



## The Tokyo eCentre and Jakarta Partnership

*Evaluation of UNHCR's contribution to  
emergency preparedness, contingency  
planning and disaster management in the  
Asia Pacific region (2000-2003)*

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# Table of Contents

Executive summary .....	1
Introduction.....	3
Methodology .....	5
General background.....	7
Building staff skills, organizational capacity and networks.....	13
Workshop achievements .....	17
Management.....	33
Distance learning .....	39
Lessons learned.....	43
Recommendations .....	45
Annex A: Terms of reference .....	49
Annex B: Summary of interviews .....	55
Annex C: eCentre Workshop summary 2000-2003.....	57
Annex D: Workshop summary, 2001 - 2003 .....	59
Annex E: Expenditure .....	63
Annex F: Abbreviations and acronyms .....	65



## Executive summary

The report describes and analyses the significant achievements and value of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and capacity building interventions in the Asia Pacific region, brought about through eCentre and Partnership activities. Over the past four years, these activities have achieved most of their stated original objectives and have also had an effect well beyond the stated objectives.

The activities have had a positive impact on the learning and practice of over 2,000 participants and many agencies. Also, through these activities, UNHCR's credibility with governments and organizations in the Asia Pacific region has improved and, thereby, has indirectly contributed to UNHCR's overall long-term goals in Asia. There has been a large expansion of UNHCR's network of participant and agency contacts, in effect an active emergency early-warning and response system of agencies and individuals.

The report concludes that field-based emergency preparedness and capacity building (EPCB) activities in Asia should continue and become a core, integral component of a UNHCR's long-term strategy in the Asia Pacific region. UNHCR's EPCB activities should be clearly linked to the overall organizational goals in the region. In other words, there are direct emergency preparedness and capacity building objectives, focused on organizational and personal as well as building and maintaining an emergency preparedness and response network. But there is also a parallel long-term goal to expand, reinforce and maintain a network of good relations with government agencies, regional institutions and national NGOs (as members of civil society) in order to influence long-term refugee policies and practices.

UNHCR must shift towards a long-term emergency preparedness strategy in Asia and elsewhere, whereby both staff and operational partner learning is seen as an ongoing, long-term process and not a short-term activity which can achieve impact in only a few years. In Asia, impact always comes from long-term relationships and the extent of organizational and personal networks. Relationship and network building take a long time to produce results and cannot be easily abandoned along the way. The large network of over 200 agencies and over 2,000 individuals who have participated in one or more EPCB activities in Asia over the past four years needs to be maintained and strengthened by continued contact with UNHCR in order to keep the network alive and active. The networks can also be used for much more than at present, providing a significant base and opportunity for further personal and organizational learning.

EPCB activities in Asia should continue to focus primarily on the refugee context, including preparedness for emergencies which may occur in the region as well as those in other parts of the world to which Asian agencies may respond. However, the programme should also include agencies which work with or will potentially work with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Asia, as a way to help stabilize populations at risk of displacement across borders. The programme should also continue to work collaboratively with national and regional agencies responsible for

a broad range of man-made and natural disaster preparedness activities because such agencies often respond to both refugee and other types of emergencies. Additionally, UNHCR has a proven competency in emergency preparedness and response in situations of mass human displacement. The organization has a responsibility to continue to develop and share this competency on behalf of the UN family in Asia and the Pacific in a systematic and long-term manner.

EPCB interventions should continue to focus primarily on existing or potential emergency situations. Some generic content is necessary in most learning activities but it must be placed in the context of real emergency situations facing the participating agencies. This flexible, situational approach requires that UNHCR's EPCB staff continue to exercise their skills in identifying potential emergency situations; selecting appropriate agencies and their staff; building and maintaining networks; as well as constantly adapting training and learning activities and materials to meet the needs of agencies and varying situations. The purpose, objectives, content and duration of learning activities must be continually assessed and adapted according to changing organizational and situational needs.

The focus of needs assessments and, hence, organizational capacity building must be placed primarily on agencies in the context of the actual or potential emergency situations they face. The criteria for selecting participating agencies and their staff must clearly reflect organizational and situational needs, with individual learning needs defined in the context of the relevant organization and situation. Specific organizational capacities to be developed and learned must be clearly defined and their staff trained to effect the desired change. Participating agencies, including UNHCR, must understand that they are expected to learn and change, not just the staff members.

The report also concludes that the management of the eCentre and the Partnership should be integrated in a decentralized field-based structure, under the eCentre, composed of two or more consulting sub-regional facilitators who will work directly with participating agencies to define organizational needs; design and undertake relevant training; as well as build and maintain the sub-regional emergency preparedness network of agencies, including all UNHCR offices. The Asia-Pacific regional coordinator would continue to be based in Tokyo, providing overall supervision and support. UNHCR should also seriously consider expanding this approach to other regions of the world, where the operational strategy can be easily adapted.

# Introduction

## General

1. This report concerns UNHCR's strategic objective to strengthen and support emergency preparedness and disaster management mechanisms in the Asia Pacific region. The 2000 Global Appeal stated that UNHCR would organize emergency preparedness and contingency planning workshops and seminars as a tangible expression of UNHCR's willingness to work with concerned governments on humanitarian measures to prepare for, and respond to, sudden outflows, and to stabilize populations at risk of displacement.
2. The purpose of the evaluation is to examine UNHCR's contribution to institutional capacity building and training in the field of emergency preparedness in the Asia Pacific region, for the period from mid-2000 through 2003. It assesses achievements made thus far; identifies lessons learned; and presents recommendations for the future.
3. The evaluation was undertaken by three external consultants, managed by UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) in Geneva, over a three-month period commencing the last week of March 2004. A Steering Committee, composed of the Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, including the Regional Office (RO) in Tokyo, the Emergency and Security Service (ESS), the Donor Relations and Resource Mobilisation Service (DRRMS) and the NGO Liaison Unit was established to provide guidance to EPAU and to promote and disseminate the findings and recommendations of the evaluation so that effective follow-up would be ensured by all relevant stakeholders. On 4 June 2004, the consultants conducted a briefing on the general findings and conclusions of the report for EPAU and the Steering Committee. A first draft was circulated for comments on 20 June 2004 and a final version was submitted by the consultants to EPAU on 4 August 2004.
4. The Asia-Pacific wide scope of the programme, budget limitations, and the three-month timeframe, caused a constraint in terms of how many agencies and participants could be reasonably contacted or interviewed. Given that the eCentre was based in Japan; funded by the Japanese Government; and Japanese NGOs were targeted for a high level of participation, it was felt that Japan should receive significant attention. Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia also received particular attention, because they collectively accounted for almost one-third of eCentre participants and over ninety-five percent of Partnership participants. The two Japanese-speaking consultants focussed on eCentre activities in Japan with particular attention on Japanese NGOs and governmental agencies. The third consultant focussed on both eCentre and Partnership participants and agencies in Indonesia and the Philippines, with shorter visits to Malaysia and Thailand. Additionally, telephone interviews were undertaken with several participants and agencies associated with EPCB activities in Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Nepal and PNG.

5. The report is structured to introduce the evaluation with an overall descriptive background of the Tokyo-based eCentre and the Jakarta-based Partnership. Given that over ninety-five percent of resources under both programmes were directly or indirectly focussed on the provision of workshops, the reader is then provided with an integrated assessment of workshop achievements and impact, with reference to the eCentre or Partnership as required. The management structure of both programmes is then examined, followed by a brief section on distance learning. Distance learning accounted for only a very tiny fraction of the human and financial resources expended.

6. The report is intended to assist UNHCR to make decisions about the future directions of the programme in the Asia Pacific region as well as potential replication in other parts of the world. In order to assist with this process, the report concludes with sections on lessons learned and recommendations.

### **Terminology**

7. Three terms appear in the title of the evaluation, as specified in the Terms of Reference: emergency preparedness, disaster management and contingency planning. Another related term, emergency management, appears frequently in the titles of various workshops and learning materials.

8. Emergency preparedness, for the purpose of the report, means all the training, materials development and networking activities undertaken in order to prepare organizations and individuals for working in emergencies. It includes contingency planning, strategic planning, standards training, humanitarian law training, emergency management training, disaster management training and many other forms of preparatory activities.

9. Emergency management, for many people, means a series of interventions responding to a state of emergency. Disaster management, for others, means activities encompassing the full spectrum of preparedness, immediate response and post disaster activities. Others make a distinction between man-made and natural disasters. However, for the purposes of this report, these two terms are used interchangeably.

10. Contingency planning is a specific activity whereby a group of relevant agencies get together to plan a potential response for a particular scenario of mass human displacement which is probable but has not yet happened.

11. Two other important terms are used in the report: network and capacity-building. Network, for the purposes of the report, means a group of agencies which, through regular staff member participation in workshops and communication in other forums, keep in regular contact with each other for the purposes of exchanging information, learning together and, in other ways, actively preparing for actual or potential emergencies. Capacity-building, again for the purpose of the report, is used in a very specific manner. It is used to describe the process of assisting an organization to develop or improve a specific functional ability such as planning or training.

## Methodology

12. The overall evaluation process was based on the EPAU Terms of Reference (see Annex A). A general reference for evaluation methodology was Donald Kirkpatrick's four levels of training evaluation: reaction of participants; participant learning; behaviour change; and impact. Within this broad framework, the evaluators have endeavoured to provide a holistic review of what happened; the impact; and implications for the future.

13. Given the large physical area to be covered; more than 2,000 former workshop participants; over 200 participating governmental, non-governmental, regional and international agencies; and a limited three-month time frame, the evaluation team adopted two basic techniques. First, was a series of interviews (see Annex B), in person or by telephone, with forty-four stakeholders, representing UNHCR headquarters; the Regional Offices in Tokyo, Jakarta and Bangkok; and Liaison offices in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Timor-Leste, as well as Japanese Government agencies and NGOs, regional institutions (ADPC and IFRC) and implementing partners (InterWorks and RedR). Ninety-five former participants were also interviewed, of which thirty-four had attended both eCentre and Partnership workshops. Over seventy-five percent of the participants interviewed had attended multiple workshops.

14. The second technique was to use an existing eCentre data-base and send a questionnaire to 728 former workshop participants and 381 distance learning students. There were 42 and 12 responses respectively, which did not produce quantitatively-valid results, but narrative feedback was very useful and proved consistent with that received from interviews. No comparable participant database existed for the approximately 1,300 participants who attended one or more Partnership workshops; therefore it was not possible to send a questionnaire to this group.

15. In addition to interviews and the questionnaire, reactions of participants were also drawn from written summaries of standard feedback reports completed at the end of many but not all workshops. Existing documentation was also reviewed, including project submissions and reports as well as mission and meeting reports. The evaluators also observed a workshop in Japan and another in the Philippines during the course of the evaluation.

16. With limited financial information available (see the summary of expenditures found in Annex E); the varying location, duration, participation and facilitation patterns of each workshop; the lack of a standard UNHCR cost benchmark for training workshops; and the vast difference in absolute costs from country to country meant that a meaningful use of the concept of cost effectiveness was not possible to evaluate.

17. The evaluators focused on identifying and articulating common themes and patterns of response which arose from stakeholder, participant and organizational input. We analysed this input, based on our own extensive experience, and have

provided UNHCR with a document which can be used for taking decisions about the future of emergency preparedness and organizational capacity building in Asia and the rest of the world.

## General background

### Overview

18. The last decade of the twentieth century did not bring about global stability as was generally anticipated at the end of the Cold War. The period was instead marked by an increase in the fracturing of nation-states, inter-ethnic or religious conflicts and large-scale human displacements in increasingly complex emergency conditions. A further complicating trend in humanitarian affairs in the new century has been the globalisation of terrorism and the effect this has had on the conduct of assistance operations in dangerous situations.

19. In view of this, UNHCR decided to build and enhance the capacity for more effective emergency preparedness and response in the Asia and Pacific region, both in terms of ongoing and potential large-scale human displacement emergencies within the region and providing assistance to other regions of the world. It is within this general context that the two emergency preparedness and capacity building programmes were established.

20. The “Regional Training Centre for International Humanitarian Response” (the “eCentre”) began operations in late-2000 and the “Partnership for Emergency Preparedness” (the “Partnership”) began in mid-2001. Both projects inherited a common emergency preparedness heritage from the Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (EPRS) in Geneva. That heritage has a long history, since the first Emergency Management Training Programme (EMTP) was conducted jointly by UNHCR and the University of Wisconsin in 1985. Since that time, many EMTP workshops have been held around the world, with balanced Government, NGO and UNHCR/International Agency participation.

21. By 2000, the overall EPRS emergency preparedness approach had been expanded and refined. The long-dominant, generic-style EMTP courses had been replaced by targeted national or regional emergency management workshops. Training of Trainers (TOT) and Contingency Planning (CP) workshops had been added to the range of available workshops as well as the Workshop for Emergency Managers (WEM), a practical, hands-on learning opportunity for UNHCR emergency roster staff. Since 2001, staff safety training has also become a common component of UNHCR’s general training for emergency preparedness in Asia.

22. The Japan-based eCentre and the Indonesia-based Partnership both developed similar but varied strategies for achieving their common goal of enhancing Asian organizational emergency preparedness capacity for effective response to mass human displacements. The basic model was characterized by using training and learning activities to achieve the emergency preparedness objectives of: expanding the institutional capacity of government, non-government and regional agencies through staff training; improving individual staff member skills; building and maintaining in-country and regional networks between individuals and agencies; and developing, adapting and disseminating learning information and resources.

The two projects inter-acted frequently, primarily on an informal basis, and the eCentre funded seven workshops in the four Partnership countries.

23. The Japanese Government, which financed the eCentre, also articulated an objective of increasing Japan's visibility through improving the capacity of Japanese NGOs working in emergency situations around the world, as one way to justify their large governmental contributions to UNHCR. In the Partnership, an additional objective was to actively enhance the ability of national and non-governmental agencies to respond effectively to mass internal displacements as one way to stabilize populations at risk of displacement across borders.

## **The eCentre**

### *Overview*

24. The eCentre was established in late 2000. Its overall goal was to establish a multi-year programme for the development of individual skills and institutional capacity in international emergency preparedness and response for crises involving forcible displacement of human populations. It was targeted at government officials, NGOs and UNHCR staff in the Asia Pacific region.

25. A summary of the eCentre's original objectives for the Asia Pacific region follows:

- to expose government and NGO staff, both in Japan and other Asian countries, to the issues, problems and creative solutions available when addressing international humanitarian response in times of catastrophic human displacement;
- to have the eCentre evolve into an operationally viable, and internationally recognised training institute;
- to facilitate development of a large enough pool of organizations and individuals to ensure a more proactive response in Asian humanitarian emergencies;
- to strengthen the humanitarian network of government and NGO partners in Japan, as well as in neighbouring countries and UNHCR;
- to build the capacity of Japan-based NGOs and their regional counterparts, as well as government officials throughout the region, in order to respond at an operational and policy level to international emergency humanitarian situations;
- to achieve greater visibility and effectiveness of Japanese NGOs within the international community;
- to find appropriate Japanese or regional institutions to act as local co-hosts in the provision of facilities and expertise.

26. The eCentre focused on three primary activities:

- training individuals (workshops and distance learning courses);

- building networks; and
- information and learning resources dissemination.

27. There were two main assumptions:

- practical skills and tools acquired through individual participation in learning activities would lead directly to an increased agency response capacity in the field; and.
- there would be sufficient interest on the part of humanitarian actors in the region to help the Centre achieve operational sustainability

28. The heart of the eCentre's tactical strategy was development and facilitation of training workshops which focused on: training individuals; networking between participants; and awareness of the eCentre's information and resource base through distribution of materials and promoting access to the web-site. The workshops fell into four broad categories: The first was Asia Pacific regional workshops on the basics of international humanitarian response. The second was regional workshops on specific skills and topics such as staff safety, standards in emergencies and best practices. The third was situation-specific sub-regional or national workshops with a specific focus such as emergency management skills, contingency planning, strategic planning, training of trainers or agency coordination. The fourth category was workshops focused specifically on Japanese agencies.

### *Management*

29. Oversight of the eCentre was designed to be achieved through an Advisory Board with representatives of donor governments, concerned NGOs in Japan and the region, the Coordinator of the Asia-Pacific Consultations (APC), the University of Wisconsin-Disaster Management Center and UNHCR.

30. Operationally, the eCentre is managed by a Coordinator and one half-time assistant, housed in the Regional Office (RO) Tokyo. The RO provides substantial administrative support as well as guidance and liaison functions with Japanese Government stakeholders; governmental and non-governmental agencies; the private sector and others involved in the Centre's activities. A data-base on all workshop participants was developed and maintained.

31. As a general practice, the coordinator received workshop ideas and requests from UNHCR offices in Asia and presented a summary at the annual Asia Pacific regional UNHCR Representatives meeting, where it was discussed and approved. Workshops are facilitated by a team of several persons, including the coordinator plus others, according to required expertise, from agencies such as a private UNHCR subcontractor, InterWorks; RedR Australia (funded by the Australian Government); and resource persons from UNHCR and other UN agencies such as WFP, UNICEF and OCHA. Over the years, logistical support has also been provided by the Royal Thai Army, the Toyota Motor Corporation, Japan Airlines, Risho Koseikai and MERCY Malaysia. The Regional Bureau for Asia provided support, backup and liaison on budget and donor-related issues.

*Finance*

32. The eCentre was financed solely by the Trust Fund for Human Security, provided by the Government of Japan. The Trust Fund for Human Security looks to achieve “freedom from fear, freedom from want” through its funding of projects which integrate and strengthen initiatives that emphasized human-centered perspectives. The Japanese Government promoted this concept through the establishment of a Trust Fund for the United Nations in 1999. The eCentre was funded for the first three years and, exceptionally, for a fourth year which will end in March 2005.

*Distance learning*

33. The eCentre distance learning programme was developed as one of the first activities of the Centre and operates in cooperation with the University of Wisconsin Disaster Management Centre in Madison, Wisconsin and the United Nations University in Tokyo. There are six learning modules, developed jointly by UNHCR, the University of Wisconsin and InterWorks.

*Information and learning resources*

34. The Emergency and Security Service in UNHCR Headquarters provided the initial training materials, however the Centre, in cooperation with InterWorks and others, soon developed and adapted additional learning and training materials. An online website library of emergency management and staff safety training and learning materials was also created, including CDs and mini-CDs which are distributed at workshops and upon request. The materials can also be downloaded from the website.

**The Partnership***Overview*

35. The Partnership programme evolved in the aftermath of the Timor crisis and ongoing civil strife and mass human displacements in Mindanao and Indonesia, with attendant fears of refugee outflows to neighbouring countries. There was existing momentum provided by a series of EPRS and eCentre-sponsored Emergency Management Training Programme courses conducted in Indonesia in the latter part of 2000 and in the Philippines and Malaysia during the first quarter of 2001. The Regional Office in Jakarta then decided to hire an expert consultant in May 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the Coordinator).

36. During June 2001, the Coordinator developed an overall regional strategy for emergency preparedness in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. The strategy was articulated in a June 2001 paper and was formally adopted at the Consultative Contingency Planning Workshop, held in Jakarta in July 2001. This workshop was attended by UNHCR, Government and NGO representatives from the four countries.

37. Papua New Guinea also sent a representative to the workshop, but PNG never became a full partner in the strategy because of bilateral sensitivities about Papua Province in Indonesia. The eCentre later included PNG in their emergency preparedness initiatives with an internal, country-specific Contingency Planning Workshop held in June 2003.

38. In order to better prepare for and respond to mass human displacement emergencies, including both refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the overall Partnership strategy focused primarily on increasing the effectiveness of existing government disaster preparedness and coordination institutions in each country. Each of the country's governmental emergency management agencies was targeted for direct capacity development. These were: Indonesia's BAKORNAS Secretariat (an inter-ministerial body responsible for disaster coordination); the Philippine's Office of Civil Defense/National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC); Malaysia's Crisis and Disaster Management Unit in the Division for National Security Division (DFNS); and Timor-Leste's National Disaster Management Office (NDMO).

39. The regional strategy was characterized by four tactical themes:

- to shift from general emergency management training towards contingency planning;
- to shift from a broad national approach towards targeted locales;
- to shift from international towards national trainers and facilitators; and
- to shift from a UNHCR-centric model of preparedness towards national institutional responsibility for disaster preparedness and response.

40. As the project evolved, additional elements and tools were incorporated to enhance addressing the individual country and sub-regional issues, including facilitation of institutional strategic planning; training on global humanitarian rights and standards; establishing and supporting mechanisms for networking and coordination; facilitating governments working across borders (when sensitivities permitted); and building links to and the capacity of regional institutions.

41. The project also discovered that each of the targeted national agencies shared the same issues of credibility and coordination leverage vis-à-vis line ministries and agencies. In order to enhance such coordination in each country, relevant government line ministries and departments as well as NGOs (both local and international) and UN agencies were also actively included in all emergency preparedness and capacity building activities. This inclusion was also considered critical in order to build, expand and reinforce the networks and relationships that are necessary for effective emergency preparedness and response as well as long-term refugee protection.

42. The Partnership also focused on building and reinforcing linkages and coordination with existing regional and other international agencies, with emphasis on the:

- ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM);

- IFRC/National Red Cross Regional Disaster Management Committee (RDMC); and
- Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC).

### *Management*

43. Oversight for the overall four-country strategy was managed through a sequence of three regional workshops, held in Indonesia, which included representatives from the four governments, UNHCR country offices as well as NGOs and international agencies.

- Consultative Contingency Planning Workshop, July 2001;
- Emergency Management & Contingency Planning Workshop, February 2002;
- Partnership for Emergency Preparedness Workshop, February 2003.

44. The first workshop discussed and approved the strategy and first six months of operations. The second workshop reviewed progress and approved activities for 2002 and projections for 2003. The third workshop was a joint Partnership and ASEAN event which, in addition to approving activities for 2003, also included representatives from all ten governments of ASEAN member countries on the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) with whom discussions were held on the potential for UNHCR assistance to develop a ACDM to be capable of becoming operational to conduct training and facilitation for disaster management.

45. Operationally, the project was managed by the full-time Coordinator, based at the UNHCR Regional Office in Jakarta. This was essentially a “one-person” operation, with the Coordinator designing and facilitating nearly every workshop, using participating agency resource persons as necessary. The RO provided administrative support in addition to that provided by the UNHCR Liaison Offices (LO) in Malaysia, Timor-Leste and the Philippines. In Malaysia and the Philippines, specific HCR staff focal points were designated. In Malaysia, this was a function which consumed 75% of the focal point’s time, including facilitation as a support trainer. In the Philippines, the function consumed nearly 50% of the staff member’s time, mainly in administrative and programme support.

46. The Regional Bureau for Asia provided active support for inclusion of the project’s activities in the relevant annual country budgets. The eCentre also actively supported the Partnership with funding of seven workshops as well as sharing learning and training materials in addition to those developed by the Coordinator and adapted to the local situations and languages.

### *Finance*

47. The Partnership was financed from the relevant country annual programme allocations for 2001 through 2003, the major portion of which was budgeted under the Regional Office in Jakarta. Continued support under the annual programme has become more and more difficult because of competing priorities.

# Building staff skills, organizational capacity and networks

## Overview

Workshops, focused on developing individual and organizational capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies as well as the building and maintaining of effective networks, has been the core of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and capacity building (EPCB) activities in the Asia Pacific region. This was achieved through individual staff learning and interaction at workshops. An improvement in organizational learning and performance as well as effective inter-agency communication and coordination was also a parallel goal in most workshops. The primary stated intent of all EPCB activities was to have governmental and non-governmental agencies preparing for and responding effectively to emergencies in the region and around the world. Learning and training materials development and dissemination also supported this core activity.

## Assessing needs and situational flexibility

48. The eCentre assessed needs through regular consultations with UNHCR offices in the region as well as informal consultations with PARinAC, government agencies and some NGOs in Japan. The Partnership followed a similar model, but also held a formal annual regional meeting, with UNHCR, governmental and non-governmental participants from the four concerned countries, to approve an annual plan. The overall approach of both was to flexibly analyze and respond to the needs of organizations, in the context of the situations they faced, by designing and delivering structured, targeted workshops.

49. During the period from mid-2000 until the end of 2003, situational and organizational needs in Asia varied considerably. The following is a brief summary of some of the situations to which the EPCB programme responded with targeted workshops:

- In Japan and Korea, the primary focus was on increasing the capacity of national NGOs to prepare for and respond to emergencies in Asia and other regions of the world. In Malaysia, the government and some NGOs were also embarking on the provision of emergency services in other countries experiencing natural or man-made disasters.
- In Indonesia and the Philippines, ongoing conflicts had led to mass internal displacements in Mindanao and various provinces of Indonesia and also fears of potential refugee outflows to neighbouring countries.
- In Nepal, the Bhutanese refugee situation and an ongoing internal conflict between Maoists and the Government, was a serious de-stabilizing force in the sub-region affecting, not only Bhutan and Nepal, but also India.

- In Sri Lanka, the ongoing internal conflict, balanced with a potential for peace and voluntary repatriation, continued to be of concern.
- In South-east Asia, the internal political turmoil in Myanmar, and the presence of Myanmar refugees in Thailand and Bangladesh, also constituted a situation of concern.
- In the Australia and Pacific region, the continuing arrival of migrants cum refugees by boat and the eventual temporary asylum given to some by Nauru and PNG brought refugee issues to the fore-front of nations which had little experience dealing with asylum seekers.

### **Overall strategy**

50. There were two very broad objectives for any given workshop. The first objective was to develop organizational capacity, primarily through individual staff learning. This was structured around the specific skills or output objectives of any given workshop, such as basic emergency preparedness and response skills, training skills, personal safety skills, using standards in emergencies, contingency planning, strategic planning and identifying lessons learned. The second objective was to facilitate the interaction of participants to develop networks of contacts, in order to foster better inter-agency and inter-personal communication and cooperation in the event of an emergency.

51. The primary strategic difference between the eCentre and Partnership was the latter's targeting of specific agencies for capacity building. This required repetitively focusing on the capacities the agencies wished to learn, such as contingency planning or an ability to train their own staff or learning how to undertake interagency coordinating roles in an emergency or any combination of these skills. Targeted staff members attended multiple workshops, initially as trainees, and then increasingly as trainers or workshop and meeting facilitators. Additionally, the inter-personal and inter-agency networking component was reinforced by participants meeting each other frequently at workshops. Participating agencies were also involved in development or adaptation of training and learning materials in materials development workshops. Inter-agency coordination workshops were also undertaken by the Partnership in order to foster effective networking and communication. The eCentre operated on an assumption that organizational capacity and networking would automatically be positively affected by individual staff learning and inter-action with others at workshops.

### **Types and duration of workshops**

52. Workshop learning was pitched at many levels, based on both organizational and staff needs, in the context of the situations in which they work. It ranged from the broad basics of humanitarian emergency preparedness and response to specific skills such as contingency or strategic planning, training, personal safety in conflict areas, as well as understanding and applying humanitarian standards. Other workshops were focused on inter-agency coordination or identifying lessons-learned and best practice. Workshops varied in duration from one to ten days, with the eCentre focusing most of their resources on five to ten day events, and the

Partnership concentrating on three to five day events. Complete lists of all workshops can be found in Annexes C and D.

### **Agency participation**

53. It would be difficult and ultimately meaningless, to list the more than 200 government, non-government, international and regional agencies which were represented by the more than 2,000 participants in EPCB workshops over the past almost four years. In very broad, summative terms, government agencies responsible for refugees, immigration, disasters, overseas assistance, home or internal affairs, foreign affairs, health, social welfare, public works, police, military and provincial or local authorities were the most numerous. NGOs included international and national members of the SCF, OXFAM, Red Cross/Crescent, Caritas, AMDA, MERCY, MSF and World Vision "families". International and regional agencies included UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, ASEAN, IOM, ICRC and IFRC.

54. Agencies targeted for repeated participation in Japan, including MOFA, JICA, Japan Red Cross, JEN, Peace Winds, SVA, AAR, BHN and Japan Platform. In the Partnership, four national disaster management agencies were targeted for special capacity-building (OCD/NDCC Philippines, DFNS Malaysia, BAKORNAS Indonesia and Timor Leste's NDMO) as well as the Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies (CRIS) at the Bandung College of Social Work and the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM).



## Workshop achievements

### Summary of activities

55. From October 2000 to December 2003, the eCentre facilitated 27 workshops (see Annex C for details). There were a total of 728 participants, of which 42% were government officials; 39% were NGO staff; and 19% were UN and other international or regional organization staff. These workshops were facilitated by a variety of resource people, led by the eCentre Coordinator and, according to specific needs, InterWorks, RedR Australia and/or various UNHCR, UN and other staff.

56. From July 2001 to December 2003, the Partnership facilitated 65 workshops (see Annex D for details) with approximately 1,800 participants (some 1,300 individuals when repetitive attendance at multiple workshops is taken into consideration). An estimated 60% were government officials; 30% were NGO staff; and 10% were UN and international organization staff. The workshops were all facilitated by the Partnership Coordinator.

57. eCentre workshops ranged from one to ten days in length with the average being five days or more. Most eCentre workshops were also regional in nature and involved international travel for many participants, as well as InterWorks when involved, therefore costs were higher. Partnership workshops ranged from one to five days, with an average of three days. A majority of Partnership workshops were also held at a national or local level and facilitated by the full-time coordinator, therefore, costs were correspondingly lower.

### Networking

58. The most frequent comment from both questionnaires and interviews was the value of human interaction at the workshops and new or renewed contacts made between individuals and agencies. Effective inter-agency communication and coordination is an essential element in all emergency situations and its importance is well documented in nearly every UNHCR evaluation of an emergency, stretching from the 1979-1980 Cambodian refugee emergency in Thailand to the 1999-2000 emergency in Timor. As well documented in many of these reports and during the PARinAC process, the most effective time to establish a communication and coordination network is before an emergency actually unfolds.

59. The Partnership workshops in Mindanao were cited as a key element in establishing and maintaining the Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN), a coordination forum of over eighty local and international NGOs, UN agencies and government agencies working in Mindanao. In Indonesia, a group of graduates from a sequence of Partnership emergency management and ToT courses formed the Indonesian Society on Disaster Management. Another example of a network in action, cited by government and NGO interviewees in both countries, was frequent communication between agencies and individuals participating in the two cross-border coordination workshops, in Mindanao and Sabah, held between Malaysia and

the Philippines in July 2002 and April 2003. Another example was cited by several graduates of eCentre workshops who later worked in the Afghanistan and Sierra Leone emergencies, where they met and worked with other eCentre graduates, and formed support networks in both operations.

60. In Japan, a different kind of network was created as a result of the eCentre collaboration with private organizations in Japan, including Toyota Motor Corporation, Japan Airlines and Rissho Kosei-kai (an international Buddhist Organization). Toyota Motor Corporation and Rissho Kosei-kai have provided use of their facilities and Japan Airlines has provided free airline tickets for participants. If an emergency were to unfold in Asia or elsewhere, perhaps this network could be activated to provide assistance outside Japan.

61. On a broader level, UNHCR offices reported gaining credibility from both eCentre and Partnership workshops both in terms of positive feedback from government and non-government participants as well as increased communication. Involvement of military participants in contingency planning workshops in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines was cited for improving planning as well as communication. Others mentioned the opening up of new contacts with police authorities had led to regular exchanges of information on refugee detainees. UNHCR participants reported many cases of being able to use relationships established at workshops as a base for informally discussing matters not directly related to emergency preparedness.

62. Representatives from the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC) and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) all mentioned that coordination with UNHCR had improved through their attendance at eCentre and Partnership workshops. Additionally, IFRC and the Partnership conducted joint training in Indonesia and ADPC was a training partner in Timor-Leste. OCHA and UNDP in Jakarta both praised the role of UNHCR in the Aceh contingency planning process. All this cooperation between agencies and individuals through practical, situation or country-specific workshops creates active networks which can communicate and coordinate more effectively when faced with an internal or external emergency.

63. Interviewees also stated that the learning and training materials distributed by the eCentre and Partnership were also key elements in reinforcing the agency network. One former participant said that the materials provided were something he would put in his suitcase when he was heading for an emergency situation.

64. In order to maintain effective networks, it is important to highlight the importance of facilitating regular contact between agencies because communication needs constant reinforcement and staff members and functions keep changing. Every person has, of course, a personal network of contacts but the eCentre and Partnership should focus on building and maintaining networks of agencies through regular contact between agencies at workshops, through their current staff. An example of the difficulty of trying to maintain a network based on individuals was highlighted during the evaluation, when sending questionnaires to 728 former eCentre workshop participants through the data-base, whereby 44% of the distributed questionnaires were returned because e-mail addresses were no longer valid. The focus of networking must be on current agency staff.

## Individual learning and change

### *General reaction of participants*

65. The first level of evaluation, according to Kirkpatrick, is the general reaction of participants to a learning activity. According to participant feedback summaries prepared by InterWorks for the eCentre, all their workshops received very high ratings in terms of immediate participant satisfaction (an average of 4.5 on a scale of 0 to 5). This pattern was confirmed by interviews with participants from both eCentre and Partnership workshops.

66. The value of such participant feedback is twofold: First, if there's a pattern of similar comments, it can be used by the facilitator to adjust or revise the content and/or process of the workshop. Second, it can be used by the project Coordinator as an input for planning of future workshops. An example was feedback from the April 2002 contingency planning workshop in Thailand, whereby many participants felt that the workshop was too "theoretical" because there was no meaningful representation from the Myanmar Government. Subsequently, the Coordinator ensured that contingency planning workshops were only held when there was both a meaningful situational context and participation by all relevant parties.

67. The only critical workshop feedback received came from some Japanese participants attending workshops in Japan. They reported difficulties in attending workshops because of work commitments when notice was not given six or more months in advance and when the duration of workshops was longer than three days. Facilitators and agency managers also reported some problems with participant selection in Japan, when managers sent subordinates as participants in place of themselves; when participants did not have adequate English Language skills; when participants were too inexperienced for the content of the workshop; and when participants were not scheduled to be working in an emergency situation (and therefore could not use the new skills).

### *Participant learning and using new skills*

68. The second and third levels of Kirkpatrick's evaluation model concern what was actually learned by participants and whether they used the new skills and changed their behaviour on-the job. The vast majority of questionnaire respondents and interviewees reported that they were already working for an agency directly or indirectly involved in refugee and/or emergency relief activities. In Partnership workshops and eCentre workshops held outside Japan, virtually all workshop participants were staff members of such organizations and working full or part time in emergency relief. In Japan-based workshops, there were some Japanese participants outside this overall pattern, including academics, journalists and individuals wishing to become involved in refugee or emergency relief work.

69. Feedback from interviews and questionnaire responses indicated that, without exception, all workshop participants felt they learned a lot personally. Most also reported that they had also used much of what they learned on the job. For example, many participants reported returning to their organizations and sharing information and materials from the workshops with their colleagues and, sometimes, senior

management. Additionally, according to questionnaire responses, highly valued workshop learning used by participants included the following:

- Understanding of UNHCR policies, standards and activities
- Knowledge and skills in emergency preparedness, contingency planning and personal safety
- The importance of communication and collaboration with other agencies in the field
- Refugee law and other international humanitarian legal instruments

70. Also, feedback from interviews outside Japan repeatedly highlighted the value and use of contingency planning, training, personal safety and general emergency management skills. Many also indicated that training itself was felt to be an incentive, motivating them to work harder and more effectively in their organization.

### **Organizational learning and change**

71. Development of governmental, non-governmental and regional agencies capable of effectively preparing for and responding to emergencies is a core overall goal of the eCentre and Partnership programmes. Also, influencing or changing an organization is the fourth level of Kirkpatrick's evaluation model, and by far the most difficult to achieve and measure. Indeed, as the programme is only in its fourth year of operation, it's probably too early to meaningfully measure overall impact on participating organizations. However, there are several indicators of organizational learning. One common example was organizations reporting use of workshop training materials in their own internal training. Also cited was the use and internal distribution of reference materials such as the UNHCR emergency manual.

72. The impact of specific skills workshops, such as contingency planning and training of trainers (TOT), was easier to assess than the impact of general emergency management skill workshops. Organizations reported, or evaluators were able to see, many contingency plans completed and/or approved by a higher authority. Managers and graduates of TOTs were also able to track the number of subsequent training workshops undertaken. Two examples were found in the Philippines, where the Tawi-Tawi provincial contingency plan (developed at a Partnership workshop) was seen to have been used during mass deportations of ethnic-Filipinos from Sabah back to Mindanao. The second example was very positive feedback received from five local participants in contingency planning workshops run by two TOT graduates whereby two municipal contingency plans were developed.

73. In Malaysia, there was one example of a reported broad organizational impact, where the head of a medical relief NGO which went to work in Afghanistan reported that their overall emergency management had shifted greatly as compared to their earlier experience in Kosovo, based upon what she and another staff member learned at an eCentre workshop. More detailed analysis is provided in the following descriptions of impact on seven organizations.

74. Six organizations were targeted by the Partnership for capacity building, including BAKORNAS in Indonesia; OCD/NDCC in the Philippines; DFNS in

Malaysia; NDMO in Timor-Leste; CRIC in Indonesia; and the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management. A seventh organization, JICA, reported organizational change as a result of eCentre workshops. The impact of workshops on these organizations varied from useful to very significant. The dynamics and extent of what organizational learning and changes did or did not occur are described in more detail below:

*BAKORNAS, Indonesia*

75. When Partnership interventions commenced in July of 2001, the BAKORNAS Secretariat (an inter-ministerial body responsible for coordinating disaster response, including IDPs and refugees) was a small government secretariat of only fifteen staff, in the office of the Vice President. They had responsibility for coordination of relief for several major groups of IDPs around the country, victims of both natural and man-made disasters. There were also fears of some fleeing to neighbouring Malaysia.

76. There were twelve Partnership/BAKORNAS co-sponsored workshops (see Annex E), spread over 18 months, focused mainly on training, planning and information management skills. Core BAKORNAS staff attended all the workshops along with approximately 200 participants from other government civilian agencies as well as the police and military plus NGOs and UN Agencies. Three BAKORNAS staff members plus one person from the Ministry of Health became skilled trainers and facilitators during this process.

77. Additionally, horizontal communication and coordination between traditional and very hierarchical government agencies was very poor, with negative consequences for the IDP assistance programme. The same was true for coordination with NGOs. Interviews indicated that inter-agency communication and cooperation improved significantly during the period of the workshops, especially with MOH, MSW, MPW and MOHA.

78. Working with the Partnership Coordinator, BAKORNAS also translated the UNHCR Emergency and SPHERE handbooks into Bahasa Indonesia and distributed 1,000 copies of each to provincial and district officials, NGOs and workshop participants. They also, again with the Coordinator's assistance, adapted and translated standard emergency management training and contingency planning modules into Bahasa Indonesia, based on UNHCR emergency preparedness materials.

79. Feedback from interviews indicated that the organization's performance was noticeably improving throughout 2002, in particular the amount and quality of training being undertaken and the coordination with other agencies. Unfortunately, in late 2002, BAKORNAS experienced a big management crisis, when 60 staff from the executive branch of government were transferred to the agency. Given the resultant chaos, the organization became rather dysfunctional and capacity-building interventions were halted in early 2003. Traces of UNHCR's input through training workshops and networking, however, could be seen and are acknowledged at the sectoral level in several line ministries.

*OCD/NDCC Philippines*

80. In the Philippines, the Partnership targeted the Office of Civil Defense/National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC). Interventions focused primarily on five key regional offices (RDCC) located in Mindanao where there was a major IDP problem and a fear of a refugee outflow to neighbouring Malaysia. The RDCC offices had a mandated coordination function during emergencies, but were basically inactive due to resource constraints and lack of a clear strategy, while line ministries and numerous NGOs provided relief in an uncoordinated manner with lots of duplication and plenty of gaps.

81. The intervention strategy focused on development of a capacity to facilitate provincial and municipal contingency planning, using of a core of skilled facilitators trained through TOT and followed by team-facilitation of CP workshops. Initially, the activities were funded primarily under the partnership but, in 2003, SCF/US (backed by USAID-OFDA funding) and UNDP (backed by EU funding for Mindanao) increasingly began to fund the emergency preparedness and capacity building activities.

82. A total of 26 NDCC/Partnership workshops were held from March 2001 through the end of 2003 (see Annex E). An estimated 700 participants, many of whom attended sequences of workshops, benefited. Participation varied greatly according to specific workshop objectives but participating organizations included many civil service agencies, the police and the military, as well as international and local NGOs and international agencies such as UNDP, ICRC/IFRC and UNICEF.

83. As a result of these interventions and the contingency planning initiative, an additional 124 contingency plans were developed at provincial and municipal level workshops during 2002 and 2003, facilitated by the core RDCC and government counterpart facilitators. This process involved more than 3,000 people in the development of these plans, representing civil society as well as governmental and non-governmental agencies.

84. In interviews, the most frequent comment was that the NDCC, as an organization, had been completely re-vitalized, from an inactive agency with theoretical responsibility for coordinating during disasters to an agency with an active agenda of contingency planning and coordination networking with international NGOs and local agencies (of which there are more than eighty in Mindanao alone).

85. In addition to the core contingency planning function internalized by the RDCC, the Partnership also introduced workshops on humanitarian standards and legal instruments; and inter-agency cooperation and coordination. Basic UNHCR and other emergency preparedness and protection learning and training materials were also adapted to the Philippine situation and more than 10,000 contingency planning manuals were printed and distributed.

*DFNS, Malaysia*

86. The Partnership focused their interventions primarily on the Crisis and Disaster Management Unit of the Division for National Security (DFNS) in the Prime

Minister's Office, the agency mandated to coordinate all disaster preparedness and response in Malaysia. The DFNS is a sophisticated disaster management agency with a lot of authority and resources, both human and fiscal. There is a clear national, state and local structure for preparedness and management of disasters, articulated under Directive 20 of the National Security Council.

87. The Malaysian government sees emergency preparedness and response as primarily a state function which is closely related to security. The DFNS has articulated their need to continually learn and improve their expertise in disaster preparedness and response. They also want to work more effectively with NGOs as one way to build and strengthen emergency preparedness and response networks. They also wish to expand their competence as providers of disaster relief assistance in other countries.

88. Partnership interventions with DFNS focused on providing additional expertise from UNHCR's eCentre and Partnership staff, InterWorks, RedR Australia as well as from participants from other countries. They reported that the training also helped them to develop better training techniques for formulating and delivering in-house disaster preparedness and response training.

89. The structure of the DFNS interventions followed the basic Partnership emergency preparedness model, whereby graduates of a contingency planning workshop and a TOT focused on facilitating local contingency planning. Graduates of the TOT were divided into teams to practice their new facilitation skills and co-facilitate contingency planning at the state level, with the Partnership Coordinator. Some 250 participants directly benefited from the 14 workshops (see Annex E), again with many attending a sequence of workshops.

90. As it was the case in the Philippines, UNHCR-sponsored training workshops provided DFNS officers at national and state levels to define their coordinating mandate and to have such mandate acknowledged by other agencies.

91. Draft contingency planning outputs from state workshops were seen but not the resultant official contingency plans, because these were regarded as confidential government security documents. Government and NGO interviewees both cited better coordination during the Sabah to Mindanao deportations, both internally in Sabah and with the Philippine authorities (as a result of the two joint, cross-border contingency planning workshops).

*NDMO, Timor-Leste*

92. Timor-Leste is an extremely poor country (among the world's 50 poorest countries) with a new governing structure. The country is going through a crisis of changing from almost 100% dependence on the UN and donors, towards setting up their own governing civil service. The country has a very limited human resource base and all government institutions can be characterized as weak with a low operational capacity.

93. The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) is a very small unit of only seven persons, formed in March of 2001, in the Ministry of Internal Administration. It started with only its human resources and is moving slowly to try and increase its

operational capacity. Partnership interventions with the NDMO have been coordinated with UNDP and ADPC (UNDP's contractual partner) from the beginning. The intervention comprised seven workshops, benefiting an estimated 200 participants, from March 2002 through June 2003 (see Annex E).

94. The intervention model followed the basic Partnership approach, with national training on basic disaster preparedness and management skills, replicated through a TOT aimed at eventually training officials in the 12 districts in the country. Under the Partnership, three pilot district workshops were co-facilitated by TOT graduates and UNHCR facilitators. Subsequently, eight additional district training workshops were held, with UNDP, OXFAM and ADPC assistance, thereby reaching eleven of the twelve districts.

95. Given the devastation of the governing structure, UNHCR input has provided some momentum for the revival of emergency management policies, structures and mechanisms. There has, thus far, been no demonstrated increase in the NDMO's capacity to coordinate emergency preparedness and response. They are still very dependent upon the International Community (the UN and NGOs in particular) for disaster response. Given the overall needs of the new government and civil service, it will be a long-term process to increase their institutional capacity.

*Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, Bandung, Indonesia*

96. In 2002, a "Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies" (CRIS) was created by the Bandung College of Social Work with assistance from the Partnership. The purpose was to develop this academic but active community practicum-focused institution (under the Ministry of Social Affairs) to complement the activities of BAKORNAS. They have sixteen full and part-time staff including lecturers, doctoral candidates and support personnel

97. The Centre's purpose is to develop a long-term refugee and IDP training and research institution with three primary goals:

- to develop professional social workers who are knowledgeable about refugee and IDP rights and have skills to work in situations of mass displacement;
- to raise public awareness about refugees and IDPs; and
- to work with communities on disaster preparedness.

98. CRIS has expanded the college's curriculum to include three permanent courses, with participation of approximately 90 students per year:

- Basic Refugee/IDP rights and protection (2nd year);
- Basic Disaster management (2nd year);
- Social work with refugees (3rd year).

99. A fourth course on refugee and IDP community conflict resolution is under preparation. Additionally, there is a compulsory six-day orientation on refugees and IDPs for approximately 200 new students each year.

100. Partnership-sponsored activities in support of CRIS included seven workshops during 2002 (see Annex E), following the now-familiar basic training plus TOT model. The first two workshops were facilitated by the Partnership Coordinator and the others were facilitated by CRIS staff. UNHCR guidelines on refugee children and women were also translated into Bahasa Indonesia and distributed to staff, students and social workers.

101. Subsequent to the Partnership workshops, CRIS, at the request of the Ministry of Social Affairs, has undertaken three missions to mediate in community conflicts in Aceh, Sulawesi and Ambon and also been requested to facilitate emergency preparedness training workshops at two other social work colleges. In addition, the CRIS has been commissioned by the National Board for the Management of Disasters and IDPs to conduct a national mapping of social conflict.

*ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM);*

102. As the Partnership Project was under headquarters and budgetary pressure to phase down during the second half of 2002, UNHCR studied the possibility of institutionalizing and mainstreaming the initiative into a more stable existing regional institution instead of creating a new structure. Among several candidates, the newly reconstituted ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) demonstrated the most potential.

103. At the beginning of 2003, a Partnership strategy was articulated to develop and strengthen this inactive ASEAN committee. The Partnership Project introduced three elements to the ACDM: 1) an Expert Consultant to provide technical expertise (i.e. the existing Coordinator); 2) funding to enable the ACDM to organize quarterly regional meetings (for the purpose of defining its emergency preparedness strategy); and 3) refugee and humanitarian components to complement the predominantly natural disaster focus of its original mandate. If successful, it was thought that this committee might eventually be able to act as a successor to the Partnership and accept a lead role for developing and facilitating effective disaster management and contingency planning training. The capacity-building effort has been centered on strengthening and promoting the ACDM to be the primary inter-governmental body dealing with disaster and emergency situations in the ASEAN region. UNHCR envisioned its intensive support to the ACDM to cover the period of 2003 to 2005, allowing sufficient time for the Committee to secure its own funding and technical resources base. UNHCR-supported technical expertise and funding support has, thus far, facilitated the following activities:

- Partnership Regional Seminar, February 2003, Jakarta: an opportunity for ACDM to brainstorm on various potential regional schemes and activities
- ACDM Regional Workshop, August 2003, Manila: setting collective objectives, and scheduling a series of cooperative regional activities with UNHCR for the period of 2003-2005.
- ACDM Regional Workshop, Bangkok, Oct. 2003: Selecting five priority projects and planning the first official meeting.

- ACDM First Meeting, Brunei Darussalam, Dec. 2003: taking decisions on the regional programme and its five priority projects.
- ACDM Regional Workshop, Luang Prabang, Laos, Mar. 2004: preparing the formal launching of the ASEAN Regional Programme
- ACDM Regional Meeting, Bali, May 2004: the actual launching of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management.

104. The biggest potential weakness of the ACDM is its consensus-based decision-making structure which requires all ten participating governments to agree. Most interviewees praised the initiative but felt that it was not in UNHCR's interest to think of totally "handing over" all Partnership activities to the ACDM. They felt that UNHCR should continue to be directly involved in EPCB activities as a long-term strategy, while continuing to build the ACDM's operational capacity as a key regional partner.

*JICA, Japan*

105. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was not targeted for specific capacity-building however, through participation of 18 staff in eCentre workshops they reported changes in their training systems because of the approaches and techniques they had experienced and learned in eCentre workshops. They have also actively developed an internal staff safety training programme, with support from UNHCR staff safety specialists in Asia.

106. JICA is a large, formally-structured government agency, responsible for external development assistance. Those interviewed noted that the agency was "ready for change" with a new, expanded mandate for peace-building and post-conflict rehabilitation and new leadership under Ms. Ogata. The workshops were very relevant to JICA staff and the influence on JICA was seen by several to be remarkable. Another reported example is JICA's formulation of a peace-building programme in Sri Lanka based partially on the results of a regional eCentre emergency management workshop. JICA has also indicated interest in funding or co-sponsoring specific eCentre training events.

**Other impact**

*Japan*

107. In the original planning, several beneficiary groups were targeted, the foremost being Japanese NGOs with a projected 50% of workshop places being reserved for NGO participants. They were targeted because Japanese NGOs were seen to lack a sufficient human resource capacity to respond quickly to humanitarian disasters in Asia and other parts of the world. At the same time, the Japanese Government was encouraging more visibility by Japanese agencies based upon the large amount of development and relief assistance it was dispersing internationally. The government also supported the establishment of the Japan Platform, a consortium of NGOs, business and government concerned with international emergency assistance.

108. As the eCentre developed, it shifted its focus somewhat, with a total of 47% of participants representing governmental agencies and 33% from NGOs over the initial three year period. During 2003, however, the emphasis seemed to be swinging back towards greater NGO participation, with 42% of participants. The major governmental and NGO agencies targeted by the eCentre can be grouped in three rough categories: the large organizations with budgets over ten million dollars (JICA, MOFA, Cabinet Office, International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, the Red Cross, Rissho Koseikai and World Vision Japan); the medium-sized organizations with budgets between five and ten million dollars (Japan Platform, JEN, Peace Winds Japan, AMDA and SVA); and the smaller organizations with budgets of less than five million dollars (AAR, Asia Pacific NPO Assistance Club, Basic Human Needs Association (BHN), Bridge Asia Japan, SHARE, Humanitarian Medical Assistance and Save the Children Japan).

109. For most Japanese NGOs and governmental organizations (the exception being JICA), the impact of workshops has not yet been seen to go very far beyond the individual participants. It is also, in the opinion of many, much too early to measure change or impact on these organizations, especially in the Japanese context where change tends to be a long, consensus-building process. Also, many organizations may not be ready for, or do not see the need for, change. Several NGO managers mentioned during interviews that they do not expect the workshops or the training to change their organizations and were satisfied with their staff's acquisition of new knowledge, practical skills and the opportunity to network with others.

110. The impact seen in internal training, such as that with JICA as well as a successful leadership training initiative undertaken by World Vision International with World Vision Japan does, however, suggest that organizational change is possible if it is tailored to the needs of the particular organization concerned. The fact that JICA has been able to effectively adapt what they learned from UNHCR demonstrates that change is possible.

111. Interviews with managers of Japanese organizations found that many did not think organizational capacity could be built solely through training alone. A majority of managers thought that building NGO capacity probably needed a more comprehensive and integrated approach focused on issues such as a proper working environment for staff; professional career opportunities; more sophisticated fundraising and adequate pay. For example, many NGOs are staffed with younger, single short-term people who have some overseas humanitarian experience but are also highly mobile in their lifestyle. Also, Japanese NGOs are widely seen to lack broad public understanding and are typically regarded as being on the fringe of civil society.

112. As mentioned previously, the eCentre has been seen by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as one vehicle to promote a better understanding of refugee and humanitarian issues and to increase support by civil society for Japan's contribution to emergency and humanitarian assistance. However, it is almost impossible to assess the impact of the eCentre on Japanese civil society. Recognition of UNHCR and its mandate during Ms. Ogata's tenure as High Commissioner was high but dropped once she left office. Also, the eCentre was not designed to take on a role of promoting recognition of UNHCR in the region or to reach out to the Japanese public.

*Other countries and situations*

113. In addition to impact in the four Partnership countries and Japan, including the seven specific agencies outlined above, other countries and sub-regions in the Asia-Pacific region faced various refugee, IDP and potential refugee situations and benefited from eCentre workshops.

114. The 2003 emergency management workshop in Nepal had a quiet, underlying theme about efforts to find durable solutions for the long-standing Bhutanese refugee situation as it affects Nepal, India and Bhutan as well as the ongoing civil conflict within Nepal. In other words, there were two objectives: one about learning and sharing emergency management skills; and the other about building relationships and working together cooperatively in the face of joint problems. Interviewees felt that both objectives were achieved but noted, realistically, that relationship building for tackling long-term, complex problems takes time and that this workshop needed to be part of a strategic sequence of learning and networking events over a multi-year period.

115. The UNHCR office in Papua New Guinea Office reopened in 2003 and has been focused on ensuring protection for refugees, most from Papua Province in Indonesia (formerly Irian Jaya). Capacity building with the authorities has focused on reception of refugees, refugee status determination and the introduction of domestic asylum legislation. The primary objective of the 2003 contingency planning workshop was to build the base for a national contingency plan for a possible mass influx of refugees.

116. PNG participants were from agencies that have involvement with refugee and immigration emergencies, e.g. health, police, provincial and district administration as well as NGOs and church agencies. The contingency plan created in the workshop was submitted to the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) for endorsement. The plan is scheduled to be updated in August 2004. Again, interviewees felt that such workshops should not be "one-off" but should be part of a longer-term process of reinforcing learning and relationships.

117. The situational back-drop of the regional 2002 workshop in New Zealand was the then ongoing attempts of migrants cum refugees to arrive in Australia. After intensive diplomatic interventions, temporary asylum was given by several Pacific states, including Naru and PNG, and the potential for more refugee arrivals was felt to be high. The objectives were, again, twofold: basic emergency management skills and building cooperation and coordination between wide-spread Pacific countries and agencies. Although refugee arrivals decreased over the following eighteen months, those interviewed felt that the workshop had achieved what they regarded as its most important objective, that of bringing people together to forge a useable network.

118. The background to the 2002 contingency planning workshop in Thailand was the situation of the internal political turmoil in Myanmar, and the presence of Myanmar refugees in Thailand and Bangladesh. Several former participants felt that, although agency and personal relationships were strengthened on the Thailand side of the situation, the lack of Myanmar Government participation minimized the potential impact. Following the workshop, constructive dialogue has been reinforced between UNHCR and the Government of Myanmar on issues related to

the sustainable reintegration of returnees to the North Rakhine State. Other capacity building initiatives such as workshops on human rights and refugee law for government officials were launched in 2003 and were planned to be expanded in 2004, including a possible lessons-learned workshop.

### **Workshop analysis and strategy**

#### *Overall workshop goals*

119. As described above, the primary reported impact of the eCentre and Partnership has been in four areas. The first component was universally-reported high levels of personal learning and satisfaction. The second component was a widely-reported, indirectly positive impact on UNHCR's credibility with government agencies achieved through holding joint, non-confrontational workshops which meet the needs of both parties. The third component was reported satisfaction with networks built or reinforced through agencies and staff participating in workshops. The fourth component was the reported positive impact on seven specific agencies.

120. Literally all Partnership and eCentre workshops received very positive feedback from participants, who reported high levels of personal learning and satisfaction as well as considerable, but not universal, use of new skills and knowledge on-the-job. This can be interpreted as a very positive confirmation of the eCentre's and the Partnership's ability to design and facilitate excellent workshops which generally meet the needs of individuals in terms of both practical content and process.

121. As regards building and reinforcing UNHCR's relationship and credibility with governments and their component agencies, as well as building networks, it is probably safe to assume that this is primarily dependent upon effective selection of agencies and staff to participate in workshops, as well as assuring that individual needs are met in terms of practical content and non-confrontational process.

122. If individual satisfaction and learning, including almost constant requests for more training from nearly all participating organizations, and positive governmental feedback are taken as the measures of impact, then eCentre and Partnership workshops in the Asia Pacific region could easily continue for many years, with periodic shifts in emphasis, content and participant selection as necessary, and with reasonably predictable positive outcomes.

123. However, the goals of the eCentre and the Partnership are not focused solely on individual learning as well as relationship and network-building. Participant learning, positive relationships and effective networks are highly valued, but the primary articulated goal of the EPCB activities in the Asia Pacific region is helping Asian **organizations** build up and maintain their capacity for effectively preparing for and responding to emergencies in Asia and elsewhere.

124. The Partnership has this goal clearly in sight but the eCentre's working assumption that organizational learning and change will automatically occur through individual staff participation in learning activities seems flawed. The eCentre should clearly target a limited number of specific governmental and non-

governmental agencies in the Asia-Pacific region for capacity-building. Additionally, the specific functional capacities to be developed must be clearly defined.

125. This does not mean that workshops should be limited to only a few organizations but, rather, that key organizations and their staff are clearly targeted for frequent and repeated involvement in specific functional learning workshops, based upon an analysis of the organization's needs. The organizations in question also need to agree with their organizational learning objectives. The selection of other organizations to be involved in any particular workshop would, as at present, be dependent upon the context of the specific refugee or IDP situation being faced and the need for building relationships and networks.

126. In summary, the ability of the eCentre and the Partnership to provide excellent learning workshops is well-established. What remains to be done is refining the task of agency capacity-building and balancing it with building and maintaining credible relationships and networks.

*Workshop targeting, frequency and duration*

127. Within the overall strategy described above, it is important to clearly target workshops to meet organizational needs. The Partnership and the eCentre are not learning institutions with a curriculum of courses or workshops to be selected by individual students. Workshops must be clearly focused on meeting the needs of identified partner organizations in relation to the actual or potential refugee and IDP situations they face. Both the Partnership and the eCentre have a core body of well-designed and tested workshops, but these workshops must be continually adapted in terms of content, frequency and duration to meet organizational needs.

128. To build the capacity of organizations, the actual function(s) to be developed or improved must be clearly defined and the relevant responsible staff member(s) identified. Also, the structure of the training intervention must include actual performance on-the-job. Individual long-term learning is best achieved by sequencing a structured learning experience, such as that provided by a workshop; followed by learner replication, often under supervision while on-the-job; and, sometimes, reinforced by another structured learning activity at the same or a higher level.

129. Learning can be achieved through a multi-day sequence of learning and practice at a workshop, or through a sequence of learning at a workshop followed by practice on-the-job over several weeks or months. There are no hard-and-fast "rules" but workshops and structured follow-up must be clearly defined and scheduled if staff and organizations are going to learn effectively and change the way they work. This approach has been used effectively by the Partnership and should also be adopted by the eCentre. Simultaneously, sequencing of learning and frequent contact between individuals and agencies is what also develops and reinforces relationships and networks. One specific example follows in the section on training trainers.

130. Another factor which must be considered is the duration of workshops and the number of agency staff members which can participate. Longer workshops, such as the current ten-day/two week eCentre's Basics of International Humanitarian

Response, provides a sophisticated sequence of content and experiential learning targeted primarily at staff who have little emergency experience. The relative value of such a workshop, to the participating agencies and UNHCR, must be compared to the value of two or more shorter workshops, with similar or different content, and with double or triple the number of participants. Again, there is no hard-and-fast rule for setting priorities but the eCentre should review their workshop priorities, using the participating agencies needs as the primary criteria. Another related example follows in the section on staff safety.

*Training of trainers and facilitators*

131. Feedback from train-the-trainers (TOT) and train-the-facilitators workshops, can be summarized as follows: when such a workshop is structured so that participants must immediately replicate their new skills in another workshop, then a lot of learning and some impact can be expected. In order to be successful at grounding their new skills, trainees must co-train with an experienced trainer or facilitator the first few times after the initial workshop. If an organizational capacity for training is desired, then the trainers must also eventually become trainers-of-trainers in their own right and that takes considerable time and experience. It also requires that they be a full-time, long-term professional in the organization concerned. Training trainers or facilitators who will not do training or facilitation is a waste of resources.

132. Workshops for training of trainers or facilitators must also be linked to the specific objective of the training or facilitation. The basic model for building an agency's training or facilitation capacity is to:

- learn the basic content of the intended training (such as emergency management or contingency planning);
- learn training or facilitation skills (using the specific content training materials);
- undertake supervised training/facilitation several times (often in co-training teams with colleagues);
- train/facilitate independently.

*Staff safety workshops*

133. In today's post-conflict humanitarian relief and development world, with a rising incidence of violence against aid workers during the past few years, staff safety is a very strong need. The five-day regional staff safety workshops held in Thailand all received very high ratings and were followed by constant governmental and NGO demands for further training, including secondment of UNHCR resource persons. Many former participants credited the workshop and instructors for changing their personal thinking. Actual behavior change, of course, remains to be tested as few have faced such situations since the workshops.

134. Given the large number of requests for staff safety training, and the current limited capacity to meet those needs, the eCentre should consider two additional activities: first, working with FSS in headquarters, to design and pilot-test a shorter version of the workshop which does not require sophisticated military training

facilities; and, second, also working with FSS in headquarters, develop a workshop and a process to train field safety advisors to become effective staff safety workshop facilitators.

135. The current workshop is excellent but, in order to meet the huge needs, an effort should be made to also develop a shorter version which can reach a wider audience in locations where military facilities are not available. For example, the Partnership countries may need staff safety training in a national context such as agencies working in high conflict areas of Indonesia. The eCentre and the Partnership must always strive to meet organizational needs, within the available resources, and up to an adequate standard, but not necessarily of the highest possible standard.

### **Materials development and dissemination**

136. The eCentre and Partnership published and/or adapted an impressive array of training and learning materials and references. These materials range from mini CDs containing basic emergency management content to reference materials such as the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies; Project Planning in UNHCR; UNHCR Registration; UNHCR Commodity Distribution - A Practical Guide for Field Staff; the UNHCR Water Manual for Refugee Situations; UN Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines; and Protecting Refugees - A Field Guide for NGOs. Additionally, there are adapted materials such as the Contingency Planning Guide for Local Government in the Philippines and the documents and manuals translated into Bahasa Indonesia. Dissemination occurs primarily through resources material distribution at workshops and downloading from the eCentre website or by requesting directly from the eCentre and Partnership Coordinators.

137. A majority of interviewees highlighted the importance of the learning resources received at workshops and many stated that they used them as references in their day-to-day work. They recounted many incidents where they referred to the references, in particular the UNHCR and SHPERE standards. Others mentioned the contingency planning guides. Others used workshop PowerPoint slides as training and briefing aids.

138. The most critical remaining task is the integration of Partnership learning and training materials into the eCentre resource base, including training outlines and PowerPoint modules for all the Partnership workshops. Currently, the Partnership resources are located in the Coordinator's computer and in various one-off CD-ROMs and other materials distributed at the end of each workshop, but no comprehensive "library" exists. The two Coordinators must work together to integrate all the Partnership materials with those of the eCentre. The eCentre resource base will also be a critical reference point if UNHCR decides to expand emergency preparedness and capacity building activities to other regions of the world.

# Management

## **Governance and oversight**

139. The eCentre has an advisory Board composed of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Coordinator of the Asia-Pacific Consultations (APC), the University of Wisconsin, PARinAC Japan, the Emergency and Security Section and Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific from headquarters and the Regional Office in Tokyo. These organisations were instrumental in the planning and establishment of the eCentre. The members provided guidance through individual consultations, and as a group through formal meetings of the full Board. For the first two years of the project, an annual full Board meeting was held in addition to frequent individual consultations with Board members. In the final year of the project, only individual consultations were held, because the work of the eCentre was well established and, also, uncertainty over the 2004 funding caused continual delays in setting a date for a meeting. During 2003, functional oversight was basically undertaken at the annual UNHCR Asia Pacific Representatives meeting.

140. Oversight for the Partnership was achieved by an annual workshop meeting with UNHCR, Governmental and NGO representatives from the four relevant countries. All funding came from UNHCR's annual programme. Interviewees felt that this form of governance worked very well. The Coordinator typically undertook individual consultations with governmental, NGO and UNHCR counterparts in all four countries, to assess needs and to propose activities. Country-specific proposals were brought to the annual regional meeting where country representatives collectively determined which activities would be undertaken and at what overall level of resource commitment by UNHCR. The management has proven to be effective in promoting a sense of sub-regional ownership.

141. Achieving effective ownership of the EPCB programme has not been easy. The basic Partnership model of an annual coordination workshop of UNHCR, Government and NGO representatives is probably the easiest and most flexible structure. Major donors should also be involved. Such a workshop format, rather than a meeting, is also an opportunity for joint thematic, lessons-learned or best-practice type activities.

142. Ownership must also actively include all UNHCR offices in Asia. This ownership by national UNHCR offices was achieved at two levels: first, through participation of the Representatives in the annual coordinating workshop at a strategic level; and, second through appointing designated UNHCR operational focal points at the country level. These focal points liaise directly with the EPCB programme and local participating organizations as well as helping with the facilitation or administration of workshops which occur in their country.

### **National and regional operational partners**

143. Both the eCentre and the Partnership set objectives to develop and transfer training and facilitation responsibilities to local or regional partners. This has been partially realized for both the eCentre and the Partnership. The eCentre has assisted JICA to develop its training capacity and the workshop facilitation base has been widened to include Red-R Australia and the use of resource persons from a wide range of agencies but no other national or regional institutional partners in Asia are in evidence.

144. In the Partnership, as described above and with variations in the level of competence, national governmental disaster coordination agencies in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Timor Leste are largely intact and continuing to develop. On a broader sub-regional level, the ten-nation ASEAN Committee for Disaster Management is showing potential as a facilitation base for emergency preparedness activities. There are also a couple of large donor governments interested in funding the Committee's preparedness and training activities.

145. As described in more detail below, there needs to be a joint UNHCR/operational partner approach to the programme, with at least one key partner agency in each of the concerned countries. UNHCR should assist each of these agencies to develop their own capacity to provide training and facilitation services for emergency preparedness. Such agencies, working with the eCentre and Partnership, can co-facilitate and co-sponsor various national and sub-regional training activities. This is an important factor in achieving Asian ownership and sustainability while, at the same time, also keeping UNHCR directly involved. This concept focuses on building strategic partnerships with national and regional agencies on a long-term basis.

### **Management and staffing**

146. The eCentre is staffed by one professional coordinator and a half-time administrative assistant plus full backup from the Regional Office in Tokyo. It has standing contractual support arrangements with InterWorks, a private company with long-term ties to EPRS and the University of Wisconsin. It also works with RedR Australia (funded by the Australian Government) and has a wide network of internal UNHCR resources to call upon as well resource persons from other UN agencies and NGOs.

147. The Partnership has one full-time trainer/facilitator who also acts as the overall coordinator. General administrative back-up is provided by RO Jakarta and the other UNHCR offices in the sub-region, but not to the same extent as the eCentre. There are no standing contractual arrangements for the provision of external resource, however participating agency resource persons are used frequently.

148. The Asia Pacific region has a large pool of highly skilled human resources, including expertise in training, facilitation and disaster management. These resources are easily available to the eCentre and the Partnership from the public, private and non-governmental sectors. As envisioned in the original eCentre objectives, the programme should wean itself from dependence on organizations outside the Asia Pacific region, such as InterWorks, and increasingly use the human

resources available from operational partners. This is not a critical comment on InterWorks, which has provided an extremely high level of expertise over the past three years but, rather, pointing out the need to build a base for all activities in Asia. Even if the regionally-available expertise is not initially equivalent to that provided by InterWorks, the use of regional human resources will, in itself, increase the level of skill and competence. This is another important way to create a sense of regional ownership. In workshops, the eCentre should also use expertise available from the Partnership.

149. Based on an assessment of the achievements and strengths of both the e-Centre and the Partnership, the activities should be combined in a single Asia Pacific strategy with a unified, but decentralized UNHCR field-based management structure, reporting to ESS in Headquarters. The Partnership facilitator would continue to function on a semi-autonomous, sub-regional basis in South-east, and probably South Asia, under the overall supervision of the eCentre coordinator. The eCentre would have two functions, the first as overall coordinator for the Asia-Pacific region and the second as a sub-regional facilitator for North and East Asia. Exact areas of responsibility would need to be clearly defined. Overall support and guidance has already been shifted from RBAP to ESS in Geneva, which is already considering the setting up of two similar programmes in the Middle East/West Asia and Africa.

150. As mentioned above, the Partnership coordinator has focused a lot of energy on selecting and working directly with specific agencies, through workshops and frequent direct consultations, in order to develop their emergency preparedness and response capacity. The eCentre should also undertake a similar role to select and work directly with key agencies in the North and East Asia sub-region and elsewhere. Agency needs in the South Asia sub-region should also be assessed. If the eCentre coordinator does not have sufficient time to undertake this additional function, then the eCentre should consider contracting one full-time consultant or two part-time consultants to work with the targeted agencies as well as undertake training/facilitation functions formerly provided by InterWorks. The consultant(s) would also provide a capacity to assist targeted agencies and train/facilitate in the South Asia sub-region. Another option would be to place one of the part-time consultants with the Partnership facilitator. The consultants could be either directly contracted by UNHCR or sub-contracted through a partner agency.

151. Staff selection is neither easy nor straight-forward in the current confused and grid-locked UNHCR human-resources management context. Both the eCentre and the Partnership have been highly successful, based on the extraordinary commitment, skills and outreach-oriented personalities of their coordinators. Also, both coordinators are directly facilitating workshops or networking outside the office for 50 - 70% of the time. Managing the eCentre and Partnership components requires a unique blend of emergency management, training/facilitation and networking skills. These are specialized jobs and cannot be undertaken by general UNHCR line-managers. The importance of this factor cannot be over-emphasized when applied to the future selection of UNHCR and operational partner staff for such programmes anywhere in the world.

## Policy guidance

152. The evaluation Terms of Reference (see Annex A) requested that the evaluators look at policy guidance from the Bureau for Asia and the Pacific and the Emergency and Security Service at Headquarters. The eCentre and Partnership strategies were both developed and articulated by the field. The Regional Representative in Tokyo at the time the eCentre was established, was the former head of EPRS in Geneva, and the Coordinator also came from an EPRS background as well as having a lot of training experience. This alone ensured a certain consistency of approach. The Partnership benefited from eCentre guidance and the Coordinator was a very experienced disaster management and training professional who had worked with UNHCR in community service functions.

153. Contrary to first impressions of a large bureaucracy, UNHCR's organizational culture is actually very decentralized. New initiatives in UNHCR are expected to be articulated by the field and only the broadest policy, such as is found in the organization's mandate and various International Protection processes and procedures, comes from headquarters. UNHCR's "East Asia and the Pacific's Strategic Objectives-2000 Global Appeal" states that UNHCR will continue to organize emergency preparedness and contingency planning workshops and seminars in the region, but this document is summative not formative. It could, perhaps, be argued that policy ratification occurs through the Operations Review Board and other more informal processes, but initiatives, as in this case, nearly always come from the field.

154. Given this background, the field unsurprisingly reported no "policy guidance" from the Asia Bureau and ESS but many expressed thanks for the support they had received, in both substantive and administrative terms. An example of this was the Asia Bureau's and Donor Relation's support for processing the eCentre proposal through the Trust Fund mechanism in UN New York.

155. EPRS in UNHCR headquarters is constantly under pressure to respond to emergencies and even their training emphasis (through SETS and WEM) is focussed on high-potential emergency situations and the training of UNHCR staff for the emergency roster. The eCentre and the Partnership have been able to focus solely on preparedness training and networking as well as supporting learning materials, rather than get overwhelmed by emergency responses. Jurisdiction for the eCentre was moved from the Bureau to ESS at the beginning of 2004. ESS was not in the "chain-of-command" from 2000 to 2003 and only provided general moral support.

## Information and materials management

156. The eCentre has an established database on all workshops, participating agencies and participants, managed by the part-time administrative assistant in Tokyo. The Partnership has no structured data-base, merely a plethora of workshop and mission reports on the coordinator's computer. The eCentre database was used to send out the evaluation questionnaires, although a serious weakness was highlighted when 44% of those sent to an e-mail address were returned as undeliverable. In the Partnership, more than one-hundred reports needed to be examined and sifted over a period of many days, in order to create an overview on

numbers, dates and locations of workshops as well as to identify participating agencies and former participants.

157. From the point of view of resource management, as is the case in the eCentre, the administrative assistant is also responsible for managing and disseminating the learning and training resources as well as the website. As mentioned above, the Partnership learning and training resources also need to be collected and integrated into the eCentre resource base.

158. A well-organized, up-to-date and easily-accessible database is critical for general management follow-up and reporting as well as a tool for keeping the informal network of former participants active through frequent communication of information about the eCentre and provision of emergency management learning and reference materials as it becomes available. It's also very important for management continuity when new or replacement staff is assigned to the programme.

159. In order to achieve this integration of workshop data and learning/training resources from both the eCentre and the Partnership, additional administrative support is obviously necessary. This could be achieved by locating the unified function in the Tokyo eCentre, which would require expanding the half-time position into a full-time position, in order that the Partnership activities and materials can be included. Another option would be for the Partnership to hire administrative support, using the same database software as the eCentre and collecting and managing all the coordinator's learning, training and reference materials (and sharing them with the eCentre on a regular basis).

160. In summary, management and operational continuity can only be assured with two critical support structures. First, it requires an administrative structure which supports a pro-active, on-the-road and facilitation-oriented programme with logistics and administrative assistance. Second, it requires excellent information management, with an active archive of correspondence, reports, learning and instructional materials and an up-to-date agency and participant data-base for networking and follow-up.

### **Visibility**

161. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is UNHCR's official interlocutor in Japan. It is also, as mentioned above, the ultimate source of the eCentre's funding, through the Trust Fund for Human Security. When the eCentre was established, and many times subsequently, the MOFA has repeatedly articulated the need to use the eCentre's activities in Japan as one way to raise UNHCR's public visibility in Japan, in order to help justify large Japanese Government donations to UNHCR.

162. While appreciating the importance of increased visibility to the Japanese Government and UNHCR, the eCentre's activities are not structured to achieve this objective. eCentre activities in Japan and elsewhere can, of course, be used indirectly as an input to public awareness building activities. It should be made clear that this cannot be an explicit objective of the eCentre. It should probably be an objective of the UNHCR Regional Office in Tokyo, but the eCentre should only be involved

indirectly by providing information and documentation to the Regional Office which can be used for public awareness-building activities.

### **Financial sustainability**

163. The eCentre is totally dependent on the Japanese-Government funded Human Security Trust Fund, with no other donors on the horizon as at the time of writing. Funding by the Trust Fund is only guaranteed until the end of March 2005 and the Government of Japan has made it clear that no further funds will be forthcoming from the Trust Fund. The transformation of the eCentre from a fully Japanese government-supported project to a multi-donor supported programme is critical.

164. Considerable emphasis was placed initially on the concept of sustainability in the original proposal for the eCentre. It was planned to find partners for the eCentre that would be capable of ensuring financial as well as operational sustainability. By the end of the project period in 2003, despite considerable efforts, it had not proved possible to find a financing formula that could fully take over from the grant-based support of the Trust Fund for Human Security. However, by the end of 2003, some progress has been made in diversifying the sources of funding. JICA is in the process of considering funding individual eCentre training events. From 2001, AusAID, through RedR Australia, funded the in-kind contribution of resource persons and trainers at eCentre workshops. Other small in-kind contributions were also forthcoming from various governments, agencies and private companies.

165. It is questionable, given the nature of the programme and objectives, that any sort of commercial model of charging fees for participants would be viable. Most participants come from organisations that are funded from humanitarian budgets and having them pay would not fundamentally change the sources of the funding. Additionally, UNHCR's financial rules and regulations make it almost impossible for individuals or organizations to contribute funds directly for a particular activity.

166. At the time of writing this report, ESS has received approval in principle to seek multi-year special funding from donors, for 2005 onwards, for the continuation of the programme in Asia and creation of two similar programmes in the Middle East/West Asia and Africa. It remains to be seen if the Japanese Government would be willing to provide partial support for the programme if other major donors become involved. As mentioned above, the Partnership has, thus far, been funded under the annual programme. As regards planning for 2005 onwards, the costs of operating the Partnership component should be included in the proposals for multi-year special funding.

# Distance learning

## **Introduction:**

167. The eCentre distance learning component was set up in tandem with an EPRS-Geneva pilot distance learning project in 2000. The content and methodology was identical to the EPRS course. In 2001, responsibility for all distance learning was handed over to the eCentre. Although some fees were charged in the early days, there have been none since 2002.

168. At first, the courses were paper-based distance learning where modules were mailed to students in book form. The courses currently cover six topics: Contingency Planning, Planning Emergency Response, Managing Emergency Response, Managing External Relations, Emergency Support and Advice and, more recently, Coordination. The modules were designed by EPRS together with the University of Wisconsin and InterWorks.

169. Subsequently, the book form was modified to an electronic-based approach where course modules could be downloaded for self-study. Mini CDs designed to be accessible from any hardware platform with no special software requirements were then produced for wider dissemination. These CDs contained files of the six courses as well as key UNHCR reference materials such as the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies.

170. The courses are self-paced and designed for periodic study based on the individual's schedule and habits. There are pre-tests with answers and chapter quizzes to help self-assessment on progress. The chapter exercises also give instant feedback to test understanding of the materials as well as to analyze issues relevant the learner's situation. Students are not required to take the University of Wisconsin exams but they can be arranged through the eCentre, and students are granted continuing education credits if they pass.

## **Student profile**

171. The number of individuals subscribing to distance learning courses totaled 381 persons, with some subscribing to more than one course. Any individual around the world can subscribe for a course and there are no requirements that they work with refugee or relief agencies. 26 certificates have been issued by the University of Wisconsin Disaster Management Center (a certification rate of 6.8%).

172. The database shows that 55% of the subscribers were NGO workers, 33% government officials, 8% from UN agencies including UNHCR, and 6% were other categories. 55% of the students subscribed from outside the Asia Pacific region. A review of course materials found that the topics were well covered, structured and, if the materials are studied, the student can achieve the stated learning objectives.

## Analysis

173. Questionnaire responses indicated that the main reasons for subscription to the distance learning courses were to increase knowledge of refugee issues, humanitarian assistance and UNHCR. It is difficult to assess the extent of satisfaction of distance learning as the questionnaire response rate was not high. However, according to the data obtained, 29% answered that the courses was "very useful", 43% "useful" and 14% "somewhat useful." It must also be noted that the low rate of response to the questionnaires from the distance learners, who would normally be expected to check e-mails frequently, could be interpreted as indicating that this form of distance learning may be a rather low priority for students.

174. The certification rate is, of course, not an indicator of course completion, but interviews and responses found that some subscribers did not even open the course materials as they were too busy. Taking the feedback into consideration, and talking with those familiar with distance learning, it would seem that significant drop-out rates are common for this form of distance learning and that, by introducing online tutorial feedback and guidance, retention rates can be raised. Interactive learning feedback/tutoring was provided during the first few months of the programme, by the eCentre coordinator, but was discontinued after the time burden became too great.

175. The experience in Sri Lanka provides an example of another approach which can lead to more sustained distance-learning. Sri Lanka represents the largest single national group of distance learners (a total of 66 persons). In Sri Lanka, the UNHCR office created informal discussion groups composed of government officials, UNHCR staff and other distance learners. Anecdotal feedback would seem to indicate that this activity increased student motivation. Also, Sri Lanka is reportedly a country which puts emphasis on information technology and where distance education is popular.

176. The distance learning project was evaluated by the University of Wisconsin Disaster Management Center in April of 2001. One of the recommendations made in this evaluation was to strengthen courses by introducing on-line tutors to provide structured feedback to students and generally doing more to guide the learning process.

177. Over the past four years, the trend for internal UNHCR training of its own staff has swung strongly in the direction of self-directed distance learning. This report is not directed at evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to internal UNHCR staff training. However, it is very important to highlight that the strong workshop-based emphasis of the eCentre and Partnership programmes is due to the critical function of building effective networks and relationships between individuals and agencies. This cannot be easily achieved through self-directed distance learning.

178. The eCentre distance learning programme is only loosely related to the core programme strategy of building networks and organizational capacity for emergency preparedness and response in the Asia Pacific region. Only the content subject matter is the same. Additionally, more than 50% of its subscribing students are from outside the Asia Pacific region. Given the current context, the distance learning programme should be managed centrally by ESS, on behalf of the global relief community. ESS may also wish to consider the advantages and disadvantages of

limiting participation in the distance learning programme to staff currently working for refugee or relief agencies.



## Lessons learned

179. General: Projecting and advancing UNHCR's protection mandate through emergency preparedness activities is a highly successful way of promoting a broader and deeper understanding of UNHCR core mandate. It is also an excellent non-adversarial way to build and expand the network of contacts which are necessary to advance UNHCR's long-term protection goals.

180. Networking: Building and expanding organizational and individual networks was a major objective of the EPCB activities in the Asia Pacific region. If networks are going to have significant impact on UNHCR's emergency preparedness, early-warning and long-term organizational goals, they must be actively maintained and reinforced directly, not only by EPCB programme staff, but also by all UNHCR offices in Asia through repeated contact at local, national or regional workshops and other activities.

181. Cultural context: All EPCB activities were targeted at and occurred in the Asia Pacific region. The vast majority of cultures in this region place a very high value on the development and maintenance of long-term personal and organizational relationships and networks. These relationships and networks are seldom abandoned or dropped for short-term considerations and certainly not without long-term repercussions. UNHCR must make a long-term commitment to all their key activities in the region, including the EPCB project.

182. Organizational focus: The EPCB programme must be clearly focused on building the capacity of specifically identified organizations, through their staff members, to become more effective at emergency preparedness and response. It is not an educational institution where students attend courses to further their own learning.

183. Organizational capacity building: It is not enough to simply assume that organizational learning will occur because of individual staff learning. It is important to clearly articulate which specific organizations will be targeted for capacity building and define exactly what capacities are to be developed.

184. A situational approach: The situation-specific targeting of the majority of emergency preparedness and disaster management workshops was a key factor in the overall success. The EPCB programme must remain flexible to respond to the needs of organizations in the context of the actual situations they face. Training doesn't exist in a vacuum and its greatest impact always occurs when it is undertaken in relation to a clear context, where the need to learn is strongly felt by both participants and organizations.

185. Ownership: Ownership of a programme can only be achieved if all concerned parties are involved in some meaningful manner, including UNHCR, Government and NGO representatives as well as major donors.

186. Staffing: The coordinators must have a specialist background in emergency management and training/ facilitation and be available to travel outside the office for more than 50% of the time. This is a hands-on training, facilitation and networking job, not a normal management position.

187. Funding: Multi-year trust funding has allowed the eCentre to develop longer-term management and operational continuity in the field, without a constant need to be re-justifying the needs and strategy every year through an annual programme ORB process. The Partnership has felt under almost constant pressure to design a hand over strategy, even when such an action was felt not to be in the best long-term interests of UNHCR. Multi-year special funding is highly desirable.

## Recommendations

188. For ease of reading, the following recommendations have been separated into specific elements. However, having separated the various elements, they also need to be understood as an integrated whole. The overall vision of the recommendations is an integrated UNHCR emergency preparedness and capacity building programme in the Asia Pacific region, which combines the most successful elements from both the eCentre and the Partnership. The Partnership facilitator would continue to operate on a sub-regional basis in South-east Asia, under the overall supervision of the eCentre. The eCentre, would function in a dual role as overall coordinator and also as the sub-regional facilitator for North and East Asia.

189. Key among the eCentre's major strengths has been the excellence of its workshops, using multiple facilitators; the administrative support structure and information management data-base; the learning materials collection and dissemination activities; and the important linkages with the Japanese Government. Key among the Partnership's major strengths has been the wide and flexible range of excellent, shorter 3-4 day workshops conducted by a single, full-time facilitator; the focus on building the capacity of specifically-identified agencies; the continuous activation of the agency network, by the same facilitator, through structuring repetitive agency staff participation in various workshops plus frequent facilitator visits and communications; and the development and maintenance of a network of dedicated UNHCR focal points through the same facilitator.

190. Under special multi-year funding, this unified programme would continue to focus, primarily through staff training workshops, on developing the operational capacity of specific governmental, non-governmental and regional organizations to prepare for and respond to emergencies of mass human displacement in the region and elsewhere in the world. At the same time, the programme would also build and maintain active networks of agencies and individuals which can further the process of emergency preparedness and capacity building as well as achievement of UNHCR's long-term organizational goals in the Asia Pacific region. It would also continue to develop, collect and disseminate emergency preparedness learning and training resources.

191. Continue: UNHCR's field-based emergency preparedness and capacity building programme in the Asia Pacific region, through a unified eCentre and Partnership operation, should continue. It should become a core component of a UNHCR's long-term strategy in the region.

192. Partnership continuity: In the short term, Partnership activities should continue under active RO Jakarta management, funded under the annual programme through UNOPS or ASEAN, until the end of 2004. RO Jakarta should not allow the Partnership programme and its network to wither while waiting for a new operational partner to emerge. As of 2005, the Partnership will operate under the direct supervision of the eCentre.

193. Unify: As of 2005, assuming adequate special funding, both components of the programme, the eCentre and the Partnership, should be brought together in a unified, but decentralized, management structure, reporting to ESS in Headquarters. The Partnership facilitator would function on a semi-autonomous, sub-regional basis in South-east and, perhaps South Asia, under the overall supervision of the eCentre coordinator. The eCentre, would have two functions, the first as overall coordinator for the Asia-Pacific region and the second as a sub-regional facilitator for North and East Asia and, perhaps, other areas. The exact area to be covered by each facilitator would need to be clarified.

194. Funding: UNHCR should identify multiple donors who will fund UNHCR's unified Asia Pacific region EPCB programme under a special, multi-year allocation that is not part of the annual programme. Linking aspects of the programme to Japan's human security model may be of use in soliciting continuing Japanese Government donor support.

195. Location: For long-term relationship-building and fund-raising purposes, the unified programme should continue to be headquartered in Tokyo.

196. Staffing: Exact staffing as of 2005, assuming adequate special funding, is difficult to project but would certainly be built around a core of: one eCentre coordinator (a UNHCR staff member); two full-time, or one full-time and two half-time, consultants working as trainers/facilitators in a similar function as the current Partnership coordinator (directly for UNHCR or through an operational partner but still under UNHCR supervision); a full-time administrative assistant in Tokyo or two half-time administrative assistants (one in Tokyo and one with the Partnership facilitator). As outlined in the Management section above, the exact staffing arrangements and specific responsibilities would need to be defined according to needs.

197. UNHCR focal points: The eCentre, working with UNHCR Representatives, must formally identify UNHCR focal points in every UNHCR Asia Pacific office. They must actively liaise with their relevant trainer/facilitator, the Coordinator and participating agencies in their country or sub-region.

198. Staff selection: UNHCR must be very careful when posting the coordinator and contracting facilitator/trainer consultants. Both functions should have a background in both training and emergency management and be skilled at training, facilitation and networking. They must all be highly mobile, being able to travel and network outside the office between 50 and 75 percent of the time.

199. Networks: The eCentre coordinator and consultants must actively maintain and reinforce their agency networks through facilitation of regular contact with national UNHCR offices, follow-up activities such as lessons-learned and best-practice workshops at an appropriate national or sub-regional level and other activities designed to keep agencies and staff in regular contact with each other.

200. Early warning: The eCentre coordinator must also determine ways in which the networks can operate as an integral "eyes and ears" part of the UNHCR emergency early-warning system.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

201. Refugees and IDPs: The eCentre should continue to target their programme on organizations which assist refugees and/or IDPs, the latter being one way to help stabilize populations at risk of displacement across borders.

202. Situational model: The eCentre should continue to use a flexible, situational model to meet the real, ever-shifting emergency preparedness and disaster management needs, including support for Asian organizations which provide assistance outside the region. It should avoid “generic” training with no clear situational or organizational focus.

203. Organizational focus: The eCentre should continue to focus primarily on developing governmental, non-governmental and regional organizations’ capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies, through training of staff members. Individual staff learning must be seen as a means towards building an organization’s capacity.

204. Targeting capacity building: The eCentre should select at least one agency in each relevant country for capacity development. Specific organizational capacities to be developed must be very clearly defined, based on an assessment of the relevant agency’s needs in the context of the actual or potential emergencies they face.

205. Workshops: After the eCentre, working with the sub-regional facilitators, has completed the selection of key agencies in the various countries, and assessed their overall needs for capacity building, it must undertake a complete review of the relevance, duration and content of all standard workshops (both eCentre and Partnership in origin) in order to ensure that workshop learning modules are effectively targeted at actual organizational and situational needs. Resultant workshop modules must be easily adaptable, in terms of content and duration, so that workshops can be tailored by the facilitators to meet needs and circumstances.

206. Preparedness: The eCentre should continue to focus solely on emergency preparedness and organizational capacity building. It must be careful not to include emergency response activities such as staff rosters and emergency assessment missions. The experience of EPRS in HQ shows that becoming involved in emergency response will divert resources away from long-term preparedness and preventive activities.

207. Staff safety training: The eCentre should immediately consider two additional activities: first, working with FSS in headquarters, to design and pilot-test a shorter version of the workshop which does not require sophisticated military training facilities; and, second, also working with FSS in headquarters, develop a workshop and a process to train UNHCR field safety advisors to become effective staff safety workshop facilitators.

208. Training of Trainers: The eCentre should select only agency staff participants who will be immediately using and replicating their new training and facilitation skills in a structured learning environment. Selected staff should have a functional responsibility for training.

209. Partnership data and materials: The Partnership coordinator should immediately begin working with the eCentre coordinator to systematically provide the eCentre with copies of all learning and training materials, including those

translated into Bahasa Indonesia. The coordinator should also provide a detailed trainer's outline (content, process and aids) for each type of workshop undertaken by the Partnership. The Partnership and eCentre coordinators should also develop an integrated database (or two separate databases using the same software) and immediately begin to record Partnership workshop data.

210. Visibility: Increased UNHCR visibility in Japan should cease to be a direct objective of the eCentre, because it deflects attention away from the primary training, networking and capacity building objectives. Increased visibility may be an appropriate objective for the Regional Office in Tokyo.

211. Distance learning: By April 2005, when the current eCentre funding ends, the distance learning programme, which is already effectively operating on a global basis, should come under the direct supervision of ESS in Geneva because its an initiative which is focused on global individual learners. The actual location of the programme's operation could be either UNHCR Tokyo or UNHCR Geneva or sub-contracted to an operational partner.

212. Replicate: UNHCR should seriously consider establishing similar field-based EPCB programmes in other relevant regions of the world.

## Annex A: Terms of reference

### **An evaluation of UNHCR's contribution to Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning and Disaster Management Training, and its impact in the Asia Pacific region**

#### **A. Background**

UNHCR's strategic objective to strengthen and support emergency preparedness and response mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region was highlighted within the 2000 UNHCR Global Appeal.

*"UNHCR will also continue to organise emergency preparedness and contingency planning workshops and seminars in the region as a tangible expression of UNHCR's willingness to work with concerned governments on humanitarian measures to prepare for, and respond to, sudden outflows, and to stabilise populations at risk of displacement."*

East Asia and the Pacific's Strategic Objectives – 2000 Global Appeal, page 166

Resulting from this strategy, a multi-year special programme was launched in 2000 with support from the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. The objective was to improve the capacity and skills of government officials, NGO's and UNHCR staff in the Asia and Pacific region in order to more effectively respond to crises involving forcible displacement of human populations.

The programme envisaged the establishment of a centre, located in Tokyo, to act as a focal point for the implementation of a range of complementary capacity building activities in the specialised fields of Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning and Disaster Management in the Asia Pacific region. Named the eCentre, it was conceived as a network of resource persons organising training activities in Japan and other regional locations and building capacity through the latest development in long-distance learning.

The activities of the eCentre are three-fold: training, preparation and distribution of knowledge resources in the field of emergency management, and the development of a network of people and institutions who work in the field of humanitarian response in the region.

The timeframe of the project was originally approved for July 2000 to June 2003 with an extension through until the end of December 2003. As the programme enters a new phase, it is important that the overall goals are reviewed and that a comprehensive evaluation is undertaken.

#### **B. Evaluation objectives**

The purpose of the evaluation is to examine UNHCR's contribution to capacity-building and training in the specialized fields of emergency management in the Asia Pacific region during 2000-2003, and to assess achievements made to-date. The

evaluation will also help identify the lessons learned and the areas where UNHCR has the ability and resources to make additional contributions.

The evaluation will pay particular attention to the impact made by UNHCR in capacity-building and training activities in the domain of emergency preparedness and contingency planning. In this regard, particular consideration will be given to the “Programme for Regional Emergency Training for Asia and Pacific Region - Centre for Emergency Training in International Humanitarian Response (eCentre)” and the emergency preparedness activities carried out by RO Jakarta.

For the purposes of this evaluation, four components of UNHCR’s contribution to Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning and Disaster Management in the Asia Pacific Region will be examined. They are:

- The Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, providing policy guidance, coordination and support to emergency preparedness efforts in the region.
- The Emergency and Security Service, providing technical inputs and quality control for emergency preparedness efforts, in the region and world-wide.
- The Centre for Emergency Training in International Humanitarian Response (eCentre), implementing a regional program for capacity building in emergency preparedness in the Asia-Pacific region.
- The RO Jakarta, implementing a consolidated approach through the “Partnership for Emergency Preparedness” project.

### **C. Indicative list of issues to be addressed**

#### *Efficiency and effectiveness*

- Which of the proposed activities have been undertaken to enhance the skills and capacity in international emergency preparedness and to build up a response network to crises involving forcible displacement of human populations?
- How effective is the strategy developed by UNHCR to enhance the Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning and Disaster Management in the Asia Pacific Region? Are there components missing in this strategy? And to what extent can this strategy be seen as a regional initiative?
- Which methods have proven particularly effective, and which have proven inadequate with regard to Emergency Preparedness, Contingency Planning and Disaster Management in the Asia Pacific Region?
- To what extent has UNHCR encouraged governments, NGO’s, other UN agencies to participate in capacity building exercise? And to what extent has UNHCR effectively built capacity with international and local NGO’s and interested governments?

- Has the eCentre developed into an operationally viable and regionally recognised training institute? And to what extent can the eCentre be seen as a regional initiative?
- To what extent have linkages between regional initiatives and the eCentre been established?

#### *Impact*

- What has been the impact of the programme on the institutional capacity within the region for planning and participating in international humanitarian responses? What has been the impact on the development of NGOs and their involvement in international humanitarian response (in particular, Japanese NGOs)?
- To what extent have the working relations with governments and NGOs changed? For example: How sustainable are the programmes implemented in the region? Have UNHCR initiatives in the region encouraged Governments to accept “responsibility/ownership” for emergency preparedness? How can UNHCR encourage this process further?
- To what extent has information and training provided, been supported and implemented? For example: How many people trained by the eCentre are involved in activities in which they were trained and make use of the training? Do partners and counterparts demonstrate readiness to collaborate with UNHCR in time of crisis involving displacement?
- What has been the impact of the eCentre and other regional initiatives on donor relations, particularly with the Japanese government?

#### *Cost effectiveness*

- What is the relative worth/value added by the respective initiatives in the region?
- To which degree has the eCentre achieved operational sustainability and independency from UNHCR (human and financial resources)?

#### *Proposals for the Future*

- What are the geographic and functional areas where UNHCR has the potential to make an additional contribution? If found appropriate, propose orientation and priorities
- What is the potential role of other organisations in the area of Emergency Preparedness and Contingency Planning, as well as UNHCR’s relations with them?
- How feasibility is the handover of the eCentre to other organizations?

- What are the conditions to establish an eCentre in other continents? – Lessons learned from Asia and Pacific experience.

#### **D. Methodology**

The evaluation will be undertaken in accordance with UNHCR's evaluation policy and mission statement of the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU), and will be guided by a Steering Committee consisting of the Bureau for Asia and the Pacific including RO Tokyo and the Emergency and Security Service (ESS), and chaired by EPAU. The Steering Committee will monitor the progress of the evaluation and promote/disseminate its findings and recommendations so that effective follow-up is ensured by all relevant stakeholders.

In accordance with UNHCR evaluation policy, the report will be placed in the public domain. UNHCR will not exercise any editorial control over the report but will provide comments on the draft and will proofread and format the report prior to publication. UNHCR reserves the right to publish a response to the report and to attach it as an annex to the report.

In order to ensure the independence of the evaluation, one or more external consultants will be identified and selected by the Steering Committee. The consultant will draft a final report and prepare a briefing for UNHCR/HQ on the findings and recommendations, and explain the applied evaluation methodology.

The recommendations presented in the report will be precise and realistic. The consultant will indicate who is responsible for implementation of each recommendation as well as the timeframe for implementation. Costing will be given for each recommendation that has financial implications. It is expected that the evaluation report will clearly indicate lessons learned and also offer guidance to UNHCR on how to evolve and apply best practice in order to improve ongoing efforts in the Asia Pacific region and elsewhere.

After the completion of the evaluation, the consultant will be asked to prepare a brief "lessons learned" report, analysing the way in which the evaluation was managed and undertaken. This report will be used to enhance UNHCR's evaluation procedures and methods.

#### **E. Consultant profile**

The consultant or consultants will have:

- Extensive experience in and familiarity with the Asia and Pacific region, UNHCR and refugee situations;
- Experience in emergency preparedness and contingency planning;
- Experience in providing training and development of training materials;
- Excellent analytic and writing skills;
- A track record of insightful evaluations.

**F. Timeframe and duration**

Total of three months during the first quarter of 2004, divided between one or more consultants (tentatively March – May 2004).

A first draft of the evaluation report is due to be presented at the Steering Committee by the first week of May 2004. The final draft is due before the end of May 2004.

**G. Means whereby evaluation findings and recommendations will be utilised**

Following the completion of the evaluation report, the Bureau for Asia and the Pacific (including ROs Tokyo and Jakarta) and ESS will prepare a joint management response to the evaluation, explaining how its findings and recommendations will be utilised.

The Steering Committee for the project will also be asked to make recommendations in this respect.

The findings and recommendations of the project may be used as a basis for briefings to donor states, the Executive Committee and NGOs.



## Annex B: Summary of interviews

### Stakeholder interviews (non-participants):

UNHCR: (25)

Japanese Government: (6)

Japanese NGOs (5)

InterWorks and RedR Australia: (3)

Partnership NGOs: (3)

ADPC and IFRC: (2)

### eCentre workshop participants (excludes below)

	HCR	Other UN	Government	Inter-governmental Organization	NGO	Total
Japan	4	2	5	2	4	17
Philippines	2	1	9	0	0	12
Indonesia	4	2	3	0	0	9
Malaysia	1	0	1	0	1	3
Timor	1	0	0	0	0	1
Thailand	3	0	2	0	0	5
Myanmar	1	0	0	0	0	1
Nepal	0	0	0	1	2	3
Papua New Guinea	0	0	1	0	0	1
Others	0	0	0	3	0	3
Total	17	4	21	6	7	55

Note: 34 of the 55 were also participants in Partnership workshops

### Partnership workshop participants (excludes above)

	HCR	Other UN	Government	Inter-gov'mental Organization	NGO	Total
Philippines	1	1	11	0	5	18
Indonesia	0	1	8	0	2	11
Malaysia	2	0	1	0	2	5
Timor	0	2	0	0	1	3
Others	0	0	0	3	0	3
Total	3	4	20	3	10	40



## Annex C: eCentre Workshop summary 2000-2003

(including breakdown of organizational participation)

	2000		2001		2002		2003	
	Japan	Other countries						
Introduction to the Basics of International Humanitarian Response	1		1		1		1	1 (Nepal)
Staff Safety Workshop			1			1 (Thailand)		1 (Thailand)
Emergency Management Training Workshop				1 (Philippines)				
Contingency Planning Workshop				1 (Malaysia)		1 (Thailand)		1 (PNG)
UNHCR Programme Management Workshop			1					
Briefing Presentation on Refugee Registration and Repatriation/ Reintegration			1					
Civil-Military UNSURE Exercise				1 (Australia)				
Regional Workshop on Emergency Management				1 (Sri Lanka)		2 (NZ, Korea)		
Training of Trainers Workshops				1 (Malaysia)	1			
Regional Seminar: Partnership for Emergency Preparedness in ASEAN Region								1 (Indonesia)
Regional Workshop: Best Practices in Asylum Management								1 (Thailand)
Updating of Contingency Planning								1 (Malaysia)
Training of Contingency Planning District and Provincial Facilitators								1 (Philippines)
Strategic Planning for Emergency Relief								1 (Timor)
Symposium on Refugees in Africa							1	
Standards in Refugee Emergencies							1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>

### Organizational participation (728 persons)

GOVT	UNHCR	Other UN	Intergovernmental Organization	NGO	Other	Total
341 (46.8%)	93 (12.8%)	28 (3.9%)	12 (1.6%)	241 (33.1%)	13 (1.8%)	728 (100%)



## Annex D: Workshop summary, 2001 - 2003

### Partnership for Emergency Preparedness (including breakdown of organizational participation)

#### Regional "oversight" seminars:

1 <sup>st</sup> : Consultative Contingency Planning Workshop, Jakarta, July 2001
2 <sup>nd</sup> : Emergency Management and Contingency Planning, Bali, February 2002
3 <sup>rd</sup> : Partnership for Emergency Preparedness/ASEAN Disaster Management Committee Joint Workshop, February 2003, Jakarta **

#### Indonesia (BAKORNAS focus):

Inter-agency Aceh Province Contingency Planning, Banda, July 2001
EMT for Bali Provincial and District Officials, Denpasar, August, 2001
TOT for National Contingency Planning Facilitators, Cipayung, Jakarta, Oct. 2001
EMT for Ministry of Home Affairs District Officials, Jakarta, Nov. 2001
Pilot-test adapted contingency planning module with Lampung Provincial Govt., Feb. 2002
Workshop on National Disaster Management Planning, Cipayung, Jakarta, June 2002
Formulation of Standard Operating Procedures for Emergencies in Aceh, Nov. 2002,
Inter-Ministerial Workshop on Integrated Information Management System for Emergencies, Nov. 2002
Strategic Planning workshop for BAKORNAS, Jakarta, Dec. 2002
Provincial Workshop for officials on Integrated Information Management System for Emergencies, throughout 2003
District Workshop for officials on Integrated Information Management System for Emergencies, January 2003
NGO Workshop on Integrated Information Management System for Emergencies, throughout February 2003

#### Philippines:

EMTP, Davao City, March 2001 *
Pilot Contingency Planning Workshop for Magiundanao Province, September 2001
TOT for national and regional Contingency Planning Facilitators, Laguna, October 2001
Comparative Learning Tour for Mindanao Contingency Planning Facilitators, January 2002
Contingency Planning Manual "Writesop", Manila, January 2002
Joint UNHCR/RDCC situation/security assessment workshop, Cotabato City, January 2002
Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop, Regions 6 & 7, April 2002
Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop, North Cotabato, May 2002

Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop, Sulu, May 2002
Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop, Zamboanga, May 2002
Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop, Basilan, May 2002
Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop, Taw-tawi, May 2002
Finalization "Writeshop" of Contingency Planning Manual, Laguna, July 2002
Joint Malaysia/Philippines Sabah CP and Coordination Workshop, Davao City, July 2002
Training workshop for Government & INGOs on Global Humanitarian Standards and Legal Instruments, Davao, July 2002
Inter-agency Workshop on Lessons-learned from the Mindanao Emergency Experience, Davao, July 2002
Interagency Workshop on Global Norms in the Context of Complex Emergencies in Mindanao, Davao, Sept. 2002
Training workshop for MILF/ Bangsamoro on Global Humanitarian Standards and Legal Instruments, Davao, November 2002
Joint Malaysia/Philippines CP Up-dating and Coordination Workshop, Sabah, Malaysia, April 2003
TOT for Provincial and District Contingency Planning Facilitators, Cebu, May 2003 **
Second Emergency Management and Contingency Planning Workshop for Maguindanao Province, Davao, August 2003
Training workshop for Government & local NGOs on Global Humanitarian Standards and Legal Instruments, Davao, July 2003
Strategic Planning for the NGO Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN), Davao, August 2003
Convenor's Meeting of Mindanao Emergency and Humanitarian Forum, Davao, August 2003
Mindanao RDCC Executive Directors Workshop on Emergencies, Davao, Nov. 2003
National NDCC Executive Directors Workshop on Emergencies, Manila, December 2003

**Malaysia:**

Contingency Planning Workshop, Kota Kinabalu, April 2001 *
TOT Contingency Planning Facilitators, Kuala Lumpur, September 2001 *
Emergency Management Workshop for Ministry of Works, Port Dickson, October 2001
Workshop for Malaysian NGOs on Refugee Emergencies, Kuala Lumpur, October 2001
Contingency Planning Workshop for Emergencies, Johor Baru, Johor, October 2001
Contingency Planning Workshop for Emergencies, Alor Seta, Keda, February 2002
Contingency Planning Workshop for Emergencies, Ipoh, Perak, February 2002
Follow-up Contingency Planning Workshop, Sabah, KK, April 2002
NGO Disaster Management Orientation Workshop, Kuala Lumpur, May 2002
Contingency Planning Manual "Writeshop", Kuala Lumpur, June 2002
Joint Malaysia/Philippines Sabah CP and Coordination Workshop, Davao City, July 2002
Training Contingency Planning Trainers for DFNS State and District Officers, Sandakan, Sabah, September 2002
Updating of Contingency Planning in Johor Baru, Johor, October 2002

Joint Malaysia/Philippines CP Up-dating and Coordination Workshop, Sabah, Malaysia, April 2003 **
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**Timor-Leste:**

National Disaster Management Orientation, Dili, March 2002
National Disaster Management Orientation, Dili, June 2002
Advanced TOT and intro to Bahasa Indonesia Modules, Dili, Sept. 2002
Three District-level Disaster Management Orientations, Oct. 2002
Strategic Planning for Emergency Relief in Timor-Leste, Dili, June 2003 **

**Indonesia (CRIS focus):**

Basic EMT for staff and Practicum students, Bandung, April 2002
Advanced TOT for Emergency Management, CRS, Bandung, May 2002
Four EMTs for aid workers in Districts of Indramayu Province, Oct. 2002
Caucus of Refugee/IDP Social Workers, Bandung, Nov. 2002

\* These three workshops were organized and funded by the eCentre, prior to the establishment of the Partnership, but are included here in order to highlight the linkages and continuity.

\*\* These four workshops were funded by the eCentre but were organized and implemented by the Partnership.

**Breakdown by participation and organization:**

1. Based on workshop reports, the total number of participants has been accurately assessed at some 1,998 persons.
2. There is no accurate data on the break-down of participants by parent agency, but the project coordinator estimated an average of 60% governmental; 30% NGO; and 10% UNHCR, UN and other agencies.
3. A large number of participants attended a multiple sequence of workshops, estimated at roughly 25% of total participation. Therefore, approximately 1,300 different persons participated in the workshops.



## Annex E: Expenditure

### Summary table of approximate expenditure in US Dollars (at the time of the evaluation)

#### eCentre

	2000	2001	2002	2003
Staffing		162,000	143,000	155,000
Project	157,000	298,000	524,000	452,000
Total expenditure	157,000	460,000	667,000	607,000

Note: In 2001, approximately \$100,000 of project expenditure was spent on three workshops in the Partnership countries. In 2003, \$30,000 was allocated to support four Partnership workshops.

#### Partnership

	2000	2001	2002	2003
Staffing		83,000	86,000	97,000
Project		89,000	83,000	66,000
Total expenditure		172,000	169,000	163,000

Note: Please note the above expenditures reported by the eCentre on behalf of Partnership activities.



## Annex F: Abbreviations and acronyms

AAR	Association for Aid and Relief
ADMC	ASEAN Disaster Management Committee
ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre
APC	Asia Pacific Consultations
AMDA	Association of Medical Doctors of Asia
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BAKORNAS	Indonesian Government Disaster Coordination Agency
BHN	Basic Human Needs association
CD	Compact disk
CP	Contingency planning
CRIS	Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies
DFNS	Malaysia Government Division for National Security
eCentre	Regional Training Centre for International Humanitarian Response in Tokyo
EMTP	Emergency Management Training Programme
EPAU	Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR HQs
EPCB	Emergency Preparedness and Capacity Building. (This is a short abbreviation to allow the authors to easily refer to the combined activities of the eCentre and the Partnership. It does not imply any dissatisfaction with the current titles of the two projects)
ESS	Emergency and Security Service, UNHCR HQs
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency

JEN	A Japanese NGO
LO	Liaison Office
MERCY	An NGO
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSF	Médecin Sans Frontières
NDCC	Philippine Government National Disaster Coordination Council
NDMO	Timor-Leste Government National Disaster Management Office
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
OFDA	Office for Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OXFAM	An NGO
Partnership	Partnership for Emergency Preparedness in Jakarta
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RedR	An NGO
RDCC	Regional Disaster Coordination Council (Philippines)
RO	Regional Office
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SET	Situational Emergency Training
SHARE	Service for Health in Asian and African Regions
SVA	Shanti Volunteer Association
TOT	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Childrens Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WEM	Workshop for Emergency Managers
WFP	World Food Programme

