

FOLLOW-UP TO RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE KOSOVO EVALUATION

1. The independent evaluation of UNHCR's response to the Kosovo refugee crisis, which was issued in February 2000, made a number of recommendations in relation to the enhancement of UNHCR's performance in emergency situations.¹ The report, together with UNHCR's preliminary comments (EC/50/SC/CRP.12), were reviewed by the Standing Committee at its seventeenth meeting. Since then, the report and its recommendations have been the subject of detailed discussion within UNHCR and between UNHCR and its partners. The Kosovo evaluation also informed the organization's *Plan of action, Strengthening UNHCR's capacity for emergency preparedness and response*, issued in May 2000 (see Annex).

2. This information paper identifies the principal recommendations of the Kosovo evaluation, and describes the follow-up action taken in relation to each of them, as reported by the relevant Headquarters sections. In instances where the evaluation report's recommendations have not been implemented, an explanation is provided. The paper has been compiled by the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit.

I. Department of International Protection

- 1.1 The Kosovo case suggests that burden-sharing can be essential for small and vulnerable states that face mass inflows. UNHCR should take the initiative to re-examine the principles and dynamics of burden-sharing for such cases. (p. xii)*
- 1.2 The standards for the implementation of HTP (Humanitarian Transfer Programme) and their ability to enhance protection should be further examined. (para. 509)*
- 1.3 Given that it is possible that HTP may be one of the few options available in future similar scenarios, UNHCR should examine and develop this concept as a form of burden-sharing that combines regional human responsibility sharing with extra-regional fiscal responsibility sharing. (para. 510)*
3. The Executive Committee examined the issue of burden-sharing as the theme of its forty-ninth session in 1998. The Department of International Protection (DIP) will be consulting with Executive Committee member States in 2000 on further development of the international protection regime, which will include new discussions on burden-sharing.
- 1.4 The issue of whether first asylum should be considered as an absolute and unconditional legal obligation consistent with the 1951 Refugee Convention should be examined within the context of UNHCR's efforts on promoting burden sharing. (para. 511)*

¹ A. Suhrke et al, *The Kosovo refugee crisis: An independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response*, February 2000, EPAU/2000/2001.

4. UNHCR's consistent position has been not to link the granting of asylum with burden-sharing. The evaluation report has not convinced UNHCR of the value of abandoning this long-standing and well-recognized position.

1.5 UNHCR's production and distribution of extensive sets of protection guidelines contributed to promoting protection standards and should be repeated for future operations. (para. 504)

5. DIP regularly produces generic guidelines and positions on various protection issues, which are disseminated to all offices in all operations. A compilation was distributed in 1999 to all Bureaux, for further distribution to field offices and operations, and is being updated and supplemented in 2000. Jointly with UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research, DIP is preparing a lengthier Protection Manual for all field offices to be distributed in 2001. In addition, when warranted by individual operations, guidelines relating the specifics of the operation to the most relevant protection concepts and principles are produced and disseminated, as in the Kosovo operation. This is currently being done, for example, for Chechnya (Russian Federation).

1.6 The technological advances experimented with during the Kosovo emergency have the potential to contribute considerably to protection activities in the future once they are refined. They should be fully developed. (para. 514)

6. From the protection point of view, the most valuable technological advance used in the Kosovo emergency was the Microsoft refugee registration kit. Although requiring some initial refinement, the kits are still being used in Albania and have recently been put to active use in Senegal and India. Plans are underway for the kits to be used in Zambia and Nigeria in the near future.

1.7 It is necessary for UNHCR to clarify its mandate regarding physical security in a realistic manner. This should be done in conformity with the provisions of ExCom Conclusion no. 72 (1993) that encourage UN member states to assume primary responsibility for security issues and to co-operate with UNHCR. (para. 516)

7. Relevant proposals on this subject have been reviewed at the eighteenth meeting of the Standing Committee in July 2000, based on the conference room paper *The security, civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements: operationalizing the ladder of options*, (EC/50/SC/INF.4).

II. Division of Communication and Information

II.1 UNHCR's internal reporting and public relations should be strengthened, especially in high-visibility emergencies, by the deployment of additional staff for public relations and protocol duties. (p. xvi)

8. This recommendation is partly addressed by the strengthening of Public Information (PI) and Public Affairs functions. (see paras. 13-21)

9. The consolidation of electronic publishing resources under the Division will also go some way towards ensuring consistent internal communication, and establishing standards for electronic publishing in field offices to enhance public relations, for example through the posting of regular updates on their web sites.

II.2 Good information flows from field to HQ and from HQ to field are essential for UNHCR to manage its own operation while, at the same time, playing its coordination role. (para. 252)

10. A project is under way in the Office of the Director to determine how best to improve internal communications. As a first step, a resource person dedicated to assessing the implementation of past recommendations on improvements to internal communications, began work on the project in August 2000.

11. As part of the Integrated Systems Project, an Electronic Document Management System is being developed under the supervision of the Records and Archives unit in the Division of Communication and Information (DCI), to facilitate and improve internal information flows and provide accurate and timely information to Headquarters and field offices.

II.3 In order to fulfil the considerable information needs of a large emergency, staff and equipment dedicated to the purpose of information management need to be included automatically in the agency's resources. (para. 429)

12. Public Information Officers are fully equipped with all they need for their information purposes. However, facilities such as e-mail, computers, and LANs are limited in certain locations. DCI will look at the different ways of providing information in such circumstances.

II.4 For high-visibility crises, additional senior staff should be assigned for public information in Headquarters. (para. 315)

13. The PI section has been authorized to create two new P4 Senior Media Officer posts which will allow much better coverage and coordination of the information flow both to and from emergencies. It will also allow more flexibility in the rapid deployment of Senior Media Officers from Headquarters without leaving the section in Geneva under-staffed during the most critical phases of an emergency.

14. Since April 2000, PI Geneva has been given decision-making power in the fielding of PI Officers during emergencies. This can include bringing additional PI staff from Branch Offices to Headquarters to help to respond to the heavy demand for information.

15. The PI section is currently establishing a central news and editing desk in Geneva that will have reporting lines directly to PI Officers in the field, facilitating the rapid collection and dissemination of information to media, the public, donors, governments, NGOs and others, using a variety of channels, including UNHCR's Website.

16. Two new Publications Officer posts (P3) have also been approved for PI Geneva. During emergencies, they will be used along with Media Officers for collecting, editing, packaging and quickly disseminating emergency information.

17. UNHCR's headquarters Video Unit, which was used almost non-stop during the Kosovo crisis for interviews and production and provision of "news edits" that were broadcast via PI's European Broadcast Union uplink, will also receive additional support with the creation of a new video production assistant post.

18. Additional digital video and photo equipment has been purchased for emergency deployment with Senior Media Officers to allow the immediate provision of images illustrating UNHCR activities on behalf of refugees in the early stages of an emergency.

19. The creation of a Senior Mass Information Officer post (P4) has been approved for coordination and technical support of all mass information activities -- a particularly crucial function in many emergencies. This function had previously been assigned to a Geneva-based PI officer who was already fully occupied with media-related duties during emergencies.

II.5 Immediate deployment of experienced press officers is equally important in high-visibility crises. (para. 315)

20. The creation of new PI posts in Geneva Headquarters (see above) will allow much more flexibility in the immediate deployment of experienced press officers in emergencies, without undue strain on crucial media and information functions at Headquarters.

21. PI Geneva now has direct input in determining who should be deployed – if necessary from Branch Offices – during emergencies. A standby roster of experienced internal and external candidates for emergency PI deployment has been compiled. During the recent emergency in Sudan and Eritrea, experienced PI Officers were swiftly and effectively deployed to both countries.

II.6 Some donors complained that offers to the Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization Service were not systematically tracked and answered. (para. 264)

22. As a matter of principle, DRRM attaches the greatest importance to servicing donors as efficiently and promptly as possible, particularly where it concerns the search for contributions or follow-up to contributions offered.

23. For in-kind contributions, DRRM depends on the advice of the Bureau or technical services as to whether a contribution can be accepted. During the Kosovo crisis, it was not always easy to obtain the necessary advice as staff were overwhelmed by the volume and variety of offers.

24. The offer of "protocol officers" referred to in this paragraph was made verbally, and was not retained by UNHCR as, at the time, it was felt that the Office was more in need of funds than of external staff.

25. The claim made in the second part of para. 264 that by September 1999, UNHCR had still not responded to a request made in July to report on a donation by Italy of \$ 1m for tents, is inaccurate. The contribution was announced on 3 April 1999, requesting a report within ten months. The first report was submitted in September 1999. The final report could only be prepared after the closure of the official 1999 accounts, in accordance with the standard requirement of the Italian Government. It was sent on 19 April 2000.

26. The general lesson drawn from the Kosovo crisis is that a complex emergency requires staff in the field dedicated to external/donor relations, and as contact point for DRRM matters.

II.7 If UNHCR continues to use ECHO-earmarked stocks as part of their Contingency Emergency Stockpile, they should seek a formal agreement with ECHO to support this. (para. 319)

27. ECHO does not maintain emergency stocks. The only stocks UNHCR could use would be items already purchased by UNHCR from ECHO funds for another programme. Such was the case in Kosovo, where ECHO agreed, on an exceptional basis, to transfer to the Kosovo operation items purchased for the Great Lakes region. The latter received replacement items of the same value.

28. Current ECHO financial guidelines do not, however, permit direct transfers as ECHO contributions are earmarked country by country.

29. UNHCR has requested ECHO to apply the same flexibility as shown during the Kosovo emergency to similar situations in the future, and has also proposed to ECHO the establishment of a contingency stockpile co-funded by ECHO. A conclusion has not yet been reached on these proposals.

II.8 ExCom should address ways in which all NGOs can be made accountable and brought into the coordination framework, making reference to the professional standards developed by NGOs. (p. xvii)

30. The Executive Committee regularly addresses the financial accountability of NGOs (as implementing partners) vis-à-vis UNHCR. The implementation of this recommendation also involves inter-agency mechanisms, especially the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of which NGOs are members. Consultations could take place with Executive Committee members, NGOs and UNHCR, to discuss a reinforcement of coordination mechanisms. NGO accountability must, however, rest with the NGOs themselves.

II.9 Donors should tie NGO funding to a coordination contract with UNHCR. (para. 433)

31. Tying NGO funding to coordination contracts with UNHCR is a matter for review on a case-by-case basis. Some donor governments are already looking into this, but a consultation process with NGOs would be useful in order to avoid unnecessary resistance. The process should also involve the Secretariat and DRRM.

II.10 NGOs have developed mechanisms to enhance effectiveness and regularize standards. Whilst not a system of accreditation, reference to mechanisms such as the Humanitarian Code of Conduct, the Sphere project and the recent Ombudsman project initiated by the NGOs, would be a useful guideline for host governments and donors and a reference point for UNHCR. Such guidelines should also be part of emergency preparedness for host governments. (paras. 434 & 435)

32. Reference to the Sphere Project and the Humanitarian Code of Conduct is included in UNHCR's Framework Agreement for Operational Partnership (FAOP). The Sphere Project represents an important first step towards a consensus on overall standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance. The Handbook was disseminated to all UNHCR offices in the field. UNHCR's Field Guide for NGOs (Protecting Refugees) and the Handbook for Emergencies are also extremely useful tools in complex emergencies.

II.11 The responsibilities of the lead agency are poorly defined. The UN agencies need to establish, via clear terms of reference or MOU, exactly what functions are expected of the lead agency. The definition should include the mechanisms required to ensure detailed shared planning and analysis in the field and at Headquarters and expected services provided by the lead agency. (p. xvii and para. 428)

33. The issue of the coordination of humanitarian activities by the United Nations has been the subject of discussion in various fora. The IASC has been the main forum in which the role and functions of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) have been agreed upon. As a result of a thorough consultative process, the IASC decided on a menu of three different coordination options for complex emergencies:

- the Resident Coordinator as Humanitarian Coordinator;
- the lead agency; and
- in special circumstances, the Humanitarian Coordinator distinct from the office of the Resident Coordinator or lead agency.

34. In addition, the appointment of a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator is also envisaged in complex emergency situations not falling predominantly under the mandate of a single agency.

35. Despite this menu of options, there has been a tendency to merge the roles of Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, and to use the lead agency option only in exceptional circumstances. As a result, the lead agency option has been formally used only on two occasions (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia). This has been a cause of concern to UNHCR, which has insisted on the maintenance of the menu of options, a position that has not always been supported by other agencies.

36. The issue of the lead agency concept has recently been highlighted in the context of overall coordination for the provision of protection and assistance to IDPs. The IASC has been urged by one Government to speed up its work of defining the responsibilities of lead agencies, as well as of those of supporting agencies. The United Nations Secretary-General has reaffirmed the three options approved by the IASC, while explaining that the Humanitarian Coordination model is "currently prevalent because it has been proven most effective in pulling together the wide array of resources made available not only from the different United Nations agencies but also from the broader humanitarian community".

37. Further development of the lead agency option and definition of responsibilities need to take place in IASC, and involve other members, particularly UNICEF and WFP.

III. Division of Resource Management

III.1 UNHCR should develop a roster of staff and external resource persons to assist in crisis diplomacy. (p. xvi)

38. The internal roster of staff maintained by the Emergency Response Service (ERS) comprises experienced staff, trained in emergencies. The external roster is made up of ex-UNHCR staff and candidates with the required competencies and skills. A roster of senior officials with the required expertise within the United Nations Common System is also under active consideration.

III.2 In massive emergencies, the agency should ensure the rapid release of middle managers by the immediate adoption of directive, rather than voluntary, deployment practices. (p. xvi)

39. ERS included a larger proportion of middle managers in the roster covering September 2000 to April 2001. At present, ten roster members are at the P-4 level. This should help ensure the quick release of middle managers to emergency operations. In addition, the Plan of Action specifies specific emergency procedures designed to obtain the release of middle management staff more promptly than in the past.

III.3 To the extent possible, rapid turnover of staff should be avoided in emergencies. (para.249)

40. One of the main functions of ERS is to provide adequate staffing during the initial two months of an emergency. The six-months roster comprises some 30 staff who can be deployed for up to two months (and in exceptional circumstances up to three months), and who are on loan from their existing duty station. Extending the period beyond this will not be possible for the following reasons:

- releasing offices would be considerably more reluctant to allow staff be placed on the roster;
- after two (exceptionally three) months of emergency deployment, staff reach a level of exhaustion which make a relay mandatory. This is the practice in all major relief organizations, many of which have much shorter lay-overs.

41. ERS agrees that the problem of high turn-over of staff arises when several relay teams have to be sent in until a post is filled. The Plan of Action foresees the creation of posts under an emergency procedure. Human Resources Service (HRS) is in the process of developing a policy in this respect.

III.4 Titles of staff should be consistent and convey the function and level of responsibility. (para. 308)

42. Efforts have been made to streamline the titles of posts to try and ensure consistency and rigour in the job descriptions. The responsibility for defining job descriptions commensurate with the function and level of the post lies with the supervisor. The Organizational Development and Management Section (Division of Resource Management) will have as one of its main objectives over the next year a review of post levels and office structure, to ensure global consistency.

III.5 UNHCR should include provisions in staffing tables that require key positions in operations management to be filled by staff with EPRO experience. (para. 311)

43. UNHCR agrees that experience as an emergency preparedness and response officer, brings decided advantages to persons occupying key operations management posts, but does not consider such experience should be mandatory.

III.6 UNHCR should institute systematic performance assessments for even short emergency missions. (para. 314)

44. The revised Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) format is multi-purpose and covers appraisals for staff on short-term missions/assignments. It is being used for staff members currently on emergency mission in Sudan and Eritrea.

III.7 UNHCR should ensure that successful emergency participation weighs heavily towards promotion and career progression. (para. 314)

45. Participation in emergency operations allows staff to develop and demonstrate competencies which make their applications for postings more attractive to managers in the selection process

46. Participation in emergency assignments provides an added value and experience for the staff. All deployments of more than 60 days are included in staff-members' fact sheets; for deployments of less than 60 days, a PAR can be issued (as is currently the case in the Sudan/Eritrea operation).

III.8 UNHCR should ensure that staff are trained to coordinate. This should include the management of meetings, awareness of guidelines and information management. (para. 424)

47. Some training opportunities are available, and the priority is to target staff who may be called upon to perform the emergencies. The Workshop for Emergency Managers (WEM) is intended for this purpose. The new OCHA-led Emergency Field Coordination Training will also reach a limited number of persons on coordination aspects. Meetings management is part of the generic management learning programme offered to all Professional Staff. Information management training is also made available to all staff.

III.9 Confusion over the role and status of OCHA staff seconded to UNHCR undermined UNHCR's credibility and the lead agency role in Albania. UN agencies should clarify the contractual status of seconded, including the development of clear terms of reference. (para. 426)

48. Staff on loan as in this case, and not seconded, have no contractual relationship with UNHCR. While the terms of reference of a loan are clear, it is the responsibility of the Operations Manager to share them with the loaned staff.

III.10 If UNHCR is to fulfil its lead agency role, it needs to allocate significant additional resources to the task such as dedicated trained staff, communications equipment and resources – over and above those needed for coordination of its own operations and implementing partners. (para. 402)

49. Assessment of needs is done by the Operations Manager; once these are stated, HRS submits lists of staff and external candidates. In the future, the Division of Resource Management will deploy a small team of functional/technical experts to an emergency to assist with the needs analysis. This will be done early in the process to ensure appropriate resources are allocated as soon as possible.

IV. Division of Operational Support

*IV.1 UNHCR should develop its registration policy and techniques. The agency should consider modifying the Handbook for Emergencies in order to acknowledge that registration is often a key protection activity. (para. 514)
The policy should cover issues such as data protection and access to information as well as ultimate ownership. (para. 366)*

50. UNHCR's strategy with regard to its registration policy and techniques is elaborated in the conference room paper *Statistics and registration: a progress report* (EC/50/SC/CRP.10, Section III), presented to the Standing Committee's seventeenth meeting in March 2000. It includes, *inter alia*, a complete overhaul of UNHCR's registration systems and procedures under a project named PROFILE. A feasibility study to scope the impact of PROFILE on UNHCR operations will be carried out shortly by Deloitte and Touche. As the Emergency Handbook has just been revised, the Division of Operational Support (DOS) does not believe that another modification of the handbook is feasible in the short run. Data protection issues are already covered in the 1994 UNHCR Registration Guide.

IV.2 A dedicated headquarters registration unit, specially trained staff, clear management lines of authority and responsibility, as well as standard guidelines and formats should be established as soon as possible. (paras. 431, 514)

51. A Registration and Statistics Unit has been created within the Programme Coordination Section. Additional post creations have been requested for 2001 to cover the management of project PROFILE and to strengthen ongoing registration support. With the two newly-appointed field registration officers, covering East and West Africa, some support for field registration is now in place.

IV.3 The lessons learned during the Kosovo emergency should result in clear registration guidelines and procedures for rapid-onset, massive emergencies. (para. 431)

52. Efforts are currently under way to enhance registration training as part of the emergency training programmes. In massive emergencies, however, no system will be able to cope with

immediate, individual registration of refugees. Adequate registration can only take place once the situation has stabilized. "Interim techniques" for appraising populations on the move are more appropriate in emergencies and are part of the PROFILE project (see preceding para.)

IV.4 UNHCR should increase the availability of its senior technical co-ordinators. Such sectoral specialists should either be part of the EPRS, or Headquarters should increase capacity within the technical units such as PTSS, STS and ICSS to enable each section to deploy staff to an emergency without undermining HQ capacity. (para. 425)

53. This recommendation addresses both the availability of technical staff in sufficient number, and their timely despatch in emergency situations.

54. As a result of past efforts to rationalize the use of technical staff, DOS has only a limited number of such staff who are directly available. To compensate for this limited capacity, DOS has developed mechanisms whereby technical expertise can be made available to UNHCR emergency operations at relatively short notice. They include stand-by arrangements with institutions specialized in technical fields of interest to UNHCR and a roster of technical experts (now also being developed in Regional Service Centres in Africa). Stand-by agreements can in principle be triggered at very short notice, once the need is established and specified. Experience with the rosters varies: with high demand for expertise in emergency situations, the experts tend to respond promptly to whichever request comes first. Problems encountered by UNHCR resulted mainly from the fact that UNHCR approached its roster experts late, following requests from emergency managers, by which time experts were no longer available. Efforts are thus being made to update and expand the rosters and to create regional rosters. A decision by ERS to systematically include technical experts in emergency teams will also go a long way to ensure enough qualified staff is mobilized in time (see Plan of Action in Annex).

V. Emergency Preparedness Service

V.1 Serious consideration should be given to divesting responsibility for suitable items to other agencies whose core task requires greater logistics capacity (i.e. WFP for complementary food, cooking sets and the like). (para. 316)

55. With the experience of recent deployments, it is recommended rather to retain and increase UNHCR's logistics capacity. During the initial phase of an emergency, the transport, storage and distribution of relief items are crucial to an effective emergency response and contribute to a positive public perception of the organization. This is not likely to change and will thus require a highly effective logistics support structure. Divesting logistics for certain items could be considered, provided that any arrangement through a third party (e.g. WFP) does not affect the priority accorded to them, and does not reduce UNHCR's capacity to deliver. In the case of Kukes, WFP's logistics capacity was overwhelmed during the critical month of April 1999. Divesting the responsibility for complementary food and cooking sets would not have improved the situation.

56. *Responsibility for distribution:* In principle, distribution of food and non-food items remains UNHCR's responsibility, according to the UNHCR/WFP memorandum of understanding (MOU), although WFP has been increasingly engaged in this process. In some locations of the Kukes operation, UNHCR and WFP undertook joint food distributions. This could be a useful approach, at least during the high-visibility, early days of an emergency. NGOs should also be involved at the early stage, as they have the expertise and are usually UNHCR's partners carrying out the distribution in the longer term, and because they too need to be visible.

57. *UNHCR's overall responsibility for persons of concern:* Divesting responsibilities to other United Nations agencies can be effective if the agency concerned is endowed with a response

capacity. Experience in emergencies with lower profiles and standard operations have shown that agencies have a tendency to limit their engagement. During the initial phase of the Oct-Dec 1999 emergency in the Northern Caucasus, for example, UNHCR and ICRC were the only agencies resourcing, delivering and distributing food. WFP food arrived only in February 2000.

V.2 Prudent planning suggests that events with a low probability of occurring should be taken seriously if the consequences entail significant risk. (p. 28) Contingency planning must include planning for the unlikely but momentous event ('Thinking outside the box'). (para. 132)

58. As part of the *Global Overview on Situational Preparedness*, all high-risk areas will be analysed and contingency plans will be established. Scenario setting will not only include risk analysis but also magnitude and intensity of potential conflicts. This should, indeed, encourage participants to 'think outside the box' and also plan for unlikely but momentous events.

V.3 To prepare for massive emergencies, UNHCR should strengthen its in-house capacity to mobilize external resources, by:

- *Reviewing and further developing standby agreements*
- *Developing national service packages with governments and others*
- *Prioritizing "shared resources" such as warehousing, transport and communications. (p. xii)*

59. Under the Plan of Action (see Annex) all stand-by arrangements have been reviewed. Additional stand-by arrangements have been signed or are under preparation. It is recalled that general service packages were handed over to DHA/OCHA in 1995. However, selected activities such as staff accommodation packages are being discussed with government agencies. UNHCR will have consultations with key emergency NGOs in October 2000, when the issue of sharing resources will be considered.

V.4 HQ response capability should be strengthened by developing comprehensive contingency plans and emergency checklists. (p. xvi)

60. As part of the Plan of Action, Headquarters emergency procedures were established. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Section was restructured to become the Emergency Response Service reporting directly to the Executive Office. The checklist for emergency procedures at Headquarters is being updated and will be available shortly.

V.5 Massive emergencies demand a surge capacity that exceeds the present deployment capability of UNHCR. Surge mechanisms, such as secondment from OCHA, did not function effectively in this case and should be examined more closely. (p. xiii). To the extent that the mechanism failed as a result of intractable UN territorialism, alternative methods of increasing in-house coordination capacity should be developed. (p. xvi)

61. The following measures have been taken to improve coordination capacity:

- Establishment of a pool of senior staff, for deployment to large-scale emergencies. One of their principle tasks will include the setting up of an overall coordination framework.
- Participation of the senior emergency staff in the Workshop for Emergency Management, which takes place twice a year (preparing some 30 UNHCR mid-level UNHCR staff per workshop under the 6 month emergency stand-by roster).

- Greater emphasis on coordination at the Workshop for Emergency Management, Emergency Management Training Programme and at other UNHCR training activities (No. 18 of the Plan of Action).
- V.6 *The inclusion of a registration specialist in the EPRS, or at the very least as an immediately deployable headquarters resource, should be considered. (para. 431)*
62. See para. 51 above
- V.7 *Deployment of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) should trigger immediate planning for a major emergency. (para. 310)*
63. This is now standard practice.
- V.8 *The composition of the emergency stockpile should be reviewed. Current levels for blankets and cooking sets are insufficient. (para. 317)*
Some items currently under frame agreements should be included in the stockpile (p. xvi).
UNHCR should seek guidance from the donor community on what level of stockpile they are willing to support on a continuing basis. (para. 318)
64. As of June 2000, the emergency stockpile continued to be based on estimated needs of 200,000 beneficiaries. Cooking sets are retained with a supplier through a frame agreement. Because of bulk and weight, kitchen sets are not usually shipped at the onset of an emergency, as priority is given to ready-made food rations. Once refugees have settled, kitchen sets are provided with the dry food rations. The supply of kitchen sets is thus provided in the second phase of an emergency operation, with priority to surface transport. ERS and Supplies and Transport Section continue to review the required level of the Central Emergency Stockpile.

VI. Executive Office/Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit

- VI.1 *The evaluators would encourage joint evaluation of responses to major emergencies, including comparison of multilateral vs. bilateral approaches. (p. xvii)*
65. In preparation for such an exercise, the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) has developed linkages with the evaluation units of other United Nations agencies (UNICEF, OCHA, WFP) and is planning to participate in one major inter-agency evaluation each year. The first one aims to cover operations in Afghanistan, and is scheduled to begin later this year. UNHCR is also planning joint evaluations with other entities (United Nations, governments, NGOs) on specific operations. The experience gained and working relationships forged during such evaluations should permit joint evaluations of emergency operations to be activated rapidly and smoothly.
- VI.2 *UNHCR needs to focus seriously on the process of institutional learning, which has an organization-specific dynamic but needs to be understood before embarking upon future actions. (page xiv)*
66. The creation of UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit in 1999 demonstrates the Office's commitment to systematically examining and assessing UNHCR programmes and practices with a view to enhancing its capacity to fulfil its mandate on behalf of refugees and other people of concern. The Kosovo evaluation and its follow-up is a prime example of this approach. UNHCR has also developed a framework for 'real-time evaluations' to be effected during an emergency, when its findings can be taken on board as the emergency unfolds. A pilot real-time evaluation was undertaken in respect of the Eritrea-Sudan emergency and this evaluation has been used as the basis for a workshop on the further enhancement of UNHCR's emergency response capacity.

VI.3 *UNHCR needs to resolve its position on military involvement relating to matters of physical security. (para. 517)*

Following the ad hoc nature of the responses to security threats within camps or refugee-populated areas in Albania and FYR Macedonia, it is particularly important for UNHCR to develop and make operational the "ladder of options" concept. (para. 518)

67. Specific proposals are contained in the information paper on *The security, civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements: operationalizing the ladder of options* (EC/50/SC/INF.4), shared with the Standing Committee at its eighteenth meeting in July 2000.

No.	UNHCR Plan of Action, Strengthening UNHCR's Capacity for Emergency Preparedness and Response	Additional Cost	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September (review period)	October	November	December	to continue	STATUS OF ACTIVITY
			Time Frame													
Post Emergency																
37	Systematic integration of evaluation reports in training, sharing with stakeholders (Donors, Refugees...)	NO														reinforce
38	Ensure that evaluation findings and lessons learned are systematically incorporated into emergency management meetings through the convening of workshops with stakeholders (internal and external). Best practices included in UNHCR manuals and guidelines.	NO														reinforce
39	Track and absorb the findings of relevant evaluations; ensure that valuable findings from them are disseminated in the house with action plans developed; and co-ordinate UNHCR evaluations with appropriate external ones.	NO														reinforce

EC/50/SC/INF.5
Annexe

List of acronyms

BAP	Bureau for Asia and the Pacific
DCI	Division of Communication and Information
DEMA	Danish Emergency Management Agency
DIP	Department of International Protection
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRM	Division of Resource Management
DRRM	Donor Relations & Resource Mobilisation Service
EFAA	Emergency Finance and Administrative Assistant
EPAU	Evaluation & Policy Analysis Unit
EPRO	Emergency Preparedness & Response Officer
EPRS	Emergency Preparedness & Response Section
ERT	Emergency Response Team
FSSA	Field Staff Safety Adviser
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IT	Information Technology
ITTS	Information Technology & Telecoms Service
MSF	Médecin sans frontières
NEP	Non-expendable property
NFI	Non-food item

OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OXFAM	OXFAM (NGO)
PI	Public Information Section
SDR	Swiss Disaster Relief
SEA	South-East Asia
SLWOP	Special leave without pay
SRSA	Swedish Rescue Service Agency
STS	Supply and Transport Section
WEM	Workshop on Emergency Management

Summary of Costs (Provisional)	
EPRS	US\$ 800,000
ITTS	US\$2,582,000
BAP/RO Tokyo	US\$ 250,000
TOTAL	US\$3,632,000