Evaluation of the Dadaab firewood project, Kenya

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Contents

Summary of conclusions and recommendations ............................................................... 1
Introduction and background............................................................................................. 13
Overview of the Dadaab Firewood Project....................................................................... 25
Environmental issues and impact ...................................................................................... 41
Relations between refugee and host communities .......................................................... 53
Impact of the firewood project on rape ............................................................................. 63
Analysis of rape data and risk factors ............................................................................... 83
Project cost effectiveness and sustainability ..................................................................... 99
Alternative approaches...................................................................................................... 111
Appendices..................................................................................................................... ..... 125

A. Principal list of documents reviewed
B. Principal list of persons interviewed
C. Chronology of main events
D. Breakdown and comparison of UNHCR budgets 1999 and 2000
E. Note on Women Victims of Violence Project (WVVP)
List of tables and figures

| Table 2.1 | GTZ budget for firewood supply project, September-December 1999 | 34 |
| Table 2.2 | Firewood distributions, July 1998 - December 2000, and calculations of kgs per household and number of days distribution lasts. | 38 |
| Table 2.3 | Wood-for-work activities, by dates, number of workers, gender, and amount of wood distributed (in metric tons) . | 40 |
| Table 2.4 | Wood distributions to vulnerable persons by date, number of recipients, and amount of wood distributed. | 40 |
| Table 5.1 | Reported indicents and rate of rape by year 1994 – 2000 | 66 |
| Table 5.2 | General firewood distribution and reported incidents of rape and attempted rape, July 1998 - December 2000. | 73 |
| Table 5.3 | Daily frequency of reported rape by period of project coverage and non-coverage. | 76 |
| Table 6.1 | Age by activity at the time of the incident: collecting wood or other activities, 1998 - September 2000. | 84 |
| Table 6.2 | Camp by activity at the time of the incident: January - July 1998 (seven months). | 85 |
| Table 6.3 | Camp by activity at the time of the incident: August 1998 - September 2000 (33 months). | 85 |
| Table 6.4 | Somali sub-clans most frequently reporting rape and attempted rape, January 1998 - September 2000. | 87 |
| Table 6.5 | Wealth group breakdown within Dadaab camps, 1999. | 90 |
| Table 7.1 | Partial list of recommended items and costs for improved refugee security of Dadaab camps in Kenya, August 2000, in thousands of dollars. | 105 |
| Table 8.1 | Security incidents reported during the first eight months of 2000. | 117 |
| Figure 2.1 | Key features of firewood project approach, 1998 | 31 |
| Figure 2.2 | Main elements of firewood supply project | 36 |
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Summary of conclusions and recommendations

Project goals and objectives

1. The Firewood Project was initiated in 1997 primarily to address issues of rape and violence against women and girls. A second objective of environmental rehabilitation was added, and later a third objective of reducing resource-based conflicts between refugees and local communities.

2. Analysis indicates that the distribution of firewood to Dadaab refugees is not easily justified strictly on environmental grounds, even though such distribution is likely to have environmental implications that need to be carefully monitored. Similarly, no analysis was done prior to project start-up that would indicate that firewood provision was necessary to avert local conflicts and tensions. Local populations—individuals, businesses, and governments—clearly do benefit from the Firewood Project, through firewood provision and transport contracts and the collection of taxes. While such benefit has been frequently seen as a central justification for the project, it should not be the measure of project success or impact.

3. Identifying of the project as an environmental initiative has resulted in its classification within UNHCR as an environmental rehabilitation and energy management project, and the selection of GTZ as implementing agency. It has produced confusion about the kinds of indicators that need to be monitored, and how project success should be judged. However, based on all assessments, it is not the availability of the wood resource that is problematic or contentious. Detailed environmental assessments indicate that within a 35 kilometre radius, quality deadwood resources remain plentiful, and at current rates of consumption are theoretically sustainable—with or without the firewood supply project. GTZ itself has recognised, as reinforced by Blondel’s (1999) findings, that firewood supply sites for the project are selected more on political than on environmental considerations.

4. Environmental rehabilitation remains an important activity for UNHCR to carry out in Dadaab, but this should continue to be the focus of the RESCUE project, and not that of the Firewood Project. There are insufficient grounds for continuing to focus on firewood supply as an environmental rehabilitation and energy-management exercise. The financial resources allocated to this project should therefore be reallocated towards its primary social and protection objectives—the reduction of rape of women and girls—and the project classified and managed within UNHCR as a community services/protection initiative.

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1 As the project is now implemented in a highly politicised context, with many “interests” involved, the extent to which tensions over wood resources existed, or exist cannot be discussed independently of the Firewood Project.
Logistical emphasis of the project

5. Firewood is the only locally purchased commodity distributed to the Dadaab refugees. In a resource poor area, such as the Northeastern Province of Kenya, it was inevitable that the local contracting for the collection and transport of the wood would become a highly politicised and complex logistical exercise with many local economic interests at stake, and pressures from many sources. It is evident that the implementing agency, GTZ, and UNHCR in Dadaab have had to spend a very large amount of effort and energy to mediate local interests and stakeholders, out of proportion to the overall mandate and purposes of the project. As a consequence the project has not really been envisioned and managed by UNHCR and GTZ staff as primarily a social and community initiative.

6. The mix of objectives provided for the project, have not helped the project implementers to understand the priorities among its goals and objectives, or how it should monitor and measure project success.

Stake-holder consultation in project design

7. This evaluation has frequently returned to the conclusions and recommendations of the stakeholders participatory Project Design Workshop held in January 1998. This workshop represented a positive achievement for UNHCR on two levels. The outcomes of this participatory design workshop remain relevant and appropriate, advocating wood-for-work and wood to vulnerable persons as the primary foci for firewood distribution, and the development of the project on a trial basis, to permit time for impacts to be measured and adjustments made. The workshop engaged all relevant actors– from the refugee community, host community, local government, and implementing partners, in a participatory process to develop a model that was both reasonable and acceptable to all parties.

8. UNHCR should engage in such participatory project design exercises only if it is prepared to accept the outcomes of such processes. The cautious and sustainable approach that had emerged from the workshop was quickly eroded, and replaced by ever-increasing demands on the part of both UNHCR staff, refugees and local contractors for larger and larger proportions of free firewood supply, as ‘the solution’ to rape. Instead of fostering community involvement, initiative and shared responsibility in the problem of rape, it has re-enforced the notion that firewood supply and sexual violence are problems UNHCR can solve alone. A revitalised participatory and co-operative approach is needed to seriously address issues of rape in and around Dadaab refugee camps.

Baseline data collection and monitoring

9. While much recognition was given to the importance of baseline data and monitoring, particularly in the Stakeholders seminar, and in early project documents, the baseline studies were carried out too late to affect the project design and mode of

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2 Not to do so is to compromise its credibility and increase skepticism of stakeholders regarding future attempts to involve them in a participatory process. By abandoning the outcomes of the workshop, UNHCR sent a signal that it did not value or respect the process that generated them; it serves to weaken the credibility of future attempts to involve refugee and other stakeholders in decision-making on matters that concern them, and serves to re-enforce established patterns of dependency.
operation. They contained little information about the socio-cultural context of rape or the household economy of which firewood collection was a part. The baseline studies were also not used to determine the variables and indicators to be monitored by the project. Insufficient monitoring was done with respect to the objectives of the project, and about the mechanisms through which they were intended to operate (e.g., about the number of firewood collection trips; changes in firewood purchase patterns, etc.).

10. The recommendation of the baseline study, that the logistics of firewood supply/distribution and monitoring of its impacts be carried out by separate implementing agencies, was not followed—to the detriment of monitoring.

11. For many, the contracting and distribution of firewood quickly became an end in itself, which served the interests of local contractors, UNHCR, and refugees—both potential employees in wood harvesting and recipient households. This helped to perpetuate a non-critical stance towards the project. For others, there was a strong desire to believe that an effective solution to rape had been found—that the reduction in rape that occurred in the month following the first free distribution was directly caused by that distribution. It became a generalised belief in Dadaab and Nairobi that firewood was a critical part of an environmental and anti-rape strategy—a fact that did not require serious monitoring. Monitoring of the project was aimed mainly at demonstrating the positive impacts of the project and at marshalling arguments in support of its expansion.

12. Baseline data should be collected prior to finalising the design of the project and its results analysed and incorporated. It should be used to identify the range of indicators for monitoring the achievement of objectives. UNHCR should be aware of the indicators of project success and ensure that monitoring of them is carried out. Given the multiple objectives of the firewood project, such monitoring requires the co-ordination of UNHCR environmental, community services and protection staff to ensure that the full range of indicators are being monitored.

Impact of the project on the frequency of reported rape

13. It is the widely expressed view of staff at Dadaab Sub-Office and Nairobi Branch Office that the Firewood Project has been highly successful at reducing the incidence of reported rape of women and girls while collecting firewood. This conclusion is generally based on the decrease in reported rapes following the first firewood distribution (in late July 1998).

14. We recommend great caution in drawing such a conclusion from the available data. An analysis which takes into account the longer-term and short-term trends related to the frequency of reported rape may suggest that reported rapes rose significantly in late 1997/early 1998, due to a complex combination of environmental (El Nino induced severe flooding) and economic factors (extreme cuts to Dadaab’s programming budget), and then returned to the levels closer to those of the 1994-1995 period. It is difficult to credit the project for the decrease that immediately

4 The rates during these months immediately prior to and after the initiation of the Project, may also have been affected by changes introduced in early 1998 in rape reporting procedures. The annual figures reported by GTZ, CARE and UNHCR vary as much as 25% for the same year indicating there is considerable error in the available statistics being used.
followed the first firewood distribution, given the other interventions and events that were occurring simultaneously and given the high degree of variability in the reported incidents of rape—week by week and month by month—that do not directly correspond with either the quantity of firewood distributed or the frequency of such distributions to refugee households.

15. The evaluation has therefore attempted to examine the differences in the frequency of firewood-related rape observable between periods when households are fully supplied with firewood and periods when they are not (see chapter on Impact of the Project on Rape). This analysis of rape reports demonstrates a decrease of 45% in firewood collection rapes during periods of full firewood coverage. However, these periods also see an increase in rapes in other locations and contexts by between 78% and 113%. It is therefore difficult for the evaluators to conclude that firewood provision is a wholly successful rape prevention strategy. Our findings suggest that firewood collection provides a convenient context or location for rape, but should not be viewed as its ‘cause’. We cannot conclude that if women were provided with more firewood, they would be significantly less at risk.

### Better targeting of the firewood project

16. The dominant ‘life-line’ distribution model employed by the project does not adequately address the needs of women most at risk of rape related to their firewood collection. The analysis carried out by the evaluators (and all relevant analyses carried out by independent consultants and organisations), have highlighted the need to properly assess the differential risk factors facing refugee women and girls. These findings are consistent with UNHCR official Guidelines, which continually draw our attention to the particular vulnerabilities of unaccompanied minors, women-headed households and other vulnerable segments of the camps’ refugee population, and the need for special measures to protect them.

17. An understanding that “firewood gathering in the bush” provides an opportunity for rape to be perpetrated, but is not the “cause” of rape (as demonstrated by the evaluation findings) suggests that the project should have been structured towards better targeted and co-ordinated initiatives to reduce the rape of refugee women in Dadaab by identifying and assisting those most at risk wherever such incidents occur.

18. A general framework for this, albeit imperfect, had been developed under the Women Victims of Violence (WVV) project, and has been carried forward in the approach taken by the Ted Turner funded project in Dadaab. These approaches have focused on a multi-dimensional response to the problems of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGV) in Dadaab: involving both improving

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5 The ‘life-line’ distribution is the name given by UNHCR and GTZ to the periodic general delivery of firewood to all refugee households, with the amount of wood determined by the size of the household. As discussed later in this report, the term ‘life-line distribution’ is value-laden, implying that these distributions play a decisive role in the life or death of refugees, and is intended to raise the profile of the project and the perception of its necessity. This is an example of the way in which UNHCR has allowed the relationship between firewood and rape to become overly politicized, to the detriment of rational decision-making and objectives achievement. (See chapter on Relations ..)

security within the camps (e.g., through repairs to live fencing) and simultaneously strengthening the capacities of actors from the refugee community, the police, UNHCR and implementing agencies to develop a co-ordinated response.

19. In particular, the micro-credit program initiated under the Ted Turner funded SGV project, as well as complimentary activities carried out by WFP and CARE, have provided alternative income opportunities to some of the most vulnerable women, and to those most at risk of rape associated with firewood collection. Such initiatives offer these women and girls the choice of whether or not to assume the risks of self-collection as opposed to purchasing firewood on the market.

20. The current Firewood Project, with its dominant ‘life-line’ distribution model, should be reviewed in the light of all available evidence which demonstrates that firewood collection is practised much more by the poorer and more vulnerable segments of the camps’ population, who do not have access to funds to purchase firewood, many of whom also collect firewood for sale as they lack alternative income sources. If the project is to succeed as a rape prevention measure, a better balance of resources currently put towards wood-for-work opportunities (with work more broadly defined) and special distributions to vulnerable persons must be found.  

Cost-effectiveness of the firewood project

21. The evaluation has demonstrated that the firewood project is very costly relative to the proportion of firewood consumption actually being supplied (about 11% of household firewood consumption since July 1998) and also relative to the cost of meeting other basic refugee needs. Sixty-eight percent of rapes continue to be perpetrated while women are collecting firewood, despite the existence of the firewood project. The main cost factor for UNHCR is the procurement and supply side. Any effort on the part of UNHCR to supply firewood will involve very high overheads, and a purchasing price considerably higher than the market value.

Future directions for the firewood project

22. Given the high cost of an agency-run firewood supply program, the possibility of assisting more women to buy wood on the market while allowing market forces to take care of increasing the supply has been insufficiently considered. The provision of wood purchase tokens to vulnerable women and wider application of small-scale income generation opportunities for women who currently have no choice but to collect firewood for sale, both go in this direction.

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7 The project has been too quick to accept the notion that more vulnerable groups cannot be identified, or that refugees will refuse to cooperate with such a process. As discussed elsewhere in this report, CARE has already had considerable success in encouraging refugees themselves to identify vulnerable households for special firewood distributions, income-generating activities and other resources. A review of the approach and results of CARE’s Community Services to refugee self-identification of vulnerable households and groups should help to define lessons that can be applied in other refugee settings.

8 Assuming household consumption levels as found by Matthew Owen, 1998, of one and a half kilograms per person per day.
23. Broader wood-for-work opportunities for women who do not collect for sale but cannot meet all their firewood needs through purchasing it, would further reduce firewood collection trips by women and girls. The thrust of these strategies would be to support the expansion of a commercial wood collection system which already exists and which is mainly carried out by men who are able to travel relatively safely through the bush in search of firewood. Non-refugee donkey-cart collectors could be encouraged to increase their participation in this firewood trade. 

24. We would therefore recommend a medium term solution that foresees a phasing-out of firewood procurement on the part of UNHCR, with, in the short term, a procurement activity that provides wood mainly to supply a much-expanded wood-for-work program. UNHCR should immediately begin to phase out the “life-line” distribution model, in favour of the wood-for-work and wood-to-vulnerable households strategy. In the long term such a phasing out will free up financial resources to implement a broad-based strategy focused on reducing rape and sexual violence no matter where it is perpetrated.

25. Considerably more thought, energy, resources, and co-operation would have to be put into creating such work. An expanded wood-for-work program would require a broader definition of work beyond just environmental activities, to include, for instance, the field of camp security, housing and sanitation, education for girls, skills training for women, and activities which support community-initiated anti-violence strategies.

26. While GTZ has the knowledge and experience to manage the firewood procurement, it is CARE that is best placed to set up a camp-wide job-creation program that could create sufficient work, not only in the environmental field. It is also CARE’s community services that has the links with the refugee community leaders and committees that are already actively identifying the most vulnerable households, and working to reduce their level of risk. Therefore discussions should be opened with CARE into the possibility of it undertaking the distribution side of the firewood project in the future.

UNHCR co-ordination of sexual and gender-based violence initiatives

27. It is ironic that the timing of bringing in the firewood project corresponded with that of cutting the UNHCR community services staff position. This post is the logical one to ensure that adequate supervision, planning, co-ordination and monitoring takes place toward meeting the project’s primary objective. This has been impossible to achieve without one or more community services personnel on staff knowledgeable about the field of SGV, and experienced in working with the Somali community and in community mobilisation.

28. For the security and community-based strategies discussed in greater detail in the body of the report to be effective, the post of community services should be reinstated with an incumbent working with a management committee of implementing partners in the area of security and SGV, to identify opportunities for a co-ordinated use of firewood and other resources.
Need for strategies addressing rape in broader context

29. While the project has reduced the incidence of rape during periods when households are fully stocked with firewood, we see a concomitant increase in non-firewood related rape during the same period. This implies a strategy that focuses on the broader context of rape, violence, and insecurity of women and girls, rather than simply addressing one location and opportunity for rape. It implies particularly, a focus on increased security within and around the camps as well as on the identification and bringing to justice of perpetrators of rape. Such a focus requires greater efforts and resources be directed at increasing community awareness and responsibility for the security of women and girls. Savings from a reduction in firewood procurement should be channelled to these activities.

30. The success of community-based strategies are contingent on raising the effectiveness of policing through a variety of measures designed to improve morale, motivation, training, investigative capacity, and addressing the issue of police inaction and corruption. The material means for more frequent and effective patrols are also required.

31. In addition to current and on-going efforts by Sub-Office to provide training and material support to the police and the mobile court, UNHCR should assist the GOK in identifying projects and potential international donors who support initiatives in the administration of justice and policing.

Need for longer term approaches

32. No long-term and sustainable solution to the problems of rape and other forms of violence in the area will be possible without a serious challenge to the cultural characteristics and practices that perpetuate them. UNHCR staff, in various documents and discussions, shy away from this problem giving priority to ‘technical fixes’ and dismissing social/cultural change as impracticable because it is a ‘long-term’ solution. While this mentality is understandable within an organisation whose strength lies in its ability to respond to short-term emergencies and mass mobilisations generated by war, in a long-term refugee situation such as that of Dadaab, UNHCR cannot afford to not be engaged in a more fundamental process of social change. The firewood distribution has been justified as a technical fix, but cannot be really effective without committed work by and within the refugee community to change its behaviours in the face of the elevated risks to its most vulnerable members.

33. One of the more positive features of the Firewood Project noted in this evaluation has been the economic benefit to local entrepreneurs and refugee workers of firewood supply, in an area where few economic opportunities of any kind exist. Ultimately, to profoundly and sustainably improve security for refugees and local Kenyans in Dadaab is to work to increase their stake and investment in the rule of law and a development process that provides viable alternatives to violence and banditry. UNHCR should facilitate and assist the GOK in building relationships with other donors and agencies with the resources and experience to support development in the area.

34. More firewood contracts and firewood provision to refugees is a growing demand from the local Kenyan population, but this should be seen as, at best, a
short-term and inadequate answer to the real need for investment, infrastructure, education and training, and long-term income generating opportunities for the area. Presently the most obvious economic opportunity for local leaders to exploit, firewood provision is no more sustainable economically than it is environmentally necessary. When the refugee camps no longer exist, the firewood market will disappear. It seems relevant for UNHCR to assist the local community and the Government to develop a longer-term strategy to create economic opportunities for the area, rather than basing the bulk of their financial impact on this one intervention.

On-going need to address rape and other forms of violence in Dadaab

35. While this evaluation has been critical of the current design and implementation of the Firewood project in Dadaab, the primary objective it was intended to address - that of the rape of women and girls - continues to be a pressing concern and problem to be addressed by UNHCR, its implementing partners, the GOK and the local and refugee communities. Given the limited resources available to UNHCR, it is a primary concern of this evaluation that it not be used as a justification simply for making ‘cuts’ to the current programming budget for Dadaab. Rather, these resources should be used to maximise the benefits related to prevention of rape and the protection of refugee women and girls. After a necessary review of the present form, design and management of the project, the resources currently allocated to the firewood project should be retained as a basis for improved and better co-ordinated programming directed at rape prevention and reduction. The following paragraph provides a partial list of other conclusions/recommendations found in report.

36. **Special donor funding:** Donor pressure to accept the funds, to then spend them over a one-year period, and also to “mainstream” the firewood supply and distribution initiative had undue influence over project implementation. UNHCR should use documentation of such cases and their outcomes in future negotiations with donors. Among the likely consequences, are violation of UNHCR’s own technical guidelines, distortion of the overall refugee support budget, and commitments and involvements from which it becomes exceedingly difficult to withdraw.

37. **UNHCR’s capacity to implement safer, community-based collection practices:** While proposals for a number of strategies to increase the security of women during firewood collection have been made, little written or anecdotal information is available to judge if and how these proposals were ever implemented. UNHCR Sub-Office staff indicate that preliminary efforts have been made in this direction, but have met with resistance from refugees. These strategies include a greater involvement of the camps’ male population in the firewood collection process, as well as the creation of ‘safe corridors’ where women, accompanied either by the police or male community members, can carry out firewood collection with some measure of protection. The evaluation team was unable to find any evidence that proposals to make firewood collection safer had ever been implemented; most appear to have met with resistance from the refugee population on the basis of arguments about Somali cultural practices. UNHCR should seek to discover how to strengthen its capacity to negotiate and achieve compromise and co-operation from the refugee population and its spokespersons.
38. **Comparative monitoring**: In general, a comparative approach to monitoring the results of the firewood versus other options has not been taken, and is an essential element in a rational utilisation of UNHCR’s resources for protecting refugees. The firewood initiative targets uniquely the security of wood collectors. It does not address all rape, nor does it contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in and around the Dadaab camps. In this sense, future monitoring of the Firewood Distribution, and the security-related activities of Sub-office as a whole, should include the gathering of information on and an assessment of the impacts of other security-related initiatives on both rape and overall security incidents.

39. **Improved police procedures and performance in the investigation of rape reports**: 36% of survivors on whom we have information say that they could identify the perpetrator if they saw him again – and an additional 18% give detailed descriptions and might possibly be able to identify their rapist. This goes directly to the pertinence of strategies focused on strengthening the technical ability and motivation of police to take women’s reports seriously, paying attention to their detailed descriptions of the assailants, correlating that with place and time of incidents and following up with investigations that would help identify and bring perpetrators to justice. Capacity building activities to improve police procedures and performance in these areas are clearly required.

40. Recent reporting indicates several general areas that should be part of an overall strategy to intensify police and Anti-banditry Unit patrols, as well as safer refugee-based firewood collection measures. The Ifo-Dagahaley and Ifo-Dadaab and Hagadera-Dadaab road areas are known to be particularly dangerous. The most dangerous areas appear to be the immediate perimeters of the camps, and certain rapists known to the community are said to hang-out in particular locations. Repeat offenders, as per women’s descriptions, appear to be a good place to start in piecing together the evidence—descriptions of events, and descriptions of the physical characteristics of the perpetrators—with which to identify rape perpetrators and remove them from circulation.

41. **Improving the status of policing in the Dadaab area**: Efforts on the part of UNHCR, through Branch Office for example, should also be directed at higher levels of the GOK to improve the status and effectiveness of policing in the area, as this will have a meaningful and sustainable benefit to the people of Kenya, long after the refugee camps are gone. As possibilities improve for a return of Somali refugees Somalia over the next few years, it appears essential for UNHCR to assist the GOK to develop a strong strategy to improve the status and effectiveness of policing in Dadaab. The GOK should be encouraged to seriously consider the fate of this historically insecure area once the refugees and UNHCR are no longer present to blame for the violence and lawlessness in Dadaab.

42. The possibility of repatriation of Somali refugees should alert UNHCR and the GOK to the brief window of opportunity that presently exists to seriously address the administration of policing and justice in the area, and to identify projects that can be funded by bilateral and multilateral donors to improve the quality of policing and address the problems of accountability, corruption and low motivation among police staff. The GOK itself should be encouraged to put in place a positive, rather than a negative incentive structure for policing in the Northeastern Province,
by increasing recognition, rewards and promotion opportunities to those officers who perform well under the difficult conditions offered in Dadaab.

43. **Involvement of the Anti-Banditry Unit (ABU):** According to the sub-office security officer, one of the factors affecting the rape rate most dramatically is a strong and well-supervised presence of the anti-banditry unit, a specially trained force able to patrol and pursue bandits under difficult bush conditions. With approximately 15 ABU officers presently stationed in Dadaab, UNHCR should actively undertake to monitor the frequency of their patrols around the camps and the relationship of these to the overall security situation.

44. **The mobile court and UNHCR’s role in ensuring the administration of justice:** The mobile court appears to have been a successful intervention on the part of UNHCR to bring the administration of justice closer to the refugee and local communities. This intervention is cost-effective, as it saves time and travel costs of both refugees and agencies’ staff (such as MSF doctors) who are called on to testify in court, as well as staff who attend to monitor and support the judicial process. According to some agencies’ staff, the mobile court has not sat as often as it should due to struggles over the conditions and incentives offered to magistrates from Garissa; and undue hardship and duress on both refugee women and MSF medical staff required to travel to Garissa to testify.

45. **Co-ordination of community-based prevention and response:** CARE has provided exemplary leadership in the struggle to combat rape and other forms of SGV in the Dadaab camps. Through its efforts to advocate on behalf of the rights of vulnerable women and children and to pursue justice on their behalf, it has gained the trust of many in the refugee community. Along with NCCK, it has created a network of community-based counsellors and facilitators to help address the social, psychological and economic difficulties of rape survivors. This relationship of trust has probably led to an increase in reporting of rape and defilement on the part of refugees, who now state that ‘someone is listening’ to them; it has also led to greater awareness within the refugee community about the consequences of rape in an effort to reduce the stigmatisation and ostracism of rape survivors.

46. The evaluators feel that CARE, through its role in implementing the Ted Turner SGV project, has made cautious progress, on a small scale, towards refugee self-identification of vulnerable households, and that additional means and strategies should be employed to build on this experience and enhance this process.

47. **Network of Refugee Community Development Workers (CDWs) and Anti-rape Committees (ARCs):** Through its network of refugee Community Development Workers (CDWs) and Anti-rape Committees (ARCs), CARE has been effectively targeting the most vulnerable women (including the disabled, female-headed households, the elderly, widows, rape survivors) and children for special assistance and support. Provided that CARE has the capacity to increase these micro-credit activities to vulnerable women, more resources, in the form of staffing and loan funds, could be directed towards this program, given its potential for providing the poorest women with the choice of purchasing their firewood. However, careful monitoring should be done to understand the nature of the choices households make regarding incomes generated, and whether or not firewood collection is effectively reduced through this process.
48. Through this network, WFP food sacks are also distributed to vulnerable women and girls, to provide an additional source of income and to encourage girls’ school attendance. The resources available to the Firewood Distribution project could be effectively tied to the protection of girls, through providing households with a valuable resource (firewood) in exchange for their daughters’ labour so as to permit them to attend school, particularly at the secondary level of education where the gender imbalance in school attendance is most marked.

49. The role of community self-management committees: The community itself also plays a role in harbouring perpetrators of rape, in feeding and sheltering them, in protecting their identities, and in perpetuating traditional forms of justice (such as maslaha, or payment for crimes committed) that may be discriminatory towards women and children and serve to perpetuate widespread impunity of criminals and aggressors. Along with the impunity ensured by the ineffectiveness of policing in the area, impunity also appears to be ensured by the refugee and local Somali communities themselves.

50. Involvement of the refugee community: UNHCR attention should be directed at increasing refugee men’s involvement in the protection of women and girls. Such a focus has broad implications for life of the Somali refugee community. Resources from the Firewood Distribution could be usefully spent in strengthening social and community-based work to identify appropriate responses to violence from within both the refugee and local Somali communities.

51. Community level responsibilities: The mandates of the CSMs, particularly the camp security committees and the anti-rape committees should be clarified and, if necessary, expanded to include the challenging task of stimulating dialogue and awareness-raising within the community about the underlying causes of rape, the mobilising of men and youths from the community around rape prevention and putting in place safer firewood collection practices. Given the extreme importance of their role as potential agents of social change within the camps, some resources should be made available to the CSMs to use in their work, provided that they are able to propose and implement a specific program of community activities around improved security and rape reduction.

52. Strengthening the capacity of Community Development Workers: UNHCR should put specific resources towards furthering the training of refugee Community Development Workers, many of whom would benefit from formal social work training. UNHCR should consider a joint project with the University of Nairobi’s Department of Social Work, to develop a special program in Community Solutions to Violence, through which talented young Somali refugees could be trained and engaged within the camps to mobilise the various segments of the community around the issue of rape, SGV and security in general. These specially trained youth could also play a role in motivating and supporting the efforts of the CSM committees in organising safer firewood collection opportunities.

53. Initiating dialogue around SGV with the local non-refugee community: Based on the experience of CARE, NCCK, FIDA-Kenya and UNHCR in the area of combating SGV, a forum should be created for stimulating discussion between the refugee and local communities around the problem of rape, SGV and other forms of violence. As rape and other forms of SGV are problems facing both groups, collaboration on
common problems should be promoted to replace the present conflictive rhetoric generated by the ongoing linkage of firewood resources with the problem of rape.

54. **UNHCR staffing and management of rape and SGV issues:** Overall, for staffing reasons, UNHCR is unable to effectively fulfil its role as lead agency in the area of refugee community services. This imbalance may have led to a significant focus on legal ‘remedies’ to rape, with inadequate human and programming resources in place to address possible preventive strategies.

55. **Supporting the role of the GOK:** UNHCR should be engaged in strategic work at the political level to improve the effectiveness of policing and to hold GOK to its obligations under international conventions. It should also assist the GOK in identifying a range of development activities to help to address the widespread poverty and pressing need for infrastructure and economic investment in the area.
Introduction and background

56. The Dadaab Firewood Project, also called The Energy Management and Environmental Rehabilitation Project, is a project to distribute firewood to refugees in camps near Dadaab, in Northeastern Province of Kenya. It was initiated by the United States Government who provided 1.5 million dollars to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in late 1997 in response to the high risk of rape and sexual assault experienced by refugee women and girls when collecting firewood in the bush. This independent evaluation of the Dadaab Firewood Distribution Project was commissioned by the UNHCR in August 2000. The independent evaluation was carried from September to December 2000.

Overview

57. Africa is one of the main refugee generating and hosting continents in the world. A succession of armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region have resulted in the flight of millions of people in search of safety, with some of these ending up in refugee camps in the north of Kenya. There are currently four refugee camps in Kenya, one in the Northwest at Kakuma, and three in the Northeast near Dadaab, about 75 kilometres from the Somali border. About 97% of the approximately 120,000 refugees reportedly in the Dadaab camps are of Somali origin. The remainder is mainly made up of Ugandans, Sudanese, and Ethiopian refugees. A signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, Kenya is committed to protecting the rights and safety of refugees who have sought asylum within its borders. The international community, with UNHCR as lead organisation, is committed to provide assistance and support to Kenya in this endeavour.

58. The three camps near Dadaab are between five and ten kilometres apart, and were each set up in the early 1990s. Ifo camp was established in 1991, and Dagahaley and Hagadera in 1992.

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9 Following the practice in the Dadaab, throughout the report we variously refer to the project being evaluated in shorthand fashion as the firewood supply project, or the firewood distribution project, rather than using the official title.
10 Conflicts in the Horn area have included the war between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of the Ogaden region in 1977-1978, and the more recent civil war in Somalia in the late eighties and into the present, which has generated the majority of the Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps. Other armed conflicts in the region include the struggle for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia, which began in the 1950s and was achieved in 1993, and the conflict between government and rebel forces in southern Sudan. In the Great Lakes region political and ethnic conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have generated millions of refugees over the past four decades, a few of whom have also ended up in Kenyan camps.
11 The official population in the camps has varied since late 1997 from a low of about 107,000 to about 128,000 because of resettlement and repatriation, new influxes, and following revalidation exercises.
Dadaab region and camps

59. Most of the area in the Northeast, and around the camps, is dense bushland, or rangelands, with sandy soils, low and unreliable rainfall, typically dominated by shrubs and small trees of Acacia and Commiphora species. The camps were created in an area with a very low settled population, inhabited by Somali nomadic pastoralists who traditionally moved with their herds between this area and neighbouring parts of Somalia. The local inhabitants are members of Ogaden sub-clans, the same sub-clans that are dominant within refugee camps. Since independence, the area has experienced a long history of insecurity and banditry, as well as a brief period of direct conflict with Somalia in the 1960s. Due to the conflict and violence in the region, it was under a state of emergency rule from the mid-1960s until 1991.

60. Three consecutive years of poor rains and drought have seriously affected many of the pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of Kenya, Somalia and in the surrounding countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. According to the UNHCR’s latest mid-year progress report, “Prolonged food shortages resulted in an increase in internal and cross-border movements as people moved with their animals in a desperate search for food, water and better grazing land. Many drought victims turned to the refugee camps for assistance.”

The camps and their administration

61. The three camps are similar in size, with Dagahaley being slightly smaller than the other two. They are set up in sections and blocks, with food and some basic supplies provided through the World Food Program (WFP), and other services provided through UNHCR implementing partners (IPs), mainly CARE International in Kenya, Medecins-Sans-Frontieres - Belgium (MSF-B), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), and the consulting and logistical wing of the Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), with the latter acting as the main implementing agency for the firewood supply project. The camps are provided with water and sanitary services, basic housing, education and medical care, as well as a range of other programs and services, with security/policing provided by the Government of Kenya. As a security measure, UNHCR has made efforts to enclose the blocks with live thorn-bush fencing. There is considerable movement of refugees and local people among the camps, and between the camps and the nearby administrative centre of Dadaab. There are marketplaces located within the perimeters of the camps where almost any commodity (from fresh milk and all foodstuffs, to fashionable shoes and clothing, radios, watches, firewood, etc.) can be obtained in exchange for Kenyan shillings.

The firewood distribution project

62. Initiated in mid-1997 following the visit of an official United States Government delegation to the camps in Dadaab, 1.5 million dollars was allocated to UNHCR by the United States. These funds were intended to provide firewood to refugee families to reduce the exposure of women and girls to the risk of rape and sexual violence while collecting firewood in the bush areas within about six kilometers of the camps. According to an internal communication at the time, from

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12 Referred to throughout the report just as CARE.
the office of Margaret McKelvey, the funds were provided to the Environmental Trust Fund, also in part “as a visible gesture to help save the Kenyan environment (which) could be useful in countering the Kenyan’s refugee weariness and indeed threats to expel all of the refugees by the end of this month.”

63. It was intended by the American funders that all the refugees be provided firewood, and there be an immediate impact on a serious problem, allowing a year to develop additional or alternative approaches to the problem. Criticisms of the Americans’ approach were raised. As stated succinctly by Matthew Owen, who participated in a design workshop for the project, and eventually conducted a baseline data study in December 1998,

the premise that bulk supply of firewood would address the rape problem, while at the same time benefitting the environment was questioned. Environmentalists feared that distribution could lead to over-consumption of wood and increase rates of tree cutting. Community services representatives questioned the assumption that firewood gathering was the cause of female insecurity and pointed out that the problem was related to rivalries and conflicts between clans and families and would not diminish with wood supply.

Project objectives and implementation

64. By mid-1998 the project as defined in UNHCR official documents in fact included two main objectives that vary from one document and progress report to another. However, one objective concerns reducing refugee exposure to attack and rape, and the other that of reducing environmental degradation.

- Reduce firewood-related exposure to banditry attacks and rape of refugees, especially women and children;

- Reduce firewood-related environmental degradation in the camp regions.

65. No wood was distributed to the refugees until July 1998, as discussions occurred over project design issues, as negotiations with potential implementing agencies dragged on, and as extreme El Nino rains caused flooding and widespread destruction of roads and buildings in the local area. After the initial funding from the United States Government was said to be exhausted in mid-1999, the provision of firewood has been included in the regular UNHCR budget for the Dadaab camps, at the level of 1.1 million dollars in 2000. According to GTZ and UNHCR sources, this supplies about 30% of the refugees’ need for or consumption of firewood, distributed in the form of a general ration to all households.

Evaluation objectives and methodology

66. The evaluation was initiated by the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) at UNHCR in Geneva, and is managed by a steering committee drawn from

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13 Communication from office of Margaret McKelvey to Yuji Kimua, UNHCR Senior Environmental Coordinator, September 21, 1997
a variety of backgrounds and responsibilities within the agency. It is being carried out by CASA Consulting, a Montreal-based consulting co-operative specialising in community development related research, from September 2000 to April 2001. The evaluation terms of reference, as provided by EPAU are:

- Assess the impact of the firewood project in addressing the problem of sexual violence in the Dadaab area;
- Assess the environmental and economic consequences of the project, as well as its impact on social relations between and within the refugee and local populations;
- Assess the cost effectiveness and sustainability of the project;
- Identify and examine the relative merits of alternative strategies in addressing the problem of sexual violence in the Dadaab area;
- Make recommendations concerning the future of the firewood project in the Dadaab area;
- Make recommendations concerning the establishment and design of firewood distribution projects in other locations where refugee women are at risk of sexual violence.

Document review and development of work program

67. A large number of documents were obtained for the purposes of this evaluation, and reviewed. A principal list of such documents is here included as Appendix A.

Interviews, consultations and field visits\textsuperscript{15}

68. An initial visit to Geneva, to speak with key UNHCR spokespersons and the United States Mission to the United Nations helped to define a work program, based on the initial terms of reference and the interests and issues emphasised by interviewees, or otherwise identified as important by the CASA team.

69. The main research methodology was to include field visits to Geneva, Nairobi, Dadaab, and Washington, and interviews during these visits with all relevant spokespersons for UNHCR, the Kenya Government, the refugees, UNHCR implementing agencies, and the United States Government. Travel to Washington was cancelled at the discretion of US Government spokespersons and officials of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) in Washington.

70. In Nairobi, the project team spoke with key UNHCR personnel in the Branch Office and the Regional Service Centre, and with UNEP, and the Department of Forestry in Nairobi, as well as with UNHCR environmental consultants and a number of NGO representatives and Kenyan academics. In Dadaab, we consulted with UNHCR Sub-office staff, WFP spokespersons, and interviewed implementing agency staff from GTZ, CARE, MSF, and NCCK. (See Appendix B for a list of persons interviewed). The senior protection officer in Dadaab was away during our presence

\textsuperscript{15} For a principal list of persons interviewed, see Appendix B.
there. As part of these interviews, we collected backup documentation whenever possible.

71. In each refugee camp the team met with members of anti-rape committees, block and section heads, community elders, women’s affairs committees, security committees, religious leaders, community development workers, resource utilisation monitors, and others. We made a trip to the bush to visit a local community and wood harvest site, attended a negotiation meeting between GTZ/UNHCR and potential wood harvest and trucking contractors from the surrounding communities. We also toured the GTZ stove production unit and GTZ nursery.

72. In Dadaab town we spoke with the District Officer, with police officers and the acting Chief of Police (OCS), and other members of the surrounding communities. Groups of donkey cart owners were consulted, as were members of the Environmental Working Group and a group of “reformed” bandits.

Analysis

73. The research team members gathered extensive documentation in each of the sites visited, and has reviewed and incorporated relevant material from these documents in this report.

74. In Dadaab, the CASA team compiled copies of narrative descriptions from rape reports dating back to January 1998, with a view to carrying out a systematic analysis of the circumstances and characteristics of the rapes within and around the refugee camps, and whether and how these changed under the Project. In total, 291 reports of sexual and gender-based violence were reviewed, coded and analysed. This process generated a wealth of information, far more than could be meaningfully discussed in this brief report; this database represents a useful instrument for UNHCR in Dadaab in their on-going efforts to monitor sexual and gender-based violence in and around the camps.

75. Agencies’ staff were interviewed in relation to general security, social and economic issues, as well as the incidence of rape and issues around rape reporting. A wide range of organisational, management and coordination issues were discussed regarding the relationship of the Project and its objectives to other activities with shared objectives being carried out in Dadaab. An overall analysis was undertaken as to the human resources and management capacity within the implementing agency and UNHCR to manage and monitor the Project. Refugee community-based women’s affairs committees, anti-rape committees, and other groups who regularly counsel and work with rape victims were also interviewed in an effort to identify the potential of community actors to play a greater role in rape prevention.

76. Following a household survey carried out in 1996 by Nancy Chege related to firewood collection and consumption in the Dadaab camps, the evaluators carried out a similar survey to allow us to compare the present situation to that of 1996 prior to the firewood project, and to understand some of the impacts at the household level of the firewood distribution.

77. The incidence of rape and violence in the area has fluctuated greatly over the years and months, rather than showing a uni-directional trend. We have collected
the information to allow an analysis relating changes in the occurrence of rape over time to:

- The specific timing of wood distributions since 1998;
- The periods when the camps are likely to be well supplied with firewood;
- The periods when significant numbers of men (local and refugee) are gainfully employed harvesting, bundling, or loading firewood on GTZ contract;
- The periods when there were extra or unusual police patrols around the camps, or other special security measures (e.g. for a revalidation process);
- Other regularly occurring or special events mentioned which could reasonably be expected to affect the incidence of rape and violence around the camps.

78. A range of other social and economic analyses have been conducted and incorporated in this report, based on the many reports, statistics, and notes compiled during fieldwork in Nairobi and Dadaab. A range of other programs and activities ongoing in Dadaab have also been reviewed and reported on. These analyses have been central to our drawing conclusions about the impacts of the firewood project, and achievement of its objectives.

Note on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of information

79. We have done our best to crosscheck and verify information wherever possible, and apologise in advance for any errors that invariably creep into a report of this kind, based on a large set of documentation (much of which also contains errors), and on interviews with persons who may not be altogether well-informed or fully able to reconstruct events of several years ago regarding the project. It should also be added that representatives from the refugee community have a healthy scepticism of outsiders and international personnel who come asking pointed questions (often of a culturally or personally sensitive nature). Answers provided by some local and refugee respondents were often contradicted in later parts of the same interview. Answers often seemed to be tailored to what was perceived as likely to be of personal benefit, in being singled out for resettlement or the like. We have done our best to be equally sceptical, while at the same time endeavouring to determine the veracity of the information provided.

The context of violence and insecurity in the Dadaab area

80. It is difficult to understand the context and issues surrounding rape and gender-based violence around the Dadaab refugee camps, or the value of potential solutions such as the firewood supply project, without a wider understanding of the generalised context of insecurity and violence in the camps and the surrounding area. A number of good analytic papers have discussed the reasons and conditions of this violence, including Crisp (1999), Fitzgerald (1998), Orono (1999), Oigo, (2000), as well as investigations carried out by human rights organizations from Africa and abroad. In addition, our own field research helped to clarify the range of factors that combine to make the security problems of the area difficult to fully address.
81. As is clear from many analyses and reports dealing with the history of conflict in the Dadaab, the broader context of violence and insecurity in the area has its roots in a history of political struggle and social and economic neglect by the Government of Kenya (GOK). According to the 1993 African Rights report, repression by the Kenyan government of Kenyan Somalis’ political aspirations to be part of a greater Somali nation-state at the time of independence from British rule, and its labelling of them as ‘bandits’ created something of a self-fulfilling prophecy:

82. “One of the main consequences of the 1963 war (and the repression of its second major flare-up in 1967) was the confiscation of most of the Kenyan Somali livestock. Draconian counter-insurgency restrictions on commerce and nomadic movement further undermined the viability of the pastoral economy. Only a minority of herders could continue their former way of life. Rapidly, an under-class developed of destitute former herders, encamped around the towns of the northeast, dependent on unreliable farms and the scarce employment opportunities. The most enterprising fled to Somalia. For many of those who remained, banditry became an attractive option.” (Africa Rights, 1993, p. 9)

83. The counter-insurgency measures that followed the short-lived secessionist struggle in Northeastern Province were extremely severe and saw many abuses by GOK police and security forces (African Rights, 1993). Unfortunately, these measures did nothing towards eliminating banditry as a way of life in the area, but most probably contributed greatly to resentment and anger on the part of Kenyan Somalis towards the GOK, and encouraged a tendency of local people to resist and combat the ‘intrusion’ of Kenyan governance and security institutions. It is into this context of local conflict that a large influx of Somali refugees arrived in the early 1990s, setting the scene for many of the problems to be encountered by refugees in general, and refugee women and children in particular.

84. The social cohesion and the effective exercise of state authority typical of peaceful communities are largely absent in Dadaab, as it is Somalia and most of northern Kenya. Conflict over resources between a number of local Ogadeni clans was a feature of the area prior to the arrival of the refugees in the 1990s. The potential for violent conflict was increased upon the arrival of members of a great number of other clans and sub-clans, who brought to the area and the refugee camps a history of clan rivalries from Somalia. This evaluation found over 40 different Somali sub-clans within the camps, many of which are in positions of extreme minority in relation to both the dominant camp and local population.

85. Poverty, both of the refugee and local population, has been cited by many commentators and individuals interviewed as the main cause of insecurity affecting the refugee population. Within the surrounding area, loss of livestock due to several years of flooding followed by drought has meant the decline of the traditional economic base of the area, without alternative investments and development programs being initiated. In general, the area is characterised by social and economic neglect by the state, leading perhaps to a locally perceived lack of legitimacy of the government and its institutions. This in turn encourages illegal economic alternatives and ‘banditry’, usually arms trafficking and smuggling, based in part on proximity to the open border with Somalia. In general, people in the area have insufficient
economic interest in the rule of law and heightened security, explaining in part why insecurity and lawlessness are tolerated by the local people.

86. The presence of refugees is both an economic asset to the local Somali community, as well as a source of competition for scarce resources. However, of the two, the resources provided by the presence of UNHCR and its implementing partners to the area—in terms of employment and commercial opportunities, healthcare, services, the digging and maintenance of boreholes among other things—largely outweigh the costs to the local population. However, given the generalised poverty of the area, local Kenyans may continue to feel that they are worse off than the refugees, whose basic needs for food and shelter are provided by UNHCR and WFP.

87. Among the refugees, many of whom have been in these camps for close to a decade, inadequate income generating opportunities exist to supplement the basic provisions of food and shelter provided them. With GOK restrictions on refugee employment, women and girls continue to collect firewood for home consumption and for sale, as it is one of the few avenues open to them to meet their requirements for a basic income.

Kenyan policy and attitudes to refugees

88. The high level of insecurity and violence in the Dadaab refugee situation is related to the host country policy and attitudes to the refugees, the location of the camps, and the lack of opportunity and options for the refugees. While a signatory to UN and OAU conventions on the rights of refugees, the Kenyan government has frequently blamed the refugees for the social and security problems of Kenya, threatening on occasion to close the camps and send the refugees back to their countries of origin. Kenya lacks national refugee legislation on refugees and authorities appear determined to resist the national integration of refugees, particularly Somali refugees. The large size and location of these camps in remote areas close to the refugees’ country of origin are in direct contradiction to all UNHCR guidelines designed to address the protection and security of refugees, which consistently recommend smaller camps, far from banditry zones and from the borders with the refugees countries of origin.

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16 As a result of the close proximity of the camps to the Somali border, small arms and automatic weapons that are widely available in Somalia flood in, as do some militia groups from Somalia, who occasionally take up residence in and around the camps. As well, tensions and clan conflicts spill over from across the border. Crisp quotes from reports in Hagadera camp where “three Auliyahan bandits were planning to attack the Abduwak clan in revenge for a recent fight in Somalia, around Kismayu. The bandits are reported to be mixed, locals and refugees together. If two clans fight in Somalia or elsewhere in Kenya, tension will build up between members of the same clans in the refugee camps.” (Crisp, 1999, p. 24)

17 UNHCR’s Emergency Handbook and Environmental Guidelines both recommend smaller size camps be established (less than 20,000) to minimize the impacts of the refugees on the surrounding environment and on the local populations, and because these people tend to come from rural origins. Larger camps are more prone to social unrest, and are simultaneously more difficult to fence, and to police. In Dadaab where the three camps are scattered across an area of 50 square kilometres, refugees are subject to rape and armed robbery as they have to cover substantial distances on foot, whether to collect firewood or to visit friends and markets.
Somali culture and attitudes

89. Both Kenyan and refugee Somalis are in a rapid process of change and adaptation, as are other nomadic pastoral peoples of Kenya, whose traditional practices, such as cattle rustling, may come into conflict with the formal legal system. Residents of the camps have a tendency to feel they are above, or outside, the law, due to their refugee status. Through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of Somali culture, bandits and other wrongdoers tend to be protected by other members of the same clan or community. With the notion of *mashlaha*, or blood money, individuals are allowed to buy exemption from criminal acts. Criminals and their clansmen often use violence to intimidate potential witnesses, making refugees very reluctant to report a crime.

90. Somali women who are survivors of rape and other forms of gender-based violence are often doubly and triply victimised by their ordeal. In addition to the personal trauma and violation they experience, they are frequently blamed, stigmatised and ostracised by community members. Traditional justice mechanisms impose low punitive costs and sanctions, and may even involve the forced marriage of young women to their rapist, since, as a rape survivor she may be considered as ‘unmarriageable’. Exacting of revenge is also an aspect of Somali culture, so cases where conflicts cannot be resolved through traditional justice mechanisms may escalate into full-scale and on-going violent conflict between members of the families and sub-clans involved.

91. Despite our efforts, it has been extremely difficult to get an accurate sense of the prevalence of rape traditionally among Somalis, either in Kenya or in Somalia, or of the extent of rape among local women and girls who are not registered as refugees. As a good number of Kenyan Somalis are known to be living within the camps, where food, schooling and medical services are provided free of charge to those registered as refugees, these women may share the risks of the refugee population. Refugee and local women interviewed suggest that there are between one and three cases a month of rape of local non-refugee women and girls. The non-refugee population being very small – totalling perhaps 10,000 – we can guess that non-refugee women in Dadaab may be suffering a similar level of rape as the refugees. Somali elders interviewed felt that traditionally, rape was not a major problem in Somali culture, mentioning that in Somalia, under the *Shariat* or Islamic law, punishment for rape is very severe and acts as an effective deterrent, unlike Dadaab, where rapists have been allowed to go unpunished.

92. In general, it has posed a difficulty for this evaluation that, to our knowledge, no detailed studies of rape among Somali populations outside the refugee context have yet been carried out, which might provide a comparative basis for understanding the situation faced by Somali refugees in Dadaab.

Police and courts

93. The Northeast of Kenya is an area where the rule of law is weak, and perpetrators of violence are seldom held accountable for their actions. Persons interviewed in the context of the evaluation stated that suspects arrested and handed over to the police are normally released back to the camp the same day. Many people suggest that bandits outnumber and win in most skirmishes with the police; and that
The police are often afraid to leave their bases to carry out routine patrols or investigate security incidents.

94. The morale of the police is very low, as they are frequently sent to Dadaab as punishment for transgressions committed elsewhere in the country. Police vehicles are often misused and unavailable when an alarm is sounded, and there are allegations that policemen themselves have been involved in violence and abuse against refugees. The police appear to have little investigative capability, and investigations rarely lead to arrests and convictions. Suspects who are captured appear to easily buy their release. The ineffectiveness of the police has resulted in encouraging the bandits and in refugee reluctance to report incidents.

The prevalence of firearms

95. The sheer number of armed individuals in the Dadaab area and the ease of access to firearms, often bought across the nearby border with Somalia, are key contributing factors to the vulnerability of refugees within and outside the camps. The presence of firearms among refugees and the local population affects the willingness of the police to risk their lives and to play an active role in defending and protecting the population. It creates a heightened climate of fear for both women and men, and is often cited as a reason for Somali men not to participate more actively in security patrols or firewood collection activities. The prevalence of firearms also conditions the reactions of women, who even in large groups, rarely act in each other’s defence. This factor has also affected the ability of agencies’ staff to execute their functions in an effective and efficient manner, as all visits to the camp are accompanied by armed police escort, and a strict curfew is enforced. The mobility of agencies’ staff, their accessibility and visibility to refugees, and even to some extent their motivation to be out and about among the refugees have, to a significant extent, been undermined by the heightened risks presented by the prevalence of firearms in the area.

Extreme psychological stress and tensions of life in the camps

96. The refugees are, in general, the victims of protracted and brutal conflicts in their country of origin, conflicts in which the civilian populations have been systematically targeted—“people brought up without justice, and under the rule of the gun.” (Crisp, p. 15). Insecurity within and outside the camps heightens tensions, and it has been suggested by analysts that as refugees feel nervous, threatened and unsafe, they are more likely to act in violent ways, thereby perpetuating the violence.

97. Traditional gender-roles and leadership structures have also been seriously challenged (Turner, 1999). In the camp setting, men are unable to perform the functions that gave them authority and status in their home country, while women have retained traditional functions, assumed primary responsibility for family maintenance, and been given some level of recognition through their inclusion in special programs and camp self-management structures put in place by the international community. These factors, in the context of generalised poverty and hopelessness associated with protracted refugee situations, may account for frustration and resentment on the part of male refugees, contributing to domestic
violence and rape, of drug abuse by men[^18], and their turning to crime and banditry. With people of different sub-clans confined to these artificially created human settlements, and with the fallout of civil war, the kind of social control of the village and of extended family networks is no longer effective. With little hope for speedy resolution to the conflict in Somalia, with little hope for resettlement, and with the Kenyan Government imposing extreme limitations on movement, on employment and other activity of refugees, they are in the difficult economic and psychological position of being in a state of limbo, without options or opportunities.

[^18]: Crisp points out that much of the violence is similar to that found in inner-city ghettos, where large numbers of poor and unemployed people live in over-crowded conditions, with all the attendant social problems. Substance abuse (Miraah) has been seen as a catalyst for much domestic and community violence against women and girls. “...refugee men, bored and frustrated by extended periods of inactivity and confinement chew the mildly narcotic substance and become aggressive as the effects wear off. Furthermore, refugee women report that domestic violence is often sparked off by arguments over the fact that men sell off basic food rations to finance their substance abuse.” (Courtney O’Connor, quoted by Crisp, 1999, p. 29).
Overview of the Dadaab Firewood Project

98. This chapter provides an overview of the Firewood project, its objectives, implementation history, and outputs. It describes how the focus of the project shifted over time, and compares actual outputs to those planned from the outset, and to those included in project contracts. It shows that a basic shift took place in relation to the project focus and approach and its intended outputs. It also outlines issues related to baseline data collection and monitoring, and how the shift in focus affects objectives achievement.

Analysis of project objectives

99. The formal objectives of the project concerned assault on women and children, and degradation of the environment. The exact wording and emphasis changed from one document to another, for example (brackets indicate alternate versions):

- Reduce firewood related exposure to banditry attacks and rape of refugees, especially women and children (GTZ contract, Annex A, 1998)
- Minimise (mitigate) fuel (firewood) related exposure of women and children to banditry attacks, harassment and sexual assault (to banditry and sexual assaults while collecting firewood)

100. With respect to environmental degradation,

- Reduce firewood related environmental degradation in the camp regions (GTZ contract, Annex A, 1998)
- Minimise fuel (firewood) related degradation in the refugee-affected area (in and around the refugee camps) (within 50 kilometres of the camps).

101. An implicit or additional goal or objective is mentioned in some documents, particularly in GTZ progress reports and GTZ proposals for new phases of the project, and in other places as a project rationale:

- To reduce natural resource utilisation conflicts between the refugee and local communities, or
- To reduce tensions between the refugee and the host population.

102. Formally initiated in the fall of 1997 by an Act of Congress of the US Government following the visit to Dadaab of a Congressional delegation, the main impetus for the project was the high level of rape and violence against women in
Dadaab camps, much of which was taking place while women were collecting firewood in the bush. Firewood supply was seen as a measure to reduce rape and violence levels through reducing the number of trips women would need to make outside the camps in search of firewood, thereby reducing the risk of violent attack. As women were collecting firewood mainly within a five-kilometre radius of the camps, and as this was seen to be the area of greatest wood depletion and environmental degradation, this measure was seen to have the concomitant effect of reducing further environmental degradation around the camps. Hence the two principal objectives for the firewood supply project.19

Delays in project start-up

103. A chronological presentation of key project events is given in Appendix C.

104. With funds approved by the United States donor in September-October 1997 for a one-year period of firewood supply, the first wood was not provided to refugees until about 10 months later, at the end of July of 1998. Only three deliveries had been made by the end of 1998.

105. Over this 10-month period, negotiations were taking place, first with CARE International in Kenya, a main implementing partner in Dadaab, and then with GTZ to implement the project. The initiation of the project in late 1997 corresponded to a period of severe cuts in other parts of the UNHCR budget, the elimination of the Community Services Officer post, and drastic cuts in the number of incentive worker posts within the camps. When CARE refused the job, arguing insufficient overheads and foreseeing a complex and time-consuming logistical exercise, GTZ was invited to be the implementing agency; and a letter of intent was signed before the end of 1997.

106. GTZ was viewed as an appropriate implementing agency, as they had been working already, since 1993, to reduce energy consumption among the refugees in Dadaab, and assisting them to obtain and use more energy efficient stoves. Several months of delays occurred while disagreements about the percentage of overheads GTZ would be allowed, or would accept, were being ironed out. During negotiations with GTZ, UNHCR tried to find other agencies to implement the project, but existing agencies—CARE, MSF and NCCK—refused or were inappropriate. Inviting a new agency to establish itself in Dadaab, it was argued, would be very time-consuming and costly, and any new agency would be at a disadvantage through lack of understanding of local clan structure and other complexities. Agreement was reached in early May and GTZ began implementation on May 11, 1998, under a Letter of Agreement with UNHCR.

107. According to a UNHCR update of the time, “The implementation of the project got delayed, initially because of the flooding of the entire region, and later due to the issue of percentage of overhead.” During the period from late 1997 and the first few months of 1998, the camps (and most of Kenya) experienced serious flooding resulting from El Nino rains. Roads were washed out, fences and some homes and buildings were seriously damaged, and for a brief period, food and

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19 In the Project Description prepared in October 1999 as part of GTZ’s contract, included as part of specific project objectives is the statement, “Further, the project intends to raise awareness amongst refugee population and develop community initiatives towards preventive measures.”
supplies were airlifted into the camps. Most non-emergency activities were put on hold, as rebuilding operations took place.

Initial disagreements on basic approach, and stakeholders design workshop

108. Some delays initially occurred because there existed disagreement or confusion about how the project would actually be implemented (and even about whether such an approach and budget was warranted). Because of the complexities involved, the issue of how to implement the project was given over to a Stakeholders Workshop. UNHCR, its implementing partners, local and refugee elders and women were invited to a 2-day seminar to carefully review the problem and “come up with a comprehensive and implementable plan of action.” (UNHCR Update, April 1998).

109. This strategy had the danger of increasing the politically charged context in which the project was to be implemented, possibly making it impossible to work out a rational and cost-effective approach. However, the workshop, attended by people very knowledgeable about the local economic, social and political context, and including both local and refugee community members, produced a surprising agreement about how to proceed, and advocated a very cautious approach. It was agreed that the project should be based on wood-for-work only, should first be implemented on a 3-month pilot basis in one camp, and that the initial funds should be distributed over a three-year period, rather than one year. Emphasis was on broad local and refugee participation, long-term viability and sustainability, and avoidance of creating further dependencies.

110. UNHCR environmentalists were advocating against free firewood in other contexts (e.g., in Kagera and Kigoma camps in Tanzania) and UNHCR was probably in full agreement with the results of the stakeholders design workshop, to go more slowly, and to begin on a pilot basis. The issue of what to do after the initial one-year funds had been used up, which should normally be decided prior to starting up such a project, would also have been weighing on the minds of UNHCR project designers.

111. While those involved at this time from within the United States Government were mostly unavailable to the evaluation for comment on these issues, it appears that they did not fully accept the outcome of the workshop, and the recommended approach. Rather, according to persons interviewed within UNHCR, the US government and implementing agencies, it appears that considerable pressure came from the donor to spend the funds in the one-year period as initially agreed. It was the donor’s intention that all households would be supplied with sufficient wood to eliminate the need for any woman to make trips outside the camps in search of firewood—whether or not such firewood was provided in exchange for work. It is unlikely that the donor appreciated the institutional barriers inherent in immediately creating a sufficient amount of work to supply all households with wood; or that it understood that a rapid set-up of a wood supply system was likely to affect the price at which wood could be purchased, and hence the degree to which the budget it provided could meet the annual wood needs of all Dadaab households.

UNHCR early implementation strategies

112. In early 1998, prior to resolving outstanding contracting issues, and perhaps prior to fully deciding on the overall project approach, Branch Office in Nairobi
initiated the purchase of a quantity of wood which would already be available when contracting and other issues were resolved. It is unclear to the evaluators whether UNHCR was in fact initiating an approach in line with that desired by the donor, or whether this was seen at the time as a one-time stop gap measure until the project approach agreed to by all local stakeholders could be implemented; i.e., an intention to just get the project moving, get some money spent, and get some wood to the refugees. Some persons interviewed with reference to this time period (early 1998) recalled that UNHCR was responding to pressures from the donor to “move the wood.”

113. UNHCR Branch Office in Nairobi set up a national tendering process to initially supply and transport 1080 tons of cut (live) wood to the Dadaab camps, intended to supply all refugees with 10 kilograms of wood. This was seen as a 30% ration for one month. A May 1998 UNHCR Project Update states that they requested quotations from commercial suppliers based on a local price of 2 shillings per kilogram (or 2000 shillings per metric ton). The one contractor who responded, cut timber in the area near Nairobi, 500 kilometres from Dadaab, but with transportation problems (road condition and security) the cost of trucking became ten times the cost of buying the wood. As there was also considerable criticism from local (Dadaab and Garissa) interests with respect to this external tender, it was quickly discontinued, prior to the full amount being supplied.

114. It is hard to imagine how cutting of live wood to substitute for the dead wood being collected by refugees themselves could be seen as an environmental protection measure, or even as an environmentally appropriate measure. As will be seen, the idea of supplying a 30% ration to all refugees remained the dominant model of the project as it was eventually implemented.

115. UNHCR concluded from this experience that,

> the above shows that we cannot viably purchase bulk supplies of firewood for distribution to refugees, and re-emphasises the need to pursue the project as we have already foreseen in the project description…. In view of the above, BO Nairobi is in continued contact with GTZ to ensure that implementation of the project activities commences as agreed on in the project design workshop. (UNHCR Update, May 31, 1998)

116. This feeling of “ensuring implementation of activities as agreed in the workshop” is reflected in the wording of initial formal agreements and project documents, which imply an approach more consistent with that advocated by the stakeholders than that of the donor.

**Note on defining project start-up and completion**

117. The beginning and end of the project for the purpose of this evaluation are somewhat difficult to define, in part because of how GTZ/UNHCR may have found it useful to have shifting definitions. We could begin on the date the project was approved by the United States (September/October 1997), or in January 1998 with

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20 UNHCR was assuming a 30% ration based on a wood use rate of 1 kilogram per person per day. As discussed later, this remained the assumption as the project was implemented, even after baseline studies showed consumption levels at least 50% higher than this.
the stakeholders’ seminar, in May when GTZ was contracted under letters of Agreement, or in July 1998 when the first wood distribution to refugees took place. We are uncertain as to when the first spending for the project took place. As a result of perhaps intentional obfuscation, it is impossible to separate the period over which the donor-funded component of the project took place, and hence to separate what have been the specific outputs and impacts of this spending.

118. A “Final Progress Report” was prepared by GTZ/UNHCR to cover the period from the beginning of the project, to the end of August 1999, after which date no further interim progress reports are available. By implication, this is the end of the Donor-funded part of the project, and the beginning of “mainstreaming” or incorporating the project into UNHCR’s regular budget. GTZ states, “There was a general firewood distribution from July 29th to 31st 1999. The firewood distributed was the last consignment purchased through the USA Government funds. The balances of firewood in the camps will be used for seedlings exchange”. A new Tripartite agreement between the UNHCR, GTZ and GOK was signed to cover the period from September 1, 1999 through December 31, 1999.

119. In a special Sub-Office written communication in response to evaluators’ questions, it was indicated that the donor funds were not depleted until some time in the first few months of 2000. Hence, it is not possible to give either a definitive start-up date or completion date for the project being evaluated. Since the “mainstreamed” portion of the project continued the activities of the project as funded under donor auspices, for the purposes of analysis we frequently use the period from the first wood distribution to the last month in which data was available to the evaluators. It should be noted that while the donor was insistent that the funds be spent over a one-year period, they were actually spent over a period of between two and two-and-a-half years.

GTZ early implementation strategies

120. GTZ reached an agreement with UNHCR in May 1998 by which time the idea of implementing a pilot phase in one camp from which lessons could be learned to design the final project for the three camps, seems to have been abandoned. The sense of urgency at the time, to spend the donor money, to buy and distribute wood to refugees, appears to have been paramount.

121. The Firewood Supply Project was officially entitled the Energy Management and Environmental Rehabilitation Project, so as to emphasise that it was not just a logistical fuel supply intervention, intended merely to buy and distribute fuel to the refugee community. “Rather it is a community participatory energy management system that addresses the security and welfare of the refugees (and the local community), equity, gender roles and at the same time encompassing issues of rational environmental considerations in the refugee affected area(s). “ (Monitoring Report, October 1998).

122. Under the heading “Project take-off understanding” GTZ states that “the project draws on experiences and lessons from similar fuel supply related interventions in refugee situations in sub-Saharan Africa,” They refer to rational

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21 An evaluation at the end of the donor component of the project, and prior to commitment to “mainstreaming” would have been most sensible.
utilisation, management and conservation, and to principles of sustainability, integration with other programming, and participation and sharing of benefits. For example, “For economic, logistical and environmental considerations, provision of fuel in refugee situations is not a sustainable solution. It can only have an impact if it is an integral part of other environmental management and conservation interventions.”

123. The Project Description, included as Annex A to letters of agreement between UNHCR and GTZ and the Tripartite Agreement (98/TF/KEN/CM/252) identifies “the key features of the approach” as in Figure 2.1:

124. The project thus described, follows in large measure the spirit and specific components of the project approach agreed to by the Stakeholders Workshop; these principles and approach are generally consistent with UNHCR environment policy and experience from other refugee contexts. They are consistent with GTZ’s experience and approach in their RESCUE project and in spearheading an environmental program in Dadaab starting in 1993. They are also compatible with a general developmental and participatory, community-oriented approach.

125. GTZ used essentially the same management team as for the RESCUE project (adding some staff as needed). The focus of GTZ activities over the first several months was on the logistics associated with firewood sourcing and distribution. They built storage depots in each camp, and hired the personnel to manage various aspects of firewood contracting, for wood collection monitoring, and to assist in wood distribution. They worked closely with UNHCR, with Environmental Working Groups (EWGs), and with local government to develop policies and procedures that could be agreed to by the various interest groups involved.

126. GTZ set up a locally based contracting system for harvesting and trucking of firewood to the camps, from areas within 50 to 70 kilometres away. It is clear that at least officially, the intended approach was to distribute locally sourced wood on a wood-for-work basis, with a portion allocated free to vulnerable groups. The first distribution of wood to refugees, in July 1998, was called a “goodwill” distribution, and allocated to all refugee families based on their holding of food ration cards. It was explained that henceforth wood would be distributed in exchange for work. GTZ states, “Pending the signing of Sub-agreement, and following pressure from various quarters including the Donor country, free firewood was distributed to all refugees in the three camps in July 1998.” (Mid-Term Report). Over the next few months, some 6000-8000 men and women exchanged five hours of environmental work for 20 kilograms of wood. The long awaited tripartite agreement between UNHCR, GTZ and GOK was finally signed in October 1998, about a year after the “one-year” project was approved.

Figure 2.1: Key features of firewood project approach, 1998.

22 The RESCUE project was initiated in 1993, implemented by GTZ of Germany, and focused on minimizing the environmental impact of the refugees and on environmental rehabilitation. It entailed establishment of nurseries and treeplanting; establishment of green-belts around the camps; environmental education; local manufacture and distribution of energy-saving stoves; and other activities.
The project intends to protect women and children from banditry attacks and rape by enabling access to firewood, albeit not free of charge but in exchange for community-environmental work;

- The project intends to use existing awareness-raising programs to incorporate messages on risks involved when an individual goes to harvest firewood alone, and assist the refugee women and children to develop community initiatives geared towards collective firewood harvesting;

- Harvesting of firewood will be controlled in such a manner as to facilitate natural regeneration, and to avoid total depletion of vegetation cover in and around the camps;

- In order to continuously reduce dependency on external funding, the project will give priority to low-cost interventions and focus on the establishment of community-based mechanisms;

- Sustainability will further be pursued by linking the project to local institutions;

- In order to allow for revision and improvements the project will commence with a pilot phase;

- The project will ensure that all stakeholders participate in both project planning and implementation, and that their respective interests are internalised within the project process... and support broad participation of community groups in delivery of firewood;

- The project will ...be infused as a gradual process to strengthen already existing women’s initiatives, energy conservation and other related environmental management projects. Participatory structures developed so far will serve as entry points for the project.... Further the project will seek mainstreaming of its specific activities into the management of the refugee-assistance program;

- The project will discourage the attitude that firewood is free of charge. To this end, the project will require that firewood be provided in exchange for accomplished community-environmental work. This will build on already existing practices such as stoves for trees and stoves for work. Only in special circumstances where a refugee is incapable of doing such work will firewood be availed free, especially for vulnerable groups.

Source: Summarised from Annex A 98/TF/KEN/CM/252; page 2

127. Other aspects of GTZ’s job, as identified in 1998, included locating opportunities and environmental projects which could employ large numbers of people to work in exchange for wood rations; working closely with community and agency-based personnel working on issues of rape and assault to evolve integrated approaches to such issues; and setting up of terms of reference and advertising for consultants to carry out baseline studies.

128. It is a finding of this evaluation, that in fact, insufficient wood-for-work opportunities were identified resulting in a complete redirection in the overall wood distribution model, and that the firewood initiative was insufficiently integrated with other rape and violence prevention strategies. The baseline studies were conducted too late to affect project design, included too little data on the social, socio-economic, and cultural conditions related to wood collection by women and the context of rape and violence against women. Baseline studies were not used to determine what
monitoring should be taking place on a continuous basis; and key recommendations made about implementation were not heeded by UNHCR and/or GTZ. These findings are further elaborated in later sections of the report.

**Directions and reasons for project shift**

129. The project that was actually implemented bears little resemblance to the principles or approach outlined in Figure 2.1. The main ways that implementation departed from the above principles include:

- Firewood was almost all provided free; the initial “good-will” distribution was henceforth referred to as the “life-line” distribution;
- The project did not begin with a pilot phase;
- Wood-for-work never made up more that 5 percent of all wood distributed;
- We are unaware of the implementation of specific initiatives to promote collective firewood collection;
- In going around the existing camp commercial firewood supply systems (particularly donkey carts) the project did not give priority to low-cost and community-based mechanisms (i.e. refugee community-based);
- While the project has worked actively with stakeholders and interest groups, the general vision and surprisingly broad agreement reached at the stakeholders Design Workshop has not in fact been implemented, either in spirit or in terms of specific project components;
- Because of the high cost of firewood supply, and by creating expectations that such supply is the responsibility of the international community, the project increases dependency on external funding;
- Rather than promoting the idea that firewood is a valuable natural resource to be conserved, the project probably helped to encourage the dependency of both local and refugee groups, through initial free distributions. GTZ in late 1998 reports difficulties in encouraging refugees to undertake wood-for-work as refugees felt that wood should continue to be provided free.

130. The project that has in fact been implemented, and the major thrust of GTZ activities and reporting has been on setting up and resolving the logistical problems associated with procurement and supply of free firewood. We believe this major shift occurred for a number of reasons, particularly because of the pressure from the donor to stick to the project time frame, and because of the susceptibility of the original project objectives and focus to manipulation by a variety of interest groups.

131. The main focus of GTZ’s activities in 1999 and 2000 include the local tendering for firewood supply and transport; conducting price negotiations at general stakeholders meetings; working with local Resource Utilisation Management Committees (RUMC’s) to supervise firewood harvesting and advise on local environmental issues; set up and management of a team of Resource Utilisation
DADAAB FIREWOOD PROJECT

Monitors to ensure that environmental practices are followed at each harvest site; erection and staffing of firewood storage and distribution centres in each camp; carrying out of general monthly firewood distributions; organising a wood-for-work strategy in the three camps; and collection of baseline data, and ongoing monitoring activities.

132. By October 1998 it was decided to distribute 70% of the wood as a free distribution based on family size, and attempting to provide 30 to 35% of fuel needs. It was also attempted to set up a strategy to provide 20% of project wood on a wood-for-work basis, aiming to provide work for one member per household, at least once per month, exchanging 20 kilograms of firewood for 5 hours of environmental work. This element would support other reforestation and rehabilitation work ongoing through other auspices (e.g., live-fencing of green-belts, de-silting of water pans). It was also planned to distribute 10% of the wood to vulnerable people who were to be identified by CARE and refugee community groups, and to investigate providing free wood to institutional groups.

Project approach, 1999-2000

133. The new Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR, GTZ and the Government of Kenya (GOK) to cover a four month period from September 1999 to the end of the year, was accompanied by a new “Annex A” entitled Sub-Project Description. The budget of 27.3 million shillings ($345,670) includes the components as shown in Table 2.1 overleaf.

134. We looked to this document for an explanation of how the project objectives and implementation approach had officially changed. The “Description of Assistance” provided is broken down by the budget items in Table 2.1.23 It makes reference to the provision of funds to purchase fuelwood to provide 30% of refugee firewood needs over the four months of the period of the contract.

135. A more detailed project description was contained in a document also prepared around this time by GTZ as a proposal for Phase II funding, intended to be submitted to the United States Government, with a budget of $5.4 million over two and a half years between July 1999 and December 2001. While this project was not funded, it provides more information than the above-described Tripartite contract signed in September 1999, about the way the ongoing firewood supply project was viewed. A detailed summary is included here to demonstrate the shift in project focus that took place from early 1998 to mid 1999, and also to understand how UNHCR and GTZ were viewing the strengths and accomplishments of the Project.

136. In summary, while the same two official project objectives are cited, they are followed immediately by the statement, “This would ultimately reduce tensions

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23 Transport mentions fuel and maintenance of vehicles, and drivers’ salaries. Repair and maintenance of distribution sheds are mentioned, as are purchase of hand tools such as machetes, axes and shovels for firewood harvest, and funds for purchase of communication equipment and office supplies. Under forestry, “the project will provide support to buy fencing materials and undertake the fencing work... hire commercial transporters (for same), support to raise and grow tree seedlings...provide honoraria for part-time (forestry staff), and incentive allowances for refugee labour and environmental working groups”. It also makes reference to provision of funds for GTZ to purchase fuel (firewood) from local entrepreneurs to cover 30% of the refugee needs for 4 months, and the cost for hand tools, tool kits, weighing scales, tendering costs, salaries for harvesting monitors, casual labourers and site watchmen.
between the refugee and the host population” suggesting perhaps that this is now seen as the ultimate objective or aim of the project. The document also states later, “The overall goal of the project would be to improve living conditions of refugees, especially women and children, and promote collaboration between refugees and the local population in the natural resource field”, thus generalising the objective of the project (e.g. reference to living conditions, implying the broad economic situation rather than security and rape issues), and focusing on relations with the “host” or “local” community. Local community, relevant government departments, and other implementing partners are included under “beneficiaries” of the project (not just the refugees as formerly).

Table 2.1: GTZ budget for Firewood Supply Project, Sept - Dec 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount in Kenyan Shillings</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,253,332</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood Purchase</td>
<td>3400 Ksh x 5000</td>
<td>17,000,000</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated costs</td>
<td>contracting, monitors, casuals, GOK rangers, etc.</td>
<td>2,483,666</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site ops/repair</td>
<td></td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. forestry activities/Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td>714,010</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Management</td>
<td>Office &amp; Staff Costs</td>
<td>3,831,993</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ Overhead</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>1,666,145</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>27,299,146</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from budget document provided by GTZ

137. Project achievements to date were seen to include the following:

- procurement and distribution of 8000 metric tons of firewood;
- baseline data surveys and studies commissioned;
- enhancing security of firewood gatherers by minimising their exposure to banditry attacks as a result of reduced number of times they have to venture out of the camps;
- set-up of tender and award committee;
- set-up of procurement, delivery, storage, and distribution procedures;
- identification of potential harvesting zones;
- realisation of equitable participation of relevant stakeholders through dialogue fora;
improvement of welfare of refugee and local target groups through employment opportunities, transport contracts, etc.;

set up of natural resource monitoring and evaluation procedures involving stakeholders;

integration of firewood project activities into other ongoing environmental activities;

provision of basic infrastructure in the three camps.

138. Project setbacks and lessons learned were seen to include:

- collection sites are chosen more on political than technical (environmental) grounds;
- it is not feasible to provide 100% of firewood requirement, because household consumption would increase, because it creates dependency, destabilises the existing firewood market, and has logistical and financial constraints. The project therefore aims to provide 40%;
- wood-for-work strategies are difficult to implement;
- environmental rehabilitation measures in a fragile ecosystem like Dadaab will always be outmatched by the demand on natural resources;
- need for further analysis to understand how or how much firewood can reduce the incidence of rape;
- difficulties in developing indicators to measure the success of the project.

139. The references to achievements around each of the main project objectives remain unconvincing, without reference to how much security of women and children has increased, how much banditry attacks on them have been reduced, how much exposure to such attacks has been reduced, how the number of trips outside the camps has been affected, etc., even though these are all quantifiable. Does GTZ-UNHCR believe women are making 30% fewer trips, for example, or they are 30% less exposed— to correspond to the 30% provision of firewood? Similarly, how rehabilitation measures, and particularly the firewood project, are affecting the ecology of the area, and affecting the demand for wood resources are also quantifiable and are not discussed.

140. The main components or elements of the project approach as it evolved over time and exists are summarised in Figure 2.2. That the listed elements constitute a very different overall approach than that discussed in early documents, and changed over time, is discussed below. It is also relevant to ask whether these proposed elements were actually implemented as planned. In particular, were monthly distributions made? Was 30 to 35% of fuel needs met? Was 70% of wood allocated for free, and/or 20% as wood-for-work and 10% to vulnerable groups? Was baseline data and monitoring carried out effectively? These questions are further addressed in the later sections.
Figure 2.2: Main elements of firewood supply project.

- To use the same staff and project manager as for the GTZ RESCUE project.
- Local tendering for firewood supply and transport (initially with the same contractor responsible for firewood collection, bundling, loading, and transport to the camps). Initially representatives from GTZ, UNHCR, GOK Forestry Department, Garissa and Wajir County Councils, and the Environmental Working Group (EWG) constituted a tender evaluation committee. Later, in 2000, contracts for collecting and transporting were separately let.
- Rather than contracts going to the lowest bidders, a quota system for awarding the tenders was initially adopted (allocating among women’s groups, Youth Groups, NGO’s, vulnerable groups, and business and politically influential groups). Later, quotas were dropped, and a process of price negotiations at general stakeholders meetings was adopted, prior to letting a new round of contracts.
- Establishment of local Resource Utilisation Management Committees (RUMC’s) to supervise firewood harvesting and advise on local environmental issues. Also, creation of a team of Resource Utilisation Monitors to ensure that environmentally sound practices are followed at each harvest site.
- Erection and staffing of firewood storage and distribution centres in each camp.
- Carrying out of General Firewood Distributions on a monthly basis. By October 1998 it was decided to distribute 70% of the wood in this way, based on family size, and the holding of UNHCR food ration cards, and attempting to provide 30 to 35% of fuel needs.
- Set-up of a strategy to provide 20% of project wood on a wood-for-work basis, aiming to provide work for one member per household, at least once per month, exchanging 20 kilograms of firewood for 5 hours of environmental work. While a strategy for 10% distribution to vulnerable people was planned, this did not get off the ground. In late 1999 a small amount of wood splits began to be distributed in this way.
- Support for afforestation/rehabilitation work ongoing through other auspices (e.g., live-fencing of green-belts, de-silting of water pans), mainly through wood-for-work activities.
- Collection of baseline data, and ongoing monitoring/evaluation activities.

Source: Summarized by evaluators from official and unofficial documents from mid-1999.
Project outputs

141. The dates and amounts of wood distributed through free rations to all households are summarised in Table 2.2. Only 17 monthly wood distributions occurred over the 30-month period. Each distribution was intended to provide 30 or 35% of need or consumption of firewood as calculated over a 30-day period. This 30 to 35% is also reported by GTZ/UNHCR as the level of need/consumption met by the project, and is the level quoted by all persons interviewed, including persons from the United States Embassy, from CARE and other agencies, from UNHCR Branch Office, and from the Government of Kenya. The donor representative rued the fact that the level of coverage was only 30% rather than 100%, as did the Head of Sub-Office. In fact, firewood project has to the end of 2000 met about 11% of wood consumption, and at most 17% of “need,” using a very restricted definition of fuelwood need.

142. The question of fuel “need” is an ambiguous one, and was initially taken by GTZ as a minimum daily amount for individuals and families to cook their food, of one kilogram per person per day. However, in a project intended to reduce the number of trips that women make in search for firewood, it is clear that “need” must be defined relatively closely with actual consumption levels. In his baseline study in December 1998, Matthew Owen points out that GTZ had been underestimating actual consumption levels, and hence the definition of “need” the project should be using, for the project to have a calculated impact on firewood collection trips. Based on his intake surveys conducted in December 1998, Owen estimated domestic wood consumption at 1.5 kilograms per person per day. As evaluators we are uncertain whether to assume that by December 1998, after three “lifeline” distributions, consumption levels were in fact edging upwards, as predicted would happen by environmentalists opposed to “free” firewood distribution. Numerous requests to GTZ by the Evaluation team for monitoring data with respect to consumption levels, resulted in the response that such monitoring was not done, was inconclusive, or had been done with a very small number of households with consumption levels shown to be rising in Ifo and Dagahaley to levels of 1.6 and 1.7 kilograms daily respectively.

143. At consumption levels of 1.5 kilograms per person per day, the average size of the monthly ration actually provided was about 19% of the 30-day consumption requirement, as compared with the 30 or 35 percent that was mandated to be provided. As can be calculated from Table 2.2, this ration was normally made to last much longer than 30 days, or an average of 52 days. Table 2.2 shows that for the 30 months or approximately 890 days over which the project has operated, (from July 24, 1998 through December 31, 2000) wood allocation should serve about 99 days or provide 11% of consumption at the level of 1.5 kilograms per person per day. If, for comparison purposes, we were to accept GTZ’s early definition of firewood “need,” the 17 thousand metric tons would last 148 days, providing about 17% of “need.” These numbers are very far from the 30% to 35% of need/consumption so widely believed to have been supplied by the project.

24 While in a few contexts a precise definition of “need” is intended, and identified as different from “consumption,” in actual reporting, and as widely understood in Dadaab, the terms tend to be used as loosely synonymous with percentages given in terms of “need/consumption” or “need or consumption.”
### Table 2.2: Firewood distributions, July 1998 – Dec 2000, and calculations of kgs per household and number of days distribution lasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates of Distributions</th>
<th>Amt distr’d (mtr. tons)</th>
<th>Kg per household*</th>
<th>No. of days wood should last**</th>
<th>1 kg pp daily</th>
<th>1.5 kg pp daily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 24-28, 1998</td>
<td>867.66&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>32.99</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 8-11, 1998</td>
<td>573.81</td>
<td>21.63</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 7-10, 1998</td>
<td>674.35</td>
<td>25.70</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1-12, 1999</td>
<td>1,245.50</td>
<td>47.49</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 23-27, 1999</td>
<td>1,206.56</td>
<td>45.99</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 22-25, 1999</td>
<td>884.92</td>
<td>33.11</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 1999</td>
<td>1,077.26</td>
<td>40.44</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26-29, 1999</td>
<td>993.17</td>
<td>37.63</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29-31, 1999</td>
<td>420.43</td>
<td>15.96</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1-4, 2000</td>
<td>1,144.21</td>
<td>37.22</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 10-13, 2000</td>
<td>1,113.70</td>
<td>36.65</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9-12, 2000</td>
<td>1,092.79</td>
<td>35.64</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5-8, 2000</td>
<td>1,154.01</td>
<td>37.26</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26-28,2000</td>
<td>1,149.05</td>
<td>37.21</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 26-29, 2000</td>
<td>1,075.39</td>
<td>34.64</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 9-12, 2000</td>
<td>1,156.75</td>
<td>36.92</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 9-12, 2000</td>
<td>1,153.44</td>
<td>36.90</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Lifeline Wood distributed</td>
<td>16,983.00</td>
<td>593.38</td>
<td>148.1</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of distributions: 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood-for-work</td>
<td>524.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood to vulnerable groups</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total incl. wood-for-work and to vulnerable persons.</td>
<td>17,515.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Calculations made by evaluators. We have used the figures provided by GTZ as to number of households supplied (the numbers reported to have actually picked up their ration). The total distributed is divided by the total number of households served.

**We have assumed an average household size of 4 consuming at the rate of 1 and 1.5 kilograms per person per day.

*Source: Compiled from GTZ/UNHCR EMERP-Firewood: Final Progress Report, Feb 2000, and other interim or monthly report sources.*

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**Wood-for-work**

144. By September 1998, after two free distributions, the project was aiming for fuel-for-work to account for 20% of all wood distributed, according to a formula based on market costs of firewood and labour, so that 5 hours of work was equivalent to 20 kg of firewood. The aim of the project is to have one member per household to work at least once a month. Given insufficient work, CARE and other

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<sup>25</sup> We are uncertain about this figure. UNHCR Sub-Office in a communication in early 2001, reports a total of 884.87 MT distributed at this time.
implementing partners are asked to help set up rotations among blocks, for allocation of the work (i.e., both wood and work is rationed). During this time, GTZ sees the main limits to wood-for-work as being

- insufficient work within GTZ operations;
- while there is work within other agencies the project is careful not to derail the current trend of phasing out agency-related incentives and replacing them with Community Self Management Systems approaches where the community is responsible for the implementation strategies;
- need to limit fuel available so as to avoid increased consumption;
- avoid putting excess fuel on the market so as not to negatively impact on the small-scale traders, especially women engaged in petty retail firewood business.

145. UNHCR/GTZ report that in the period from September to October 1998, 10,875 household heads applied to work for wood. 6,069 were hired, each for 5 hours and 20 kilograms of wood. Over 95% of people who turned up to work were women and children aged over fifteen. Table 2.3 shows the dates and amounts of wood distributed in exchange for work, and the main activities performed. Wood-for-work where work itself is rationed defeats one of the advantages of this type of intervention: namely, that those at risk can themselves opt in, or choose to substitute this kind of work for the “work” entailed in self-collection of firewood. When the women themselves are able to choose this option, it includes their own calculation of personal risk, and helps to ensure that the project is reaching those most at risk.

146. Firewood-for-work (including in exchange for commodities such as seeds and seedlings) amounts to about $524.45^{26}$ out of 16,983 or 3% of total wood distributed over the period from July 1998 to December 2000. This is considerably less than the 20% mandated in the Tripartite agreements signed between the GTZ, UNHCR and the GOK in mid 1999, and considerably less than 100% intended to be so provided from the beginning.

Wood to vulnerable households

147. In September 1998 it was first intended to provide 10% to vulnerable individuals and families. This did not prove feasible, GTZ states, as people in the camps did not co-operate in defining vulnerable people, insisting that all women were equally vulnerable in the camps. However, in September 1999, at the initiative of CARE, the Project began to work with Community Development Workers (CDWs), Community Self-Management committees (CSMs), block reps and others, to identify vulnerable groups, to benefit from old timber splits donated by UNHCR. 190 needy cases were identified, and each person given 30 kilograms of wood. The vulnerable group included rape victims, divorcees, widows, disabled, orphans, elderly, and single mothers. Firewood splits continued to be distributed in August and September 2000, as summarised in Table 2.4. Distribution to Vulnerable Groups amounts to 0.01% of wood distributed over the 30-month period.

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^{26} Based on GTZ reporting, UNHCR in 2001 provides a total figure of 514.728 Metric Tons.
Table 2.3: Wood-for-work activities, by dates, number of workers, gender, and amount of wood distributed (in metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>F'males</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,869</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>mainly fencing</td>
<td>121.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>seed &amp; seedling exchange</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>seed &amp; seedling exchange</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>exchange for seedlings</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>seedlings exchange</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td>seedlings/seeds/live fencing/micro-catchments</td>
<td>115.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>reinforcement of greenbelts</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>seedlings/seeds/live fencing</td>
<td>13.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>for seedling/seeds</td>
<td>13.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>seeds/seedlings exchange</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>micro-catchments</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>live fencing</td>
<td>21.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>seeds/seedlings</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>greenbelt repairs</td>
<td>28.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>2,397</td>
<td>3,914</td>
<td>greenbelt repairs</td>
<td>71.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>new greenbelts</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>exchange for Manure</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>repair live fencing, greenbelts, dig micro-catchments</td>
<td>18.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,363</td>
<td>16,113</td>
<td>22,476</td>
<td></td>
<td>524.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from GTZ Progress Reports

Table 2.4: Wood distributions to vulnerable persons by date, number of recipients, and amount.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Wood Distributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2000</td>
<td>298 (mainly women)</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>16.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from GTZ Progress Reports

27 We are uncertain about these figures. UNHCR Sub-Office in a communication in early 2001, reports a total of 514.78 MT distributed as wood-for-work.
28 We are uncertain about these figures. UNHCR Sub-Office in a communication in early 2001, reports a total of 8.62 MT distributed to vulnerable groups.
Environmental issues and impact

148. This chapter focuses on the relevance or importance of the firewood supply project in addressing environmental problems in Dadaab. It examines the “environmental” objective and rationale of the project and its relation to other objectives; the kinds of data obtained for decision-making in the environmental context of the project; the extent to which UNHCR environmental guidelines and lessons learned in other refugee contexts have been applied in the design and implementation of this project. It examines views about the effects of firewood collection, and the extent of accessible firewood in the area, from both the point of view of UNHCR consultant studies, and from local government perspectives.

Emphasis on environmental objective

149. While the rape and sexual violence objective appears to have been paramount in the initiation of the project, particularly in terms of the intention of the donor, the environmental purposes have tended to overshadow the protection ones. For instance, in UNHCR’s Country Report and Operations Plan for 1998 through 2000, the firewood supply project is not mentioned in relation to protection objectives or initiatives, nor in relation to community services or health programming. Five policy priorities are outlined in the Report and Plan, including Women and Children, Refugee Women, Children/Adolescents, Disabled, and the Environment. Discussing the results for 1998, the Firewood Project is only mentioned under the “Environmental Concerns” section. After stating the project’s two objectives, the Report describes the project in the following words:

The project in not only a logistical fuel supply intervention, but also a community based energy management effort, principally addressing the security of refugees, especially women and children firewood collectors, and mitigation of environmental degradation.

150. For the strategic plan to the year 2000, again only under the Environment Policy is firewood supply mentioned, and this in relation to the last of five environmental objectives:

To maintain supply of firewood in Dadaab refugee camps after completion of on-going Firewood Supply Project at the level of 30-35% of the total needs in order to reduce firewood collectors, especially women and children, to exposure to risks and assault and to reduce the environmental degradation. Firewood would be mostly distributed for work in the community services, environment, education and general hygiene activities.

151. The choice of GTZ as implementing agency, and the rationales provided for doing so, all clearly indicate that UNHCR has been focusing on the firewood project as an “Energy Management and Environmental Rehabilitation Project,” the official
name for it in fact. The energy management aspect fits well with GTZ’s activities of providing energy efficient stoves and education in relation to saving energy in cooking; as well as with GTZ’s work with environmental working groups and environmental monitoring committees.

**Environmental rationale for the firewood project**

152. To understand the environmental benefit of the project we need to first understand the assumed relationship between firewood supply and the environment. What was the environmental and resource situation the project was intended to address or ameliorate?

153. Given the fragile ecosystem and semi-arid climate into which these refugee camps have been introduced, and the long-term presence of the refugees, many for up to 10 years to date, it is clear that attention should be paid to the environmental implications of the refugee camps. Fears had been expressed over the years about the risks of severe environmental impacts due to extraction of large amounts of fuelwood and other natural resources. Particularly at Ifo camp, which is located in a floodplain zone, the surrounding area seems to be seriously depleted of all vegetation in every visible direction. In fact this is in part because of the total way the land was originally cleared by UNHCR when the camp was first established, and the particular micro-ecology of the Ifo camp area.

154. GTZ has been engaged to carry out environmental rehabilitation activities in the Dadaab area since 1993, including the creation of tree nurseries, tree-planting projects, green belts, environmental education, introduction of energy-saving stoves. In their proposals for continued funding for the firewood project, they describe the environmental problem as follows:

> Extraction of large quantities of fuel, construction and fencing materials, clearing for camp establishment, increased number of livestock, adverse weather and inappropriate natural resources management interventions have also variably resulted in deforestation, soil erosion, siltation of waterpans, woodland and rangeland degradation in and around the refugee camps. (Proposed Firewood Project Phase II, p.1)

155. Environment problems are often described in these general terms, with few facts presented. In January 1998, in the report from the stakeholders design workshop for the firewood project, the “firewood-related environmental degradation” is described in terms of areas becoming “denuded” and refers to firewood harvesting resulting in “decline of land carrying capacity, soil erosion, and severe dust storms.”

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29 Firewood environmental degradation is concentrated within a 2.5 to 5-kilometre radius around the camp, where land is now virtually bare of woody vegetation... Intensive localised removal of vegetation cover leads to the area becoming denuded and requiring replanting, and natural regeneration is curtailed. Expansion of firewood harvesting is presently constrained by lack of adequate means of transport and the constant banditry attacks. Consequently, the areas around the camps have continued to be degraded with the resultant decline of land carrying capacity, soil erosion, and severe dust storms.” (Stakeholders Workshop, January 1998).
Lack of environmental data in 1997

156. Most of the area within 50 kilometres of the camps, and much farther, is dense bush land, or rangelands, mainly sandy soils with low and unreliable rainfall, covered with shrubs and low bushy trees. The vegetation is typically dominated by shrubs and small trees of Acacia and Commiphora species with scattered patches of grassland and seasonally swampy areas. “Thus the dominant occupation is pastoral agriculture and the shrubs and trees are more important for their browse than for their wood products. The estimated growing stock of wood in these rangelands as a whole is approximately 690 million air dry tonnes, with an annual growth of some 16 million tonnes, air dry.” (p.3, Country Report for Kenya, UNHCR Towards Sustainable Environmental Management Practices in Refugee-Affected Areas,1998)

157. The actual impact of refugee firewood collection on the environment of the Dadaab area was not well known in 1997 at the initiation of the project. Only since satellite images have been produced in 1999 by an IRD study, and some baseline survey work conducted first by Matthew Owen in late 1998, and then in more detail by Nicolas Blondel at the end of 1999, are we beginning to understand both the extent of the local wood resource (live wood and dead wood), and the extent of the environmental impact of the refugees on these resources, in the past and projected into the future.

Wood harvesting plans and energy assessments

158. UNHCR environmental guidelines refer frequently to a wood harvesting and/or supply plan, which is normally made during the emergency phase of a refugee situation, and is based on needs surveys and a survey of available harvesting areas and their stocking volume. Such a plan is treated as basic. “Such plans will assist decision-makers in deciding on the main options for wood supply, i.e., supervised/controlled harvesting by refugees themselves or an organised and centrally managed wood supply.” Such a plan “provides the basis for further preventive and mitigating measures” and “regular adjustments of the initial plan will be required.” (Forestry in Refugee Situations, 1998, p. 23)

159. Similarly, the guidelines refer to an energy supply and demand assessment:

An energy supply and demand assessment should be carried out for each refugee operation. It is essential to have reliable information on the supply and accessibility of wood and other forms of renewable energy, in addition to substitute fossil fuels and their practicability of use. For this, local inventories are required or available information should be obtained on the bio-mass growing stock, annual yield and land use types. Accurate data on refugee energy consumption levels and energy-use habits and preferences are also needed. These surveys can help ensure sustainable short- and long-term energy supply and should form the basis for an ongoing energy research and monitoring program. (Selected Lessons Learned, 1998, p. 63).

160. The evaluators are unaware of the existence of such plans for Dadaab, whether they were made during the initial set-up of the camps, whether they have been regularly adjusted over the time of the refugee presence. However, if such plans existed, the findings of Owen in December 1998 about the wood resources available,
or of Blondel in 1999 would not have been surprising. If such surveys and plans existed, it would seem unlikely that an organised wood supply program would have been justified on environmental grounds.

Findings of recent environmental surveys

161. From recent studies, the following general views appear to prevail with respect to the environmental situation:

162. According to Matthew Owen, independent environmental consultant, “Much has been made of the impact of the Dadaab refugees on the hosting environment and the potential for future damage. In the absence of sound ecological monitoring, the issue has provided political capital to both local leaders and the central government. Field data suggest that the situation is less severe than first appears and that ample firewood remains available in accessible areas.” (Owen, 1998)

163. According to a detailed study by Nicolas Blondel, “there are no major causes of concern regarding the environmental situation around Dadaab and all impacts are reversible. It is not the catastrophe depicted by some local stake-holders.” (Blondel, 2000)

Environmental degradation and levels of deforestation

164. The only evidence of deforestation, as reported by Blondel, is within 5 kilometres of the camps. The situation is worst around Ifo camp, which was initially cleared by UNHCR without due regard to the environment, and which has the most fragile ecology. There has been relatively little impact around Hagadera camp, with Dagahaley somewhere in between.

165. A situation of slow deforestation prevails. As identified by a 1999 IRD study, using satellite imagery, the level of deforestation at current rates is about 3 to 5 square kilometres a year, most of it around Ifo and Dagahaley, a rate which is unlikely to increase.

Availability of dead and live wood around Dadaab camps

166. In general, signs of a ‘pronounced’ dead firewood scarcity are observed nowhere. On the contrary, in the firewood collection by refugees, a relative selectivity towards certain species is still in effect, and measured consumption levels are not low. Blondel accounts for the lack of a more significant impact on the biomass resources around the camps, with the explanation, “Dadaab complex is in the middle of an ocean of bush” and refers to the relatively lesser efforts (by wood collectors) needed to bring back dead wood to the camps as compared to live wood (thus accounting for the limited amount of live wood cutting for firewood purposes).

167. A ‘moderate’ scarcity of deadwood prevails, which is more pronounced around Ifo camp. Blondel in fact has calculated that there is a long-term equilibrium between firewood consumption by the camp population and the natural production of dead wood within 30-40 kilometres of the camps. This is the case with or without the firewood project. The important point is the range of approximately 35
kilometres radius that is needed to find the equilibrium, and the fact that donkey carts can cover this area.

168. According to Matthew Owen, even if the available dead wood in an area were exhausted, sustainable cutting of live wood at a certain level will have no negative effects. Standing stock of useable wood in rangeland areas such as Dadaab is estimated at 10-20 tons per hectare, with a mean annual increment of 0.5 to one ton per hectare. Relying on annual increment alone, the refugees could meet their annual needs from sustainably harvesting a circle of 14-20 kilometres. (Owen, 1998, p. 12)

*Sustainability of existing systems of wood supply*

169. The overall concentration of dead wood in the Dadaab bush within 30 km radius is 2.5 tonnes per hectare, with some depletion evident with respect to “commercial” quality dead wood. Dead wood of all types is still abundant not far from Hagadera camp. The most precarious situation is around Ifo camp, where marginal proportions of firewood are cut live.

170. Dead wood is a normal by-product of the species in the area, and is in a constant state of generation. According to Blondel, calculations (including dead wood generation) reveal that the current situation is a dynamic near-equilibrium one inducing very slow changes.

171. An efficient system of commercial dead wood harvest by donkey carts has developed. The donkey carts do not need roads, and can travel up to 30 kilometres. They hence have a very selective effect on the environment and the depletion of wood resources. An area slightly superior to the 30 kilometre radius currently reached by donkey cart activity, is in theory sufficient to allow a sustainable, indefinite exploitation of dead wood to cover the energy consumption of the total population currently present in this radius.

*Justifications for the firewood supply project on environmental grounds*

172. Under these environmental circumstances it is hard to make the case for spending up to 1.5 million dollars a year to supply firewood—on environmental grounds alone. Also in the light of these most recent studies, the focus of the GTZ RESCUE project, on protection and rehabilitation of the areas within 5 kilometres of the camps seems highly appropriate and well targeted. The environmental education, and distribution of energy saving stoves seems likely to produce good effect for the dollars spent. These measures also promote lower firewood consumption, rather than potentially raising levels, as threatened by the firewood distribution project.

173. If we were to imagine ourselves back in 1997-1998 in a situation of new funds coming available for a project focused on protecting or ameliorating the environmental situation that prevailed at that time, our first priorities would have been on obtaining improved data about the levels, causes, and areas of environmental degradation, and then on support for targeted and focused interventions. Improved environmental monitoring of the 5 kilometre area around the camps would seem useful, as would further or continued stove replacement, environmental education (including about energy saving methods such as milling, using larger cooking pots and pot lids, and making these more available, etc.), and
community participation in tree planting/fostering, green belts, and the like along the lines already practiced by GTZ’s RESCUE project. Education and support for more kitchen gardens or community gardens seems another possibility to be considered. Support for kitchen and community gardens within the camps have the potential to decrease demand for cooking fuel (through their provision of fresh foods) as well as providing refugees with needed life skills, a more varied diet, better nutrition, and income earning opportunities.

Expansion of supply based on existing commercial systems

174. In 1997, when UNHCR was considering how to increase the supply of firewood, measures in support of the existing donkey cart system of firewood supply should have been contemplated (e.g., availability of loans to buy donkeys or carts). The donkey cart system was and is a particularly environmentally appropriate one. The donkey cart takes only dead wood, of high quality, and will go at least 30 kilometres in search of the highest quality dead wood. Because of the distances it is able to cover, and because of the amounts of dead wood available, there is no incentive to cut live wood for energy purposes, except for the making of charcoal, which is illegal. The donkey cart does not require roads, and can go anywhere within its radius (collection need not be concentrated in certain areas such as near access roads). It has minimal negative impact on the environment, as compared to trucks and other vehicles. In this way it is a very selective collection method, with a range that is, according to Blondel, theoretically sustainable without any other system being introduced.

175. Incentives in 1997-98 for expansion of the donkey cart system as the main or only way to increase supplies to the camps would undoubtedly have resulted in some decreases in the price of wood-- as donkey carts became more readily available, with the resultant increased competition in the wood market place. This would have been to the benefit of the refugee households, and women and children at risk, and perhaps leading to some degree of increased consumption by the more well-off households.

176. Ultimately a significant expansion of the donkey cart system would require increased demand for wood from the marketplace. The more the areas immediately around the camps are depleted of quality wood, the more incentive there is for households to purchase their wood, rather than undergoing long and burdensome trips into the bush. Similarly the degree of risk from banditry and rape around the perimeters of the camps also acts as an incentive for households to purchase their firewood. The limiting factor here is the lack of financial resources to purchase firewood on the part of a significant proportion of households.

177. Thus, in terms of rape reduction, such an analysis would suggest an intervention that puts the means into the hands of precisely those households unable and unlikely to substitute purchased wood for self-collected wood, namely the poorest households. A wood-for-work scheme, which provides tokens or cards to be exchanged for wood in the market place, (or for wood collected by the existing donkey cart system on behalf of a wood supply project) would seem to address this.

178. According to Blondel, the limiting factor on allowing wood to continue to be supplied through the pre-existing systems (namely household self-collection and purchase from donkey-cart) is that donkey carts might have to range out an
additional five kilometres, for long-term sustainable harvest in this fashion. This seems feasible, and is probably already happening. Donkey cart owners interviewed as part of this evaluation mentioned going out as far as 40 kilometres, and regularly staying out up to three nights.

Firewood Supply Project in relation to UNHCR Environmental Guidelines

179. We reviewed the UNHCR environmental guidelines and experience in other contexts, to determine under what “environmental” circumstances one could justify a firewood supply project. Under lessons mentioned in Refugee Operations and Environmental Management (1998) it is stated,

   Considering its costs and implications, firewood supply should be attempted only under specific local conditions, such as in regions completely devoid of bio-mass or where areas of unique ecological significance are at stake. (p.67)

   Experience has shown that organised fuelwood supplies only become effective in precluding refugee-induced damage to forest areas if a full supply of the minimum wood requirements is provided, and if complementary protection measures are enforced to prevent refugees from additional harvesting.... Provision of free supplies should be avoided at all costs. (p. 26)

180. Reasons given for avoiding free firewood supply include:

   • refugee consumption will tend to go up once energy is supplied and the ration is only a portion of what is actually consumed;

   • refugees will continue to gather wood from local sources;

   • supply costs can be considerable, particularly compared with the economic value of the protected resource;

   • free supply undermines the value of firewood as a natural resource and can thereby contradict efforts to protect forests and encourage tree planting.” (Selected Lessons Learned, p. 67)

181. The UNHCR forestry guidelines conclude:

   …a full organised wood supply is more the exception than the rule. It is a costly and management-intensive undertaking which will only be justified in situations where the refugee population density far exceeds the supply capacity of surrounding forest areas, where freedom of refugee movement is restricted by the host government, or in cases of security risks related to wood collection. (Forestry in Refugee Situations, 1998, p. 25)

182. As the refugees in Dadaab have the freedom to go outside the camp to gather firewood; and as that resource does not exceed the supply capacity of the surrounding forest area-- even for the gathering of dead wood on the ground, let alone for selective cutting of live wood -- the only justification for the current project
can be “the security risks related to wood collection.” We would conclude that the Firewood Supply Project should be judged primarily on its contribution to reduction of security risks for refugee women firewood collectors in Dadaab.

Environmental impact of refugees according to government and local sources

183. A report was produced in June 2000, on behalf of the Garissa Council, on the impact of the refugees in relation to vegetation, wildlife, agriculture, livestock population, public health, water resources, and on Garissa Council revenues. The authors note in the introduction, however, their intentions behind expressing their environmental concerns regarding the refugee presence in Dadaab:

184. “This report is to assist the Government of Kenya in pressing for a compensation from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in rehabilitating the area degraded and to uplift the social status of the local community while the refugees are still in Kenya.” (p.2)

185. While the consultant reports of Owen and Blondel have been highly controversial in this politically charged context, they are the product of independent consultants who carried out careful measurements and surveys, and who are not UNHCR staff. They are also supported by the Geographical Information System (GIS) satellite imagery and analysis produced by L. Gambezy and D. Chaminade. The Garissa Committee report states that they made a visit to the camps and their surrounding environment, but “due to inadequate availability of reliable baseline data, the mission relied entirely on” … physical/visual observation, interviews with local communities, meetings with Environmental working group members, visits to wood supply project harvest sites, and some reference to available secondary data. A sample of some of the problems they identify include:

- indiscriminate destruction of the vegetation within a 20 kilometre radius;
- destruction of water catchment areas;
- depletion of ground water due to over-pumping;
- siltation of water pans;
- 10 year loss of fuelwood cess (tax) on wood self-collected by refugees;
- severe decline in livestock herds (and consequently in livestock cess) since the refugee presence;
- pit latrines are too numerous and too shallow, and garbage collection inadequate;
- destruction of wildlife habitat by refugees, poaching and hunting by refugees, trapping of birds, collection of ostrich eggs.

186. While more awareness education among refugees is suggested, and more appropriate monitoring in certain sectors, they end their presentation with the two proffered solutions of “repatriation of refugees to countries of origin” and “fencing of camps to restrain refugees into the camps.”
While no environmental resource surveys were carried out by the evaluation team, with respect to the issues raised by the Garissa group, we feel that their concerns about impacts of the refugee presence on wildlife are probably well placed. Similarly, the need for more monitoring in this area, as well as with respect to water use appears important. The decline of livestock herds is most strongly related to severe long-term droughts in the area, as are many other environmental impacts the Council might like to attribute to the refugee presence. They legitimately point out that they have received no taxes or return on the wood resources consumed by the refugees over the years of their presence in Kenya.

Local fuel wood monitoring and evaluation

On behalf of the Firewood Project, monitoring has been carried out in 1999 and 2000 by a joint committee made up of representatives from GTZ, UNHCR, Government of Kenya, and Wajir and Garissa County Councils. This committee was charged with documenting availability of deadwood in the harvesting zones, carrying out baseline surveys, and monitoring the impacts of fuel harvesting on the environment and on local communities and refugees.

The general conclusion in both years was similar:

Fuel wood is plenty at the harvesting zones with an average of 1.5 metric tons per square kilometre (In 1999 it was 235.65 metric tons). However, there are variations as a result of ecological conditions of the Zones. The fuelwood is dry and of hard indigenous species… at the bulking sites and refugee camps…

In 1999, the observable impacts were stated to include:

- creation of many access roads and paths;
- fuel wood wastes (splits) at the bulking sites;
- hunting of wildlife by refugees;
- harvesting of wet wood by some of the contractors in the zones.

In 2000, the observable impacts of the project were the same as in 1999 except for the last one, where damage was attributed not to contractors but to refugee labourers as follows:

- harvesting of wet wood, grass and live cutting of acacia species for building and pod collection by refugee labourers.

While the attitudes of the Dadaab community members in 1999 were positive, they did not remain so by 2000:

All in all it was the view of the local community that they have benefited and hope to benefit from the project and have confidence in GTZ and UNHCR and the project. They do hope that the project will increase the tonnage allocated to them and the number of contractors from their areas. (1999)
All in all, it was the view of the local community that the benefits are minimal and there is need for a price review in order for them to benefit from the Project. This will also create confidence in GTZ, UNHCR and the Project. Some communities requested an increase in the tonnage allocated to them and the number of contractors from the area. (2000)

193. These views as quoted for the two years reflect the political nature of these environmental monitoring reports, and of the context in which they are produced. About deforestation and the availability of deadwood they concur with Blondel:

Only one type of species is harvested (Qordobo) indicating dead wood is not scarce. High consumption in the camps (1.57 kg/day/person) is the same as in rural areas where fuel wood is not scarce. There is still live wood within the vicinity of the refugee camps which is unusual compared with other refugee situation because Dadaab is a bush land. (p. 14)

There are no real threats on the bio-diversity resulting from firewood harvesting. Apart from possible indirect risks on wildlife, deadwood collection is particularly environmentally friendly. (p. 16).

194. About the situation around the camps, for Ifo and Dagahaley they speak of a ring of deforestation within a radius of about 18 kilometres and “possible live cutting for fuel wood and building purposes”. Around Hagadera deforestation rates are low, and they see no need to supply wood on environmental grounds.

195. According to the monitoring report, the project has had many important social and economic benefits, as discussed elsewhere, for instance in the area of job creation. The authors suggest that 80% of the donkey carts employed are refugee owned and operated, and 42% of the labour provided for collection and splitting, is provided by refugees, with the balance from local labour. Estimates of total numbers of jobs or person months of work created, both refugee and non-refugee, are not provided.

Baseline data and environmental monitoring

196. As discussed, the introduction of the Firewood Project occurred in a politicised context, which became more so as the project went on. Hence, decisions were not made solely on efficiency and cost-effectiveness criteria. Similarly, they were made in a context of limited baseline data, and limited objective knowledge about the environmental impact of the refugees and their firewood gathering activity, or about the available supply of firewood in the local area.30

197. While it was strongly advocated at the time, in the January 1998 Design Workshop for instance, that additional baseline data be required-- on the energy

30 As in the case of the environment, rape was also a political and emotional issue, and certain beliefs about the causes and circumstances were constantly repeated without being verified. (e.g., that men would be killed if they collected firewood; that almost all rapes were perpetrated by bandits deep in the bush, by unknown armed bandits; that 95% of all rapes took place during firewood collection). Relatively little systematic information was documented as to the causes and circumstances of rape and violence against women, the characteristics of the perpetrators, or whether the victims of rape and violence were likely to be of a particular clan, socio-economic and family status within the camp community, or the like.
market, clan system and natural resource use, regional economics of natural resources, land tenure system— to the extent that such studies were done, they were done well after key project design and implementation decisions were taken. When the baseline data study carried out in December 1998 by Owen, became available, the results were “disputed by many Dadaab based stakeholders” in line with the political nature of the firewood supply initiative.

198. It was only after the project approach and operations had been set up and three general wood distributions made, that this baseline study made clear that the environmental impact of the refugees was less than had been thought, that wood consumption levels were much higher, that the commercial wood market in the camps was much larger, that the supply of firewood in the area beyond 5 kilometres was plentiful, and sufficient to last, conservatively estimated, at least 12 years using existing methods of collection (mainly donkey cart). Owen’s results were validated and amplified by Blondel, reporting in May 2000, that the collection of dead wood by donkey cart within a 35 kilometre radius of the camps is theoretically sustainable indefinitely, with or without the Firewood Project.

199. The problem with the baseline studies is not only that they were carried out too late to affect the basic design and direction of the project. They contained insufficient information on existing firewood collection and purchase by refugee households, or on the existing commercial market for firewood. They also provided no information on the socio-cultural and socio-economic factors that contribute to different levels of exposure to risk and violence in the camps. The absence of this type of information allows unverified assumptions to hold sway, such as that everyone is equally at risk, equally involved in firewood collection, equally vulnerable to rape and violence, and equally affected by the firewood distribution project. This is very unlikely the case. With these omissions the baseline data collection process provided insufficient information and was not used effectively to identify the indicators that should be monitored by the project.
Relations between refugee and host communities

200. The refugee camps are placed in a particular geographic, social, economic and political context in the Northeast of Kenya, about 75 kilometres from the Somali border, five to ten kilometres from Dadaab, about 100 kilometres from Garissa, the seat of the district government, and 500 kilometres from Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Four main issues are briefly discussed in this chapter, namely:

- the “objective” for the firewood project to reduce resource-based conflicts between the refugees and the surrounding communities;
- the meaning of the notion of host community, and the need to make a distinction between the communities surrounding the camps and the Kenyan Government and dominant Kenyan populations;
- the implications of a basic shift in project approach and direction toward emphasis on fair and equitable distribution of benefits to local, Kenyan populations;
- a brief discussion of the economic implications of the Firewood Project for this region of Kenya.

The “objective” of reducing natural resource tensions and conflicts

201. While not usually stated as an official objective of the Firewood Supply Project, the objective of reducing natural resource-related tensions or conflict with surrounding communities is often mentioned in proposals and progress reports generated by the Firewood Supply Project either as a project rationale or as an intended benefit or impact.

202. While the donor makes clear that the project was intended to respond to the problem of women and girls being raped while collecting firewood, it was also seen as “a visible gesture to help save the Kenyan environment (which) could be useful in countering the Kenyan’s refugee weariness and indeed threats to expel all of the refugees by the end of this month.” (Communication from office of Margaret McKelvey to Yuji Kimua, UNHCR Senior Environmental Coordinator, September 21, 1997).

203. In October 1998, a GTZ Project Update refers to the “core problem” in the following terms:

The diminishing availability of natural resources results in competition, which may lead to tension between the local and refugee communities. Consequently, this would impact negatively on the welfare and security of the communities.
204. The implication appears to be that the insecurity of and violence against women and children (mentioned as part of “the specific problem”) is a consequence of resource conflicts around firewood. Similarly, Annex A, the formal project description signed as part of the Tripartite agreement in October 1998 between UNHCR, GTZ and the Government of Kenya (GOK) has tried to rationally or causally tie together the three objectives of the project,

In response to indiscriminate harvesting of firewood by refugees, local communities tolerate the banditry attacks on refugee women, and over time, develop resentments towards refugees. In the event that such resentments are exploited by selfish leaders, ethnic incitement and fighting would result.

205. These stated assumptions had considerable potential to inflame the local situation, making decision-making on technical, non-political bases less and less possible. No data are provided to demonstrate that such views, actions, or links in fact existed at the time the firewood supply was initiated (e.g., that indiscriminate firewood harvesting was taking place or viewed to be taking place; that locals resented refugees, or resented their firewood collection activity; or that locals resented refugees so much as to tolerate rape, or that they would tolerate rape because of refugee women collecting firewood, or that women are raped because they collect firewood). Part of the problem here may be the reference to “local communities” and who exactly is meant by this phrase; this is discussed in more detail in the next section.

206. As discussed in earlier chapters, local Kenyan governments, communities, and individuals are willing to present arguments that put pressure on the international community to provide them with economic benefits. What is clear to the evaluators is that insufficient efforts were made by UNHCR and its implementing partners to avoid language and assumptions that would fuel the politically charged context of the Dadaab refugee camps. They have allowed both the environment and the rape of refugee women and children to become commodities or political goods that are repeatedly used as part of any negotiation with local Kenyans.

207. This is very evident in documents, environmental monitoring reports, and the like produced by Kenyan sources since the Firewood Project was initiated. It was evident in a price negotiation meeting attended by the evaluators during their visit to Dadaab. Almost every potential firewood contractor or local government representative, made reference to the terrible plight of women refugees who are raped while gathering firewood, and the environmental degradation which has resulted from refugees harvesting firewood indiscriminately. Some suggested, somewhat ominously, that if no appropriate agreement could be reached on the price to be paid to local contractors for a ton of firewood, rape of women and children would surely be going up.

**Lack of data about resource conflicts**

208. The question is not so much whether resource-related conflicts and tensions exist at present, but whether they have gone up or down as a consequence of the Firewood Project. We believe it is both impolitic and unfortunate that reference to reduction of natural resource utilisation conflicts and tensions between host and
refugee populations have been used as rationales for or objectives of the Firewood Project.

209. No data, anecdotes, or even arguments are presented as evidence of tensions between local and refugee communities, of the cause or depth of conflicts, or of resource-based conflicts which could be well addressed by initiation of a firewood supply project. In GTZ’s proposal for Phase II, they state:

The project drew on experiences from similar fuel supply related interventions in refugee situations in sub-Saharan Africa.” These included, “Rational utilisation, management and conservation of resources in refugee situations enhances the resource base and protects the livelihood of the local community thereby minimising the likelihood of resource based conflicts between the local and refugee communities.

210. Hence, the existence of tensions or resource conflicts is taken by GTZ as a potentiality, as something that sometimes or often occurs in refugee situations, rather than an observed phenomenon in Dadaab. In Dadaab, it has been reported that some locals have moved their families into the camps because the refugees are in fact better off than some of the poorer local families who do not receive food relief rations and other support. This illustrates both a potential for resentment and the extent to which there are close ties between local and refugee populations – such that many have suggested that the two are now, in practical terms, fully intermingled.

Firewood and politics

211. One thing abundantly evident to the evaluators while in Nairobi and Dadaab was the highly politicised nature of the Firewood Project at every level. It has apparently received considerable attention in the Kenyan Press, frequently of a critical nature. Any discussion of solutions with regard to rape and violence against women brings the stock response that we need more firewood. In everyone’s mind more firewood automatically and directly translates into less rape. Negotiations about firewood prices, contracting, and the like, always bring in reference to the plight of refugee women and children constantly at risk of firewood related rape. Similarly, the rape of the environment by refugees in the course of firewood gathering is a taken-for-granted phenomenon that is somehow completely addressed by gathering firewood in more distant places and under theoretically more controlled circumstances.

212. The data to support these assumptions are far from conclusive, and have sometimes been misinterpreted to support these politically useful viewpoints. The idea that without the project there will be resource-related conflicts and other tensions with local populations is also used politically at every opportunity in

31 GTZ and UNHCR Sub-Office in Dadaad may also have had as a point of reference the example of and rationale for the firewood supply project in Kakuma camp in Northern Kenya, where the local Turkana violently opposed refugee self-harvesting and successfully forced the introduction of full firewood supply.
32 This is not to say that conflicts have not in fact existed in Dadaab. However, we are not aware of any studies, surveys, or the like which have been conducted with respect to this issue; nor of anyone publicly taking up this issue in 1996 or 1997 prior to the initiation of the firewood supply project.
33 Reports of refugee owned donkey carts moving about the area quite freely, or with payment of some type to local persons claiming the territory or the resources in an area, suggest that resource-based conflicts are manageable, particularly with respect to firewood.
support of continuation of the project. It should be noted that this and the other objectives related to the rape of women and the environment are all to some extent within the control of the stakeholders. Hence, it is obvious that any effort on the part of UNHCR and its implementing agencies to eliminate or reduce the firewood supply project or even to significantly modify its modus operandi, will take place in this highly politicised arena, where there is always the implicit threat of increased levels of rape and deteriorating relations between the refugees (and international agencies that protect them) and the surrounding communities.

213. In the opinion of the evaluators, insufficient action was taken by UNHCR to avoid this situation from the outset. Even the name “lifeline distribution” given to the free and periodic general distribution of firewood to all refugee households is highly suggestive and value-laden. This name implies that these distributions play a decisive role in the life or death of refugees, and is intended to raise the profile of the project and the perception of its necessity. The lesson here is that for UNHCR to have control over its programming and budgeting, it must try to avoid as much as possible politicising the local situation regarding refugees. At the time this project was initiated, UNHCR did not have sound baseline data about the causes and circumstances of rape; about the magnitude and circumstances of firewood purchase and self-collection; or about the extent to which the firewood resources on the ground had been affected by the refugee presence. Without these data, the perpetuation of self-serving fictions, and a politically highly charged atmosphere will prevail, making more effective or more financially efficient interventions very difficult to undertake.

214. Over the past two years, despite the revelations from the Owen and Blondel studies, for instance, UNHCR in Nairobi and Dadaab has not yet accepted the importance of detached and systematic monitoring in relation to these and other factors related to measuring the project’s impacts. They therefore lack the means to adjust the project elements in accordance with such data, or to have available such information in negotiations with stakeholders. Information is still regularly used by all parties to put forward opinions that need justification. Hence, the monitoring being carried out by the project appears to be mainly used to underline the continuing importance of the project (on environmental and reduction of rape grounds) and the need to expand it if possible—rather than in asking continuously how we can best adjust the project to meet its intended objectives.

The host community

215. The population of the Dadaab camps and the surrounding areas is much more similar (and often said to be indistinguishable) than is the case in most other refugee situations. The camp population has varied over time and was said to be about 108,000 in 1997, with the local population said to be about one-tenth of this, at about 10,000 (and to have at least doubled over the period of the refugee presence). Both the bulk of the population in the camps, and the surrounding Kenyan population are of Somali, pastoral nomadic background, with a majority of both locals and refugees being of the Ogaden clan. The population in the camps and in the surrounding area seems to be somewhat fluid, and there continues to be considerable movement between Kenya’s Northeast province and Somalia, with its border about 75 kilometres from Dadaab, as well as movement between Garissa, Nairobi, and other parts of Kenya.
216. In the course of interviews with local agencies’ staff, refugees and
government spokespersons, it was also stated that there is considerable overlap
between the Dadaab population and the refugee population, with significant
numbers holding both Kenyan identity cards and refugee ration cards. In part, this is
because of the difficult economic situation in the area, where many families have lost
their livestock, and hence their livelihood, to prolonged and severe drought
conditions which have prevailed for a number of years. The refugees, with their
guaranteed food rations and other assistance, are thus viewed as economically better
off than some local people living at barest subsistence levels. This situation, as well
as the fact that Dadaab has become an important centre in Africa for resettlement
opportunities, has created a range of incentives for local Kenyans to register as
refugees in the Dadaab camps. The inability to physically distinguish the Somali
refugees from the local population exacerbates the difficulties for UNHCR in
identifying who is a local person and who is a bona fide refugee.

217. At the time when the refugee camps were set up near Dadaab, about 10
years ago, the local established population in the community was thought to be
nearer 500 than to 10,000. With the loss of livestock and the basis for their nomadic
pastoral lifestyles, and with the widespread provision of relief rations to affected
populations, (provided through local chiefs/administrators) there has been a
propensity toward the formation of more permanent settlements in the area. The
camps, with their significant population base and international presence, have
exerted a pull on the surrounding local populations, attracting them to the area to
engage in business, to buy supplies, but probably also to commit crimes, banditry
and sexual assaults.

218. In this context the language typically being used, of “host community” and
“refugee community” is probably somewhat inappropriate at times. Similarly, the
relationship to resources of nomadic peoples is different than for settled agricultural
peoples. The Somali populations have traditionally occupied these Kenyan “Trust
lands” in North-eastern Province as part of their travelling over large areas in search
of water and grazing for their livestock. The political border between the two
countries, Kenya and Somalia, has been largely irrelevant to these nomadic peoples.
The area has long been considered wild or dangerous by Kenyan authorities, and
little effort was made to regularly control or police the area or to make it secure.

219. The discussion of local-refugee conflicts and tensions is often used in very
general ways without specific reference. There is no reason to assume that the
attitudes and interests of the central “host” government, of dominant populations, of
district governments, or of the ethnically similar communities immediately
surrounding the refugee camps are all identical. This non-specific type of reference
may nevertheless be inflammatory in the local situation.

Attitudes/support of government authorities and dominant Kenyan populations

220. There have been territorial disputes in the past between Kenya and Somalia,
and the region remains politically important to the Government of Kenya. It should
also be pointed out that there appears to be obvious prejudice (racial or ethnic bias)
within the dominant Kenyan population against the minority Kenyan citizens of
Somali origin, and more so against Somali refugees, whether in urban areas or in
camps. There are strong views against the settlement of Somali refugees in Kenya, or
against providing Kenyan identity to Somali refugees.
221. In discussions with the Government Forestry Department in Nairobi, it was suggested that the Firewood Supply Project was first identified and supported by the Department so that the Government and Kenyan population could have greater benefit from the presence of refugees and the international agencies in Kenya. While Kenya has signed UN protocols on refugees and granting of asylum, the presence of a large number of Somali refugees in Kenya is generally not viewed as very desirable, and UNHCR has several times had to intercede with the Government to prevent Kenya making the decision to oust the refugees from Kenyan soil. The District Officer stationed in Dadaab suggested that the refugee camps in Kenya are a significant liability because they are a locus for gun-running, and other forms of organised crime spilling over from across the border with Somalia. In his opinion, a large number of guns are hidden in the camps and eventually make their way throughout the country, (where gun ownership is heavily controlled) thereby promoting crime and mayhem in Kenya.

222. Kagwanja (1999) has argued that “Kenya’s long-standing apprehension with regard to large refugee influxes is the result of several factors: a chronic shortage of arable land, which comprises only three per cent of the country’s territory; a particular fear of ethnic Somalis, who in the 1960s fought for the North-east of the country to be incorporated into a greater Somali state; and a more general concern that the arrival of refugees will lead to the spread of firearms, increased levels of crime and social unrest. As a result of these concerns the colonial and post-colonial Kenyan states have sought to limit the number of refugees on the country’s territory and have consistently rejected any suggestion that exiled populations be given land and allowed to settle in the country on a long-term basis.” (quoted in Crisp, 1999)

223. Prior to the early 1990s when a large influx of Somali refugees entered the country (over 400,000), Kenya had readily granted refugees government identity cards and access to education, health and housing. While Kenya had no real means of physically preventing the influx, and was also obliged under UN and OAU refugee conventions, Kenyan authorities made it clear that the refugee presence was unwelcome—through forced repatriation of at least half of the refugees, and placement of the remainder in camps in remote and insecure areas of Kenya and a strong “determination to resist the integration of refugees into the economic and social life of the country.” (Crisp, 1999, p. 18)

224. The Government of Kenya remains an important partner in allowing and supporting the presence of the refugee camps, in permitting the gathering of firewood and building materials, and in providing police, courts, and other services in support of the refugees. In this sense, a financially large project which provides contracts to local businessmen and locally influential people, and which allows Government officials to charge a cess or tax on firewood, may be seen as a way to gain support from the Kenyan host governments.

**Basic shift in project approach and direction**

225. As demonstrated in the Overview, this project with dual objectives relating to rape and to the environment, has undergone a basic shift in focus, with the much of the energy of project implementers taken up with mediating competing demands from local interests. This shift in focus is reflected in project documentation, in statements of objectives, project activities, and outputs.
Directions and reasons for project shift

226. While we believe the original intention and rationale for the project (particularly that of the donor) was to reduce rape and violence against women and children while collecting firewood, the secondary objective of reducing pressure on wood resources around the camps often took precedence in people’s minds. The selection of GTZ as implementing agency and the formal name of the project, “Energy Management and Environmental Rehabilitation Project” underlined the environmental emphasis of the project. The need to provide formal rationales to link these two objectives brought in reference to resource-based conflicts, tensions between refugees and the local community, and even the idea that rape of refugees was tolerated as a kind of punishment or quid-pro-quo for refugee rape of resources (as discussed above).

227. With both rape and the environment now highly politicised, the project became focused on setting up tendering regulations and procedures, and on negotiating with local stakeholders, particularly local politicians, Government councils, and individuals, organisations, and small businessmen seeking lucrative wood supply contracts.

228. A key decision taken during these early negotiations was that refugees could only be involved in a subordinate role to so-called “local” people, or people with Kenyan citizenship. Hence, while refugees had previously collected all their firewood themselves, either for self-supply or for sale within the camps, and while refugees owned almost all the private means of transportation in the area, including donkey carts and trucks, they were not to be considered as contractors for the Firewood Supply Project. They could however, provide labour. Donkey carts could be subcontracted and refugee-owned trucks could be leased by Kenyan firewood contractors. Hence the Project brought about a direct transfer of control over a portion of firewood supply away from refugees to local Kenyans. It was now also clear that it was not so much about security of women and children or about harvesting wood in a more environmentally appropriate fashion (or spreading more thinly the environmental effect of refugees) as it was about a “sharing out” of financial benefits. (Some of the financial implications of doing this are discussed in the chapter on Cost Effectiveness).

229. Decisions as to where to harvest were being made less on where wood was most plentiful, but mostly on the basis of equity and sharing out of the financial benefits of the project (and what could be negotiated in the local political arena). According to GTZ, in their proposal for a Phase II, in 1999, one of “the project setbacks and lessons learned” include “collection sites are chosen more on political than technical (environmental) grounds.” Similarly, the relative cost-effectiveness associated with harvesting zones was only one factor among many, with equity considerations and negotiations among local shareholders being paramount. Environmental and cost considerations were weighed in in setting general parameters (e.g., the decision to harvest within a 50-70 kilometre zone), after which political negotiations determined specific sites and terms.

230. Parties vocal during the Design Workshop, with the greatest stake in using the wood supply to reduce trips to the bush by women and children, were little involved in project implementation and had little influence in how the project evolved. The main focus of GTZ’s activities in 1999 and 2000 include the local
tendering for firewood supply and transport; conducting price negotiations at general stakeholders meetings; working with local Resource Utilisation Management Committees (RUMC’s) to supervise firewood harvesting and advise on local environmental issues; set-up and management of a team of Resource Utilisation Monitors to ensure that environmental practices are followed at each harvest site; erection and staffing of firewood storage and distribution centres in each camp; carrying out of general firewood distributions; organising a wood-for-work strategy in the three camps; and collection of baseline data, and ongoing monitoring/evaluation activities.

231. As discussed in the Overview, wood-for-work initiatives, wood for vulnerable households, monitoring of project impacts, particularly in relation to women’s wood collection patterns, and with respect to risk factors were given little emphasis. Most of the wood was given out as a free ration (about 97%); and because only 17 “monthly” distributions were made over a 30 month period\(^{34}\), the refugees have continued to self-collect or buy firewood to meet up to 90% of their consumption.

**Economic assessment**

232. While environmental concerns have been repeatedly used to justify what are essentially local and regional economic interests, the firewood supply project does in fact play an important role in the local economy. While food and other essential items of the care and maintenance regime of the refugees are procured from outside the region, firewood is plentiful in the general vicinity of the camps, and represents the only commodity, apart from labour, that can be locally purchased. Firewood provision has become an important industry in this area with few commercial opportunities and with little public investment or development planning.

233. Apart from herding of livestock, petty trading, and perhaps the Mirrah trade, firewood has become a significant economic activity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that part of the profits from firewood contracts are being invested in replacement of the drought devastated herds in the area. Other evidence and interviews indicate that locals are learning from the refugees about petty trading and similar small-scale business activity. Both these effects will have longer-term impacts beyond the presence of the refugees.

234. More firewood contracts and firewood provision to refugees is a growing demand from the local Kenyan population, but this should be seen as, at best, a short-term and inadequate answer to the real need for investment, infrastructure, education and training, and long-term income generating opportunities for the area. Presently the most obvious economic opportunity for local leaders to exploit, firewood provision is no more sustainable economically than it is environmentally necessary. When the refugee camps no longer exist, the firewood market will disappear. It seems relevant for UNHCR to assist the local community and the Government to develop a longer-term strategy to create economic opportunities for the area, rather than basing the bulk of their financial impact on this one intervention.

\(^{34}\)Measured from the first distribution in July 1998 to the end of December 2000.
235. As an international agency with all the knowledge and links with development agencies (multi-lateral, bi-lateral, and NGO’s) with the specific mandate to assist in socio-economic development among deprived populations such as those in Dadaab, UNHCR should use its leverage to bring the plight of these populations to the attention of such organisations; and assist local groups to develop strategies and plans which will help them to approach the most relevant external agencies and organisations with the mandate to provide the assistance required.
Impact of the firewood project on rape

“If HCR does not provide refugees with 100% of firewood, it is we who are raping these women” HSO – Dadaab, October 2000.

“Out of the 164 reported cases of rape in 1998, there were 98 cases that took place in the bush as women were collecting firewood. There were 40 reported cases of rape in the camp including one in the borehole and one in the health post. There were 4 reported cases of rape of women herding and 22 reported cases of rape along the major roads in Dadaab. It can be concluded from this data that the major cause of rape, among others, in Dadaab is the women’s attempt to meet their household requirements. The major requirement as mentioned several times in this paper is firewood. The women’s attempt to meet the other 60% to 70% of their fuel requirements not met by the UNHCR draws them into situations where they are very vulnerable to attack.” (Orono, March 1999. p. 35)

These comments reflect the sense of urgency to solve the problem of rape in Dadaab felt by agencies’ staff, and the extent to which many have come to equate firewood provision with a solution to rape. Firewood collection, or women’s attempt to meet their household requirements, has for many come to be seen as the “cause” of the rape and violence experienced, and hence, more firewood is offered as the main solution offered to an on-going problem.

While a sense of frustration and discouragement regarding this problem is understandable, given its complex nature, a somewhat uncritical stance regarding firewood distribution and the current approach of the project appears to predominate among UNHCR staff in Kenya. In this chapter we focus on attempting to objectively assess the direct impact the Firewood Project has had on the incidence of rape in Dadaab, mainly through comparisons between periods when households are fully supplied with firewood and those when it is likely they have run out. We also provide some assessment of indirect benefits or impacts of the Project in Dadaab.

Overall trends in rape in Dadaab

The problem of rape in and around the Dadaab camps has been the subject of investigation and criticism of UNHCR’s ability to protect refugee women since the early 1990s, when several human rights organisations first brought this situation to public attention. However, identifying comparable data by which to assess the relative severity of the situation in Dadaab - for instance rape rates in comparable non-refugee settings in Kenya or other parts of Africa - is a challenge. Media attention has recently focused on the high incidence of rape in South Africa, which in 1994 was reported to be among the highest in the world at 99.7 reported cases per
100,000. However, within Kenya and other African countries\textsuperscript{35}, official reporting of rape among the general population tends to be low, due largely to social and legal definitions of the crime which tend to place blame and responsibility on the victim.

239. Refugee camps represent a distinct setting, which cannot easily be compared with other non-refugee settings in Africa or abroad. Particularly in Dadaab, where UNHCR and implementing agencies have been making concerted and systematic efforts to address rape and other forms of SGV, institutional mechanisms and support services have been put in place which encourage rape reporting and directly challenge community notions and institutional behaviours which might seek to penalise the survivor of rape. Hence, the reported rate of rape in Dadaab is not easily comparable national statistics that reflect a varied and complex range of social and legal obstacles to reporting.

240. A further challenge in the case of Dadaab arises in attempting to standardise and compare the frequency of rapes reported by month or by year in the form of a rape rate based on population estimates\textsuperscript{36}. While refugee populations figures are provided by UNHCR on yearly, monthly and even weekly basis, it the opinion of the evaluators that these numbers should not necessarily be taken at face value for a number of reasons:

- Many of the UNHCR and IPs staff and others we spoke with in Dadaab felt that the population figures for the three camps, even immediately after revalidation exercises, were considerably higher than the actual number of residents in the camps. We were told of busloads and truckloads of people arriving in Dadaab from as far away as Nairobi to ensure that they were counted in the revalidation exercise of March 2000, although they do not actually reside in the camps;

- We were also told that the revalidation exercise saw some families and individuals registering more than once under different identifies, or busloads of school children being brought in from Garissa to help augment family size. Apparently, the fact that non-Somali staff of CARE and HCR cannot tell which Somalis are local and which are refugees, which are going through several times,

\textsuperscript{35} While somewhat dated, Obi N.I. Ebbe discussion in the World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems, State University of New York at Brockport, 1993 provides an illustration of the way some criminal justice systems place responsibility and blame on women victims, rather than on rapists. Social, legal and institutional factors, in many areas in the world, combine to create a climate in which very few rape survivors may be willing to bring their cases to the police: “In 1989, there were 309 reports of rape to the Kenya police, for a rate of 1.3 per 100,000 population. Although rape is a very serious offence in Kenya, date-rape is not a crime. This is because the culture provides that a woman should stay away from a man who has no ties of consanguinity with her. If she is invited by a man who has no blood relationship with her, she should know that a demand for sexual favor will be a likely prospect. If she does not expect to yield to the possible sexual demand of the invitee, she should decline the invitation. Therefore, in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and many other countries in Africa south of the Sahara, it is inherently contradictory and ridiculous for a woman to report that she was raped by her friend or boyfriend who invited her for a date. The cultures of these countries send a message to women, “Beware in responding to a man’s invitation. If you accept the invitation, then you pick the consequences”.”

\textsuperscript{36} In national statistics, the rape rate is generally calculated by dividing the number of reported cases by the population size (generally based on census data), and multiplying this figure by 100,000. This gives the number of reported cases per 100,000 of the population. National crime assume a static population over long periods of time (four years between censuses), which is itself far from the reality of the situation, and also very different from the shifting refugee population figures routinely reported for Dadaab.
under different identifies, is a source for some overestimation of the actual camp population;

- One of the chief arguments used by GTZ in discussion with the evaluators as to why it is providing more firewood per household than might be observed from the numbers is that the actual number of residents in the camp is quite a bit lower than the official statistics;

- Reporting by UNHCR on population figures may also contain inaccuracies, as do many of the documents we have examined in the course of this evaluation. For example, in March 2000, immediately after the revalidation exercise, Sub-Office reported population figures for Ifo and Hagadera that are identical, to the person, despite the fact that it is highly unlikely that the two camps have exactly the same population, and Ifo is generally thought to be slightly larger in population than Hagadera.

241. In general, it can be said that there are clear reasons that can lead to an overestimation of the camps’ population, both from the point of view of bona fide refugees who must survive on limited rations, as well as Kenyans residents who would like the opportunity for resettlement that refugee status offers. Whatever the case, it is not the population of registered refugees that concerns us here but the actual numbers of refugees resident in the camps. Those numbers appear to be unknown, and unknowable for the purpose of this evaluation. This might in part explain why UNHCR and its implementing partners themselves only report on the raw frequency of reported rape incidents, rather than a standardised rate.

242. Therefore, based on the ambiguities and issues involved in estimating the actual population of camp residents, we have refrained from giving a false sense of accuracy which can result from the attempt to standardise frequencies in the form of a rape rate, based on population figures that are themselves questionable. It might be safer for the reader to imagine a population in the general vicinity of 100,000 for the past few years, and take the population figures supplied as potentially suggestive of trends, but not a certainty.

243. At the request of UNHCR, we have calculated rape rates in Table 5.1, but the variation in the resulting table, both by year and by source of the data on rape reports should only serve to alert the reader to the fact that it is rather difficult to denote a clear or unidirectional trend in the changing rape rates.

244. Both the frequency and rates of reported rape in Dadaab are highly variable, by year and by month, as illustrated in Table 5.1 and 5.2 (below). The camps having been in existence for close to a decade, we can see that year-by-year, there is significant variation in the number of rapes reported to implementing partners and the police. While it is observable from Table 5.1 that the numbers and rates of rape in Dadaab have declined since 1997-1998, the current rate of rape is also higher than that reported for 1995 or 1996 (according to GTZ’s statistics), prior to the introduction of the Firewood Project.

37 If the actual population of camp residents is indeed closer to 100,000, then the raw rape frequencies can be considered relatively comparable from period to period.
245. Over the years, discrepancies have also existed between numbers of rapes reported by different agencies in Dadaab; it appears that the category of ‘sexual and gender-based violence’ (SGV), which includes rape and a wide variety of different forms of violence, may be confusing analysts and agencies’ staff. Some analyses may have confused reporting on rape and attempted rape with other or all forms of SGV.

Table 5.1 Reported incidents and rate of rape by year - 1994 – 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents reported by UNHCR*</th>
<th>Rape Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>Incidents reported by GTZ**</th>
<th>Rape Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>Estimated Camp pop***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>101,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>113,299</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>122,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>107,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>109,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>121,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
* UNHCR reported rape incidents from End of Mission Report by I. Muema, Community Services Consultant, Dadaab, December 2000, and E. Olang, UNHCR legal consultant, February 2001, based on figures provided by CARE.
** Comparison figures from GTZ/UNHCR, Final Progress Report, February 2000, and Orono, March 1999.
*** Estimated rates calculated per 100,000 population: for 1995 to 1999 using population figures provided by Orono, 1999 p. 8-9. For 1999, estimates provided by evaluators based on Sub-Office Monthly Field Monitoring Reports. For 2000, estimate based on the results of the revalidation exercise completed in March 2000.

246. Despite this issue, we cannot account for the differences between the rape statistics reported by Orono and GTZ, as compared with those reported by Muema, hired as Community Services Consultant under the Ted Turner SGV project in 2000. The evaluators can only say that for 1998 and 1999, there are many errors in reporting of rape statistics by GTZ, a situation that should be understood and corrected38. This is an important issue, considering that no one in UNHCR has observed or requested correction of these inconsistencies and errors. Despite signs that Sub-Office Dadaab takes the issue of rape seriously, its staff have passed on a range of inaccuracies found in GTZ-UNHCR documents to higher levels within the organisation.

38 Rape statistics provided monthly for 1999 in the Annex to GTZ’s final progress report (February 2000) bear little resemblance to the monthly summaries prepared by the SGV focal point in CARE.
While the rape statistics provided by various sources are not identical, they demonstrate a similar trend: Orono describes a particularly high number of reported incidence towards the end of 1993 (87 cases reported in only three months from October to the end of December), followed by a low point in 1995, increasing again to peak at 164 (or 149 according to Muema) by the end of 1998. Both Muema and GTZ’s figures, as reported in Annex A of the Project’s Final Progress Report of February 2000, describe a significant reduction in reported rapes in 1999 and 2000, bringing levels back to something comparable to the 1994-95 period, prior to the introduction of the firewood project.

While many UNHCR staff at Branch and Sub-office have ascribed the decline in reported rape in mid-1998 directly to the Firewood Project, it is the assessment of the evaluators that the factors affecting the incidence of rape in Dadaab are too numerous and complex to infer such a direct causal relationship. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the timing of the first firewood delivery itself coincided with a general improvement in climatic and security conditions in the area; other factors, such as the institutional changes in reporting and coordination mechanisms for addressing rape and other forms of SGV may similarly have played a role in bringing down overall tally of reported rapes by reducing the risk of duplication of rape reports received by the different agencies working with refugee women in Dadaab. It is therefore revealing to consider not only the short- and medium-term trends associated with reported rape in Dadaab, but also the longer-term trends (along the lines presented in Table 5.1), which might help to qualify the impression of a strong direct and causal relationship between the Firewood Project and the rate of rape in Dadaab. However, given the rather large differences in the number of reported cases provided by these two sources cited in Table 5.1, it is difficult to establish the exact pattern of longer-term changes.

Timing of the firewood distribution and comparisons with the 1997-1998 period

The success of the Firewood project is invariably measured by UNHCR staff in relation to the very high incidence of rape and generalised violence that began to escalate in 1997 and peaked in the first half of 1998. By most accounts, two factors largely explain the heightened insecurity during this period. The first was the El Nino rains, which for two years created widespread flooding of the area. These floods rendered roads impassable, destroyed infrastructure, wiped out large numbers of livestock, and killed off much of the live thorn-bush fencing that had been planted around and within the camps as a measure to protect refugee households from attack by intruders from within and outside the refugee community. These floods strongly affected the mobility and effectiveness of agencies’ staff, as well as the ability of the police to effectively patrol the area.

A second, and perhaps more devastating factor was that of dramatic cuts to UNHCR’s budget for the Dadaab camps, which affected the provision of programming and services of all kinds. In 1997, CARE alone cut 40% of its staff and 60% of its incentive workers from within the refugee community. As well as affecting the quality of care and maintenance to refugees, these cuts meant a dramatic reduction in the amount of direct income to refugee households. These extremely difficult conditions led some refugees to opt for voluntary repatriation to Somalia. At the household level, these cuts may have prompted more women and girls to turn to self-collection of firewood where previously they may have had the means to purchase some, if not all of their firewood. The combined effect of severe flooding,
the loss of livestock, and fewer incentive jobs available to refugees are also seen by some agencies’ staff to have led to a marked increase in armed banditry activity in the area.

251. The early months of 1998 saw a recession of the floods and a resumption of more normal operations for the security forces and implementing agencies working in Dadaab. It is likely that the same factors, such as improved road conditions, that made it finally possible for the GTZ-UNHCR project to make the first firewood delivery after many months of delay, were also responsible for an improved overall security situation. It is therefore important to consider the success claimed by the project in the light of the extreme insecurity and critical economic difficulties facing both the refugee community and agencies working in the area that characterised the later part of 1997 and the early part of 1998.

Issues around the reporting of rape

252. The variations in the monthly or yearly rape figures that we will be exploring in this analysis reflect only those incidents reported to implementing partners and/or the police. In all countries and all contexts, it is generally accepted that the actual incidence of rape is considerably higher than what is reported. In most contexts, the costs to women may be felt to outweigh the benefits of reporting, in terms of stigmatisation, the added intrusion of repeated questioning by police and social workers, the sense of profound personal violation, degradation and shame for which formal ‘justice’ brings little sense of relief. However, in Dadaab, there is an added level of complexity related to the issue of reporting: opinions vary sharply as to how we should interpret the changing trends in reported rapes, and the degree to which present figures are in line with the actual occurrence of rape. Prior to discussing the impact of the firewood distribution on incidents of rape, we must also consider the factors affecting overall reporting rates and other measures/initiatives designed to improve these.

Somali culture

253. Under-reporting may be a serious problem in the Dadaab area, due to strong traditions of resolving conflicts within the Somali community and a history of mistrust and repression by police in the area. In addition, some have argued that there is a much higher level of under-reporting than in other contexts due to the high cost to women in Somali culture of being identified as a rape survivor:

254. “Somali women who have been raped face not only the physical and psychological trauma of rape, but also the likelihood of rejection by their families. A strong cultural stigma is attached to rape in Somalia, as elsewhere. In numerous cases, families have begged UNHCR officials to take their daughters to another camp after she has been raped because of the stigma on the family. In other cases, once a woman is raped, she is ostracised by her husband and isolated from her family.” (Africa Watch, 1993, p. 17)

Risks to physical security associated with reporting

255. Apart from cultural arguments about prevailing Somali attitudes towards rape survivors, there are also particular dangers linked to the context of widespread
insecurity and impunity described elsewhere in this report. Whether and what women report is closely tied to how safe they feel about reporting. Many women have been threatened by their assailants, and told that if they report or divulge information about the incident or his identity, he will come after them again: in several of the rape reports reviewed, the survivor describes that “He said if I reported the incident, he would come back and kill me”. In this sense, the police are often cited as part of the problem, rather than the solution: police inaction or complicity with bandits and rapists has been cited by refugee women as a main reason for not wanting to report to the police (see the following chapter).

256. Most rapists are never apprehended by the police and stories of those who have been apprehended and ‘escaped’ from police custody are well-known to refugee women. Clearly women who cannot be adequately protected by the police become doubly vulnerable for having reported a rape incident or a rapist. The factors of real threat of reporting and of the idea that in Somali culture women may be doubly victimised by rape would suggest a tendency in Dadaab towards under-reporting.

The question of false reporting of rape

257. While the previous factors tend to suggest that rape statistics should be seen as ‘the tip of the iceberg’, individuals interviewed have suggested that during specific periods, women’s reporting patterns may have been overly high, with some degree of false reporting encouraged particularly by special steps to resettle women victims of violence and rape. The Women Victims of Violence (WVV) project, with its special focus on addressing the situation of women victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence, was criticised for encouraging false reporting by assisting to resettle women on the basis that they were rape survivors. While is beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess whether the WVV led to a widespread situation of false reporting, the issue of false reporting apparently did not end with it. Minutes of the Inter-Agency Security Committee, which meets weekly at Sub-Office Dadaab, reveal occasional investigations into, what are sometimes concluded to be false reports. This, combined with the fact that often the police are the last to hear of reported incidents of rape, as well as occasional cases of reports to camp police not being communicated to the police station in Dadaab, may act to increase the perception of false-reporting on the part of police: “The OCS noted that some refugees were presenting incidences of rape for purposes of securing resettlement…[The Protection Officer] confirmed that rape may lead to resettlement but that it is not automatic, as other protection criteria have to be met.” (Minutes of the Inter-Agency Security Committee, 01/08/2000)

258. In 2000 one case of a false report actually went to trial, and the woman was found guilty and convicted: “A refugee woman who cheated the Police at Ifo that she was raped was jailed for three years. She will serve the jail term outside the prison in view of her ill health.” (Minutes of the Inter-Agency Security Committee, 12/07/2000) Despite this case, the evaluation team believes that CARE’s Community Services has been extremely diligent in following up reported rapes and that false claims, should they occur, are unlikely to find their way into the official statistics compiled by the SGV focal point in CARE.

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**Improvements in reporting of rape cases**

259. Under the period covered by the Firewood Project, CARE’s Vulnerable Women and Children (WVC) Supervisor has been largely responsible, as SGV focal point, for co-ordinating information gathering on SGV cases and its sharing between agencies (CARE, GTZ, MSF, NCCK, UNHCR and the police) in Dadaab. This has helped to provide sound information, both on the frequency of rape, as well as on the details regarding the survivors, perpetrators and the circumstances of the incidents, which is an essential condition for any monitoring of the effectiveness of the various activities directed at addressing the incidence of SGV in the camps. CARE should be congratulated for its efforts in compiling and following-up on details of accounts of each incident, which have helped in some cases to identify the perpetrators and bring them to trial.

260. However, the quality of information currently available has not always been maintained. A difficulty for this evaluation has been the fact that rape reports from the pre-project period (prior to July 1998) have provided minimal information upon which to base a real comparison of the characteristics of rape incidents between the pre-project and project periods. Prior to the period covered by the Firewood Project, low levels of co-ordination and cross-verification by implementing partners, UNHCR and the police may have led to distortions and confusion in the rape statistics, as revealed by an analysis carried out by a UNHCR intern in the spring of 1998. This analysis indicates for the month of January 1998, in which there were 26 reported rapes and 5 reported attempted rapes, that NCCK reported 25 cases, MSF 17 cases, CARE 16 cases, and the police 16 cases. The analysis reveals two cases of duplicate reports from women using different names. The present context, which correctly emphasises the sharing of information between all agencies, may discourage a few reports from women who for some reason do not want their cases known by all or any particular agency. While the rape survivor may report to MSF, CARE or NCCK for the purpose of getting medical attention, counselling and/or other services, reporting may be forgone if it is seen as too closely linked with reporting to the police.

**Reporting of ‘firewood-related’ as opposed to other types of rape**

261. Related to the factors above, there may be bias in favour of refugee women reporting rapes which occur in the bush, such as those while women are collecting firewood, as opposed to other rapes, occurring when women are alone or in cases where the rapist is known to them. A review of rape records and interviews with Anti-Rape Committee members and refugee leaders indicate that a common pattern in firewood-related rapes is that the incident is known within the camp, even before the woman makes it back to her block. A rapist, alone or in a group of men comes upon a group of women, who immediately scatter and run back to camp; one woman is raped by the assailant(s) while the others may alert community members, block and section leaders and/or members of the anti-rape committee. If a woman’s family and community already know that she has been raped, and she no longer has the

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40 The 16 cases reported by the police were from Ifo only, despite the fact that CARE reported six cases from Hagadera and Dagahale had also been made to the police.

41 In the records reviewed from 1998 on, we found few cases where rapes were reported to CARE and not also to the police, and these few cases were all in the first six months of 1998.
choice of hiding the fact, she may be more likely to go through the formal process of filing a report.

262. Alternatively, in cases where the perpetrator is known, traditional conflict resolution methods continue to be practised, such as maslaha, whereby the family and clansmen of the perpetrator will ‘settle’ disputes with the family of the survivor through payment in livestock (the standard ‘fine’ for rape among the Somalis is four cows, aged two to three years), other goods, or through forced marriage of an unmarried woman to the perpetrator of the rape. Such complexities further confuse the issue of the real proportion of bush-rapes by unknown assailants and in-camp rapes by perpetrators known to the survivor and her family.

263. Such issues are relevant and important in any attempt to assess the ‘success’ of strategies, such as the Firewood Project, designed to reduce the incidence of rape. Are we dealing with a situation in which all, some or very few rape cases are reported? Are all types of rape equally likely to be reported? Interviews with CARE Community Services staff indicated a high degree of confidence that women are reporting a very large number, if not all cases of rape. It appears that IPs’ staff who work most closely with refugee leaders and rape survivors, and in particular CARE’s WVC Supervisor, have succeeded in gaining the confidence of the refugee community and are working effectively with camp committees to promote the idea that rapes should be reported, while respecting the decision of individual women who choose not to report.

264. On the other hand, we were told by some refugee leaders of frequent night-time attacks on refugees’ homes, involving rape, torture and robbery that continue to go unreported, suggesting that not enough is being done to improve the security of the refugee community within the camps. It is our sense that the work of UNHCR and IP’s since 1993 to change attitudes in the refugee population towards rape survivors and to encourage women who have been raped to report have succeeded in improving the overall reporting rate. There may however be a greater tendency towards under-reporting of rapes that can be hidden and for which there are no witnesses, as well as those which are traditionally ‘settled’ or negotiated within the community by elders.

265. Overall, the evaluation team considers that given some level of uncertainty about the actual versus the reported level of rape, and the complex interplay of factors that have generated present numbers on rape and attempted rape, an assessment of the impacts of the firewood project on the frequency of rape and attempted rape should be taken with some degree of scepticism. As should be clear from the sections above, it is difficult to estimate the direct impact of the firewood distribution on the incidence of rape and attempted rape in the Dadaab area. There are a range of different interventions that all impact simultaneously (including variations in the frequency and locations of police patrols, income generating activities, live-fencing, training workshops, presence of the mobile courts, etc.), and the Sub-Office appears to have no unified framework for assessing the relative effectiveness of these different measures. The firewood project itself, has given relatively little attention to monitoring on an ongoing basis the social and economic characteristics of the women and girls who continue to make weekly forays to the bush to collect firewood. There is also a wide variance in the frequency of all violent

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42 In only 13% of the rape reports reviewed by the evaluators were there no witnesses and in half the cases reviewed there were two or more witnesses to the incident.
acts, including rape, assault, murder and armed banditry, that appears to follow a complex pattern that is difficult for agencies staff to explain in any systematic manner.

**Relationship between rape and firewood collection, August 1998 - September 2000**

266. Table 5.2, which covers a period of 30 months since the beginning of the project, shows that there were 16 months in which firewood was provided (albeit in different quantities), and 14 months when it was not. Based on an analysis of rape reports compiled by CARE, the total number of rapes and attempted rapes during the 16 months in which firewood was distributed is 118, which yields an average of 7.4 reports per month, while the total number of rapes and attempted rapes for the months of without distribution is 85, yielding an average of 6.1 reported incidents per month, suggesting that there are fewer rapes when firewood is not distributed than when it is. While this is the format chosen by GTZ for reporting the results of the project (see Annex of Final Progress Report, Feb. 2000), such a superficial comparison is likely to bias our understanding of the impacts of the firewood distribution project, as distributions vary considerably as to the quantity of firewood distributed and when distributions fall in a given month. Distributions which take place late in the month could only be expected to affect the rate rape in the following month. However, an overall observation is that monthly firewood distribution does not go very far towards explaining variations in the trends related to reported incidents of rape and attempted rape over the period covered by the project.

**Methodological basis for the analysis of impacts of the firewood project on rape**

267. As described in the methodology section of the Introduction and Background Chapter, the evaluation undertook an analysis of 291 reported SGV incidents beginning in January 1998, seven months prior to the first firewood delivery, to mid-September 2000, just prior to the arrival of the evaluation team in Dadaab. Of the 291 SGV cases reviewed, 266 (91.4%) were cases of rape, 22 (7.6%) were cases of attempted rape, and 3 (1%) were cases of domestic violence (husbands assaulting their wives). The files we reviewed included no reported incidents of other forms of sexual and gender based violence (SGV).

268. While sexual and gender-based violence is a broad concept which takes many forms in Dadaab, including female genital mutilation (FGM), forced or early marriage, abductions, rape and sexual assault, the evaluation terms of reference and the objectives of the firewood project have focused our attention specifically on the analysis of rape and attempted rape incidents. Below, these are analysed together, since we are interested here not in a legal distinction but in the characteristics of survivors, perpetrators and the incidents themselves. The attempted rapes share all the same characteristics of actual rapes - the only difference being the twist of fate that allows the survivor to escape from the assailant prior to rape taking place. Similarly, our review of 291 SGV cases involved 55 reported cases of “defilement,” the rape of a minor. Under Kenyan law defilement carries a maximum sentence of 14 years, a less severe punishment than the rape of an adult woman. Our analysis will include all of these defilement cases, as they do not tend to differ significantly from incidents involving adult women, except in a couple of cases of very small children.
Table 5.2: General firewood distribution and reported incidents of rape and attempted rape, July 1998 - December 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Firewood Distributed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul '98</td>
<td>July 24-28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug '98</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep '98</td>
<td>September 8-11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct '98</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '98</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec '98</td>
<td>December 7-10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan '99</td>
<td>January 1-12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb '99</td>
<td>Feb 23-27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr '99</td>
<td>April 22-25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '99</td>
<td>May 29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun '99</td>
<td>June 26-29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Aug '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Oct '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec '99</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan '00</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Feb '00</td>
<td>February 1-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar '00</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr '00</td>
<td>April 10-13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '00</td>
<td>May 9-12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun '00</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul '00</td>
<td>July 5-8 and 26-28</td>
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<td>Aug '00</td>
<td>August 26-29</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep '00</td>
<td>September 21-30</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct '00</td>
<td>October 9-12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '00</td>
<td>November 9-12</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec '00</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>203*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* It should be noted that while in December 2000, I. Muema identified a total of 74 cases of reported rape in 2000, E. Olang, legal consultant at SO Dadaab reports 82 cases of reported rape for 2000.

Therefore, our sample of rape and attempted rape cases from January 1998 to September 2000 includes 288 reported cases. Of these 115 took place prior to the introduction of the project, and 173 took place after the first firewood delivery. However, our analysis below at times deals with fewer numbers of cases, as many of the rape reports reviewed did not provide the relevant information. For each
analytic step undertaken, we therefore provide the number of missing cases for which key information was unavailable.

*Estimating direct project impacts*

270. The firewood intervention was not designed to have an effect on the overall incidence of rape and attempted rape in Dadaab. It was conceived and designed only to impact the incidence of rape or attempted rape while women and children are collecting firewood, by supplying a portion of annual household firewood consumption.

271. We have therefore attempted to test the hypothesis put to us by individuals within GTZ, UNHCR and CARE that the project causes rapes to go down in the period immediately after a distribution. To do that, we have calculated a period of ‘coverage’ based on the figures provided by GTZ on metric tons of firewood given out per distribution and existing estimates of refugee firewood consumption patterns (GTZ, Owen, 1998), as shown in the Table 2.2 above. In the first two columns of this table, we show the dates and amounts of firewood distributed by GTZ. The last two columns show the number of days by distribution that firewood should last, based on the 1 kilogram per person per day estimate which is frequently used as an estimate of ‘need’, and the 1.5 kilogram per person per day estimate, which is much closer to actual consumption patterns in the Dadaab camps.

272. Based on these estimates of days the firewood should last, we have calculated a period of ‘coverage’ by the project – the period during which we can assume the refugee household is fully stocked with wood. As we can see from the totals above, the period of coverage is between 87 and 130 days out of a total period of 800 days. For the purpose of our analysis, the ‘period of coverage’ begins halfway through the distribution period and extends for the number of days calculated for each distribution and for each level of wood consumption.

273. The cross-tabulations below show the relationship between the frequency of reported rape or attempted rape and the ‘period of coverage’ – the period during and immediately following the firewood distribution when households are assumed to be using their GTZ–provided wood. They compare the period of coverage with the period of non-coverage in terms of the number of rapes reported to have occurred while the survivor was collecting firewood as opposed to cases in which the survivor was doing something else: e.g., sleeping in her home, tending animals, travelling for personal or business reasons.

*Direct reduction in rapes occurring during firewood collection*

274. The results indicate that the incidence of rape during firewood collection is somewhat lower during the ‘period of coverage’, and statistical tests indicate that

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43 Since the first firewood delivery to mid-September 2000.
44 For example, for the first distribution (July 24-28) the period of coverage is calculated from July 26 and extends either for 8.1 (at the 1 kg level) or 5.5 days (at the 1.5 kg level of consumption).
45 The following analysis requires that we hold constant the camps’ population, despite the fact that there is some variance in the population figures reported by UNHCR over this period. Nevertheless, and particularly in light of our uncertainties regarding the actual number of camp residents (as outlined at beginning of this chapter), we feel it to be sound as a measure of direct impact of the firewood distribution on the reported frequency of rape.
this difference is not likely to be due purely to chance. Between 7 (Cross-tabulation 5.1.) and 11 rapes (Cross-tabulation 5.2.) were reported to have occurred while collecting firewood during the period of coverage, as opposed to between 100 and 104, depending on our assumptions about firewood consumption by refugees in Dadaab. A rate of rape can be calculated to compare the frequency of rapes while collecting firewood for those periods when households are fully supplied by firewood with a rate of rape while collecting firewood when households are not supplied, by dividing the number of rapes by the number of days in the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-Tabulation 5.1: Period covered by firewood distribution with consumption estimated at 1 kilogram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While collecting wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While doing something else</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from rape records data. Missing data on 11 cases.

Assuming daily consumption of firewood at the 1.5 kg level, daily rape rates during firewood collection are .08 for the coverage period and .146 for the non-coverage period. This represents a decrease in rapes while collecting firewood of 45.2%, meaning that during the days households are assumed to be fully-supplied with firewood we see a decrease of 45.2% of rapes while collecting firewood. (See Table 5.3)

**Chi-Square Tests for 1 kg pp per day level of consumption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>9.864</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>8.470</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>9.199</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>9.803</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Computed only for a 2x2 table
b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.19.

**Chi-Square Tests for 1.5 kg pp per day level of consumption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>5.049</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>3.855</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>4.674</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>5.018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Computed only for a 2x2 table
b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.04.
Cross Tabulation 5.2: Period covered by firewood distribution with consumption estimated at 1.5 kilograms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>During coverage period</th>
<th>Outside coverage period</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While collecting wood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While doing something else</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from rape records data. missing data on 11 cases.

This decrease is in line with the hypothesis put forward by GTZ and others within HCR and CARE that we should see a decrease in the number of rapes during firewood collection in the days following a general distribution. However, a number of refugee women and children continue to collect firewood during the period of full coverage, and rapes while collecting firewood continue to be reported, as indicated by the 54.8% of remaining cases.

Table 5.3: Daily frequency of reported rape by period of project coverage and non-coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumption level</th>
<th>During coverage period</th>
<th>Outside coverage period</th>
<th>% difference in frequency of reported rape between periods of coverage and non-coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>While wood collecting 1.5 kg</td>
<td>7/87=.08</td>
<td>104/713=.146</td>
<td>Decrease of 45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 kg</td>
<td>11/130=.084</td>
<td>100/670=.149</td>
<td>Decrease of 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While doing something else 1.5 kg</td>
<td>9/87=.103</td>
<td>42/713=.058</td>
<td>Increase of 77.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 kg</td>
<td>15/130=.115</td>
<td>36/670=.054</td>
<td>Increase of 113%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All rapes 1.5 kg</td>
<td>16/87=.18</td>
<td>146/713=.2</td>
<td>Decrease of 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 kg</td>
<td>26/130=.2</td>
<td>136/670=.2</td>
<td>No difference in tot. reported rapes by coverage period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from evaluation rape records data provided by CARE and wood distribution data provided by GTZ.

By way of explanation for these findings, we can say that basis for the project and the hypothesis advanced by GTZ and others assumes that households use most of the GTZ-provided wood in the days immediately following the distribution, and therefore do not continue to collect firewood during the ‘coverage’ period. However, given that the wood provided by GTZ is considered to be of very
high quality, consisting of larger pieces of longer-burning hardwood from areas further away than women and children can normally travel, it might also be the case that some households choose to use the higher quality wood more slowly, and continue to collect wood from the bush to help stretch their supply. Another explanation may be that those women who are collecting for commercial purposes and who rely on firewood collection as a basic source of income continue to collect during this period. Whatever the case, regardless of the level of firewood consumption we choose to use, it is likely that the project has led to a decrease in the number of rapes perpetrated while women and children are collecting firewood.

Unanticipated findings

278. An unanticipated finding is that during the period of coverage, when households are fully supplied with firewood from GTZ, we see an increase in the reporting of rapes while women are ‘doing something else’. Using the 1.5 kg estimate for consumption, rapes while women are doing other things increase by 77.6% during the coverage period. This finding is quite surprising, and a little counter-intuitive, if we assume, as some UNHCR and project staff seem to have done, that the problem of rape is directly related to firewood collection. Two explanations for this finding are that refugee women and children may use the additional time available while their firewood needs are met to go to the bush for other items – such a poles for their tukuls (huts), grasses or other items for sale. The other is that there is also an increase in reported rapes taking place inside the camp during the coverage period. Depending on the coverage estimate used, as many as a third of all rapes in the camp in the 800 day period reviewed took place during the coverage period.

279. This finding is particularly interesting in the light of past experiences, such as that with the WVV project, which focused on addressing the high incidence of rape within the camps. Its success in the mid-1990s in terms of increasing security inside the camps, was seen by agencies’ staff to have led to a corresponding increase in rapes in the bush, so frequently associated with firewood collection. This relationship should re-enforce our understanding that firewood collection represents one opportunity among many for rape to occur. It implies that, where there is little chance that they will be caught and punished, would-be rapists will seek out alternative places to carry out their attacks. It should direct our attention towards the fact that in Dadaab, perpetrators of violence are rarely made to account for their actions, and in this context, opportunities will always exist for rape to be carried out.

Small difference in the overall frequency of rapes between coverage and non-coverage periods

280. Another unanticipated finding, which goes to the direct impact of the firewood distribution project, derives from the findings described in the previous sections. The overall frequency of reported rape decreases during the coverage period, when households are fully-supplied with firewood, by at best a 10% difference in the incidence of all rapes, and at worst, no difference at all (see Table 5.3, above). As we have seen above, on a month-to-month and year-to-year basis, the frequency of rape and other forms of violence vary considerably – but firewood

47 Another explanation, although impossible to verify based on present information, is that patterns of reporting are also changing simultaneously, as indeed they most probably have been since the mid-1990s under efforts of IP and UNHCR staff to encourage reporting (see Issues Around Rape Reporting, above).
provision does not appear to be directly responsible for a major change in either the short-term or longer-term rape trends. The difference of 10% in overall incidents of reported rapes during periods when households are fully supplied, is quite far from the 68% decrease in rapes reported by GTZ-UNHCR. The 45% decrease during periods of full supply in reported rapes taking place while women are engaged in firewood collection, should alert us to the on-going need among some groups of women and girls for the income they derive from firewood collection. Therefore even 100% firewood supply by UNHCR, at the exorbitant cost this would entail, might only marginally decrease the rate rape while doing little to address the need for income that underlies women’s patterns of firewood collection.

**Indirect impacts on the incidence of rape**

281. Another hypothesis proposed by individuals in GTZ is that the project impacts on rape in the bush may be indirect. According to GTZ, the project involves a great deal of labour on the part of refugees and locals. GTZ suggested that rapes in the bush decrease as a result of employment opportunities for local and refugee men who might otherwise turn to banditry and whose idleness has been linked to rape. Accordingly, the CASA team has tested this hypothesis by using data provided by GTZ on the period when labourers and contractors have been actively involved in firewood gathering and delivery in the bush and correlating that information with the precise dates of reported rapes in the bush. Based on this analysis there appears to be no significant difference in the rape rate during the work periods associated with firewood supply contracts, which according to GTZ, covers approximately half of 1999 and most of 2000. However, the social and economic benefits associated with creating employment opportunities for local people and refugees cannot be discounted, and may be an important indirect benefit and positive impact of the Firewood Project.

**Reduction of women’s and girls’ household workload**

282. An unintended, but positive impact of the project has likely been a lightening of refugee women and girls’ workload in some households. As has been described above, the project has provided households with high quality firewood that may burn longer than the types of wood women can collect locally. This firewood distribution therefore may have reduced to the number of trips to the bush made by some women and girls who collect firewood for home consumption or for sale. This can be a time-consuming and physically demanding activity, involving walking many kilometres under the hot sun. For other households, which previously purchased all of their firewood, the amount supplied by GTZ has likely increased their discretionary income, permitting more spending on other goods. As will be discussed in the following chapter, household income plays a large role in determining who are the women and girls making most frequent trips to the bush for firewood.

283. Any reduction in women’s workload should be seen as positive, and may increase the amount of time women have to rest or relax or, more likely, permit them to take on additional training or income generating activities through which to improve the condition of their families. Low levels of literacy and formal schooling among Somali women may place a limit on alternative strategies to create alternative income generating opportunities for them, and any training for alternative income
generation should be seen as an important strategy for providing sustainable alternatives to firewood collection for income purposes. Existing and expanded efforts to provide training and credit to vulnerable refugee women to develop alternative income generating activities, as currently implemented under the Ted Turner SGV project, should also be accompanied by rigorous efforts to expand the market for goods and services produced by refugee women.

284. Somali girls’ school attendance, relative to that of boys, remains low although it has improved over recent years. As of September 2000, girls’ school attendance at the primary level was 8,905 versus 13,390 boys, and at the secondary level 3 girls to 122 boys. As with WFP’s interventions to assist vulnerable refugee women and promote girls’ school attendance, the firewood distribution could be more fully incorporated into a broader strategy to assist the poorest women and girls who wish to receive training or further their education, by providing wood-for-work opportunities and wood-for-education opportunities to encourage families to forego their daughters’ labour in favour of keeping them in school.

Dangers of linking firewood and rape

285. As we have examined in previous sections of this report, the firewood project may have had unintended but negative impacts on rape in the bush by increasing the dollar-value of firewood collection and politicising refugee women’s collection activities. As local ‘bandits’ in the bush are often said to have familial and clan links to firewood contractors in the area, some may see their role as defending the interest of local firewood entrepreneurs. Since the introduction of the project, at least two cases of rape have been reported in which the perpetrators questioned the survivors as to why they were collecting firewood when it is provided to them by GTZ. This is but one indication that consistently linking the issue of rape to firewood provision may increase rather than decrease conflict with the local community as the monetary value of firewood to the local population has increased significantly under the Project.

Impact on women’s income

286. A potential adverse effect of the “life-line” distribution model that has received far too little attention from UNHCR and GTZ as part of their project monitoring activities has been the impact of the project on the poorest refugee women and girls. As discussed in further detail in the following chapter, the evidence from Dadaab, as well as other refugee settings in Africa shows that not all female refugees are equally involved in firewood collection, and hence are not equally at risk of firewood-related rape. Studies, such as a Save the Children Fund (SCF) socio-economic assessment in Uganda, have demonstrated that it is generally the poorest 40% of women and girls who are engaged in firewood collection for sale. Similar SCF studies in Dadaab have confirmed that firewood collection and retail sale are typically carried out by the poorer refugee women. A potential risk associated with free supply of firewood is that of lowering its market value, and

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48 CARE Kenya, Refugee Assistance Project SITREP – August 21 to September 20, 2000. p.34.
49 Save the Children Fund’s Socio-economic Assessment of refugee camps in Uganda documented that most of the firewood collected for sale in those camps was supplied by the poorest women, who made up 40% of the female population (reported to us by Sarah Norton-Stall, Child Specialist, HCR Regional Service Centre, Nairobi).
hence increasing the number of trips required by commercial firewood collectors (including poorer women) to maintain the same level of income.

287. This evaluation has been unable to determine the exact trend related to changing market prices for firewood in the Dadaab camps relative to other commodities, and different sources provide contradictory evidence for this. For instance, in December 1998, Owen reported that the project, by increasing the demand for donkey-carts to be involved in commercial supply was pushing firewood prices up in the local markets. On the other hand, Orono (1999, p. 23) reports that: “the price of firewood in the small markets has gone down because of the presence of firewood supplied by GTZ. A donkey cart (200-250 kgs) of firewood before the firewood distribution was Kenya shillings 500; now the same donkey cart of firewood is Kenya shillings 250 only. And during firewood distribution days it goes down by twenty shillings”.

288. The Project has not collected adequate baseline data on this point, and virtually no project monitoring has been done in Dadaab to ascertain the characteristics of women making frequent firewood collection trips. More detailed project monitoring should be carried out to ascertain if the most vulnerable women are in fact making more, rather than fewer trips to the bush as a result of lower market prices influenced by the “life-line” distribution model.

Perception of firewood as ‘the solution’ or the ‘temporary fix’

289. A possible negative impact of the firewood distribution on addressing the problem of rape is that for many, firewood provision has deflected attention and resources from other pressing and fundamental issues. Firewood has come to be seen by many as ‘the solution’ to the problem of rape; several persons interviewed suggested to us that only 100% firewood provision would really solve the problem. This is both an unrealistic and short-sighted suggestion, when we consider the high cost incurred thus far for the provision of a very small proportion of refugee wood consumption, and the limited results, in terms of rape reduction, that have been achieved.

290. Others have described the Firewood Project as a short-term ‘technical fix’ designed to give UNHCR time to develop more ‘sustainable solutions’. However, the resources and vision needed to develop those sustainable solutions are needed now, and the two-and-a-half year period under the “life-line” distribution system has created expectations, both on the part of the local contractors and the refugees themselves, that UNHCR can and should assume responsibility for solving this problem in this manner. There is a danger that the temporary and ‘technical fix’ has already become institutionalised, to the point that meaningful adjustments to it may be very difficult to make.

291. A conclusion drawn from the findings described above is that firewood collection has presented an important opportunity, rather than the cause, for attacks on and rapes of refugee women and children in Dadaab. As will be described elsewhere in this report, and according to a variety of commentators, UNHCR has attempted to protect refugee women and girls and ‘contain’ the rape, without clearly articulating the nature of the problem50. As will be discussed further elsewhere, the

50 With the exception of Crisp (1999).
real cause of rape and other forms of violence in the area appears to be the impunity of rapists and perpetrators of violent crimes, who are tolerated and harboured within the local and refugee community, and the ineffectiveness of GOK police and security forces in fulfilling their protection mandate. The real challenge to UNHCR appears to be how to work effectively with these groups, to increase the social and punitive costs associated with rape and to strengthen their capacities to take action towards preventing and discouraging rape wherever it may occur.
Analysis of rape data and risk factors

292. The way the Firewood Project has been implemented has assumed an equality of risk among the female population of the refugee camps. The equal wood ration, based only on family size and the holding of a UNHCR ration card is therefore justified as the main way firewood is distributed. This section presents our analyses of the rape records for Dadaab in an effort to identify any risk factors associated with being a survivor of rape, and hence associated with being at risk for rape. These include the age, clan, and camp of the survivor. We also examine secondary data on and female headed households, and on socio-economic differences within the camps. Based mainly on a survey conducted for the purposes of this evaluation, we examine the extent to which firewood self-collection patterns and firewood purchase vary among and within the camp populations. Issues related to Project Monitoring, and to identifying alternative solutions based on the characteristics and behaviour of perpetrators are also outlined.

Characteristics of rape survivors

293. Of the 288 reported cases of rape and attempted rape, only two were reported by women and girls who are were not ethnic Somali. Both these cases appear to be of Ethiopian women. As is widely acknowledged by both refugees and agencies working in Dadaab, rape tends to be a problem mainly affecting the Somali population, as other ethnic groups have effectively organised themselves such that men carry out or accompany women on firewood collection trips.

Children and youth

294. Rape is a phenomenon affecting women and girls of all ages in Dadaab. Children and minors under the age of 18 represent a significant proportion of survivors, both while collecting firewood and while doing other things. There are five cases of small children, between one- and five-years old, being defiled at home, within the blocks, or lured from the block to the outskirts of the camp to be defiled. Children this young appear to be more vulnerable within the camps, and are often defiled (raped) by perpetrators known to them or their family.

295. Generally these incidents occur either at night, while sleeping, or during the day when their mothers are occupied away from the home. As described above, CARE Community Services staff feel that the fact that the year 2000 saw an unprecedented number of defilements reported does not mean that such cases a new development, but that girls and mothers increasingly feel it is appropriate to report them. This can be seen as a success in the overall strategy to combat SGV within the Dadaab camps.

296. Rape associated with firewood collection appears to become an issue for girls as of the age of about 10 years, when they go out to collect in groups of young girls or with their mothers or clanswomen. This is particularly the case for the
poorest households, who rely heavily on the economic contribution of girls towards meeting household needs.

<p>| Table 6.1: Age by activity at the time of the incident: collecting wood or other activities, 1998 - September 2000 |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>While wood collecting</th>
<th>While doing something else</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 12 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-17 years</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24 years</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34 years</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39 years</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and older</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Evaluation analysis of rape records, missing age data on 36 cases out of 288.

297. Early marriage being a common phenomenon in the camps, girls of 15 or 16, if not younger, are often married and starting families of their own. CARE, WFP and NCCK are involved in working with the community around the issue of early marriage and promoting girls’ primary and secondary school attendance which tends to be very low, and the Firewood Distribution project could be better co-ordinated with these efforts. By providing firewood to families who keep their daughters in school, GTZ-UNHCR is not only reducing the risk to these girls to rape in the bush, but also providing a value-added in terms of meeting other pressing program objectives.

Women

298. In terms of rapes while collecting firewood, the 30-34 age group seems to be at higher risk that other groups. This may be related to the fact that women in this age group may have larger family sizes and hence require more wood. They may also be more frequently engaging in firewood collection for sale, as well as home consumption, which means more frequent trips to the bush. However, we have no adequate data that allows us to correlate the age-structure and socio-economic structure of the camps to identify why, specifically, this group is more at-risk of rape while collecting firewood.

Camp

299. The camp in which a woman or girl resides appears to be a strong factor in explaining her risk of exposure to rape in general, and rape while collecting firewood in particular.

300. Despite the fact that the population size of Ifo and Hagadera reported to be identical at the time of the revalidation exercise carried out in March 2000, female residents of Hagadera report less than half the rapes than do the residents of Ifo. This
is true for the period both prior to and since the project. However, in the period since the introduction of the firewood project, women and girls in all camps are more likely to report rape while doing something other than collecting firewood. In all camps, but particularly in Hagadera, women are presently more likely to report being raped at home or within the camp. This was confirmed to us in interviews with women and men refugees from Hagadera who told of a very high level of violence within the camp, and the presence within the camp of an organised extortion ring that includes members of elected leaders within the camp security committee.

Table 6.2: Camp by activity at the time of the incident: January - July 1998 (seven months)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp where survivor lives</th>
<th>Rape occurred while collecting firewood</th>
<th>Rape occurred while doing something else</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Pop. size after 1998 revalidation exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hagadera</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ifo</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagahaley</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>108,691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Missing data on 25 cases.

Table 6.3: Camp by activity at the time of the incident: August 1998 – September 2000 (33 months) 51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp where survivor lives</th>
<th>Rape occurred while collecting wood</th>
<th>Rape occurred while doing something else</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Population at 2000 revalidation exercise52</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hagadera</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ifo</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>43,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagahaley</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>121,166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Missing data on 9 cases.

301. While it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to attempt to verify these allegations, members of the camp’s security committee were particularly singled out as being associated with a high level of violence, robbery, extortion and rape within the camp’s boundaries, and that police passivity was bought by this local ‘mafia’. In fact, the chairman of the security committee in one of the camps was named as the leader of this ring by several refugees, and he specifically misinformed evaluation team members about his clan identity.

51 The purpose of the Table 6.3 above is to provide a general indication of relationship between camp size and frequency and location of rape. While UNHCR statistics on camp sizes vary within the 33-month period described in this table, the difference in the populations between Hagadera and Ifo, according to Sub-Office Monthly Field Monitoring Reports, never exceeds 1000 persons during this period. This means that although the camps are comparable in size throughout the period, they vary significantly in terms of the numbers of reported rapes.

Little has been done by UNHCR to analyse and document significant differences between the camps, and the manner in which demographic and economic differences are related different security problems faced by camp residents. Yet, the bustling marketplace of Hagadera is one indication that the economic opportunities and resources available to this community distinguish it from Ifo and Dagahaley. In terms of clan composition and place of origin, Hagadera is also distinct, with a greater percentage of the population coming from urban areas in Somalia. Ifo and Dagahaley offer fewer economic opportunities to refugees, and have very different clan structures, as will be described below.

Ifo, which reports the highest level of rape and the highest level of rape while collecting firewood, is also located in marshland area, initially devoid of vegetation (after UNHCR clearing operations) and increasingly depleted by refugee collection of firewood and other materials. Given the combination of fewer economic opportunities and more difficult access to firewood in the immediate vicinity of the camp, women must go out farther and for longer periods in order to meet their needs for firewood than is the case in either Hagadera or Dagahaley.

A final factor that may be relevant in determining the risk of women and girls to rape is their block of residence within the camp. In particular, the evaluation team notes a very high level of rape reporting from residents of Ifo’s blocks A11 (8%) and A9 (3.2%), which account for 11% of all cases for which we have information on the survivors’ block. UNHCR should verify whether these percentages are proportional to the population size of these blocks, or whether and why residents of these blocks are at particular risk.

Clan

Clan seems to be another relevant factor in determining women’s overall vulnerability to rape. Our sample includes over 35 different sub-clans, with the majority being of the Ogaden group, which makes up the majority of inhabitants both within the camps and within the local population.

Historic clan rivalries and spill-over of inter- and intra-clan warfare are often given as the cause of rape in Dadaab. According to one hypothesis, women and girls are raped because they belong to a clan hostile to or at war with the rapist’s clan – in other words, that rape is being used as a weapon of war. While this dimension of rape clearly exists in Dadaab, an analysis of rape records indicates that rapists do not always, or even generally, ask his victim for her clan prior to raping her. In fact, in only 21% of cases do we have information that the survivor reports being asked her clan.

This lower-than-expected percentage may in part reflect a problem in the recording of women’s descriptions of the incidents, as many of the reports prior to 1999 provide little or no detail about the incident; in 25% of cases there is no information on which to judge whether or not clan seems to have played a role in the targeting of rape survivors. It may also be that survivors, in their shock and trauma, omit to mention being asked their clan; however, in 54% of cases where there is
detailed information available on the incident, there is no mention of the survivor being asked her clan.\textsuperscript{53}

308. The role of clan identity in defining women’s vulnerability to rape is unclear. A woman’s clan identity may only be important to the rapist on the basis that he will not rape a woman who is a member of his own clan or sub-clan. If he knows or can ascertain that she is not a member of his own group, as is often the case in rapes that take place within the camps, he may not need to ask her clan before raping her. Furthermore, in many cases, the perpetrator may simply not care about the woman’s clan, and will rape no matter what clan she is from. In a couple of cases described by survivors, the assailant asked her clan only after having raped her. This would indicate that asking about clan should not always be considered a sign that clan rivalry is the motivation for rape.

309. However, quite apart from direct victimisation by assailants on the basis of clan, clan identity appears to be an important factor of risk, as we can see from Table 6.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent of Camp Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden\textsuperscript{55}</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Estimated 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.Suber</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>Estimated 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awlyahan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Estimated 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdalla</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Estimated 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukabul</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Estimated 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galjael</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>Estimated 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marehan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Estimated 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Estimated 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shekal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Estimated 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Som.Bantu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Estimated 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maalin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jidwaaq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Clans</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>No-information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>288</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{53} Clan information could be asked for many reasons besides the perpetrator’s decision-making about whether or not to perpetrate the rape. Asking a person’s clan seems to be inherent or typical in almost every kind of encounter among Somalis.

\textsuperscript{54} Estimates on clan composition of the camps were requested from UNHCR by the evaluation team but appear not to be available. Estimates of clan composition used here were made by N. Blondel, based on data gathered during a four-month field mission to Dadaab in 1999.

\textsuperscript{55} This table describes the most frequently occurring clans and sub-clans in our analysis of 291 rape records.
310. While the estimates of sub-clan populations are extremely rough, Table 6.4 demonstrates that some clans, who are in a clear minority both in relation to the dominant camp population and the surrounding local population are disproportionately at risk of rape. While members of the dominant Ogadeni sub-clans appear to experience fewer rapes relative to their population size, the situation of some ‘minority’ clans, particularly the Galjael, is the opposite. The Galjael report a disproportionately high incidence of rape, a fact that merits close attention and analysis.

311. We also note a relationship between camp and cases in which clan identity seems to play a role: of 58 cases where women report being asked their clan, only 9 of these are in Hagadera; 31 are in Ifo, and 18 are in Dagahaley. Of the three camps, Ifo is estimated to have the highest level of clan diversity, and inter/intra clan conflict may play a more significant role there. Many of the smallest clusters of ‘minority’ clans are found in Ifo.

312. Precisely why minority clan members appear to be more at risk of rape is complex, and merits closer investigation. Apart from the obvious explanation of historic clan rivalries, in the present refugee context, minority clan members, originating from areas in Somalia far from Dadaab may have fewer economic resources and enjoy less social protection than do members of locally dominant clans. Some have gone as far as to suggest that unlike many local Kenyans who have settled within the camps for economic reasons, these minority clans represent the bona fide refugees of Dadaab.

313. In terms of firewood collection, majority clan members may have greater claims to local firewood and other resources. Small minority clans, such as the Galjael, may be suffering a combination of hardships, including greater social discrimination, less clan protection, fewer alternative economic opportunities (to engaging in firewood collection) and no historic or clan-based claim to the use of the local resource base. These factors add up to a condition of extreme risk in venturing into the bush, but also characterises their experience within the camps.66

**Female-headed households**

314. While it is commonly accepted that single-parent and female-headed households often face added difficulties in meeting basic needs, the evaluation was unable to acquire adequate data to assess the prevalence of this situation in Dadaab. Nonetheless, it is likely that female-headed households in Dadaab are among the poorest, and most at risk of firewood-related rape. Hyndman (2000) estimates, based on information provided by CARE, that in 1994, as many as 40% of households in Dadaab were female-headed. Refugees who met with the evaluation team signalled that the trend towards female-headed households is on the increase, as divorce and abandonment by males are often the result of extreme tensions and conflicts between

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66 While clan identity may be a significant factor of risk of rape, it should not be singled out, but rather taken as one in a number of such factors that should be used to determine if and what special measures are necessary. There is a danger that clan identity can easily become mis-used and manipulated by the refugee community. Already it is common for identities – name, clan, family size, place of origin, to be collected by some refugees, and the evaluators were made aware of cases where local Ogadeni individuals claimed to be of the Galjael, perhaps with the knowledge that clan identity could become the basis for resettlement, as ethnic identity has been in the resettlement policies of several industrialised countries.
couples generated by conditions of grinding poverty and a sense of hopelessness in this protracted refugee setting. Some families may also have experienced separation in their initial flight from Somalia, and have been unable to reunite.

315. Of 178 cases of reported rape and attempted rape for which we have data on the survivor’s marital status, 20% were single (mainly children and youths), 60% were married, and 20% were divorced, separated or widowed. However, as Hyndman has pointed out, in the Somali context, in which men are permitted to have more than one wife, marriage itself does not ensure that the husband is present and residing within the household. Marital status itself, in the context of Dadaab, is thus a weak indicator of the presence of both a male and female adult able and willing to engage in family maintenance.

Socio-economic differences within the camps

316. While refugee camps are sometimes thought of as relatively homogeneous populations in terms of access to resources, this is not the case. Differences occur as some refugees are able to get jobs working for one of the agencies (e.g., UNHCR and its implementing partners) and receiving “incentive” pay for their services. Other refugees have relatives – either in their country of origin, or who have been resettled - who are able to send remittances or provide credit to start small businesses. The Somali banks, which operate in Kenya and abroad, are formidable networks for ensuring that extended families and clansmen are able to assist their members from far-off points on the globe. Many of the refugees in Dadaab are also very entrepreneurial, Somali women being particularly known for their business skill, and operate businesses of many types within the camps, generating cash that can be used to purchase firewood.

317. In addition, it is widely agreed by agencies’ staff in Dadaab that some households may have access to extra rations and ration cards, relative to their family size. Thus some households have access to greater amounts of food rations and other resources than they can consume. The surplus can then be sold or exchanged for other commodities.

318. In addition to the trade in food, clothing, and household items, among other things engaged in by some refugees, the miraa trade thrives, with thrice-weekly flights and trucks transporting 100s of sacks of the leaf for consumption by local refugee men. Criminal activity also takes place, including gun-running, extortion and theft.

319. For the past few years the UK Save the Children Fund has carried out “Food Economy” field assessments in the three Dadaab camps, commissioned by UNHCR and WFP. These are essentially socio-economic studies of the camp populations. Based on their survey, they break the population down into groups by ‘wealth’ – an unusual terminology, given the context of generalised poverty and limited access to resources of every kind that characterise the Dadaab area.

320. For 1996, they provide the following population breakdown for Dadaab: rich: 15-25%, middle: 25-35% and poor: 40-60%. The 1999 breakdown has split the category rich into “rich” and “better-off middle” because now 5-15% of refugees have a monthly income of 4000 shillings or more. A category “less poor” is split of from the “poor” group, as they are much less likely than the latter to sell their food
ration. “In both 1996 and 1999, within the poor there are households who access less than 100-150 shillings per month, who either have no ration cards or one with a smaller (than actually exists) household size on it.” These are referred to in the 1996 report as the destitute and represent less than 10% of the population.

321. “The main determinant of wealth in Dadaab is a household’s connections. Those who are ‘well-connected’, that is have access to remittances from outside Kenya, or Kenyan Somalis or refugees involved in country-wide trade, are wealthier. The camp operates on something akin to a system of patronage. The wealthier households will assist their kin or clansmen in earning an income and increasing their wealth, particularly through giving them credit to operate a small business. Households without access to these wealthier people are poor.” (SCF Kenya Refugee Study, 1999) The following table describes the ‘wealth’ groups in 1999.

322. From the descriptions presented in Table 6.5, it is likely that all but the ‘poor’ in the refugee camps are able to afford to buy all or much of their firewood if they so choose, on the basis that a range of other basic needs, in terms of food, shelter, education and basic household items are met by UNHCR and WFP. This is certainly the case based on the prices that prevailed in 1997 when the project was initiated. At that time the monthly cost of firewood for a family of five would be about 200-225 shillings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>% of total pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Large traders, e.g., Posho mill owners. Move around to trade in the northeast or Somalia. Monthly income, over 4,000 Ksh</td>
<td>5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better-Off</td>
<td>Traders and incentive earners. Households with an incentive worker are calculated to be 6% of the pop. Monthly income: 2,500-4,000 Ksh</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Vegetable sellers, clothes sellers, house builders, cereal stores and medium traders. Monthly income: 800-2,500 Ksh</td>
<td>15-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Poor</td>
<td>Firewood collectors, housemaids, men with wheelbarrows. Monthly income: 400 - 800 Ksh</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Refugees without any regular income source except gifts, or those who seasonally (or occasionally) collect and sell wood or wild food or ration cereals</td>
<td>35-45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SCF: Kenya Refugee Study, Food Economy Updates of Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera Refugee Camps, Dadaab, Kenya
323. The SCF analysis clearly points to the fact that two groups are particularly vulnerable to firewood-related rape: The less poor (15-20%) and poor (35-45%) – some portion of the former being actively involved in the commercial firewood trade, and the latter because they have no economic alternative to collecting both for home consumption and for sale. The SCF findings are supported by the findings of the evaluation team, which carried out its own household survey in October 2000.

Analysis of firewood collection and purchasing patterns

324. The household wood procurement survey carried out by the evaluators cannot be considered representative, due to its small sample size of 100 households in all three camps, but it can be taken as indicative and supportive of more extensive studies carried out by SCF in Dadaab and other refugee settings in Africa, as well of those of Nancy Chege in 1996 and Matthew Owen in 1998. The CASA household survey as carried out found that 19% of households surveyed (n=100) do not collect any firewood (Dagahaley 7%, Ifo 18% and Hagadera 30%).

325. In addition to receiving wood through the firewood supply project distributions, 62% of households were meeting another part of their need for firewood through buying it – mainly in the market, or from donkey carts. About a quarter of households were buying at least 30% of their firewood, with 10% of households meeting more than 70% of their firewood needs through purchasing it. About 20% of households said they buy half or more of their firewood. This increase\(^\text{57}\) in purchasing of wood occurs despite the fact of the GTZ distributions and the fact that firewood prices have gone up since 1997.

326. The evaluators were repeatedly told by agencies’ staff and the refugees that ‘Somali men don’t collect firewood’, both because it is not a ‘traditional’ role for men, and because they say that they are at risk of death or injury by the same ‘bandits’ who rape women. A particularly interesting aspect of the CASA household survey findings is that 24% of households surveyed reported having adult men participating in firewood collection activities: of these 16% of households had both men and women carrying out firewood collection, and 8% of households had only adult male collectors. Dagahaley appears to have the highest number of households in which men participate in firewood collection (36%), followed by Ifo (24%) and Hagadera (15%). Between those households who currently purchase all their firewood (19%) and those with adult male collectors only, 26% of households have no female collectors at all.

Analysis of male involvement in firewood collection

327. Understanding the issue of male involvement/non-involvement in firewood collection has been a central problem for agencies working on SGV issues in Dadaab, given the high risks to women and girls. In our review of refugee rape cases reported since January 1998, none of the survivors were accompanied by an adult male, although a few were accompanied by small boys (under the age of 12).

328. It would be useful for GTZ, UNHCR or other IPs to undertake to analyse if and why Dagahaley might have a higher level of male participation in firewood collection. Are these males all involved in the commercial firewood trade? If not,

\(^{57}\) Compared with reports by Owen in 1998, for instance and by Chege, 1996.
what has motivated them to participate in firewood collection? Are they members of the dominant clans of the area, or do they have privileged contacts that allow them special rights to collect the resource? In 1998, Owen estimated that 53% of all firewood was brought to the camps by refugee men, using either donkey-carts or hand-carts, and we can assume that proportion might be even greater today, given the rise in the number of donkey-carts in the area. It remains to be understood why a number of men can and do engage in firewood collection without resulting in official reports of assault or injury. In the case at least of commercial collection by refugee males, insight on this point can be taken from Orono (1999):

The contractors who are the local inhabitants of the area, then guarantee the safety of the refugee donkey cart owners for their business [through GTZ contracts] to flourish…The business arrangement between locals and the refugees in the procurement of firewood contradicts the male Somali refugees’ reason given previously for not helping their women in firewood collection as other nationalities such as Ethiopians and Sudanese do…The other likely explanation is the refugee men’s carrying along with them some cash or goods such as cigarettes and miraah to give to the bandits, if encountered, as some kind of bribe or gift. Research should be done in this area since it can form a basis for changing the Somali men’s attitude towards firewood collection thereby lessening the need for cash donation for firewood provision. (p. 25)

329. Increasing refugee men’s involvement in the protection of women and girls, requires much greater attention from UNHCR and IPs. While directly related to the problem of rape that occurs while collecting firewood, such a focus would also have much broader and long-lasting implications for life of the Somali refugee community. Through the course of meetings and interviews in Dadaab, the evaluators came to know of strong male religious leadership in Dagahaley that is actively engaged in the struggle to reduce rape. Could this account for the greater level of male participation in firewood collection in Dagahaley? It merits consideration that some resources from the Firewood Distribution project as it is presently structured, could be usefully spent in strengthening social and community-based work to identify appropriate responses to violence from within both the refugee and local Somali communities.

330. While the household data collected by the evaluation team cannot be considered conclusive, taken along with all other studies of women’s firewood collection patterns, it re-confirms the fact that a firewood distribution project in Dadaab, as well as other initiatives which aim to reduce the risk of rape to women and girls, should seek to effectively target those without economic alternatives to firewood collection and without other forms of social protection.

331. The explanations offered by Orono further re-enforce the idea that those women and girls who are most vulnerable and at risk while collecting firewood, may be those without the economic means, clan affiliations, privileged relations or even a male household member to ensure their protection. UNHCR’s programming will be more effective at combating rape in the bush if it more directly targets those women making a disproportionately high number of weekly trips for firewood. Such initiatives might use a combination of firewood-for-work with an expanded
definition of ‘work’, as well as increased micro-credit for alternative income generating activities, and a refugee-developed ‘safe collection’ strategy.

Other factors of risk

332. Other factors associated with the risk of rape while collecting firewood, such as the time and location of incidents, appear have been well documented by CARE and UNHCR. While many of the earlier rape reports reviewed do not provide specifics of the location of the incident, recent reporting by CARE is more detailed, and indicates several general areas that should be part of an overall strategy to intensify police and Anti-banditry Unit patrols, as well as safer refugee self-collection measures.

333. The Ifo-Dagahaley road area is known to be particularly dangerous, and accounts for approximately 10% of all reported rape cases for which information on location is available. The Ifo-Dadaab and Hagadera-Dadaab road areas are also particularly dangerous, not only to women collecting firewood, but also to those travelling between camps and to Dadaab town for a range of other reasons. The most dangerous areas appear to be the immediate perimeters of the camps, and it was suggested by refugees that rapists are often known to return to the same general area on the outskirts of the camps from which they can intercept women leaving or returning home. This point merits deeper investigation, in order to develop approaches to identifying and capturing repeat rapists, for instance.

Absence of effective project monitoring

334. The CASA household survey and other analyses of the characteristics of rape incidents in Dadaab are activities not typically carried out as part of a project evaluation. They were necessary, however, to address the problem faced by the evaluators because of a general absence of appropriate data being collected by GTZ and UNHCR on which to base any serious assessment of the project impacts. The baseline data survey, carried out by Owen in December 1998 was long overdue as the project’s baseline information was being gathered many months into project implementation.

335. However, Owen’s report should have served to establish a framework for monitoring project impacts, as it identified a number of key indicators essential to establishing the impact and relevance of the project. This evaluation has also suggested a number of indicators that would strengthen the capacity of GTZ-UNHCR to assess the success of the project approach. Therefore, in addition to the environmental monitoring currently carried out by GTZ, and that recommended by Blondel (2000) some key indicators and questions which should be addressed as part of on-going monitoring (at regular intervals) of the project by GTZ are:

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58 Numerous approaches to co-ordinated and safer firewood collection have been developed over the years, but to our knowledge, have never been tried. Generally the refugee community has rejected the idea of camp-wide co-ordination efforts. However, women and girls are already going out in groups (70% of women who report being attacked are in groups of four persons or larger, ranging up to 29 women) – generally made up of their clans women. It might be more practical to allow smaller units within each camp to determine their own ‘safe collection’ strategies, which could then be facilitated by the ARCs.
• Characteristics of refugee wood collectors: age, gender, camp, clan, whether a female-head of household, socio-economic status;

• Number of trips outside the camp, by whom and for what purpose;

• Effects of firewood distribution on firewood prices, both from the point of view of the refugee consumer, as well as the incomes of women and men who collect firewood for sale;

• Trends in purchasing of firewood: given the risks of collecting firewood and the costs of purchasing it, how do households decide whether and how much wood to purchase? How much income is required for women to purchase rather than collect firewood?

Identifying solutions: characteristics of perpetrators

336. According to our analysis of 288 rape records, the vast majority of rape survivors describe their assailants simply as ‘bandits’, which, as we will see below is a problematic concept which obscures, rather than assists our understanding of how to target measures effectively towards the identification and capture of perpetrators. Some are known by the survivors to be repeat rapists with specific identifiable features. In approximately 9% of cases on which we have adequate information, the perpetrators are individuals known to the survivor, either as family members, acquaintances, neighbours or others.

337. In approximately 40% of cases on which information is available, the perpetrator is a lone assailant, and in another 30% of cases survivors report that there are two assailants. This contradicts past assumptions that suggest that most rapes are perpetrated by gangs or larger groupings of men. In 25% of cases, survivors report between 3 and 5 assailants, and in 5% of cases survivors report groups of men larger than six, ranging from six to 34 men. The term assailants here must be qualified, as it concerns the number of men accompanying the rapist, many of whom are guilty of non-interference and not defending the survivor, but do not actively take part in the attack and rape. In 70% of all incidents regardless of the number of assailants - rape is perpetrated by one individual. In 22% of cases rape is perpetrated by two individuals, while reports of rape perpetrated by between three and five assailants represent 8% of cases.

338. In approximately 85% of cases on which we have adequate data, at least one assailant is armed; in 70% the assailant(s) is(are) armed with a firearm. Other weapons carried by assailants are knives, sticks, clubs or pangas (machetes). The fact of heavily armed assailants has presented particular difficulties, challenging the willingness and ability of police in Dadaab to take them on, and limiting the willingness or ability of women to act in each others’ defence. In this sense, greater activity by the Anti-Banditry Unit, which is specially trained at pursuing armed groups in heavy bush areas, is an apt partner to help determine the best interventions to ensure the security of women during firewood collection.

339. A final and somewhat surprising finding is that 36% of survivors on whom we have information say that they could identify the perpetrator if they saw him again - and an additional 18% give detailed descriptions and might possibly be able to identify their rapist. This is a surprising fact, given that most analyses have
described assailants as ‘masked’ and ‘hooded’, implying that survivors would be unable to identify them. It also goes directly to the pertinence of strategies focused on strengthening the technical ability and motivation of police to take women’s reports seriously, paying attention to their detailed descriptions of the assailants, correlating that with place and time of incidents and following up with investigations that would help identify and bring perpetrators to justice. Capacity building activities to improve police procedures and performance in these in these areas are clearly in order.

Problematic concept of bandit

340. In discussions, the refugee groups distinguished between unknown bandits and ‘local’ bandits, who were known by the refugee communities. People were very conscious not to reveal the identities of the latter type of bandits. Underlying some of this concern was the notion that in terms of clan or tribe there is little difference between the Somali Kenyans who live outside the camps and the Somali Somalis who live inside. One quiet male group discussant, when asked if he had anything to add stated that ‘the bandits may be sitting with us now’…(Igras and Monahan, October 1998).

341. This quote from the CARE-Sponsored Assessment of Issues and Responses to Sexual Violence, carried out in October 1998, echoes our own findings from our visit to Dadaab. Many of the rape reports we reviewed state that the woman is raped by one or more ‘bandits’. However, the concept of bandit in Dadaab is problematic, and may be used to describe any male who is armed, as well as some who are unarmed.

342. While in Dadaab, the evaluation team attended a well-run workshop held by NCCK to train Community Health Motivators (CHMs) – members of the refugee population who are trained to take on a leadership role in promoting women’s reproductive health, including efforts to combat female genital mutilation, early marriage, forced marriage and rape. As part of the training, participants were asked to practice their counselling skills through a role-play exercise. The scenario was that of a young girl who is stalked by a young male neighbour as she leaves the camp to collect firewood. She is raped by him in the bush, while collecting firewood. The role-play exercise saw the CHM attempting to ‘counsel’ the family, and mediate between the outraged family of the girl and the young man’s father who pays the police not to intervene and seeks to arrive at a financial settlement with the girl’s father. In the midst of the activity, the rapist is nowhere to be seen. We asked our translator “Where did he go?” Our translator answered, “Who do you mean? The bandit?” We answered, “He’s her neighbour. Why do you call him a bandit?” Our translator answered, “Because he raped her.”

343. These anecdotes illustrate that the concept of ‘bandit,’ as it is used in Dadaab, obscures far more than it assists our understanding of who the individuals are who perpetrate rape and other forms of violence. During our time in Dadaab we heard of arms being stock-piled within the camps to be sold there or to be taken to Nairobi for sale. We heard allegations of local bandits buying the complicity or inaction of the police. We also heard allegations from refugees that within the camps, local bandits have assumed leadership of the Community Self-Management Security Committees, and other representative bodies of the refugee community. If this is the case, then truly ‘the bandits are among us’ and addressing this reality is a difficult
but critical task for agencies working to combat rape and other forms of violence in Dadaab.

344. This being said, it should also be made clear that not all ‘bandits’ are rapists. In Dadaab town, evaluation team members met with a group of men who were described to as ‘reformed bandits,’ a group of four men between the ages of 20 and 30, interested in receiving a firewood supply contract from GTZ/UNHCR. While it is not clear that they are in any way reformed, they explained that people turn to banditry primarily for economic reasons and for lack of other opportunities. Some bandits rape, but not all do, and among bandits there may be fights – which may end in death – over behaviour such as rape, that some find unacceptable. “There are as many different bandits as there are people,” we were told. The ‘bandits’ interviewed also stressed that the temptation to return to banditry – theft, highway robbery, etc., – was extremely strong. We were told that there were 40 other bandits in the bush, waiting to see if this small group that had “reformed” could prosper through firewood contracting. If not, they themselves would be returning to the bush to go back to living by illegal means.

345. From our review of 33 months of rape records, it appears that there is a growing sensitivity on the part of those recording incidents of rape (and particularly the VWC Supervisor at CARE who mainly interviews the victims and completes the Annex 2 form) that the use of the term ‘bandit’ may well obscure, rather than assist in identifying and apprehending rapists in the area.

Known serial rapists

346. In addition to the large number of armed men or ‘bandits’ moving about in the bush and within the camps, there are a surprisingly high number of rapes by individuals known to the victim as a repeat or serial rapist. These are cases where the woman who has been raped knows the identity of the assailant as a rapist. Although there are relatively few such cases, they point to issues that should be considered in developing strategies to combat rape – in the bush or elsewhere.

347. In Dagahaley, for instance, an elder and spokesperson for the Anti-Rape Committee of that camp described to us the case of a serial rapist from that camp and the frustrations of community members with police inaction:

348. Spokesperson: “In 1998, there was a certain guy, who was raping women and who was always in the same location – about 2 or 3 kilometres outside camp and always in the same place. Some elders went to the police and said ‘there is a problem with this guy – we will take you to him’ but the police didn’t want to leave the station. We said ‘If you are afraid, don’t worry because we will go with you’ but they still didn’t want to leave. So the elders went to this guy and got him to give up his gun – he had raped maybe 100 ladies – and we said that if he stopped he would be forgiven and would be re-integrated into the community”

Evaluator:: “What happened? Did he stop?”

Spokesperson: “No, he didn’t. He didn’t feel accepted by the community. He has raped again in a group and went back to get a gun. He couldn’t be re-integrated.”
This story raises many issues about the nature of the violence against refugee women. More recently, in the spring of 2000, a conviction of a serial rapist was handed down by a magistrate in Garissa with a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment. This conviction was hard won, and demanded a relentless pursuit of justice on the part of agencies’ staff and in particular, CARE’s VWC Supervisor, who is also the focal point for agencies working with refugees in Dadaab. It is largely due to her attentiveness to women’s descriptions of their assailants and her ability to make connections between the characteristics of the incidents she has recorded, as well as her diligence and determination in putting pressure on the police to arrest suspected rapists that can account for the recent success in prosecuting perpetrators of rape. According to CARE’s VWC Supervisor: “The individual was known to a group of women gathered near the police station, who heard the woman’s description of her ordeal. They said he was a serial rapist who was a local from Dadaab town. He had openly bragged that he had been responsible for the rape of over 49 refugee women.” If the anecdotal information provided to the evaluators is true, then the acts of the two serial rapists described above account for 23% of all rapes reported in Dadaab since the end of 1993.

In addition to the above, several other cases of serial rapists have been identified. For instance:

**Red-toothed rapist:** Four or five women have reported being attacked by a tall, black man with discoloured (red) front teeth.

**Naked rapist:** Three or four women describe a tall naked man, sometimes alone and sometimes accompanied by a second attacker, attacking and raping women from the bushes around Ifo camp.

**Condom-using rapist:** Orono (1999) describes a repeat/serial rapist around Hagadera in the following manner: “The year 1999 saw three reported cases of rape by a rapist(s) who used condoms. The fact is that Hagadera has a serial rapist who is aware of the presence of sexually transmitted diseases. A profile of this rapist may be that of an educated male stalker who knows his victims and their routines. He targets 16- to 23-year-old females. All his victims were collecting firewood close to the camp near the police base. All his attacks occurred in the day around 3 p.m.”

The analysis above is not meant to suggest that all rape in Dadaab can be explained by serial rapists on whom we have some evidence and who might be identifiable by survivors. However, these repeat offenders appear a good place to start in piecing together the evidence—descriptions of events, and descriptions of the physical characteristics of the perpetrators with which to identify them and remove them from circulation. This type of work requires time and a relationship of trust with women survivors, as well as with other women of the surrounding area who may also hold details and information about repeat rapists. This is but one area in which the police and experienced UNHCR protection and community services staff with a close rapport with the Somali community, could be playing a more active role in prevention of rape.

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350. Based on UNHCR estimate of a total of 643 reported rapes in Dadaab, 1994-2000 (see first page of the previous chapter).
Project cost effectiveness and sustainability

“Resources available for UNHCR environmental interventions are scarce. It is therefore a matter of some importance that these interventions be selected according to whether they make the best use of such resources.”
(UNHCR Environmental Guidelines, 1996, p. 8)

352. This section is intended to examine primarily the cost effectiveness of the Firewood Supply Project, the economic and financial implications of this spending in relation to what has been achieved, and in relation to alternatives that were available for meeting project objectives. It attempts to place this spending in the financial context of Dadaab. UNHCR has been under severe financial pressure in recent years. In 1997 and 1998 years, attempts to begin to financially treat Dadaab as the long-term care situation that it in fact is, were put on hold. A number of services and posts were cut, including secondary education and the community services post. The introduction of the firewood project at this time (through special donor funding) and its costs should be considered in this context.

353. Unless there is no choice about a spending allocation, it should always be considered in relation to what else might have been provided with these funds (e.g. more or better quality food, health care, education, etc.), and in relation to the costs of other ways of achieving the project objectives. Other issues of sustainability are also discussed.

The cost of firewood provision

354. Whether an intervention is cost effective needs to be measured against what it has and is able to achieve in relation to its objectives, and whether this degree of objectives achievement could have been attained in a less costly manner. The costs also need to be understood in relation to overall spending. One of the main reservations about a firewood supply intervention, on the part of UNHCR when it was introduced in Dadaab was its cost. In 1998, Matthew Owen ends his baseline study with a strong caution about the cost of this intervention, a caution which was largely ignored, but which bears repetition here-- as now, two years later, his analysis is equally valid.

355. “It appears that the cost of firewood supply was not properly appreciated by the donor at the project’s outset. The funds now remaining are sufficient to match only 12% of refugee consumption. This has the potential to reduce firewood-related risk by 12%, assuming that it is translated into an equivalent reduction in individual harvesting forays, but will cut overall risk by well below 5% (given that 46% of all trips outside the camps for wood products are not for firewood, and that many other trips are made for non-wood reasons). It is hard to envision how this funding constraint could be overcome, as to match current levels of firewood consumption with external supply would cost $8 million per year in firewood procurement costs alone. The funding issue highlights the pitfalls of trying to address the social
problem of refugee insecurity through large-scale cash injections." (Matthew Owen, 1998)

356. We have estimated wood procurement costs slightly lower (see sections below) as UNHCR/GTZ have been able to negotiate somewhat more favourable wood prices, but the general thrust of his calculations and analysis remain valid at the end of this evaluation.

357. It has been exceedingly difficult for the consulting team to determine the actual costs of the firewood provision, and therefore to calculate costs per head, or costs per month, or total costs per ton of firewood provided, in relation to this project. It has also been difficult to determine at what point the project funded under special (U.S.) funding was complete, and how its accomplishments should be judged. This occurs because different reporting periods are used; there are numerous uncorrected errors and inconsistencies in progress and final reports, and confusions over tonnage procured versus tonnage distributed, and the like. According to a Sub-Office communication received in January 2001 in response to our information request, a total of $3,005,240.89 has been budgeted for firewood provision since the initiation of the project to the end of 2000, under three sub-projects for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. The budgets for these three years were approximately $1.44 million, $369 thousand, and $1.2 million respectively.

358. The total procurement cost for the whole period is said to be $1,470,579.60, excluding administrative and operational support costs. We have estimated that firewood purchase is about 62% of the total GTZ budget in 1999. On this basis, the total cost of the firewood project should have been about $2.4 million by the end of 2000, with about $.9 million of this from UNHCR’s general budget.

359. Also, based on the January 2001 communication, we estimate that a total of 10,763 tons of firewood were procured with the US funds, of which about 8,467 had been distributed to the refugees by the time the final report was prepared. Another 7,582 metric tons were procured under UNHCR general funds for a total of 18,348 metric tons of firewood procured by the end of December 2000.

The costs of 100% provision of firewood

360. The procurement costs alone of providing the approximately 70,000 metric tons required annually at prices currently paid by GTZ would be about $4.2 million dollars. There would be administrative and operational costs, which would likely increase this estimate to about $6.7 million. All evidence suggests that when 100% of fuel is provided consumption levels are likely to go up substantially, perhaps 50-100%. The procurement costs for providing 100% of firewood would therefore likely be close to $10 million and possibly much higher. In the context of the total budget for the care of these refugees this is would appear unreasonable (see section on budget below).

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60 “Some of the other resource allocations were utilised/covered in expenditures including staff costs and non-staff costs such as travel, contractual services, general operating expenses, supplies, and non-expendable property for the project. We have not received SPMR for October/December 2000 to establish the funds left for the year 2000 from GTZ Nairobi.” (UNHCR Sub-Office communication, January 2001).

61 For a population of 120,000-130,000 consuming between 1.5 and 1.6 kilograms per day, the annual tonnage required would between 65,700 and 75,920.

62 At an exchange rate of 75 shillings to a US dollar.
361. UNHCR environmental guidelines indicate that the only way consumption levels can be controlled, is if refugees are completely prevented from self-collection of firewood (as in Kakuma). They would also need to control commercial firewood brought into the camps for sale.

The cost of the Firewood Project compared to self-collection and existing commercial supply systems

362. We raise the question of the cost of wood provision if the project supply project did not exist, and no other intervention in this regard had taken place by UNHCR. The cost of self-supply has essentially been zero (apart from the risks and labour entailed). However, it could be argued that the resource does have some type of natural resource value. Since the Government of Kenya has (prior to the Firewood Project) been unable to collect a tax on the use of this resource by the refugees, this could be considered a contribution of Kenya to the refugee support, which has not normally been counted in the checklist of goods and services provided by UNHCR and other donors. With the firewood project, Garissa County Council charged a cess of 500 shillings per ton, which they later reduced to 250. At this latter rate, the value of the resource annually consumed by the refugees over the past 10 years would be at least $210,000 per year.

363. Firewood has always had a commercial value within the camps, based on the amounts charged by donkey carts (and women sellers) bringing in wood for sale. The retail value of firewood is currently about 2 shillings per kilo, delivered to the door, or purchased in the camp market. The commercial retail value of the firewood annually consumed is about $1.8 million (assuming all wood consumed were purchased).

364. The costs of the commercial supply of the same quantity (17,516 MT) of firewood supplied by the firewood supply project to date, based on a retail price of 2 shillings per kilogram (or about $25.00 per tonne) would be about $437,900 or 30% of the “procurement” costs entailed by the UNHCR/GTZ program.

365. It is not that these additional costs could necessarily have been avoided by UNHCR, who have in fact obtained lower prices in past months through effective negotiations with local suppliers, and a reduction of the tax initially charged by the

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63 Assuming a population of 120,000, using 1.5 kilograms a day, the value of this resource as it lies on the ground, at 250 shillings per ton, would be about (120,000 x 1.5 x 365 x 250/1000) 16.4 million shillings or $210,000 (exchange rate of 79) per year.

64 It was about half this in 1996-97.

65 Owen and Chege report costs closer to 1 shilling per kilogram for the period 1996-1997. Owen reports a price for December 1998 of two shillings, saying that prices were unusually high during the period because commercial firewood collectors were almost all in the bush collecting for the Firewood Project and due to the onset of the rainy season. UNHCR used a price of 2 shillings per kilogram in March/April 1998 in determining an appropriate price for a “delivered” kilogram of firewood for their national tendering process.

66 In response to an earlier draft of this report, GTZ brought the following clarification: “The price of firewood is determined by the quality of wood. The firewood that is sold at the markets by women mostly are handled by gatherers cost ~ Ksh. 2/- per kilogram but the wood quality that is comparable to the project's wood and the ones supplied by donkey cart owners. The prices the donkey load which the same quality that the project is issuing at most times which we monitor is Kshs. 800/- per donkey cart load which means the cost is about Kshs. 3.2 per kilogram. This type of firewood [comes from] tree species that take much longer to finish than the quality that is collected by hand by the women around the camp.”
Garissa Council. However, UNHCR should have recognised that when the international community becomes the buyer and supplier of wood, the same cost structure will not apply, and supply costs will inevitably triple or go even higher (as they have), raising the question as to whether alternative modes of intervention to achieve the same objectives, might not have been more cost-effective (e.g., relying more on existing systems of wood supply).

Firewood supply in relation to other Dadaab refugee support spending

Between 1999 and 2000 the total UNHCR expenditure budget for the camps increased from $4.6 million to $5.6 million. Comparing UNHCR’s budget in 2000 to that in 1999 (when firewood was partly covered by the special donor funds), firewood provision increased from 11% to about 20% of the total budget (see Appendix D). We note that between 1999 and 2000, when the budget has increased by 20%, the budget for health and nutrition decreased in absolute terms by $81,825, and as a proportion of the total programming budget from 41% to 32%. Most other components of the budget have decreased or increased marginally or stayed more or less the same except for provision of fuel and transport/logistics (the latter increasing from 13% to 16%). While most people we spoke with in Dadaab advocated increasing the ration of firewood, we are uncertain whether they would have continued to advocate this if it were seen to be provided at the expense of other services, rather than over-and-above other things. How would the refugee answer the question, “Would I like a few more kilograms of wood per month, but at the expense of secondary education for our youth, or at the expense of a number of doctors and nurses and basic medicines?”

Comparative cost of rescue project and of WFP rations in Dadaab

Though it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to judge the relative merits of all aspects of refugee support in Dadaab, some points of comparison with other programming areas are worthy of mention. The cost of WFP rations was provided to us only for the new budget period from October 2000 through September 2003, including refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma. The protracted relief and recovery operation for Kenya refugees is approximately US$85 million, with total food cost estimated at about $35 million (based on a March 2000 exchange rate of 73 Kenyan Shillings).

The cost of the WFP food rations per head is estimated by WFP at $52.77 per head annually. The cost to UNHCR, including transport and overhead costs is more than double this at $127.06 per head. Provision of wood to date has cost about $15.00 per person per year. Comparing the procurement costs for a full requirement of wood per head, the annual cost is about $35 excluding all overhead costs. This amounts to about two-thirds of the value of the food basket.67 In Dadaab, where the refugee food basket has been severely trimmed (and below minimum standards for months at a time), as have other programs and services, the firewood supply must be seen in the light of shortages of other basic needs, and its merits judged on an overall strategy to address the various objectives involved.

67 At the average cost per ton that wood has been provided to the project to date (about $84 per ton) it would cost about $51.00 per head to procure the full requirement, and over $80.00 including overheads and operations costs. Figures provide in this section should be treated as inexact, because of variations over time in exchange rates, population, and the like.
369. The GTZ RESCUE project, set up to accomplish a range of environmental objectives, and engaged in environmental education and rehabilitation and distribution of energy-saving devices, has cost a similar total amount to firewood supply to date, but over a 6 ½ year period, since June 1994, or less than US$500,000 per year. This project is multi-dimensional, and well targeted and integrated.

**Firewood costs in relation to other gender-based violence reduction options**

370. In early 1999 the Ted Turner Fund or program was set up. This entailed a donation to UNHCR of $1.65 million for the “Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender Violence Against Refugee Women and Adolescent Girls in Sub-Saharan Africa”, with refugee women in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone initially identified for assistance. The overarching goal of the project was said to be:

371. “To enable refugee communities, concerned governments and humanitarian actors to respond in a timely and effective manner to prevent sexual violence against refugees, with a specific focus on women and adolescent girls, and to put into place systems for responding compassionately to survivors of sexual violence and bringing perpetrators of these crimes to justice.”

372. The project was extended to include Kenya and Tanzania, which have been struggling to combat incidents of SGV for several years. While the evaluation team is unclear on the precise amount spent on the TTF programme in the Dadaab camps in 1999 and 2000, it appears to be of the order of $300,000, with approximately $80,000 for training and community services activities. The assistance provided includes:

- training of UNHCR, NGO, and Government staff working with victims of violence (fees for training 200 local authorities/ refugee leaders);
- promoting/involving local authorities and police in pursuing perpetrators through prosecution;
- effective outreach and information materials to refugee populations to sensitise them about the consequences of gender violence;
- empowering women through skills development programs and income generating activities (some 925 women in Dadaab and 400 in Kakuma to be granted small loans to start small business ventures);
- live fencing of residential blocks;
- secondment of a community outreach worker for 6 months;
- fees for a legal consultant and two resource persons from the judiciary.

Despite the numbers provided in documents and interviews, the evaluators remain unclear about the specific annual budget committed for Dadaab camps, for all the Ted Turner Fund project activities. Budget figures have been found, identifying $30,000 for Tanzanian refugee women (over a two-year period) and $30,000 committed for Kenya, including both Dadaab and Kakuma refugees for a period of 18 months. In March 1, 2000, the project, “Prevention of Sexual Violence against Refugee Women” was established (00/AB/KEN/CM/256) for the two camps for the 2000 calendar year, which mentions project requirements of Ksh 5,138,000 or about $65,000, and the amount obligated as $17,600.
373. If these project funds were doubled, they would remain only a part of the annual budget to provide 10 to 15% of firewood needs, allowing for much more intensive training and community mobilisation to take place and more vulnerable women able to participate in training and micro-credit schemes. Rather than 6 months of a Community services consultant, the project could provide many more months, or a number of community development specialists for a year; provided that sufficient overhead costs were met, several thousand women could be assisted in starting small businesses, and potentially be assisted to establish the means to buy firewood rather than collecting it.

Costs of other SGV options

374. With the objective of making women less at risk of rape and gender-based violence, a number of options apart from firewood supply have been identified periodically by various security studies, anti-rape committees and the like, and some have been at least partially implemented. These include:

- increased police patrols within and around the camps; also better training and sensitisation of police; and recruitment of specially trained police, such as the anti-banditry trained units;
- improved incentives/police action to find, capture and arrest bandits and rape/assault perpetrators;
- set-up of mobile courts in Dadaab, to encourage more prosecution of perpetrators through the courts, followed by severe sentences;
- improved fencing around the camps (e.g., repair of the live fencing damaged by floods; more frequent monitoring of live fencing for vulnerable sections); increased fencing around the blocks;
- identification of banditry-prone areas and improved security in these areas;
- improved lighting, and systems for sounding alarms at the level of the blocks;
- provision of a lorry/taxi for regular refugee transport to Dadaab and between camps;
- greater support for community self-help initiatives to combat rape and gender-based violence.

375. These options and solutions have been proposed by CARE, by Crisp, and to some extent by this evaluation, and are discussed in greater detail in other sections. Many have to do with wider areas of refugee security, not just with reduction of gender-based violence (see section below). While training of the police, or recruitment of anti-banditry units are solutions not all within the control of UNHCR or of financial considerations, UNHCR may be able to undertake more serious negotiations to make policing of the area a greater priority for the Kenyan Government, and to help make Dadaab a more attractive and prestigious post for Kenyan police personnel.
376. With respect to the other options listed, we were told of court cases held up because of magistrates, doctors and other witnesses not receiving petty amounts for financial support for travel to attend court. Provisions to keep live fencing in a better state of repair, and to extend or strengthen it; to set up alarm systems and guards in the blocks—while these may appear to be costly, could each amount to tens of thousands, rather than hundreds of thousands, depending on the scale on which they are implemented.

377. Where services are to be provided directly by UNHCR and the international community, they are likely to be costly. Support for private initiatives from within the camp to set up a lorry/taxi service between Dadaab and the camps, for instance, would result in a relatively low cost service. Greater support for self-help initiatives would entail, to begin with, at least one UNHCR person on site to train, monitor and support the activities of community development workers and self-help committees from the camps.

Costs related to overall security improvements

378. Some of the above mentioned costs are included in discussions underway with donor governments for extensive improvements in security in the Dadaab and Kakuma camps. The total budget for these interventions amount to a one-time cost of $3.7 million and annual costs of about half a million dollars. The stated priorities and their estimated costs for Dadaab only are as summarised in Table 7.1. To provide full perimeter fencing, an additional police post in each camp equipped with additional vehicles and radio equipment; to allow for greater participation in policing and guarding in the camps by refugees based on incentives pay; and to provide extensive electric lighting for the camps is estimated to cost approximately $2.34 million on a one-time basis, and an additional $320 thousand annually, for the Dadaab camps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1</th>
<th>Partial list of recommended items and costs for improved refugee security of Dadaab camps in Kenya, August 2000, in thousands of US dollars ($ 000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police incentive (improve relation with police; add police posts)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish multi-level security force, including incentive paid refugee guards</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police vehicles</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF communications</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp electric lighting</td>
<td>1,297</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional fencing for blocks, including perimeter chain-link fencing</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


379. Gender-based violence is best addressed through a combination of mechanisms which include both the general, camp-wide security measures, as well as some specifically targeted to women’s and girls’ special security needs. The cost of
the firewood project, with its primary objective of addressing the risks of rape of women and children, should be considered in relation to the costs of other measures likely to affect their security. The issue of impunity of offenders and the ineffectiveness of the police, has been discussed in other sectors, as well as evidence that as rapes in the bush go down, rapes in the camps go up—suggesting that the security budget currently being discussed is attempting to address similar issues to that of the firewood project.

Ways of making women safer while collecting firewood

380. In 1996, prior to initiation of the Firewood Supply Project, a number of studies and analysts were proposing ways to make women firewood collectors safer. These included, urging men to collect firewood instead of women, or for men to accompany women on firewood collecting trips. This strategy has been successful with respect to refugees from some ethnic backgrounds (e.g., Sudanese) but less so among Somali refugees. Nevertheless, according to the CASA survey, 24% of households surveyed have adult men participating in firewood collection. 16% of households have both adult men and women participating in wood collection.

381. Other strategies proposed by Hoertz (1996), and by Chege (1996) include:

- Encourage women to collect in designated areas, on one or two collection days per week, providing greater safety through numbers, and making police patrols possible and more effective (Hoertz, 1996).
- Encourage firewood collectors to search for wood in large groups (500 to 1000) (Chege, 1996).
- Provision of lorry/taxi transport to women going to the collection site (Hoertz, 1996).
- Employ the use of more donkey carts and have the wood sold at a subsidized rate (Chege, 1996).
- Encourage communal cooking, and cooking of one meal per day, to conserve firewood (Chege, 1996).

382. Collection in designated areas or large groups: To our knowledge, these proposals, of identifying collection days, or collection zones corresponding to specific days, thereby encouraging the bush to be very populated in designated areas at designated times, have met with early resistance from the refugees and have not been implemented; or if attempted, the results not systematically reported.

It should be noted, while we believe these were serious options at the time (in 1996-97), in the highly politicised context that now prevails around firewood collection and its purported links with rape, they are now no longer proposed as serious alternatives to supply of firewood.

While proposals for a number of strategies to increase the security of women during firewood collection have been made, little has been done to document if and how these proposals were ever implemented. UNHCR Sub-Office staff maintain that preliminary efforts have been made in this direction, but have met with resistance from refugees. It appears important that Sub-Office record and analyse the views of refugees, its response to them and what has been done to overcome objections and achieve compromises. It has been a criticism raised by external observers of UNHCR in the context of this evaluation that its staff in Kenya is weak in terms of its ability to effectively negotiate and build
options that require some organisation and co-operation, but little financial cost. As part of a community self-help approach, the activities of the camp anti-rape committees could be expanded and clearly hold potential coordinating camp-level efforts for reducing firewood related rapes (see the next chapter). Such approaches could be coupled with self-defense training and training on how women in large groups should best respond to the actions of an armed individual or that of a small group of armed men.

383. Lorry/taxi support: A local lorry that, perhaps for a small fee, ferries women to the wood collection site introduces another option for women collectors. A one-way trip would reduce exposure by 25-35% of the time they are outside the camp. Whether such a taxi service could be made to operate safely and effectively is unknown at present. It would likely have cost less than $60,000 per year, to hire at least one for each camp, leaving daily at regular intervals throughout the day. The costs would be minimised if the service was not directly provided by UNHCR, but rather was a private initiative supported and perhaps subsidised by UNHCR.

**Alternative ways of reducing firewood-related trips**

384. With the objectives of reducing the number of trips women were making in search of firewood and the concomitant environmental degradation from firewood collection, project designers and implementers also had a number of options, some of which were proposed at the outset, and some of which were not seriously considered but should have been. All would have required a testing period to see which worked best, or how to optimise the situation. They would also require the services of several people able to work with and motivate the refugee community. Broadly speaking these include alternative ways of making women safer while collecting firewood, and alternative ways of supplying firewood.

**Other ways to reduce energy consumption**

385. Nancy Chege’s suggestion to encourage communal cooking, and cooking of only one meal per day, are featured among other suggestions put forward by UNHCR energy environmental guidelines, to help reduce the levels of wood consumption, and hence the number of trips women need to make in search of firewood (and the concomitant exposure to the risk of rape and assault). The Domestic Energy in Refugee Situations Guidelines (1998) propose for instance, promotion/introduction of a long list of energy-saving practices, many of which are already being successfully promoted under GTZ’s RESCUE project. These include:

- improved stoves;
- collective cooking (multi-family, institutional);
- firewood preparation;

understanding with the refugee population, particularly as concerns resource limitations that are frequently beyond the direct control of UNHCR. UNHCR should seek to discover if these criticisms are justified, and how it can strengthen its capacity to achieve compromise and cooperation from the refugee population and its spokespersons.
• fire management (shielding, control of air supply, simmering, putting out fires promptly);
• food preparation (pre-soaking, milling);
• cooking management (better pots, lids);
• food supply.\textsuperscript{71}

386. For each of these, estimates have been made by UNHCR experts, as to the amount of energy that can be saved, and hence the number of collection trips. For instance, fuel savings of 30-40 per cent are said to be achievable through proper shielding of fireplaces. PUTting out fires promptly rather than allowing fires to burn out naturally, can save 15-20%.

387. All of these measures should normally be part of an energy management plan that would include provision of energy-saving devices and public education currently undertaken by GTZ’s RESCUE project; and the modalities associated with firewood supply. Such a plan would include an analysis of the trade-offs and costs and benefits, and energy savings associated with each type of intervention. If such a plan had been prepared prior to initiation of the firewood supply project, it would go to the heart of the cost-effectiveness of the project. This is so because the firewood project is intended to achieve its two objectives primarily by reducing the number of trips women make for self-collection of firewood. Any measures which reduce energy requirements work in this direction.

Alternative firewood supply possibilities

388. In the previous sections we have discussed the cost of the Firewood Project in relation to the overall UNHCR budget, to other components in the budget, and in relation to other programs and potential initiatives directed at reducing environmental degradation and gender-based violence. From a cost effectiveness standpoint, we can also ask whether in choosing to distribute firewood to the Dadaab refugees have we chosen the most cost-effective way to do so?

389. Owen (1998) points out that when the firewood project was initiated, there was a well-established commercial system of firewood collection and distribution in place, and that at least half of the wood entering the camps in 1998 was being collected for sale. Blondel (1999) emphasises that the deadwood supply in the area within range of the current donkey cart supply system (35 kilometres) is sufficient to be theoretically sustainable indefinitely. Our evaluation survey found that with the firewood supply project about a fifth of households currently meet all the rest of their fuel needs by purchasing it and a majority of households buy at least part of their cooking fuel, rather than self-gathering it.

\textsuperscript{71} “However far refugees go in adopting fuel-saving hardware and conservation practices, there will be limits on how much energy can be saved which are governed by the foods being cooked.” UNHCR, Domestic Energy in Refugee Situations, 1998, p. 35. UNHCR and WFP should undertake to study the issue of staples issued to Dadaab refugees, who generally prefer pasta, which can be cooked with very little energy, as opposed to maize and beans that are not preferred foods and require a much greater amount of energy to cook.
390. A willingness in 1997 to consider support for or intervention on the “demand” side, rather than the supply side, assuming that market forces would take care of the supply of wood to the camps, would have focused attention on more cost-effective possibilities of increasing wood supply to those most at risk for rape (discussed in next section). Such a measure could also have been supported by incentives to expansion of the existing donkey cart system, through subsidising or providing low cost loans for the purchase of donkeys or carts.

*Alternative firewood distribution strategies and “demand” level support strategies*

391. Four more cost-efficient approaches, some of which were tried and abandoned and others that should have been explored, as alternatives to “lifeline” distribution to all households include:

- Distribution through a combination of wood-for-work and free distribution to vulnerable groups as proposed by the 1998 Design Workshop and early Project documents;
- Creation of alternative income-generating opportunities for families now dependent on the sale of firewood (as implemented on a small scale through Ted Turner and WFP funds);
- Incentives and measures to enable a larger proportion of the population to purchase firewood on the commercial market to substitute for self-collection;
- The use of wood to promote other social and economic objectives within the camps, such as providing wood in exchange for school attendance by female children (greatly under-represented among the current school population).

392. Each of these are discussed in other parts of the report. They are listed here to point out that more cost-effective and targeted alternatives, other than the “lifeline distribution” model of engaging in a full-scale wood supply program, were available and have been insufficiently tested, modified and implemented.

*Sustainability issues*

393. Organised fuel supply requires a multi-year commitment. Fuel supply can be expensive and, once initiated, hard to suspend. Donor agencies and UNHCR must make a clear funding commitment to any such activity.” (UNHCR Selected Lessons Learned, 1998, p. 67)

394. In the case of UNHCR ‘s initiation of a firewood supply project, in the context of severe budget restraints, sustainability issues are closely related to cost-effectiveness issues. The United States insistence that $1.5 million be spent on firewood supply to attempt to meet the total fuel needs of Dadaab refugee households for a one-year period, and that henceforth such provision be “mainstreamed” and provided through the general budget, seems untenable and unsustainable. Insufficient recognition was also given to the probability that the cost of firewood provision would be much higher than estimates based on current market costs, both because prices would go up, and because consumption was likely to increase.
395. As discussed in other sections, the price at which firewood could be supplied by UNHCR was initially at least three to four times the price at which wood was being supplied by the established private market. While monitoring as to consumption levels has not been carried out, or the results made available, it appears that consumption too has been edging up, since the introduction of the project.

396. Given UNHCR’s financial constraints, the project has been able to continue to date because UNHCR has spread the budget over a longer period than that requested by the donor, and because only a fraction of the fuel consumption needs have been met. This level of wood provision may be affordable within the context of UNHCR’s overall budget, but needs to be questioned on “effectiveness” grounds, in relation to how meeting about 11% of the consumption can effectively achieve project objectives.

397. In the view of the evaluators it was both inappropriate for the donor to obligate UNHCR to undertake costly firewood distribution in a context where only one-year funds were committed, and not right for UNHCR to accept the funds on these terms. Once a firewood supply program is started, firewood becomes viewed as an entitlement by the refugees, as do firewood contracts on the parts of local people, and firewood taxes on the part of local government councils. Attempts to stop firewood provision or to modify the modalities of such provision take place in this now politicised arena, as do “rape” and “the environment” as well.
Alternative approaches

398. From its inception, the Firewood Project was not conceived as a stand-alone activity, but was to form part of a co-ordinated strategy to reduce the risk of rape and violence to women and children in the Dadaab area.\textsuperscript{72} Such strategy has evolved over a number of years, but owes many of its elements to the Women Victims of Violence project initiated in 1993 and mainstreamed into UNHCR’s general program in 1995 (see Appendix E).

399. Over the past seven years, under a variety of interventions, Sub-Office in Dadaab has attempted to co-ordinate the range of actors, IPs, police and the refugees themselves, to improve the security situation for refugees, and refugee women and children in particular. However, as lead agency mandated to provide protection and care to refugees, UNHCR can not be seen as firmly guiding and monitoring the performance of the various actors towards meeting the objective of addressing the incidence of rape of refugee women, or effectively managing available UNHCR resources in this regard. As we have seen in previous sections of this report, key indicators for reviewing the success of the project have not been identified and monitored, as a basis for comparative assessment of the relative merits of other anti-rape and anti-violence interventions. In addition, there is a range of lower-cost and no-cost approaches that should be adopted by UNHCR to further its objectives.

400. The Firewood Project, as examined here and in other sections of this report, has not been implemented in such a way as to maximise its results in meeting the objective of rape reduction, or even the reduction of rapes related to firewood collection. The ‘lifeline’ distribution model, while perhaps an effective response to political pressures at many levels, does not adequately address the needs of those women and girls who actually collect firewood, and hence are most at risk. While subsidising the consumption of households who would otherwise purchase their firewood - possibly contributing to increased overall consumption levels - it responds inadequately to those most in need.

401. Firewood is a necessary commodity for the refugee community, but UNHCR’s role in providing it can only be at very high operating and purchasing costs, and is without the strong positive effects that were anticipated, as the poorest women and girls will continue to make trips to the bush for items which can be sold on the market. Firewood provision may also have undermined GTZ’s other environmental activities, such as components of the RESCUE\textsuperscript{73} project designed to reduce firewood consumption.

402. For firewood provision to continue, given the high costs to UNHCR, it must be effectively tied in to other activities, such as wood for community, security and environmental work (described in greater detail below), wood for vulnerable

\textsuperscript{72} This is evident in the wording of official Project contracts and in progress reports.

\textsuperscript{73} The RESCUE project, for environmental educational education and rehabilitation, and distribution of energy saving devices, has cost a similar total amount, but over a 6½ year period, since June 1994, or less than US$500,000 per year.
households, training opportunities for women leading to alternative income generating activities and formal education for girls, grossly under-represented particularly at the secondary level of schooling.

**Relationship of findings to UNHCR Guidelines on Refugee Women and Children**

403. The findings of this evaluation have thus far largely been in line with the issues and recommendations found in UNHCR’s *Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women* (1991), its *Guidelines on the Protection and Care of Refugee Children* (1994) and its *Guidelines on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence Against Refugees* (1995). These documents repeatedly call attention to the particular vulnerabilities of specific groups, and the need for special measures to ensure their safety and protection:

404. “Within the female refugee population are women who are particularly vulnerable to protection problems: for example unaccompanied adolescent girls and women, elderly women and disabled women:

- Identify women who fit into these vulnerable groups and determine if they are facing special protection problems;
- Develop approaches in consultation with refugee women to address their special needs…” (Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, p.33)

405. Under ‘Key Issues’ for both the emergency stage and long-term refugee situations, the *Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women* highlight in a number of places the special vulnerabilities of women-headed households and the need for “assistance policies that ensure that single refugee women and women-headed households gain access to food, shelter, healthcare, clean water, firewood, etc.” (1991, p.16)

406. In particular the Guidelines on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence Against Refugees, clarifies that “Females who are on their own, for whatever reason, whether they are single, widowed, abandoned, unaccompanied minors, lone heads of households, or women who have been separated from male family members by the chaos of flight or during voluntary repatriation, are all particularly at risk of sexual violence” (1995, p.8). As has been explored in this evaluation, it is likely that many of the women making most frequent trips to the bush fit these descriptions of women at particular risk of sexual violence, thereby requiring special measures to protect them.

407. The *Guidelines on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence Against Refugees* provide numerous recommendations related to combating sexual violence. While it does not specifically advocate general distribution of firewood, it does recommend numerous other strategies for combating rape and sexual violence against refugee women and girls, including:

- Improved lighting and fencing;
- Increasing security patrols – involving both police and refugee groups;
• Establishing fora for discussion among refugees, and between refugees and local communities;

• Providing [social and economic] assistance to local communities;

• Creating a visible presence of UNHCR protection and field staff within the camps to gain first-hand knowledge of women’s protection problems;

• Combating frustration and boredom of male refugees;

• Liaison with national women’s organizations;

• Facilitating the investigation of complaints of sexual violence;

• Ensuring protection of the victim and any witnesses from reprisal;

• Disciplinary action taken in cases involving government officials and refugee workers;

• Documentation and analysis of information;

• Deployment of female security personnel;

• UNHCR support to national security forces where needed.

408. Many of these measures have been or are currently being implemented by UNHCR, CARE, NCCK, FIDA-Kenya and particularly through the activities of the Ted Turner Project on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. These efforts merit amplification and expansion. Other recommendations have yet to be tried in Dadaab, such as the deployment of female security personnel. In addition, the Guidelines recommend numerous measures to assist in changing behaviours and attitudes of key actors around issues of sexual violence, many of which require increased attention by UNHCR. These include:

409. “Recognize the influence of community and religious leaders in this context and enlist their cooperation in changing attitudes towards sexual violence, both in terms of prevention and in alleviating the effect on the victims…Refugee leaders could be trained so that they will be in a better position to assist in modifying negative attitudes towards victims and in fostering concepts of community responsibility. Moreover, such training could facilitate the dissemination of information on sexual violence and measures for prevention.” (p. 24-25)

410. “Government officials should be informed of their responsibility and of the measures they should take to protect the rights of refugees, with particular emphasis on the national laws, relevant international human rights instruments that they have ratified, and UNHCR’s Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73 (1993) on Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence”. (p. 26)

411. “Members of the security forces should be advised of the relevant codes of conduct aimed at preventing and redressing abuse of power, in particular that which involves the commission of acts of sexual violence. They should be made aware of the problem of sexual violence and ways of taking preventive and remedial
protective action. Furthermore, they should be trained in interviewing skills and how to support the victims to enable them to handle these cases appropriately.” (p.26)

**Actions and spending in support of improved policing in Dadaab**

412. The Kenyan police hold primary responsibility for the protection of refugees and for maintaining security in and around the Dadaab camps. However, according to interviews carried out with refugees, UNHCR, IP and police staff, the quality of policing in and around the Dadaab camps is a serious part of the problem and its improvement, a key element in the solution to the rape and violence facing refugees.

413. Despite sustained efforts to provide training to police and to improve the climate of trust between the police and the refugee community that were undertaken under the WVV project, and continue today through the work of the Ted Turner SGV project in partnership with International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya), there are still serious problems to be addressed related to police effectiveness in providing basic protection to the refugee community in general and women and girls in particular, as well as UNHCR’s role and response in relation to police ineffectiveness.

**Ineffectiveness of some police staff**

414. Based on interviews carried out and a review of rape records and other documentation, ineffectiveness of policing in the Dadaab area appears to be one of the more fundamental issues in dealing with the prevalence of rape and other forms of violence affecting both refugees and locals. Refugee women told the evaluators that many women continue to feel that it is pointless to report rape to the police, as they are not taken seriously.

415. While some officers are highly motivated and skilled at doing their job, there appear to be numerous others within the police community in Dadaab who put at risk the security of the refugee and local population. UNHCR sub-office staff make strong efforts to work collaboratively with the local police, but appear to lack the will and the support at higher levels to take a strong stand in the face of flagrant abuses and ‘mistakes’ on the part of police officers.

416. The two cases presented here suggest a high level of ineffectiveness, or corruption, the investigation of which is well beyond the scope of this evaluation. Given the rate of escape from jail cells in the Dadaab area, a polaroid camera with which to photograph suspects would seem to be a small investment that would facilitate the re-capturing of escapees. As these cases directly involve the security and protection of refugee women who have come forward to report and identify the perpetrators of rape, they also call into question the willingness of UNHCR staff to monitor and advocate that refugees, made doubly vulnerable by their willingness to come forward, are appropriately served by the police and judicial system.74

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74 UNHCR inaction is all the more surprising as it itself is being blamed for the state of the jail cells from which prisoners routinely escape.
Among the rape records reviewed the evaluators encountered the case, in 1999 of two girls, both minors, riding with the police from Dagahaley to Ifo. According to the report of one of the girls, they paid the policeman 50 shillings for the ride. The same policeman then tried to hold the hand of one of the girls, when her sister asked him not to touch her. When they arrived at the police base in Ifo, according to the report of both girls, they were locked into the police base, where the police officer raped them. They were held overnight and raped the following morning by a second police officer. They were only released late that afternoon.

Although evaluation team members have enquired into the follow-up by UNHCR into this incident, we have been unable to get further information as to investigations and punitive actions carried by the police or GOK, or efforts by UNHCR to bring the officers responsible to justice.

Improving the status of policing in the Dadaab area

417. A key issue appears to be the low status associated with being posted to the area – which for many officers is actually a form of punishment or disciplinary action for transgressions committed elsewhere in the country. According to police staff interviewed, many police officers posted to Dadaab do not have the basic motivation or incentives to do a good job, to protect civilians, and to pose a serious challenge to the smugglers, robbers, rapists and gun-men who operate in the area. It is true that many police have lost their lives in attacks by banditry groups over the years, and that they have reason to be afraid. However, the GOK has preferred to deny or distance itself from the high incidence of rape in the area, or to suggest by its own inaction, that this is now UNHCR’s problem. This it has become, with UNHCR supplying training and material assistance to ensure a still weak level of effective policing, and being blamed for appalling ‘mistakes’ and every ineptitude of local police staff, without any formal response.

418. Efforts on the part of UNHCR, through Branch Office for example, should also be directed at higher levels of the GOK to improve the status and effectiveness of policing in the area, as this will have a meaningful and sustainable benefit to the people of Kenya, long after the refugee camps are gone. As possibilities improve for an eventual return of Somali refugees to Somalia over the next few years, it appears essential for UNHCR to assist the GOK to develop a strong strategy to improve the status and effectiveness of policing in Dadaab. The GOK should be encouraged to seriously consider the fate of this historically insecure area once the refugees and UNHCR are no longer present to blame for the violence and lawlessness in Dadaab.

419. The possibility of repatriation of Somali refugees should alert UNHCR and the GOK to the brief window of opportunity that presently exists to seriously address the administration of policing and justice in the area, and to identify projects that can be funded by bilateral and multilateral donors to improve the quality of policing and address the problems of accountability, corruption and low motivation among police staff. The GOK itself should be encourage to put in place a positive, rather than a negative incentive structure for policing in the NE Province, by increasing recognition, rewards and promotion opportunities to those officers who perform well under the difficult conditions offered in Dadaab.
The case of the rapist who escaped three times from Dadaab area police cells

In May 2000, a known criminal wanted on two counts of rape and several counts of other crimes was apprehended and jailed in Garissa, where two refugee women brought charges against him. He ‘escaped’ from his jail cell in Garissa, and was later picked up by the police and jailed in a cell in Dagahaley camp. He also ‘escaped’ from Dagahaley. He was finally picked by police and jailed in Dadaab, and it was arranged that the mobile court would sit on August 29 in Dadaab to hear his case, as it involved the rape of two refugees. The mobile court sat, which involves time and expense in co-ordination and the transport of a magistrate from Garissa. The case was brought forward, but due to ‘mistakes’ in the paperwork prepared by the Dadaab police, the magistrate had to defer hearing the case until the following day, so that the errors in the charge sheet could be corrected. That night, the prisoner escaped and has been at large since. The same day, August 29, another rapist who had defiled a four-year-old girl also escaped from the same police base in Dadaab in a separate incident. UNHCR and IPs were formally informed of the escape on September 5, 2000.

The evaluation team questioned many in SO and IPs about this case during its field mission to Dadaab and Nairobi in October-November 2000, and in particular the then acting chief of police (OCS) in Dadaab. According to the acting OCS, the prisoner escaped through a hole in the ceiling. We asked to see the cell where he was held, and from which many other prisons have ‘escaped’, and he refused. He said that the escape was possible because UNHCR had not paid for the cell’s repair. We asked if the police had a photograph of the prisoner, as he had been in the custody of police several times. He said that they had no photograph, which would clearly be helpful in attempting to re-capture the suspect. More shocking perhaps, is that the only action that the evaluation team could identify as having been taken by UNHCR around these events, was to put a ‘note’ in the file which was sent on to BO Nairobi. When asked, SO staff stated that no letter of protest had been written or formal action been taken to the police or GOK at any level. The two women who brought charges against their rapist have not been transferred to Kakuma, as it was originally suggested they should be, and remain highly vulnerable with the perpetrator whom they identified still at large.

Involvement of the Anti-Banditry Unit (ABU)

420. In addition to routine policing, other factors have been identified that are believed to influence the opportunities and risks to would-be rapists in the bush. An important one of these is the presence of the Anti-Banditry Unit (ABU) in the area around the camps. According to the sub-office security officer, one of the factors affecting the rape rate most dramatically is a strong and well-supervised police presence of the anti-banditry unit, which is a specially trained force able to patrol and pursue bandits under difficult bush conditions. In the first eight months of 2000,
for instance, two periods show less than 10 reported rapes per month: February and March have one and two reported rapes respectively, and July and August have five reported cases each (see Table 8.1, below). The February-March period coincided with the extensive re-validation exercise (from late February to mid-March) that saw some 300 supervised police officers, including members of the ABU, stationed in and around the camps. This period, as might be expected in the presence of this size of police presence, saw a significant decrease not only in rapes, but in all security incidents, including murder and armed banditry.

| Table 8.1. Security incidents reported during the first eight months of 2000. |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
|                 | Rapes | Murders | Armed Banditry | Total |
| January         | 10    | 9       | 5              | 24    |
| February        | 1     | 1       | 3              | 5     |
| March           | 2     | 0       | 2              | 4     |
| April           | 10    | 0       | 8              | 18    |
| May             | 10    | 0       | 6              | 16    |
| June            | 11    | 0       | 10             | 21    |
| July            | 5     | 0       | 3              | 8     |
| August          | 5     | 1       | 0              | 6     |

Source: UNHCR, Branch Office, Nairobi, October 2000.

421. This period was followed by three months of intensified violence, in terms of a higher incidence of reported rape, as well as more reports of armed banditry activities. According to the UNHCR sub-office security officer, in response to the rising number of security incidents and the limited resources of the local police, a new action was taken: “At this point in time the police were fully occupied, doing patrols, guarding the hospitals...we realised we could call for the ABU which was stationed in Garissa. From late July and into August, the ABU with 39-40 officers came and stayed in the area for two weeks.” While the force was many times smaller than that present during the revalidation exercise, it was considered to be effective as a deterrent to violent crimes in and around the camps, during the period it was dispatched to the area.

422. However, it has proved impossible to test the hypothesis that the presence of the anti-banditry unit(s) is directly related to fewer security incidents in general or of rape in particular over the medium to long-term, mainly because such records are not kept. The anti-banditry unit has conducted its patrols in different regions and has not informed UNHCR of its presence when in the Dadaab area. Systematic comparison between changes in the frequency of rapes and other violent acts and the presence of the anti-banditry unit has hence not been carried out by UNHCR.

423. With approximately 15 ABU officers presently stationed in Dadaab, UNHCR should actively undertake to monitor the frequency of their patrols around the camps and the relationship of these to the overall security situation.
424. In general, a comparative approach to monitoring the results of the firewood versus other options has not been taken, and is an essential element in a rational utilisation of UNHCR’s resources for protecting refugees. The firewood initiative targets uniquely the security of wood collectors. It does not address all rape, nor does it contribute to the improvement of the overall security situation in and around the Dadaab camps. In this sense, future monitoring of the Firewood Distribution, and the security-related activities of Sub-office as a whole, should include the gathering of information on and an assessment of the impacts of other security-related initiatives on both rape and overall security incidents.

The mobile court and UNHCR’s role in ensuring the administration of justice

425. The mobile court appears to have been a successful intervention on the part of UNHCR to bring the administration of justice closer to the refugee and local communities. This intervention is cost-effective, as it saves time and travel costs of both refugees and agencies’ staff (such as MSF doctors) who are called on to testify in court, as well as staff who attend to monitor and support the judicial process. The UNHCR-funded Mobile Court represents an innovative approach to combating sexual and gender-based violence, as well as other crimes, on the part of Sub-Office in Dadaab, and a model that should be shared with other refugee programmes dealing with similar issues.

426. However, according to some agencies’ staff, the mobile court has not sat as often as it should due to struggles over the conditions and incentives offered to magistrates from Garissa. Other concerns have also been raised about UNHCR’s role in coordinating and monitoring court those proceedings that continue to be held in Garissa, and which has placed undue hardship and duress on both refugee women and MSF medical staff required to travel to Garissa to testify. Some IP’s staff feel that UNHCR, as lead agency in ensuring the protection of the rights of refugees, should demonstrate greater effectiveness and efficiency in coordinating the travel and logistical arrangements to facilitate that cases involving refugees be heard. As of September 2000, with the hiring of a Kenyan woman legal consultant to follow SGV cases and to provide legal advice to survivors, the police and MSF doctors, it may be hoped that the weaknesses in UNHCR’s coordination role on SGV cases may, in part, be addressed.

Co-ordination of community-based prevention and response

427. CARE has provided exemplary leadership in the struggle to combat rape and other forms of SGV in the Dadaab camps. Through its efforts to advocate on behalf of the rights of vulnerable women and children and to pursue justice on their behalf, it has gained the trust of many in the refugee community. Along with NCCK, it has created a network of community-based counsellors, leaders and facilitators to help address the social, psychological and economic difficulties of rape survivors. This relationship of trust has most probably led to an increase in reporting of rape and defilement on the part of refugees, who now state that ‘someone is listening’ to them; In combination with a number of workshops held by UNHCR staff and FIDA lawyers to raise legal and human rights awareness among the various actors in Dadaab, the work of CARE and NCCK has also led to greater consciousness within the refugee community about the consequences of rape in order to try to reduce the stigmatisation and ostracism of rape survivors.
Network of refugee community development workers (CDWs) and anti-rape committees (ARCs)

428. Through its network of refugee Community Development Workers (CDWs) and Anti-rape Committees (ARCs), CARE has been effectively targeting the most vulnerable women (including the disabled, female-headed households, the elderly, widows, rape survivors) and children for special assistance and support. A revolving loan fund has been set up with funds from the Ted Turner SGV project that has provided loans for small business creation to 925 women, as of the end of 2000. This has been a remarkably cost-effective strategy for addressing the income needs of the poorest households. Provided that CARE has the capacity to increase these micro-credit activities to vulnerable women, more resources, in the form of staffing and loan funds, could be directed towards this program, given its potential for providing the poorest women with the choice of purchasing their firewood. It is also highly sustainable, as these loans have thus far had a 98% repayment rate. Such measures also decrease dependency and provide training, skills and resources that will remain with the refugee community in the future. However, careful monitoring should be done to understand the nature of the choices households make regarding incomes generated, and whether or not firewood collection is effectively reduced through this process.

429. Through this network, WFP food sacks are also distributed to vulnerable women and girls to provide an additional source of income and to encourage girls’ school attendance. The resources available to the Firewood Project could be effectively tied to the protection of girls, through providing households with a valuable resource (firewood) in exchange for their daughters’ labour so as to permit them to attend school, particularly at the secondary level of education.

430. Although it has been a difficult task in the context of generalised poverty and refugee resistance to acknowledging that some are more vulnerable than others, CARE has succeeded in engaging and facilitating refugees’ self-identification of the most vulnerable households through its network of community workers and leaders. This network is of critical importance in maximising the efforts of all agencies and projects in addressing the issue of rape, both in the bush and within the camps, as it is in the best position currently to provide information on and target those women who are most at risk of rape, given their ongoing need to venture into the bush for firewood (and other items) both for home consumption and for sale. Additional resources and careful strategizing are required to build on the cautious gains made by CARE in refugee self-identification of vulnerable households through its implementation of the Ted Turner SGV and WFP projects.

431. While a small portion of the GTZ-UNHCR firewood procured has been distributed to vulnerable households, this proportion appears inadequate, given the disproportionate risks of rape in the bush to those households who do not have alternative forms of income or support. This imbalance should be redressed, and a greater level of co-ordination should be established, giving the refugee community,

75 It has been the overall contention of UNHCR and GTZ that the “lifeline distribution” model was a necessary response to refugee unwillingness to acknowledge that some households are more vulnerable or at greater risk than others. Here, again, the evaluators feel that CARE, through its role in implementing the Ted Turner SGV project, has made cautious progress towards refugee self-identification of vulnerable households, and that additional means and strategies should be employed to build on this experience and enhance this process on a larger scale.
NCCK, CARE’s Community Services and Vulnerable Women and Children’s staff a more active role in identifying the groups who are most at risk, and channelling firewood resources towards special distributions and wood-for-work opportunities for them.

The role of community self-management committees

432. Despite the obvious successes in building community-based initiative around rape reduction, as some CARE and NCCK staff admit, the community itself also plays a role in harbouring perpetrators of rape, in feeding and sheltering them, in protecting their identities, and in perpetuating traditional forms of justice (such as maslaha, or payment for crimes committed) that may be discriminatory towards women and children and serve to perpetuate widespread impunity of criminals and aggressors. Along with the impunity ensured by the ineffectiveness of policing in the area, impunity also appears to be ensured by the refugee and local Somali communities themselves.

433. Concerning the ongoing risks to women and children associated with firewood collection and other trips outside the camp, the Community Self-Management Committees (CSMs) who met with the evaluation team offered few suggestions and proposals as to how to reduce the risks involved. Numerous ideas have been proposed over the years of low-cost, community-based measures that might lead to a real reduction in the rape rate by protecting women and children who continue to collect firewood on a daily and weekly basis. These include a greater involvement of the camps’ male population in the firewood collection process, as well as the creation of ‘safe corridors’ where women, accompanied either by the police or male community members, can carry out firewood collection with some measure of protection. The evaluation team was unable to find any evidence that proposals to make firewood collection safer had ever been tried; most appear to have met with resistance from the refugee population on the basis of arguments about Somali cultural practices.

434. However, no long-term and sustainable solution to the problems of rape and other forms of violence in the area will be possible without a serious challenge to the cultural characteristics and practices that perpetuate them. UNHCR staff, in various documents and discussions, shy away from this problem giving priority to ‘technical fixes’ and dismissing social/cultural change as impracticable because it is a ‘long-term’ solution. While this mentality is understandable within an organisation whose strength lies in its ability to respond to short-term emergencies and mass mobilisations generated by war, in a long-term refugee situation such as that of Dadaab, UNHCR cannot afford not to be engaged in a more fundamental process of social change. The firewood distribution has been justified as a technical fix, but cannot be really effective without committed work by and within the refugee community to change its behaviours in the face of the elevated risks to its most vulnerable members.

435. Meetings and discussions with Anti-Rape committee (ARC) members, and other CSMs, reveal a deep concern with the issue of rape and other forms of violence, and an acknowledgement that the problem of rape is a problem of the Somali

76 Meetings with CSMs included the anti-rape committees, women’s affairs committees and security committees for each camp.
population – as both survivors and perpetrators are almost exclusively from that group. Yet these meetings were also characterised by a sense of powerlessness on the part of committee members. ARC members emphasised their role in counselling survivors and facilitating the reporting process, but were unwilling or unable to articulate preventive measures, apart from firewood, that would improve the situation. In general, these committees mentioned practical needs, in terms of office space, communications equipment and transport, without any indication of how such resources could help them better develop and implement community-based solutions of any kind. One suggestion that did emerge and appears easily accomplished is to provide ARC members with special identification badges, as they are often called on to escort survivors to the police base to report rape incidents. Such badges would identify them to the police as having a legitimate role as advocates and supporters for the survivor.

436. The CSMs are weak and require more support from UNHCR and IPs if they are to mobilize and organise the community towards safer, community-based firewood collection, and other measures to prevent violence. The mandates of the CSMs, particularly the camp security committees and the anti-rape committees should be clarified and, if necessary, expanded to include the challenging task of stimulating dialogue and awareness-raising within the community about the underlying causes of rape, the mobilising of men and youths from the community around rape prevention and the putting in place safer firewood collection practices. Given the extreme importance of their role as potential agents of social change within the camps, some resources should be made available to the CSMs to use in their work, provided that they are able to propose and implement a specific program of community activities around improved security and rape reduction.

437. UNHCR should also put specific resources towards furthering the training of refugee Community Development Workers, many of whom would benefit from formal social work training. UNHCR should consider a joint project with the University of Nairobi’s Department of Social Work, to develop a special program in Community Solutions to Violence, through which talented young Somali refugees could be trained and engaged within the camps to mobilise the various segments of the community around the issue of rape, SGV and security in general. These specially trained youth could also play a role in motivating and supporting the efforts of the CSM committees in organising safer firewood collection opportunities.

Initiating dialogue around SGV with the local non-refugee community

438. Despite our efforts, it was extremely difficult to get an accurate sense of the prevalence of rape among local women and girls who are not registered as refugees. As a good number of Kenyan Somalis are known to be living within the camps where food, schooling and medical services are provided free of charge to those registered as refugees, those women may share the risks of the refugee population. Refugee and local women interviewed suggest that there may be one case a month of rape of local women and girls. However, the local Kenyan population being very small – totalling perhaps 10,000 – we may assume that non-refugee women in the Dadaab area may be suffering similar levels of rape to those among refugees.

439. Based on the experience of CARE, NCCK, FIDA-Kenya and UNHCR in the area of combating SGV, a forum should be created for stimulating discussion between the refugee and local communities around the problem of rape, SGV and
other forms of violence. As rape and other forms of SGV are problems facing both groups, collaboration on common problems should be promoted to replace the present conflictive rhetoric generated by the ongoing linkage of firewood resources with the problem of rape.

**UNHCR staffing and management of rape and SGV issues**

440. If impunity and the low social and punitive costs associated with rape and other violent acts within and outside the refugee community are rightly seen as key causes for the problem of rape in Dadaab, a strong and balanced team of community services and protection staff is required.

*Imbalance between community services and protection staff*

441. In relative terms, the Sub-office budget has put significant resources towards the protection side of its activities and far less towards providing effective leadership in community services. As of September 2000, Sub-Office had four legal protection staff in place, and only one junior community services consultant on a six-month contract. Overall, for staffing reasons, UNHCR is unable to effectively fulfil its role as lead agency in the area of refugee community services. This imbalance may have led to a significant focus on legal ‘remedies’ to rape, with inadequate human and programming resources in place to address possible preventive strategies. It is ironic that UNHCR is able to budget US 1.2 million a year to firewood distribution, and does not have the resources to engage an experienced community services staff person to help supervise and guide such a project with its primary objective of addressing rape and assault of women and children.

442. Sub-office clearly requires a Community Services staff person with experience in community mobilising around SGV and the ability to work effectively with the Somali community to provide leadership, monitoring and co-ordination of initiatives, programmes and funds dedicated to addressing the problem of violence against women and children. GTZ, as we have seen, has done an excellent job in mastering the process of tendering and letting of contracts in a difficult and conflictive setting. However it also appears to be under-staffed and has been weak in its ability to implement and monitor the social/community components of the project as originally defined. The Community Services post having been cut in 1997, there has been inadequate supervision, planning and co-ordination to ensure that the project is meeting, as effectively as possible, its primary objective.

443. An experienced community services staff person, with a management committee of IPs working in related areas, should be given the responsibility of managing available resources designated to addressing the problem of rape of women and girls in the most strategic and effective manner. Based on this evaluation, this would involve a reduction of the ‘lifeline’ distribution model, and a move towards more effective targeting of firewood and other resources towards those refugees at greatest risk of rape and assault. With the participation of all IPs, this management committee should assess the possibilities for increasing wood-for-work and other income generating activities to vulnerable women and children, as well as investigating opportunities for expanding the local and other markets for goods and services produced by refugee women. If it can be established that alternative income generating activities and revolving loans do effectively increase
women’s incomes to the point that they can purchase, rather than collect firewood and other items from the bush, and IPs, such as CARE deem that they have the capacity to effectively administer these at an increased level, more resources should be allocated to these activities.

Supporting the role of the GOK

444. UNHCR should be engaged in strategic work at the political level to improve the effectiveness of policing and to hold GOK to its obligations under international conventions. It should also extend itself, based on its accumulated experience in Dadaab and that of its implementing partners, to assist the GOK in identifying a range of development activities to help to address the widespread poverty and pressing need for infrastructure and economic investment in the area.

445. One of the more positive features of the Firewood Project noted in this evaluation has been the economic benefit to local entrepreneurs and refugee workers of firewood supply, in an area where few economic opportunities of any kind exist. Ultimately, to profoundly and sustainably improve security for refugees and local Kenyans in Dadaab is to work to increase their stake and investment in the rule of law and a development process that provides viable alternatives to violence and banditry. UNHCR should be clear that given its mandate and its own financial crisis, its role can only be to facilitate and assist the GOK in building relationships with other donors and agencies with the resources and experience to support development in the area. Given the impoverishment and historic social and economic marginalisation of this region of Kenya, it is of paramount importance that UNHCR, as a major UN agency, utilise its influence both within the UN system and internationally to involve UNDP, World Bank, bilateral donors and NGOs in identifying, with the Kenyan Government, needs and goals for development programming in a variety of sectors including education, health, infrastructure, business development, governance and human rights.
Appendices

Appendix A: Principal list of documents reviewed

Appendix B: Principal list of persons interviewed

Appendix C: Chronology of main Events

Appendix D: Breakdown and comparison of UNHCR budgets 1999 and 2000

Appendix E: Note on Women Victims of Violence Project (WVVP)
Appendix A

Principal list of documents reviewed

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Appendix B

Principal list of persons interviewed

Jeff Crisp, EPAU
Naoko Obi, EPAU
Gregory Wangerin, Senior Fundraising Officer
Patrick Tigere, Legal Advisor
Kate Burns, Reproductive Health Officer
Katharina Samara, Gender Unit
Sajjad Malik, Senior Rural Settlement Officer
Javier Lopez-Cifuentes, Senior Desk Officer
Asmita Naik, Child Specialist
By tele-conference: Mr. Jarl Krausing, UNHCR Environment Unit, David Stone and Nicolas Blondel (Consultants – Environment Unit)
Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Dona Tarpin, US Permanent Mission in Geneva
Daniel Tshitungi, Representative of Branch Office Nairobi
James McAnulty, Regional Refugee Coordinator, U.S. Embassy, Nairobi
Venancio Njuki, Environmental Officer, Branch Office Nairobi
Tsehaye Jacob, Community Services Officer, Branch Office Nairobi
Alberto Cabeia Chys, Senior Programme Office, Branch Office Nairobi
Jaqueline Parlevliet, Protection Officer, Branch Office Nairobi
Robert Kuenstle, Field Safety Advisor, Branch Office Nairobi
Millicent Atieno Mutuli, Associate Public Information Officer, Branch Office Nairobi
Felix Ngunjiri Dishon, Senior Conservator of Forests, Government of Kenya, Nairobi
Sarah Norton-Staal, Senior Regional Policy Advisor (Children) UNHCR Regional Service Centre
Mary-Ann Fitzgerald, formerly of Refugees International
Nicolas Bondel, UNHCR Environmental Consultant
Anisur Rahman, Programme Officer, UNEP Nairobi
Manab Chakraborty, Biodiversity Country Studies/Strategies, UNEP Nairobi
Xia Kunbao, Coordinator, Emergency Response, UNEP Nairobi
Matthew Owen, UNHCR Environmental Consultant, Nairobi
Vedasto Mwesiga, Head of Sub-Office, Dadaab
Kazuhiro Kaneko, Senior Programme Officer, Dadaab
Idah Muema, Community Services Consultant, Dadaab
George Arogo, District Officer, Government of Kenya, Dadaab
Esther Olang, UNHCR Legal Consultant, Dadaab
Zeinab Ahmed, VWC Supervisor, CARE Dadaab
Syphines Olila, Programme Manager, CARE Dadaab
Ahmed Sheik, UNHCR Environmental Officer, Dadaab
Abdi Muhammed, GTZ Dadaab
Samson Obuya, UNHCR Security Officer, Dadaab
Christof Han, GTZ Nairobi
Mr. Chege, GTZ Dadaab
Doctors and administration of Medecin Sans Frontiere – Belgium in Dadaab
Gon Myers, WFP Dadaab
Mr. Shifraw, Field Officer, Dadaab
NCCK staff and religious leaders, Dadaab
Members of Environmental Working Group, Dadaab
Group of Donkey Cart Owners, Dadaab
Resource Utilisation Monitors, Dadaab
Anti-Rape Committees, in Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley camps
Women’s Affairs Committees, in Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley camps
Community Self Management Security Committees, in Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley camps
Women Firewood Contractors, Dadaab
Group of ‘Reformed’ Bandits, Dadaab
Camp Security Officers in Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley Camps
Dr. Mbithi, Acting OCS (Police Chief), Dadaab
Sergeant Wilson Adune, Police Officer, Dagahaley
Group of Donkey Cart Owners
Esther Kiragu, UNHCR Ngara Sub-Office (by e-mail)
Chris Talbot, UNHCR Geneva
Dr. N. Whande, UNHCR Geneva
Jennifer Hyndman, author, Vancouver, Canada
Appendix C

Chronology of Main Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Firewood Project History</th>
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<tr>
<td>1996 and earlier</td>
<td>Some antecedents to initiation of the firewood project include: High publicity about rape; Women Victims of Violence and other interventions; RESCUE program to address environmental effects of Refugee presence. Visit of Kimani, in late 1996, RESCUE Monitor who recommends certain key baseline information needed before undertaking an expensive initiative such as firewood supply; Visits of Nancy Chege and Thomas Hoerz, who identify firewood collection as the main locus or context of rape and gender based violence, and offered various solutions (not including free firewood supply)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-1997</td>
<td>Two-day visit of US Congress staff looking into refugee protection, assistance and resettlement issues in East Africa. In Dadaab they are briefed on “the nexus between firewood and rape of refugee women.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 1997</td>
<td>A special contribution of 1.5 million dollars is earmarked for firewood supply, intended to respond to the problem of women being raped while collecting firewood, and also as &quot;a visible gesture to help save the Kenyan environment (which) could be useful in countering the Kenyan’s refugee weariness and indeed threats to expel all of the refugees by the end of this month.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct - Dec 1997</td>
<td>Discussions take place with CARE as a possible implementing agency for the project., but Care declines. Negotiations begin with GTZ. Flooding from El Nino rains help delay project start-up.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1998</td>
<td>Stakeholders design workshop is held, to develop an action plan, which recommends among other things, a three year implementation period, with an initial 3-month pilot phase; that wood be mainly exchanged for work, and distributed free only to a few vulnerable groups; that more baseline information be obtained about existing wood availability and supply systems; that principles of sustainability and community self-reliance and direct participation be taken as paramount.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb - May 1998</td>
<td>Negotiations with GTZ about implementing the project. Disagreement about percentage of overhead to be paid. Delays also because of serious El Nino flooding in the area. UNHCR Branch Office in Nairobi initiates purchase and transport of firewood from Nairobi area (from cutting of live wood) intended as an interim measure to supply 10 kilograms per person</td>
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### DADAAB FIREWOOD PROJECT

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<tr>
<td><strong>May 11 1998</strong></td>
<td>Agreement reached with GTZ to implement the project, receiving a 6.5% overhead. GTZ begins looking for consultants to conduct baseline studies; begins organizing locally available firewood suppliers to start forming firewood supply groups, and starts making an inventory of environment-community work.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>May - July</strong></td>
<td>Call for tenders locally; formation of tender committee (CARE, UNHCR, GTZ, GOK), criteria developed to spread the benefits over various groups (women, businessmen, local NGOs, etc.) 17 contractors accepted to supply initial 826 metric tonnes. Decision to exclude refugees from bidding on grounds the wood resource belongs to Kenyans, but refugees and donkey carts can be hired by Kenyan contractors to assist in harvesting and transport of wood.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>July</strong></td>
<td>Results of first draft report of consultants’ baseline survey discussed by UNHCR and GTZ, and eventually disputed by stakeholders. Strikingly, the report finds that women and girls who harvest firewood contribute only 14% of the firewood consumed in the camps, leading GTZ to conclude that the project would thus have to cater to only 14% of the population. Report also confirms availability of sufficient firewood in the area for at least 12 years. (Document not made available to consultants).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 24-29</strong></td>
<td>First wood distribution, to all refugee families in all three camps, following the same system as used for food distribution (rations according to family size) from specially constructed storage centers built in each camp. A rationale given by GTZ/UNHCR for this departure from the planned modalities of the project, “In view of the long period that refugees have waited since they first learned about this project, and in the absence of concrete data on who belongs to the vulnerable groups it was found necessary to provide the first bunch of firewood free of charge. This was explained to refugees as a sign of goodwill, and also used to sensitize them on the principle of wood-for-work that is to be applied in future distributions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 31</strong></td>
<td>Progress report describes the project approach with the following key ideas: Prevention of exposure to attacks; target on vulnerable groups; selective firewood harvesting (environmental conservation); firewood for community-environmental work; sustainability; participation; integration.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aug - Sep</strong></td>
<td>Firewood harvesting and transport to camp storage sites continues. Allocation of contracts becomes a very political process with Environmental Working Groups (EWG) lobbying for local interests; with Governments demanding a Cess or tax on firewood collection; with different local rural communities/areas vying for inclusion, and the like. Quotas for special group interests (e.g. women, vulnerables, local businessmen) are used to...</td>
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selected contractors, rather than just the lowest bidders. Four distribution strategies are explored: goodwill provision (providing a part of each household’s fuelwood need); firewood for work, with cooperation of CARE, UNHCR, and MSF; distribution to vulnerable groups and for institutional catering.

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<tr>
<td>Sep 8-11</td>
<td>Second “goodwill” distribution in the three camps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early Oct 1998</td>
<td>A tri-partite sub-agreement is finally signed between GOK, UNHCR and GTZ, as to specific project activities and implementing modalities, and 9,726,670 Ksh transferred to GTZ. (Document not provided to evaluators). GTZ reports that USD 310,000 (about 21% of project funds) have been spent since May 1998 on the basis of letters of agreement between UNHCR BO Nairobi and GTZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1998</td>
<td>Tendering for firewood supply from Dadaab area continues, reportedly 50-70 kilometers from the camps to not interfere with refugee donkey-cart supply system; A planned general distribution is delayed reportedly because heavy rains disrupt wood collection and delivery to the camps. Wood for work strategy successfully introduced, over opposition from refugees that wood should be free. Cooperation only when participation is explained as voluntary, and “in addition” to free wood rations. 6069 persons each contribute 5 hours of environmental work in exchange for 20 kg’s of wood, and a total of 121 metric tons is distributed. A large cess or tax is imposed by the Garissa County Council of 500 Ksh per metric ton.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 1998</td>
<td>To date, 84 different suppliers have received local contracts and a total of 5014.05 MT have been brought to the camps (including 289.05 MTs from Nairobi). Third goodwill distribution takes place, 07-10 December, providing 674 metric tons. Another 12 metric tons is distributed as wood for (environmental) work. Through the latter, fencing of a few new green belts and limited tree planting was achieved (limited by ongoing drought). Despite only three distributions over a six-month period, the project sees a decline in rape statistics from 104 total reported rapes in the first six months of the year to 60 in the latter half of the year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1999</td>
<td>Fourth general distribution of firewood. Report of Baseline data studies (Matthew Owen) carried out in December 1999, indicates environmental damage and firewood depletion is mainly localized in 2-5 kilometer area; that deadwood is plentiful in areas beyond this radius, and particularly beyond 30 kilometers; that firewood consumption is higher than originally estimated by GTZ, at about 1.6 kgs per person per day; and that apart from the firewood supply project, 50% of firewood coming in is being brought into the camps by commercial suppliers for sale (by donkeys, donkey carts, and wheelbarrows).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1999</td>
<td>Fifth general distribution of firewood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar - July 31 1999</td>
<td>Four more general distributions take place, based on locally harvested deadwood, from areas 35-70 kilometers from the camps. A total of 7983 metric tons has been distributed by the end of July, through free distributions, and another 427 metric tons through wood for work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug-Sep</td>
<td>No more wood distributions, as the US dollars run out, and UNHCR finds</td>
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1999

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<td></td>
<td>New funds for continuing the project and re-negotiates contracting terms with GTZ. A new tripartite contract is signed for 27,299,146 ksh for the period September 1, 1999 through December 31, 1999. The contract makes provision for GTZ to purchase firewood from local entrepreneurs to cover 30% of the refugee needs for a four-month period to the end of December 1999.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct - Dec 1999</td>
<td>No wood distributions. Delays result from negotiations with stakeholders, but GTZ-UNHCR eventually successfully negotiate a lower price with local suppliers and stakeholders to provide wood at 2000 ksh per metric ton, and to pay a reduced tax of 250 ksh per ton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 31 1999</td>
<td>The Final Progress Report reports significant reduction in levels of rape in 1999, as a consequence of firewood supply (continuing the reported reduction started in the latter half of 1998). Despite meeting only a small part of firewood need, and making distributions only 6 out of 12 months, total reported rapes in 1999 were (according to this progress report) 56 compared with 164 in 1998, (and to 105 in 1997, and 78, 56, and 77 in the three previous years).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2000</td>
<td>Revalidation exercise places population at 121,902 persons, as project beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan- Apr 2000</td>
<td>Firewood gathering and transporting are provided separate contracts (rather than combined as before). 81 gatherers are involved in supply from 16 locations in Garissa and Wajir districts. General distributions take place in February and April, providing 1144 and 1113 metric tons at a scale based on achieving a 30% of monthly need met (assuming consumption or need to be 1 kilogram per person per day and that distributions occur every 30 days). An additional 28.5 tons are provided as firewood for work over the period, benefiting 1306 persons, each working five hours for 20 kilos of wood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>Firewood survey by Blondel confirms findings by Owen that impact of refugees is highly localized in 5 kilometer area; that firewood gathering remains highly selective; and that with natural generation, deadwood can theoretically be sustainably harvested indefinitely by donkey-carts ranging within a 35 kilometer area, with or without the firewood supply project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1999 - Sep 2000</td>
<td>Small amounts of wood are provided to vulnerable households, on an irregular basis, mainly splints and broken or left-over bundles. This appears to account for less than 20 tons of wood in total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Oct 2000</td>
<td>Work of tender committee, Environmental Working Groups, and resource monitors (RUM’s) continues, around supply of wood from areas within 35 to 70 kilometers of the camps, at the agreed price of 2000 Ksh per ton, and payment of Government Cess. A total of five general free distributions take place over this period, with none in September and June, and two in July. A total of 5628 metric tons is distributed over the period or an average of 938 tons per month, intended to meet 30% of need or consumption (still defined as 1 kilo per person per day). Another 122 tons is distributed as wood for work, mainly for work on greenbelts, live fencing of greenbelts, and digging micro-catchments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2000</td>
<td>Visit in Nairobi and Dadaab of Members of Evaluation Team.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Breakdown and Comparison of UNHCR Budgets 1999 and 2000

The Dadaab UNHCR Sub-Office provided CASA with a copy of the year 1999 and 2000 budget for UNHCR activity in Kenya, “for the care and maintenance for refugees in Kenya East and North,” broken down by sub-project, and presented in US dollars. The total budget for the 12 months of 1999 is given as $4,629,722, rising to $5,559,163 in 2000 (an increase of $929,441 or 20%). See Table D.1 below.

Domestic Needs and Household Support (Item C) includes fuel supply, which accounts for 99.5% of this category. In 1999, the US special contribution was used to supply fuelwood for the first half of the year to the end of July. During the latter 6 months, negotiations and decision-making about the future of the project were ongoing within UNHCR; negotiations were held with GTZ, and between GTZ/UNHCR and the community stakeholders, regarding the price that would be paid and other modalities of firewood supply. For this reason, although some contracting and harvesting activity took place, no firewood was distributed to the refugees during the latter half of 1999.

Firewood in the UNHCR Budget

According to written briefing notes provided to CASA in Dadaab, the total budget for firewood supply to the end of 2000, has been 225,000,000 Ksh or $3,001,065 (exchange rate 75) including the amount provided by the US government initially. The balance is from GTZ’s general budget in 1999 and 2000. Taking into account the amount spent for firewood in the latter half of 1999, (close to $400,000) and the US contribution, of $1.5 million, this would mean that UNHCR committed over $1.1 million for firewood supply in the 2000 budget. The actual 2000 budget figures provided show a figure of $867,382 for household fuel supply. A significant portion of the budget is also presumably included under Agency Operation Support, with small amounts under Forestry and Infrastructure (though we have not confirmed this).

$1.1 million as a proportion of the total budget of $5.5 million is 20%. Similarly, $867,382 is 20% of the programming budget (apart from operations support).
### Table D1: UNHCR Budget for Refugee Support in Dadaab, 1999 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount in US$</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Complementary Food Commodities</td>
<td>52,814</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Transport/Logistics</td>
<td>450,026</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Domestic Needs Household Support (Fuel)</td>
<td>397,962</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Water (Non-Agriculture)</td>
<td>357,879</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Sanitation</td>
<td>59,254</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>1,464,682</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Shelter/Infrastructure</td>
<td>175,708</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Community Services</td>
<td>138,866</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Education</td>
<td>414,778</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Forestry</td>
<td>10,657</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Legal Assistance/Protection</td>
<td>16,567</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Programme Budget</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,539,193</strong></td>
<td><strong>76.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Agency Operational Support</td>
<td>1,090,529</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,629,722</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is our view that 20% of the total UNHCR budget committed to the supply of cooking fuel, (in a budget which includes provision of water, sanitation, health, community services, and all the other care and maintenance of the refugees) seems high. When we consider that only 10-15% of the consumption of cooking fuel was supplied over this period, it seems particularly costly.

**Firewood Supply in relation to other components of the UNHCR budget in Dadaab**

We note that between 1999 and 2000, when the budget has increased by 20%, the budget for health and nutrition decreased in absolute terms by $81,825, and as a proportion of the total programming budget from 41% to 32%. Most other components of the budget
have decreased or increased marginally or stayed more or less the same except for provision of fuel, and transport/logistics. Fuel supply has increased from about 11% of the programs budget to 20% and transport and logistics from 13 to 16%.

In a long-term care situation, such as prevails in Dadaab, we would anticipate that decreasing amounts would be spent on all the basic care aspects, such as water, sanitation and shelter (compared to the emergency phase) with increases proportionally, in community services and education. This is clearly not what is observed over these two budget years.

The question from the standpoint of Dadaab refugees remains, if we did not receive firewood, would we have received $1.1 million dollars less support? If we ask for and get more firewood will it be over and above other forms of assistance, or will it be instead of other things from the cash-strapped UNHCR support programs? What would the refugees themselves answer, if they were to be asked about trade-offs-- is it better to get 10% or 15% of my cooking fuel for free, or is it better to have more or improved education, improved health care, better community services support; or more opportunities for the poorest or most vulnerable families and individuals to get loans, to get wood for work, or other special assistance? Would I like a few more kilograms of wood per month, but at the expense of secondary education for our youth, or at the expense of a number of doctors and nurses and basic medicines?
Appendix E

Note on Women Victims of Violence Project (WVVP)

This brief description is included because of the importance of the Women Victims of Violence Project as an antecedent to current responses to issues of rape and gender-based violence in Dadaab, including the firewood supply project.

The WVVP, launched in October 1993, represented a first major intervention directed at improving security in and around the camps to prevent violence against women, at a point when rape and other forms of violence in the camps was at a record high. The project existed as a distinct set of activities for two years, and its objectives and some of its activities ‘mainstreamed’ into the daily operations of other units in mid-1995. The principal objectives\(^1\) of the WVVP were to:

- develop and implement measures for improving the physical security in and around the camps to prevent further violence;
- to provide the Kenya police with the training and logistical support required to assist in ensuring more comprehensive protection to the refugee sites;
- to promote a community-based response to protection and to the prevention of sexual assault and other acts of violence;
- to promote consciousness-raising amongst the public, including the refugee community and the law enforcement agents on the emotional and physical consequences of sexual violence on its victims;
- to provide counselling and therapy to treat physical and emotional trauma following sexual assault; and
- to provide material assistance and skills training to enhance the capacity of rape survivors and other women at-risk to fend for themselves.

A main achievement of the WVVP appears to have been a strategy that involved many key actors (refugee leadership, community-members, local police, and agencies’ staff) in a common effort to raise the profile of SGV, and to address issues of stigmatisation and ostracism of survivors from the community. The WVVP put in place mechanisms for collaboration both within the refugee community (in the form of anti-rape committees, security committees, block watches, etc.) and between agencies and refugees, in the

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form of a joint refugee-agencies anti-rape committee. Specific practical contributions, which continue to play a role in the fight against violence and SGV in Dadaab, were:

- introduction of live-fencing around and within the camps to restrict entrance and free movement of outsiders;
- introduction of material assistance to the police, in terms of fuel, vehicles and communications equipment to enhance their effectiveness. At this point the need for female police officers was identified as an important element in the protecting of women survivors, but has never been implemented by the GOK;
- building of a partnership with The International Federation of Women Lawyers/Kenya (FIDA-Kenya) for legal assistance to SGV survivors who were willing to report to the police and to press charges. FIDA continues to be an important partner and resource for UNHCR in dealing with SGV cases;
- The training and creation of a network of refugee workers to counsel, support and enhance the economic self-sufficiency of rape survivors.

CARE-Kenya played a key role in this process, and has taken over management of much of the counseling and support services to rape survivors. CARE also works to assist and facilitate the role of the anti-rape committees in the camps, as well as to manage the Ted Turner funds for income generating activities for refugee women.

Though short-lived as a distinct project, the WVVP laid the foundation for most of the initiatives presently under-way to address SGV in Dadaab, including identification of the need for some form of assistance in the form of cooking fuels, which in part may have led to the establishment of the Firewood Distribution project.

The WVVP, however, came under criticism for a number of reasons, some of them short-sighted. It was criticised for its lack of focus, as it attempted to carry out a broad range of activities simultaneously, many of which were seen to be broadly directed at the overall camp population, rather than specifically targeting women and girls. This criticism may have been misplaced: given the complexity of the situation in Dadaab, and the problems faced by UNHCR and implementing partners on many fronts, efforts to improve security for women and children cannot reasonably be separated from affecting the male population as well.

At a management level, UNHCR was also criticised for the fact that the WVVP was carried out ‘in house,’ with two UNHCR protection staff, two UNHCR community services staff and a project co-ordinator carrying out many of the project activities themselves rather than delegating this work to implementing partners. As a result of the strong role in project execution played by UNHCR, it was found that “implementation
is inadequately co-ordinated with related activities, such as health, social and community services”².

These two points are relevant in the context of the Firewood Distribution project. While it is inadequately co-ordinated with other activities with shared objectives carried out by UNHCR and other agencies, this is not because of excessive control over implementation by UNHCR. On the contrary, the lack of co-ordination appears to be the direct result of inadequate staffing within sub-office to effectively tie the project into an overall strategy directed at rape reduction.