are being shipped to Peshawar for sale (without hindrance).
f) targeted food aid projects through mechanisms such as the Widows Bakeries are functioning. In the Widows Bakeries project women produce bread at 62 sites throughout Kabul: the bread is distributed to destitute women and their families based upon a regular survey of recipients. Each person is eligible to receive a single 400 gram loaf of bread per day: they pay about C $ .01 per loaf (this represents an approximate 93% subsidy off current market rates for bread). The subsidy is covered by WFP flour. There were many women at the bakery visited (and at others we passed): the women told us that the bread was the only food that their families had.
g) some food-for-work projects involving reconstruction of parts of Kabul have started. Some of these are managed by HABITAT. The sub-project visited (flood protection) involved only men. Discussions with the HABITAT representative ) indicated that the projects were proceeding but faced considerable problems with logistics and other operational constraints usual in a civil war setting. Further, the Taliban authorities have little idea of what should be done in Kabul: they have arrived in power without any real vision of what Afghanistan could/should be or how to govern. The Taliban have a very limited understanding of the mechanics of large cities (water supply, sanitation, power grids, housing/industry mix, etc.) and for the time being are taking advice from outsiders like HABITAT.
h) routine visits to WFP food storage areas showed a clean, organized, well run operation. Interestingly, food pilferage is very low for a civil strife situation: all international staff spoken to noted that the Taliban were very disciplined and never stole/appropriated food or other relief supplies. An example supporting this assessment was given: during the fall of Kabul, local residents looted a relatively small amount of WFP supplies (191 tons); after the Taliban secured the city they promised to get back the entire 191 tons for the WFP from the culprits; the WFP however, after ascertaining Taliban methods, declined the offer of returned food because it was felt that regaining the food was not worth the cost in amputated limbs.
i) it appears that one rather difficult area of interaction between women's rights and the Taliban ethic will be in the area of schooling. All schools are currently closed but preparations are being made to renovate at least 20 in the Kabul area. The UN has offered $300,000 for this but only on the condition that 10 of the schools be for girls. The Taliban have refused to sign an agreement with this conditionality - it is unclear whether they still oppose girls education on principle or whether they are prepared to permit the renovation of the girls schools so long as they do not have to publicly repudiate their past position. This issue (and this UN project) encapsulate one of the main challenges to development agencies working in Afghanistan - does one support relief/development activities involving women quietly in order to get the projects up (but recognizing that the consensus that underlies them is fragile) or does one pursue the issue of women's needs directly and openly in an attempt to encourage the Taliban to revise their views (but accomplishing very little tangible work while the public debate is underway). The Post has become aware that representatives of Saudi Arabia have interceded with the Taliban on the women's education issue, in an effort to encourage the Taliban to adopt a more reasonable position: the likely impact of this demarche (and others by the UN) is unclear but, in my view, the debate is unlikely to be publicly resolved while significant fighting continues in the northern areas.
As a final note, the combination of winter and continuing civil strife is having a significant effect upon the currency. The Taliban Afghani (each side has its own currency) now trades at about AF-T 28,000 to US$1; the Dostom Afghani has dropped to approximately AF-D 90,000 to US$1. Both currencies are devaluing very quickly, though the Dostom currency appears to be in a free fall, wiping out the currency assets of those residing in the northern areas. Some observers take this to indicate a quickening dissipation of support to Dostom. Inflation in Afghanistan is also very high (over 100% but no precise figure available): thus, people are turning to barter and to the US$ for virtually all trade/exchange.
Counsellor (Development)
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the DIRB within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.
Reference
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Refugee Branch Asylum Division, Ottawa. 4 February 1997. "Trip Report-Kabul, Afghanistan." Report from the Canadian mission in Islamabad, Pakistan.