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Transnational philanthropy: Somali youth in Canada and Kenya

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Introduction

One of the greatest signs for optimism in the Somali refugee crisis has been the diaspora’s unwavering desire to assist with peace building and development, both within Somalia and in neighbouring countries. While there has been a growing dialogue on the potential of diaspora philanthropy as a development resource, this conversation has, for the most part, failed to engage with forced migrant communities\(^1\) – an omission that may inadvertently contribute to the discursive construction of migrants as agents and refugees as passive victims (Horst 2006).

The following research is an attempt to broaden the migration-development dialogue by eliciting the experiences and perspectives of resettled Somali youth who are actively engaged in transnational philanthropy. It seeks to demonstrate how an enhanced understanding of forced migrants’ diaspora support can yield unique insights into what social investments exile communities prioritize for the development of ‘home’. Using the youth association *Students for Refugee Students* (SRS) as a case study, this multi-sited study will explore the ways in which transnational philanthropy between Somali youth in Canada and Kenya reflects and/or reconfigures traditional structures of obligation. In other words, what can collective remittance patterns tell us about how youth in exile (re)interpret and apply the social and moral codes governing their home communities?

Somali society is often defined by its resilient kinship networks. These networks ensure individuals’ ‘basic rights are guaranteed and obligations clearly defined’ (Lewis 1981: 12). Lewis states that ‘the evocative power of kinship [is] the axiomatic natural basis for all social cooperation’ in Somali social life, prescribing obligations to respect elders, assist kin, and prioritize collectivism (Lewis 1995: vii). However, such cultural norms were established to cope with the challenges of arid nomadic lifestyles (Farah and Lewis 1993) rather than those confronted by civil conflict, displacement, exile and diaspora. As such, this paper explores the ways in which traditional (or normative) social obligations have been adapted to the myriad contingencies arising from displacement and argues that transnational philanthropy is one means through which Somali youth have engaged with traditional obligations in new ways.

A growing body of literature finds that ‘Somali social relations based on kinship [now] spread comfortably across the globe’ utilizing new technologies to ‘fulfill the obligations of family and kinship from anywhere in the world’ (Healy 2010: 380). However, for the Somali youth in this study, fulfilling ‘obligations to family and kinship’ is not enough; they seek to extend traditional social obligations in a way that transcends allegiance to clan and expresses a new allegiance: one based on generational ties. This allegiance to fellow youth is expressed through the mobilization of collective remittances in support of secondary education in the Dadaab refugee camps. Unable to offer in-kind support at the camp level, these youth have turned to transnational modes of demonstrating solidarity and support by collecting and transmitting collective remittances from Canada.

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\(^1\) Exceptions include: Horst 2004; Lindley 2010; Hammond 2010; Hammond et al. 2011.
Like many resettled youth, SRS members experience a liminality that is both generational (between childhood and adulthood) and geographical (between multiple home places). One of the ways in which SRS members have navigated this dual liminality is through the establishment of their philanthropic association. As ‘a purely youth-driven movement’ (Amiir 2011), SRS uses transnational assistance between young Somalis to bridge multiple home places, sustain important transnational networks, and demonstrate solidarity to youth in exile. In this respect, SRS represents an important form of diaspora philanthropy that has hitherto been overlooked in the literature.

Despite increased academic engagement with diaspora philanthropy, youth-led associations have been mentioned only in passing (Aysa-Lastra 2007; Garchitorena 2007; Fagen 2009a,b; Tchouassi 2010). As such, this paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating the diaspora contributions of Somali-Canadian youth who have navigated numerous ‘labels’ (Zetter 1991) – asylum seeker, refugee, student, resident, citizen – all the while seeking to contribute to a nation steeped in civil conflict. Since the majority of research on diaspora philanthropy focuses ‘on the dynamics and mechanisms of flows rather than the motivations that animate the donors’ (Sidel 2008: 19), I seek to unveil the reasons why Somali youth have mobilized to support the community in Dadaab and the ways in which their actions reconfigure social structures of obligation.

In doing so, I align myself with Lindley in her belief that ‘just as migrants are not “just labour”, remittances are not “just money”’ and it is therefore paramount to analyze ‘the social texture of the remittance process’ (Lindley 2010: 2). Moreover, while most remittance and diaspora research has focused primarily on countries of origin and residence, I aim to contribute to a multi-sited understanding of these diaspora relations, by interrogating the oft-overlooked remittance flows from the country of resettlement to that of asylum.

I begin with an outline of the conceptual framework underpinning the research and analysis (namely literature on displaced youth, remittances and diaspora philanthropy) and an overview of the methodology. The case study is then contextualized with a background on the Somali crisis, Dadaab refugee camps and Canadian resettlement programs. The subsequent sections investigate the ways in which social obligations underwrite both personal and collective transnational remittance patterns; whether or not fulfilling these obligations enhances one’s authority and leadership at the household and community level; and the various ways in which SRS’s philanthropic identity contests dominant generational-gender- and clan-based hierarchies. I then conclude with some reflections on the study and the ways in which SRS (re)produces future aspirations of Somali youth.

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2 See Hammond et al. (2011) for valuable insights into youth diaspora philanthropy (pages: 4, 35, 39).
4 My focus on Africa is an attempt to address the geographical imbalance of diaspora philanthropy literature (Copeland-Carson 2007: 3) which focuses predominately on Asia, Central and South America and the Caribbean. Mercer et al.’s book Development and the African Diaspora: Place and the Politics of Home (2008) and the forthcoming report by Hammond et al. (2011) titled Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peacebuilding are notable exceptions.
Refugee youth

A growing literature finds that young refugees have exploited the liminality of displacement to challenge dominant gender, ethnic, generational and political ideologies (Chatty 2010; Hampshire et al. 2008; Madut Jok 2005; McEvoy-Levy 2006; Mann 2008; Hoodfar 2008). Prior to delving into this scholarship, it is important to note that the labels ‘youth’ and ‘young people’ are ‘socially constructed, historically variable and highly contestable’ (McEvoy-Levy 2006: 2). I use the terms pragmatically in this study to refer to those between the ages of 14 and 30, thereby including both secondary students in Dadaab, and the founding members of SRS; such broad definitional categories are also in line with other studies of African youth (Abbink 2005; Madut Jok 2005).

Displacement can bring dramatic changes to the roles and responsibilities of young people, at times thrusting youth into positions of greater responsibility and at others creating obstacles for achieving adult status (Hart 2008; Tefferi 2008). For many participants in this study, the experience of being displaced to Kenyan refugee camps introduced heightened obligations for contributing to the household economy from a young age. Upon resettlement, these obligations were again transformed, often designating them as the primary breadwinners for their families, thus simultaneously empowering and burdening these youth with new roles and responsibilities. Numerous scholars have documented similar trends, whereby displacement results in the reconfiguration, and even contestation, of inter-generational power relations (Terrefi 2008; Mann 2008; Hoodfar 2008).

In rising to new challenges, young forced migrants demonstrate that they are not simply victims of political turmoil, but ‘agents in overcoming diversity’ and ‘actors (re)shaping social relations and power formations’ (Hampshire et al. 2008: 25; Abbink 2005: 3). While much research on youth agency has focused on how growing autonomy and generational tensions have been manifested in adolescent violence (Bay and Donham 2006; Abbink and Kessel 2005), a counter-discourse portrays young people ‘as peace resources’, highlighting how newfound agency can be a driving force behind social development (McEvoy-Levy 2006: 12; Helsing et al. 2006: 213).

Though the literature engages with youth development (and youth-led development) occurring in refugee camps (Chatty 2010) and in resettlement communities (Stermac et al. 2010), there has been relatively no engagement with how these processes occur across space. As such, this paper attempts to do so by inserting young people into discussions on diaspora philanthropy and exploring the transnational dimensions of their social roles and obligations. However, before turning to the case study of SRS, I will first briefly outline the key concepts surrounding diaspora philanthropy.

Remittances: the new development mantra?

Refugee and forced migration scholars have become increasingly engaged with the so-called ‘migration-development’ nexus – exploring the ways in which refugee remittance economies may contribute to community-level development in countries of origin. The
recent rediscovery of this nexus has brought renewed hope for migrants’ engagement with ‘development from below’ after decades of scepticism over ‘brain drain’ (De Haas 2010).

Coined as the ‘new development mantra’ (Kapur 2003), remittances have gained the attention of global financial organizations, governments, and humanitarian actors (Fagen 2009a). Exceeding Official Development Assistance and private philanthropy in the developing world, remittances constitute ‘one of the most important, but also least understood, private global capital flows’ (Huston Institute 2010: 59).

Remittance scholarship has been bolstered through the growth of transnational studies, which problematize traditional notions of migrant assimilation and detachment, suggesting that transnational links can survive long temporal and geographical separation (Lindley 2010). As such, ‘brain drain’ v. ‘brain gain’ dichotomies are no longer clear-cut, as migrants often sustain ‘simultaneous commitment to two or more societies’ (De Haas 2010: 21). While the majority of remittances are allocated for individual or household use, an unknown portion is earmarked for social investment (Johnson 2007).

These funds are increasingly recognized as diaspora philanthropy and like all remittances, are ‘an expression of strong transnational social bonds and of the wish to improve the lives of those left behind’ (De Haas 2010: 22). Although diaspora philanthropy is not new (Johnson 2007; Newland et al. 2010), it did not emerge in the broader migration-development literature until the late 90’s. By the turn of the century, it had become a focal point for the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard, the International Network for Strategic Philanthropy, Asian Development Bank, The Philanthropic Initiative, as well as numerous academic scholars. Concomitantly, aid agencies, NGOs and select governments around the globe began facilitating and promoting these transfers (Johnson 2007, Sidel 2008).

The unparalleled rates of diaspora philanthropy in recent years can be attributed to several trends including: the recognition of diasporas as sources of investment, technology transfer, and political/commercial contacts by developing states; an exponential growth in global philanthropy more generally; and the revolution in information communication technology (ICT), enabling diasporas to organize and pool their funds (Johnson 2007: 11; Van Hear 2003; Newland et al. 2010; Brinkerhoff 2009). As such, diasporas are seen as ‘increasingly important players on the global stage’ (Brinkerhoff 2007: 24); yet they are often constituted and defined in numerous, and often divergent, ways.

There is a burgeoning consensus among scholars that migration ‘and forced migration in particular, are amongst the most important social expressions of global connections and

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5 Migrant remittances have grown exponentially in recent decades, from $31B in 1990 to $167B in 2005 (De Haas 2008:1). Despite recent economic downturn, global remittances increased from $289B to $338B between 2007-2008, exemplifying how migrants economize through self-sacrifice to ensure the stability of these transfers (Huston Institute 2010).

6 However, the majority of studies remained limited to India, Philippines and China. According to Sidel (2008) this can be attributed to the presence of large diasporic communities from these states in the West, their relative wealth, and the large amount they are able invest both in their home communities and their current countries of residence.

processes’ (Castles 2003: 24). These global connections are frequently described as transnationalism and diaspora. While transnationalism denotes the ‘multi-stranded social relations that link […] societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch et al. 1994: 7), diasporas refer to geographically dispersed populations who identify with a shared homeland and engage in social, economic, political or cultural exchanges amongst themselves.

Though the terms transnational community and diaspora are often used interchangeably, Van Hear (1998: 259) suggests that transnationalism refers to a ‘dual allegiance to place of origin and the place of current residence’ while diaspora ‘involves a still wider spread of allegiances’. Thus, for this paper, I will use ‘transnational philanthropy’ when referring to the work of SRS which occurs between two countries (that of resettlement and asylum) and ‘diaspora philanthropy’ when referring to all other trends.

Just as definitions of transnationalism and diaspora are prismatic, so too are understandings of philanthropy. The Migration Policy Institute defines philanthropy as “private resources donated out of an altruistic interest to advance human welfare” (Newland et al. 2010: 3). This seemingly straightforward definition, does not easily distinguish philanthropy from other financial transfers including remittances and investments. This becomes particularly complex when recognizing that philanthropy is culturally constructed (ibid).

For instance, Johnson (2007) suggests that commercial and economic investments should be considered philanthropic with respect to Chinese migrants who believe such transfers constitute the best form of ‘giving back’. Likewise, monies sent to distant relatives may be considered family remittances in many African cultures, but philanthropy by those in the West who feel greater social distance between themselves and extended kin (Copeland-Carson 2007). As such, it is important not to retrofit the giving patterns of other communities into Western philanthropic models, but rather explore the ways in which these models might be adapted and refined.

These examples further demonstrate the complexity of distinguishing between remittances and philanthropy, which are neither synonymous nor mutually exclusive. Remittances constitute merely one aspect of diaspora philanthropy, which includes the intense exchanges of ideas, ideologies, business, political practices, technological understanding, and other forms of social capital (Fagen 2009a). Conversely, diaspora philanthropy only represents a small ‘portion of remittance flows from the nation’s diaspora back home’ (Johnson 2007: 9).

The remittance-philanthropy nexus is further complicated by the term collective remittances. While individual remittances are sent to families, close relatives and friends, collective remittances encompass ‘resources sent by organized groups of persons in the country of destination to finance and support specific projects to benefit a known community in the country of origin’ (Aysa-Lastra 2007: 6). As such, I will use collective remittances and diaspora giving interchangeably.

Fagen (2009a,b) has criticized the term collective remittances for falsely implying a natural extension of individual remittances, when in actuality the funds being mobilized are simply ‘donations’ (see also Orozco 2006). However, striking parallels between individual and
collective remittances do distinguish these funds from other forms of charitable giving. In both modes of remitting, donors are motivated by deep transnational bonds felt toward recipients.

Also, unlike other charitable initiatives, diaspora philanthropy is almost exclusively volunteer-run and funded through the membership dues (Fagen 2009a,b). Not only do these members give monetary support, but also contribute their time, knowledge, expertise and connections to business, political and humanitarian actors. These contributions – along with skill transfers, civic awareness, cultural competencies, technological understanding and other forms of social capital – are classified as social remittances (Levitt 1998, Nyberg-Sorensen 2004).

Growing interest in diaspora remittances has not been free of controversy (Ammassari and Black 2001; Nyberg-Sorensen 2004, Özden and Schiff 2006). Many scholars have questioned the productivity of these flows and whether their impact extends beyond recipient households. Moreover, there are concerns of diaspora monies being mobilized to sustain civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and fuel identity politics (Anderson 1998). There are also criticisms of remittances not reaching the poorest individuals or communities (thus exacerbating local inequalities) and fostering recipient dependency (thereby limiting human capital development) (Van Hear 2003, Brinkerhoff 2007, Lindley 2010). On the other hand, remittances are praised for providing much needed assistance to immediate recipients as well as significant ‘second-round effects in the local community’ (Lindley 2010: 147).

Such debates extend to discussions of philanthropy. Where diaspora groups yield limited development impact they are labelled as ‘sub-standard’: clan biased, ad hoc, small-scale, cowboy enterprises, lacking in technical expertise’ (Lindley 2010: 146). Conversely, those that are efficient at mobilizing large funds for humanitarian services may find themselves criticized for allowing local governments to abdicate responsibilities (Sidel 2008). Yet despite these critiques, diaspora associations are increasingly heralded as ‘exemplary social actors, with unique levels of commitment to beneficiary communities, low overheads and privileged access to and understanding of difficult and remote contexts’ (Lindley 2010: 146).

Diaspora philanthropy is believed to be more stable than individual labour remittances over time (Aysa-Lastra 2007: 2) and thanks to increasing globalization, migration and internet access, non-elite philanthropy has now surpassed elite philanthropy (Dunn 2004). The collaboration of non-elite actors, most of whom hold deep emotional ties to the recipient community, ensures that ‘charitable donations raised through diaspora networks are often targeted at poverty alleviation or disaster relief and are intended to end up where they are most needed’ (Van Hear et al. 2004).

Drawing on the terminology and literature outlined above, this study seeks to elicit the ways in which Somali youth reconstitute the social norms of home from the diaspora. What are the models of philanthropy to which they subscribe and how are these reflective of household- and community-held social obligations? Moreover, what can their philanthropic
efforts tell us about the types of social investments diaspora youth prioritize for the development of home?

**Methodology**

The transnational nature of the research necessitated both a multi-sited approach and diverse modes of data collection (Bloch and IOM 2005: 22). Given a dearth of literature on Somali youth in Canada and the changing nature of education in Dadaab, I chose to carry out primary data collection in the camps, Western Canada and online using a multitude of interview techniques, observation, document collection and a web-based self-completion questionnaire.

While centering on the perspectives of Somali-Canadian youth, this study seeks to contextualize these viewpoints by positioning them in relation to educational and youth programming in Dadaab. As such, it builds upon field research carried out over a period of two weeks in Nairobi and Dadaab in 2009, consisting of eight semi-structured interviews with representatives of the three organizations relevant to SRS projects: UNHCR, Care International and Windle Trust Kenya (WTK). Observation was further carried out at camp schools, ICT centers and youth programs allowing for the collection of field notes and primary documents. After leaving Kenya, follow-up interviews and requests for updated documentation were completed via email, and data was crosschecked with the SRS interviews and self-completion questionnaires detailed below. I also conducted an online interview with Asni Mekonnen, Senior Program Officer of the WUSC Student Refugee Program, based in Ottawa.

*Table 1: Refugee Service Provider Participants*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Identifier</th>
<th>Professional Role</th>
<th>Location &amp; Mode of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marangu Njogu</td>
<td>Executive Director of Windle Trust Kenya</td>
<td>Nairobi, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asni Mekonnen</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer, WUSC Student Refugee Program</td>
<td>Ottawa, Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 1</td>
<td>NGO Manager: responsible for all educational programming</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td>UNHCR Representative, education</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 3</td>
<td>NGO Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, community development and education</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 4</td>
<td>NGO Service Provider, girl child education</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 5</td>
<td>NGO Service Provider, education</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 6</td>
<td>NGO Service Provider, ESL and IT education</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 7</td>
<td>NGO Service Provider, program development</td>
<td>Dadaab, Face-to-Face</td>
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</table>
I chose to refrain from interviewing refugee youth in the camps due to numerous moral and ethical dilemmas (see Schweitzer and Steel 2008: 15), including the difficulties of attaining informed and voluntary consent given the power imbalances between myself and potential participants; the chance that the ‘fly in, fly out’ nature of the research may have left participants feeling ‘exploited’; and the expectations that were raised by presumptions that I was a rich Dibadaha (outsider) from the ‘West’ with access to resources and resettlement opportunities (Mackenzie et al 2007: 303, 314). As such, I only interviewed service providers working with youth and/or education directly. In so doing, certain voices have been silenced and I am thus unable to ‘identify similarities and differences in perception between implementing agencies and the refugees’ in Dadaab (Mwangi 1995: 10).

That said, the primary focus of my research is not to elicit the experiences Somali refugee youth in Kenya (as important as those experiences are) but rather to investigate the philanthropic perceptions, experiences and motivations of those select youth who had been resettled to Canada through the WUSC program. Using a participatory approach, the research seeks to explore the ways in which diaspora philanthropy intersects with these youth’s conceptualization of their social identities and obligations. Six SRS youth took part in face-to-face interviews, four in web-based video-voice interviews and seventeen in an online survey.

It is important to note that the findings of this study cannot be generalized to all Somali-Canadian youth or Somali diaspora organizations for the following reasons: first, all SRS members who participated in the study were refugees resettled by WUSC through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSRP), and thus their migration experiences may greatly differ from those of government-sponsored refugees, asylum claimants or family dependents (see page 14). Second, to meet the criteria for WUSC sponsorship they were all high school graduates between the ages of 17-25, single with no dependents and proficient in English/French upon arriving to Canada (WUSC 2009). These characteristics may differentiate their experiences of resettlement and integration from those of other groups. Several research participants also noted that they felt ‘distanced’ from other Somali diaspora groups, as a result of their positioning within WUSC and college/university social networks.

Although SRS members may represent an exceptional group of resettled Somali youth, I believe their engagement with transnational philanthropy demarcates them as an important ‘exception’. As Turner (1999: 8) articulates: ‘the reason for focusing on the successful refugees is thus not due to their numbers but rather due to their possibility of changing existing power structures and perhaps even dominant ideologies’.

All interviews for this study were conducted in English, participation was voluntary and unpaid, and informed consent was (re)negotiated throughout the project in order to allow participants’ to re-evaluate their position in the research as it evolved. Interviews lasted an average of 30-45 minutes with UN and NGO representatives, and 45-60 minutes with

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8 Two of these interviews were done individually and the others were conducted in pairs; natural group interviews were preferable where participants were friends and comfortable questioning, supporting and even challenging one another’s claims.
Somali-Canadian youth. They were recorded and transcribed verbatim by hand, with the exception of those from select service providers who requested that notes be taken instead. Transcripts were coded using TAMS software and applying a grounded theory approach, including open, axial and selective coding.

To ensure that informants were positioned as *participants* rather than *subjects*, they were welcomed to review and revise the transcripts and final paper. Following the work of Grinyer (2002), participants were further given the option to remain anonymous, be recognized for their narratives by their own names and/or take ownership of their experiences by participating in the analysis.

In addition to conducting face-to-face interviews in Canada and Kenya, the ‘distance-collapsing capacity of the internet’ (Markham 2004: 49) allowed me to carry out in-depth interviews with four founding and executive members of SRS across Canada using online video-voice software (Skype).9

In seeking a purposive sample (such as the SRS Executive), web-based interviewing provides a pragmatic, cost-efficient way of facilitating greater participation from geographically dispersed informants than a face-to-face approach (Mann and Stewart 2003). Not only is it more convenient for participants – who are able to contribute at home at a time of convenience to them – but it also allows them to control their anonymity by turning off the video function and using voice-altering software should they choose. This method was particularly appropriate, given that CMC is the most common form of communication for the SRS membership, and all interviewees were familiar with Skype software.10

In order to provide all SRS members and alumni with an accessible and confidential means to provide qualitative and quantitative data, a web-based survey was created. This survey could be completed at any time over the course of two months and responses were collected via online software to ensure complete anonymity. Prior to launching the survey, I asked SRS Executives to review the questions both to ensure cultural sensitivity, and to move away from the assumption that I as the researcher ‘already know what the relevant questions are’ (Rodgers 2004: 21). The URL link to the survey and details of the research were circulated via e-mail and online platforms such as the SRS Facebook group.

While the self-completion questionnaire was a cost and time efficient way to enable wider participation, it had numerous drawbacks: questions had to remain concise to reduce respondent fatigue; there was no means for prompting or probing; and, most importantly, I could not know who answered which questions or contact them for additional data. Of the

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9 Of the limited literature on Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC), the majority is restricted to text-based asynchronous (email interviews) and synchronous (‘real time chat’) interviewing (Markham 2004; Mann and Stewart 2000). Now technologically outdated, these studies create a false binary between CMC and face-to-face data collection, one that I believe has been unaveled by internet-based, open access tools for video chatting, that give the researcher access to the visual cues once reserved for face-to-face interactions.

10 Despite claims that there is a lack of clarity concerning ‘online ethics’ (Mann and Stewart 2003; Markham 2004: 118), I found internet-based interviewing less problematic than face-to-face interviews, which required finding a ‘neutral’ space that ensured the confidentiality and comfort of individual participants.
seventeen completed questionnaires only twelve were selected for analysis, as five respondents had not been resettled to Canada through WUSC and/or failed to fill in the survey adequately.

Ultimately participants in the questionnaire, like those in the face-to-face and online interviews, were self-selecting, and thus there are no generalizable findings. A further shortcoming of the study is the limited female representation, with only 6 of 27 SRS participants being women. Although, I believe this disparity reflects a larger trend of the distinct, albeit shrinking, gender imbalance of the WUSC resettlement program overall, it will never-the-less be investigated further through the analysis. Before exploring the results of this above methodology, I will first offer a brief background on the Somali refugee crisis and the social mechanisms used to cope with conflict and displacement.

**Somali exodus, asylum and resettlement**

The Somali people have been without an effective government for over two decades and since 1988, the country has been characterized by flights of refugees en masse into neighbouring states. Western intervention efforts in the aftermath of Somali state collapse (January 1991) were disastrous, both in terms of establishing local stability and international support for ongoing peace efforts. As a result, an international presence in Somalia has been almost non-existent since the mid-90’s, contributing to one of the core causes of the protracted nature of the Somali crisis: ‘stagnation and international neglect’ (Loescher and Milner 2008).

Somalia remains a complex political emergency and out-migration caused by continued violence, droughts, and environmental disasters, has remained an on-going trend. As of January 2011 there are 385,000 Somali refugees in Kenya (UNHCR 2011d). The number of Somali refugees arriving to neighbouring countries between January and March 2011 is more than double what it was in 2010, with Kenya receiving the majority (ibid). During this period an average of 10,000 Somali refugees were registered in the Dadaab camps every month (ibid).

In the absence of state infrastructure and protections, Somalis have relied heavily on the social security mechanisms embedded in traditional clan systems. These systems define ‘relationships, rights, and obligations’ and demand ‘loyalty in both allegiance and in material support’ among members (Koshen 2007: 74). Indeed, the Somali call for help (“Tolay, tolay”) translates to “Oh my kin, my kin”, exemplifying the fundamental responsibility of family assistance within the established social order (ibid: 92; see also Farah and Lewis 1993).

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11 In 2010, there were 14 women and 54 men sponsored through the program.
12 Under Siyad Barre, clan affiliations were equated with ‘multipartyism’ and suppressed under the banner of socialism (Lewis 1995: 151). With the collapse of Barre’s regime, Somalis placed increased confidence into their clans, creating a resurgence of identity politics (Healy 2010). These clan allegiances have acted as both a source of destruction and refuge throughout the crisis.
However, these obligations extend far beyond family; in response to widespread poverty, it is incumbent on all Somalis to pay alms (zakat) and perform other charitable acts (sadaqa). Islam permeates all aspects of Somali culture, enshrining the obligations of husbands to provide for their wives, wives to obey their husbands, and for all to demonstrate concern for family and those in need: ‘Devout is he who gives possession, out of love for Him, to relatives and orphans, the needy, wayfarers, beggars and for the ransom of slaves’ (Sura 2, 177 as quoted in Horst 2006: 65).

Two decades of displacement have both strengthened and shifted these social obligations (Hammond 2010; Koshen 2007). The growth of female heads of household and breadwinners has not only challenged men’s traditional duty to provide for wife and family (Lewis 1995), but also ‘opened doors to [female] participation in clan matters that were once accessible only to men’ (Hammond 2010: 11). However, increased financial responsibilities have not necessarily translated into increased political representation for many Somali women (ibid). As such, the degree to which shifting obligations impact local leadership remains unclear – a trend that will be explored in the context of youth further on in the paper. Obligations have been further reconfigured through the growth of diasporic remittances, as Hammond (2010: 2) articulates:

Remittances are the glue that holds together many families, the means by which individuals living in exile away from their extended families actively fulfill their social obligations and play a meaningful role in their communities despite the physical distance that separates them.

As such, the social function of remittances equals, or perhaps even outweighs, the economic one, as senders gain enhanced social capital through their contributions and are threatened with social isolation should they fail to fulfil these expectations.

**From failed nation state to globalized nation**

The Somali culture is one that emphasizes family and group identity over individual autonomy. The powerful social bonds among Somali clans and clan-families (see Lewis 1961, 1995) dictate that physical distance does little to negate one’s obligations to those who remain genealogically close (Hoehne and Luling 2010). As such, the contributions of the Somali diaspora have ranked their home country as the world’s largest recipient of remittances per capita (Ahmed 2006: 5). Beyond Somali socio-cultural obligations for giving (Hammond 2010), the quantity of individual and collective remittances can be attributed to the sheer size of the diaspora, which is estimated at 1-1.5 million people (Hammond et al. 2011: 1).

During the 1990’s, Somali asylum applications were recorded in over sixty states (Van Hear 2003: 1), and the UNDP claims that ‘Somali society as a whole has been ‘globalized’ and is no longer confined to the borders of a nation state’ (UNDP 2001: 132). Continuous out-migration due to conflict and instability has resulted in the loss of approximately 80 per cent of the skilled population from the country (Lindley 2010: 33), but also the mobilization of remittances and resources from abroad.
While clan structures have complicated peace-efforts, they have also reinforced collaboration among the diaspora and mobilized impressive efforts in the face of continued violence and the absence of governance (Healy 2010; Fagen 2009a). In response to the collapse of the banking system in the early 90’s, Somalis established a specialized money transfer system, known as the Xawilaada, to facilitate remittances. This system is arguably the most advanced in Africa and handles around two billion US dollars annually (Lindley 2010: 37). Based on kin-based businesses, the Xawilaada is now global in scope and plays a major role in the telecommunications revolution in East Africa. It is one example of how an increasingly diasporic nation is able to organize and make significant economic contributions to both Somalia and the region.

In addition to sending household remittances, Somalis have proven to be ‘especially effective in mobilizing its clan and sub-clan organizations’ abroad to build infrastructure and equip facilities within Somalia (Fagen 2009a: 8). Government and NGO matching schemes that have been well documented in Latin America (Orozco 2006) are now being replicated in Somalia (Hammond 2010). Somscan UK, a diaspora association of Somalis in the United Kingdom (UK) and Scandinavia, has collaborated with the Danish Refugee Council to secure a European grant of 550,000€ to promote return to Somaliland by developing the water and educational infrastructure in Burao (Van Hear et al. 2004; Kleist 2009). Similarly, Care International sought to enhance diaspora giving by establishing the Diaspora Partnership Program (DPP) (Care 2011). While the majority of remittances are private (around $US 1.2-2 billion annually), a forthcoming report by Hammond et al. (2011) highlights the $US 130-200 million used for humanitarian and development assistance.

A substantial amount of Somali remittances are aimed at bolstering education (Lindley 2006); most prominently, personal remittances and donations raised through Somaliland Forum, a diaspora non-profit, were used as start-up funds for the establishment of the University of Hargeisa in Somalia in 2000 (Copeland-Carson 2007). Lindley’s research on diaspora giving to Somaliland showed that through ‘informal solidarity networks’ and ‘more institutionalized relationships’, the Somali diaspora contributes ‘substantially to schools, hospitals, mosques and community improvement projects’ (Lindley 2010: 84).

However, though this philanthropy represents the indomitable spirit of the Somali people, like most transnational philanthropy, these efforts are often ad hoc, highly localized, and fail to systematically collaborate with NGO efforts on the ground, leading to program duplication (Kent and Hippel 2004; Mercer et al. 2008: 18). While Somali remittance patterns are geographically dispersed, this paper will focus specifically on the transactions between two sets of localities: resettlement communities in Canada and the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya.

**Education in Dadaab**

The largest refugee camp in the world, Dadaab is located in north-eastern Kenya’s Garissa District, approximately one hundred kilometres from the Kenya-Somalia border and consists of three sub-camps: Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera. Established in 1991 with a
capacity to host 90,000 refugees, the camp has grown to host approximately 313,309 refugees (as of March 2011) of which 94% originate from Somalia (UNHCR 2009a; UNHCR 2011b,c). Similar to Kakuma, Kenya’s only other refugee camp, Dadaab is located in a semi-arid climate and experiences severe weather (extreme heat in the dry season and widespread flooding in the wet season) as well as frequent hostility from the local population (UNHCR 2009a). These living conditions create an extremely precarious situation for refugees with 43% of the population lacking adequate dwellings, 82% lacking household latrines and almost all being affected by water shortages (UNHCR 2011a,b).

Educational provision is a further impediment; 118,915 youth are school going age (5-17) (UNHCR 2011c), yet roughly half are not in school (UNHCR 2009a,b). UNHCR states that providing every child in Dadaab with access to formal education would require the construction of 46 additional schools (UNHCR 2009a). As of August 2009, the teacher-student ratio was 1:68, of which 92% of these teachers were untrained (ibid; Interviewee 1 2009). Within the three camps, there are 18 primary schools that cater to 37,125 learners (39% girls), and 3 NGO-run secondary schools with 2,705 learners (26% girls) (UNHCR 2009b).

In 2008, as a response to the limited absorption capacity of existing secondary schools, the refugee community demonstrated their agency by constructing three additional schools (Njogu 2011; Interviewee 1 2009). Through a Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR, Care and the community, the refugees accepted responsibility for paying for incentive teachers and school supplies, while Care provided support in the management and running of the schools and UNHCR assisted in liaising with donors (UNHCR 2009b). As of 2010, Dadaab’s secondary schools have fallen under the mandate of Windle Trust Kenya (WTK) and the leadership of Executive Director Njogu (2011) who explains the expansion of education in Dadaab as follows:

The establishment of Community Secondary Schools was an initiative mainly by the refugee youth [as well as] the parents, community leaders and other stakeholders […] The youth who had qualified [for resettlement to Canada] and others who had graduated from colleges and Universities in Kenya through scholarships given by WTK among others, teamed up and volunteered to be teachers to the Community Secondary Schools. Parents and community leaders lobbied for space within the existing primary schools funded by UNHCR and run by CARE Kenya to host the first classes. The youth (both school going and out of school) mobilized available resources to equip the first classes with desks among other [things]. The youth mobilized the community to contribute to take care of teachers needs, teaching materials and books for instruction.

\[13\] Research by Crivello and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2010) on Sahrawi refugees, highlights how the prioritization of education and the construction of schools is not unique to Somalis.

\[14\] Many families obtain the Community Secondary Schools annual fee of 2,700 Kenyan Shillings ($33 US) through their transnational networks. As of 2011, the launch of a new UNCHR Secondary Education Strategy will ensure all 6 secondary schools are funded and resourced equally, necessitating that all secondary students will be required to pay fees (UNHCR 2009).
Like many displaced youth, those in Dadaab place great value on education (Chatty 2010; Hoodar 2008; Lindley 2006); seeing it as a passport to resettlement, they are acutely aware that it is a ‘highly contested resource, and access to it can make or break a person’s future’ (Abbink 2005: 22). Despite a growing number of refugee youth in the camp, education remains highly under funded (Interviews 2009, 2011).

Though ‘every agency knows the primary importance of education in Dadaab’ (Interviewee 4), they find that donors consistently view it ‘as a luxury’ unworthy of funding (Interviewee 6), despite the fact education and training could provide refugees with the skills needed to assist with challenges plaguing the camps, such as water, food and health (Njogu 2009, 2011). Throughout the study, participants consistently affirmed that young people in Dadaab are eager for better educational and livelihood opportunities that will enable them to be agents of change in their communities. For a select few (around 10-15 annually) the opportunity for higher education and permanent residency in Canada awaits.

From camp to campus

As of January 2011, 129 Somali refugees have been resettled to Canada by the World University Service of Canada, all but ‘a handful’ of whom, were resettled from Kenya (Mekonnen 2011). As the world’s only program to link resettlement and access to post-secondary education, the WUSC Student Refugee Program (SRP) has brought over 1000 refugees to Canada as permanent residents since 1978. Through the program, each sponsored student is enrolled at a Canadian post-secondary institution and provided with tuition fees and living allowance for at least their first year.

WUSC represents one of many organizations to sponsor refugees annually through Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSRP). Unlike Canada’s Government-Assisted Refugee Program (GARP), where refugees are referred by UNHCR and supported by government-funded settlement services, the PSRP allows Canadian citizens and volunteer organizations to privately sponsor and support refugees for resettlement. Implemented in 1978, the PSRP has contributed to the resettlement of over 195,000 refugees and persons in refugee-like situations, helping Canada maintain one of the three largest resettlement programs in the world (CIC 2003, 2007).

The success of the WUSC SRP is dependent on the financial and in-kind support of student-led volunteer groups at post-secondary institutions across the Canada who currently fundraise over CAN$2 million each year for the program. While the WUSC SRP may seem like an insignificant contribution to Canada’s refugee programs, had WUSC been ranked a resettlement country in 2006, the 50+ students it sponsored that year would have put it in fifth place after the United States, Australia, Canada and Sweden (Goodwin 2010). Additionally, access to higher education and permanent residency (guaranteeing social and economic rights) provides SRP students the means to support valuable transnational networks through economic and social remittances to their communities of origin.
All candidates for WUSC sponsorship are required to be between 17-24 years old to ensure that the program “is rooted in the idea of “youth sponsoring youth”” (WUSC 2009). For many resettled young people, the experience of being sponsored by student volunteer groups demonstrated to them the immense impact youth can have on humanitarian efforts when working collectively across the country. One founding SRS member explains:

I think one driving factor for me has been the fact that the lives of so many students have been changed through just a dollar or a dollar and fifty cents contribution by [students via WUSC] local committees […] its not only one student, its not only two students, its not only three students that this are helping. This is something that has been in existence for 30 years! Personally that had the biggest impact on me, and it showed me what it means to do things collectively – doing things in togetherness – that small things really matter […] I feel that has been the biggest contributor to the force that I sometimes feel for changing lives (Amiir 2011).

Faaid (2011) concurs that Somali students were inspired to see how ‘one string to another string makes a rope’, and believed that an association which modelled membership dues on WUSC student fees could generate substantial collective remittances for students in Kenya. Thus in 2008, after several Somali students convened at the WUSC Annual Assembly in Ottawa, Students for Refugee Students was born. This association, driven entirely by the vision and commitment of Somali SRP students was established to serve three core functions.

First is to create a diasporic response to the educational needs in Dadaab in a way that engages ‘both people who are in the camp and also those who left the camp’ to ensure ‘a togetherness in the approach’ (Amiir 2011). In this sense, SRS is a classic example of what Mohan terms development by diaspora, whereby migrants facilitate the development of a shared homeland ‘across space’ (Mohann 2002: 104). In its diaspora organizing, SRS
exemplifies the agency of migrant youth in finding ‘alternate modes of expression’ to influence and connect with ‘home’ (Abbink 2005: 8). Recognizing the plethora of needs in protracted refugee situations, all interviewees stressed the paramount importance of education:

There’s a lot of problems and you can't say you can do something about everything, but I feel that education is one of the key things [...] For someone [in the camps] the whole difference between succeeding in life and not succeeding (getting a D or a C rather than A) is just about getting the right tools – textbooks, teachers – that is all that is going to make the difference. That is where we think we can step in and give back (Mahad 2011).

Inspired by the level of agency exhibited by the Dadaab community in the establishment of the Community Secondary Schools, SRS has remitted 201,000 Kenyan Shillings ($2,411 US) to fund supplies and support the wages of refugee teachers in these schools to date.

The second function is to ‘bring together the sponsored students themselves’ and provide ‘a community of their own’ to assist one another through the resettlement and integration process (Amiir 2011). In this vein, the third aim is to create a Somali association in Canada free of clan divisions that strives to ‘neutralize those kinds of tensions and give all students a feeling of belongingness and ownership for something they can contribute to, so they can feel they can do something together’ (Amiir 2011). Thus while some studies have shown how ‘the socialization of new generations in misery in refugee camps or exile contributes to the development of war-supporting diaspora’ (McEvoy-Levy 2006: 13), the case of SRS suggests that opportunities for education and diaspora engagement can help foster alternative discourses of conflict resolution and development.

In order to facilitate these functions, SRS holds monthly meetings for its general membership (which fluctuates between 50-70 people) via online chat rooms, and executive meetings via Skype and MSN (an instant messaging service). Once a year, select SRS members attend the WUSC Annual Assembly and are provided a meeting room to hold their own consultation. In addition to providing meeting space and advice when requested, WUSC national staff assists SRS in facilitating remittance sending.

Rather than utilizing the Xawilaada, SRS collects $100CAD annually from its members into a Canadian bank account, which WUSC then remits to Windle Trust Kenya (WTK) on SRS’s behalf. WTK then distributes the funds in line with priorities set by the SRS Executive. According to WTK Executive Director Marangu Njogu (2011):

WTK informs the school headmasters and PTA (Parents, Teachers Association) of the amount of remitted funds. The funds are shared amongst the three schools and distributed and accounted for by school head teachers. WTK then accounts for the funds usage to the school head teachers. We provide a report on the activities supported by the funds.
Thus, like other groups of youth who have experienced conflict and displacement, SRS finds allies in ‘transnational global networks, in foreign NGOs etc. and becomes the nexus and agent of change’ (Abbink 2005: 25).

RS has only been in operation since 2008 and its on-the-ground contribution, like that of many diaspora philanthropic groups, has been limited. However, Mercer et al. (2008: 21) remind us that it is distinctiveness rather than scale of diaspora philanthropy that is important; in particular, diaspora giving establishes innovative means for articulating local desires and negotiating transnational identities. In doing so, SRS provides an interesting case for exploring the ways in which transnational philanthropy reflects and/or reconfigures structures of obligation and the social roles ascribed to Somali youth.

By surveying and interviewing SRS members, I found that while traditional values and social obligations for sharing instil these youth with a calling to ‘give back’, these obligations have been infused with the member’s own priorities of education and clan unity and operationalized by using diasporic and humanitarian frameworks. For these youth, the indomitable sense of obligation to assist is inculcated in physical isolation from friends and family who remain in encampment, and expressed from afar through the virtual transmission of remittances.

**Obligations to give**

We have this collective responsibility to help […] you have this feeling that you should not eat alone if your neighbour can’t […] the same thing comes with us in the diaspora, we have the same feeling of responsibility. You leave the camp and you don’t want to just forget about it. You have that collective responsibility, that heaviness on your shoulders. I’m sure our reaction is a product of collective responsibilities among Somalis (Faaid 2011).

When asked about the establishment of SRS, all interviewees emphasized how the collective idea or urge to form an association was common among all of them long before it came to fruition:

> I think it was just in the mind of each one of us, that’s why I was saying we are all founders, because each one of us had in our minds – the urge or consciousness that we have to do something for the youth in the camps (Amina 2011).

The idea of SRS was rooted in personal experience – experiences of living through hardship, of receiving humanitarian assistance, and of being part of a community that values collectivism and obliges sharing.

All emphasized how, through their own experiences in Kakuma and Dadaab, they shared a deep empathy for young people still in the camps:

> The motivation is the actually situation in the refugee camps. I lived there for over 10 years so I understand what challenges they are facing there […] I will not be imaging, but I actually know the challenges they are telling me so
I can’t turn a blind eye to it. I have to do something about it – however small it is (Saahid 2011).

Like Saahid, almost all survey participants were educated in the camps\(^{15}\) – an experience they believed instilled a personal sense of responsibility to assist: ‘the fact that I have been in their position before obliged me to help [my emphasis]’ (Respondent 8). Most members were one of two or three students selected for the WUSC program out of 80 to 100 of their peers – circumstances which left some with survivor guilt\(^{16}\) and all with the compulsion to ‘give back’:

I think my personal motivation was just the idea of having a chance to give back, to say ‘if I made it, I want others to make it too’ (Abdi 2011).

I feel that I really owe a lot and anything that comes my way has to go out. Seriously! This is the motivation I have and I will carry on this way forever. I don’t want to be rich but I want to help. What I have, I want to share because that gives me happiness (Amina 2011).

Open-ended interview and survey questions revealed that the impulse to give back is driven by prismatic motives including:

- Altruism
- Responding to need
- Personal experiences of camp life
- Empathy and admiration for camp youth
- Belief in education
- Demonstration of gratitude for receiving humanitarian assistance
- Survivor Guilt
- Somali cultural and Islamic values that necessitate giving

Of these motives, Somali communal values were referenced repeatedly. Participants spoke of a ‘we culture’ (Amina 2011) where youth are ‘raised to share everything’ and learn that ‘whoever is well-off financially is at least expected if not obliged to share his wealth with the needy’ (Respondent 8). While all participants stressed that Somalis are ‘a nation of sharing’ (Respondent 4), no one specified fear of rejection or isolation from the home community as a motivation for remitting; however, I do feel it is important to note that the threat of community rejection is a recurring theme in the literature, even with respect to Somali youth specifically (Terrefi 2008: 33).

Participants never questioned the merits of being obliged to give, but accepted it as a fundamental aspect of a dignified way of life. Amiir (2011) explains that,

\(^{15}\) 9 of 12 respondents attended camp primary school, 11 of 12 attended camp secondary, and all volunteered in Kakuma or Dadaab upon graduation.

\(^{16}\) ‘Survivor guilt’ refers a form of stress caused by the perception that one is ‘guilty’ of overcoming or surviving a traumatic event or difficult circumstance when others (including friends and family) have not.
The Somali culture is one that really encourages and practices helping others [...] and the fact that we've come to a world that is really rich, that has a lot of opportunities, a lot of us feel that there is an obligation that we don't say “oh I’m lucky that I’m out”. So there's that connection and even obligation that we will feel, we shouldn’t say “oh, I got mine and I don’t really care what happens” [my emphasis].

‘For those raised in Dadaab’ social obligations to assist fellow Somalis are an ever-present ‘inborn thing’ (Maxamuud 2011). Many refer to this socialized norm as the degqqsi, or responsibility to give. It is clear from the repetition among responses, that through the reiteration of these norms through time, ‘they appear to operate as natural and universal’ in the present, regardless if one is in refugee camps or the diaspora (Cykwik 2002: 611).

There is a common Somali saying that: Labadii wax yar wada cuni wayda, wax badan ma wada cunnan - If you do not eat the little you have together, you cannot eat together in times of plenty. Interviewees often alluded to this parable, comparing their work with SRS in Canada to the obligation they once had in the camps to share their meals with neighbours in need. Saahid (2011) elaborates:

It is considered a responsibility among the Somali people that even if you can’t afford anything more, you invite your neighbors to share your lunch with you. So the act of giving is not only limited to those who can afford, but to everyone. Just share as little as you have with those in need [...] One of the things that drives the [SRS] members, is it doesn’t matter how many student loans you are getting every semester, or how short on resources you are, it is still your obligation to help those who did not get the opportunity [...] sparing a lunch or a dinner [and remitting the money] would be the least you can do.

Thus, despite their physical separation from the Somali refugee community in Kenya, the normative conventions of home continue to govern the lives of those in the diaspora

**Cultural hybridity**

Rather than embrace the individualist orientation of Canadian society, SRS members appear to maintain a virtual adherence to the social and moral codes operating in Kakuma and Dadaab that demand selflessness. However, through diaspora philanthropy, SRS youth reconcile the two cultures by drawing inspiration from Canadian civic engagement and NGOs to operationalize their obligations to give. More than merely providing a functional model, Canadian humanitarianism also viewed by many as a core motivation for the establishment of SRS. While experiences of displacement and encampment instilled SRS members will a sense of duty to respond to need, the WUSC Student Refugee Program gave them the inspiration and model for doing so. Faaid (2011) articulates how ‘SRS members themselves wouldn’t be here if that Canadian culture of offering opportunities to
others was not there itself”. He states that one cannot help but ‘get inspired by the level of concern and generosity, and humanity exhibited by Canadian undergrads’.

Many SRS members feel a deep obligation to “give back” not only because their culture dictates it, but also to repay all they had received from Canadian students:

I had the hope of once getting over to [a] developed country not [by] myself but through the help of someone, and it finally happened. Therefore, this is my turn […] to help change the life of my fellow refugee students in the camps (Respondent 3).

People in Canada who don’t know about you still reach out for you. That really touches you a lot. It kind of opens your heart more and shows you that you have to help. So I would say [SRS] is a Somali-Canadian culture (Amina 2011).

Amina, like many members of the diaspora, has developed a sense of cultural hybridity – or ‘double consciousness’ – that represents an attachment to both an old and new home place (Mohann 2002: 88,97). The lived experience of these young people spans myriad cultural contexts, bringing in influences and inspirations from each (ibid: 132).

11 of 12 survey respondents stated that the work of SRS reflects certain aspects of Canadian culture, referencing values of humanitarianism and generosity,\(^{17}\) while noting that ‘in many ways the structure of SRS borrows from the excellent community organizational skills that we learnt in Canada’ (Respondent 5). This mirrors global trends whereby exposure to North American and European philanthropy has helped Somali groups generate innovative fundraising techniques (Hammond et al. 2011: 41).

Furthermore, in addition to volunteering with SRS, 50% of respondents currently volunteer with their respective WUSC volunteer groups, and 75% have in the past, representing a dual allegiance to both asylum and resettlement home places (see Brinkerhoff 2007: 412). It is clear from both the survey and interviews that the WUSC NGO model is one SRS seeks to replicate in its work;\(^{18}\) in this respect, SRS reflects Mercer et al.’s observation that diaspora associations ‘tend to mimic’ NGOs both in their language and organizational form, though they ‘emerge organically and are historically rooted in a way NGOs are not’ (Mercer et al. 2008: 22). Indeed, unlike Canadian NGOs, SRS is embedded in particular social obligations and norms that influence its collective remitting patterns.

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\(^{17}\) One survey respondent did not approve of SRS’s philanthropic approach, believing that Kakuma camp as well as Dadaab should receive financial support. As such, this individual’s responses often diverged from the others.

\(^{18}\) The association has already begun to do so by establishing SRS as a student club at the University of Toronto with the goal of founding more committees on campuses across Canada.
Charity begins at home

When explaining their sense of obligation to assist those in Dadaab, most interviewees seemed careful to distinguish between obligations to family and those to the broader Somali community in Kenya. According to Saahid (2011), at ‘a family level, they expect you to study, and succeed in your studies […] at the community level you are telling everyone its possible [my emphasis].’ Maxamuud (2011) concurs that ‘every family, like my family’ expects specific contributions and assistance, ‘but the other people in the community, all they expect is just for you to encourage their students to reach the same goal’.

These comments appear to reflect what Horst identifies as two distinct, yet interwoven, social networks operating in Somali society: one based on kin relations, and the other on neighbours and friends (Horst 2006: 63). Each of these networks has their own systems of social and economic cooperation that facilitate transactions of ‘information, services and resources’ among members (Horst 2006: 64). In order to better reflect the findings of my research, I have recast these two networks as Family and Dadaab Community respectively.

Participants weigh the social obligations corresponding to each network differently, designating family obligations as paramount. When asked to rank immediate family, extended family, friends, charities and NGOs, and SRS in order of remittance priority (both private and collective), all 12 respondents ranked their immediate family first. This reflects the Somali belief that *Nin boqol aril eh reerkiisana xoolo la’hiyaiin waa faqri* - *The man who owns 100 goats, but his relatives have nothing is poor.* However, several individuals chose to also rank extended family and SRS first, thus splitting their vote (as depicted in Fig. 2). Extended family was the prevailing second priority, followed by SRS and friends.19

![Fig. 2: Remittance Priorities](Ranked on a scale from one to seven)

Notably, respondents who specifically mentioned a sense of ‘obligation’ and ‘responsibility’ to send ‘mandatory’ financial support always did so with reference to family and friends, rather than the community at large (Respondents 7,9,11 and 12). This may suggest that while family members make claims on each other for monetary

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19 No respondents indicated that they remit to charities and NGOs, though one respondent wrote that s/he sends financial support to the Somali Community Youth and Sports Club.
remittances (Al-Sharmani 2007: 5), individuals in the diaspora do not feel the same expectations placed on them by the larger community. In essence, the obligation to remit does not transfer directly from the household to community level.

While financial remittances are seen as central to fulfilling family obligations, community assistance may focus on non-monetary strategies of transnational support, including good role modelling and mentorship for refugee youth and the transfer of new ideas and knowledge via web-based communication. Collective remittances are therefore not obligatory in the same manner as private remittances, but rather indicate extended social values of sharing and solidarity. Daahir (2011) notes that,

There is that obligation […] “charity begins at home”. It’s first you feed your people and then they are obliged to give anything they have got to others. So, if you give them, you are not only giving them but I’m sure they will give out some. You need to start with them and then go extend it.

When asked if there was an expectation at the community level to receive collective remittances, SRS members claimed that teachers, parents and youth in Dadaab had ‘never expected’ (Maxamuud 2011) to receive diaspora philanthropy and that ‘they were surprised’ (Abdi 2011) and ‘very appreciative’ (Saahid 2011). They added, however, that since a precedent of collective remitting has been established, the community ‘expects a lot’ (Abdi 2011) and ‘asks for more’ (Saahid 2011).

In her research, Hammond (2010: 3) similarly found that where Somalis remit for philanthropic means, ‘they must do so as an additional payment rather than in place of the regular support they send to relatives’. Thus the potential for diverting private remittance flows towards community development projects is limited by the social functions and obligations that underpin them; in addition, encouraging philanthropic remittances ‘may represent an unbearable burden’ to those struggling in the diaspora (ibid).

Social pressure to remit often hinders students’ integration and academic achievement in Canada. Furthermore, unrealistic expectations from family in the camps indicate a disconnect between the two localities – one which is often exacerbated rather than remedied by improved communication technologies (see Hammond 2010; Datta et al. 2006):

It’s a benefit to be a responsible person, but it’s also as big challenge for the people out here too. There is a disconnect for people back home in Somalia and Kenya, […] they think it’s all rosy, they think you can get anything you want to them […] When you are the person they are all calling – just one young person, who has to go to school and work part time, and you put all these demands on his plate, I mean it could be overwhelming. So that is a big challenge for people, and a lot of people drop out of school, just to help with that support (Mahad 2011).

Mahad was the only interviewee who spoke candidly about the adverse effects of these pressures; however, through the anonymous survey, 5 of 12 respondents wrote of the
‘stress’, ‘pressure’ and ‘anxiety’ caused by family expectations for financial support. As Figure 3 indicates, the majority of participants send remittances more than once a month. Interviewees spoke of unforeseen expenses when family and friends become ill or decide to marry or travel and many cited remittances as their largest expense (ranging from $450 to $8,000 CAD annually).

![Figure 3: Remittance Frequency](image)

That said, many participants also recognized both the ‘positive and negative impacts [external expectations] have on the youth’ (Respondent 10). Indeed, obligations to remit can provide students with an increased incentive to succeed in their studies, thus bettering their economic opportunities. Saahid (2011) states that pressure to remit, ‘could be entirely considered as a burden but [also] as a motive, something that’s pushing you and making you achieve’. A survey respondent agrees that, ‘on a positive note it makes the youth feel more responsible and work hard’ (Respondent 10).

Research on displaced youth has often stressed the ‘links between adolescent well-being and the availability of meaningful opportunities for young people to contribute and feel connected to the community in which they live [my emphasis]’ (Mann 2008: 54); however, what is remarkable about the private and collective remittances patterns of SRS youth, is that this meaningful engagement with communities of origin occurs from afar.

This paper has hitherto highlighted how remittances act as a window into the expanding social obligations placed on youth through the process of the transnational migration. It follows that one must ask whether the ability, and responsibility, to remit allows the sender to reposition him/herself within the household or community social mobility. Moreover, do these enhanced responsibilities emerge only as a result of resettlement, or are they present in contexts of the displacement and transnationalism operating at the camp level? In the following section, I delve into these questions and explore the ways in which collective remittances reflect shifting generational, gender and clan identities.
**Shifting obligations and social roles**

The experience of SRS youth seems to uphold the widespread assertion that, ‘conflict and displacement frequently lead to the transformation of young peoples’ roles and responsibilities’ (Hampshire et al. 2008: 26). Scholars have frequently shown how exile can bring about the renegotiation of previously uncontested social hierarchies and the questioning of shared understandings within a community (citations). Likewise, forced migration can transform what Kabeer (2000: 466) describes as ‘implicit contracts’ between family members and generations – contracts that govern ‘an arena of affective reciprocity [and] of tacit claims and obligations’.

All participants acknowledged that their social obligations had increased as a result of migration. Several attributed this trend to their initial displacement rather than subsequent resettlement. For them, social roles were reconfigured by seeking asylum in Kenya – a process that necessitated taking up greater leadership within the family and community from a young age. Amina believes that her responsibilities to remit to Canada are merely a continuation of those once shouldered in the camps:

> Even when I was back home […] when I finished high school I became a teacher so I could contribute to the family. I had all the domestic things I had to do. Here I do the same. When I’m working, I work and I send back home, and I still do what I can. So I don’t see a huge difference (Amina 2011).

It is not uncommon in refugee contexts for children to be expected to contribute to the household economy in new, often amplified, ways (Mann 2008). Additionally, educated young refugees often take up the role of community organizers due to their ability to speak multiple languages and communicate with aid workers (Terrefi 2008: 27). Indeed, 10 of 12 survey respondents, and all SRS interviewees, worked as incentive teachers in the camps and most took up additional leadership roles as interpreters, community development assistants, and student committee organizers. Faaid (2011) reflects on how ‘coming to Dadaab, you start doing things earlier than you should and assume a leadership role way way way [sic] earlier than it would be in a normal setting’; hence, one may not notice a change in social responsibility upon arriving in Canada.

For others, it seemed shifting social obligations and leadership roles were directly correlated to being abroad:

> When I was in Kakuma I was a son being supported. But when you come here it’s totally the reverse. Now you are the breadwinner and everyone is waiting for you (Mahad 2011).

Similarly, 10 of 12 survey respondents felt their household role had changed since arriving in Canada, the majority of whom attributed this to their newfound status as a (primary) breadwinner. Thus remittances represent one way in which the intergenerational contracts are renegotiated, inverting parent-child obligations.
One could also conceptualize the transformation of social norms, not as an inversion of generational roles, but as a shift in how these norms are materialized. Amina (2011) suggests that young people have always found important ways of contributing to family and community, but as a result of resettlement, these contributions have shifted from volunteer-based, grassroots support to transnational financial assistance. Two respondents (one male and one female) explained how they had gone from providing assistance by ‘fetching water, washing clothes’ and ‘cooking’ in the camps – to providing moral and financial assistance transnationally.

Several respondents also noted how remittances offered a way to compensate for their inability to assist family and community in situ. Thus, youth social obligations are reconfigured in numerous ways through transnational migrations. First, obligations to support family in practical ways are heightened upon fleeing to Kenya. Upon resettling to Canada, these obligations are shifted from physical forms of help to virtual ones: from in-kind assistance to financial and moral support.

There remains little consensus among participants as to whether or not this newfound ability to provide much needed financial assistance impacts one’s social mobility within the refugee community. When asked if they felt their role in the camp community had changed since coming to Canada, 11 of 12 respondents felt it had to some degree. Interestingly, few mentioned increased leadership and influence, but rather emphasized the growing expectations placed on them by those in Kenya for financial support and academic excellence. Notably, several respondents felt that their level of social influence had increased as a result of providing transnational mentorship and counselling to camp youth via online platforms. Through the interviews, this question of changing social roles was explored in greater detail and healthy debate ensued.

Some felt that even at the camp level, increased social responsibilities enabled youth to assume greater leadership roles, potentially challenging traditional structures of authority:

> The youth really plays a specific role now. Before it was dominated by the elders […] it was up to the old man to dictate: ‘do this and do this’. That is it. But now the Somali communities are changing. The youth are taking a lot of roles […] are the ones now talking. Because back at home I used to take care of everything, I was responsible […] I was the one who used to buy, the one who used to budget for everything, to do whatever was needed in the family. Even if my sisters come with a man, I was the one to decide, to advise them on whether this was the right man […] unlike before when I was just left out and told, ‘no, it is the old men who are supposed to be deciding’ (Daahir 2011).

Daashir is among many forced migrant youth who sense a shift in social norms and traditional hierarchies brought about by protracted exile (Hampshire et al. 2008; Terrefi 2008). Others like Faaid did not believe that increased responsibilities among youth had repositioned them in society: ‘sometimes when I send money I know that I am helping, but I still remain the same – I'm still the son’. For them, the need for intergenerational help is amplified through migration, but expressed in ways that keep traditional hierarchies intact.
Displaced youth often struggle to balance the maturity required to provide the support expected of them while maintaining a deference to elders that limits their social mobility (Mann 2008: 55). The following dialogue from a natural group interview highlights the tensions and challenges felt by youth navigating this dilemma:

Abdi: It’s incumbent upon you as a child that you give back. Me giving back to my parents doesn’t give me the chance to dictate what goes on in the family. My dad still dictates. I contribute and he dictates. On my money! It doesn’t give me any power, all it gives me is more responsibility.

Maxammud: I think for your parents, your own parents, that’s true, I agree with him. But for the community at large, if they see a young person giving back to the community, doing a lot of efforts, I think they respect him a lot.

Abdi: Not to the extent it can make you a leader.

Maxammud: Ah, if there are no other alternatives, they will make you one definitely.

Abdi: We can hope. I don’t see it changing.

Maxammud: In my opinion it will change with time.

Abdi: It may, but its not happening at the moment. The minute they are gone, you will be 50 years old, and your child will say I want this 50 year old to go. It’s a cycle. All I want is for them to make chances for us to take part.

**Generational roles**

This desire to ‘take part’ in community leadership (both transnationally and/or through return), was reiterated throughout the research; when asked if they felt the youth had a specific role to play in the Somali diaspora, all SRS participants articulated that young people have an essential role of providing informed leadership to eradicate tribalism and establish effective governance. There is a strong consensus among interviewees and survey respondents that their positioning as young Somalis who have lived through the conflict and displacement, secured an education, and gained access to diaspora resources, designates them as the ‘solution to the Somali anarchy’ (Respondent 3).

This fervour for youth agency is held in contrast to resentment for the shortcomings of the older generation. For many, a difference in values between the generations permeates all aspects of SRS’s work:

This is purely a youth driven organization. We have no connection with older generations. As a matter of fact, we see most of them as not having the same principles or objectives that we have. [For] a lot of them, there’s a lot
of tribal issues – even in the community organizations that are in Canada. I don’t personally feel good about them, and they do not have the same sort of objectives, long-term objectives, that we do have (Amiir 2011).

While some recognize that the ‘youth themselves are not clean of [conflict]’ (Faaid 2011), others believe it is ‘the old men who are still fighting’ and the young people who ‘are being used in the war’ (Daahir 2011). For Daahir (2011), it is the diaspora youth ‘in USA, in Europe, in Canada – who want peace in their country, who are talking about it [and] taking a much bigger role than they had before’.

In his research on adolescent Afghan refugees, Hoodfar (2008) found a similar trend of young people seeking to differentiate themselves from older generations and advocate for educational opportunities and gender/ethnic equality. Abdi and Maxamuud (2011) were adamant that the youth must differentiate themselves from their elders and:

Abdi: …take up the whole leadership.
Maxamuud: It’s not easy to say.
Abdi: It’s not easy because culturally we are ingrained to respect our leaders. We can’t take it away from them. But to be successful we have to take it away from them. They are irresponsible. The older generation is screwing us up.
Maxamuud: They are wasteful. They have seen Somali government; they have seen the prosperity.
Abdi: They have seen anarchy and government. Me and Maxamuud, all we have seen is anarchy […] I don't know these heydays the older generation can reminisce about.

Abdi’s comments reflect how youth, displaced by conflict, differentiate themselves from older generations ‘who can remember a time from before the war’ (McEvoy-Levy 2006: 2). Moreover, they uphold Abbink’s (2005: 7) observation of how many African youth ‘interpret their problems through a moral prism’ and ‘often suggest that adults have given up on them or have reneged on their social and moral obligations towards them’. With respect to Somali politics and peace building, many SRS youth share this sentiment, believing that the road to a new Somalia must not emulate those paved by previous generations. They concur that since it is the youth who have known the hardships of growing up in protracted exile, it must be them who endeavour to ensure the next generation is not confronted with a similar fate:

The Somali youths are the ones who really experience what it is to be stateless, what it is to be born a refugee, grow up refugee, cross borders and all this […] we lost that childhood and everything, so we should now be proactive, defend and break this trend (Faaid 2011).

We are the generation that has faced the biggest challenges, and we are the generation that understands these challenges. So it’s not just the material
support that we do for the Somali community, but we have to play an advocacy role (Saahid 2011).

Though the above statements appear to construct a binary relationship whereby youth are the peace-loving victims of displacement and elders are clan-driven instigators of conflict the intergenerational relationship is, in fact, far more complex.

While the aforementioned resentment is an important dimension of these relations, there is also a recurring acknowledgement by participants of the positive work elders are doing and the potential for inter-generational collaboration. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that SRS was inspired in large part by the activism and self-generated assistance sparked by Dadaab parents in establishing Community Secondary Schools (Mekonnen 2011). Indeed, this belief in the value of education among the older generation was something that came out frequently during interviews in Dadaab (Interviewees 2,4,5,7).

A WTK teacher observed how ‘the community is now attending inter-agency meetings on education, and it is clear how much they treasure education for their children’, with Njogu (2009) echoing that ‘if you listen to the refugees carefully, they say that education is the only take away item from the camp […] they see education as the only thing they can bequeath their children’. Indeed, some Somali youth applaud the efforts of the older generation, calling the community secondary schools, ‘one of the most productive initiatives or acts carried out by parents themselves’ (Dawo 2011).

**Contesting gender and clan ideologies**

While many SRS members acknowledge the important role being played by elders, they feel that what distinguishes them from their parents, in some cases, is the youth’s emphasis on gender- and clan-equality. With respect to the first, the acceptance of girl child education by Somali communities appeared contested among to NGO informants in Dadaab; though many noted a recent trend of communities ‘mobilizing for Girl Child Education […] and the motivation of girls increasing’ (Interviewee 5 2009). Regardless, several SRS members believe that the older generation has failed to see the fundamental importance of gender equality – a failure that will ultimately be rectified by increased youth leadership:20

> We allow girls to be educated […] Somali’s old man is still there, but I’m sure that will totally change when we ourselves become old, […] girls are as helpful as boys but girls are not being helped. That is why I am helping them. You know we have got such bad things still […] but I’m sure with time we shall be out of it.’ (Daahir 2011)


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20 Unfortunately the commitment to female equality has not manifested itself in the SRS leadership, where only one woman holds an executive position. That said, all members have claimed that female participation in the association remains highly active, and is likely to grow as the number of young women being settled through WUSC continues to increase. A female executive seat was created; however, no one ran for the position.
Like the Afghan youth in Hoodfar’s (2008) research, SRS members remain loyal to family and community while striving to challenge the dominant gender and ethnic/clan ideologies underpinning these social institutions. They too believe that gendered norms and clan affiliations ‘contradict a sense of equity and citizenry’ (Hoodfar 2008: 185), and seek to use diaspora philanthropy to overcome these divisions.

Research on refugee youth in the Middle East has elucidated young peoples’ ‘opportunism and agency related to gender discrimination and education’ (Chatty 2010: 28). SRS embodies such opportunism and agency, mobilizing philanthropy in manner that brings education, gender empowerment and clan unity to the fore. These three values are deeply intertwined in SRS’s vision of transnational philanthropy and peace building:

I believe education is the key to all these conflicts; when someone is educated they can think about their future, having a job and a stable life, then there is no need for all these fights you know? People can start operating as a family, and they can live and think in a very constructive process, without thinking of only fighting (Mahad 2011).

Indeed, all interviewed agreed that education is the key to empowering Somalis, particularly the next generation, to move towards ending tribalism.

What’s unique about this organization is that we are all students from refugee camps, and we have all different clan affiliations and tribes, and all of us are doing this to get rid of that inkling. To me that is one of the important things that we have going for us, to see that happening in a community […] through education we can break that cycle of clan affiliations and do something for a bigger cause […] I think education can bring that change and go to the next level (Mahad 2011).

Just looking at SRS itself, it gives you a hint of how people are getting together and uniting, and bringing a change. In that sense you see that people are getting educated […] If we all get together as brothers and sisters we can make the country go higher, and that is the biggest emphasis we are making, those of us involved in the association (Amina 2011).

This willingness to reach across clan lines differentiates SRS from most Somali diaspora groups, as the majority target diaspora support based on regional and clan affiliations (Hammond et al. 2011: 65). In so doing, SRS’ work represents a divergence from dominant clan-based allegiances and offers a new vision of social support networks.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research has been to investigate the collective remittance patterns of resettled Somali youth and what these patterns reveal about how traditional structures of obligation are reconfigured by young members of the diaspora. The notion of ‘traditional
structures of obligation’ that has guided my research and analysis has centered on the normative Somali values of kin-based reciprocity and assistance (Lewis 1961, 1995).

References to family, religious, and community duties, as well as the use of traditional Somali parables and proverbs throughout the interviews and survey responses, highlight the way in which the social norms of ‘home’ seem to guide the daily decision-making of the research participants. While these social norms were originally developed to cope with the challenges of a nomadic lifestyle in East Africa, protracted conflict and exile have introduced new hurdles to which such norms must adapt. The liminality of exile has allowed young Somalis to interpret dominant social ideologies in new ways, while maintaining a strict adherence to obligations for assisting kin.

Like many displaced youth around the globe, SRS members are committed to bettering themselves through education while maintaining a commitment to helping family (see Chatty 2010: 30). What is notable in this study is the way in which participants have upheld these commitments while in the diaspora, despite the spatial separation between themselves and the social supports/pressures of home. Remittances represent a means to both overcome this spatial distance and compensate for the senders’ inability to provide in situ assistance at the camp level.

Throughout this study, I have endeavoured to frame diaspora philanthropy as a mode by which resettled young people express their solidarity with refugee youth overseas, gratitude for receiving international assistance and vision for an educated, equitable and stable Somali society. Furthermore, I have sought to use these transnational flows as a window into the agency and self-help of refugee and diaspora communities and the ways in which the cultural norms and duties governing Somali life adapt to multiple migrations.

Given the dearth of research on youth diaspora philanthropy, this study provides new insight by bridging two distinct bodies of literature – that relating to diaspora philanthropy and the other to forced migrant youth – and relating them to original, multi-sited primary research. While such an approach has only scratched the surface of an expansive topic (encompassing prismatic understandings of national and generational identity, philanthropy, and forced migrant agency) it has, I believe, yielded several important findings.

Interviews and questionnaire responses continually suggested that transnational migration leads to the reconfiguration of social obligation in a series of ways. First, it appears that protracted exile in a refugee camp context requires youth take on heightened responsibilities in the household, while presenting them with opportunities for new leadership roles within camp operations (schools, NGOs etc.). Second, youth maintain a continuity of traditional social obligations upon resettling to Canada, but – unable to provide regular help at the camp-level – their life-long orientation to assist family and community is manifested in transnational remittances.

These remittances can take two forms: private and collective. Somali cultural dictates the obligatory nature of the first, and as the research has shown, Somali youth continue to respond to this normative duty by prioritizing remittances to family. In contrast, collective
remittances are not mandatory in the same way, but rather represent contributions above and beyond private remittances. These collective donations seem to represent an expression of youth-to-youth assistance and symbolize a generational allegiance. Moreover, they are indicative of how educated, young Somalis are marshalling a unique form of transnational support that elucidates the determination and capabilities diaspora youth.

Reiterating the limited scale and scope of this study, I wish to emphasize that while the above conclusions are not conclusive, they seek to offer a new vantage point for continued research and engagement with the oft-overlooked philanthropic efforts of diaspora youth. SRS is merely one example of the global mobilization of Somali youth who are engaged in diasporic advocacy and philanthropy.

The University College London Somali Students Society, for example, recently fundraised £700 for the Dadaab refugee camps in December 2010. The Worldwide Somali Students (WSS) is yet another association that seeks to promote youth activism and fundraise for the higher education of Somali students; in fact, the group is currently organizing an initiative titled ‘Operation Restore Hope 2012’, whereby 1,000 educated young Somalis will return to Somalia from the diaspora to offer their services and expertise in a variety of sectors. Similarly, social networking sites such as Somali students on Facebook (with 4000 members) are engaging in conversations around social remittances, diaspora philanthropy and peace building.

Recent research, commissioned by intergovernmental organizations such as UNDP, speaks to the emerging interest in and affirmation of Somali youth initiatives by the international community (Hammond et al. 2011). In addition, this research reveals that there is a strong desire among young Somalis in the diaspora, including second and third generations, to provide financial and social remittances for community-based support. As such, ‘young, educated Somalis are defying the conventional wisdom about the low levels of commitment among diaspora youth in critical ways’ (Hammond et al.: 40), and, I believe, SRS exemplifies this trend.

Working collectively, across multiple localities, SRS members have embarked on a philanthropic initiative that appears to uphold traditional social obligations of collectiveness and sharing through innovative new means. By emulating and collaborating with NGOs and drawing from organizational practices in Canada, SRS has operationalized traditional responsibilities in the form of collective remittances. Through this process the association seeks to highlight the social values it feels are especially vital for rebuilding Somalia: clan unity, gender equality, youth empowerment and education.

Though SRS is a young association, whose organizational structure, capacity and impact is limited in many ways, the vision of its membership remains unrestrained. While the extent to which diaspora philanthropy will result in social mobility within the refugee community remains highly contested, many SRS members remain hopeful. Several noted that SRS is just the first step towards enhanced leadership and responsibility for Somali diaspora youth.

\[\text{The association has over 600 members in the UK, US, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, India, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Bangladesh and China.}\]
Amiir (2011) articulates that if there is ever to be peace in his country of origin, the Somali youth will have to become leaders:

Not just leaders, but leaders who are informed, leaders who care, and leaders who understand what is necessary, and what other societies do. I think Somalis in the diaspora are in a position to not only assume that leadership role, but to participate actively, both socially and economically, to bring that understanding of the Somali community that the world needs. Because it seems that the world is unable to understand the Somalis generally.

SRS youth concur that while diaspora philanthropy offers a way to assist with meeting the immediate needs of those in Kenya, the goal of the Somali youth in the diaspora is to one day ‘bring about change, to bring about a new Somalia, a new governance, a new ideology’ (Amina 2011). For them diaspora philanthropy represents one way to inch closer to that collective vision.
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**Interviews**

Please note most names have been anonymized and Canadian cities unidentified.

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DAAHIR (2011) Interview with author, Canada, January 2011.
DAWO (2011) Interview with author, Canada, January 2011.
MARWO (2011) Interview with author, Canada, January 2011.
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