SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

This review is intended to analyse operational issues facing UNHCR in protecting and assisting war-affected populations as well as identify management lessons which can be used to improve emergency response. The review focuses principally on UNHCR's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992, although many of the issues and lessons were also drawn from 1993.

The review was carried out by Lowell Martin, Chief of the Central Evaluation Section, during missions to the Former Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Key documents and studies were reviewed and indepth discussions were held with UNHCR staff in headquarters and the field. Extensive discussions were held with officials of other United Nations agencies, donors, the governments, and staff of non-governmental agencies. Information covering essentially all activities was collected and analysed during the review, but in the interest of brevity, only the information required to facilitate an analysis of major issues and support conclusions is provided.

BACKGROUND

(1)        The emergency relief operation in former Yugoslavia was the largest and possibly the most prominent humanitarian initiative ever undertaken by the international community. For UNHCR, the programme was arguably the most significant and challenging which the organization has mounted since it was established more than 40 years ago. Moreover, the operation has led to a wide-ranging reassessment of UNHCR's role and mandate, as well as a reappraisal of the relationship which exists between the humanitarian, political and military components of the UN system.

(2)        Yugoslavia began to break up in mid-1991, when two of the country's six republics declared their independence. Over the next few months, UNHCR's small Belgrade office followed political and military developments and reported to Headquarters on the growing number of population displacements taking place.

(3)        At the October 1991 meeting of the Executive Committee, the Federal Government of Yugoslavia asked UNHCR if it could help to address some of the country's growing humanitarian needs. Following consultations between the UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner, UNHCR was requested to take the lead in assisting displaced people in Yugoslavia.

(4)        UNHCR responded to these requests by sending an assessment mission to the country, the aim of which was to determine the nature and scope of the organization's presence and involvement. Although the prevailing attitude was generally one of caution, staff members who participated in the mission recognized that with Croatian independence near, displaced people who had moved into or out of the republic would effectively become refugees, and therefore of direct concern to UNHCR.

(5)        Shortly after the mission, UNHCR decided to launch a modest assistance programme in Croatia. In addition, the High Commissioner appointed a Special Envoy with overall responsibility for the republics that made up former Yugoslavia. At the time, very few people within the organization imagined that he would be there for an extended period of time.

(6)        UNHCR's growing involvement in former Yugoslavia was influenced by a number of different factors. Having established an early presence in the area, UNHCR was well placed to respond to the humanitarian needs of the population when the war erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, with the distinction between refugees, displaced persons and other war-affected communities becoming increasingly blurred in the republic, UNHCR soon found itself committed to an immense relief operation.

(7)        UNHCR's involvement in former Yugoslavia was also influenced by broader developments on the international scene. In many senses, the end of 1991 was a crucial period for UNHCR. At the end of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, there was a sense that the UN system in general, and UNHCR in particular, had entered a new era, in which traditional assumptions, principles and mandates would have to be reconsidered. The unexpected and massive movement of Iraqi refugees into Iran and the border area of Turkey had caught UNHCR unprepared. The organization was unprepared both in terms of its policy with regard to people who had been refused the right to seek asylum in another country, and in terms of the agency's operational capacity to respond to large-scale emergencies.

(8)        Key donor states, dissatisfied with what they perceived as the poor performance of the UN system in the Persian Gulf, had concluded that greater coordination was required amongst the humanitarian agencies involved in complex emergencies. Significantly, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, winch was specifically created to address this shortcoming, was being established at precisely the time when UNHCR was mounting its operation in former Yugoslavia.

(9)        Other developments in the international environment also helped to shape UNHCR's response to the crisis. Throughout the 1980's, concern had been growing amongst the states of Western Europe about the increased number of asylum seekers arriving from other parts of the world. UNHCR had in many ways tried to help governments deal with this development. Nevertheless, there was a feeling within official circles that by calling on states to keep their doors open, UNHCR was contributing to the problem. By the time large numbers of people began to leave their homes in former Yugoslavia, the principles on which UNHCR's work is based were being called into question throughout Europe.

(10)      The willingness of Western states to challenge the traditional refugee regime had become particularly apparent during the Persian Gulf crisis, when Turkey was supported by its more powerful NATO allies in refusing to admit asylum seekers from northern Iraq.

(11)      Donor states which had only recently been insisting that UNHCR limit its expenditure and restrict itself to core activities with Convention refugees now insisted equally vehemently that UNHCR should assist the 400,000 internally displaced people massed at the border between Turkey and Iraq.

(12)      Although the UN's performance in the Persian Gulf was criticized by donor states, UNHCR's willingness to assume responsibility for the relief operation in northern Iraq led to an unprecedented increase in funding. As a result, UNHCR was finally able to emerge from the financial crisis which had confronted the organization in 1989.

(13)      These developments had demonstrated that if UNHCR was to remain a relevant organization in the emerging new world order, it would have to adopt increasingly innovative and pragmatic responses to population movements.

(14)      The evolving situation in former Yugoslavia, therefore, presented UNHCR with a variety of important institutional challenges. The operation provided the organization with an opportunity to demonstrate its continuing relevance in Europe; to utilize and develop the enhanced emergency capacity which it had built up in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf operation; to operationalize the preventive approach to refugee problems being advocated by many governments; to prepare for potential crises in former Soviet Union; and, finally, to demonstrate the value of the lead agency concept to governments which had created a new coordinating body.

(15)      The Sarajevo Accord of January 1992, known as the Vance Plan, began to clarify UNHCR's role and formalized the organization's presence in former Yugoslavia. The plan, which gave UNHCR responsibility for the registration and return of displaced people, generated a feeling that negotiations would bring about a quick solution to the conflict. At the same time, however, reports from UNHCR staff in the field cautioned against the proposed rapid return of people who had been uprooted during the. conflict. Moreover, any sense of optimism began to quickly wane as staff realised the difficulty of implementing the plan and as serious conflicts started to break out in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(16)      The senior managers responsible for providing resources to the operation continued to debate the extent of UNHCR's involvement. Discussions between the Regional Bureau for Europe and the support services centered around whether the organization should be dedicating scarce resources to an operation in Europe; the lack of clarity with regard to UNHCR's emerging role; and the organization's capacity to manage a potentially large and complex operation. There was a growing sense that if UNHCR were to provide some protection to the displaced populations and play a preventive role in the conflict, the ' organization would probably be required to provide assistance on a very large scale.

(17)      Considerable effort was also spent trying to work out the respective roles of UNHCR and ICRC, particularly with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given its mandate and experience, ICRC initially accepted responsibility for working in conflict areas, while UNHCR focused its efforts on the more peaceful areas of former Yugoslavia. However, at the outbreak of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICRC acknowledged that it did not have the capacity to address the growing needs in the war zones. Consequently, UNHCR's involvement was expanded to include these areas.

(18)      While this development was consistent with the wishes of many UNHCR field staff, the Regional Bureau at headquarters was more inclined to seek the involvement of other agencies, not only ICRC, but also UNICEF and WHO. Neither of the two UN agencies, however, had a strong interest in the operation nor the funding required to play a significant role in former Yugoslavia.

(19)      On the ground, the Special Envoy had recognized at an early stage that if resources for the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be mobilized, then field staff would have to establish a credible and visible operation. Once UNHCR's ability to deliver had been demonstrated to the donors, he believed that support would readily follow.

(20)      The considerable energy and particular experience of the Special Envoy undoubtedly had an important influence on extending UNHCR's role in former Yugoslavia. Having served in Central America, where UNHCR had played a significant role in the regional peace process, the Special Envoy recognized the need for a comprehensive approach, linking the international community's humanitarian and political responses to the situation. Equally important was the Special Envoy's experience in fund-raising during the Gulf crisis, which greatly influenced his vigorous and proactive approach to external relations.

(21)      A UNHCR appeal for US$ 165 million, launched at the end of April 1992, marked a significant escalation of UNHCR's involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The size of the appeal surprised field staff concerned with the operation, as did the donors' immediate and positive response, which further committed the organization to a large-scale relief operation.

(22)      Significantly, and in contrast to past operations, UNHCR did not attempt to withdraw when the war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While operational conditions became increasingly difficult and dangerous, decisions were continually made to intervene and save lives.

(23)      The commencement of the Sarajevo airlift in July 1992 was a key event in affirming UNHCR's lead role in the operation. Although several Western governments were willing to assume responsibility for the airlift, UNHCR was eager to demonstrate its effectiveness, and worked hard to secure responsibility for this aspect of the relief effort. Once the airlift began, the operation gained a much higher political profile and the need for UNHCR's presence in former Yugoslavia ceased to be debated internally.

(24)      Within a month, the High Commissioner convened a ministerial-level international meeting in Geneva, which adopted a comprehensive humanitarian strategy. Soon afterwards, an inter-agency mission designed a plan of operations and joint appeal, which provided the basis for an expanded UNHCR presence. Large numbers of UNHCR staff began to arrive in former Yugoslavia. Numerous offices were opened and transport modules consisting of trucks, drivers and maintenance facilities were put in place.

(25)      By September 1992 the UNHCR operation had expanded to over 100 staff and continued to grow. For several months the situation remained chaotic. Staff struggled to organize the resources they had received and to feed nearly two million refugees, displaced and war-affected people. The situation began to stabilize towards the end of 1992, with the completion of winter preparations and a move into a larger office in Zagreb.

(26)      From this time, the operation began to maintain a high momentum. UNHCR was able to deliver and distribute very substantial amounts of assistance - some 600 metric tons a day from November 1992. At the same time, WFP started to organize itself to assume responsibility for the delivery of food to UNHCR warehouses at ports of entry, the first significant support received from another UN agency.

(27)      1993 was characterized by continued growth in staff numbers and by fruitless efforts to move out of the emergency phase and towards a more stable and controlled operation. Unfortunately, however, rapid changes in the pattern of conflict continually required UNHCR's over 500 field staff to respond to new events and circumstances. These problems were only exacerbated by shortfalls in resources and deteriorating security. Consequently, UNHCR continued to move from one crisis to another throughout the year.

(28)      By January 1994, the operation had been underway for two years and had assisted over four million people. UNHCR's own expenditure of US$ 600 million, coupled with some US$ 400 million of in-kind contributions channelled through the organization, brought the total cost of the UNHCR operation close to a billion dollars.

(29)      Other UN agencies had budgeted some US$ 570 million for the same period, most of which was provided in the form of WFP food. In addition, an amount of aid exceeding that channelled through UNHCR was provided bilaterally and through NGOs.

OVERVIEW

(30)      UNHCR's relief operations have played a critical role in alleviating suffering in former Yugoslavia. Although the impact of the organization's intervention is difficult to assess with any degree of precision, it is generally acknowledged that the assistance delivered to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina has saved many thousands of lives and has helped to avert population displacements in a number of areas.

(31)      Without the food, shelter materials and medicines which UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations have provided to displaced, besieged and war-affected communities, a large number of deaths would inevitably have occurred from hunger, cold and disease, especially amongst the more vulnerable segments of the population. The assistance programme has permitted many people to stay in their homes, and in some instances, the presence of UNHCR and other international personnel has placed obstacles in the path of violence, discouraging ethnic cleansing and the harassment of minorities. Furthermore, by focusing international attention on forced displacements and other human rights abuses, UNHCR has had some success in moderating the worst excesses of the parties.

(32)      The operation in former Yugoslavia has had many important consequences for UNHCR. By demonstrating its expertise in launching such a large-scale relief programme, the organization has gained a greatly enhanced public reputation and boosted its credibility with donor states. Staff members have also developed a new degree of pride and self-confidence in UNHCR's operational abilities. As a result of these developments, UNHCR is now better equipped to play a leading role in international efforts to protect and assist populations with urgent humanitarian needs.

(33)      The relief operation in former Yugoslavia had I many unconventional features and took place within an unusually complex political and military environment. In such an environment, none of UNHCR's conventional durable solutions were appropriate. The primary humanitarian objective was to save lives and reduce suffering until a political settlement could be achieved.

(34)      UNHCR's principal efforts toward this aim consisted in delivering as much relief tonnage as the warring parties would allow, in an attempt to alleviate suffering and enable beneficiaries to remain in their areas of origin. At the outset of the operation, no-one envisaged the intensity or duration of the conflict, the scale of the population displacements it would provoke, or the amount of assistance that would have to be provided to its victims.

(35)      UNHCR's protection and assistance efforts were carried out in some of the most difficult operational conditions ever encountered by the organization. Several million beneficiaries had to be fed and provided with shelter materials, a task which required the creation of an exceptionally large and complex logistical operation. UNHCR staff found themselves working in the middle of an active conflict, with limited and sometimes non-existent security provisions.

(36)      The war in former Yugoslavia, which involved not only regular armies, but also militia forces and unruly factions, was itself unconventional in nature. As has been frequently pointed out, mass population displacements were a direct objective - and not just a consequence - of the conflict. UNHCR's efforts to prevent mass displacements by enabling people to remain in their own towns and villages were therefore in direct opposition to the aims of the warring parties. In such a context, every humanitarian activity inevitably had political and military consequences. Furthermore, political leaders seldom seemed willing to compromise, often displaying an extreme disregard for the suffering of their people.

(37)      The situation on the ground and conditions imposed by the warring parties changed on a daily basis, making it extremely difficult to predict scenarios and formulate plans. Operational difficulties were invariably aggravated by the deep-seated animosity amongst the combatants and communities concerned.

(38)      In view of the many difficulties that the operation faced, UNHCR's performance can be highly commended. Certainly, UNHCR's activities in former Yugoslavia have received widespread praise from other UN organizations and donor states. In many respects, the organization's response was quicker and more effective than in recent emergency operations in areas such as Bangladesh, Kenya, the Persian Gulf and West Africa.

(39)      The political analysis carried out by senior UNHCR staff in the operation was generally excellent, often permitting the organization to keep pace with and anticipate developments. The organization's media relations activities also met with much acclaim, and were widely viewed as having been handled more successfully than in any previous major operation.

(40)      Although protection efforts in Croatia and Serbia were reasonably effective, the function encountered many difficulties in conflict areas. Protection activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina had short-term successes and there were specific situations where UNHCR's presence helped to strengthen the safety and security of threatened populations. On a broader level, however, the impact was generally very modest.

(41)      The logistics operation managed to deliver massive quantities of food despite continual obstacles. Using staff secondments and a recently expanded roster, UNHCR was able to get more people rapidly on the ground than ever before. However, difficulties in deploying a sufficient number of mid-level internal staff greatly hindered the organization's ability to provide the management structure and programme management required.

(42)      UNHCR's efforts to coordinate the relief operation with its UN partners, NGOs and the military could have been given more attention. In practice, however, other UN agencies had neither the presence needed for meaningful co-ordination nor much interest in being coordinated by another organization.

(43)      Although the working environment was extremely difficult, UNHCR was nevertheless able to benefit from a number of positive circumstances. These included:

-     an ample supply of highly skilled and committed local staff;

-     the availability of large numbers of external personnel who despite their lack of UNHCR experience had excellent professional skills;

-     the provision of massive financial and logistical resources" by donor states for a sectorally limited operation;

-     the existence of a more developed infrastructure and better organized community structures than in most other emergency operations; and,

-     the availability of existing resources and reserves amongst the beneficiaries.

(44)      The international relief effort had several consequences that were not anticipated at the outset. First, the operation enabled governments to focus public attention on their response to the humanitarian dimension of the problem, thereby diverting attention from failures in the political process as well as calls for direct military intervention.

(45)      By supporting humanitarian efforts, Western governments were able to maintain the appearance of doing something without actually contributing to a resolution of the conflict. According to one senior UNHCR official, "every time the question of settling the conflict came up, the donors responded by saying that they were going to give more money to the humanitarian effort."

(46)      Second, the relief operation became an important component of European efforts to contain the conflict and the population movements that it provoked. Protecting and assisting the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina reduced the number of people seeking asylum in neighbouring and nearby states, in some senses enabling traditional asylum countries to evade their international responsibility.

(47)      Third, the provision of assistance in a war zone can easily prolong and contribute to the conflict. By sheltering people from the impact of the war, assistance can reduce pressure on political leaders to compromise, and assume direct responsibility for the welfare of their communities. In more tangible ways, external assistance can also lengthen and fan a conflict. Troops and militia forces can be fed, and fuel supplied to hospitals, for example, can permit warring parties to use their own resources for military purposes.

(48)      Critics of the operation have tended to focus on the undesirable consequences of a relief programme in a war. They have suggested that as a refugee agency, UNHCR should not have become involved in assisting war-affected populations, or should point have withdrawn.

(49)      The principal questions that have to be asked are whether there were any realistic alternatives to the approach adopted by UNHCR, and whether a different approach could have saved more lives and reduced suffering. As a humanitarian agency, UNHCR has to focus on the needs of victims and serve as their advocate. The organization must consider and try to minimize the political and military ramifications of its decisions. However, UNHCR is certainly not in a position to make humanitarian decisions on the basis of whether its efforts could have a limited war or prejudge its outcome.

(50)      The net impact of UNHCR's involvement in former Yugoslavia has clearly been positive. Lives were saved and hardship was reduced. Moreover, it was perhaps inevitable 'that with an effective early response, UNHCR would become inextricably drawn in, and lose a degree of control as the humanitarian programme became part of a much larger political and military process.

(51)      The operation in former Yugoslavia has acted as an important catalyst in the international community's evolving approach to humanitarian protection and assistance. First, it has blurred the traditional distinction between refugees and other categories of people in need of protection. Second, it has encouraged closer integration of the humanitarian, political and military elements of the UN system.

(52)      For UNHCR, the operation has had particularly important implications for the future. The organization has clearly moved into new areas, somewhat away from its more traditional role as a refugee protection agency. Among other developments the operation has introduced a new style of militarized humanitarian relief and has intensified the discussion regarding preventive strategies.

(53)      Many observers believe that UNHCR's activities in former Yugoslavia set the stage for greater future involvement with internally displaced persons and other vulnerable non-refugee populations by a highly operational UNHCR. With the experience it has gained, it is not difficult to envisage UNHCR working in close association with UN peace-keeping operations while serving as an umbrella organization for international relief operations.

Prevention and Protection

(54)      Working with displaced and war-affected populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina confronted UNHCR with a variety of protection issues, many of which had never been previously encountered or systematically examined.

(55)      The concept of preventive protection, which emerged early in the operation, constituted an effort to address root causes, thereby enabling people to remain in their areas of origin. Thus, it was hoped that preventive efforts could avert population displacements and limit the scale of the refugee problem. Regrettably, the joining of two separate notions, prevention and protection, provided a misleading description of UNHCR activities as well as a misinterpretation of the protection concept. Consequently, preventive protection was neither understood nor appreciated by field staff, and as the conflict developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was soon abandoned.

(56)      The operation in former Yugoslavia nevertheless provides some important insights regarding the nature and potential of preventive activities. In a number of specific instances, UNHCR's presence, mediation and assistance had a moderating effect on the warring parties and may have helped to inhibit expulsions and displacements. Despite these occasional successes, UNHCR's experience in former Yugoslavia reveals a need for the preventive approach to be more carefully considered.

(57)      To be successful, preventive measures will have to be more accurately targeted at the real causes of displacement in a specific situation. This, however will require a greater understanding of the social, economic and political dimensions of mass displacements than UNHCR has until, now been able to develop.

(58)      Preventive steps have to be taken at an early stage, and normally at the political level, in order to have a substantial impact. It is increasingly evident that prevention should precede the outbreak of full-scale conflict, before law and order have completely broken down, while there are still identifiable authorities and there is room for mediation and conciliation.

(59)      If it is to be effective, prevention will also require substantial resources. Unfortunately, many of the preventive measures which can be drawn upon include activities such as early warning, education, mass information, and economic assistance, for which adequate resources are seldom available. Furthermore, if resources are attainable for prevention there is always the risk that they may not be available for refugees.

(60)      Much more effort is required to define UNHCR's role and specific areas of competence in a manner that does not over-estimate or misconstrue the organization's possible contribution. Once UNHCR has determined its likely involvement, the organization must more effectively communicate the meaning and implications of prevention to front-line staff.

(61)      Care must be taken to ensure that prevention by UNHCR does not become an excuse for inaction by states or a pretext for restrictive practices. Perhaps the most important precondition to seek when carrying out preventive activities is a population's ability to leave their own country and request asylum elsewhere.

(62)      One of the most pressing dilemmas confronting UNHCR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was whether to help people stay in areas of conflict or try to move them to locations where protection and assistance could be more easily provided. In the event, UNHCR felt obliged by constraints to adopt a restrictive evacuation policy.

(63)      At the outset, staff were understandably reluctant to help people become refugees, a blatant contradiction of the preventive protection concept and anathema to traditional UNHCR principles and ways of thinking. Furthermore, as the aims of the war became clear, evacuation was seen as encouraging ethnic cleansing and prejudging the outcome of the conflict.

(64)      The political and practical constraints of evacuating people were formidable: who should be evacuated and where should they be taken? Moreover, evacuations were seldom accepted by the warring parties and could not be undertaken without considerable risk to those being evacuated. In such a new context, UNHCR lacked policies or procedures to deal with the issue. In view of the likelihood of similar dilemmas arising again when working with internally displaced persons, UNHCR should consider the issue of evacuation more systematically in order to establish some basic principles.

Assistance and Logistics

(65)      The mobilization and delivery of relief to war-affected populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the largest and most difficult logistical operation ever undertaken by UNHCR. Although the relief effort has received widespread acclaim, the logistical operation had some weaknesses, such as a lack of control over stocks and distribution. These shortcomings, however, were to a large extent unavoidable given the difficult working environment, the speed with which the operation had to be launched, and the variety of human and material resources which had to be patched together. Moreover, while UNHCR's logistical system was somewhat undisciplined and disjointed, it had a very substantial delivery capacity.

(66)      Because the operation is generally considered to have been a logistical success, the numerous problems created by an over-reliance on external staff have generally been overlooked. UNHCR still needs to establish a small corps of professional logistics staff to set up logistical systems and to direct external personnel.

(67)      When assembling a relief operation from a variety of disparate resources, a substantial management effort is required to maintain a common system in which assets are centrally managed. In addition, an effort must be made to ensure that internal programme capacity matches external logistical inputs, so as to avoid simply shifting gross tonnages of relief as quickly as possible in an uncontrolled and imbalanced manner.

(68)      One of the principal lessons learned from former Yugoslavia is the enormous potential which exists to mount and consolidate an international operation under a UNHCR banner when governmental and public interest has been mobilized. In view of the danger of over-extending UNHCR's management capacity in such situations, the organization's efforts should, from the outset, be more clearly focused on providing the operation with an overall framework and direction. In too many cases, a desire to maintain control and a leading role has led UNHCR to miss or only belatedly take advantage of opportunities to devolve responsibilities.

Management Issues

(69)      UNHCR has made considerable progress in developing its emergency management capacity, but still needs to improve its internal systems and planning approaches.

(70)      Emergency planning is always problematic but presented "an unparalleled challenge in former Yugoslavia, given the rapidly changing pattern of the conflict and the absence of a conventional durable solution to guide UNHCR's work. Even when such difficulties exist, however, planning is essential to inform and guide staff as to what they are trying to achieve.

(71)      In an emergency, the detailed and long-term blueprints traditionally associated with the notion of planning are inappropriate. A more fruitful approach involves defining overall mission objectives and priorities; thinking through scenarios and options; and developing situational policies and principles based on various scenarios. Initial planning should also set out structures and lines of communication as well as clarifying individual roles and responsibilities.

(72)      Within this general framework, detailed programme plans, prepared and updated on a regular basis, are required to respond to constant changes in needs, resources and field conditions. The monthly operational plan that was eventually developed in former Yugoslavia provided an effective means of meeting this requirement.

(73)      The appointment of a Special Envoy in the field and the creation of a dedicated unit for the emergency at Headquarters once again demonstrated the value of such arrangements in a fast-moving operation. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that the Special Envoy arrangement does not circumvent Headquarters structures that could make a valuable input into decision-making and policy formulation. Furthermore, despite the benefits which can be gained from separating a fast-paced operation from slower-moving programmes, special emergency units should in most cases remain within the relevant regional bureau, or should be rationalized and reintegrated into a regional structure as quickly as possible.

(74)      The operation in former Yugoslavia illustrates the need for UNHCR to adapt its funding and staffing procedures to the needs of a rapidly developing emergency. In general, the Financial Management and Information System (FMIS) proved too complex and insufficiently flexible. UN administrative procedures were too restrictive for practical use, and UNHCR's own post creation procedures often slowed down the recruitment and deployment of staff.

(75)      The management of a large-scale emergency operation is always going to be demanding, requiring as it does the ability to both think thoroughly and to act decisively. Considerable progress has been made in these areas over the past few years. Nevertheless, further improvements to UNHCR's methods, systems and procedures are required to strengthen the organization's emergency management capacity.

Agency Coordination

(76)      UNHCR was requested to assume a leading humanitarian role in former Yugoslavia at an early stage of the relief operation. Although the experience of the past two years has in many ways demonstrated the validity of the lead agency approach to coordination, it has also revealed the need for UNHCR to give greater attention to the operational implications of this concept.

(77)      The authority and responsibilities associated with UNHCR's lead agency role were never fully or formally defined. In practice, UNHCR interpreted the notion in terms of assuming direct responsibility for operational activities in all sectors of the programme.

(78)      UNHCR's relationship with the other agencies more on logistical and administrative support than on policy-making and planning. In general, the humanitarian organizations of the UN system operated as a loose consortium or association. Each agency had its own set of priorities, planned its own programmes and generally undertook separate efforts to mobilize resources.

(79)      It is widely recognised that the leading operational role assumed by UNHCR contributed to the speed, effectiveness and flexibility of the relief effort. At the same time, however, the absence of a UN system-wide response and the lack of support and guidance provided to NGOs had some unfortunate consequences. The potential contribution of other humanitarian organizations was not fully realized, UNHCR itself was often left overstretched, and relief coverage was somewhat uneven

(80)      UNHCR's interpretation of its lead agency role was shaped by a number of factors. These included the action and delivery-oriented approach of UNHCR; donor state acceptance and appreciation of the role assumed by UNHCR; and the general reluctance of other UN organizations, including the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), to make a major commitment to former Yugoslavia.

(81)      Experience in former Yugoslavia suggests that UNHCR's recent and successful efforts to strengthen its emergency preparedness and response capacity have to some extent deflected the organization's attention from the issue of inter-agency coordination. UNHCR must therefore give greater consideration to the lead agency concept and identify the activities and arrangements required to solicit the involvement and collaboration of other UN agencies, the ICRC and the NGOs in large-scale relief operations.

Military Support

(82)      Experience in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that national military contingents, operating under UN auspices, have the capacity and potential to provide many useful forms of support to a large-scale relief operation. Nevertheless, a number of obstacles must be overcome if there is to be regular and effective collaboration between UNHCR and the UN's peace-keeping or protection forces.

(83)      Given UNPROFOR's mandate to support the UNHCR relief operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would have been both logical and desirable for the two components to work closely together. In practice, however, the absence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, coupled with the lack of an overall coordinating framework, meant that there was often an unfortunate distance between the humanitarian and military aspects of the operation. These fundamental obstacles to effective collaboration were only exacerbated by differences in size, location, command structure, operational style and organizational culture.

(84)      Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from former Yugoslavia is that when the humanitarian and military aspects of a UN operation cannot be separated, because they are both ultimately linked to Security Council resolutions, then they must be better integrated at the operational level. Greater efforts should be made to avoid the kind of ill-defined relationship into which UNHCR and UNPROFOR drifted in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(85)      When UN forces are providing humanitarian support, UNHCR must develop a better understanding of how military structures operate, and seek ways to guide the military. If UNHCR intends to work with peace-keeping and protection forces, it must also take steps to orient, train and exchange information with military personnel. UNHCR must learn how its small number of staff can influence and make effective use of the massive military capability potentially at the disposal of humanitarian operations.

(86)      UNHCR's widely acclaimed performance in former Yugoslavia will almost certainly lead to requests for the organization to provide humanitarian assistance in future operations involving UN military forces. The organization should now make effective use of the experience, expertise and authority that it has gained over the past two years to lead a discussion of the future relationship between the UN’s humanitarian, peace-keeping and conflict-prevention activities.

Human Resources

(87)      In every emergency for the past 15 years, the most frequent criticism of UNHCR has been the organization's inability to rapidly deploy an adequate number of suitably experienced personnel. The operation in former Yugoslavia was in some senses no exception to that rule.

(88)      UNHCR's new emergency staffing arrangements, developed in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf operation, enabled the organization to mobilize the required number of staff in a relatively short period of time. Serious difficulties arose, however, in identifying, deploying and retaining the services of middle-level personnel who could manage and administer the programme effectively, as well as supervise  the large number of external staff recruited for the operation.

(89)      To become an effective emergency organization, UNHCR must finally acknowledge the need to establish a complete senior management team at the outset of an operation, rather than concentrating all responsibilities in a single Representative or Special Envoy. In a large emergency, there is also a need for an experienced senior head of operations and a senior head of administrative, financial and personnel functions. In addition, UNHCR requires a carefully managed reserve capacity to supplement or take over from the emergency team and to remain with the operation for an extended period of time.

(90)      One of the most critical elements in UNHCR's response was the effective use of emergency rosters as well as standby staffing arrangements with governmental and non-governmental organizations. UNHCR should expand its efforts to supplement its internal capacity with external expertise. To optimize the effectiveness of both external and internal staff, much more serious and creative efforts must be made to provide them with orientation and training, both before and during their deployment in the field.

Staff Security

(91)      When UNHCR began to assist victims of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, few envisaged that the organization would soon find itself working in the middle of a war zone. Moreover, as the importance of UNHCR's role grew, it became increasingly difficult for the organization to disengage from the operation, despite the deteriorating conditions. While efforts were made to improve staff security, UNHCR's lack of experience in such situations meant that adequate security provisions were never fully developed.

(92)      Improvements can and should be made to prepare and equip field staff for situations where security problems exist. At the same time, UNHCR must think more carefully about the organization's responsibility towards its staff. In former Yugoslavia, newly engaged personnel, provided with neither adequate training nor support, were expected to take risks that national military services would not take. Staff were also expected to assume responsibility for decisions about their own security, although they often lacked the experience and guidance required to make the necessary judgements.

(93)      UNHCR should take overall responsibility for determining when conditions are too hazardous for the organization to operate. On a more local level, field offices must have the right to make security decisions when they believe that they are confronted with an unacceptable level of risk. Decisions to remain should not, however, be binding on individual staff members. No UNHCR employee should be obliged to go to or remain in a situation which they themselves deem too dangerous.

(94)      UNHCR has an obligation to attempt to meet the humanitarian needs of people who are of concern to the organization. UNHCR should not, however, accept direct responsibility to undertake activities for which other organizations (such as UN military forces or the ICRC) are much better suited by virtue of their mandate, experience, training and resources.

(95)      It is unrealistic to think that UNHCR can develop the quasi-military capacity required to work in areas of active conflict. Nevertheless, steps could be taken to establish a corps of personnel - or even a new organizational component - composed of staff with the training and experience required to work in hazardous situations.

(96)      UNHCR must precisely define the security conditions in which it is prepared to ask staff to work, as well as think through possible arrangements for support and handover. Before accepting any further invitations to work in situations of internal displacement and conflict, UNHCR should clearly explain to donor states and to the political and military components of the UN system, the limits of its capabilities and involvement.

Media Relations

(97)      Media relations in former Yugoslavia were the most successful and most professionally handled in UNHCR history. These efforts have had a number of important consequences. In addition to mobilizing resources and political support for the operation, public information activities were used to denounce abuses, in an effort to protect war-affected populations. At the same time, media coverage provided a means of asserting the neutrality of humanitarian relief, enhancing the security of aid workers and facilitating their access to the beneficiaries.

(98)      The unusual level of media interest in former Yugoslavia and the liberty which UNHCR staff were able to take in expressing their views suggests that these achievements win not easily be replicated in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, the operation provides an important indication of the advantages which can be gained from a very active public information strategy. The most important components of such a strategy include:

-     making efforts to cultivate and support the press at all levels of the organization;

-     permitting staff to talk with the media on subjects they know;

-     making effective use of staff with media experience;

-     serving as an accurate, reliable and timely source of information and analysis; and,

-     guiding the media to interesting and important stories.

(99)      UNHCR's experience in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the benefits that can be gained when media relations are treated as an important and integral part of the organization's operational activities. With the expertise and reputation UNHCR has acquired, the organization is now well placed to make better use of the international media. At the same time, greater efforts could be made to cultivate local media, in order to make the operational environment more favourable to UNHCR's humanitarian efforts.

(100)    Improving UNHCR's emergency response capacity, as well as adapting to new operational environments and demands, are two of the principal challenges now confronting UNHCR. By being better prepared to meet these challenges, UNHCR will be able to save many lives and reduce a great deal of human suffering. Furthermore, it is increasingly evident that successful emergency operations significantly contribute to UNHCR's credibility and authority, thereby facilitating its efforts to protect, assist and find solutions for refugees throughout the world.

PREVENTION AND PROTECTION

PROTECTION HAD MANY ASPECTS

(101)    Two years after UNHCR began its operation in former Yugoslavia, there was a general recognition that the organization had assisted thousands of refugees to find safety in neighbouring and nearby states and helped to prevent a number of large-scale refoulements.

(102)    UNHCR's involvement kept innumerable displaced and war-affected people alive and in some instances averted population displacements by preventing - or at least moderating - the abuses committed by the warring parties. Furthermore, by sharing information with the media and other members of the international community, UNHCR alerted the world to the process of ethnic cleansing and focused global attention on other atrocities.

(103)    Despite the positive consequences of UNHCR's involvement, there has been a growing awareness that the distribution of relief in a war zone does not constitute protection, and that the kind of prevention and protection activities available to humanitarian organizations and personnel can have only a very limited impact when performed under conditions of active conflict.

(104)    At best, UNHCR's presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina had a mitigating and delaying effect, rather than a genuinely preventive or protective impact. In many instances, the presence of UNHCR and other international personnel meant that atrocities were only committed in a less obvious and more covert manner. Moreover, on a number of occasions, after seemingly successful preventive efforts, areas were subsequently closed off by military forces, ‘ethnically cleansed', and then reopened.

PREVENTIVE PROTECTION WAS INTRODUCED

(105)    Protection in former Yugoslavia has gone through many stages. Initially, UNHCR hoped to introduce a new strategy characterized as preventive protection, and to assist in the repatriation of people who had been displaced by the early conflict between Croats and Serbs, thus also providing protection in a more traditional manner. Preventive protection was intended to avert population displacements and to limit the scale of the refugee problem. By establishing an international, humanitarian presence in the region, and by providing war-affected populations with material assistance, UNHCR hoped that it could create a situation in which the need to flee was diminished, thereby enabling people to remain in their areas of origin.

(106)    Unfortunately, preventive protection proved to be a misleading and unworkable strategy, and, as a result, the approach was quickly abandoned. By the end of 1992, the concept had disappeared from the vocabulary of most field staff in former Yugoslavia. UNHCR's efforts to introduce a preventive protection strategy provide a number of important insights regarding the nature and potential of preventive activities, and therefore warrant closer attention.

A NEW APPROACH WAS NEEDED

(107)    The notion of preventive protection emerged in the context of discussions regarding the role of UNHCR and other international organizations in addressing the root causes of refugee movements. In the specific circumstances of former Yugoslavia, the relevance of a preventive approach was reinforced by a number of considerations. These included, for example:

the inability of many people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to leave the country;

the determination of some war-affected populations to remain in their homes;

the operational difficulties involved in providing shelter to large numbers of refugees and displaced people in the region; and,

the unwillingness of many Western European countries to admit large numbers of people fleeing from the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

(108)    Ideally, European states wanted to keep asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia as close as possible to their areas of origin, possibly even recreating the kind of 'safe area' that was established in Northern Iraq to avert a large-scale refugee influx into south-east Turkey. Within UNHCR there was a growing recognition that the traditional approach of calling upon governments to be generous and to keep their doors open would prove futile.

(109)    Preventive protection thus emerged in 1991 as an untried but potentially more relevant approach to deal with massive population displacements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To some extent, it was a concept in search of application, a theory in need of testing. Perhaps more significantly, it was the only response which the international community was prepared to contemplate at that moment.

PREVENTIVE PROTECTION HAD MANY CRITICS

(110)    In practice, the notion of preventive protection was not appreciated by many UNHCR staff in the field. Many of the organization's more experienced personnel were ambivalent about this new approach, regarding it as a negation of the right of asylum and a betrayal of the fundamental protection principles to which their professional lives had been dedicated. Moreover, given UNHCR's evident inability to stop the process of ethnic cleansing, the notion of preventive protection appeared increasingly inappropriate.

(111)    UNHCR staff generally found it difficult to understand the concept of preventive protection. Without sufficient guidance regarding its basic principles, strategies and operational modalities, UNHCR personnel had to interpret the concept as pragmatically as possible. In most field locations, this meant maintaining contacts with local communities and identifiable authorities; mediating and intervening on behalf of minorities; and monitoring the imminent movement of populations.

(112)    Significantly, as the operation in former Yugoslavia proceeded, the delivery of material assistance quickly became an increasingly important component of UNHCR's protection strategy. Food aid served as a means of sustaining people and preventing further displacements, but also provided a concrete rationale for UNHCR's presence in the area.

(113)    UNHCR's growing emphasis on emergency logistics and the distribution of relief was influenced by the vague nature of the preventive protection concept. The assistance programme provided staff with a concrete programme and budget, with definable objectives, measurable targets and identifiable operational tasks. These elements appeared far more nebulous in the preventive protection initiative. Donors also had difficulty understanding and judging protection efforts, and quickly began to judge the success or failure of the UNHCR operation almost solely in terms of metric tonnes of aid moved.

APPROACHES WERE QUESTIONED

(114)    Many questions have been raised about UNHCR protection policy in former Yugoslavia. One of the most serious concerns the extent to which the preventive protection strategy is consistent with traditional humanitarian principles such as the right to seek asylum and international burden-sharing. In the view of its harshest critics, preventive protection simply 'let Europe off the hook'. For them, the approach legitimized the restrictive asylum practices which have multiplied in the region during recent years, and endorsed the view that there are acceptable alternatives to flight, even in situations where the affected population has a demonstrably well-founded fear of persecution in their own country.

(115)    Many UNHCR staff categorically reject such criticisms, pointing out that from the outset, UNHCR insisted on the right to seek and find asylum. They also argue that the analysis upon which such criticisms are based fails to comprehend the intransigence of European policy at the time. Governments, they note, did not hesitate to push people back at the height of the fighting. Even so, large numbers of Bosnians and other former Yugoslav citizens were admitted by European states, under temporary protection schemes or other arrangements.

(116)    Critics contend that as well as being physically sustained by the food which UNHCR delivered, the affected populations were morally sustained by the idea that they would be rescued in some fashion by the international community. In reality, of course, the political will for such action did not exist. Thus the enormous amount of assistance channelled through UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations became something of an alibi for states which wanted to avoid both a military involvement in the conflict and a large-scale refugee influx from former Yugoslavia.

(117)    Those responsible for the operation point out that populations were morally sustained only in a few locations, such as Sarajevo, and even then principally by the presence of UNPROFOR and the international media. They note that the extent to which the operation may have served the political purposes of Western governments is hardly an argument against the humanitarian operation, and question whether the absence of relief efforts would have made any difference on the political front.

IMPORTANT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN

(118)    UNHCR's experience in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the limited value of most prevention and protection activities in situations of open conflict. The operational environment in former Yugoslavia was such that the small-scale and localized protection and prevention activities undertaken by UNHCR inevitably had only a limited impact. The concept of protection is founded to a significant extent on the premise that the parties to a conflict have some respect for international law and diplomacy, and that they are fearful of international repercussions. Prevention is based on education, mediation and the notion that the parties wish to limit the human and physical devastation which inevitably results from war.

(119)    The ideas of protection and prevention counted for little in a situation where the combatants, populations and politicians concerned were consumed with anger, hate and irrationality. Although the presence of journalists, human rights observers and UN aid workers can have a moderating effect on warring parties in many conflict situations, in former Yugoslavia, the combatants proved insensitive to outside scrutiny and were unafraid of international sanctions. The ferocity of the fighting and the logic of the war were so strong that even a substantial reinforcement of the organization's presence would have made little difference to the pattern of conflict and population displacement.

(120)    A useful comparison can be made between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sri Lanka, where the preventive activities undertaken by UNHCR - the organization of food convoys, the distribution of relief to displaced populations, and the creation of Open Relief Centres (ORCs) for people seeking safety, shelter and medical care - are generally recognized to have played a useful role in alleviating suffering and reducing the scale of the refugee exodus. As a Central Evaluation Section review has noted, "the unanimous opinion of everyone consulted, including the inhabitants of ORCs, is that if the UNHCR assistance programme had not been available, the majority of those benefiting from it would have gone to India. "

(121)    UNHCR's Sri Lanka programme was able to take advantage of several positive features of the operational environment, few of which existed in the context of former Yugoslavia. For example:

-     the Sri Lankan conflict was smaller in scale and intensity than the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

-     both the Sri Lankan government and its armed opponents were supportive of the UNHCR programme and generally honoured the agreements which they made with the organization;

-     UNHCR's humanitarian relief operation was autonomous of any UN peace-keeping or political presence, and its neutrality in the conflict was generally not called into question;

-     the Open Relief Centres, protected and administered by UNHCR, provided displaced people and other affected populations with a real degree of safety and security, not only in the centres themselves, but also in surrounding areas; and,

-     the option of leaving the country remained; as UNHCR's evaluation report observed, despite the many obstacles to flight, "it is generally agreed locally that any sufficiently determined individual who wants to go can do so. " PREVENTION REQUIRES MORE ANALYSIS

(122)    Prevention, protection and solutions have become the fundamental components of UNHCR's global strategy for the 1990s. The organization's knowledge and understanding of these three concepts is, however, extremely uneven. While the concepts of protection and solutions have been systematically examined and applied by UNHCR since its creation more than 40 years ago, the notion of prevention has been subjected to almost no in-depth analysis. More significantly, UNHCR's practical experience with prevention is so limited that the operational implications of this approach remain extremely vague.

(123)    A number of lessons and ideas can be drawn from UNHCR's recent experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Clearly, preventive activities are most likely to be effective in the period which precedes a full-scale conflict, while identifiable authorities still exist, while civil institutions continue to function, and before law and order has completely broken down. In Bosnia and Herzegovina none of these conditions were met.

(124)    On its own, UNHCR can make only a limited contribution to prevention. UNHCR must attempt to serve as an initiator or catalyst for preventive efforts. The organization simply does not have the mandate, resources, expertise or presence to address the root causes of refugee movements in a systematic manner. As the High Commissioner has observed, "prevention is a multifaceted undertaking which, to be effectively accomplished, requires the participation of many different actors. It involves the promotion of human rights, economic development, conflict resolution, institution building and the broad dissemination of information." Many of these activities are most appropriately undertaken by other elements of the UN system, with UNHCR playing a supportive and catalytic role.

(125)    A concerted effort is required, both within and outside the organization, to identify UNHCR's specific areas of competence and expertise, and to develop a more comprehensive approach that includes establishing effective partnerships with other institutions which are, or could be, engaged in preventive activities. Even then the potential for prevention should be kept in strict perspective. Once UNHCR has elaborated its potential involvement it must more effectively communicate the meaning and implications of prevention to front-line staff.

(126)    Prevention is clearly a very positive and innovative approach. Nevertheless, as a number of commentators have pointed out, this strategy may also have unintended and undesirable consequences. It is likely that prevention will be manipulated by states, used as an excuse for political inaction and as a pretext for the introduction of restrictive asylum policies. Given the pattern of events in Northern Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina, why should any potential host country now open its borders to an unlimited number of refugees and asylum seekers? Why not simply insist that the populations concerned are protected and assisted within the borders of their own country? Recent events involving Somali refugees in Kenya, Afghans in Pakistan and Azarbaijanis in Iran demonstrate the new-found popularity of this argument.

EVACUATION WAS AN AGONIZING ISSUE

(127)    One of the most pressing dilemmas confronting UNHCR personnel at the outset of the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was whether to help people to stay in areas of actual and potential conflict, or whether to facilitate their movement to locations where protection and assistance could be more easily provided. This issue created endless difficulties and frustration for field staff, many of whom were relatively new to the organization.

(128)    Humanitarian relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially intended to enable people to remain in their own homes, a strategy which was consistent with the international community's efforts to combat ethnic cleansing, and with the UNHCR's belief that its role in former Yugoslavia was to prevent, rather than create, new population displacements. A policy of organized evacuation, it was felt, would simply have prejudged the outcome of the war and contributed to ethnic cleansing.

RESTRICTIVE POLICIES WERE INTRODUCED

(129)    At the outset of the operation in early 1992, UNHCR adopted ICRC's policy of non-evacuation - an INTRODUCED approach which also appeared to be consistent with preventive efforts. Having begun the operation under the banner of preventive protection, UNHCR could hardly be seen helping people to become refugees. Once relief flights to Sarajevo started, however, questions began to be raised as to why the organization was not allowing people to leave on the empty planes.

(130)    UNHCR maintained that it would only assist departures in life-threatening situations. Instead of attempting to pursue a policy of evacuation, UNHCR stressed the right to freedom of movement and the right to seek access to safety.

(131)    Some field staff found it difficult to understand the organization's evolving evacuation policy and were reluctant to accept such restrictive criteria. Others, however, favoured them. Consequently, inconsistent practices were commonplace. In some instances, staff who were requested to assist in the movement of people refused to do so on policy grounds. At other times, desperate and ad hoc decisions were made to evacuate. In Srebrenica, for example, thousands of people who had lost everything were living in a situation which was clearly not tenable, with many being killed by snipers' fire. In this environment an agreement was negotiated enabling the evacuation of 150 vulnerable people for humanitarian reasons.

(132)    After much discussion in the field, the idea that prevention and evacuation were not mutually exclusive strategies or objectives gained acceptance, and evacuation criteria were expanded. In principle, the clarification of evacuation policy and criteria facilitated field staff efforts to assist in the transfer of people. In practice, however, staff continued to agonise over what constituted a life-threatening situation and faced innumerable obstacles in actually carrying out evacuations.

(133)    By early 1993, the High Commissioner recognized that UNHCR had reached the limit of its capability in providing relief to the war-affected in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a letter to the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner asked for this issue to be brought once again to the attention of the Security Council. More specifically, UNHCR sought the Security Council's support in gaining access to besieged cities and safe passage out of conflict areas, thereby enabling the evacuation of wounded people and other vulnerable groups. UNHCR could not, she emphasized, focus its efforts exclusively on the provision of assistance to people who remained in their homes and areas of origin.

DEBATE CONTINUES

(134)    With the benefit of hindsight, however, some observers suggest that UNHCR could have done more to assist people to safety - a function, they suggest, that is quite distinct from that of 'creating refugees'. According to this argument, when the objective of the war became clear, UNHCR should have informed the affected populations that it could not guarantee their protection, and offered them the opportunity to leave. If UNHCR's activities had been oriented in this manner at an earlier stage of the conflict, it is argued, many more lives might have been saved and a great deal of human suffering averted.

(135)    Critics suggest that a stricter focus on the humanitarian needs of the victims may well have resulted in a different approach to the problem. They believe that UNHCR gave a much higher priority to the right to remain than it gave to the right to leave, an approach which may have originated from the organization's sensitivity to participating in the process of ethnic cleansing, as well as its close identification with the political objectives of the United Nations and key donor states.

(136)    A few observers suggest that there were some alternatives to the initial anti-evacuation approach of ICRC and UNHCR. The creation of protected areas, for example, would have posed many operational and military difficulties, but might also have provided more secure conditions to the country's besieged and war-affected populations. Furthermore, had UNHCR promoted the notion of large-scale resettlement more vigorously, the potential recipient states - who were determined to avoid this outcome - might have taken additional steps to address the root causes of the refugee problem.

EVACUATIONS FACED MANY OBSTACLES

(137)    Staff responsible for developing UNHCR's approach to evacuation point to the political and operational problems that evacuation would have encountered. It was easy to suggest that people should be assisted to safety, but where exactly should they have gone and how would they have got there?

(138)    Architects of UNHCR policy point out that critics who suggest that UNHCR should have tried to organize evacuation have an unrealistic perception of UNHCR's influence. As an independent humanitarian actor, UNHCR could only work on the basis of consensus by all parties. Evacuations through the frontlines were simply not safe, nor accepted by the warring factions. Any large-scale efforts to evacuate would have resulted in UNHCR being perceived as a party to the conflict and, in the view of many, the organization would have had to discontinue its relief operation. Operational difficulties aside, evacuation convoys would have entailed unacceptable risks to those being evacuated, who would have been the target of shelling and sniping.

(139)    Even small-scale attempts to evacuate civilians degenerated into endless haggling over exchanges of evacuees for money, prisoners, dead bodies, food, or whatever imaginable before the warring parties would permit the evacuees to leave. Furthermore, evacuations inevitably led to increased persecution and ethnic cleansing in the hope that those remaining would depart or be taken out.

(140)    The possibility of creating protected or 'safe' areas was never considered a workable solution by UNHCR. Such areas could not be protected by UNPROFOR and quickly became large refugee camps in the areas of origin. Protected areas were neither safe or economically viable, nor did they permit freedom of movement in or out. In establishing safe areas the international community simply encouraged more ethnic cleansing.

(141)    Some criticism of the delay in reorienting UNHCR's approach and providing earlier and better guidance on the evacuation issue is justifiable. It must, however, be recognized that the organization was attempting to operate in an entirely new type of situation, for which established policies and procedures did not exist. In many cases, staff working among suffering civilians simply had difficulty accepting a restrictive, constraints-oriented evacuation policy, regardless of its logic, when they recognised that people could not be protected where they were.

TEMPORARY PROTECTION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED

(142)    The governments of Europe generally opted to provide ‘temporary protection' rather than granting refugee status to asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia or providing them with resettlement places. Although a legally undefined notion, temporary protection is based on the understanding that persons with such status will return to their own country when it is deemed safe to do so. Such arrangements, which have involved more than 600,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia, 250,000 of them in Germany alone, have proven to be a useful means of short-circuiting the very lengthy asylum procedures which exist in most European states.

(143)    Despite the success of this approach, there is a growing sense that it is time to move from a stage of pragmatically managing temporary protection to the development of legal frameworks and standards of treatment that specify the obligations of states. It is evident that UNHCR could play a useful role in this process.

(144)    Some staff members and external observers believe that the time and energy which UNHCR has focused on the relief operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has diverted attention from important protection and asylum issues in neighbouring republics and in other European states. It has been suggested, for example, that UNHCR could have made greater efforts to convince Slovenia to open its doors to refugees. Similarly, some commentators have suggested that UNHCR should have been more vigorous in its protests when Austria decided that asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia were not going to receive any more assistance, and should therefore seek alternative destinations.

(145)    Assessing the validity of such observations is very difficult. UNHCR has, for example, consistently and repeatedly pressed the Croatian and other authorities to admit greater numbers of people. At a broader European level, the organization has made frequent calls for the whole of the continent to share the burden of the refugee exodus. Many of these efforts have gone unheeded and unrewarded, however, as the countries concerned have increasingly adopted a policy that asylum seekers from Bosnia and Herzegovina should generally remain in and, if necessary, be returned to the first safe country in which they arrived. Such an approach made it feasible for asylum seekers to be returned, for example, from Slovenia to Croatia, since Croatia was deemed to be safe.

IN PRACTICE, CHOICES WERE LIMITED

(146)    In analysing UNHCR's protection efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principal question that has to be asked is whether a different approach could have saved more lives, reduced the scale of human suffering and contributed to solutions. At the same time, however, it is necessary to ask what decision-making latitude and influence UNHCR realistically has. Despite UNHCR's consistent efforts to focus primarily on the needs of the victims, it was perhaps inevitable that the organization's objectives and strategies reflected the priorities of the most influential forces within the international community, in this case the Security Council and the principal donor states.

ASSISTANCE AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANCE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT

(147)    UNHCR's efforts to mobilize and deliver assistance to displaced and besieged populations in former Yugoslavia represented the largest and most difficult relief operation ever undertaken by the organization. Drawing upon the logistical capacity of several states, the massive aid operation has served as the principal source of food for many thousands of people and has played an important role in limiting the scale of displacement.

(148)    The magnitude of the relief effort, which involved the use of over 400 vehicles, led to the operation being described as 'a trucking operation with frills'. Although this description is not entirely accurate it does reflect UNHCR's priorities, as well as the way in which the organization's human and material resources were primarily deployed. Other programme activities, such as the provision of shelter and social services, were very small-scale and often belated in comparison with the transport and distribution of food.

(149)    The logistics operation deserves much praise for its achievements. The speed with which the operation was launched, and the variety of resources which had to be patched together, is impressive by any standard, particularly in view of the difficult working environment. The swiftness is even more impressive when compared to the deployment timetable of UNPROFOR or other UN organizations.

THE OPERATION PROVIDES MANY LESSONS

(150)    Despite widespread acclaim, the operation was not ideally designed and consequently had a number of weaknesses. In the final analysis, however, the relief effort very successfully delivered the food which displaced and war-affected populations needed to survive. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the operation could have been organized and implemented in any other way. There was simply no-one available with an overall picture of the relief effort who could coordinate and direct the programme as the pieces were provided by governments.

(151)    The operation in former Yugoslavia was in many senses unique. Nevertheless, important lessons can be drawn from the experience with regard to large-scale logistics activities in an emergency, as well as the provision of assistance in a conflict zone.

(152)    In trying to meet assistance needs, relief coming into the country was quickly delivered to the areas UNHCR could reach. Deliveries had to be based on crude population statistics rather than any real assessment of needs, and consequently the food basket delivered was often imbalanced. The lack of access and security constraints did not permit monitoring and commodity control. Inevitably perhaps, some humanitarian assistance found its way to combatants in the conflict.

(153)    In order to establish such an immense relief system in such a short period of time, donors were requested to provide whole logistics modules rather than individual elements such as trucks, drivers or warehouses. Without significant overall direction, broad responsibilities were defined by the members of rapidly formed logistics teams and the components were cobbled into a system.

(154)    Through sheer hard work, risk-taking and a 'get it done' philosophy, highly qualified logistics personnel succeeded in working out a delivery-oriented operation among themselves. The result was a relatively undisciplined and disjointed system, but one with a very substantial capacity. In the final analysis, the nature of the operation meant that UNHCR was obliged to focus on shifting gross tonnages as quickly as possible.

LOGISTICS SHOULD BE INTEGRATED

(155)    Normally, the logistics function is regarded and treated as a part of UNHCR's programme activities. A programme unit, fed with information from the field, is expected to oversee and target logistics activities. In former Yugoslavia, however, by quickly building a massive logistic structure staffed by external logisticians, UNHCR created an organizational component which completely dwarfed the small programme unit. Consequently the two functions worked separately, with programme staff tending to run after logistics, rather than guiding the relief operation.

(156)    Many complications arose from the tendency of extremely proactive logistics staff to direct deliveries without consulting a programme structure that in principle should have been much larger. With logistics controlling food and sending it out as quickly as it came in, programme staff were in no position to ascertain whether commodities were actually being moved, let alone specify which deliveries should go where.

(157)    Neither logistics nor programme staff were able to attend to the basic aim of ensuring that the right people were provided with the correct balance of various food items. Quickly distributing when access was available led to oversupplying some commodities to particular areas. Unfortunately, once a particular commodity had been oversupplied, it was inevitable that there would be an under supply of that item to other communities. This in turn created imbalances in the food basket which proved impossible to correct.

(158)    UNHCR was never able to develop a clear overall picture of the extent to which needs were being satisfied. As a result, agencies which would have liked to support gaps in the programme were unable to target their efforts. Furthermore, items that should have been targeted, such as supplementary foodstuffs, were distributed to all beneficiaries on an indiscriminate basis for over a year.

COMMODITIES HAD TO BE MOVED QUICKLY

(159)    Political pressures to deliver stocks often forced logistics staff to move commodities. To the extent possible, UNHCR tried to distribute a mixture of food items, but with the field calling for deliveries it was often very difficult to close warehouse doors until enough of each commodity could be assembled to provide a full basket. With items being pumped through the system, any needs assessments that were undertaken were likely to be ignored.

(160)    While the logistics staff engaged for the operation tended to be experienced people with strong professional qualifications, they knew little of UNHCR's structure, working methods or even its basic mandate. Logistics personnel easily overlooked or misunderstood what should have been the programme's role. Even when roles were understood, the absence of programme staff at the same professional level made it unrealistic for logistics staff to relinquish the functions they had assumed.

(161)    In view of the speed with which the operation was organized by external staff and the very limited direction given to the operation, it was perhaps inevitable that there would be little communication and understanding between logistics and programme personnel. There was simply no-one available, in the field, with the time to make the linkages required among various organizational components or even within the logistics function.

(162)    The absence of programme personnel and an experienced staff member to direct the operations was rooted in UNHCR's perennial emergency staffing difficulties. While the organization was quickly able to engage skilled external logistics officers (on one occasion the UK's Overseas Development Administration alone provided five in a single day) it was not able to deploy a commensurate number of experienced internal programme staff. Even a year and a half after the massive operation had begun, UNHCR had only deployed one programme officer with prior UNHCR experience in the function.

(163)    The few programme staff assigned to the operation were often obliged to concentrate much of their time on the planning and financial aspects of projects relating to non-food items, which in dollar terms constituted only a small percentage of the overall programme. A disproportionately small amount of programme time was spent on the hundreds of millions of dollars of food delivered through UNHCR.

A COMMON SYSTEM SHOULD BE DEVELOPED

(164)    In rapidly cobbling together a massive logistics operation in several republics, a high degree of independence had to be given to the six extended distribution points in Belgrade, Metkovic, Ploce, Rijeka, Split and Zagreb. Initially, there was neither a common system nor any form of centralized control. The relatively autonomous extended distribution points essentially drove the operation.

(165)    A central system would have enabled a more efficient and economic overall management of logistics assets and relief commodities. Costly logistics assets could have been used more flexibly rather than being under-utilised in areas where access was being denied to trucking teams. In the absence of strong central management with the authority to move logistics resources between extended distribution points and between the five OCMs, logistic personnel were often extremely reluctant to give up trucking assets, fearing that these would not be returned. Consequently, costly truck teams often sat idly waiting for access to be reestablished. Furthermore, without a common and centralised system, it proved extremely difficult to coordinate the delivery of relief or even simply to report back to donors in a coherent manner.

SMALL GROUP NEEDS REQUIRE ATTENTION

(166)    The absence of programme staff unquestionably contributed to assistance being largely limited to food. It is doubtful, however, that the operation would have had the capacity to provide a balanced programme for millions of war-affected persons. To a large extent, needs were almost endless and far outpaced programme resources, which were in any case often under threat of funding shortages. Despite the criticism from those with particular sectoral interests, the operation had neither the means nor the flexibility to set up the kinds of services that were often advocated; simply providing limited food assistance outside urban areas was frequently extremely difficult.

(167)    Even with the financial means to address a significant portion of the required health, education and social services, the structure and personnel to implement these activities would simply not have been available. NGOs with the capacity and the organizational sophistication required to provide such services were in short supply and often already had government funding to carry out other activities.

(168)    Working in a war zone, combined with limited financial and implementation capacities, created serious programme constraints. Nevertheless, UNHCR's experience clearly underscores the importance of anticipating and reacting to individual and smaller group needs, even if it requires an investment of time disproportionate to the number of people being helped and UNHCR's potential impact on the problem. In several instances, less obvious needs became major issues, leading to damaging public criticism and demanding a subsequent large investment of organizational time. In former Yugoslavia, the operation gave priority to the most basic survival needs of the beneficiary population as a whole. As a result, more specific and highly emotive needs such as medical evacuation and care for rape victims and abandoned psychiatric patients were perhaps inevitably neglected.

SIMPLE SOLUTIONS ARE REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY

(169)    A lesson re-emphasized by the emergency is the need to avoid unnecessarily sophisticated technological solutions. After logistics and computer staff struggled for some eighteen months to set up an elaborate computerised stock control system, a senior logistician observed that a manual system would have been more accurate and only slightly less efficient. Moreover, a manual system could have functioned almost immediately. The former military logistician pointed out that a computer system is essential for an army supply organization tracking between 12,000 and 15,000 different items, but is certainly not necessary when fewer than 100 items are stocked, as was the case in former Yugoslavia.

LOCAL RESOURCES AND APPROPRIATE STAFF REDUCE COSTS

(170)    The operation illustrates the importance of maximizing the use of local logistics resources which can substantially reduce operational costs. As the logistics operation progressed, staff recognised, for example, that by deploying international trucking teams closer to the border areas, greater use could then be made of much cheaper local contractors to transport commodities to the international teams. The potential savings were considerable. For example, a local rate of US$15 per metric ton compared to US$615 for the most costly single trucking team, which in total was budgeted at US$6 million per year.

(171)    Any rational argument about the need for additional programme and finance staff, a UNHCR logistics team, a head of operations and a purchasing officer, needs only go as far as the potential savings such staff could have realised. The financial losses and potential embarrassment associated with non-professional staff procurement, contracting and systems design are both alarming and avoidable.

ASSISTANCE PRINCIPLES COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED

(172)    Relief workers generally believe that basic needs were covered and that food went to its intended beneficiaries. Nevertheless, working in a war zone has required the flexible application of generally recognized assistance principles regarding access, assessed need and monitoring. Experience has demonstrated that the only principle that can realistically be followed while working in a country at war, is simply being neutral and trying to assist all those in need, irrespective of their origins. Even following such a basic principle is often problematic since providing food to someone's enemy may easily result in the aid provider being perceived as an enemy.

(173)    In trying to reduce the level of suffering, the international community endeavoured to provide food to those it had access to, rather than on the basis of need, or the ability to monitor whether the aid was actually received by the intended beneficiaries. In such a situation, it was inevitable that aid was misdirected by the warring parties, to the benefit of combatants.

(174)    Making distinctions among beneficiaries was unrealistic, since essentially all able-bodied males were combatants, who often wore civilian clothes and lived with their families. Furthermore, staff pragmatically recognized that the more easily identifiable combatants were frequently the type of persons who would not hesitate to take food from vulnerable non-combatants, if they themselves did not receive assistance.

(175)    Since the granting of access was political, it was also inevitable that aid frequently did not go to those in greatest need but to those the combatants were willing to feed. Consequently aid easily became a hostage to the military and political objectives of the warring parties, who used relief as a weapon or as a source of support for their war efforts.

(176)    UNHCR was able to monitor in an impressionistic and informal manner, but closer and more careful monitoring would, in many instances, have put staff at high risk. Furthermore, with some 200 depots serving as the final distribution points for a far greater number of municipalities, even a weak attempt at monitoring would have required huge staff resources.

(177)    In principle, humanitarian organizations can suspend or withdraw from an operation if their principles are not respected. In practice, however, assistance cannot be stopped if people will starve without aid or if political imperatives dictate that assistance will be provided. Consequently, humanitarian agencies have little ability to manoeuvre and stick to their principles even when few, if any of them, are respected. It is increasingly clear that when humanitarian organizations provide aid in conflict situations they will be obliged to take an extremely pragmatic stance, and, when necessary, to bend their principles, as both UNHCR and ICRC have had to do in former Yugoslavia.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

UNPRECEDENTED DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED

(178)    In recent years, UNHCR has successfully reinforced its capacity to meet the needs of fast-moving relief operations. Experience in former Yugoslavia, however, indicates that the organization should take additional steps to develop its emergency planning approaches and management systems.

(179)    Attempting to respond to civilian needs in a zone of active conflict presented UNHCR with unparalleled planning challenges. Rapid and constant changes in the situation on the ground meant that staff were continually obliged to respond to new developments, sometimes on an hourly basis. As a result, many concluded that it was a sufficient challenge simply to plan the next food convoy.

(180)    Setting objectives proved particularly difficult. In the post-war context of the Persian Gulf operation, for example, the situation in the field was volatile but UNHCR's aims became quite clear: to repatriate the refugees, to establish an assistance programme adapted to the cold weather and to hand over longer-term responsibilities to other humanitarian agencies.

(181)    With the absence of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was no durable solution around which UNHCR could orient and plan its work. Rather than promoting repatriation, local integration or resettlement, the organization's primary objective was generally defined either in broad terms of saving lives by maximizing the supply of relief until a political settlement could be reached, or in the narrow terms of the monthly logistics plan.

PRIORITIES WERE SELDOM CLEAR

(182)    Although the monthly plan enabled staff to set immediate logistical priorities, they often remained confused about which activities they should prioritize. Should they, for example, focus on helping people at risk to flee; providing a reassuring presence; negotiating the protection of minorities; managing a logistics operation; coordinating with other agencies; or serving as a media spokesperson? At the same time, confronted with an almost limitless range of demands and needs, UNHCR personnel found it difficult to determine the limits to each of these activities.

(183)    Planning and prioritization were rendered even more difficult by UNHCR's potential involvement in activities which the organization had never before undertaken or even imagined. In Sarajevo, for example, the most critical needs included support to municipal services such as water, gas and electricity supplies, as well as the production of essential commodities such as bread and coal.

(184)    Periodic funding shortages only exacerbated the planning problem and complicated efforts to enter into agreements with implementing partners. Furthermore, staff could not imagine that the peace settlement that was always expected to completely alter the operation would remain elusive for so long.

(185)    The lack of clarity with regard to priorities, coupled with the operation's reactive nature, meant that most UNHCR personnel, particularly those new to the organization, simply tried to respond to the most urgent events of the moment. Although it was not always overt, staff confusion as to what they should be doing permeated every level of decision-making.

(186)    The implications of individual decisions were not always thought through. As a result, staff members often found that after taking a number of piecemeal decisions, operational activities were moving in a completely different direction than anticipated.

(187)    The Headquarters sections responsible for support and control functions normally encourage field staff to clarify their operational objectives. In former Yugoslavia, however, normal planning requirements tended to be waived, or were applied in very precise and counterproductive ways. Satisfying FMS, for example, often required field staff to carry out detailed planning for future activities, even though the fluidity of the situation meant that time-consuming revisions soon had to be made.

NEW APPROACHES ARE NEEDED

(188)    In any discussion of planning and objective-setting in an emergency context, it is always easier to identify problems than to provide solutions. Efforts to improve emergency planning are, however, worth the time and energy required. As one experienced emergency manager pointed out, two-thirds of making anything work is letting other people know what will be expected of them. Quite simply, planning permits delegation and keeps staff informed as to what they should be trying to achieve.

(189)    A better understanding of the nature of planning in emergencies is evidently required. Experience has shown that in a fast-moving emergency, the detailed and voluminous blueprints traditionally associated with the concept of planning are of very little value. In an emergency situation such as former Yugoslavia, a more appropriate approach to planning includes:

-     defining operational objectives, priorities and limits:

-     thinking through scenarios, contingencies and options;

-     developing situational policies and principles;

-     establishing structures and lines of communication; and,

-     clarifying individual roles and responsibilities.

(190)    Once these processes have been undertaken, operations managers can continually review, adjust and communicate plans in order to maintain a focus on what they and their staff are trying to achieve. In addition, more detailed programme plans and priorities, such as those contained in the monthly operation plan used in former Yugoslavia, will permit staff to adapt their activities to constant changes in needs and resources. Staff must also recognize that in an emergency, decisions and plans made one day will undoubtedly be changed the next.

A SPECIAL ENVOY PROVED ESSENTIAL

(191)    As well as demonstrating the limitations of traditional planning approaches, the emergency in former Yugoslavia has reinforced UNHCR's recognition of the need to delegate authority to the field.

(192)    The appointment of a Special Envoy reporting directly to the High Commissioner proved to be a particularly effective organizational arrangement for a situation in which overall operational responsibility could not easily be discharged from a single location. This approach, which had first been used in the Gulf crisis and later employed in the Cambodia and Afghan repatriation programmes, enhanced the organization's flexibility and accelerated decision-making in the field.

(193)    The appointment of a Special Envoy increased the attention that could be devoted to policy and political issues, and provided the operation with an overall perspective that a conventional country representative could not have developed. At the same time, the Special Envoy served as a bridge between the different republics involved.

(194)    Among the few disadvantages of the Special Envoy arrangement is the extent to which such a function can easily bypass Headquarters structures that could usefully participate in the policy and decision-making process. Involving several senior staff in these processes can be particularly useful in situations where the unconventional nature of an operation may require a degree of caution.

ORGANIZING THE OPERATION WAS DIFFICULT

(195)    Working out the respective roles of the Special Envoy and the OCMs (Office of the Chargé de Mission) covering five republics of former Yugoslavia was one of the more contentious aspects of the operation. This was particularly the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which absorbed the vast majority of the Special Envoy's time.

(196)    Efforts to draw a distinction between the policy-making responsibilities of the Special Envoy and the operational responsibilities of the OCM for Bosnia and Herzegovina proved extremely difficult since political negotiations often touched on the smallest details of the convoy operation.

(197)    Organizing UNHCR's structure to support the operation in Bosnia was difficult in view of the geographical dispersal of the many parties involved in the operation; the decentralized nature of the logistics system; and the difficult security conditions and communications problems which existed in Sarajevo. In these circumstances, every possible arrangement offered advantages and disadvantages.

(198)    Moving the OCM for Bosnia and Herzegovina from Sarajevo to Zagreb early in the emergency may have been unavoidable, but the operation was often more difficult to manage without an OCM or Deputy operating from the republic being covered. Zagreb was relatively secure and was generally easier to operate from than Sarajevo. It provided quicker access to many supporting locations and was also the base for a number of key organizations involved in the operation. This arrangement did not permit UNHCR to coordinate closely enough with the military command which located its headquarters in Kiseljak, a town near Sarajevo.

(199)    This arrangement also had the effect of isolating the OCM from UNHCR's field offices in the republic, as well as the wide range of activities in Sarajevo and from the NGO community, which was largely located in the Croatian port of Split. The presence of both the OCM for Bosnia and the Special Envoy in the Croatian capital, also increased the extent to which both offices were perceived as biased. Such perceptions were, of course, particularly strong in Belgrade.

(200)    With so many scattered offices and newly appointed staff involved in the operation at the outset, it was sometimes difficult to determine who was supporting or directing whom. Within a two-month period, for example, the head of the Pale liaison office was told that the office reported to the Special Envoy, the OCM for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OCM in Belgrade. One can imagine the confusion that new UNHCR staff members would experience in such a situation.

(201)    Communication between UNHCR's many offices in former Yugoslavia was also difficult. The Special Envoy was constantly analysing political developments and potential scenarios, and therefore had the clearest vision of the situation and the overall direction of the operation. However, with a huge and hastily established office, and with most staff new to UNHCR, the structures and channels needed to communicate the Special Envoy's plans and policies were often lacking.

(202)    In too many instances, UNHCR personnel felt that they were not provided with the information, guidance and feedback which they required to function effectively. As a consequence, staff were often placed in embarrassing situations, and were obliged to improvise in discussions with NGOs, government officials and the press.

A SEPARATE HQ UNIT OFFERS ADVANTAGES

(203)    At Headquarters, a Special Operational Unit for Former Yugoslavia (SOFY) was established to manage the operation, separate from the European bureau, which lacked the operational experience found in other regions.

(204)    The creation of a special operational unit offered advantages in terms of team-building, freedom of action, creativity and pace of work. SOFY, however, does not provide a useful model for most emergency.operations, which are more effectively managed by an organizational component such as the Gulf crisis unit, which offered many of the same advantages as SOFY while remaining within the relevant regional bureau.

(205)    Despite the benefits which can be gained from separating a fast-paced operation from slower-moving programmes, special operations units should be rationalized and reintegrated into a regional structure as quickly as possible. Such an approach enables emergency activities to be conceptualized within a broader operational and organizational context, and encourages the introduction of solution rather than relief-oriented strategies. Locating a special operations unit in a regional bureau tends to facilitate the phasing out of functional activities that are allowed to develop within an emergency structure and which duplicate those in other parts of the organization.

NEW PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED

(206)    Difficulties associated with planning, staffing and communication were often at the heart of operational problems. For most personnel, however, the difficulties encountered in using UNHCR's regular procedures and systems for mobilizing financial and human resources in a fast-moving emergency often generated even greater frustration and annoyance.

(207)    Particular criticism was directed at the FMIS system, which proved too complex for new staff and implementing partners, as well as too rigid for a constantly changing operation. Few personnel were sufficiently conversant with the system to use it effectively. Furthermore, staff frequently complained that the system over-emphasized budgetary aspects while tending to neglect planning and performance.

(208)    Procedures relating to administrative expenditures continued to be far too restrictive for practical use in an emergency operation. With headquarters authorization required for certain expenditures in excess of $500, the procedures create unnecessary work and delay. Moreover, such procedures seem senseless when representatives are able to provide implementing partners with far greater authority for precisely the same expenditures, and to sign LOIs (Letters of Instruction) worth millions of dollars. Curiously, ad hoc procedures to authorize administrative expenditures in emergency situations were developed in the late 1980's, but they are not widely known and have only been made available to staff on a selective basis.

(209)    Despite progress in establishing accelerated recruitment procedures for emergencies, existing procedures for post creation still need to be adapted to emergency requirements. At present, the creation of urgently required positions is often delayed a month or more by the need to wait for the next scheduled meeting of the periodic post review board.

(210)    Any discussion of emergency management and procedures ultimately returns to the question of deploying experienced personnel. The large number of externally recruited staff engaged for the operation generally had excellent management skills. They did not, however, have sufficient emergency experience and knowledge of the organization to think through the operation in a comprehensive manner nor to make effective use of its systems and structures. This difficulty was compounded by the lack of training in UNHCR principles and procedures offered to external recruits taking up management positions.

(211)    Managing emergency operations continues to be one of the most difficult challenges confronting UNHCR. Although the organization has made significant efforts to improve its capacity to respond to emergency needs, additional efforts are still required to adapt methods, systems and procedures to suit the requirements of rapidly evolving field operations.

AGENCY COORDINATION

THE LEAD AGENCY ROLE REMAINS VAGUE

(213)    The last three years have witnessed a series of complex humanitarian operations in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, prompting the international community to consider how such large-scale relief programmes can be most effectively organized. While it is generally recognized that coordination between humanitarian agencies could be improved, there is much less agreement on the models and mechanisms that are required to achieve this objective. Some useful ideas can be drawn from recent experience in former Yugoslavia.

(214)    UNHCR was asked by the UN Secretary-General to play a leading role in former Yugoslavia at the outset of the relief operation. Since that time, UNHCR has generally been referred to as 'the lead UN agency'. The meaning and operational implications of this concept, however, have remained vague.

UNHCR ACTED ALONE

(215)    In practice, the UN relief programme in former Yugoslavia has effectively been a UNHCR operation rather than a genuinely system-wide response to the emergency. UNHCR has had a much larger presence than any other UN agency, and, together with WFP, ICRC and its implementing partners, has been responsible for channelling the majority of relief assistance to the beneficiary population. Relatively little activity has been undertaken by other UN agencies.

(216)    In general, the humanitarian organizations of the UN system have operated as a loose consortium or association. Most agencies had their own priorities, planned their own programmes, and carried out their own fund-raising activities. Tasks were generally not allocated in a systematic manner.

(217)    In leading the relief operation, UNHCR has acted as the principal point of contact with UNPROFOR, ICFY, UN Headquarters and the warring parties, on behalf of other UN agencies and the NGOs. At field level, UNHCR assisted other organizations with logistical and administrative support. As a consequence, UNHCR's relationship with the other agencies has tended to focus more on immediate activities and problems than on policy-making and planning.

NGOS REQUIRE MORE ATTENTION

(218)    The 100 or more NGOs working in Bosnia and Herzegovina have made a major contribution to the operation. Except for the 25 voluntary agencies working as UNHCR implementing partners, however, UNHCR has generally been unable to provide them with substantial support and guidance. For most NGOs, UNHCR's principal contribution has been in practical matters such as the provision of identity cards, licence plates as well as security and programme information.

(219)    In Zagreb in particular, UNHCR was often unable to provide the voluntary agencies with the support they sought. In an effort to facilitate coordination, UNHCR co-funded an office of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). Because UNHCR lacked structures and staff dedicated to the NGO liaison function, however, agency representatives were often left wandering the corridors of the UNHCR office, looking for answers and information. Collaboration tended to be most effective in the field, where UNHCR and the NGOs were able to work closely together and to establish coordinating committees for specific sectors such as shelter, food and health.

(220)    The presence of a single UN agency, providing a lead in all aspects of the operation, is generally recognized to have streamlined the relief effort and in many ways contributed towards its efficiency. However, UNHCR's limited ability to mobilize a UN system-wide response and to provide support and guidance to the NGOs had a number of unfortunate consequences.

(221)    Perhaps most significantly, the potential contribution of other humanitarian organizations was not fully realized, and UNHCR itself was often left over stretched. Without UNHCR's direction, the coverage provided by the NGOs was uneven. Relief efforts were duplicated in some areas, while the resources provided to other locations were small in relation to needs. UNHCR was also unable to cultivate and develop the smaller NGOs, leaving many agencies with a sense of isolation from the operation as a whole.

LIMITED COLLABORATION HAD MANY CAUSES

(222)    The organizational and coordinating arrangements which emerged in the operation were the product of several different factors.

(223)    From the outset, UNHCR very actively sought a leading role in former Yugoslavia, an approach which did not always encourage the participation of other UN agencies. Moreover, once the Secretary-General had requested UNHCR to spearhead the relief effort, the lack of a formal agreement detailing agency roles and responsibilities meant that UNHCR and other UN organizations were able to interpret the lead agency arrangement in whichever way they chose. In general, other agencies had little interest in receiving direction from another UN organization.

(224)    There was a general desire amongst other UN agencies to limit their involvement in former Yugoslavia. Some - such as WFP and UNICEF - had other programmatic and geographic priorities, and were particularly reluctant to establish huge-scale operations in a European country. Others - such as WHO - were more accustomed to planning long-term programmes with government ministries, and therefore lacked the action-oriented, 'order and delivery' approach required for an emergency operation of this scale. Thus in sharp contrast to UNHCR, most other UN agencies generally established only a small and belated presence in the field.

(225)    UNHCR did not receive substantial support from another UN agency until early 1993, when WFP formally assumed responsibility for the delivery of food to UNHCR warehouses. WFP's belated involvement was partially attributable to the nature of the initial relief- programme, which was largely limited to the distribution of food parcels. Nevertheless, many UNHCR personnel questioned the benefits that could be gained by devolving an ongoing activity to another organization, pointing to the time and energy which had to be invested in the handover process as well as the operational difficulties which arose as the other agency came up to speed.

A LEAD AGENCY OFFERED ADVANTAGES

(226)    Donor states have often expressed their support for the notion of coordinated and system-wide UN responses to complex emergencies. In former Yugoslavia, however, perhaps the most complex and important operation for western governments, they appeared to recognize that a single operational entity could manage the programme in the most effective and responsive manner. Such a conclusion could only have been reinforced by observing the experience of UNPROFOR, which consisted of some 40 national military contingents, struggling to work together.

DHA'S INVOLVEMENT WAS LIMITED

(227)    The minimal participation of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in former Yugoslavia also played a part in reinforcing UNHCR's leading role in the relief operation. The DHA was formally established at the end of 1991 with the explicit purpose of coordinating system-wide responses to complex emergencies. But the new organization came into being just after UNHCR had been designated as lead agency, and it was barely functioning at the time when the relief operation was launched.

(228)    In mid-1992, DHA participated in an inter-agency assessment mission but subsequently confined itself to assembling consolidated appeals on the basis of inputs provided by different agencies. These appeals did not, however, attempt to set out a coordinated UN objective and programme, and were of limited value as far as many donors were concerned.

ICRC MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION

(229)    In the scale and nature of its activities, the ICRC's contribution to the operation in former Yugoslavia came closest to that of UNHCR. Historically, there has been a relatively clear division of labour between the two organizations: while the ICRC has worked with war-affected populations in conflict zones, UNHCR has focused its protection and assistance efforts on refugees in countries of asylum. In former Yugoslavia, however, the effective broadening of UNHCR's mandate to include displaced, besieged and war-affected populations broke down this traditional boundary.

(230)    Inevitably perhaps, organizational relations in the field were sometimes strained, particularly in the early stages of the emergency. The contrasting mandates and approaches of UNHCR and ICRC, as well as their different relationships to UNPROFOR and the warring parties, hindered cooperation. As the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina progressed, however, it became evident that there was more than enough work for both agencies, and that it was impossible to divide up that work by beneficiaries or by area. Although this resulted in a degree of overlap between UNHCR and ICRC, assistance activities were generally well harmonized and the two agencies strived to maintain a consistent approach.

(231)    Working together on protection issues tended to be more problematic. Although levels of cooperation depended on the personality of individual delegates, the ICRC's somewhat secretive approach to protection matters often hindered its ability to share information with UNHCR.

ICRC'S APPROACH WAS COMPLEMENTARY

(232)    The organizational culture and working methods of the ICRC are quite distinct from those of UNHCR. As experience in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated, the ICRC tends to work in a rather structured and rigid manner, adhering firmly to a very clear set of basic humanitarian principles. In contrast, UNHCR tends to adopt a far more flexible and pragmatic approach, focusing more on the achievement of immediate objectives than on the means whereby those goals are attained.

(233)    These differences were illustrated very clearly in former Yugoslavia by the alternative strategies used to deliver relief. UNHCR, for example, made extensive use of UNPROFOR escorts. In some situations, the organization was prepared to challenge the combatants and push its way through roadblocks. In certain instances, UNHCR was also prepared to engage in trade-offs, providing the warring parties with a portion of the relief so that the rest of the shipment could reach its intended destination.

(234)    The ICRC, however, generally adopted a more principled and inflexible approach, refraining from the use of military escorts and refusing to bargain with combatants. Rather than working out local deals and ad hoc solutions like UNHCR, the ICRC attempted - with only moderate success - to work on the basis of formal agreements, negotiated at the highest level.

(235)    The different mandates and approaches of the ICRC and UNHCR are in many senses complementary and in former Yugoslavia were combined to good effect. Close coordination and collaboration between the two organizations is likely to remain problematic, however, particularly in protection matters and in smaller-scale operations where the scope for competition is greater. As a fiercely independent organization, the ICRC will always remain outside of any formal coordinating arrangements established by the UN system. Moreover, while the ICRC has tried to modify its activities and working methods to meet the new demands of the post-Cold War era, it retains a very distinctive and sometimes rigid set of operational principles.

UNHCR WAS WELL SUITED FOR THE LEAD

(236)    In the three years since the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, UNHCR has expended a substantial amount of time and effort in developing its emergency preparedness and response capacity. While some difficulties remain to be resolved in this area, particularly in the transition from emergency to regular arrangements, there is a general recognition that these measures have had a very substantial impact. Donors, NGOs and other UN agencies agree that no other humanitarian organization could have assumed the role and responsibilities taken on by UNHCR in former Yugoslavia.

(237)    UNHCR's determination to strengthen its operational performance, coupled with misconceived efforts to restructure the emergency response arrangements of the UN system, have to some extent diverted the organization's attention from the question of inter-agency cooperation. There is now also a danger that the acclaim received by the operation in former Yugoslavia could cause UNHCR to develop a somewhat exaggerated sense of its effectiveness while downplaying the potential contribution of other agencies.

LEAD AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES NEED CLARIFICATION

(238)    Although experience in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the validity of the lead agency model, it has also revealed the need for UNHCR to give greater thought to the operational implications of this concept. More specifically, UNHCR must resist the temptation of confusing the notions of 'lead agency' and 'sole agency', and should identify the kind of actions that can be taken to solicit the involvement and commitment of other humanitarian organizations. Experience in other recent operations suggests that these could include:

-     involving other agencies more fully in the policy-making and planning processes;

-     developing a better understanding of the capabilities and working methods of other agencies;

-     undertaking fund-raising efforts on behalf of other organizations and sharing resources with them;

-     appointing staff and establishing structures with specific responsibility for coordination with other agencies in the field, particularly NGOs;

-     gathering and disseminating both operational and situational information in a systematic manner;

-     developing common facilities with other agencies and providing practical support to them;

-     initiating joint training and activities with other agencies; and, team-building activities with other agencies; and,

-     highlighting the contribution of other agencies in media relations activities.

(239)    The international community's appreciation of UNHCR's performance in former Yugoslavia has increased the probability that the organization will be i