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Mobility, territoriality and sovereignty in post-colonial Tanzania

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Introduction

Growing hostility towards refugee populations in Tanzania (attitudes which are expressed both by local communities and political authorities) is often explained by allusion to the dramatic increase in refugee numbers over the last decade. In this type of analysis, the increased refugee presence is claimed to have a negative impact on the economy and environment of the host region. Without a doubt, the crisis in neighbouring Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) lead to a massive influx of refugees in the regions of Kagera and Kigoma (Western Tanzania) in a very short time span. In the period 1994 – 1996, Kagera alone hosted over 700 000 refugees, compared to a local population of 1.5 million. At the end of 2000, approximately 490, 000 refugees (mainly from Burundi but more recently also from the Democratic Republic of Congo) remained under the responsibility of UNHCR. In addition to this number, it is estimated that a similar number have re-settled in local villages.

Obviously, the immediate impact upon the host communities of the region was considerable. Hungry refugees stole crops and cattle, destroyed fields and, in the search for fuel wood, created alarming rates of deforestation. Among them were armed youth – members of rebel movements – some of whom have also engaged in banditry activities. Voices of concern and even hostility among the local population were henceforth to be expected. Any visitor to the region engaging in small talk with the locals will recognise these sentiments. In fact, it has even caught the attention of scholars in Dar es Salaam. The title of Musoke’s article (1997) is revealing: “From Hospitality to Total Hostility: Peasant Responses to the Influx of Rwanda and Burundi Refugees in the Kagera and Kigoma Regions of Tanzania.”

But UNHCR also found its operation environment to have altered:

During the past few years the traditional hospitality towards refugees by the Tanzanian authorities and host communities has been strained by growing insecurity (perceived to be caused by refugees) and the pressure on limited natural resources exerted by higher numbers of refugees. As a result, assistance and protection programmes for refugees are being delivered in a more politically charged atmosphere. (UNHCR 2001)

It is not only the local peasant in the remote West who resents the refugee presence: in the capital, also, politicians have picked up the thread of this argument. The army have

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on “Transnationalism: The Impact of Transnational Processes on the Nation-State and National Cultures” (19-21 June 2001, Amman / Jordan). The author wishes to thank the conference organisers (Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies) and participants who provided a stimulating platform for debate. A special acknowledgement is also due to Mark Duffield for his criticism and advice. The author alone, however, remains responsible for errors of fact or interpretation.

2 A map of Tanzania can be found in the appendix.

3 It is important to note that Tanzania’s population of 32.1 million is distributed unevenly over its territory. The coastal region in the East and the mountainous border with Kenya in the North East are more densely populated than the centre and western regions.
cracked down on ‘illegal immigrants’ outside the camps on various occasions and within the Parliamentary Commission on Security, the refugee presence is a regularly returning topic. Refugees have become, according to the authorities, a security concern, threatening the peace and stability of the Tanzanian nation. It is clear, however, that within some of the camps, insurgencies against neighbouring regimes are indeed being prepared which does little to facilitate regional diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, as the paper will attempt to demonstrate, the ‘securitisation’ of the refugee issue is not a military issue per se.

These changing attitudes have attracted significant attention, particularly considering Tanzania was always perceived as a particularly safe haven for refugees from the wider region. Since its independence, it has enjoyed international attention for a variety of reasons. Under the charismatic leadership of it’s first president, Julius Nyerere (1964-1985), it embarked upon a course of ‘Socialism & Self Reliance’. Despite similar rhetoric in many other African countries in the 1960s, social, economic and political reforms were indeed implemented. Tanzania emerged as a politically stable nation. Within the region, it was also a centre for the struggle against apartheid; the capital of Dar es Salaam hosted the radical intellectual leadership of liberation movements and opposition groups from East, Central and South Africa. Already in the 1960s, refugees found a safe haven in Tanzania. The first were Rwandese Tutsi who fled ethnic violence in Rwanda. Later, people fleeing fighting in Mozambique and Burundi also entered the country. Refugee numbers throughout the 1970s remained stable (around 180,000). By the mid-1980s economic crisis prevented the further implementation of reform policies. Nyerere was forced to alter his course, i.e. gradual liberalisation of both the economic and the political markets.

This development was obviously not unique to Tanzania, but had a somewhat different effect given the latter’s unique historical experience. In 1992, the political scene changed with the introduction of multipartyism. With the democratisation of Southern Africa and the dissolution of the Eastern Block in the 1980s and early 1990s, Tanzania lost quite a bit of its aura in regional diplomacy. However, despite the intrusive reform policies, a war with Uganda in the 1970s and occasional tension on and with the island of Zanzibar (which forms a part of the United Republic of Tanzania), the country has avoided suffering the same fate as many of its neighbours. On the contrary, from the 1990s it continued to witness a dramatic rise in the influx of refugees resulting from regional conflicts.

However, changing attitudes towards (forced) migrants can not solely be explained by rising crime rates or deforestation statistics. All economic and social change is relative. It is not only difficult but somewhat arbitrary to attempt to localise the threshold point of local tolerance, above which feelings of hostility supposedly erupt. The issue is more complex than is within the scope of such a quantitative approach. A more critical analysis of changing refugee representations is therefore necessary.\(^4\) Perceptions of social and

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\(^4\) While quite a large amount of literature and research has concentrated on Tanzania in its role as a refugee hosting nation, most texts concentrate on humanitarian, development and human rights issues. Without a
political community in general are the object of ongoing negotiation. In this paper, the question will be forwarded as to why the place of the (forced) migrant within the wider socio-political community has changed in Tanzania (from the 1970s to the 1990s). Or to phrase it in more general terms, we shall address issues of how mobility relates to concepts of community, social identity and most of all (state) sovereignty. The focus in this paper will be on Tanzanian policy makers and their visions on the relation between the nation-state and mobility. While in the 1970s, control over mobility was deemed beneficial for the benefit of national economic development, from the 1980s onwards, control over mobility has developed into a security issue. But the figure of the refugee has not only been employed by Tanzanian policy makers. We are confronted with a whole range of actors trying to claim the refugee as a subject of their policies, some of them being better placed to do so than others.

In order to study the changing place of the migrant, a far broader perspective (both spatially and temporally speaking) needs to be adopted (than is, obviously, possible within the limited framework of this paper). In the first section, the issue of the relationship between nation, state and territory shall be placed within a more theoretical context, while maintaining a focus on Africa. In a second section, the case of Tanzania shall be elaborated and this from the post-colonial period onwards, distinguishing the Nyerere and post-Nyerere periods. Despite the fact that it results in a somewhat partial view and the impression of a rather top-down approach, the focus shall be centred more upon Tanzanian policy makers, less voice being given to the subjects at whom policy is directed. However, some anecdotal evidence, in the margins of this paper, will aid to make clear that all policies are (and are to be considered as) mere possibilities. Their intended outcome is never guaranteed.

The relationship between state, nation and territory in Africa

In order to understand the shifting attitudes and changing policies regarding (forced) migrants, we need to examine the triangular relationship between state, nation and territory. This relationship is clearly not simply given or fixed but open to negotiation and change. Within classical modernist perceptions, the nation is a clearly bounded community living in a demarcated territory and represented by a state which reconciles the rights of the individual with the community of which he is a member. The sovereignty of the state is limited to the physical borders of the territory inhabited by the nation. In reality this ‘ideal-type’ obviously does not exist. However, it remains a model which continues to inspire policy. As a reminder, it is useful to note that the now ‘common’ concept of the refugee is in fact a modern construct. Mobility and migration have always been normal patterns of life.

doubt, an analysis of these issues is pertinent. However, an alternative and more critical perspective, one that allows for various questions to be raised (beyond humanitarian issues) will hopefully be more instructive concerning the changing place of the (forced) migrant in Tanzanian society.
The twentieth century became the century of the refugees, not because it was extraordinary in forcing people to flee, but because of the division of the globe into nation-states in which states where assigned the role of protectors of rights, but also that of exclusive protectors of their own citizens, including the role of gatekeeper to determine who could become new citizens. (Adelman 1999, 90)

Rise and decline of the patrimonial state

The literature on the state in Africa is vast; the number of definitions equally so. States in Africa are routinely described as collapsed, corrupt, criminal, cursed, weak, failed, patrimonial, predatory, prebendal, quasi, to use some of the more common adjectives. But especially in the case of Tanzania, the debate “strong state vs. weak state” is not leading us anywhere. Everything depends on what is meant by strong or weak, which is a whole debate in itself. It seems more useful to look at individual histories of states and take it from there to theorise about different typologies. Many of the studies on so-called failed states have drawn their conclusions from a context where (some history of) violent conflict is present. Tanzania, on the other hand, has a history of remarkable political stability. Moreover, these are negative definitions, i.e. stressing deviation from ‘the norm’. They look at African political rationalities as failed copies of Western political systems.

We need to look beyond the first impressions of failure and crisis if we want to understand anything of the logic and the inner rationalities of social, political and economic processes in Africa. The authors of ‘Africa Works’ e.g. (Chabal & Daloz 1999) are strongly in favour of such approach. They have, however, received major criticism from scholars who believe that the aspirations of African people for a better life (democracy, respect for human rights, less corruption etc.) are wiped off the table by attitudes who e.g. describe warlordism as ‘business as usual’ and ignore the enormous social cost of such practices. It is indeed always a challenge, when studying political systems with another historical and cultural background, to maintain an analytical balance between difference and similarity. There are arguments for and against both theories of cultural reductionism on the one hand and structural universalism on the other. However, only through a serious (and admittedly somewhat detached) analysis of the inner logics of political praxis in Africa, we can start to understand what kind of new order is currently developing; a new order which is certainly not a return to the past.

In this respect, it is important to also have an eye for continuity rather than rupture in political developments, since: a) African states can not be reduced to mere colonial imports, and b) these imported constructions have been copied and indigenised from a very early stage (Mbembe 2000a). From the point of view of this argument, it is essential to focus on the socialisation of the African state. Since Bayart’s ‘Politics of the Belly’ (1993) we have learned that the socialisation of the state in Africa has mainly been realised on the basis of the latter’s capacity to distribute wealth. Or to use Mbembe’s words: “the relationships of subjection are created in the distributive order”. (2000a)
Authority in Africa has, in many cases, indeed been based on a capacity to transform economic matters into social and political ones.\textsuperscript{5} This reflects a particular relationship of subjection, where a ‘proper’ citizen was never created, i.e. a legal subject with both rights and obligations, viz. the state. Initially, the post-colonial state in Africa seemed to take a firm hold over economic assets. In many African countries the early post-colonial period saw the multiplication of a plethora of para-statal agents such as marketing and pricing boards for cash and food crops. However, control over the economy should not only be seen in the strict sense of control over production. Access to the state guaranteed access to the economy. This could range from tax benefits on in-coming development aid or percentages on contracts with foreign investors, to having access to an office phone with which to conduct private business. Maybe this can explain, in part, why the large majority of conflicts in Africa in that period did not target the state \textit{per se} but were conflicts between different groups or even individuals looking to take hold of the state not only as the seat of authority, but moreover as a means of access to the economy.

What authors like Bayart (1993) or Chabal & Daloz (1999) seem to have underestimated is the unsustainability of patrimonial politics. The patrimonial state logic is a dead end street given its problems in reproducing itself. From the mid-1980s on, local and global developments have undermined the state’s capacity to distribute wealth. Within the limited scope of this paper, it would not be possible to engage in debate as to whether this economic debacle should be explained by changes in the global economy, which have continued to marginalise Africa’s position on the world market, or merely with reference to ‘corrupt’, faulty national policies. Many observers however, whether left or right wing, overlook the so-called parallel economy, which presents a slightly different picture. Africa is not necessarily fully isolated from the global economy, but new actors are participating in it in novel ways (money laundering, smuggling of forestry resources, diamonds or even art). The parallel or ‘illegal’ economy is by nature not only traversing state borders but in some respect also transcending them. (see e.g. Bazenguissa-Ganga & McGaffey 2000) Mbembe remarks in this respect that on the African continent, two geographies of economic power are becoming increasingly prevalent; the corridor economy and the enclave economy. The first concerned with the extraction of (natural) resources for ‘export’ and the second centred around sites of economic importance such as mines. (Mbembe, 2000c) A third could be added, namely the ‘\textit{économie de brousse’}. What is important here is the effect this situation has had on sovereignty. A fragmentation of authority is taking place as new actors have entered the scene in the competition for control over resources, thereby announcing in several countries the end of the accommodation of elites. It can be argued that the more stable African countries are cemented together precisely by accommodating a middle and upper class. However, even here the cement is starting to crack. Extreme examples can be found in the war zones of Central and West Africa, where we do not witness a social regression into chaos and anarchy, but on the contrary, the painful renegotiation of the modalities for legitimate

\textsuperscript{5} De Boeck has, in this regard, contrasted western ‘constipated’ attitudes to economic development with an African attitude which is more ‘excremental’. That these are directly opposed is not so much the problem. The problem lies in the fact that foreign intervention in Africa (from NGOs to states) considers one attitude superior to the other. (De Boeck 1998)
domination. African state rulers, in response, often mimicked the strategies of informal networks in this struggle for authority, and as such the distinction between public and private spheres in these war zones becomes increasingly blurred. On a local level, the struggle for land which is pertinent all over Africa should not merely be seen as a struggle over scarce resources as such, but as a struggle to determine who has a right over what. This is not to argue that the social cost of these violent transitions should be ignored. Let’s not forget that the recent war in Congo e.g. has wasted already 2.5 million lives. In large parts of the continent, the living conditions of ordinary people have dramatically declined over the past years. But beyond the images of crisis (mainly distributed by the aid industry), we can see that a new order is developing.

There are also less violent examples of the informalisation of structures such as the proliferation of religious movements. As Mbembe pointed out the fragmentation of value producing institutions does not solely affect the state. To put it simplistically, if authority is based on control over economic resources, then the multiplication of actors who control such resources results in a fragmentation of authority, whereby the African state seems to be the one that stands to lose the most. We should not be blinded by the dwindling resource base per se, but rather pay attention to the fact that it is not clear anymore who has the authority to divide the cake.

On the other hand it is interesting to note that so-called state collapse also obscures the fact that old elites are able to recycle themselves with remarkable ease. Despite regime switches and coups d’état, in many countries there are in fact few changes at the top, whether in public or private life. This has been demonstrated in a variety of countries, even including Zaire/Congo. Given the fragmentation and de-institutionalisation of authority, don’t we need to look beyond the state? Since Foucault, many scholars have argued for a less state centred approach in the study of political processes. As Rose e.g. explains, new flows and alliances spatialize power along very different dimensions. Politics is much more than the totality of the state versus society relations. When reflecting on the future of the institution of the state in Africa, Collinson (1999) rightly points out that it is fruitless to look for an all or nothing scenario.

The question of the future of the African nation-state is also part of a broader, even worldwide debate on the future of classic state models in the face of globalisation. For sure, globalisation has become a label applied to a growing number of processes and it hence often obscures more than it reveals. Moreover when it comes to the future of the nation-state model in the face of globalisation, the debate often centres on the question whether the state is undermined or not in the face of global economic processes, whereby more

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6 In the Eastern Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) e.g. rebel movements have been recently accused of plundering natural mineral and forestry resources. In a statement, however, these same movements declared themselves the legitimate authorities of the territory under their control, so that they are in a position to conclude contracts with the companies and individuals of their preference.

7 The problem of legitimate authority is particularly manifest when it comes to peace negotiations with a fragmented number of contenders, such as is the case e.g. in Burundi. Whose agenda is legitimate enough to gain a place at the negotiation table? Anyone wielding a machete or a movement with a PR office in Brussels? (see e.g. Van Eck 2001)
‘left wing’ writers often dispute the demise of the nation state model (cf. e.g. Weiss 1997, Kagarlitsky 1999).

**Globalisation and the restructuring of authority**

It remains important to have an eye for the varied impact of global processes. Bauman (1998) contrasts the mobility of capital with the locality of labour. Globalisation and localisation are two sides of the same coin, hence the term glocalisation launched by Robertson (1995). One can not deny that there is an element of ‘class’ involved in determining the side of the equation on which one ends up. (Bush & Szefeľ 1998, Bauman 1998) Could it perhaps be that there are different ‘classes’ of states? It indeed appears that some states have been able to extend their sovereignty beyond their borders and have more successfully adapted themselves to the global state of the world. Duffield (2001) e.g. explains how metropolitan states have allied themselves with the aid business, becoming powerful public-private networks with a capacity to have an impact on societies physically far removed. As Rose (1999) argues modern regimes rationalise themselves according to a certain truth. Metropolitan power centres have diagnosed the situation in large parts of Africa as damaging to international security, hence legitimising intervention. According to Soguk humanitarian interventions are not just inspired by solidarity in the face of human suffering, they are even a site for the reconstruction of the international state system:

> Humanitarian interventions are not simply activities of a tertiary order, undertaken to resolve a problem, but also practices of active regimentation, oriented to produce, stabilize, and empower the specific territorially bound and territorially activated hierarchy of citizen/nation/state on which the very ontology of the state system continues to rest. (Soguk 1999,188)

Western powers consider the economic debacle in Africa a threat to international security which demands drastic reforms. Most international organisations ascribe economic failure in Africa to poor management. The state needs to loosen its grip on the economy, and reduce its economic role to that of a facilitator. Governments need less bureaucrats and more technocrats/managers and government departments need to be run like companies. This neo-liberal (third way?) is thus equally prescribed as a solution to African problems. (Rose 1999) The replacement of a distributive (or welfare) state model by a regulatory state model, would require a huge change of the social basis of state sovereignty. It is presumed that better and transparent government will instil trust upon citizens and improve relationships between state and society, thereby reducing instability. This is the essence of most so-called structural adjustment programmes. As Reno and others have argued, these measures have increased the number of competitors within the economic field and ironically contribute to the current instability in large parts of the continent. (Reno 1998)

The point is that globalisation has produced a new form of inequality. While authorities all over the world are being transformed due to global developments, some have a greater
grip on the discourse that serves to legitimise their authority. And this has much to do with control over resources because African state rulers, who derive their legitimacy from their distributive capacity, are now confronted with changing conditionalities for external patronage. Especially in the case of multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, conditions of good governance, deregulation and liberalisation are attached. De Waal (1997) has a point when saying that the sovereignty of African states has been undermined by aid and development agencies who have a tendency to reach directly to the subjects involved. This puts African state rulers in a difficult position.

Should rulers risk cultivating popular legitimacy by providing services to citizens and thereby marginalize threatening rivals? Should they complete the privatization of state power, perhaps selling the benefits of their globally recognized sovereignty to drug traffickers and money launderers seeking safe havens? Or should they adopt intermediate strategies, such as becoming heavily dependent on new foreign investors who leave rulers free to wage war against internal enemies? Herein lies the element of choice, although it is constrained by changing exogenous conditions. (Reno 1998, 47)

Migration as a challenge to the nation-state?

While African state rulers are juggling competing sources of legitimate authority, the community which they are supposed to represent has also undergone changes. One could argue that, despite some nationalist rhetoric in the 1960s, many African state rulers have never cared very much to establish a relationship of trust with their populations, and have cared more about their own ‘ethnic relatives’ than the nation. However, there are at least two reasons to develop this issue further. First of all, let us consider the case of Tanzania. Perhaps Tanzania is not the big exception, but I hope to demonstrate that under Nyerere some serious consideration and effort was put into the nurturing of the nation. And secondly, African state rulers have increasingly used discourses of autochthonous character to defend their position viz. contenders. (Clapham 1996, Mamdani 2001)

In this context, a few words are pertinent regarding the concept of ethnicity. The nation in Africa is not the sum of its ethnic groups. Ethnicities can be described as ideologies, making reference to cultural, religious or even just historical differences. They are contextual, i.e. not fixed, although they can assume the rigidity of a group when carrying an ethnic label becomes economically damaging or even life threatening. So-called ethnic conflicts in Africa are not separatist wars where groups fight for the right to self-determination.

8 The second war in Congo is a vivid example. This war is not only fought out on the battle field but equally in the streets of Kinshasa, where people of presumed Tutsi descent are considered to represent the Rwandan and Ugandan occupying forces and as a result are the target not only of harassment but even assassination.
We need to try to conceive of ethnicities as identities and as behaviour (..) it is precisely the mix of ‘interest’ (the external behavioural side of ethnicity) and ‘affect’ (the internal / identity side) which makes ethnicity such a potent cocktail. (Van Hoyweghen & Vlassenroot 2000b, 96)

It follows from this that re-drawing the map of Africa will not solve instability. It can even be argued that the relationship between (state) authority and territory as such is in need of revision. The border is traditionally considered as the embodiment of the relationship between state and society, it is the border which represents the sovereign state. (Wilson & Donnan 1998) African states are often described as weak on the basis of their failure to control their borders. So where does this leave the migrant who crosscuts the territory of the state and therefore also challenges its sovereignty?

Reference has already been made to the origin of the concept of the refugee. When we think about refugees we often think about the Geneva Convention (1951) and the foundation of UNHCR, when the construct/notion of the refugee was officially recognised and a judicial framework for protection drafted. This framework however, was limited spatially and temporally. Its limits encompassed those of Europe and its recovery after World War II. Only in 1967 was a protocol added to broaden protection to other contexts. The Palestinian crisis in 1948, e.g., was initially not covered by the Geneva Convention. The Convention came into being for essentially three reasons:

1) To provide a framework for the 11 million displaced peoples resulting from World War II;

2) To recognise the failure to prevent the persecution of Jews (and to prevent the re-occurrence of genocide);

3) And (in light of the confrontation between the East and West Block) as part of the struggle against communism.

The authority of the state is reconfirmed as it is considered the supreme judge of the fate of refugees within its territory. The state is the only institution with the power to recognise and protect refugees within its borders. However, the focus is nevertheless on the rights of the refugee to access the welfare provided by the host state to its own citizens. It is interesting, in this respect, to note that in the original text of the Convention the focus is on the receiving state and little is said about the sending state. However, the welfare state of the 1950s and 1960s has gradually been replaced by a new type of state, i.e. the regulatory state. In the 1990s, it is the sending state that is the centre of attention, as it is described as an institution that failed to respect the values and achievements of the modern nation-state.

9 The debate between scholars on the future of the state in Congo e.g. revolves around issues of territoriality. Should, in the current context, future state models rely on a re-territorialising or de-territorialising of authority?
In any case, the current perception seems to be that international migration has become the latest challenge to the state. We are confronted with:

… a growing perception that they (refugees) represent a threat to national security and that they undermine the sovereign right of states to control the admissions of foreign nationals onto their territory. (Crisp 1999)

As Abiri has explained, the end of the Cold War has lead to a redefinition of the term security. Although it seems that at first sight the issue of security is ‘humanised’ (by enlarging it to include non-military issues), the role of the sovereign state as the protector of human security is reinforced. The migrant is pictured as a threat to human security because he/she challenges the sovereign state and places a burden on receiving societies. (Abiri 2001) Europe took the lead in changing asylum politics, especially after the dissolution of the Eastern Block. Other regions across the globe followed. (Rutinwa 1999) As Soguk argued however, this threat to disturb the balance between state, nation and territory is equally recuperated by states to justify their role as protector of the values of the nation-state (such as democracy, development and the environment). The refugee has been singled out as a specific category, according to Soguk even for the purpose of modern statecraft. He argues that refugees seem to threaten state sovereignty while, at the same time, represent an opportunity for recuperation by the state. The state needs to propagate a definition of the subject which it claims to represent. The problematic of the refugee in a discourse depicting the refugee as threat to the normal functioning of states and societies (disrupting democracy, development, etc.) eventually serves to underline the state in its role as saviour and protector of those values. (Soguk 1999)

Clearly the reasons why people move are complex and many push and pull factors are involved. (Van Hear 1998) But even here we see an element of ‘class’ difference. Some movement is directly linked with globalising processes and is therefore not merely a traversing of borders but also a transcending of them. Collinson (1999) refers in this respect to the movement of highly skilled, managerial and business staff who circulate within a transnational and even global business network. On the other hand, even though

… affected in various ways by globalisation and other changes in the world political economy, the movement of transnational migrants remains firmly tied to forces and processes operating at the territorial level. (Collinson 1999, 12)

With respect to Africa, there is equally an exaggerated focus on crisis related displacement and less so on labour migration. (De Haan 1999) Apart from the continued importance of nomadic lifestyles in some regions, household income throughout African societies is to a substantial extent determined by some form of mobility. It is equally important to see how refugee and labour migrant networks interact. These flows of people can not be studied in isolation from one another. Also on an international scale
asylum seekers and refugees are part of larger migrant diasporas. The gap between 
refugee and migration studies should be bridged.\textsuperscript{10}

The word diaspora is slowly becoming a more popular term to define these complex 
networks. (Cohen 1999) However, with the word diaspora, the stress is not so much on 
the mobility of the people involved but rather on their attachment to a specific 
community, a specific or sometimes even mythic place of origin. They are, as it were, 
multi-local communities. On the one hand, there is the discourse that pictures the refugee 
as a faceless and helpless individual in the mass, someone with no home, no identity, no 
means of survival. (Malkki 1995) On the other hand, the number of studies funded by 
European governments on the new migrant networks, de-territorial diasporas, etc. 
indicate that a new policy issue is emerging. Hereby the refugee is seen as an integral part 
of those networks that escape state sovereignty and thus threaten stability and security. In 
these studies special consideration is given to the networks which e.g. smuggle prostitutes 
from East European states, or traffic Chinese labourers across borders. There is a clear 
trend to criminalise all migration not controlled or beneficial to the receiving state. (Abiri 
2001) Control over mobility is seen in direct relation to the establishment of security and 
authority. In Africa, given the fragmentation of authority, we see several actors compete 
over the right to have access to the refugee. Here, displacement is not just a \textit{result of} 
conflict but also a \textit{tool in} conflict.\textsuperscript{11}

Since control over mobility is deemed essential to safeguard authority and states continue 
to be considered the gatekeepers of political community, this has given impetus to a 
debate on the legal subject. The question is “who can be part of the political 
community?” Interestingly enough, the debate often revolves around issues of loyalty and 
affinity to the nation. To put it bluntly “who can we trust?” Perhaps this is one of the 
reasons why there is so much to do on the issue of identities of migrants. Also within 
anthropology, a heated debate is taking place (especially since Kibreab’s thought 
provoking article in the Journal of Refugee Studies, 1999), about the relationship between 
mobility (mainly focussing on forced migration) and identity. The question is, simply 
put, whether identity and community are territorially rooted or not. There is little point in 
fully involving ourselves in this debate at this stage. It is first of all a debate about 
perspectives where both sides clearly have valid points, and where there is simply no 
right or wrong. For example, when discussing the idea of returning ‘home’ (in the sense 
of repatriation of refugees after conflict has ended), it becomes clear that ‘home’ remains 
a problematic concept. One can return to a specific place but one can not go back in time 
and un-think the horrible events that have forced displacement in the first case. Identities 
are transformed through displacement. Moreover, repatriation is often nothing more than 
a new form of displacement. (Warner 1994) On the other hand, Kibreab, taking a more

\textsuperscript{10} As already pointed out, the classic modernist notion of the nation-state is pertinent in policy. This also 

applies to the classic (dépassé) concept of the refugee. When ever fewer migrants fall under the legalistic 
category of the refugee, more and more people fall under the new category of the (economic) migrant, 
which is not without risk as this might present Western states with an excuse to pursue ever more vigorous 
closed door policies.

\textsuperscript{11} E.g. regroupment policies in Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda where populations are put into camps to 

‘protect’ them from rebel attacks and infiltration or the use of refugees as hostages in regional wars.
‘rights focussed approach’, argues against the ‘we are all tourists mentality’. Many people in the south have clearly far less influence on the context of their mobility. The ‘de-territorialised’ identities they seem to expose are, according to Kibreab, instrumental in their struggle for survival rather than anything else. (Kibreab 1999)

But secondly and more importantly, this debate takes place above the heads of the subjects involved. The category of the refugee is problematised and transformed into a governable space.

The object of problematization is to neutralize and accommodate the specific difficulties posed by refugee presences by reinscribing (and limiting) the meanings and identities of the difficulties themselves. (Soguk 1999, 17)

But this governable space is claimed by competing authorities. Hence competing discourses circulate and conflicting voices speak for the refugee, all claiming the truth about the ‘refugee’ as subject of authority. Host governments incite nationalist discourse to get ‘foreigners’ out or at least contained in camps. Given the political importance of ethnicity and the nature of ethnicity, this is quite ironic. Who falls under the category of foreigner is very arbitrary. The question is indeed: “When does a settler become a native?” (Mandani 1998)

In a recent work, Mamdani has elaborated on what he terms “the crisis of postcolonial citizenship”. While most analysis of violence in the post-colonial period has focused on the concept of ethnicity, he brings race back into the picture. In many countries, the search for the ‘alien,’ the ‘migrant,’ the ‘non-citizen,’ etc. is conducted with significant fervour, encouraging marked levels of violence. He describes e.g. the case of the Banyamulenge in Congo, the case of the Banyarwanda in Uganda, and the story of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. (Mamdani 2001) Anyone who has followed the events in Central and East Africa closely can vouch for the fact that the so-called ‘politics of indigeneity’ have become a powerful factor in political developments. The rise of discourses of indigeneity is a particularly worrying development (not only in Africa) since they often form the legitimising basis for (violent) action against ‘foreign’ populations. (Clapham 1996).

It is important to keep in mind that the African continent is not moving in a single direction (Mbembe 2000b) but that conflicting trends co-exist, such as transnationalising practices and identities and territorialising practices and identities. NGOs operate within de-territorial categories of identification of their target groups (such as the poor or women) and avoid what they consider backward categories of identification such as ethnicity in order to justify their operations that ignore international boundaries.12 This is a form of governance. International institutions wave the declaration of international human rights whenever they see fit. National governments in contrast organise airlifts to save only their own displaced nationals from dangerous conflict zones far afield.

In essence we can agree that the problematic of the refugee as a threat to security (for the state) also serves to demonstrate that the state is needed to protect the values of peace, democracy and development and that the refugee is therefore used to legitimise state authority. However, after discussing the complexities of the reality on the ground, we have to acknowledge that some actors have been better placed to claim governance over the refugee than others.

Tanzania under Nyerere: migrants as an economic asset

As already pointed out, refugee issues should not be studied in isolation from migration trends and should also be placed in their proper historical context. However, given the limited framework of this paper, only a summary of the pre-independence situation in Tanzania can be sketched. Since the fieldwork experience on which this paper is based is mainly tied to migration between the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi and to a lesser extent Uganda) and Tanzania, the focus will be mainly on those migration experiences, and to the region in which they occur, namely Kagera and Kigoma Regions.

The region which straddles the border with what are now the countries of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda is a semi-arid savannah. It was populated at a far later stage than the surrounding mixed farming highlands of Rwanda, the Kivu Rift Valley and the shores of Lake Victoria. Pastoralists originally conquered this frontier from the 10th century A.C. onwards. The savannah region was not insignificant, since it was the setting for great social change in the wider region where powerful kingdoms developed. The Kagera and Kigoma Regions were, at least in the pre-colonial period, more similar to the societies to the west and north than those in the east. Culturally speaking, there were more similarities with the Great Lakes Region than with the rest of Tanzania.13 (Schoenbrun 1998) Due to its dense population, Ruanda-Urundi was regarded by Belgian colonial authorities as a labour reserve, mainly for the mines in Congo but some arrangements were also made with the British for the re-settlement of what were termed ‘excess’ populations in Uganda and Tanzania. While seasonal labour migration within Rwanda and Burundi has always been very important, migration further afield was less common until the colonial period. Tanganyika often served as a transit country since labour prospects were better in Uganda or even Kenya. Mainly Hutu peasants migrated during this period (whether forced or not) and a certain number have remained in e.g. the town of Bukoba to work on coffee plantations.

The first ‘real refugees’ arrived in the period 1959-1961. While the Belgian coloniser had first used the Tutsi court as an intermediary in their rule of Ruanda-Urundi, this strategy was changed only at the eve of independence when Hutu were spurred on to take

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13 It is interesting to note that among populations in Kagera e.g. the labels Hutu and Tutsi are also known. These labels do not denote an ethnic group in the classical anthropological sense, but rather a position in society and economic activity within that society. Within the countries of Rwanda and Burundi these labels have been politicised to such great extent, that they have become ‘ethnic’ labels, often with dramatic consequences as the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda reminds us. This politicisation has not taken place on the Tanzanian side of the border.
over in what was called the ‘social revolution’ of 1959-1961. The monarchy was abolished and at independence a Hutu elite interpreted democracy as a majority rule by the ethnic (Hutu) majority. This was not a peaceful transition and an exodus of Tutsi took place towards neighbouring countries, including Tanzania. Among them were both ordinary peasants, military staff and royalty. In the period 1959-61, the Tutsi refugees were hosted in a temporary camp (Muyenzi) close to the border. By 1961 there were 10,500 Rwandans in the area. While initially there was support for UNAR, the royalist party of the Rwandan refugees (mainly because it had been active in the anti-colonial struggle), times were changing equally in Tanzania. When chiefdoms were abolished, the old ruling class from Rwanda equally lost its status viz. Tanzanians. Between those who had remained in Ngara (Muyenzi camp) tensions revolved mainly around diplomatic/military actions. Tutsi notables in the remote region of Kagera, in particular, were reluctant to turn to farming as a means of survival. Accepting land was considered an acceptance of exile and therefore treason towards the Mwami (the Rwandan king). A military command never really got off the ground, failing to become sufficiently organised to seriously threaten the new regime in Kigali. In addition, no support was forthcoming from the Tanzanian end, since the new, democratically elected government in Kigali had been officially recognised. The Tanzanians preferred to integrate the Rwandese refugees as a self-reliant community.

The attitude of the Tanzanian government towards the Rwandan exile community should be seen in its proper historical context. Tanzania’s first and charismatic President, Julius Nyerere, chose the path of a socialist, self-reliant peasant society. A single party system and an extended bureaucracy followed a very modernist course of state-led growth and development, albeit with a focus on the agricultural sector. This was supposedly the ‘African touch’ to a modernist system of economic progress. This vision was confirmed in the so-called Arusha Declaration of 1967. Nyerere, a former teacher himself, was especially admired for his efforts in the sector of education. He wanted to provide free or low cost social services guaranteeing unilateral access. In any article on Nyerere will be found mention of the high literacy rates of the mid 1970s and early 1980s (90%) and the nearly universal primary education as examples of his good intentions. The focus on education also served to foster a sense of national identity. While Kiswahili was originally only spoken by a small group on the coast and the island of Zanzibar, it has by now become the lingua franca of the wider region. Tanzania played an important role in its proliferation. (Lange 1999)

Nyerere was firmly opposed to partisan politics and also maintained a system whereby officers in regional administration were circulated regularly to other regions in an attempt to curb corruption and patrimonialism. The Tanzanian state was founded on a relationship of subjection similar to that of other African states, directed toward maintaining control over the distribution of economic spoils. The only difference is that

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14 One should avoid reading the history of Rwanda solely in ethnic (Hutu vs. Tutsi) terms. Strictly speaking Hutu and Tutsi are part of the same cultural community of the Banyarwanda, sharing the same language, cultural and religious practices and living in mixed settings. Their precise historical relationship is the cause of much controversy, even between academics, due to the extreme politicisation of Rwandan history. (Van Hoyweghen 2000c)
Tanzania tried to establish a more ‘just’ and ‘equal’ distribution than seemed to be the case in other states. It would be foolish to believe that clientelism did not exist in this system. Because the state discouraged any form of private initiative or success and rather effectively controlled a licensing system (to run shops or hotels e.g.), favouritism was not totally absent, but perhaps occurred on non-ethnicised basis. As in many countries of the former Eastern block, access to jobs or economic advantages implied working oneself up the party ladder.

An enormous amount of literature has focussed on Tanzania’s road to development, initially optimistic, from the mid 1970s and 1980s though more sceptical about the possibility of ‘capturing the peasant’. (Hyden 1980) It is equally important to note that in the 1970s the World Bank’s operation in Tanzania represented its second largest programme in Africa. In 1974, another Tanzanian government project was the focus of international attention, namely the ambitious villagisation programme (Ujamaa), which intended to organise populations in self-reliant communities. It never really took off.

While on paper, the organisation of the early independent state in Tanzania does not differ very much from other African countries, (i.e. a strict hierarchical administrative organisation from the national to the household level controlled by a single party system willing to take firm control over economic, social and political life), the outcome seems to have differed slightly. The particular stress on national identity (through education and the meticulous organisation of the civil service) created a system with its own inequalities but a less patrimonial one than in many other countries. This did not result in a more effective institution as such (as economic failures would later show), but governmental practices have contributed to the creation of a subject with a loyalty to the nation and the state. The collapse of other countries around Tanzania (Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda), while Tanzania itself remained stable, has only reinforced the view of many Tanzanians that their society is more pure and of a higher moral standard. This created a very interesting situation, which Landau has very aptly described.

Through its dislocation/relocation of the population, its extensive ideological propagation, the cooperatization of the economy, and creation of a feared semi-secret police, the party introduced a new series of disciplinary techniques that, building on existing perceptions and attitudes, had a dual effect: it simultaneously created and de-participated a national population. (Landau 2001, 11)

The author refers to the Tanzanian state as a ‘discoursive state,’ one that has no real material presence or impact but very strong symbolic connotations and identification. To understand government practices in Tanzania, it is clearly useful to look beyond the institution of the state.

The Rwandan refugee community was offered a place in this new society. A rural resettlement programme was started though many refugees continued to refuse the offer of land. In response, the Tanzanian government threatened to stop food rations. From 1961 to 1964, food remained in regular supply through the Red Cross, allowing refugees
so inclined, to continue resisting resettlement. When the Red Cross pulled out in 1964, hunger was suddenly a reality. Some Rwandans fled to Burundi, Karagwe or Uganda. Missions and private initiatives stepped in to help the refugees but conditions in Muyenzi camp worsened. From this period the Tanzanian government made an increasing effort to provide services that would promote integration, i.e. resettlement, mainly through sponsoring of education (aided by the international community). From the end of 1963 to early 1964, Muyenzi was de-concentrated into several ‘Rwandese’ villages. Aid came through again, in the form of provision of tools and seeds and investment in agricultural production. It is not entirely clear to what extent mobility was controlled and which public services were open to Rwandans – though there is evidence to suggest that those who had the means to escape the isolated region did in fact do so. Kagera offered little more than a poor peasant life. Over time, it appeared to have created a kind of class difference within the exile community between those who could afford to leave and those who had to remain behind.

Over this decade, an important stratification took place among refugees. Although the large majority arrived empty handed, things had changed drastically by the 1970s. Some had ‘benefited’ from the years of aid distribution or had kept funds which were collected to fight for return. Some had influence, others had cattle and others still worked themselves up through education. More historical research would probably trace this stratification back to differences in the refugee community before their displacement from Rwanda. (Gasarasi 1976 & 1990) Due to the location of the villages and the fact that Rwandans did not mix well with local Bashubi populations, Rwandese cultural practices continued as usual.

The attitude of the Tanzanian government towards culture at that time was in fact rather peculiar. Cultural and ethnic differences were considered dangerous for the nation and its values of democracy and development. On the contrary, the idea was to create a kind of multi-ethnic national culture based on a mix of traditions. Just like esperanto it never really worked. (Lange 1999) On the one hand, the quick rotation of civil service staff was deemed necessary to prevent cultural ties influencing the distribution of services. On the other hand, the rural poor were more or less tied to their villages. With respect to the Rwandese and Burundi refugee communities, who have been separated from the local population, the Tanzanian government seems to have underestimated the strength of cultural identity.

The exercise with the Rwandese refugees was repeated with Burundi refugees who fled in the 1970s but in far larger numbers, namely 72, 000 in 1972 and by 1974 growing to 120, 000. Evidence strongly suggests that the resettlement of refugees in remote areas was a strategy of the Tanzanian government to develop and exploit these new areas. (Malkki 1995) The stress was always very much on self-subsistence, self-reliance and the exploitation of the land as a contribution to national economic development.

By this time the Rwandese villages were self-reliant and produced food without further help from outside. In 1974 the Ujamaa villagisation project was launched, which leads one to suspect that the ‘experiment’ with resettlement and integration of Rwandese
refugees is to be seen within the wider framework of Tanzanian agro-economic policies. *Ujamaa* policies were, in general, poorly received. Rwandans had invested heavily into forming self-reliant communities and had little desire to move again. Cattle owners feared their herds would be commandeered within communal collectives. Many cattle owners left Muyenzi around this period such that over a decade, the original population of 10,500 had declined to 3,000. In 1977, Tanzania hosted 35,000 refugees from Rwanda, 130,000 from Burundi and 50,000 from Mozambique (although 25,000 were again repatriated).

By the 1980s, 30,000 Rwandese were offered ‘*en masse*’ Tanzanian citizenship. Despite some difficulties of an administrative nature (Gasarasi 1990), most of them accepted and were considered successfully integrated. This was a remarkable act. The question of the Rwandese refugees was considered settled by the Tanzanians as of the 1980s and they were further regarded as successfully integrated, and in fact even considered as exemplary hard working citizens. There were occasions where demands for return were addressed to the Habyarimana government in Kigali, coming from Rwandese Tutsi living in less fortunate conditions than those in Tanzania. These were never taken seriously by Kigali, arguing that there was simply no space available to resettle returning populations. On the contrary, there have been talks in the 1980s between the Rwandan and Tanzanian governments about the resettlement of Rwandans in Western Tanzania. This was part of a larger plan to develop/exploit the region around the Kagera River Basin. The project however, never eventuated.

**Post Nyerere: migration as a threat to security**

As indicated, from the late 1970s early 1980s, the Tanzanian economy was delivered a serious blow. Poverty in rural areas was grinding and food security had become a real cause for concern. Initially, Nyerere refused to accept the conditions of the IMF (mainly drastic cuts in the civil service and provision of social services) in order to receive further loans. In 1985, Nyerere eventually admitted his failure and publicly took responsibility by stepping down, making way for Ali Hassan Mwinyi to lead the country through a series of economic and political reforms (prescribed by the money lenders, i.e. World Bank and IMF). From a macro-economic point of view, Tanzania’s economy was gradually on the mend. (Temu and Due 2001) However, the erosion of social service provision was serious (primary education e.g. declined from over 90% to a mere 67% in 1997) and food security hardly improved. The country remains very heavily donor dependent and is required to allocate 1/4 of its budget to the servicing of debt. In 1998, UNDP still counted Tanzania as one of the poorest countries in the world (it is 156th on a list of 174). Economic liberalisation increased competition but led to a marked increase in patrimonial style politics and factional struggle.

During this period of quite dramatic change, Tanzania was confronted with a massive refugee influx generated by conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Kagera alone hosted in the period 1994-1996 over 700,000 refugees, compared to a local population of 1.5 million. The (initially mainly negative) impact of this massive influx should not be
minimalised or argued away. (Daley 2000, Rutinwa 1999). However, one needs to point out that the impact was varied. In the remote and sparsely populated Kagera Region e.g., the refugee camps brought economic opportunity for many. Refugees provided cheap labour (the banana production in Karagwe increased spectacularly as a result). The aid agencies provided work. However, the local rural poor did not manage to take advantage of such opportunities. One could argue that the refugee presence mainly speeded up or reinforced economic changes which were already underway and created greater competition and inequality among the local population. Most negative comments about the refugee presence are related to their large numbers (500,000 Rwandans alone), negative ecological impact and rising crime rates (mainly theft of cattle and crops). Nevertheless, it is useful to point out that the negative impact has little to do with the fact that the ‘new population’ in Kigoma and Kagera Regions is of foreign origin. Many of these refugee camps are larger than local towns, and therefore display a problematique which can be seen in any other town of similar size. What we are seeing is in fact a negotiation of legitimate access to local resources, rather than the depletion of these resources as such.

Secondly, focusing on the new dynamics and changing relations that were brought about by the refugee influx is more revealing. As already pointed out above, the refugee camps also offered economic opportunities. The camps in the Ngara area (Kagera) still host the largest markets of the region and have as such become a nexus for trade networks between Rwanda and towns on Lake Victoria or even further afield. Within these trade networks a variety of people participate, including camp populations, illegal (non-registered) immigrants, locals and former Rwandese nationals who have acquired citizenship and now travel back and forth between Rwanda and Tanzania. Even though the Rwandese camps were closed in December 1996, many Rwandans remained behind. From 1996 to 1998 Rwandans were in a difficult position in Tanzania and were the target of mop up operations by the Tanzanian military. Many Rwandans claim to have fled Rwanda out of fear: fear of persecution, fear of the army, fear of losing their land or house. But one should also consider the pull factors.

There are many stories of economic hardship in Rwanda. Some prefer the confinement of the camp to rural poverty, because it offers food, shelter and free healthcare. And some remaining Hutu rebels preferred to hide in the bush and survive on banditry activities rather than face persecution in Rwanda. Several gangs were also formed through local participation. In April / May 1997 the security situation along the Rwandese - Tanzanian border was problematic. The Tanzanian military carried out ‘mop up operations’ in order to deport the residual Rwandese caseload, as a natural follow-up of the repatriation exercise of December 1996. Later on in 1997, all ‘illegal aliens’ were rounded up. Any person who had not legalised his/her status under the Immigration Act of 1972 or the Citizenship Act of 1995 was considered a legal target, even if having resided in Tanzania for decades. Even some Rwandans who had migrated to Tanzania in the 1940s in search of work were targeted. However, during the September 1997 operation, only 27

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15 Landau (2001) reported a dissimilar situation in Kasulu (Kigoma). Food production decreased since the theft of food crops acted as a disincentive to continue engagement in food production.
Rwandans were arrested (while there are thousands) and none were sent back. Although local populations often complain about the negative impact of the refugees, there was little co-operation to hand over illegal immigrants to the military. Most complaints about refugees and demands for solutions are addressed to humanitarian agencies rather than state representatives. Both the parallel economies which had developed around the camps as well as gang activities had and have no strict refugee character. There are even rumours that some local police ‘hired out’ their weapons over the weekend. It was never put that way but the military clean-up operations could also be interpreted as a symbolic action to stress who is (or would like to be) in control of events in this remote border region.\[16\]

These changing economic dynamics in Western Tanzania are bound to have a political impact over time. With patrimonial politics on the increase, many local businessmen in the west are now in a position to fund their own election campaigns or influence local politicians. Up to now, being dispatched to these remote rural areas as district governor e.g. was considered a punishment and apart from the former single party (CCM) there was little or no other party activity. However, the region has slowly but surely put itself on the political map in Tanzania, and this is mainly due to the refugee issue. Unfortunately, research in these regions has so far concentrated on humanitarian and development issues and not on changing political dynamics.

A not well documented event, which took place at the same time, was the return of the old Rwandese Tutsi exile community to Rwanda. Once a new government in Kigali (led by the rebels of the Rwandese Patriotic Front) replaced the old, genocidal government in 1994, thousands of Tutsi returned ‘home’ from all over the region (and the rest of the world). While the RPF had originated out of a specific Ugandan exile context, the movement quickly gained support in other countries. (Mamdani 2001) Rwandese exiles in Tanzania have never played a very prominent role in the RPF movement. It is clear, however, that a huge Rwandese diaspora emerged rather suddenly. Evidence indicates that the desire to return to Rwanda was evoked up as part of a global strategy of the RPF network. People were morally obliged to pay contributions or to send sons to the front. While many did so out of conviction for the good cause, many poorer families (and especially women) who neither wanted to return to Rwanda nor become involved in the RPF, had little choice to act otherwise. The RPF activity caused considerable unease among Tanzanian government officials. In Tanzania, too, young men of Rwandese (Tutsi) descent were recruited. Organisations sprang up everywhere (also e.g. on the campus of the University in Dar es Salaam) rallying for support. All this while the large majority of them had since received Tanzanian citizenship. Some ‘Rwandans’ were in influential positions, such as government or security services, although their political presence was not as manifest as in other countries.

\[16\] In 1998 however, the Tanzania government was forced to recognise the fact that something had to be done about the (renewed) Rwandese presence in Kagera. From that point onwards, Rwandans have been recognised again, but only on an individual case by case basis. At the end of 2000, there was a steady Rwandan camp population of 27,000. Many more are working ‘illegally’ in the villages. A possible way to trace them is by getting in touch with building contractors, like in any country around the world. Landau described similar dynamics for Kasulu. (Landau 2001)
When Kigali fell in 1994, however, many eventually did return to Rwanda. This event has had lingering effects on Tanzanian national and local politics. Especially in Kagera, there persists intense bitterness among a local population who feels betrayed by these settlers. This has not so much to do with the fact that their neighbours, colleagues or friends returned ‘home’. It has mainly to do with how this return took place. Tutsi colleagues reportedly failed to turn up one morning without notice. Some villages emptied over the course of just a few weeks. The last Tutsi people remaining were often chased away by local populations. Many enjoying dual nationality still travel back and forth and engage in trade networks. There are no legal measures to prevent anyone holding Tanzanian citizenship from entering the country, which is a great cause of frustration. The hatred against Tutsi populations in Kagera is not to be underestimated. Some even believe that the new government in Kigali has plans to annex Kagera as a solution to the demographic pressure. While such plans do not seem to exist, the power of rumour is very strong. Ethnic stereotyping of Tutsi is strongly present in local narratives bearing some similarities with the situation in Congo, though much less extreme. Many negative statements regarding Rwandese refugees are in fact directed towards the old generation of Tutsi exiles as well as the current refugee population. This fact is very often misunderstood.

So, while some Rwandans returned, others entered, but in far larger numbers. In the mean time, the majority of Rwandans have returned and the majority of refugees are from conflicts in Burundi and Congo – concentrated in the Kigoma Region. The dramatic rise in refugee numbers brought a new set of political actors to the region, and more specifically a large number of humanitarian agencies. On the one hand there are several NGOs, most of whom are subcontracted by UNHCR to carry out specific tasks, such as water provision, health care or food distribution, while UNHCR concentrates on issues of protection and diplomacy. Very few NGO staff ask questions about the origins of the crisis, the political role of the camps etc., preferring to keep themselves strictly to their humanitarian tasks. It is only more recently that such agencies have started to question their political influence. Since interventions in Somalia and the Rwandese refugee ordeal in Zaire/Congo, there seems to have been an ‘awakening’ that in fact intervention has an impact beyond humanitarian concerns. Although the Burundi camps in Tanzania present an equally difficult diplomatic issue, the business of aid in Kigoma seems to continue yet again as usual. The figure of the refugee as it is propagated by NGOs is in a sense de-territorialised, abstracted from local political and economic complexities and defined in terms of universal human rights.

A multilateral organisation such as UNHCR is in a more delicate position, since it has to liaise between host governments and governments of countries of origin, and should not ignore that the refugee issue is more than a humanitarian one. It failed to protect Rwandese refugees from refoulement in 1996, although it had itself promoted voluntary repatriation. And now the tension is increasing with the Tanzanian government regarding the issue of the Burundi. It is an organisation which defends the refugee, but therefore also the principles of the modern nation-state. The fact that it propagates a discourse on repatriation as the only durable solution is hence not very surprising, since mobility is
considered world-wide to be a threat to the values of the nation-state. UNHCR is therefore an organisation often blowing hot and cold.

President Mkapa announced in May 2001 that Burundi refugees residing in Tanzania should be repatriated at all costs. Mkapa is fed up with accusations that his country is harbouring rebels from Burundi and said that once these refugees leave, Tanzanians will be able to live in peace and continue with their development activities. However, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs made similar threats to close the camps as early as March 1998. (Rutinwa 1999) On the other hand, UNHCR strongly advised against repatriation in the face of continuing hostilities and the ever-lacking cease-fire in Burundi. And clearly, being dictated by organisations such as UNHCR, is not to the liking of most government officials in Dar es Salaam, especially now that many countries around the world (and particularly in the West) are implementing closed door policies. The refugee issue has become a ‘black jack’ which is used in regional diplomatic power plays. In fact, all statist actors (including multilateral agents) hold similar views on refugees and the question of migration. The view that refugees present a challenge to state sovereignty (and stability) continues to be widely held while debate centres mainly around the question ‘where to put the refugees?’, i.e. how to contain them.

Conclusion

Tanzania’s state sovereignty seems to be under attack from various sides. First of all, it has lost considerable control over the economy, thus drastically cutting the power it once exercised as distributor. When it comes to the issue of migration, international organisations are often better placed to influence decisions regarding refugees, not only because they fund the camps but many state projects as well (subsequently with conditions attached). Refugees themselves are part of a more complex migrant diaspora, many of whom are involved in all sorts of semi-legal cross-border trade networks. They thus instrumentalise complex identities, adapted to changing conditions and needs. In addition, the ‘quality label’ of citizenship awarded the Rwandese Tutsi in the 1980s has been abused by many (in the eyes of the Tanzanians, both government and local community). While several actors are competing for control over the (forced) migrant, sometimes, as the return of the Tutsi diaspora should remind us, migrants make their own decisions against attempts to adapt their behaviour. This contributes to a demonstration of the fact that all attempts at governance are possibilities played out in a field where complex forces operate.

The refugee influx has also brought about a new regional economic dynamic in a remote, poor, rural region. Some individuals have benefited greatly from these new economic opportunities and are, in theory, capable of constructing networks dissident to authority given a more liberalised political field. Last, but not least, whether seeking help or merely an ear for their complaints, the local populations of the west of the country are these days more inclined to turn to international agencies than to the state.
But maybe it is useful to keep in mind Soguk’s argument concerning refugees, its point being that refugees represent both a threat and an opportunity for statecraft at the same time. On several occasions, government officials manipulate the refugee issue in order to paint a picture Tanzania as a victim of the international community and as a morally superior nation of peace-loving, hospitable citizens. We can indeed see a clear continuity in governmental practices. Less effort is being put into reinforcing the state institutionally, while more, or at least continued, emphasis is being directed towards maintaining the symbol of the nation-state among the population. Despite the liberalisation of the political market and a continued de-institutionalisation of government practices, the symbol and values of the nation-state remain as yet largely uncontested. In the current context where international forces are urging the Tanzanian state to abandon the distributive or welfare state model for a regulatory model, the question is for how long the discoursive state can continue to be effective. Can its authority resist further fragmentation to the preservation of stability in Tanzania?
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APPENDIX 1

Political Map of the United Republic of Tanzania