Contribution to UNHCR Global Virtual Summit on digital identity for refugees: Identifying and Clarifying Principles regarding Privacy, Confidentiality, Data Protection and Security

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Background

UNHCR, in partnership with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), has called for submissions regarding how digital identity can provide greater opportunities for refugees and asylum-seekers, allowing them to contribute more to their host communities. In the context of this enquiry, UNHCR and IRCC have made clear that they are aware of the issues regarding privacy, confidentiality, data protection and security. The organizers believe that “digital identity can be one of the new pathways by which refugees can access greater opportunities and contribute more to their host communities...” Among the benefits which they identify are being able to obtain SIM cards in refugees’ own names access to financial services, university courses on line and more widely ‘digital inclusion.’

These potential benefits indicate that the organizers anticipate systems of digital identities for refugees which will not only be available to the authorities of one state (where they are resident) but also to other states and to the private sector. As refugees, by definition (Article 1 Refugee Convention), have a well founded fear of persecution in their country of origin (or former residence), their personal data is highly sensitive. The risk to refugees and their families (often still resident in the country of persecution) of inadequate protection of their privacy and personal data is persecution, torture and enforced disappearance, all subject to absolute prohibition under UN human rights conventions. This means that the privacy of refugees is even more sensitive than the privacy of other persons who are not at risk of persecution or torture. The consequences of misuse of personal data are so profound for refugees that a heightened data protection obligation is obligatory. Digital identities which are created on the basis of personal data of refugees and then shared among state authorities,
between states and with the private sector represent an enormous challenge to refugee protection worldwide. This is a profoundly problematic project in light of known (and criticised) state practices which already fail to protect people’s privacy in the digital age. We refer, for instance, to the widely reported US Government’s mass surveillance programmes on electronic communication.

The international community has already expressed its deep concern regarding the correct implementation of the right to privacy contained in international human rights agreements, in particularly in the context of technological advances of the digital age. It is with this in mind that we make this submission to your enquiry.

**Legal Framework:**

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Article 17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (ratified by 167 States) “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation”. “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.” “In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

**Introduction**

We consider that UNHCR and IRRC need to proceed with great caution in respect of this initiative and most importantly must take into account the settled position of the international community as expressed by OHCHR in its report on the Right to Privacy in a Digital Age. The Annual Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 30 June 2014 provides an excellent overview of the challenges which the digital age presents for the universality of the right to privacy. In this submission we take the opportunity to develop on three paragraphs of that report in particular: paragraph 32; paragraph 35 and paragraph 36. In
particular, our concerns relate to the claim and in the case of some states, the assumption that the right to privacy can be differently articulated depending on the nationality of the person claiming it. This problem has arisen with the expansion of electronic technology which is based on technical capacities unrelated to national borders. As intelligence services seek to obtain information, including personal data, in the interests of their national security, the rules which they apply all too frequently are those relating to foreign intelligence. This has accentuated a tension regarding the human right to non-discrimination in the delivery of the right to privacy as it has required state authorities to provide some justification for the differential treatment of citizens and foreigners, including refugees (as increasingly the personal data of citizens is mixed with that of foreigners, all data travelling around the world on the internet before arriving at its destination), something which they could previously avoid. The means which are used to obtain personal data includes requirements on private sector actors to release to state authorities extensive personal information which they hold on customers.

From a European perspective, we are particularly concerned by developments in the European Union where the right to privacy of non-EU nationals (including

recognized in the Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The Human Rights Committee, in its general comment No. 31, affirmed that States parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.” This extends to persons within their “authority”.

3 This conclusion is equally important in the light of ongoing discussions on whether “foreigners” and “citizens” should have equal access to privacy protections within national security surveillance oversight regimes. Several legal regimes distinguish between the obligations owed to nationals or those within a State’s territories, and non-nationals and those outside, or otherwise provide foreign or external communications with lower levels of protection. If there is uncertainty around whether data are foreign or domestic, intelligence agencies will often treat the data as foreign (since digital communications regularly pass “off-shore” at some point) and thus allow them to be collected and retained. The result is significantly weaker – or even non-existent – privacy protection for foreigners and non-citizens, as compared with those of citizens.

4 International human rights law is explicit with regard to the principle of non-discrimination. Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law” and, further, that “in this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” These provisions are to be read together with articles 17, which provides that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and that “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”, as well as with article 2, paragraph 1. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee has underscored the importance of “measures to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity regardless of the nationality or location of individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance.”
refugees)\textsuperscript{5} is currently subject to greater intrusions than that of EU citizens. This problem is particularly acute as regards the creation, use and access to EU databases of personal information of non-EU citizens (described as third country nationals by the EU institutions) such as the EU database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and third country nationals apprehended irregularly crossing an external border, EURODAC;\textsuperscript{6} the database of personal information of all third country nationals who apply for a visa, the Visa Information System;\textsuperscript{7} the database which includes personal data of third country nationals who are to be refused entry to the EU, the Schengen Information System II;\textsuperscript{8} and the proposal that these databases should linked to permit police authorities to search all of them simultaneously.\textsuperscript{9} The implicit assumption of these databases and the new proposal for interoperability among them is that the privacy of the foreigner is protected to a lesser extent than that of the (EU) citizen. This presumption is inherent in the fact that none of the EU databases containing information about EU citizens are available on such a wide basis to police authorities, nor are they interoperable. The problematic nature of the legal framework is reinforced when the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)\textsuperscript{10} is taken into account. This database has been split into two – one containing criminal record information of EU citizens the other of information relating to the criminal records of third country nationals (including dual EU and third country national citizens). Only the latter database will be included in the interoperability project with the other databases containing personal data of foreigners.\textsuperscript{11} We are deeply concerned that this action by a regional institution undermines the principle of equality in relation to the right to privacy and is inconsistent with the duty of the EU’s Member States to comply with the UDHR and ICCPR.

The universality of the right to privacy

As the OHCHR makes clear in its 30 June 2014 report, the right to privacy is universal. It applies equally to everyone, whether they are citizens or foreigners, including refugees, of the state within the jurisdiction of which they find themselves. Differences in the protection of the right to privacy contained in the

\textsuperscript{5} An example is the Eurodac database which holds the fingerprints of everyone who has sought asylum in the EU (with length retention periods) and the availability of that sensitive personal information to law enforcement authorities.
\textsuperscript{6} Regulation 603/2013 OJ [2013] L 180/1.
\textsuperscript{7} Regulation 767/2008 OJ [2008] L …/1.
\textsuperscript{11} COM (2017) 344.
ICCPR on the basis of nationality are inconsistent with the right to equality contained in Article 27 ICCPR.

The Human Rights Committee in General Comments 15 and 31 has made it very clear that citizens and foreigners are equally entitled to rely on the ICCPR rights without distinction:

“10. States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party. As indicated in General Comment 15 adopted at the twenty-seventh session (1986), the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.”

The position of the Treaty Body responsible for the correct interpretation of the ICCPR is clear – the right to privacy in Article 17 applies equally to all persons whatever their nationality or immigration status. Further, there is only one standard applicable to the right to privacy. The content of the right contained in Article 17 does not vary according to the nationality or immigration status of the individual entitled to it. States parties which have bound themselves voluntarily to comply with the ICCPR and to deliver its rights to everyone within their jurisdiction must, in so far as they are implementing their Article 17 obligations, provide a consistent level of protection of privacy to everyone which fulfils their ICCPR obligations as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee. Further, the right to privacy must be protected by the state including in circumstances where at first instance the challenges arises by the actions of private sector actors (and only subsequently are accessed by intelligence authorities).

12 “[Aliens] may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence.” HRC General Comment 15 The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant 30 September 1986.


14 By extension, the reasoning of the Committee on Economic and Social Rights in Communication 5/2015 “If a State party does not take appropriate measures to protect a Covenant right, it has a responsibility even when the action that undermined the right in the first place was carried out by an individual or a private entity. Thus, although the Covenant primarily establishes rights and obligations between the State and individuals, the scope of the provisions of the Covenant extends to relations between individuals.” 20 July 2017, E/C.12/61/D/5/2015.
The 2017 session of HRC Universal Periodic Review included a peer-to-peer review of the UK, one of the EU Member States which has been heavily involved in the collection, storage, manipulation and sharing of personal data according to the revelations of Edward Snowden, former US contractor with the National Security Agency, in 2013.\(^{15}\) The question of the protection of the right to privacy was reviewed in that session and in the preparatory documents the following summary of concerns were raised by UN human rights institutions and bodies:

“Right to privacy and family life\(^{16}\)

43. The Human Rights Committee was concerned that the current legal regime in the United Kingdom allowed for mass interception of communications and lacked sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interference with the right to privacy. It recommended that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 be revised, with a view to ensuring that access to communications data is limited to the extent strictly necessary for prosecution of the most serious crimes and is dependent upon prior judicial authorization.\(^{17}\)

44. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism stated that current assessments of the threat posed by terrorism in the United Kingdom had changed significantly in profile over the past years and that there should be a debate on the extent to which the public was prepared to tolerate official access to metadata.\(^{18}\) He urged the British authorities to review their operations to ensure that they comply fully with the obligations of the State under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms regarding the right to liberty and security and the right to respect for private and family life.”\(^{19}\)

It is clear that, in the UPR, the HRC was not satisfied that the UK government’s attempts to codify in law generalised power to intercept electronic communications were consistent with the right to privacy. While the specific issue of the differential treatment of citizens and foreigners was not directly addressed, the problem arises because of the capacity of the state to access the personal communications of both citizens and foreigners within a general framework of protection of privacy which was considered inadequate.

On the issue of jurisdiction and extraterritorial effect of Article 17 ICCPR, we endorse the position of the High Commissioner in the report on the Right to

\(^{16}\) A/HRC/WG.6/27/GBR/2.
\(^{17}\) See CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, para. 24.
\(^{19}\) newsarchive.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13678&LangID=E.
Privacy in the Digital Age. This position has been widely adopted by the UN Treaty Bodies as evidenced in the UPR of the UK in 2017. The Right to Privacy and National Constitutional Protections for Citizens

What is the situation where a state’s constitution provides a higher level of protection of privacy than that which has been established by the HRC as required by Article 17 ICCPR but that constitutional protection is limited to citizens of the state? This situation appears to be ever more common, as the HRC noted in the concluding observations on the 4th periodic report of the USA in 2014. This position also exists in EU law regarding access and the grounds for access to the EU databases which contain only information about third country nationals as described above in the introduction. In the European Commission’s proposal for interoperability of the databases, dispositions permit Member States to provide access to the interoperable databases to their police authorities for purposes of identification without the necessity of any suspicion of crime.

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20 A/HRC/27/37 para 33.
21 CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 para 22, as noted in the High Commissioner’s report of 30 June 2014: “22. The Committee is concerned about the surveillance of communications in the interest of protecting national security, conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) both within and outside the United States, through the bulk phone metadata surveillance programme (Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act) and, in particular, surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendment Act, conducted through PRISM (collection of communications content from United States-based Internet companies) and UPSTREAM (collection of communications metadata and content by tapping fiber-optic cables carrying Internet traffic) and the adverse impact on individuals’ right to privacy. The Committee is concerned that, until recently, judicial interpretations of FISA and rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) had largely been kept secret, thus not allowing affected persons to know the law with sufficient precision. The Committee is concerned that the current oversight system of the activities of the NSA fails to effectively protect the rights of the persons affected. While welcoming the recent Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, which now extends some safeguards to non-United States citizens “to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the national security”, the Committee remains concerned that such persons enjoy only limited protection against excessive surveillance. Finally, the Committee is concerned that the persons affected have no access to effective remedies in case of abuse (arts. 2, 5 (1) and 17).
1. Where a Member State police authority has been so empowered by national legislative measures as referred to in paragraph 2, it may, solely for the purpose of identifying a person, query the CIR with the biometric data of that person taken during an identity check.
Where the query indicates that data on that person is stored in the CIR, the Member States authority shall have access to consult the data referred to in Article 18(1).
Where the biometric data of the person cannot be used or where the query with that data fails, the query shall be carried out with identity data of the person in combination with travel document data, or with the identity data provided by that person.
2. Member States wishing to avail themselves of the possibility provided for in this Article shall adopt national legislative measures. Such legislative measures shall specify the precise purposes of identity checks within the purposes referred to in Article 2(1)(b) and (c). They shall designate the police authorities competent and lay down the procedures, conditions and criteria of such checks.”
Further, the prohibition on discrimination in the proposal does not include nationality.23

We note that the General Assembly, in the New York Declaration of 19 September 2016, stated: "We recall that our obligations under international law prohibit discrimination of any kind on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Yet in many parts of the world we are witnessing, with great concern, increasingly xenophobic and racist responses to refugees and migrants." (para 13 A/71/L.1). We are concerned that the actions of the EU in respect of the privacy of third country nationals is a further demonstration of a response to refugees and migrants inconsistent with both Articles 17 and 26 ICCPR.

Further the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has set out the relationship to rights and discrimination in the following terms, noting the consistency with the HRC General Comment 18:

"...discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights."24

In order to fulfil their obligations under these Articles 17 and 26 ICCPR, states must ensure that there is no discrimination in the protection of privacy of citizens and foreigners. The single fact of failing to be a citizen of a state cannot justify differential treatment in the protection of privacy. We are dismayed that the justification for an EU separate database of third country nationals who have been convicted of offences appears to rest on unsupported claims about the threat of terrorism25 and the effectiveness of border controls.26 Yet, the ICCPR
standard requires the same protection of privacy to be apply to both citizens and foreigners. Where states are able to provide higher standards of privacy protection to their citizens than are considered the threshold required by Article 17 ICCPR, the same standard must also be applied to everyone irrespective of nationality or immigration status in order to comply with Article 26 ICCPR. Where states seek to interfere with the right to privacy, as the High Commissioner has clearly set out in section A.1 of the note of 30 June 2014, there are finite grounds on which this can be done, the interferences must not be arbitrary and it is for states to justify on those grounds, in accordance with the law, the compatibility of the interference.

We would highlight one final point, there are a number of state efforts regarding the lack of relevant data on convictions for criminal offences of foreigners as opposed to nationals of the state. It seems that some states are starting projects to separate out data about criminality and foreigners from that of citizens. The new reporting requirements contained in the Trump Travel Ban(s) on US law enforcement bodies to provide data on convictions of foreigners in the US is one example of this move. This also seems to be the logic of the EU proposal for a special database of third country nationals who have been convicted of offences in any EU Member State discussed above. No attention is given to the discriminatory effect of such databases and their prejudicial affects, in particular develop existing tools, but also concrete suggestions and ideas on new forms of interoperability. The Commission calls for more efficiency and interoperability of existing European databases and electronic information exchange systems, including an ECRIS-TCN system. The work to follow up on the Communication was led by the High Level Expert Group on Interoperability and the ECRIS-TCN system proposed here is one of the systems that is part of this interoperability initiative. Such interoperability would not be possible if a decentralised solution as proposed in January 2016 would have been pursued.

27 US Executive Order 13780 Sec. 11. Transparency and Data Collection. (a) To be more transparent with the American people and to implement more effectively policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall, consistent with applicable law and national security, collect and make publicly available the following information:

(i) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; convicted of terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity, affiliation with or provision of material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national-security-related reasons;

(ii) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and who have engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States;

(iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called "honor killings," in the United States by foreign nationals;

(iv) any other information relevant to public safety and security as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals charged with major offenses.

the challenges to equal treatment in the protection of privacy or the rights of third country nationals to the protection of their personal data.

Conclusions

In this contribution, we have addressed only the issue of discrimination between citizens and foreigners in exercise of the right to privacy. We have made three propositions:

1. Articles 17 and 26 ICCPR protect the right to privacy of everyone. There must be no discrimination between the right to privacy of citizens and foreigners (including refugees).
2. Interferences with the right to privacy of people on the basis of their nationality is a suspect ground of discrimination which states must justify in accordance with the limited grounds applicable to the ICCPR right.
3. In so far as states provide more extensive protections of privacy to their own nationals they must also extend these protections to foreigners within their jurisdiction to comply with Article 26 ICCPR.

We warmly welcome this Inquiry which is both timely and of profound importance to the protection of the privacy of refugees in a digital age.

25 March 2019