

**A REVIEW OF UNHCR'S
SECURITY POLICY AND
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION**

**THE REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE
ON SECURITY POLICY AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
OCTOBER 2004**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Although UNHCR was already actively engaged in advancing issues of staff safety, the deadly attack of 19 August 2003 on the United Nations in Baghdad, as well as other tragic incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan targeting humanitarian workers exemplified a new reality:

- The United Nations, ICRC and other humanitarian actors have unequivocally been targeted by terrorist groups.

These attacks thus highlighted the need for further efforts. As part of its response to this new reality, the High Commissioner established a Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation under the leadership of the Assistant High Commissioner. As part of its terms of reference, the Steering Committee tasked a Working Group to prepare a report. A draft version of this report was discussed, amended and adopted by the Steering Committee.

The report summarizes the results of the review by the Working Group on Security Policy and Policy Implementation of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation and provides a series of recommendations for strengthening UNHCR's policy and approach to security management.

Methodology

In terms of methodology for the preparation of this report, the Working Group adopted a project management approach that involved breaking down the Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee into discrete topics and assigning those topics to individual members of the Working Group for in-depth analysis. The work was divided into three phases: Research and Consultation, Analysis and Consolidation of Results.

As part of the Research and Consultation Phase, the Working Group conducted three surveys. The first was a survey questionnaire administered to a random sample of staff members in the Field. The second survey was a targeted questionnaire to selected informants at the managerial level. The third was a survey of Field Safety Advisors (FSAs). In addition, focus group interviews were conducted with a group of former Representatives now posted at Headquarters, the Staff Welfare Section, the ICRC Security Section and security focal points for selected NGO partners. Individual interviews were also conducted with all Directors of Bureaux. A series of analytical papers were produced on various topics as well. Senior managers from the Asia, CASWANAME and Europe Bureaux reviewed the report and provided input to strengthen its recommendations at the Management Staff Security Seminar organized by UNHCR's Regional Centre for Emergency Training in International Humanitarian Response (the "eCentre") on 28-30 July 2004 in Thailand.

An important aspect of the review of the Working Group has been to review previous recommendations of earlier evaluations and reviews of Security including "Enhancing Staff Security" 24 November 2000, "Staff Stress and Security: A Management Challenge for UNHCR", January 1997 "Working in a War Zone – a Review of UNHCR's Operations in Former Yugoslavia", April 1994.

In approaching its work, the Working Group has concentrated on UNHCR Security Policy and Policy Implementation. The larger framework of the UN Security Management System is currently also under review, and significant changes are expected. The assumption of the Working Group in preparing this report is that in addition to its membership in and commitment to an effective UN Security Management System, UNHCR must have its own security policy and approach, not least because the security and safety of staff members is an issue of organizational and managerial accountability.

The Global Security Risk Management Challenge

As a field-based organization carrying out operations in difficult environments, risk and risk management has always been a feature of UNHCR's work. Whether operating in remote and difficult duty stations, confronting crime and banditry or dealing with frustrated asylum-seekers, UNHCR staff members have necessarily had to deal with a range of insecurity.

In the last decade, however, the security environment in which UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations have operated has steadily deteriorated largely in response to the increase in the incidence of internal armed conflict and more recently as a result of the threat of terrorism. As a consequence UNHCR must respond to a variety of challenges that have a direct impact on the organization's ability to manage the security of staff members.

These issues, which include the direct targeting of humanitarian workers, the need to maintain impartiality and neutrality in conflict situations so as to ensure sufficient humanitarian space to operate, and the nature of our relationship to the military remain significant challenges today. The situation, however, has become fundamentally more complicated as a result of the consequences of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, and the attack on the United Nations in Baghdad on 19 August 2003. As a result, UNHCR must take into account and adapt its security approach to a serious and qualitatively different threat that is significantly independent of local circumstances and developments.

Strengthening the Culture of Security within UNHCR

UNHCR has made considerable effort and, as a result, important progress in recent years in managing staff security effectively; however, given the current security challenges the organization must face, it has not done enough. The 24 November 2000 report, "Enhancing Staff Security" stated that "UNHCR has failed to integrate the issue of staff security into the organization's management practices, procedures and culture". This is still largely true today, and thus it is imperative that UNHCR shape its organizational culture so as to enhance a culture in which security is ingrained in all aspects of its operations both at Headquarters and in the Field. This is the core recommendation that the Working Group is making.

Augmenting the culture of security within UNHCR must be seen as a long-term effort and must be backed by strong and sustained managerial commitment. By organizational culture, we mean the system of shared actions, values and beliefs that guide the behaviour of staff members. In order for UNHCR to promote the continuing development of a culture of security, organizational policies, processes and procedures will need to be changed so that security is fully integrated. Training and learning will also need to play a major role. Similarly rewards and sanctions within the organization will need to be modified so as to value the importance of security. Of fundamental importance will be the behaviour of managers as they

are the single most important element in both enhancing the culture of security and in ensuring effective and appropriate security management.

The specific recommendations within the report describe a series of steps UNHCR should take in order to transform the organization and build the culture of security envisioned above. The recommendations focus on policy, training, operational guidance, staff management relations, security of national staff members, security and stress, security information management, telecommunications, use of security expertise, human resource policy and other topics relevant to security management. Many of the recommendations can be addressed with existing resources while some do have financial implications that are described in the report.

Of critical importance will be the mechanism put in place to implement the recommendations of this report. The Working Group recommends that the Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation be made permanent, that a new Working Group be established under the leadership of the Head of the Emergency and Security Service (ESS), and that there be annual reporting of progress to the Executive Committee. Assuming the Recommendations are accepted, the initial task of the new Working Group will be to prioritize the recommendations, establish workplans and mobilize the internal resources necessary to make sustained progress within agreed timeframes.

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared at the request of the Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation. The report summarizes the results of the Working Group on the review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation and provides a series of recommendations for strengthening UNHCR's policy and approach to security management.

Background and Purpose

As part of the ongoing efforts in the areas of staff safety and, as a consequence of the tragic events of 19 August 2003 in which 22 United Nations staff members were assassinated in Baghdad, as well as the murder of our colleague, Bettina Goislard, in Afghanistan on 16 November 2003, in IOM/FOM No 023/2004 of 11 March 2004, the High Commissioner announced the formation of a Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation to be chaired by the Assistant High Commissioner and to be composed of the Director of Human Resource Management (DHRM), the Director of the Bureau of Central Asia, South West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (CASWANAME) and the Head of the Emergency and Security Service (ESS).

The Steering Committee's mandate is to assess current policies and, where appropriate, propose improvements in the following areas:

- Security management procedures in place globally; identification of vulnerabilities and gaps, and concrete steps needed to address them;
- Study of threat assessment and risk management procedures in place;
- Current UNHCR participation in the UN security management system, and how to maximize support of UNSECOORD and inter-agency processes;
- Exploration of opportunities for dialogue and better understanding of the environment in which we are operating with civil society groups, including evaluation of parties hostile to the United Nations, on issues of impartiality, neutrality, and humanitarian principles;
- Discussion of appropriate relations with governments, the military, state and non-state combatants in conflict areas;
- Fostering greater security collaboration with other agencies and organizations;
- Training programmes, staff member and managerial accountability;
- Staff safety implications on the new staffing and human resource policy;
- Assessing the cost implications for the organization of an overhauled staff security policy.

Methodology

The Steering Committee at its first meeting on 13 April 2003 established a Working Group to review the issues of concern to the Steering Committee and to make recommendations for improving and strengthening UNHCR's security management policy and approach. The Working Group held its first meeting on 5 May and thereafter meeting twice a week until the end of June.

The Working Group consists of the following individuals: Anna Christina Bystrom, Julie Dunphy, Arman Harutyunyan, Carla Van Maris, Michael Dell'Amico, Richard Foyer-Ackland, Roland L'Allier, Karen Farkas, Esin Gullu, Jo Hegenauer, Harry Leefe, Raouf Mazou, Hanne Raatikainen, Duda Suzic-Kofi, Geoff Wordley, and Alan Vernon (Chair).

In terms of methodology for the preparation of this report, the Working Group adopted a project management approach that involved breaking down the Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee into discrete topics and assigning those topics to individual members of the Working Group for in-depth analysis. The work was divided into three phases: Research and Consultation, Analysis and Consolidation of Results.

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In approaching its work, the Working Group has concentrated on UNHCR Security Policy and Policy Implementation. The larger framework of the UN Security Management System is currently also under review, and significant changes are expected. The assumption of the Working Group in preparing this report is that in spite of its membership in and commitment to an effective UN Security Management System, UNHCR must have its own security policy and approach not least because the security and safety of staff members is an organizational and managerial accountability.

The Global Security Risk Management Challenge

“Security for our staff...has reached its lowest level ever. Daily, staff members are exposed to violence and intimidation to such a threshold that guaranteeing minimum security has long passed. How far can we push our staff to operate under these conditions? When and how do we say enough is enough and conclude that we can no longer operate, or has it now become an acceptable criterion to operate under these conditions?”

The words above will hardly astonish most UNHCR staff members. What might surprise some is that they were written over ten years ago, in a UNHCR report dating from December

1993¹. The observation that the world is becoming a dangerous place for humanitarian workers is not in itself new; since the early 1990s aid workers have faced ever-increasing risks in carrying out their duties of helping those in need. Nonetheless, the spectacular attacks of September 11 2001, the bombing of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad in August 2003 that killed 22 UN staff members, and the murder of UNHCR staff member Bettina Goislard later that same year, all contribute to an intuitive perception that something has fundamentally changed. It is certainly true that staff safety issues have never figured more prominently in discussions of humanitarian operations, nor have they preoccupied the minds of so many humanitarian workers up to the most senior levels. Thus, in assessing UNHCR's current security environment, the place to begin is to ask, "What has changed and what hasn't?"

What has changed, and what hasn't: UNHCR's security environment in the mid-1990s

The humanitarian security landscape of the 1990s can be summarized as follows:

--The 1990s saw a sharp rise in the number of conflicts around the world. In places like the Balkans, Somalia, Tajikistan and the northern Caucasus, antagonisms that had remained dormant during the previous decades came to life in the post-Cold War thaw.

--From Angola to Liberia to Haiti to Afghanistan, disputes increasingly took the form of intra-state civil struggles. Traditional wars between nation-states, such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the late 1990s, became the exception rather than the rule.

--Conflicts during this time were predominantly inter-ethnic; in places like Rwanda, the Balkans and Sudan, dividing lines were no longer ideological but tribal, religious and cultural.

--These conflicts saw a proliferation of irregular, non-state actors: warlords and rebel groups in Somalia, the Great Lakes Region and Sierra Leone or armed militias in Colombia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Afghanistan. These elements were often undisciplined and had little knowledge of or respect for the norms of armed conflict; banditry, looting, hostage-taking, rape and other crimes were widespread.

--This period also witnessed a global surge in the spread in small arms, and landmines continued to constitute a significant threat to aid workers.

--The 1990s saw an erosion of the humanitarian shield of neutrality. In Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere, aid became highly politicized, a source of power for those who could secure it for their group, or deny it to their enemy.

--The inviolability of attacking humanitarian workers ceased to be universally respected, as aid workers were perceived by some parties as "soft targets." Cases of banditry, hostage taking and even killing of aid workers, including UNHCR staff, occurred in West Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Eastern Asia and elsewhere.

UNHCR's vulnerability during the 1990s

--This period saw UNHCR's vulnerability grow in proportion to the threat. UNHCR staff continued to work in remote and isolated areas with minimal infrastructure or facilities.

¹ Cited in "Working in A War Zone – a Review of UNHCR's Operations in Former Yugoslavia," UNHCR Central Evaluations Section, April 1994.

Increasingly, these areas were unstable, conflict-ridden, populated by irregular armed elements and inadequately governed and policed.

--Moreover, the power of mass media to raise awareness, growing competition among humanitarian agencies and rising donor expectations often led to intense pressure for the agency to "show a presence," even in highly unstable areas.

--For UNHCR, the politicization of aid was acutely felt. In conflict areas like Rwanda and Kosovo, where outflows of people resulted from deliberate campaigns of intimidation and violence, those helping refugees were not always welcomed or perceived as impartial by all sides. "Ensuring humanitarian space" became a major challenge for the agency.

--In addition, mounting frustration at the difficulty of finding durable solutions, combined with greater empowerment of the information age and awareness of the power of the media, led to increasingly restive urban refugee populations. This resulted in a sharp rise in demonstrations at UNHCR offices, personal threats to staff, and cases of refugees committing acts of self-harm to draw attention to their plight.

-- The murder of three UNHCR staff members in West Timor, Indonesia in September 2000 and the subsequent murder of a UNHCR staff member in Guinea later that month brought home in a tragic manner the heightened vulnerability of UNHCR staff members around the world, and compelled the organization to strengthen its approach to the security and safety.

--Finally, as a result of all these factors, stress and related staff welfare issues emerged as serious concerns.

"The day the world changed": UNHCR's security environment since September 11, 2001

In the week after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the headline of weekly news magazine The Economist referred to the fateful date as "the day the world changed." Certainly, few would dispute that the consequences of these events have been felt around the globe. However, as we have seen, much of the insecurity that characterized UNHCR's security environment was already present in the 1990s. Thus it is appropriate to ask, what has changed since September 11, 2001?

--Patterns of global conflict and instability that emerged in the 1990s have not decisively changed. Although the new decade has seen hopeful signs of reconciliation in some of the last decade's most intractable conflicts (Angola, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, southern Sudan), fresh fighting has broken out elsewhere (Ivory Coast, Iraq, western Sudan) and others disputes continue to fester or hang in the balance (Somalia, DRC, Liberia, Kashmir, Afghanistan). In particular, lack of resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees and the continuing conflict in the Occupied Territories has continued to create significant instability and complicate international relations.

--Moreover, in many cases threats have increased in complexity and sophistication: the use of state-of-the-art explosives, the coordination of attacks using cell phone and internet technology and the intermingling of banditry, terrorism, narcotics and human trafficking in some locations are examples. This trend has been exacerbated by the phenomenon of global

communications and the internet which have enabled organizations using terror to mobilize on a global scale.

--Transnational terrorism currently dominates the agenda of many nations, the headlines of the major news media, and the fears of many people, among them humanitarian workers. Current efforts to battle this phenomenon, described by the United States and other nations as the War against Terrorism, have had a polarizing effect, as the conflict is perceived by many to have religious and cultural dimensions. However, unlike in the bipolar world of the Cold War, today the United Nations is clearly perceived as being linked to one party of the conflict. This has eroded the organization's neutrality to an unprecedented degree.

--Terrorism itself is not a new phenomenon. The 1970s saw the emergence of groups like the Bader-Meinhof Gang in Germany and the Red Brigade in Italy. During the 1980s, terrorism raged in places as disparate as Northern Ireland, Greece, the Middle East and Sri Lanka. The 1990s saw the emergence of transnational terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, distinct and troubling patterns have emerged in the current decade, including the following:

- Groups using terrorist tactics have become increasingly sophisticated, demonstrating the ability to organize, finance and recruit across international borders and coordinate complex operations using modern technological means.
- Terrorism has become "democratized," some would even say "banalized": atrocities once perpetrated by only the most extreme elements are now seen as commonplace and "copycat" attacks are multiplying.
- Perhaps as a consequence of the phenomenon above, events have also become increasingly spectacular and "media-worthy", as the September 11, the Bali and the Madrid attacks attest.
- More than in previous decades, the use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical) is a prominent concern.

-- The 19 August 2003 attack on the United Nations headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad that resulted in the death of 22 United Nations staff and visitors and injuries to more than 150 persons as well as the 27 October 2003 attack on the ICRC in which two persons were killed exemplified the new reality:

- The United Nations, ICRC and other humanitarian actors have unequivocally been targeted by terrorist groups.

UNHCR's vulnerability since 2001

As regards UNHCR's vulnerability, events since September 11 have exacerbated trends already visible in the previous decade.

--The damage to the United Nations' perception of impartiality and neutrality has affected UNHCR no less than other parts of the organization. Most people do not make a distinction between the United Nations' political processes and UNHCR's humanitarian mandate. This has greatly complicated the challenge of creating humanitarian space.

--Interagency competition and media pressure have only grown in the present decade. Moreover, the fact that some major donors are also combatants in the war against terrorism has created additional pressures, and sometimes conflicting agendas.

--While UNHCR continues to operate in the most remote and unstable environments, heightened concern about terrorism has rendered urban staff vulnerable as well. Indeed, the fact that terrorism is especially prone to strike in urban environments has blurred the distinction between headquarters and field security, questioning the relevance of traditional organizational divisions between the two and exposing worrisome gaps. The ability of terrorism to strike anywhere, including places never before considered at risk, has led to a realization that many of our facilities are seriously inadequate to ensure the protection of staff.

--The indiscriminate nature of the terrorist threat means that people are no longer exposed to risk only in their workplaces or homes; they can be just as vulnerable in a church or mosque, a shopping mall, or anywhere else. What is more, staff members themselves no longer bear the brunt of the risk; their families can just as easily become the victims of an attack.

--Global security concerns and in some cases anti-immigration sentiment continue to restrict options for resettlement, adding to the frustration and tension of refugees, especially in urban settings. Again, this has led to a realization in some cases that existing facilities are inadequate to ensure the safety of staff.

What it all means: Implications for UNHCR

The assessment above paints a worrisome picture. Global conflict and instability, banditry and criminality, and modern terrorism, combined with an eroded perception of neutrality and even a belief by some that we are legitimate targets, pose serious challenges to UNHCR's ability to fulfil its mandate while ensuring the safety of its staff. However, taking stock of these factors and identifying the implications that stem from them provide a basis for identifying areas in our current approach where improvement is needed. These implications, summarized below, have informed the analysis and recommendations of the working group.

--The multiple uncertainties of the present era suggest that thorough assessment of threat, vulnerability and risk have become indispensable for any humanitarian activity. This is true in all phases of an operation, but especially up front in the planning stages. Adopting a "risk management approach" means accepting that there are or may be times when operations are not possible.

--Given the danger in the environment in which UNHCR must operate if it is to protect and assist refugees, it is inevitable that staff members will be hurt and killed. It has happened in the past and it will happen again.

--In spite of the efforts and progress UNHCR has made in managing the security of staff members, the organization must take security more seriously. Indeed, UNHCR must actively shape its organizational culture so as to promulgate a culture of security in which security is ingrained in all aspects of its operations both at Headquarters and in the Field.

--There is more than ever before a need for training in these and other security skills, especially for managers who will have to make difficult decisions in the field.

--Identifying viable strategies and methods for creating and maintaining humanitarian space is of paramount importance.

--The changing environment will undoubtedly require significant resources devoted to security, but equally important, more supple and flexible mechanisms to apportion them most efficiently. Donors will have to be informed; needs and strategies explained.

--More than before, the ability of a staff member to handle difficult security decisions has become a crucial consideration in selection for key positions in the field. This is especially true for senior managers.

--Many other human resource questions may need to be weighed in considering staff assignments: nationality, gender, contractual status (e.g. national vs. international staff), age, experience, and willingness of the staff member to accept the mission.

--More than before, the safety needs of families must now be taken into account.

--There are many questions that must be answered concerning the difficult issue of accountability. What are the agency's expectations of managers? What tools will be given to support them? How can the agency assure its managers that, in an inherently risky world, they will be supported in difficult decisions if the actions taken were supported by analysis of facts known at the time and entailed acceptable risk? What will be the consequences if this is not the case?

-- The terrorist threat suggests the need not only to reconsider standards for many urban facilities, but to rethink traditional relationships between headquarters and field safety mechanisms.

--The agency must consider specific measures to respond to tensions among urban caseloads: in this point and the one above, in certain cases, there may be no alternative to office relocation.

--Staff welfare needs have never been greater.

PART TWO: OVERALL RECOMMENDATION: STRENGTHENING THE CULTURE OF SECURITY WITHIN UNHCR

UNHCR has made considerable efforts and as a result important progress in recent years in its attempts to manage staff security effectively. Important achievements include the promulgation of a Security Policy in November 2002, the creation of increased numbers of Field Safety Advisors and Field Safety Assistants in field operations, a strengthened Field Safety Section at Headquarters, and development and roll-out of the training CD-Rom on "Basic Security in the Field". A further important achievement has been the strengthening of the Staff Welfare Section. In terms of financial resources for security, the creation of the Regional Security ABODs as a contingency reserve for funding unforeseen security requirements has been a highly effective mechanism.

However, given the current security challenges the organization must face, insufficient progress has been made. The 24 November 2000 report, "Enhancing Staff Security" stated that "UNHCR has failed to integrate the issue of staff security into the organization's management practices, procedures and culture". This is still largely true today, and thus it is imperative that UNHCR shape its organizational culture so as to enhance a culture in which security is ingrained in all aspects of its operations both at Headquarters and in the Field. This is the core recommendation that the Working Group is making.

Strengthening the security culture within UNHCR must be seen as a long-term effort to be backed by strong and sustained managerial commitment. By organizational culture, we mean the system of shared actions, values and beliefs that guide the behaviour of staff members. In order for UNHCR to foster the continuing development of a culture of security, organizational policies, processes and procedures will need to be changed so that security is fully integrated. Training and learning will also need to play a major role. Similarly rewards and sanctions within the organization will need to be modified so as to value the importance of security. Of fundamental importance will be the behaviour of managers: they are the single most important element both in augmenting the culture of security and in ensuring effective and appropriate security management.

The following Policy Statement of Intent is taken from the proposed new chapter in the UNHCR manual on Security Management and describes what strengthening the culture of security will mean for UNHCR:

Recommendation 1: UNHCR is committed to an organizational culture in which safety and security are ingrained in all aspects of UNHCR's operations both at Headquarters and in the Field. While UNHCR has made significant progress in its management of security, enhancing the organizational culture of security and safety will require a multi-year effort and significant commitment at all levels of the organization.

For UNHCR, an organizational culture of security and safety means:

- Staff members understand and accept the risks inherent in the work of UNHCR;***

- Everyone in the organization is trained in, understands and can apply UNHCR's approach to and methodology for Security Management;*
- Security and safety considerations are integrated as normal functions of UNHCR operations and activity;*
- Security management is seen as everyone's job with managers at all levels of the organization having a particular responsibility and accountability;*
- UNHCR staff members at all levels are disciplined in their compliance with security rules and protocols, and non-compliance is grounds for dismissal;*
- UNHCR recognizes the importance of competence in security management and prioritizes this competence in the selection and promotion of managers;*
- UNHCR staff members and partners speak a common language of security in which terminology is used in a consistent manner;*
- From the earliest planning of operations, security is integrated into the assessment and design process so as to maximize the delivery of protection and assistance in potentially hazardous environments without exposing staff members to an unacceptable, unnecessary or unforeseen level of risk;*
- UNHCR manages its operations from a risk management² perspective in which there is ongoing effort to identify, understand and mitigate risk and responsible risk taking is how UNHCR staff members carry out their work;*
- Resources for security are sufficient so that the organization does not have to compromise on measures necessary to ensure, to the fullest extent possible, the security and safety of staff members and partners;*
- UNHCR actively develops an approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs and builds on lessons learned and best practice;*
- UNHCR is an active member of the common UN security system, complying with established guidelines, sharing information and contributing recommendations to improve overall security management;*
- Staff members have full confidence in how UNHCR manages security.*

The Executive Management of UNHCR fully recognizes that achieving an enhanced culture of security and safety within UNHCR is a long-term effort and commits itself to ensuring that the requisite time and resources will be made available to do so.

² UNSECOORD defines security risk management as the process of assessing the likelihood of threats that may affect UN System personnel, missions and other assets, and the implementation of specific risk mitigation strategies to lower the probability and/or impact of the identified threats.

PART THREE: SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations address weaknesses and areas for improvement in UNHCR's current security policy and approach. Implementation of the recommendations will help move UNHCR towards the strengthening of the current security culture for UNHCR to fulfil its mandate in a dangerous world.

UNHCR's Security Policy

The existing Security Policy issued in November 2002 under IOM/68/2002-FOM/64/2002 is a solid foundation for improved policy. The policy requires updating and expansion in a number of areas including gender and specific security needs of women, security measures for national staff members particularly in situations in which international staff members are evacuated, and security procedures in the event of death or serious injury to staff members due to insecurity. The policy is also not sufficiently explicit on the extent to which UNHCR's approach to security management should be decentralized.

Of greater concern, however, is that the document is largely unknown within the organization, and there have been no substantive efforts to promote the policy and use it for decision-making or training.

There are also longer term areas of development to be incorporated into the policy including:

- ✓ the commitment of UNHCR to the ongoing development of a UNHCR-specific approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs within the framework of the UN Security Management System,
- ✓ the commitment of UNHCR to develop safety and security measures and approaches tailored to the specific needs of different categories of staff members, e.g. protection officers, protection assistants, drivers, field officers, Representatives, etc.

In order to improve the policy and ensure appropriate linkages between key organizational processes and procedures, the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 2: UNHCR should develop within the framework of the UNHCR Manual a comprehensive chapter on security management which covers policy, methodology, procedures, and guidance.

The Working Group has prepared a first draft of the proposed, new chapter on Security Management, which it is submitting for consideration with this report. The Emergency and Security Service would be responsible for the updating of this Chapter.

UNHCR Security Management Theory and Practice

UNHCR does not have a “Best Practice” approach to security management which has been documented or disseminated within the organization. Field Safety Advisors, however, generally have a consistent approach which they promote on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, experienced field managers who have worked in insecure environments generally share a risk management approach to effective field security management that includes rigorous ongoing assessment of the operating environment, identification of danger and threats in the environment, assessing the likelihood or risk of their occurrence, identifying ways to mitigate risks through both physical security measures and fostering understanding and acceptance of UNHCR’s work among local actors. In effect, UNHCR best practice in security management has involved the application of a risk management approach which supports responsible risk taking by UNHCR staff members as they carry out their work.

What is of concern is that there are no mechanisms or training which provide a vehicle for disseminating (and developing) the UNHCR approach, nor ensuring that UNHCR identifies internal and external best practice in security management.

This is an area where UNHCR clearly can do better; thus the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 3: UNHCR should commit itself to the long-term development of an approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs, and builds on lessons learned and best practice. ESS and DOS should work together to develop this approach.

Recommendation 4: The UNHCR approach to security management should be documented in operational guidance and incorporated into UNHCR Security Training at all levels of the organization.

Mainstreaming Security in Planning and Management

As indicated earlier in the discussion on enhancing security culture, safety and security are not fully mainstreamed in the organizational culture of UNHCR in the sense of having safety and security ingrained in all aspects of UNHCR’s work and activities.

Security is not systematically featuring in our planning and programming documents other than in the Country Operations Plan (COP) as one bullet point under the heading Context and Beneficiary Population and in the Section of the COP dealing with management issues where there is a section in which planners are asked to describe the security situation and safety/health conditions for UNHCR staff and their dependants, and outline measures to be taken to prepare/update evacuation plans and security briefing materials and deliver security-related training. These elements in the COP are not systematically reviewed at Headquarters as part of the Annual ORB prioritization exercise.

While there has been considerable adaptation of programme delivery strategies in operations experiencing significant insecurity, e.g. Afghanistan, this experience has not been documented and lessons drawn in any formal way.

There is a clear need to do more to ensure that security is systematically integrated into UNHCR planning and management processes. An important way of doing this will be to adopt the concept of risk management as a feature of UNHCR's programme and project planning methodology as a standard feature of the way in which UNHCR manages security.

At present there is no common methodology or terminology in use within the organization on risk management. Risk management is, however, implicit in the approach UNHCR takes to programme and project management and there is an inherent understanding of the risk management challenge that managers face among staff. Risk management for UNHCR includes the systematic identification, assessment and mitigation of risks as an integral part of the way UNHCR works. In order to achieve this, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 5: UNHCR should refine its approach to operations management so as to incorporate risk management as a core aspect of the way in which UNHCR plans and manages operations.

Recommendation 6: Current Country Operations Plan, Country Report, Situation Report and Project formats should be modified so as to more effectively integrate security assessment and analysis, risk analysis, risk mitigation and reporting.

Recommendation 7: UNHCR should commit to a Security Mainstreaming Initiative as UNHCR's process for ensuring that safety and security concerns for staff and persons of concern are fully integrated into the planning and management of operations as an essential core component of UNHCR's operational strategy.

For UNHCR, security mainstreaming is:

- An integral part of the normal functions of UNHCR management.
- A planning and management concept which enables UNHCR to maximize the delivery of humanitarian assistance in potentially hazardous environments without exposing staff to an unacceptable, unnecessary or unforeseen level of risk.
- The return of the ownership of security management to mainstream team leaders and their staff, providing them with the necessary capacity, and empowering them to judge each situation on a case-by-case basis on its own merits.
- A process which raises security management to levels similar to Protection or Gender issues within UNHCR, recognizing it as a fundamental element underpinning all operations.
- A comprehensive approach which considers the security implications in all aspects of UNHCR operations planning, and from the earliest stages.
- A dynamic process which enables leaders and staff continuously to re-evaluate and adjust the conduct of operations in the light of changing security environments using a risk management approach which includes the systematic identification, assessment and mitigation of risks .

- A holistic approach and philosophy which assists managers and staff to think through their planning in an iterative manner, producing a balanced reconciliation between humanitarian objectives and essential security.

UNHCR aims to achieve full integration and mainstreaming of security in all aspects of the planning and management of operations through improved and comprehensive security training and operational guidance as well as adaptation and improvement of planning and reporting formats.

UNHCR's Security Organization – the Field Safety Section

The Organizational Development and Management Section (ODMS) was tasked in May 2004 by the Working Group on Security Policy and Policy Implementation to review the structure of the Field Safety Section (FSS). More precisely, ODMS was requested to:

- Identify the roles and functions that FSS is currently performing;
- Identify the roles and functions that FSS should perform in the future;
- Identify alternative design options for the structure of FSS; and
- Recommend a structure for FSS that best fits its role and functions.

The starting point for the analysis regarding FSS's current role and responsibilities was IOM 68/2002–FOM 64/2002 of 26 November 2002 on UNHCR Security Policy and Chapter 2 of UNHCR's Manual. As to the future role and functions of FSS, the analysis was based on the draft recommendations of the Working Group on Security Policy and Policy Implementation. Information was also gathered through personal interviews.

The aim of the review was not to review the current and future skill-sets required for the Section to be able to discharge its responsibilities; however, such a review will be needed in order to ensure that FSS is fully capable of carrying out the role with which it will be tasked in implementing the recommendations of this report. An additional consideration that warrants attention, which was not included in the review, was the placement of FSS within the Headquarters structure.

The review was based on the following basic assumptions:

- UNHCR's approach to security management will be decentralized with primary responsibility for the security of staff members vested in the UNHCR Representative in the Field.
- UNHCR will continue to need a dedicated security organization, the Field Safety Section, and a certain number of international and national security specialists to support managers in managing risk within UNHCR.
- UNHCR will develop a UNHCR-specific Security Management Approach for managing security, which will be documented in operational guidance and incorporated into UNHCR Security Training at all levels of the Organization.
- Everyone in the Organization will be trained in UNHCR's approach and methodology for Security Management.
- Security and safety considerations will be integrated as normal functions of UNHCR operations.

- Security management is seen as everyone's job, with managers at all levels of the organization having a particular responsibility and accountability.

On the basis of the review of the structure and functions of FSS, and taking into account the recommendations of this report, it is proposed that the revised structure for FSS should be based on a two-pronged approach: to re-organize FSS within the Emergency and Security Service at Headquarters in such a way that it is better positioned to meet its current and future challenges and, to strengthen the field capacity of FSS by increasing the number of regional global posts in the Field.

The following changes are proposed to the structure of FSS at Headquarters:

Recommendation 8: Creation of a Training and Policy Development Unit. The main responsibilities of this unit would be to (a) develop further UNHCR's approach to security management, and (b) develop an appropriate security information management system. Policy papers, standard operating procedures and training material would need to be developed accordingly. The unit would also act as a training coordinator: monitoring the training of staff, providing training advice and support to trainers and managers, organizing training and, on occasion, taking part in the delivery of security training. Regular missions to the Field are important for the staff in this unit so that they do not lose touch with the Field.

Recommendation 9: Creation of a "Current Operations Unit". The main role of this unit would be to constantly monitor the changing security situations in the Field and to provide immediate support and advice to the Bureaux, Desks and operations in the Field on safety and security matters that cannot be provided by regional global posts based in the Field. A close link between the "Current Operations Unit" and the Training and Policy Development Unit is required in order to ensure that the queries from the Bureaux and the Field will be reflected in the documents produced by the Training and Policy Development Unit, and that the staff working on the Helpdesk are aware of all new policies and standards and are thus able to answer queries in a comprehensive and consistent manner.

Recommendation 10: Creation of an Administrative Unit. Taking into account the increasing number of administrative/human resources responsibilities that FSS is required to handle, and the enormous amount of time currently devoted to these activities by almost all FSS staff, it is proposed that a small Administrative Unit be created within FSS. This unit would inter alia coordinate the deployment of FSAs in the Field and act as the focal point for all queries regarding specific human resources management issues which are not handled by DHRM.

Recommendation 11: Outposted FSAs. A team of outposted FSAs will still be required to support operations with very specific and serious security concerns. However, it is recommended that the procedures for their deployment be clarified and made clear to Representatives prior to any further deployment.

Recommendation 12: Depending on the final recommendations of the Working Group and the workload that will be placed on FSS as a result of the implementation of these recommendations, it is further recommended that the need for a Deputy post and an Executive Assistant post be reviewed at a later stage.

Recommendation 13: Strengthening the field capacity of FSS through increasing the number of regional global posts in the Field. Currently FSS has three Senior Regional Field Safety Advisors in the Field, two in Africa and one in Asia. Their primary responsibilities are to support the mainstreaming efforts through provision of advice and support, delivery of training, capacity building and awareness raising. Ideally, in order to ensure that the mainstreaming efforts can be carried out in an equal and consistent manner all over the world and that the new Security Management Approach can be effectively implemented in the Field, it is recommended that this number be increased. At a minimum, this would mean increasing the number of Senior Regional Field Safety Advisor posts from the current three to some six or seven.

Security Training

A key means for achieving a stronger culture of security within UNHCR will be training and learning. To date, there have been a number of accomplishments in security training, foremost amongst which is the creation of the Basic Security in the Field CD Rom which was accepted as a UN System-wide training tool. Other accomplishments include the delivery of staff development workshops for Field Safety Advisors and Field Safety Assistants in 2002 and 2003 respectively. The Field Safety Section in cooperation with the Staff Development Section developed a series of Action Learning³ Modules in 2001- 2002, and the piloted use of these modules in 2002 in three countries. In addition, the UNHCR eCentre has organized five day Basic Safety and Security Training Workshops in 2002, 2003 and will do so again in 2004. ESS and the eCentre will organize a Security Management Seminar for Senior Managers in July. FSS also has plans for an additional Senior Security Management Workshop in Africa later in the year. A security module will be included in the Protection Learning Programme and security is being integrated in the revised Management Learning Programme. Other training which is being carried out by individual FSAs is not always reported or tracked.

³ Action Learning is a process for bringing together UNHCR teams (and as appropriate partners) to analyse an actual security-related work problem and develop an action plan for addressing the issue. The team continues to meet as actions are implemented, learning from the implementation and making mid-course corrections.

While these efforts are important it is clear that UNHCR should develop comprehensive security training for staff members that better prepares them for security conditions in the Field and supports the continuous strengthening of a culture of security within UNHCR. The Working Group recommends that:

Recommendation 14: UNHCR should commit to a multi-year effort to develop comprehensive security training for UNHCR staff members, which complements UNSECOORD training.

Recommendation 15: Security training in UNHCR should combine basic training for all staff members in the Field and at Headquarters with targeted training based on job categories.

Recommendation 16: Security Management Training should be mandatory for all Heads of Offices; this training should be organized as a first priority. Security focal points are an additional priority target audience for training.

Recommendation 17: UNHCR should provide situation-specific security training for new operations which should include political and cultural orientation as well as briefing and security advice on the specific security situation in the country concerned.

Recommendation 18: All staff members deployed into Phase Three Security conditions or above should complete, at a minimum, a security course comparable to the training provided in the Workshop for Emergency Managers and the eCentre Basic Security courses.

Recommendation 19: In order to provide a foundation for these learning and training programmes, FSS and SDS should together carry out a comprehensive security learning needs assessment.

Responsibility for development of Security Training and Learning Programmes in UNHCR is a shared responsibility between the Field Safety Section and the Staff Development Section.

All Field Safety Advisors are by definition security trainers and facilitators of learning. The Working Group recommends that all FSAs should be trained in the use of Action Learning. The Working Group recommends that:

Recommendation 20: All Field Safety Advisors should be trained in the use of Action Learning Methodology as their standard means of providing security training.

The United Nations, UNHCR, and Terrorism

The threat of terrorist attacks on the United Nations in general, or targeting UNHCR in particular, poses a serious and difficult problem for UNHCR. As the threat is invisible and not geographically circumscribed, it is difficult to ascertain the level of threat in any given location. It is also difficult to ascertain UNHCR's vulnerability; however, UNHCR's

involvement in urban refugee programmes does in theory heighten the risk to UNHCR staff members.

The United Nations at present does not have a means for assessing the likelihood of a terrorist attack, and is thus largely reliant on open source information. Neither UNSECOORD nor FSS have provided any guidance to country offices on how to take the terrorist threat into account in their own security procedures, other than to remain vigilant and to ensure all “appropriate” security measures have been put in place. The key issue is to determine what the “appropriate” security measures are. The Regional Office in Jakarta and the Regional FSA have been particularly proactive on this issue, and there would be value in examining their experience and the measures they have put in place and using their experience as a basis for the development of operational guidance.

UNHCR has acknowledged in documents to the Executive Committee that UNHCR as part of the United Nations is the potential target of terrorist attack. Work has begun at Headquarters in terms of improved physical security in response to a perceived terrorist threat.

FSS does contact at-risk country offices on an ad hoc basis when it receives public warnings (typically US or UK travel advisories of increased terrorist threat levels) and provides advice on security measures for UNHCR within the framework of the country Security Management Team.

This is a difficult issue for UNHCR. We can expect that as part of the larger change management process on security management within the UN that a strengthened analytical unit within the new UN Security Management Organization will be established that may provide support and guidance on this. It is also clear that regardless of whether there is a centralized analytical capacity that can more effectively identify the threat of a terrorist attack on the United Nations, integration of that threat into the security analysis and the elaboration of appropriate security measures, will essentially be a country-level task.

Much more work will be required in coming to terms with the current terrorist threat to the United Nations, and by implication, to UNHCR. At this stage, the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 21: The Field Safety Section should develop operational guidance for Field Offices where there is the threat of terrorist attack in terms of “appropriate” security measures. This guidance should be incorporated into security training.

Recommendation 22: The Regional Office Jakarta’s experience and the efforts made there should be evaluated as part of the effort to develop such guidance.

Staff-Management Interaction on Security

Staff-management interaction on security matters is largely unstudied within the organization. The survey done as part of the work of the Steering Committee on Security Policy is the first organization-wide effort undertaken in this area. The results of the survey on the issue of management’s concern for the well-being of staff members are seen as being positive in that

the majority of respondents indicated that UNHCR managers are concerned about security and are taking appropriate measures to ensure the safety of staff. Security review missions in Afghanistan in late 2003 and early 2004 suggested, however, that there is a considerable need for better communication on security issues, particularly in situations of high insecurity.

There is also recognition among managers consulted as part of the review of the Working Group that the absence of rules and training for managers means that staff-management interaction on security is very ad hoc and subject to personalities. There is a general recognition among staff members surveyed as part of this review that there is a need for more frequent opportunities to discuss security concerns, particularly in situations of high insecurity.

While the United Nations' Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) approach provides a basic framework for security measures, there is still considerable ambiguity with respect to what constitutes reasonable and appropriate decision-making and behaviour with respect to security. In particular there is ambiguity as to the standards by which individuals will be judged in the event a staff member is hurt or killed due to insecurity. This ambiguity can lead to overly risk-averse behaviour. The concept of due diligence may be a useful addition to UNHCR's approach to security management. Due diligence refers to the level of judgement, care, prudence, determination, and activity that a person would reasonably be expected to carry out under particular circumstances. Applied to security management, "due diligence" means that UNHCR and its managers take all reasonable precautions, under the particular circumstances, to prevent harm to staff members. Application of the concept of due diligence can be seen as both preventive in the sense of helping to ensure that all "reasonable" security measures and preparations have been taken as well as "protective" in the sense of providing security to the supervisor in the event that staff members are injured or killed that his or her actions or inactions can be defended on the basis of "reasonable" standards.

The current system of Security Focal Points within the organization is too loose and unstructured. Terms of reference for this position do not exist, nor has training or operational guidance as yet been provided. It is also unclear whether security focal point positions should be established at the sub and field office levels. A key aspect of the role of the Security Focal point is to ensure effective communication within the Office on security matters. This is clearly a weakness in UNHCR's current approach to security. In order to improve the quality of staff-management interaction on security, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 23: The concept of due diligence should be researched and its potential application explored as a complementary and positive new aspect of UNHCR's approach to security management.

Recommendation 24: All offices (at branch/sub/field levels) should have a security focal point regardless of whether a Field Safety Advisor is present or not. A key task of the Security Focal Point is to facilitate sharing of security information.

Recommendation 25: Senior Managers should participate in security assessments and view security assessments and security measure planning as a participatory exercise in which all staff should play a role.

Recommendation 26: A key element in the envisioned Senior Management Training Programme for Managers recommended elsewhere in this report should be a significant component on staff-management interaction on security issues and the importance of effective leadership of and care for teams in relation to security.

Recommendation 27: As part of this effort, operational guidance should be developed which can support managers and staff in creating effective interaction and cooperation.

Recommendation 28: In field situations in which a Security Phase is in effect, at a minimum a weekly security meeting at both the branch and sub/field office levels must be organized so that security information can be shared and discussed.

Security of National Staff Members

While both United Nations and UNHCR security policies recognize no fundamental distinction between national and international staff members and expect that both categories of staff will be fully integrated into the security management system, there is a continuing perception among many staff members of the UN Security Management System being a two-class system with different standards for international and national staff members. This perception stems largely from situations in which international staff members are evacuated and national staff members left behind, often with an implicit or stated expectation that they will continue to work.

UNHCR's Security Policy, paragraph 7.2 states that "In instances where entitlements vary among staff members, such as in the case of evacuation, planning should take into account the differences and provide reasonable measures for ensuring the safety of all: e.g. establishing procedures for national staff after an evacuation and providing for continuous contact and advice." This paragraph would benefit from more explicit guidance on what constitutes "reasonable measures".

There has been, in the Working Group's view, enormous untapped capacity within national staff members in security management. The vast majority of national staff members are dedicated and of high quality. They also, of course, have opinions and concerns on the security measures the United Nations is implementing and how UNHCR is managing security. They are keen to contribute to improved security management. They also have concrete suggestions for improving the system, but don't necessarily see ways in which they can put these ideas forward. The challenge for UNHCR is to find ways to tap this potential.

Situations in which international staff members are evacuated are the most difficult for UNHCR to manage. In most cases, national staff members are largely ready and willing to undertake responsibility for continued implementation, assuming it is sufficiently safe for them to do so, but at present there is no systematic preparation of national staff for such contingencies.

UN Security Policy limits relocation/evacuation of national staff members outside their country to only the most exceptional cases in which their security endangered, or their

property lost or damaged as a direct consequence of their employment with the United Nations. UNSECOORD has outlined the measures that can and should be undertaken to support national staff members. This information should be disseminated to all UNHCR managers in duty stations where there is a security phase and be made available on the intranet.

With respect to the security of national staff members, the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 29: Given the significant untapped potential within national staff members and managers that can be utilized to strengthen the UNHCR Security Management, UNHCR should consider the formation of “security advisory groups” among national staff members who would work closely with the security focal point on security matters.

Recommendation 30: As part of the security contingency planning process, national staff members should be prepared and trained to assume emergency functions of offices and operations in the event of evacuation of international staff members, and structures should be in place so that they get appropriate support.

Recommendation 31: UNHCR managers should be aware of the full range of measures available to support national staff members in situations of insecurity, in particular in situations in which international staff members are being evacuated.

Recommendation 32: Within the framework of the UN Security Management System, and as needed for its own staff, UNHCR should develop clearer guidelines with regard to the evacuation of national staff members.

Recommendation 33: Targeted training for national staff members in job categories where insecurity is an important feature of their work (protection assistants, drivers, field assistants, etc.) should be developed as part of UNHCR’s commitment to enhanced security training.

Security and Gender

Very little explicit policy exists either within UNHCR or within the UN Security Management System on the gender dimension of security. Nor has much work been done on the specific security needs of women. This is an area that the Working Group believes needs priority attention, and thus recommends that:

Recommendation 34: FSS should develop specific policy, procedures and guidelines on the specific security needs of women.

Recommendation 35: UNHCR should consider the formation of women's security groups at the branch and sub-office levels to promote dialogue on security issues of concern to female staff members, both national and international, in situations of significant insecurity.

Security Information Management within UNHCR Operations

Effective information management is vital to effective security management. In spite of the recognition and importance given to security information management in UNHCR's current security policy, little work has been done to date to ensure effective security information management or to develop a security information system. The same is true for the United Nations as a whole. This is in spite of the fact that it is widely recognized that in the absence of effective analysis, it is extremely difficult to ensure that security management decisions are well-informed. As a result, the current situation can be characterized as follows:

- The current approach to security information management is ad hoc as there are no standard definitions, rules or procedures in place. As a consequence reporting on security incidents and threats is irregular. In addition, there are no procedures in place to ensure that after-incident analysis takes place.
- There is considerable reporting on the security that takes place, but it is ad hoc and irregular, and does not lend itself to systematic analysis.
- Field operations tend to develop their own rules and procedures, but there is little consistency from operation to operation.
- Dissemination and sharing of information at all levels of the organization in both Headquarters and the Field is inconsistent. Security information may be reported to Bureaus/ Desk, but it may not be systematically reported to FSS.
- As with most information within operations, the tendency is for information to flow upward to senior managers but far less information flows downward and horizontally.
- As a result of lack of systematic gathering of data and information, analysis of security information is particularly weak resulting in little decision support for managers.
- Rules and procedures for sharing of threat information are unclear and ambiguous.
- As a consequence, there is no systematic analysis of security incident trends incidents involving UNHCR staff members, which in effect means that UNHCR cannot say with any degree of certainty that its security risk mitigation measures are having the intended effect.
- There are no current requirements for threats and risk assessments undertaken in the field to be shared with Headquarters.
- Even though there is an incident database at FSS, it is not used to the full potential: there is no comparison with the number of incidents involving other agencies, NGOs, nor any cost benefit analysis.
- The Standard Reporting Formats for Security shared with Field Safety Advisors in 2002 are useful starting point, but these formats were not shared beyond Field Safety Advisors.

A key aspect of security information management is the role of data and information in supporting effective analysis of the security environment and security risk management. At

present UNHCR does not have a standard approach or methodology for the analysis of the security environment for operations. At the same time management of risks is a core element in all programme management processes and is at the centre of the United Nations' approach to staff safety. What UNHCR has at present are informal processes very much grounded in the individual experience of managers. It is clear that UNHCR can do better. The United Nations has recently developed a Security Risk Management model to support more effective threat and vulnerability assessment in the light of planned operational activities. This new model presents an opportunity for UNHCR to strengthen the skills of its managers in security risk management.

There are other ways UNHCR can strengthen the capacity of UNHCR teams to gather and analyse security information. These include making more effective use of public information and improved use of geographic information and mapping. Consideration should also be given to the development of location-specific data-bases and tracking systems (in addition to a centralized system at Headquarters) for incidents or accidents directly and indirectly involving UNHCR staff members and its implementing partners. ICRC's work in this area provides a useful model from which UNHCR can learn.

As is obvious, there is considerable work to be done on the issue of security information management. Work on security information management should be seen as part of the ongoing effort within the organization to manage information more effectively within operations; thus there is a clear need for cooperation between ESS, DOS and the Bureaux in this area. UNHCR also needs to actively participate in, contribute to and benefit from efforts within the UN system to improve information management and analysis. In order to improve the situation, the Working Group recommends that:

Recommendation 36: Within the framework of UNHCR's effort to manage data and information more effectively, UNHCR should develop a security information management system which will support security management. Such a system will ultimately provide software support for inputting, collating and organizing data so as to provide selective data and reports to management, and support analyses of trends so as to assist in security management.

Recommendation 37: UNHCR should establish closer linkages between Public Information and security in order to take advantage of Public Information's links with journalists and monitoring of the local media, as well as to improve understanding of public perceptions of the United Nations and, if appropriate, devise strategies for helping enhance public acceptance of UNHCR's role.

Recommendation 38: More effective use should be made of geographic information and mapping in security management including integration of geographic information into UNHCR's security information management system.

Recommendation 39: UNHCR should embrace UNSECOORD's new Security Risk Management Model as an opportunity to strengthen UNHCR's

own capacity to analyse and respond to situations of insecurity. As a priority, UNHCR field managers should be trained in UNSECOORD's new Security Risk Management Model.

Security Resource Management (human/ financial resources)

Field Safety Advisors

UNHCR continues to experience serious problems in the personnel management of Field Safety Advisors. These problems include unsatisfactory conditions of service, high levels of attrition much of it related to UNSECOORD recruitment of UNHCR FSAs, difficulty in determining what would constitute an appropriate overall number of FSAs, lack of criteria for creation of posts, difficulty in managing the rotation of FSAs, and difficulty in establishing surge capacity to respond to new situations of insecurity where FSAs are needed. There are also problems with the utilization of outposted FSAs who are administratively assigned to Geneva but who can be posted to any field locations where security needs are deemed to be of a high priority. For these FSAs there are no agreed rules as to length of deployment. Current Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) policy requires UNSECOORD clearance of FSA candidates, a practice that is both bureaucratic and inflexible, and inevitably constrains UNHCR's ability to choose candidates that respond to the organization's specific needs.

All of these problems require urgent attention. To address the situation, the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 40: The Field Safety Section should become directly responsible for the recruitment and posting of FSAs and centrally manage their deployment in close consultation with Bureaux and Representatives in the field.

Recommendation 41: UNHCR should adopt the following principles for determining whether an FSA is needed in a particular situation:

- a. In principle, an FSA should not be needed if managers are trained and have demonstrated competence in security management and if security has been integrated and mainstreamed into all aspects of the operation.
- b. Provision of security expertise is viewed as a time-limited intervention. The nature of the intervention increases depending on the degree of insecurity in the situation, and can range from time-limited support missions providing training and establishing systems, to the creation of national FSA posts or time-limited international FSA posts.
- c. All FSA posts in the field are subject to a yearly review.
- d. International Field Safety Advisor posts are posts that are also part of a pool of security experts who are deployed in response to situations of insecurity in the field where time-limited support is needed. Unlike other posts which fall within the staffing table of field offices, all international Field Safety Advisors posted to a place of duty will be

automatically considered in the same category as members of an ERT; that is, eligible for 2-3 month emergency deployment. Decision on redeployment of an FSA will be made by ESS, in principle in consultation with the line manager concerned, but will ultimately based upon global security needs. However, an FSA will not be called upon to undertake such an emergency deployment more than once in a 365-day cycle.

Recommendation 42: UNHCR should develop criteria for determining whether an FSA is needed. The bases for such criteria are reflected in the following questions:

- a. Is there persistent and sustained insecurity in the situation as a result of armed conflict or other threats?
- b. Is there armed conflict in a neighbouring country that is likely to spill over into areas where refugees and UNHCR are present?
- c. Is there direct targeting of humanitarian workers?
- d. Is the situation new and as a result security risk assessment and the elaboration of a security risk management strategy, procedures and rules are not yet complete?
- e. Have the managers and staff in place not yet received appropriate security training?

Recommendation 43: UNHCR should reach agreement with UNSECOORD and the IASMN to discontinue submitting FSA candidates for approval while maintaining a commitment to maintaining agreed standards on qualifications.

Recommendation 44: Conditions of service for newly created FSAs should be improved by awarding all FSAs who successfully complete an initial 3 or 6-month probationary period at least 1-year contacts thereafter, and, if necessary, ESS should maintain a fund enabling it to ensure financing of these contracts even when a country programme/desk/bureau has not committed to the presence of that FSA post over the coming year.

In order to respond to new situations of insecurity, UNHCR is able to call upon additional FSAs through standby arrangements with partners and through its pool of five “outposted” FSAs who are administratively assigned in Geneva but who can be outposted to any field locations where security needs are deemed to be of a high priority.

Experience has shown that the standby arrangements for FSAs and the outposted FSA pool are not always sufficient, and redeployment of existing FSAs is sometimes required. As the number of FSAs available is limited, it is necessary to re-deploy within the region, or in between regions, to other locations if there are more urgent needs.

With respect to the redeployment of FSAs to respond to new situations of insecurity, the Working Group recommends the following procedure be adopted:

Recommendation 45: The Field Safety Section will have overall responsibility for this prioritization task. FSS will consult closely with concerned Bureaux and Representatives in the field in carrying out redeployments. In the event FSS and a Bureau/Representative cannot agree on a proposed redeployment, the matter will be referred to the AHC for final decision. In all instances, redeployment of FSAs from existing posts will not be for more than three months.

Financial Management

In recent years UNHCR has significantly increased its expenditure on security and has introduced measures to ensure that sufficient resources are available for security. The most important innovation in this regard has been the introduction of the Regional Security Budgets in December 2001. The Regional Security ABODs serve as an effective contingency reserve for responding to new situations of insecurity. They have been essential in helping to ensure UNHCR's compliance in meeting Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS). The Regional Security ABODs are not used, however, to fund security officer posts, and for operations with limited budgets, this represents a serious problem.

Budgeting for security costs has proven more problematic due to the fact that many security costs involve dual use objects of expenditure. There are of course clearly identifiable, direct security costs such as Field Safety Advisors, Security Guards, Malicious Acts Insurance (MAIP), and UNSECOORD cost-sharing, but other costs such as communications, building enhancements, transport, and others are more difficult to discriminate as they are essentially dual use. For example, telecommunications is essential to effective security management but it is also essential to coordination and day-to-day management of operations. Is it useful to attempt to apportion a security percentage to such objects of expenditure?

Where it is possible to clearly identify security costs is when it is necessary to enhance security through improvements in physical protection measures as a result of new insecurity and changing Minimum Operating Security Standards. It is more difficult to anticipate these costs in advance, and thus the need for a contingency reserve.

Recent efforts to get field operations to budget for and report on security costs comprehensively have not worked due to the difficult in dealing with dual-use objects of expenditure. Thus, UNHCR is able to budget for and track clearly discrete line items such as FSA costs, UNSECOORD and MAIP costs, and use of Regional Security ABODs, but estimates of other security costs have proven unworkable. At issue is whether it would be useful to develop a formula for apportioning security costs for dual use items. It is useful to compare the United Nations' approach to security budgeting which aims to identify all security costs with that of ICRC. ICRC does not have security budgets. They integrate security costs into their overall operational budgets and see these costs as the price of doing business.

The Working Group believes that UNHCR should adopt a policy on the budgeting of security costs that, to the fullest extent possible, attempts to integrate and not separate security costs in separate budget lines. This applies in particular to dual use objects of expenditure such as telecommunications, building improvements, supplies and equipment. For discrete and direct security costs, these should be budgeted for and reported upon. These include contracting of

security firms for office security, residential security costs, and UN Security Management System cost-sharing at the country level. UNHCR also budgets for and tracks expenditure for UNSECOORD and Malicious Acts Insurance.

With respect to the financial management of security, the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 46: The Regional Security ABODs serve as an effective contingency reserve for responding to new situations of insecurity and should be maintained.

Recommendation 47: UNHCR's policy on the budgeting of security costs should be, to the fullest extent possible, to integrate and not separate security costs in separate budget lines. This applies in particular to dual-use objects of expenditure such as telecommunications, building improvements, supplies and equipment. There are, however, discrete security costs which should be budgeted for and reported upon. These include contracting of security firms for office security and residential security.

Security and Telecommunications

Telecommunications play an essential role in security by facilitating the transmission of information and notifications, the monitoring and checking of movement in the field, giving warnings of deterioration in the situation, and supporting crisis management by linking managers in different locations.

In recent years, UNHCR has under-invested in Information and Communications Technology in recent years, in particular in establishing a cadre of skilled technicians and operators who can move rapidly into new emergency situations. As a result of this under-investment, UNHCR has consistently performed poorly in the telecommunications sector in recent emergencies.

In conclusion, Telecoms is generally well resourced to provide the equipment needs of the field but chronically under-resourced so far as the complementary provision of fully skilled, UNHCR-experienced, manpower is concerned.

Recommendation 48: UNHCR should commit to substantially increased investment in Information and Communications Technology so as to achieve the best possible Information and Communications Technology networks in field operations beginning at the emergency stage as a key element in UNHCR's security management strategy. A key element in improving UNHCR's performance in telecommunications will be to increase the number of telecoms technicians and operators.

Recommendation 49: UNHCR should fund the ITTS RapITT proposal for establishing a rapid response pool of telecommunications operators and technicians as a matter of priority.

Recommendation 50: UNHCR should also explore closer cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP) on telecommunications, given WFP's role as a common service provider of Information and Communications Technology.

Use and Management of Security Expertise

While no comprehensive study of how UNHCR managers and staff are making use of our FSA and FSA assistants, the results of the Working Group's survey of FSA and anecdotal evidence from FSAs themselves highlight a number of positive elements and problem areas where improvement is needed. On the positive side, the majority of FSAs in the field report positive levels of involvement of on and appropriate consultation with senior managers on security matters.

On the negative side, a number of problems remain including:

- Uneven integration of FSAs and FSA Assistants in operations planning and management processes;
- A tendency to see FSAs as a technical expert responsible for the Security "sector" rather than as an Advisor;
- In the worst case, FSAs are seen as senior guards and senior drivers and working as close protection for the representative.

Managers, staff members and the FSAs themselves share a perception that the most important tasks the FSAs carry out are not in administering UNHCR's response to UN Security System Requirements in terms of movement control, monitoring staff ceilings, overseeing the work of national staff members, etc. These tasks were acknowledged to be important, but what managers and staff value most from their FSAs, both international and national is direct advice on security, undertaking security assessments, building information networks, training participating in planning and monitoring activities, and providing situational analysis and risk management support. FSAs also play an important role in investigations, refugee security, technical assistance to camp-based police and the need to set up refugee warden and community policing systems. FSAs can and should be an important element in UNHCR's protection capacity at the field level.

There is also a clear opportunity to make more effective use of national security staff members in particular in terms of supporting more effective security situation analysis. Not only are national staff members less expensive than internationals, but they are not subject to qualification screening by UNSECOORD thus providing UNHCR with the opportunity to draw on a broader range of backgrounds and profiles.

The November 2000 report "Enhancing Staff Security" recommended that in order "to balance current profile and job description of field security personnel with analytical skills; furthermore to rename 'Field Safety Advisor' (FSA) to 'Field Safety Officer' (FSO)." The Working Group considers this recommendation still valid; however, the Group recommends the title be Field Security Officer rather than Field Safety Officer. Such a change is consistent with the effort to further develop a culture of security within UNHCR as well as conveying a connotation of greater authority on the individual concerned.

UNHCR has not produced any explicit guidance to managers on how to make the most effective use of FSAs and FSA Assistants beyond what is included in the UNHCR Security Policy. To improve the current situation, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 51: The Field Safety Section should develop guidelines for managers on the use of security expertise.

Recommendation 52: Field Safety Advisors/Field Security Officers should concentrate on value-added tasks of undertaking security assessments, training, building of information networks, information and reporting systems development, participation in planning, and risk management support to managers.

Recommendation 53: UNHCR should explore making more effective use of national Field Safety Assistant positions. Rather than drawing solely on the standard profile of ex-military or ex-police, UNHCR should explore identification of candidates who have university degrees and field experience with proven analytical and writing skills that can support improved security analysis. These candidates would necessarily require training in the UN Security Management System as well as basic security management.

Recommendation 54: The title of Field Safety Advisors should be changed to Field Security Officers and the name of Field Safety Section to the Field Security Section.

UNHCR and the UN Security Management System

UNHCR's Security Policy states that "UNHCR is an active member of the common UN security system, complying with established guidelines, sharing information and contributing recommendations to improve overall security management". UNHCR has complied with the letter and spirit of this policy both at Headquarters and the Field.

There has been and continues to be tension in the relationship between UNHCR and UNSECOORD on matters of policy at the Headquarters level. Working relations at the field level tend to be generally pragmatic and effective though there is tension there as well, particularly when the system at the country level is seen as unresponsive and bureaucratic. The tension at the policy level has tended to arise out of UNHCR's efforts to see the development of a UN Security Management System which is more responsive to the needs, capacity and resources of individual agencies such as UNHCR. UNSECOORD, having to respond to the needs of a broad range of UN agencies, tends to prioritize uniformity and standard approaches. The reality for UNHCR is that it cannot easily opt out of the UN Security Management System, though in theory the option is available. As a consequence, UNHCR has to do a better job of building alliances within the United Nations for its position on how the system should evolve. This is particularly important given the reform process underway under the leadership of the Deputy Security General which will lead to the creation

of a Department of Security which combines UNSECOORD with the UN Security and Safety Service and will create a strengthened, centralized UN security organization.

UNHCR's current security policy provides insufficient clarity regarding UNHCR's own development of a UNHCR security management approach and system within the framework of the UN System.

For example, should UNHCR view the UN Security Management System as a common service which will ultimately meet all of UNHCR's security management needs? To some extent that has been our approach as we often argue that we create FSA posts in the deep field as UNSECOORD/ FSCOs are not present there. Do we need to retain our own approach and internal resources to meet HCR specific needs or do we push the system to respond to our needs and refrain from building internal UNHCR-specific approaches, procedures and resources?

The analysis earlier in this report, the day-to-day experience of UNHCR in field operations, and managerial accountability for the security of staff members demand that UNHCR needs to both engage more effectively in the common UN Security Management System and continue to develop its own approach and practice. As has been seen in the event of deaths of staff members due to insecurity in West Timor, Indonesia, Guinea and Afghanistan, accountability rests with UNHCR management and pushing that accountability onto the common UN Security Management System is neither feasible or acceptable. To improve the current situation, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 55: UNHCR should seek more proactively to influence the development of a UN Security Management System which recognizes the specific and unique needs of UNHCR and that provides the space for UNHCR to develop its own system and approach within the over-arching framework of the UN System. An important part of this effort is to build closer alliances on security management with WFP, UNICEF, and OCHA.

Recommendation 56: As recommended earlier in the report, UNHCR should commit itself to the long-term development of an approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs, and builds on lessons learned and best practice.

Security Management and UNHCR's Implementing and Operational Partners

UNHCR's policy on security for implementing and operational partners is contained in Paragraph 7.3 of the UNHCR Security Policy. The paragraph states: "UNHCR recognizes an obligation to assist in the safety of collaborating non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly implementing partners. Offices should seek to help them achieve the same level of field safety for their personnel as UNHCR has put in place for its staff, to the extent allowable by mandate and capacity. This begins with open communication and information sharing on safety matters: the recommended means of achieving this is a local security network headed by an NGO security focal point, as articulated in the Inter-agency Standing Committee guidelines for security collaboration between the United Nations and NGOs.

Cooperation may also include UNHCR logistic and administrative assistance. UNHCR should inform collaborating NGOs of the security guidelines in place for its own staff and encourage their adoption by the NGOs as a matter of prudence, while respecting their right of final decision. Similarly, safety planning, including evacuation measures, should account for NGOs as far as it is logistically and financially feasible, permitted by administrative and host-country rules and desired by the individual NGO.”

The policy provides appropriate high-level guidance on security and safety support for collaborating NGOs, especially implementing partners, but there are a number of areas of ambiguity in its application. These include the following:

- How should a team on the ground apply the qualifying phrase “to the extent allowable by mandate and capacity”?
- How much support on security costs should UNHCR provide within the context of its contribution in project agreements to NGO overhead costs?
- Should distinctions be made between international and national partners?
- What kind of collaboration on security should be pursued with government implementing partners?
- How far should UNHCR go in supporting partners who are receiving funding from a variety of sources besides UNHCR?
- Should UN MOSS standards serve as a benchmark?

Of particular concern is the fact that this policy statement has not been integrated into UNHCR programme procedures as reflected in Chapter 4 of the UNHCR Manual or for partners. For example, the otherwise excellent “Partnership: An Operations Management Handbook” for UNHCR’s partners makes no mention of safety and security in spite of being updated in 2003.

While the current policy states that UNHCR recognizes its responsibility to do so, it does not explain the rationale for why UNHCR should collaborate closely with and support implementing and operational partners on security matters. The rationale is that close collaboration with our partners represents enlightened self-interest. By collaborating closely, UNHCR extends its security information network thus helping to ensure UNHCR staff security. Close collaboration also provides a potential means for implementation in situations of high insecurity when it may be necessary for UNHCR to withdraw but NGO partners may still be able to operate.

With respect to field security collaboration with implementing and operational partners, the Working Group recommends the following:

Recommendation 57: UNHCR should revise its current policy on field security collaboration with implementing and operational partners to more clearly reflect the organization’s commitment to close and effective collaboration with its implementing and operational partners on security.

Recommendation 58: A key element of the revised policy should be UNHCR’s commitment to work within the framework of the IASC Guidelines on Field Security Collaboration.

Recommendation 59: The revised policy should be incorporated into Chapter 4 of the UNHCR Manual and UNHCR's Partnership Guidelines, sub-project agreements, and the annual programming instructions.

Security and Stress

Insecurity creates stress and stress can lead to insecurity. Whether as the result of prolonged presence working in insecure environments or as a result of exposure to a life threatening situation, stress is inevitable. The challenge for UNHCR is to ensure that it has the right response mechanisms in place in order to ensure that staff members get the support they need in a timely manner, and that staff members are not left working in conditions in which the stress they experience can weaken their judgment, lead to burnout or lead to reckless behaviour.

Over the years UNHCR has steadily increased its concern about the welfare of its staff members and has taken steps to improve their well-being. Many of the measures taken have been in direct response to the insecurity in the environment in which UNHCR must operate. The awareness of the link between security and stress dates back to the late 1980s, while the operation in the Balkans and Somalia in the early 1990s brought to light very specific concerns related to post-traumatic stress reactions resulting from security incidents. Much has been done to raise awareness about post-traumatic stress and to demythologize the model of a strong and fearless humanitarian worker.

Among the positive developments in terms of staff welfare are the inclusion of staff welfare in the management learning programme, emergency preparedness training, FSA training, induction and pre-deployment orientation. Today, UNHCR has 5 full-time professional counselling positions. The establishment of the 96-member Peer Support Personnel Network (in Africa, Asia, CASWANAME and Central and South America) is another important achievement.

There is also much more pre-deployment briefing being done. UNHCR has produced a brochure "Managing Stress of Humanitarian Emergencies" in English and French, and a self-help guide "Traumatic Stress Reactions" in English, French and Spanish.

In spite of these achievements, there is more that can be done to ensure that UNHCR is appropriately meeting its "duty of care" for staff well-being. To help improve the situation, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 60: Given the increasingly volatile working environment, UNHCR should review the existing career path and analyze whether a specific category of "highly risky assignment" should be introduced. Such assignments should have very specific selection criteria (with option of using psychometric tools), specific all-inclusive insurance policy, specific security, health and welfare training, specific incentives (not monetary but time out or specific early retirement options) and maximum amount of time allowed to serve in such situations.

Recommendation 61: UNHCR should better integrate staff welfare issues in the operational planning and day-to-day management of UNHCR. In the broadest sense this means that managers/leaders are sensitive to the welfare issues and able to identify them and ask for help for dealing with them. More specifically, this could relate to the early inclusion of staff welfare issues in the management of a concrete emergency.

Recommendation 62: From the earliest stages of emergencies, UNHCR should ensure that operational planning includes an assessment of living and working conditions and that these recommendations are implemented in the very first phase of an operation.

Recommendation 63: The Field Safety Section and the Staff Welfare Section should coordinate their work more closely, and ensure better integration and sharing of security-related information, particularly in relation to security incidents, undertake joint missions, and strengthen FSA capacity in medical and psychological first aid .

Recommendation 64: The system of welfare-related pre-deployment and post-deployment debriefing should be strengthened not only as a mechanism for supporting staff well-being but also as a tool for organizational learning.

Recommendation 65: UNHCR should consider, as part of its management development efforts, the development of a Leadership programme that would include a focus on care of teams and motivational leadership, emotional intelligence, handling group dynamics, rather than only focusing on operational management.

Recommendation 66: UNHCR should consider the establishment of a bi-annual stress survey as a means of eliciting feedback on the overall well-being of staff members.

Recommendation 67: UNHCR should identify staff members who are/have been particularly or regularly exposed to highly stress-provoking situations including violent beneficiaries, tragic family histories, and long working hours, and should ensure that measures are in place to provide appropriate support and relief from the stressful conditions in which these staff are working.

Recommendation 68: UNHCR should develop a mechanism whereby staff members are provided with all relevant information with regard to a possible deployment, thus allowing staff members to make an informed decision on accepting deployment to a specific area in keeping with Principle #5 of the Code of Conduct.

Security Management and Human Resources Policy

As part of its review, the Working Group has initiated an effort to review Human Resources policy from a security perspective. Given the limited time frame in which the Working Group is operating, it is not possible to complete this review. The need for such a review is self-evident if UNHCR is to strengthen its security culture. Foremost among the changes needed is to incorporate security into the performance appraisal system and to use competence in security management as a criterion for selection and promotion of managers. In crisis situations in which insecurity is significant, given the importance of having international staff members with specific, in-depth knowledge of the local environment, in addition to the knowledge that national staff members can provide, there is a need to explore ways in which such expertise can be made available. There is also a need to examine structure and staffing levels in offices experiencing significant insecurity. With respect to Security Management and Human Resources Policy, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 69: UNHCR should continue the review of human resources policy from a security perspective and ensure that security awareness, compliance and competence are fully integrated in aspects of UNHCR's Human Resources Policy.

Recommendation 70: As a priority UNHCR should integrate security into the performance appraisal system for all staff members, and use competence in security management as a criterion for selection and promotion.

Relations with Governments and Non-Traditional Actors on Security

As highlighted earlier in this report, global conflict and instability, banditry and criminality, and modern terrorism, combined with an eroded perception of neutrality and even a belief by some that the United Nations is a legitimate target, pose serious challenges to UNHCR's ability to fulfil its mandate while ensuring the safety of its staff. These challenges are complicated by the fact that in many of the countries in which UNHCR needs to operate, there is deep scepticism about the role of the United Nations.

For example, a recent report of the CASWANAME Bureau on a recent Strategic Review of UNHCR's Operations in North Africa and the Middle East highlighted the following overarching trends in these regions:

- There is mounting distrust among governments and people in the North Africa and Middle East Region in relation to the United Nations. This distrust, together with the perception of the United Nations' close association with Western international powers, has been greatly exacerbated by the war in Iraq;
- The dominance of national security concerns around the world, as well as what is perceived in the Arab world as an increasing "Islamophobia" in the West, presents a major challenge for humanitarian work and efforts to expand protection space in the region.

Similar trends and consequent concerns can be seen in parts of Asia and Africa. Given these trends, are there steps that UNHCR can take to help build understanding, acceptance for the Office's work, and through that help creates conditions in which UNHCR staff members can work with a reasonable level of security? Are there opportunities within this "crisis" that UNHCR can seize in order to improve the situation?

The beginning of the answer to this question, in the Working Group's view, can be seen in the heightened interest within the humanitarian community in the need for enhanced dialogue and partnership. This is taking many forms. The Swiss Government has launched an initiative to facilitate dialogue between Islamic interlocutors and the West. In the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the Sub-Working Group on Humanitarian Security is focusing on establishing more effective dialogue with all relevant local communities, and with "unconventional" interlocutors who have influence in the zones of conflict and instability. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has begun an initiative entitled "Dialogue with Islam".

UNHCR's own internal reflections also suggest a way forward. Again citing the report of the Strategic Review of UNHCR's Operations in North Africa and the Middle East:

- Nevertheless, fundamental changes that are taking place in the region may also bring socio-political openings and reforms and therefore offer new opportunities to UNHCR to promote the rights of persons of concern.

The challenge is how to seize these new opportunities. The Strategic Review of UNHCR's Operations in North Africa and the Middle East identified the following actions as critical:

- Utmost priority should be given to building confidence in the United Nations and UNHCR among governments in the North Africa and Middle East region, raising awareness and systematically developing partnerships through regional institutions, notably the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as well as with regional/local NGOs (e.g. Arab Lawyers Union, Arab Parliamentarians' Union, etc.);
- Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on (and resources devoted to) public information in the region as a whole through more coordinated and effective use of the Arabic and international media, use of high profile personalities (including, but not limited to, the Goodwill Ambassador), working with civil society, etc. in order to build confidence in the United Nations and UNHCR and its Mandate. Such efforts should be made in close consultation with the office of the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information.

The Working Group agrees that the actions identified by the colleagues in CASWANAME are important first steps, but there is a need to go further. The crisis is not just in North Africa and the Middle East but also Africa and Asia. And taking into account the need for dialogue, then clearly the issue is global. Therefore, UNHCR needs to find a way to work of how to fulfil its mandate in a context of crisis between the Islamic world and the West in a manner that keeps UNHCR staff members as safe as possible. This must necessarily be a long-term, multi-year effort and it must be implemented on a global basis. In effect what UNHCR needs is an in-house "think tank" that can study and reflect on the issues and challenges and shape the strategic directions of the Office. Such a "think tank" would need to be staffed with

individuals with appropriate experience. An important aspect of its work would be to establish effective partnerships with other organizations working on the same set of issues.

One aspect of this effort must be to consider UNHCR's relationship with non-traditional, non-state actors, particularly those who may misunderstand or reject the United Nations. This is particularly important in the current polarized context in which one is expected to take sides, and UNHCR's standard approach of being ready to talk to anyone who can help ensure the protection of refugees may be misunderstood. While the complexity of this issue is beyond the scope of this review, UNHCR in collaboration with other partners inside and outside the United Nations, there is a need to re-examine their relationship with non-state actors.

An additional area where further work is required is on UNHCR's relationship with the military in high security environments, particularly in view of the need for clearer guidelines and recommendations. With respect to these issues, the Working Group recommends that the follow steps be taken:

Recommendation 71: UNHCR should establish an in-house “think tank” that can study and reflect on the issues and challenges confronting UNHCR in the Middle East and beyond and help shape the strategic directions of the Office.

Recommendation 72: Utmost priority should be given to building confidence in the United Nations and UNHCR among governments in the North Africa and Middle East region, raising awareness and systematically developing partnerships through regional institutions, notably the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as well as with regional/local NGOs (e.g. Arab Lawyers Union, Arab Parliamentarians' Union, etc.).

Recommendation 73: Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on (and resources devoted to) public information in the region as a whole through more coordinated and effective use of the Arabic and international media, use of high profile personalities (including, but not limited to, the Goodwill Ambassador), working with civil society, etc. in order to build confidence in the United Nations and UNHCR and its Mandate. Such efforts should be made in close consultation with the office of the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information.

Recommendation 74: UNHCR should use initiatives such as the ESS eCentre initiative which focus on emergency preparedness as opportunities for building acceptance and support for UNHCR's work in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Recommendation 75: UNHCR should develop more explicit guidance on working with the military in high security environments.

Staff Safety and Refugee Security

This report has focused on the security of staff members but it is important to recall that in situations in which staff security is threatened, refugees and returnees are typically much more at risk. When refugee security is enhanced, the security of staff members is improved as well. Given this relationship, and given that UNHCR's *raison d'être* is to protect refugees, one of the most important investments that the Office can make in staff safety is to do a more effective job in promoting the physical protection of refugees.

The physical security of refugees is guaranteed by international and domestic legal obligations and is primarily the responsibility of the host state, but may also be provided by regional or international mechanisms such as UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.

Where UNHCR and the international community assist a host state in ensuring and enhancing the physical security of refugees, the safety of UNHCR staff, other humanitarian workers and local populations is also improved. This is not a new lesson. UNHCR has been assisting countries of asylum such as the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Guinea for almost a decade with so-called refugee "security packages". These refugee security mechanisms have proven to be very effective but they do require sustained financial support, and they oblige a shared commitment and engagement by a number of actors.

The acceptance of burden-sharing and capacity-building measures to improve the refugee security mechanisms of countries overburdened by massive influxes of refugees only took root in the mid-to-late nineties, but much more needs to be done if this acceptance is to have a stronger impact on both refugee and staff security. This includes more predictable support of UNHCR's "Ladder of Options" refugee insecurity response framework, and for the Agenda for Protection whose Goal Number 3 advocates sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to receive and protect refugees; while Goal Number 4 advocates addressing security-related concerns more effectively. Both the "Ladder of Options" framework and the Agenda draw on a broad United Nations recognition that the international community has a responsibility to assist States that lack the capacity or resources to address refugee insecurity, as was acknowledged in Security Council Resolution 1296 (April 2000), on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. UNHCR must remain a strong and vocal advocate of the Secretary-General's protection of civilians "roadmap", the *Aide-Memoire* and the "Ten-Point Platform" where the physical security of both humanitarian staff and refugees is highlighted. The argument has been well-established at the highest levels: support to States in ensuring refugee security will also have an immediate and positive impact upon staff security. Therefore, the Working Group recommends:

Recommendation 76: UNHCR should strengthen its efforts to promote more effective burden-sharing and capacity-building measures to improve the security mechanisms of States including support for "security packages" for refugee security. Such action, which is consistent with the Agenda for Protection and relevant Security Council Resolutions, is one of, if not the single most important investment that can be made in staff safety.

PART FOUR: CONCLUSION

The Way Forward: Implementation of Recommendations

On the basis of its review of Security Policy and Policy implementation, the Working Group is making one overarching recommendation: the strengthening and reinforcement of an organizational culture of security in which security is ingrained in all aspects of UNHCR's operations both at Headquarters and in the Field. All of the remaining recommendations of this report are in support of this larger aim. UNHCR has made significant progress in its management of security of staff members; however, achieving a stronger organizational culture of security and safety will require a multi-year effort and significant commitment at all levels of the organization.

Given the multi-year nature of the recommendations, it is essential that their implementation be grounded in permanent structures of the organization. With this in mind the Working Group recommends that follow-up to the report and implementation of the recommendations be implemented as follows:

Recommendation 77: Overall responsibility and accountability for the implementation of the Recommendations of the Report rest with the High Commissioner.

Recommendation 78: The current Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation will be established as a permanent UNHCR committee and will be responsible for implementation of the recommendations. The Assistant High Commissioner will chair the Committee which will be composed of the Head of the Emergency and Security Service, the Director of the Division of Human Resource Management, the Director of the Division of Financial and Supply Management, and a Director of one of the Bureaux on a rotating basis.

Recommendation 79: To support implementation, a Working Group chaired by the Head of the Emergency and Security Service and composed of the Deputies (or equivalent) of all Bureaux and Support Departments and Divisions will be responsible for establishing an annual work plan, implementing the recommendations, and reporting on progress.

Recommendation 80: The Steering Committee will prepare an annual progress report for the High Commissioner to be presented to the Executive Committee.

ANNEX I: SUMMARY LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Recommendation: Strengthening the Culture of Security within UNHCR

1. UNHCR is committed to the strengthening and reinforcement of an organizational culture in which safety and security are ingrained in all aspects of UNHCR's operations both at Headquarters and in the Field. While UNHCR has made significant progress in its management of security, achieving an enhanced organizational culture of security and safety will require a multi-year effort and significant commitment at all levels of the organization.

For UNHCR, the continued strengthening of an organizational culture of security and safety means:

- Staff members understand and accept the risks inherent in the work of UNHCR;
- Everyone in the organization is trained in, understands and can apply UNHCR's approach to and methodology for Security Management;
- Security and safety considerations are integrated as normal functions of UNHCR operations and activity;
- Security management is seen as everyone's job with managers at all levels of the organization having a particular responsibility and accountability;
- UNHCR staff members at all levels are disciplined in their compliance with security rules and protocols, and non-compliance is grounds for dismissal;
- UNHCR recognizes the importance of competence in security management and prioritizes this competence in the selection and promotion of managers;
- UNHCR staff members and partners speak a common language of security in which terminology is used in a consistent manner;
- From the earliest planning of operations, security is integrated into the assessment and design process so as to maximize the delivery of protection and assistance in potentially hazardous environments without exposing staff members to an unacceptable, unnecessary or unforeseen level of risk;
- UNHCR manages its operations from a risk management perspective in which there is ongoing effort to identify, understand and mitigate risk and responsible risk taking is how UNHCR staff members carry out their work;
- Resources for security are sufficient so that the organization does not have to compromise on measures necessary to ensure, to the fullest extent possible, the security and safety of staff members and partners;
- UNHCR actively develops an approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs and builds on lessons learned and best practice;
- UNHCR is an active member of the common UN security system, complying with established guidelines, sharing information and contributing recommendations to improve overall security management;
- Staff members have full confidence in how UNHCR manages security.

The Executive Management of UNHCR fully recognizes that achieving an enhanced culture of security and safety within UNHCR is a long-term effort and commits itself to ensuring that the requisite time and resources will be made available to do so.

Specific Recommendations**UNHCR's Security Policy**

2. UNHCR should develop within the framework of the UNHCR Manual a comprehensive chapter on security management which covers policy, methodology, procedures, and guidance.

UNHCR Security Management Theory and Practice

3. UNHCR should commit itself to the long-term development of a UNHCR-specific approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs, and builds on lessons learned and best practice. ESS and DOS should work together to develop this approach.
4. The UNHCR approach to security management should be documented in operational guidance and incorporated into UNHCR Security Training at all levels of the organization.

Mainstreaming Security in Planning and Management

5. UNHCR should refine its approach to operations management so as to incorporate risk management as a core aspect of the way in which UNHCR plans and manages operations.
6. Current Country Operations Plans, Country Report, Situation Report and Project formats should be modified so as to more effectively integrate security assessment and analysis, risk analysis, risk mitigation and reporting.
7. UNHCR should commit to a Security Mainstreaming Initiative as UNHCR's process for ensuring that safety and security concerns for staff and persons of concern are fully integrated into the planning and management of operations as an essential core component of UNHCR's operational strategy.

UNHCR's Security Organization - the Field Safety Section

8. Creation of a Training and Policy Development Unit. The main responsibilities of this unit would be to (a) develop further UNHCR's approach to security management, and (b) develop an appropriate security information management system. Policy papers, standard operating procedures and training material would need to be developed accordingly. The unit would also act as a training coordinator: monitoring the training of staff, providing training advice and support to trainers and managers, organizing training and, on occasion, taking part in the delivery of security training. Regular missions to the Field are important for the staff in this unit so that they do not lose touch with the Field.
9. Creation of a "Current Operations Unit". The main role of this unit would be to constantly monitor the changing security situations in the Field and to provide immediate support and advice to the Bureaux, Desks and operations in the Field on safety and security matters that cannot be provided by regional global posts based in the Field. A close link between the "Current Operations Unit" and the Training and Policy Development Unit is required in order to ensure that the queries from the Bureaux and the Field will be reflected in the documents produced by the Training and Policy

Development Unit, and that the staff working on the Helpdesk are aware of all new policies and standards and are thus able to answer queries in a comprehensive and consistent manner.

10. Creation of an Administrative Unit. Taking into account the increasing number of administrative/human resources responsibilities that FSS is required to handle and the enormous amount of time currently devoted to these activities by almost all FSS staff, it is proposed that a small Administrative Unit be created within FSS. This unit would inter alia coordinate the deployment of FSAs in the Field and act as the focal point for all queries regarding specific human resources management issues which are not handled by DHRM.
11. Outposted FSAs. A team of outposted FSAs will still be required to support operations with very specific and serious security concerns. However, it is recommended that the procedures for their deployment be clarified and made clear to Representatives prior to any further deployment.
12. Depending on the final recommendations of the Working Group and the workload that will be placed on FSS as a result of the implementation of these recommendations, it is further recommended that the need for a Deputy post and an Executive Assistant post be reviewed at a later stage.
13. Strengthening the field capacity of FSS through increasing the number of regional global posts in the Field. Currently FSS has three Senior Regional Field Safety Advisors in the Field, two in Africa and one in Asia. Their primary responsibilities are to support the mainstreaming efforts through provision of advice and support, delivery of training, capacity building and awareness raising. Ideally, in order to ensure that the mainstreaming efforts can be carried out in an equal and consistent manner all over the world and that the new Security Management Approach can be effectively implemented in the Field, it is recommended that this number be increased. At a minimum, this would mean increasing the number of Senior Regional Field Safety Advisor posts from the current three to some six or seven.

Security Training

14. UNHCR should commit to a multi-year effort to develop comprehensive security training for UNHCR staff members, which complements UNSECOORD training.
15. Security training in UNHCR should combine basic training for all staff members in the Field and at Headquarters with targeted training based on job categories.
16. Security Management Training should be mandatory for all Heads of Offices; this training should be organized as a first priority. Security focal points are an additional priority target audience for training.
17. UNHCR should provide situation-specific security training for new operations which should include political and cultural orientation as well as briefing and security advice on the specific security situation in the country concerned.
18. All staff members deployed into Phase Three Security conditions or above should complete, at a minimum, a security course comparable to the training provided in the Workshop for Emergency Managers and the eCentre Basic Security courses.
19. In order to provide a foundation for these learning and training programmes, FSS and SDS should together carry out a comprehensive security learning needs assessment.
20. All Field Safety Advisors should be trained in the use of Action Learning Methodology as their standards means of providing security training.

The United Nations, UNHCR, and Terrorism

21. The Field Safety Section should develop operational guidance for Field Offices where there is the threat of terrorist attack in terms of “appropriate” security measures. This guidance should be incorporated into security training.
22. The Regional Office Jakarta’s experience and the efforts made there should be evaluated as part of the effort to develop such guidance.

Staff-Management Interaction on Security

23. The concept of due diligence should be researched and its potential application explored as a complementary and positive new aspect of UNHCR’s approach to security management.
24. All offices (at branch/sub/field levels) should have a security focal point regardless of whether a Field Safety Advisor is present or not. A key task of the Security Focal Point is to facilitate sharing of security information.
25. Senior Managers should participate in security assessments and view security assessments and security measure planning as a participatory exercise in which all staff should play a role.
26. A key element in the envisioned Senior Management Training Programme for Managers recommended elsewhere in this report should be a significant component on staff-management interaction on security issues and the importance of effective leadership of and care for teams in relation to security.
27. As part of this effort, operational guidance should be developed which can support managers and staff in creating effective interaction and cooperation.
28. In field situations in which a Security Phase is in effect, at a minimum, a weekly security meeting at both the branch and sub/field office levels must be organized so that security information can be shared and discussed.

Security of National Staff Members

29. Given the significant untapped potential within national staff members and managers that can be utilized to strengthen the UNHCR Security Management, UNHCR should consider the formation of “security advisory groups” among national staff members who would work closely with the security focal point on security matters.
30. As part of the security contingency planning process, national staff members should be prepared and trained to assume emergency functions of offices and operations in the event of evacuation of international staff members, and structures should be in place so that they get appropriate support.
31. UNHCR managers should be aware of the full range of measures available to support national staff members in situations of insecurity, in particular in situations in which international staff members are being evacuated.
32. Within the framework of the UN Security Management System, and as needed for its own staff members, UNHCR should develop clearer guidelines with regard to the evacuation of national staff members.
33. Targeted training for national staff members in job categories where insecurity is an important feature of their work (protection assistants, drivers, field assistants, etc.) should be developed as part of UNHCR’s commitment to enhanced security training.

Security and Gender

34. FSS should develop specific policy, procedures and guidelines on the specific security needs of women.
35. UNHCR should consider the formation of women's security groups at the branch and sub-office levels to promote dialogue on security issues of concern to female staff members, both national and international, in situations of significant insecurity.

Security Information Management within UNHCR Operations

36. Within the framework of UNHCR's effort to manage data and information more effectively, UNHCR should develop a security information management system which will support security management. Such a system will ultimately provide software support for inputting, collating and organizing data so as to provide selective data and reports to management, and support analyses of trends so as to assist in security management.
37. UNHCR should establish closer linkages between Public Information and security in order to take advantage of Public Information's links with journalists and monitoring of the local media, as well as to improve understanding of public perceptions of the United Nations and, if appropriate, devise strategies for helping enhance public acceptance of UNHCR's role.
38. More effective should be made of geographic information and mapping in security management including integration of geographic information into UNHCR's security information management system.
39. UNHCR should embrace UNSECOORD's new Security Risk Management Model as an opportunity to strengthen UNHCR's own capacity to analyse and respond to situations of insecurity. As a priority, UNHCR field managers should be trained in UNSECOORD's new Security Risk Management Model.

Security Resource Management (human/financial resources)

Field Safety Advisors

40. The Field Safety Section should become directly responsible for the recruitment and posting of FSAs and centrally manage their deployment in close consultation with Bureaux and Representatives in the field.
41. UNHCR should adopt the following principles for determining whether an FSA is needed in a particular situation:
 - a. In principle an FSA should not be needed if managers are trained and have demonstrated competence in security management and if security has been integrated and mainstreamed into all aspects of the operation.
 - b. Provision of security expertise is viewed as a time-limited intervention. The nature of the intervention increases depending on the degree of insecurity in the situation, and can range from time-limited support missions providing training and establishing systems, to the creation of national FSA posts or time-limited international FSA posts.
 - c. All FSA posts in the field are subject to a yearly review.
 - d. International Field Safety Advisor posts are posts that are also part of a pool of security experts who are deployed in response to situations of insecurity in the field where time-limited support is needed. Unlike other posts which fall within the staffing table of field offices, all international Field Safety Advisors posted to

a place of duty will be automatically considered in the same category as members of an ERT; that is, eligible for 2-3 month emergency deployment. Decision on redeployment of an FSA will be made by ESS, in principle in consultation with the line manager concerned, but will ultimately based upon global security needs.

However, an FSA will not be called upon to undertake such an emergency deployment more than once in a 365-day cycle.

42. UNHCR should develop criteria for determining whether an FSA is needed. The bases for such criteria are reflected in the following questions:
 - a. Is there persistent and sustained insecurity in the situation as a result of armed conflict or other threats?
 - b. Is there armed conflict in a neighbouring country that is likely to spill over into areas where refugees and UNHCR are present?
 - c. Is there direct targeting of humanitarian workers?
 - d. Is the situation new and as a result security risk assessment and the elaboration of a security risk management strategy, procedures and rules are not yet complete?
 - e. Have the managers and staff in place not yet received appropriate security training?
43. UNHCR should reach agreement with UNSECOORD and the IASMN to discontinue submitting FSA candidates for approval while maintaining a commitment to maintaining agreed standards on qualifications.
44. Conditions of service for newly created FSAs should be improved by awarding all FSAs who successfully complete an initial 3 or 6-month probationary period at least 1-year contacts thereafter, and, if necessary, ESS should maintain a fund enabling it to ensure financing of these contracts even when a country programme/desk/bureau has not committed to the presence of that FSA post over the coming year.
45. The Field Safety Section will have overall responsibility for this prioritization task. FSS will consult closely with concerned Bureaux and Representatives in the field in carrying out redeployments. In the event FSS and a Bureau/Representative cannot agree on a proposed redeployment, the matter will be referred to the AHC for final decision. In all instances, redeployment of FSAs from existing posts will not be for more than three months.

Financial Management

46. The Regional Security ABODs serve as an effective contingency reserve for responding to new situations of insecurity and should be maintained.
47. UNHCR's policy on the budgeting of security costs should be, to the fullest extent possible, to integrate and not separate security costs in separate budget lines. This applies in particular to dual-use objects of expenditure such as telecommunications, building improvements, supplies and equipment. There are, however, discrete security costs which should be budgeted for and reported upon. These include contracting of security firms for office security and residential security

Security and Telecommunications

48. UNHCR should commit to substantially increased investment in Information and Communications Technology so as to achieve the best possible Information and Communications Technology networks in field operations beginning at the emergency stage as a key element in UNHCR's security management strategy. A key element in improving UNHCR's performance in telecommunications will be to increase the number of telecoms technicians and operators.

49. UNHCR should fund the ITTS RapITT proposal for establishing a rapid response pool of telecommunications operators and technicians as a matter of priority.
50. UNHCR should also explore closer cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP) on telecommunications, given WFP's role as a common service provider of Information and Communications Technology.

Use and Management of Security Expertise

51. The Field Safety Section should develop guidelines for managers on the use of security expertise.
52. Field Safety Advisors/Field Security Officers should concentrate on value-added tasks of undertaking security assessments, training, building of information networks, information and reporting systems development, participation in planning, and risk management support to managers.
53. UNHCR should explore making more effective use of national Field Safety Assistant positions. Rather than drawing solely on the standard profile of ex-military or ex-police, UNHCR should explore identification of candidates who have university degrees and field experience with proven analytical and writing skills that can support improved security analysis. These candidates would necessarily require training in the UN Security Management System as well as basic security management.
54. The title of Field Safety Advisors should be changed to Field Security Officers and the name of Field Safety Section to the Field Security Section.

UNHCR and the UN Security Management System

55. UNHCR should seek more proactively to influence the development of a UN Security Management System which recognizes the specific and unique needs of UNHCR and that provides the space for UNHCR to develop its own system and approach within the over-arching framework of the UN System. An important part of this effort is to build closer alliances on security management with WFP, UNICEF, and OCHA.
56. As recommended earlier in the report, UNHCR should commit itself to the long-term development of a UNHCR-specific approach and methodology for managing security which takes into account the specificity of UNHCR operations and needs, and builds on lessons learned and best practice.

Security Management and UNHCR's Implementing and Operational Partners

57. UNHCR should revise its current policy on field security collaboration with implementing and operational partners to more clearly reflect the organization's commitment to close and effective collaboration with its implementing and operational partners on security.
58. A key element of the revised policy should be UNHCR's commitment to work within the framework of the IASC Guidelines on Field Security Collaboration.
59. The revised policy should be incorporated into Chapter 4 of the UNHCR Manual and UNHCR's Partnership Guidelines, sub-project agreements, and the annual programming instructions.

Security and Stress

60. Given the increasingly volatile working environment, UNHCR should review the existing career path and analyze whether a specific category of “highly risky assignment” should be introduced. Such assignments should have very specific selection criteria (with option of using psychometric tools), specific all-inclusive insurance policy, specific security, health and welfare training, specific incentives (not monetary but time out or specific early retirement options) and maximum amount of time allowed to serve in such situations.
61. UNHCR should better integrate staff welfare issues in the operational planning and day-to-day management of UNHCR. In the broadest sense this means that managers/leaders are sensitive to the welfare issues and able to identify them and ask for help for dealing with them. More specifically, this could relate to the early inclusion of staff welfare issues in the management of a concrete emergency.
62. From the earliest stages of emergencies, UNHCR should ensure that operational planning includes an assessment of living and working conditions and that these recommendations are implemented in the very first phase of an operation.
63. The Field Safety Section and the Staff Welfare Section should coordinate their work more closely, and ensure better integration and sharing of security-related information, particularly in relation to security incidents, undertake joint missions, and strengthen FSA capacity in medical and psychological first aid.
64. The system of welfare-related pre-deployment and post-deployment debriefing should be strengthened not only as a mechanism for supporting staff well being but also as a tool for organizational learning.
65. UNHCR should consider, as part of its management development efforts, the development of a Leadership programme – that would include a focus on care of teams and motivational leadership, emotional intelligence, handling group dynamics rather than only focusing on operational management.
66. UNHCR should consider the establishment of a bi-annual stress survey as a means of eliciting feedback on the overall well-being of staff members.
67. UNHCR should identify staff members who are/have been particularly or regularly exposed to highly stress-provoking situations including violent beneficiaries, tragic family histories, and long working hours, and should ensure that measures are in place to provide appropriate support and relief from the stressful conditions in which these staff are working.
68. UNHCR should develop a mechanism whereby staff members are provided with all relevant information with regard to a possible deployment, thus allowing staff members to make an informed decision on accepting deployment to a specific area in keeping with Principle #5 of the Code of Conduct.

Security Management and Human Resources Policy

69. UNHCR should continue the review of human resources policy from a security perspective and ensure that security awareness, compliance and competence are fully integrated in aspects of UNHCR's Human Resources Policy.
70. As a priority UNHCR should integrate security into the performance appraisal system for all staff members, and use competence in security management as a criterion for selection and promotion.

Relations with Governments and Non-Traditional Actors on Security

71. UNHCR should establish an in-house “think tank” that can study and reflect on the issues and challenges confronting UNHCR in the Middle East and beyond and help shape the strategic directions of the Office.
72. Utmost priority should be given to building confidence in the United Nations and UNHCR among governments in the North Africa and Middle East region, raising awareness and systematically developing partnerships through regional institutions, notably the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as well as with regional/local NGOs (e.g. Arab Lawyers Union, Arab Parliamentarians’ Union, etc.);
73. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on (and resources devoted to) public information in the region as a whole through more coordinated and effective use of the Arabic and international media, use of high profile personalities (including, but not limited to, the Goodwill Ambassador), working with civil society, etc. in order to build confidence in the United Nations and UNHCR and its Mandate. Such efforts should be made in close consultation with the office of the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information.
74. UNHCR should use initiatives such as the ESS eCentre initiative which focus on emergency preparedness as opportunities for building acceptance and support for UNHCR’s work in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
75. UNHCR should develop more explicit guidance on working with the military in high security environments.

Staff Safety and Refugee Security

76. UNHCR should strengthen its efforts to promote more effective burden-sharing and capacity-building measures to improve the security mechanisms of States including support for “security packages” for refugee security. Such action, which is consistent with the Agenda for Protection and relevant Security Council Resolutions, is one of, if not the single most important investment that can be made in staff safety.

Implementation of Recommendations

77. Overall responsibility and accountability for the implementation of the Recommendations of the Report rest with the High Commissioner.
78. The current Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation will be established as a permanent UNHCR committee and will be responsible for implementation of the recommendations. The Assistant High Commissioner will chair the Committee which will be composed of the Head of the Emergency and Security Service, the Director of the Division of Human Resource Management, the Director of the Division of Financial and Supply Management, and a Director of one of the Bureaux on a rotating basis.
79. To support implementation, a Working Group chaired by the Head of the Emergency and Security Service and composed of the Deputies (or equivalent) of all Bureaux and Support Departments and Divisions will be responsible for establishing an annual work plan, implementing the recommendations, and reporting on progress.
80. The Steering Committee will prepare an annual progress report for the High Commissioner to be presented to the Executive Committee.