Refugee aid and protection in rural Africa: working in parallel or cross-purposes?

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Introduction

Over the past decade there has been an ongoing debate about how to reconcile the different priorities of defending basic human rights and providing life-saving humanitarian aid during complex emergencies. This debate has focused on how the delivery of aid can be (or is always) used to political ends. At the extreme it may effectively become a weapon of war as most vividly seen in ongoing conflict in southern Sudan. Many humanitarian aid agencies are increasingly aware of that they must look beyond simplistic responses of offering aid and consider the wider impact of that aid on the underlying problems. Human rights agencies are also coming to a greater recognition that humanitarian aid plays an important role in enabling the full range of human rights to be upheld, for example ensuring access to people under threat (for a useful summary of the current debate see Minear and Weiss 2000).

UNHCR has long been at the forefront of such debates as it is a major player in most complex emergencies and it has a dual mandate to provide protection and humanitarian assistance. It has been faced with extremely difficult choices and has been open to much criticism, with varying degrees of justification. Its co-ordination of the huge aid programme for the massive Rwandan refugees camps in Goma, which also acted as the base for the exiled genocidal former government sparked widespread debate as did its support for their eventual forced return in December 1996 (Pottier 1999). Its policy of preventative action in countries of origin prior to refugees’ flight to enable them to stay, the so-called ‘right to remain,’ in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia has also been challenged (Cunliffe and Pugh 1997, Barutciski 1996). When UNHCR is dealing with states which will not uphold the minimum standards of protection for refugees, it continually faces the question of whether it should be involved in a bad protection option when the alternative is worse (Morris 1997).

In these debates the focus is on how UNHCR should provide both assistance and protection to refugees from external threats, often arising from the state of asylum or origin and also, of increasing concern, from non-state actors including factions within the refugee population and local hosts. In this paper, I want to look at a different aspect of the problem and consider how the two mandates may create internal contradictions within UNHCR: in particular, to consider how the provision of aid may undermine protection and even result in threats to it arising from UNHCR itself. Likewise, measures required to facilitate the provision of protection can diminish the quality of the aid provision, particularly from a developmental perspective. The paper arises from field-level observations and experience and highlights management practices which can create these difficulties. The focus of the discussion here is on refugees in Africa.

I do not want to go into detailed analysis of nature of protection here – there are plenty of others better qualified to do that (e.g. Minear 1999, Paul 1999) – but it is helpful to start with some indication of what is meant by the term. Within UNHCR’s statute the key role of protection is to ensure that the refugees are treated in accordance with the provisions of the international refugee conventions: primarily the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) but also regional conventions such as the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1967). For the field, UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies (1999) summarises the priority aims of international protection in emergencies as being to ‘ensure admission and at least temporary asylum; prevent forcible return (“refoulement”); and ensure that refugees are treated in according to basic human rights standards.’
I will focus on these aspects of protection in the following discussion. I will draw largely on personal experience, particularly from my research work in Zambia and also experience as a practitioner working as a consultant and as NGO staff member. Although the range of examples here may be limited, I have heard similar stories from others and believe that the issues will resonate with those who have experience in other areas. The purpose here is to raise questions about current practice and to illustrate how universal assumptions about refugees can lead to undesirable results in particular circumstances. Although the tenor of the paper may be critical, it is offered on the basis of my own involvement in humanitarian programmes with refugees and in full recognition of the dilemmas they throw up.

In the main body of the paper, I discuss a number of areas in which UNHCR’s dual mandate for providing refugee protection and humanitarian aid can contradict each other. I start by looking at the problems of marking out the refugees and then targeting aid towards them, particularly when refugees are being assisted by local hosts outside refugee camps. This process tends to cast refugees as the problem to be solved rather than the war and may also result in relief programmes which may undermine development initiatives. I then turn to consider how the priorities of humanitarian aid may create direct clashes with protection aims, especially during registration and where refugees suffer abuses in camps funded by UNHCR. In conclusion I tentatively suggest a way that some of these problems may be avoided by differentiating more sharply between UNHCR’s protection and aid roles.

**Patterns of refugee movements in Africa**

As Crisp (2000) observes, by the end of the 1990s there were two main regions of displacement in Africa. One in the west centred around Liberia and Sierra Leone and including Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire. The second much larger region is a swathe through the centre of the continent stretching from Angola to the Horn. Within these areas there is no standard pattern to the way that refugees arrive in neighbouring countries of asylum in Africa. In 1994 there were some of the most rapid and concentrated movements into one area ever witnessed, as Rwandan Hutus streamed out of Rwanda firstly into Ngara, Tanzania and then to Goma, Zaire. In contrast, the later widespread movement of refugees from DR Congo has been much more sporadic and resulted in small groups of refugees arriving in various locations over a number of years. Likewise from Liberia and Sierra Leone, refugees fled into Guinea in waves during the 1990s to settle in its Forest Region.

The geography and history of Africa means that one common feature of refugee movements on the continent is that the refugees often arrive in the host countries in remote rural areas far from the state capital. The borders imposed by colonial powers cut across many ethnic groups and in many cases the people of the frontier areas have a loose relationship with the distant state whose authority is frayed at its edges. The people of different nationalities on either side of the border may have more in common with each other than either groups has with their corresponding co-nationals from the capital.

As a result when many African refugees cross into a neighbouring country, they may join their kinsfolk on the other side of the border. The first assistance is usually provided by local people and their help and protection may be given freely and willingly, although not without personal cost (Chambers 1986). Beyond a certain level the increase in population may create resources difficulties, especially in the short term as food, water and shelter may run short. However, the extent of the problem may vary considerably depending on the local environment. In areas of low population density in Zambia and Guinea, refugees have been
able to acquire land with the support of the local leaders, for building houses and producing crops (Bakewell 1999, van Damme 1999).

Most African governments have long been resistant to such self-settlement and demand that refugees be housed in camps or settlements. A major factor cited in determining these policies is often security for both the hosts and the refugees. Large groups of refugees staying in the border area present a potential target to their opponents from whom they fled; the refugees may also present a potential threat to the country of origin if they engage in military activity on the border. Another important factor in encouraging the formation of camps is that they ensure that refugees remain a visible and easily identified target group for international aid. The camps also make the management of emergency aid considerably easier for the government, UNHCR and NGO implementing partners. The debate about whether camps are a better response to refugee influxes than self-settlement is far from over (see Black 1998, Crisp and Jacobsen 1998).

Identification and registration

Protection offered by local hosts is a basic human response of enabling people to stay in safety and protecting them from harm. Having escaped across the border, refugees may perceive the authorities in the country of asylum as the next threat. In the worst case it might be to expel refugees back across the border in which case UNHCR has a very urgent protection problem to tackle. Of sometimes equal worry to refugees is the pressure from the authorities for them to identify themselves for registration and removal from the border area to a distant camp. Refugees in Africa over decades have resisted efforts to put them in camps and the majority have stayed outside. Some of their concerns have included: a desire to stay near the border to enable their independent return when they felt it was safe; a fear that they be taken away from their kin among whom they stay; a reluctance to become dependent on aid resources and a scepticism about the validity of the promises of aid agencies to provide their needs (Bakewell 1999, van Damme 1999). Faced with such circumstances, from the refugees’ perspective remaining anonymous may be the best form of protection they have.

For UNHCR it is essential to establish that the people involved are of concern to it and entitled to its protection. Since the OAU Convention extended the definition of refugees in Africa to include those fleeing the effect of wars as well those suffering individual persecution, the status of individuals in refugee emergencies on the continent does not usually need to be determined at this stage. However, UNHCR states that ‘a registration exercise should be conducted at the earliest possible stage of an emergency operation’ (UNHCR 1999:16). The questions which could be asked is what purpose does this serve and is it always necessary?

Where UNHCR knows there are refugees, it needs to monitor the responses of the government and ensure they are fulfilling their obligations. It keeps a close watch on the situation and it wants to know how many people are there. This might be achieved through local leaders who will know about new arrivals in some detail. Refugees may come forward with information and NGOs operating in the area, media and other sources can give a good idea of the number of refugees who have arrived. But does UNHCR need to identify all refugees individually and give them a special card? What other organisation protecting human rights would expect all potential victims of abuses to register with them, thereby possibly exposing themselves to more danger (especially where a government, as opposed to local people, is hostile to refugees)? Ensuring that UNHCR maintains a presence on the
border area and that it keeps open channels of communication with the areas where refugees stay may be as effective in providing protection.

**Targeting of aid undermining local protection**

Besides any protection requirements, the driving force behind registration is very often a concern with the management of aid resources. UNHCR is mandated to assist refugees and the humanitarian aid that is offers is targeted at them. In order to know that the aid is going to the right people it is necessary to know who they are. The basic registration of refugees provides the required information on the location of aid recipients and their demographic profile. It may also be linked to a wider needs assessment of the refugee population. Moreover, the registration cards provide a mark of entitlement which greatly eases the process of resource distribution.

The focus of aid efforts on refugees immediately drives a wedge between local hosts and the refugees, especially when the refugees arrive in very remote areas of great poverty. In such circumstances some local hosts may be poorer than refugees and many may live at a very low level of subsistence. As refugees are provided with aid resources, from food to free healthcare at standards beyond anything available to the local community, their standard of living can exceed that of many of their hosts. This can cause resentment. UNHCR suggests that tensions should be avoided by ensuring that there is sufficient aid available so there is not negative impact on local resources and infrastructure improvement are designed to benefit the local community (UNHCR 1999:19).

In refugee aid operations, the role of local hosts in housing refugees is often downplayed and their hospitality may be treated with suspicion. Questions are asked about why people take the refugees in and hosts may be treated with suspicion. Most recently this was seen most strikingly in an example outside Africa when Kosovo Albanians arrived in Albania in 1999 and the majority stayed with host families. The hosts were widely reported to be demanding exploitative rents and using the refugees presence to gain access to aid. At least one evaluation (ODI, Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds, Report May 2000) redressed the balance and reported movingly of the care taken by some Albanian families to ensure that the refugees staying with them were as comfortable as possible. It is important not to assume that local response mechanisms can deal with refugee influxes but it is equally important to recognise what they can do. If targeting aid towards refugees to the exclusion of local hosts undermines the initial protection and aid and creates hostility towards refugees, it is acting against their protection.

The default international humanitarian response tends to be to move refugees to camps and settlements at the behest of the host government, and as noted above often citing security reasons. It is widely recognised that camps are not necessarily the best option and Black (1998) argues that they can reduce security if refugees are forced to live in them against their will. The same questions asked about the local hosts, ‘what’s in it for them?’ need to be asked of the government, UN agencies and NGOs which manage the camps. Significant numbers of jobs, contracts and other such benefits will flow to those agencies involved. UNHCR may be faced with conflicting interests. The management of aid demands targeting and possibly encampment, whereas the best protection for refugees may demand local settlement and different forms of aid delivery.
Aid casting refugees as the problem

Besides the creation of resentment, humanitarian aid for refugees can create more subtle difficulties. Aid is presented as a response to the ‘refugee problem’ in a particular area. It casts the refugees as the problem rather than their being a symptom of a much wider problem of conflict. The refugees are a convenient focus of action, the international community can be seen as doing things, and the specific symptom can be dealt with. This rhetoric of refugees as a problem facilitates the development of anti-refugee feeling. Refugees can be blamed for crime, overcrowded schools, shortage of medicines, creating price rises, and a host of other social and economic ills.

The arrival of large numbers of people does create some enormous pressures, but it can also be seen as an opportunity to improve some longstanding problems. In the border area of north-west Zambia, it was widely thought by local villagers, chiefs and to a lesser extent local government, that the presence of the refugees had boosted the population and helped to develop the area (which is still one of the poorest in the country). The ‘refugee problem’ was only raised away from the border areas and it appeared to be magnified the further one moved towards the capital where refugees could be a useful card to play in a wider political and nationalist game. This reflect back to the border in polices of frontier control, containment and other such measures.

Undermining the quality of aid by targeting refugees

The relationship between protection and humanitarian aid also restricts the type of aid which can be offered and in many cases reduces its quality. UNHCR’s mandate constrains it to work only with refugees or others of concern to it. As noted above, the influx of refugees will have a major impact on the host society especially in border areas where resources may be consumed. More disturbingly the insecurity of war will come across the border. This may be seen by increased border patrols by the asylum country’s army and police which can result in harassment of local people. It could be in a full scale incursion from the country of origin as war spills over the border.

The border areas of Zambia have repeatedly been attacked from Angola over the last 35 years of war and Zambians have withdrawn from their villages near the border for fear of their lives. In some areas the border is marked by rivers whose plains offer the best areas for grazing cattle but these are no longer accessible. Border areas are inevitably areas of trade and the closing of the border changes the patterns of business. Some will gain from the war economy but more will lose as the volumes of trade will decrease as populations shrink. An area that was once on the road to another country becomes a dead end.

These are problems of war but UNHCR can only tackle the problems of refugees. If the refugees move from the border so do the resources. The focus of UNHCR on the refugees often means that it fails to see the problems for the national hosts, nor does it set the problems of refugees within this wider context (Bakewell 2000). The difficulties refugees faces are likely to be interpreted as the result of their being refugees, without recognising that they may reflect long-standing development problems which affect all.

For example, when refugees arrive in an area of chronic malnutrition it must be expected that they will be malnourished as the local people are. Providing food aid for refugees in response to this malnutrition will do nothing to solve this prevailing development problem. It may simply raise the refugees’ nutrition status above that of the local people. This may meet...
the Sphere standards for the refugees (Sphere Project 2000) but it does nothing for the hosts. Moreover, food aid will inevitably change the balance of the local food economy for better or worse and may undermine existing development programmes in the area. In any similar context minus the refugees, providing food aid is likely to be criticised as bad development practice. UNHCR never pretends to be a development agency but nor should it ever be an anti-development agency.

A central problem with UNHCR’s humanitarian aid is that it is directed towards people on the basis of their having a particular legal status rather than on the basis of need. I would not argue that refugees are not requiring particular assistance. The arrival of refugees is a good indicator of an increased level of humanitarian need which may be acute. However, this need is not solely found among refugees nor will all refugees be poor. Some will arrive with belonging and sufficient resources to re-establish themselves if they can find a place to do so and, as noted above, in some circumstances refugees may generally be better off than their hosts. UNHCR and aid agencies differentiate between groups of refugees by age and gender but it tends to be based on stereotyped assumptions which cast all those who fit a particular set of criteria as ‘vulnerable’.

However, for the most part local hosts will not be included in aid programmes except in as far as they are directly involved with refugees¹. A particular region in which refugees stay may be eligible for infrastructure support from UNHCR as a ‘refugee-affected area’ to ensure that refugees will be able to attend schools and receive health services. The focal point remains refugees.

The question to be asked here is whether offering aid on the basis of legal status is a satisfactory approach to dealing with the crisis caused by war? Where the international community does not take on special responsibility for the legal protection of people, it would not be acceptable to discriminate in this way. For NGOs it contravenes article two of the Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes: ‘Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone’ (emphases added). If humanitarian aid responses to refugee crises were able to take a broader view of the problems, perhaps it would result in more imaginative and participatory programmes which build on the capacity of both the refugees and their local hosts.

The registration process as an abuse of human rights

The refugee label is a bureaucratic one and does not necessarily coincide with people’s self-description. It is therefore open to subversion. In as far as it is associated with access to resources there may be a strong motivation for people to present themselves as refugees. In as far as it is associated with removal to a camp, refugees may make great efforts to avoid it. The fact that the majority of refugees in Africa stay beyond the reach of international aid suggests the latter may apply to more people.

In order to impose the bureaucratic definition, extreme methods may be used during registration. Where it is anticipated that people may avoid registration, refugees might be rounded up from villages in sudden sweeps. A priest in north-west Zambia described to me

¹ For example, some host families in Albania received food parcels – I have not come across a case of this in Africa.
how during the 1980s whole families fled into the bush at the sound of a vehicle from town for fear of being taken to a settlement and they would stay away from their houses for some days. UNHCR may not have been directly involved in these exercises but they are tainted by them and refugees in the settlement described being forced into the settlement by the UN. A decade later UNHCR’s attempts at registration of refugees in the villages were made impossible by the memories and people’s continued fear of exposure.

In refugee camps it is expected that refugees will try to register repeatedly in order to inflate their numbers and gain extra ration cards. The process will often include corralling refugees into counting areas, tagging them or marking them with indelible ink, and then issuing them with the requisite ration cards. The whole exercise is carried out over as short a time-scale as possible to minimize the chances of people ‘recycling’ and registering twice. It is hard not to draw parallels with them management of animal herds; the term ‘shepherds’ has crept into a UNHCR guide on registration (see Hyndman 2000:130). Not surprisingly such registration procedures are widely resisted, sometimes violently especially where conducted with inadequate negotiation with the refugees. Hyndman illustrates this with examples from Kenya and Tanzania and concludes that ‘it becomes clear that headcounts are a coercive exercise conducted by humanitarian staff on the bodies of refugees’ (2000:127-131, see also Harrell-Bond 1999:154).

The actual process of registration may thus impose on refugees inhuman and degrading treatment which is contrary to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It may be argued that this is only for a very short period of time and justified by the wider benefits which it brings to the refugees in the form of improved aid delivery. However, this is debatable (Harrell-Bond 1999:158). For the most part registration, especially in camps, does not have a clear protection benefit for the refugees but serves the interests of the aid programme. When the registration process creates new protection problems for refugees, is it appropriate that the agency to whom they might appeal is the very one which is infringing their rights?

Protection following aid

UNHCR’s humanitarian aid activities require considerably more resources than their legal protection work. Providing food, water, shelter and medical care is a major task demanding high levels of management and co-ordination and absorbing huge volumes of cash. All UNHCR staff may be well versed in its mandate for protection but in the field the focus of their day to day tasks appears to be the co-ordination of humanitarian aid. As a result protection activities can become an add-on to the larger work of providing aid. An example from Zambia illustrates this.

The attempt to round up self-settled Angolan refugees in Zambia was a failure and only about 30% moved to the official settlements. By the 1990s the majority of refugees still on the border had largely dropped out of sight of UNHCR and interest was only rekindled by the prospect of the having to cope with their return to a peaceful Angola, which is sadly still elusive. While I was working among Angolan and Zambians on the border it was clear to see that Angolans had settled and were almost indistinguishable from Zambians. Their position was secure in as far as they had integrated very well with the local people and there were more concerns about the prospect of Angolans leaving than their staying.

However, there were still many who had not acquired the appropriate Zambian papers and if those who had were open to challenge if the authorities so desired. Given the remoteness of the Zambian state to the border areas and the mediation of traditional leaders who were very
keen to see refugees stay in their areas, the status quo was okay. However, the situation was liable to change should the government start to take an interest in the region again – which it since has due to the resurgence of fighting in eastern Angola and arrival of new refugees.

I expressed a particular concern to UNHCR about those refugees who remain without any papers in the border areas. The response of a junior protection officer was to state that these people should have registered with UNHCR when they first arrived and it would be very difficult given the lapse of time. She did acknowledge that having arrived from Angola they would be *prima facie* refugees. She expressed the view that UNHCR was only dealing with regularised refugees, i.e. those living in official settlements, and it could not extend its protection to those who stayed outside. This was in stark contrast to my understanding of UNHCR’s protection mandate which extends to all those whose situation fits the definitions of the international convention, which self-settled refugees manifestly do.

I was surprised that such views should come from a protection officer, however junior, although I do not think this reflected an official stance of UNHCR towards self-settled (I was not convinced they had one). Because these refugees had not fitted with the demands of the aid programme, there was no practical way that these refugees could avail themselves of UNHCR’s protection.

**Direct conflict between aid and protection**

UNHCR’s delivery of relief aid can add a more direct threat to protection once refugees are confined with camps or settlements. UNHCR funds the services which are provided by implementing partners. In the first instance these are likely to be NGOs although later government departments may take over as NGOs withdraw. Within the settlements the implementing partners hold a huge amount of power over many aspects of refugees’ lives. They control access to aid commodities such as food, and also livelihood resources such as land and jobs.

Refugees in settlements and camps are in a very exposed position with respect to the aid agencies which are providing services for them. For the most part UNHCR is the main donor and institutional stakeholder in the settlement, and it has a strong interest in ensuring that the management of the programme runs smoothly. Where refugees feel that their rights are being infringed in some way by the system, e.g. ethnic bias in the provision of resources or recruitment of staff, they have few avenues for appeal when the very agency which is supposed to provide protection is co-ordinating the programmes they object to.

In most cases NGOs or other implementing agencies may discharge their obligation with full regard for the rights of the refugees whom they serve. However, there is limited accountability for their work and it is possible for abuse to arise. In one notorious settlement in southern Africa, the staff of the lead NGO had become entrenched in their positions during the 1990s and were able to run the settlement as a fiefdom with very limited oversight. Stories of mismanagement and corruption were rife and refugees who resisted the system were labelled as trouble makers and were reportedly intimidated and sometime subject to imprisonment (such was the staff’s influence with the local authorities) or violence. For some years, UNHCR had no presence in the settlement and it was very slow to respond to allegations and take action. Whatever the truth of the matter, the refugees have effectively were left unprotected from an exploitative situation where their rights could be abused.
The operational requirements of the aid programme may push protection issues into the background even on some of the most fundamental questions of refugee rights. As repatriation was planned for Angolan refugees in Zambia in 1996 a survey was conducted by the lead NGO. This enquired whether the respondents wanted to repatriate in 1996 or 1997, rather than any open questions about whether people wanted to go at all. This came to the remarkable result that all but 17 of the 25,330 Angolan refugees in the settlement wanted to go to Angola. I visited one of the roads in Meheba where the survey had reported that everybody wanted to leave and, even moving along a short portion of the road, I rapidly met people who said that they did not want to repatriate. In particular, some of the older people who felt they were too old to make such a transition expressed great concern at the idea of having to establish new homes back in Angola. Who could they appeal to when UNHCR was organising the repatriation programme in collaboration with NGO partners?

Conclusion

There is no doubt that UNHCR faces enormous challenges in fulfilling both its protection mandate and providing adequate and appropriate humanitarian aid. Confronted with the realities of refugee emergencies, it is often caught in impossible dilemmas and forced to make uncomfortable compromises which may run counter to its principles (Morris 1997).

It is not desirable to disassociate protection and aid as the two are intimately linked; they must run in parallel. Without aid, host states may refuse to accept refugees. Aid is also a vital aspect of ensuring a rounded approach to protection which upholds the full range of refugees’ rights, including economic and social rights. However, given the conflicts between the two roles described above, it seems dangerous to have the same agency responsible for both protection and aid. In order to meet the objections raised here, some sharper differentiation between UNHCR’s protection and humanitarian aid functions is required. One response to these criticisms is for UNHCR to establish clearer lines of management between staff engaged in protection and those providing aid. Perhaps the former could have direct lines of accountability to Geneva creating the space for protection field staff to ask awkward questions from a somewhat detached perspective.

A more extreme response would entail the creation of new UN agencies to fulfil the roles and ensure that both protection and aid can be provided of the highest quality in any given context. My tentative suggestion is that one agency would be mandated to deal with war affected populations to meet emergency needs and look for sustainable longer term solutions. It would be working with people according to their need rather than their legal status. This might involve establishing refugee settlements or it could be open to much more imaginative responses.

In time it may be perfectly legitimate for this agency to stop working in a given situation as it stabilises and people achieve a reasonable standard of living (perhaps measured relative to the rest of the country). Since its focus would not just be on refugees it could be involved in the provision of aid to other forced migrants and those who stay in their homes including refugee hosts as a matter of course. The artificial association of the refugee label with a particular set of resources could be eroded and the debates about whether UNHCR should work with those outside the formal refugee category would become history.

Another agency would be specifically mandated to look at the legal protection of refugees, to ensure that their rights are respected. In particular, it would ensure that the humanitarian aid programmes respect those rights giving equal access to refugees. This agency would have to
maintain its concern for as long as refugees are present although this may reduce to a minimal level as refugees integrate into the local society. It would act as a check on the operation of aid programmes ensuring that refugees’ interest upheld, in the same way that governments are expected to ensure that aid programmes are consistent with the interests of their nationals. Ideally the host government will consider the interests of refugees and the role of the refugee protection agency will be reduced, but where government’s fail the agency would act.

Any such split would have to involve clear memoranda of understanding to ensure that the two agencies work closely together. The international response to war and refugee crises manages to draw together UN agencies as a matter of course. If UNHCR is to provide any aid it will almost inevitably involve WFP for example. The division of the work between two agencies does not necessarily imply a division within the overall international response so much as a restructuring of its management. No doubt there are many objections to such a suggestion that are based on a much greater knowledge of the UN system than I possess. However, there would also be many objections to the current system should it be proposed today. The question is whether a change in the status quo would yield sufficient benefits for the innocent victims of war to make the pain of restructuring worthwhile.
REFERENCES


