EVALUATION OFFICE | EVO/2024/10

Annex to Evaluation Report: **An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Decentralization and Regionalization Reform**

UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

Prepared by: Deloitte Consulting AG

SEPTEMBER 2024

UNHCR Evaluation Office

UNHCR's Evaluation Policy confirms UNHCR's commitment to support accountability, learning and continual improvement through the systematic examination and analysis of organizational policies, strategies, and programmes. Evaluations are guided by the principles of impartiality, credibility, and utility, and are undertaken to enhance the organization's performance in addressing the protection, assistance and solution needs of refugees, stateless people and other persons of concern.

Evaluation Office

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Case Postale 2500

1211 Genève 2

Switzerland

unhcr.org/about-unhcr/evaluation

Published by UNHCR

Table of contents

Table of Figures

Annex 1: Aggregate administrative and staff expenditure

Figure 1: Aggregate administrative and staff expenditure distribution (2018-2023, USD Mn)

Aggregate Administrative (ABOD) and Staff Expenditure (2018-2023, USD Mn)								
ABOD and Staff expenditure	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	**Sum (2018-21)**	**2022**	**2023**	**Grand total**
HQ	383.66	404.37	410.31	423.46		437.93	438.67	
RBs (i.e., Regional Desks pre D&R)	55.74	30.01	-	-		-	-	
HQ total (A)	*439.40*	*434.38*	*410.31*	*423.46*	*1,707.54*	*437.93*	*438.67*	*2,584.14*
Other strategic initiatives not part of D&R (BTP and PSP) (B)	*20.72*	*15.91*	*35.46*	*66.84*	*138.93*	*76.68*	*63.95*	*279.57*
HQ total expenditure (C= A-B)	*418.67*	*418.47*	*374.85*	*356.61*	*1,568.61*	*361.25*	*374.72*	*2,304.57*
HQ ABOD and staff expenditure net of strategic initiatives (y-o-y) (D)		(0.21)	(43.61)	(18.24)	**(62.06)**	4.63	13.47	**(43.96)**
RO	122.85	126.72	6.32	-	255.89	-	-	255.89
RB	-	17.97	93.38	104.08	215.43	116.99	119.14	451.56
Regional activities	-	16.95	6.37	6.94	30.26	7.47	13.24	50.97
MCO	-	-	96.37	104.36	200.73	125.03	125.66	451.42
RB total expenditure (E)	*122.85*	*161.63*	*202.44*	*215.38*	*702.31*	*249.49*	*258.04*	*1,209.84*
RB ABOD and staff expenditure (y-o-y) (F)		38.78	40.81	12.94	**92.53**	34.11	8.55	**135.19**
HQ and RB ABOD and staff expenditure net of strategic initiatives (y-o-y) (G= D+E)		38.57	(2.80)	(5.30)	30.47	38.74	22.02	91.24
CO	*837.34*	*901.77*	*949.84*	*1,077.01*	*3,765.97*	*1,227.16*	*1,274.24*	*6,267.37*
Country strenghtening expenditure (H)		64.43	48.07	127.17	**239.67**	150.15	47.08	**436.90**
ABOD and Staff expenditure net of strategic initiatives (y-o-y) (I=G+H)		**103.00**	**45.27**	**121.87**	**270.14**	**188.89**	**69.11**	**528.14**

Increase in RB expenditure offset by reduction in HQ in the year 2020 and 2021

Annex 2: Functions and Staffing

2.1 Regional Bureaux workforce

Figure 2: Regional Bureaux workforce growth and distribution (2019-2023, #)[1]



2.2 Staff and Affiliate workforce

Figure 3: Staff and Affiliate workforce split by Headquarters, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices by region (2018-2023, #)[2]



[1] Source: UNHCR Division for Human Resources (downloaded by Evaluation Office on 26-06-2024). Staffing data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis
[2] Source: UNHCR Division for Human Resources (downloaded by Evaluation Office on 26-06-2024). Staffing data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis

Figure 4: Staff and Affiliate workforce split by Headquarters, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices by region (2018-2023, #)



2.3 Functional distribution analysis

Figure 5: Functional distribution and growth across the organization (2018-2023, #)



Figure 6: Functional distribution and growth at Headquarters (2018-2023, #)



Figure 7: Functional distribution and growth at Regional Bureaux (2018-2023, #)



Figure 8: Functional distribution and growth at Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices (2018-2023, #)



Annex 3: Generative AI Use-cases to support multi-year strategic planning

Deloitte has been supporting UNHCR Headquarters, Regional Bureaux and Country Operations in efficiency uplift in the resource and financial planning processes by identifying use cases for Generative AI applications. As of August 2024, four high-priority use-cases have been shortlisted to action with ongoing pilots into the Ukraine and Uganda country operations.

Use-case 1 - Situation Analysis Assistant

GenAI-supported solution for COs to:

- Support collecting and structuring data from the relevant UNHCR-internal and external sources, to form a consistent country situation analysis,
- Facilitate translations to ensure consistency,
- Help rewording content for situation analysis documents as relevant,
- Facilitate the inclusion of reporting data in the situation analysis narratives.

Use-case 2 - Harmonization of country-specific documents

GenAI-supported solution for RBs to:

- Support comparing and summarizing country-specific documents, such as multi-year strategies, budgets, or staffing figures, against regional or global strategic directives,
- Smoothen the quality assurance process of country-specific documents made by RBs.

Use-case 3 - Programme Strawman Assistant

GenAI-supported solution to create a programme blueprint, out of both financial figures and textual data, which will help country operations:

- Improve assurance to donors and affirm UNHCR's engagement and alignment to mandate by reporting back on budget figures,
- Ensure the pragmatic reflection of the country situation, needs assessments, results framework into the budget allocation made for the programmes and justifying their evolution over time.

Use-case 4 - Policy Management Assistant

A tool for the whole organization, COs, RBs and HQ alike to:

- Support a better comprehension of policies across the whole organization through a Q&A system with knowledge of all the applicable guidance,
- Support the creation and update of new guidance products across all divisions and operations by facilitating research, quality assurance and drafting processes.

Annex 4: Organigrammes

Figure 9: Final core model Regional Bureaux organigramme (2019-3-14)



Figure 10: Final core functional organigramme (2019-18-1)



Figure 11: Template organizational chart for Country Offices (2023-1-12)



Figure 12: Template organizational chart for Sub-Offices (2023-1-12)



Figure 13: Template organizational chart for Field Offices (2023-1-12)



Figure 14: Template organizational chart for Field Unit (2023-1-12)



Annex 5: Case study on distribution of workforce in technical areas of Child Protection (CP) and Gender-based Violence (GBV) from 2018-2023

Topic 1: Workforce analysis for Child Protection:

The graph in figure 15[3] shows the distribution and growth of dedicated CP workforce[4] at HQ, RB and CO/MCOs between 2018-2023. As shown in the graph, there has been a significant increase in the number of dedicated Child Protection workforce between 2018-2023, primarily driven by growth in CO/MCOs with affiliates forming a major portion of the dedicated workforce. The decrease in 2021 can be attributed to the harmonization exercise led by DHR which led to conversion of many CP positions into generalist positions, however the dedicated workforce returned to the prior levels in 2022 and has been growing since. As noted above, approximately, three-fourth of the CP workforce comprises general protection or CBP staff who have child protection as one (among many) responsibility. As per the 2023 data, there is limited dedicated CP workforce in RBs. Although staff accounts reveal that there are Protection Officers with responsibility and substantial knowledge of CP (among other areas). It should be noted that this growth in workforce numbers reflects an overall growth in workforce across the organization during the time period under scrutiny, which in turn corresponds to a continued exponential growth in global refugee flows and corresponding (uneven) growth in UNHCR budget.

Figure 15: Child Protection distribution and growth by Headquarters, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices with total affiliates (2018-2023, #)



The graph in figure 16[5] shows the proportion of CP workforce as % of total protection and operational delivery workforce of UNHCR from 2018-2023. Overall, the CP workforce has expanded more rapidly than the total protection workforce over the past five years. While the total protection and operational delivery workforce grew at a CAGR of 9%, the CP workforce increased at a CAGR of 10%. Though, beginning 2022, the positions in CP have shown an

[3] Source: Workforce data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis
[4] It is to be noted that for the purpose of this analysis, the number of dedicated workforce has been estimated by calculating the number of workforce who have Child Protection within their job title. The figure does not reflect workforce that may be working in the field of Child Protection, but without a designated job title denoting the same. Thus, figures may not reflect the total range of Child Protection capacity and expertise across the organization. CO/MCO category also includes Chiefs of Mission and Liaison Offices and National Offices reporting to MCOs.
[5] Source: Staffing data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis

increasing trend, the overall CP workforce is only 1.26% of total protection and operational delivery workforce as of 2023.

Figure 16: Child Protection workforce as % of protection and operational delivery workforce (2018-2023, %)



The graphs shown in figure 17[6] illustrate the CP workforce distribution and growth by workforce type in HQ, RBs and CO/MCO, respectively, between 2018-2023. In terms of growth at HQ, RB and CO/MCO level, it has largely been driven by affiliates who also have limited decision-making authorities. The headcount of affiliates in HQ grew from nil in 2019 to 6 in 2023. While there has been a large increase in affiliate headcount at CO/MCO which has grown from 29 in 2018 to 46 in 2023. As affiliates are rising within thematic areas, it becomes central to maintain a balance between permanent and affiliate workforce as the affiliate-led growth carries a risk of disrupting the continuity of programmes. To overlay it with one of the key findings in a previous audit, any of the sampled affiliate profiles also did not hold supervisory positions[7]. Additionally, there is also a large gap in dedicated capacity between RBs and CO/MCOs. The evaluation of UNHCR's Child Protection Programming found that Regional Advisors and Protection officers with expertise in CP are essential for enhancing technical capacity at the regional level. However, this expertise is not consistently available, as most RBs lack dedicated Child Protection specialist positions.

[6] Source: Workforce data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis
[7] OIOS (2023). Audit of affiliate workforce arrangements in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Figure 17: Child Protection workforce by distribution and growth by type in Headquarters, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices (2018-2023, #)



The graph in figure 18[8] shows the regional distribution of CP workforce from 2018-2023. At a regional level, EHAGL has the largest number of dedicated CP workforce. The growth in capacities at regional level from 2018-2023, as illustrated in figure 18, is significantly driven by AME (28% CAGR) and EUR (23% CAGR), which may indicate scaling up of capacities due to regional priorities.

Figure 18: Child Protection workforce distribution and growth by regions (2018-2023, #)



There are significant differences in the distribution of CP workforce across the different regions of UNHCR. While factors such as overall protection staffing, the number of operations in various RBs, and the regional population size that UNHCR serves can explain some of this diversity, regions with similar profiles still exhibit varying levels of dedicated CP staffing. For example, in 2023, the number of dedicated CP workforce in MENA was 17, in comparison with EHAGL, where the corresponding number was 44.

Topic 2: Workforce analysis in the field of Gender-based Violence

The graph in figure 19[9] shows the dedicated[10] workforce distribution and growth in the field of GBV at the HQ, RB and CO/MCOs between 2018-2023. As illustrated in figure 19, between 2018 and 2023, dedicated GBV workforce capacity has increased at 9% CAGR. While the increase in dedicated GBV workforce is predominantly driven by HQ and RBs, the primary concentration of dedicated capacities resides closer to the field, with 85% of the GBV workforce in CO/MCO in 2023. According to the informants in HQ, the increase in HQ is also linked to the implementation of an earmarked project. Furthermore, as part of D&R reform, HQ decentralized the global roving scheme, which assigned the staff members in these positions at HQ to specific RBs.

[8] Source: Workforce data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis
[9] Source: Staffing data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis
[10] It is to be noted that for the purpose of this analysis, the number of dedicated workforce has been estimated by calculating the number of workforce who have GBV in their job title. The figure does not reflect workforce that may be working in the field of GBV, but without a designated job title denoting the same. CO/MCO category also includes Chiefs of Mission and Liaison Offices and National Offices reporting to MCOs.

Figure 19: Workforce distribution and growth in the field of Gender-based Violence at the Headquarters, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices with total affiliates (2018-2023, #)



Figure 20[11] below illustrates the workforce distribution in the field of GBV in proportion to the total protection and operational delivery workforce in UNHCR from 2018-2023. The GBV workforce has increased proportionately to total protection and operational delivery workforce, both growing at 9% CAGR from 2018-2023. According to the informants in HQ, the decline in workforce in the field of GBV in 2021 is due to the result of a harmonization exercise implemented by DHR which impacted many GBV positions. These positions were converted into general protection or multiple thematic protection positions, as discussed before. However, beginning 2022, the positions in GBV have started to grow and stabilized since then. Despite the growth, the overall workforce in field of GBV is only 1.99% of total protection and operational delivery workforce as of 2023.

As in the case of CP, this needs to be seen in the context of steadily growing overall budget and workforce in UNHCR, as well as exponentially growing needs and refugee flows across the world.

Figure 20: Workforce in the field of Gender-based Violence as % of protection workforce (2018-2023, %)



The graphs shown in figures 21 and 22[12] illustrate the GBV workforce distribution and growth by type in HQ, RBs and CO/MCO respectively between 2018-2023. As shown in figures 21

[11] Source: Workforce data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis
[12] Source: Workforce data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis

and 22, the growth in dedicated GBV workforce is fueled by Professional staff (P) at HQ and RB, while CO/MCO growth is supported by National (NO) staff and affiliates.

Some of these changes can be explained due to positions created in newly declared emergencies, which were temporary in nature and may not continue in post emergency period. For e.g, the Ukraine response (from Feb 2022) resulted in an increase of P positions across levels, which were then cut. Similarly, some of the affiliate positions in HQ and RBs are linked to earmarked funded projects and according to desk review and data validation, some GBV capacity is situated in RBs for the purpose of being deployed in emergency situations and may thus not be counted as RB resources. Due to data limitations, it is not possible to distinguish such workforce from the dataset.

Figure 21: Workforce distribution and growth in the field of Gender-based Violence by type in Headquarters and Regional Bureaux (2018-2023, #)



Figure 22: Workforce distribution and growth in the field of Gender-based Violence by type Country Offices/Multi-Country Offices (2018-2023, #)



Some variation in workforce in the field of GBV can also be seen across the regions, exemplifying the flexibility given to the regions in planning their staffing pillars and workforce. The graph below in figure 23[13] shows the regional distribution and growth of GBV workforce from 2018-2023. At a regional level, EHAGL has the largest number of dedicated GBV workforce; however, the overall growth in capacities at regional levels is predominantly driven by WCA (30% CAGR) and SA (21% CAGR). A decline has been observed in GBV workforce in MENA (-8% CAGR).

Factors such as overall protection staffing, the number of operations in various RBs, and the regional population size that UNHCR serves can explain some of this diversity, the regional growth is also nuanced by the capacities of partners, national systems, overall size of the operations and emergency situations. A significant factor contributing to the uneven distribution of dedicated capacities across regions is the fact that the sample organigram provided by DIP for regionalization did not specifically include GBV, Instead, it used "Community Based Protection" summary term which was interpreted differently across regions .

[13] Source: Workforce data as of 31st December for each year from 2018-2023 (provided by Evaluation Office from UNHCR Managing Systems, Resources and People (MSRP) and Workday), Deloitte analysis

Figure 23: Workforce distribution and growth in the field of Gender-based Violence by region (2018-2023, #)



Annex 6: Comparative Table of UNHCR Emergency Levels

Table 1: Comparative Table of UNHCR Emergency Levels[14]

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
Emergency Preparedness (Risk analysis, CP)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Declaration	AHC-O declares internally, through a communication to the SMC. Expires automatically after 6 months, with no possibility of extension.	HC declares through broadcast, following advice from AHC-O and consultations with RB/DESS. Expires after 6 months; can be exceptionally extended for a further 3 months. RB submits a request for extension before the expiration date.	HC declares through broadcast, following advice from AHC-O and consultations with RB/DESS. HC notifies ERC and IASC Principals in case of a refugee emergency. Expires after 6 months; can be exceptionally extended for a further 3 months. RB submits a request for extension before the expiration date.
Confirmation of Leadership (HC, RB, and Rep)	No	No	HC confirms existing leadership arrangements or decides on new ones. Rep and RB conduct review of leadership at sub-office/field level.
Emergency Cell (Senior staff of CO, RB, DESS, DIP, DSPR, DER, DIST, DHR, etc.)	Optional; RB and DESS determine coordination mechanisms with relevant operation(s).	Yes, RB establishes an EC, co-chaired by D/DD of RB and DESS.	Same as L2
Specialist Cells (HR, PRT etc.)	Optional	Optional	Optional
Senior Level Working Group (SLWG) (AHC-O, AHC-P and relevant RB and divisions Directors)	No	Yes, within 2 weeks of the declaration (thereafter when required).	Same as L2

[14] UNHCR (2023). Comparative Table of UNHCR Emergency Levels. Unpublished Internal Document

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
Joint Senior Level Mission (JSLM) (D/DD of RB and DESS)	Not required	Yes, within 4 weeks of the declaration. Briefing to the AHC-O and AHC-P, followed by a written report.	Same as L2
Human Resources	ERT/SCER/ Standby partners on request.	Same as L1	Same as L1
	DESS Emergency Surge Team deployment optional.	Same as L1	Principal Emergency Coordinator or senior member of DESS is automatically deployed, with a multi-functional support team.
	Fast Track optional (normally within 8 weeks).	Same as L1	Same as L1
	Position changes: RD and/or Rep can redeploy a s/m to a vacant Fast Track or regular position, provided the s/m is serving on a position at the same grade, in the same operation, and consents. RD and/or Rep can also redeploy Fast Track international positions within a country and/or across countries covered by the declaration.	Same as L1. Additionally, notification of intent to change a position is not required; effective date for changes to encumbered positions is reduced to 3 months; and 1-year service requirement is waived for P/D positions, as per para 7.14 of the RAF.	Same as L2
	Expedited recruitment: Rep can waive the desk review for temporary recruitment, other exceptional measures in coordination with DHR.	Same as L1	Same as L1
Emergency-reserved Budget	Regional Directors can allocate up to USD 5 million and AHC-O up to USD 10 million, but not more than USD 10	Same as L1 (Allocations are cumulative throughout the declaration, including any	Same as L1 (Allocations are cumulative throughout the declaration, including any extension and change of level, and

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
	million per country in total).	extension and change of level, and cannot exceed USD 10 million in total per country).	cannot exceed USD 10 million in total per country).
Supply	Global Stock (GSM) is available for requests of CRIs. The RFQ ceiling and LCC procurement approval authority are USD 750,000, if the most senior Supply Officer in the country is P4 or above. Rep has procurement approval authority up to USD 250,000. Minimum floating periods may be shortened for RFP (min. 2 weeks), ITB (min. 1 week) and RFQ (no min. timeframe).	Same as L1	Same as L1
Cash Based Interventions	Global arrangements for cash transfer mechanisms. Global CBI Payments Hub.	Same as L1	Same as L1

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
Partnership Agreements	Representatives or Head of Offices can select partners (upon IPMC recommendation) without a Call for Expression of Interest. New partners complete UN Partner Portal registration and PSEA capacity assessment within 3 months of signing the partnership agreement. Simplified LOMI can be used (not further than 31 Dec of the budget year). For 6 months from Agreement date, partners can undertake procurement above USD 100,000, provided they commit to submitting a Pre-Qualification for Procurement application within this time.	Same as L1	Same as L1
Real-Time Review (RB and DESS)	No	Upon request of AHC-O or in consultation with RB.	Yes, undertaken after 3 months of the declaration.
Post-Emergency Phase (CO, RB, DESS and relevant divisions)	At the end of the declaration, review of protection and operational strategies, frameworks, and leadership arrangements; operational footprint, structure, and security.	Same as L1	Same as L1
Evaluation (Evaluation Service)	Optional (may be commissioned at the request of the SET or RB).	Optional (may be commissioned at the request of the SET or RB).	Yes, conducted no later than 15 months after the declaration.

Annex 7: List of stakeholders and documents consulted

7.1 List of stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation

7.1.1 Stakeholders interviewed during the Inception phase

The evaluation team has gone through the transcripts of interviews with stakeholders already conducted by EvO during the process of elaboration of TOR. Additionally, the evaluation team has also conducted interviews with diverse stakeholders as part of the inception phase.

Table 2: List of stakeholders consulted for elaboration of ToR by the EvO

Name	Role/Position
Steve Corliss and Nadia Jbour	Director of Change and Senior Adviser
Steve Corliss, Nadia Jbour, Yasser Saad, and George Woode	Director for Change; Senior Adviser, Senior Change Management Adviser, Transformation and Change Service (TCS), Senior Transition Adviser, Office of AHC-O
Arman Harutyunyan	Head of TCS
Alex Mundt	Principle Situation Coordinator, Ukraine (former member of Change Team during D&R design)
Stephan Grieb	Deputy Director, Division of Human Resources
Salvatore Lombardo	Former Chef de Cabinet
Indrika Ratwatte	Regional Director, Bureau Asia & the Pacific
Emilie Irwin	Senior Policy and Guidance Coordinator, TCS
Alexandra Barbara Krause	Senior Policy Adviser, Office of DHC
Field Reference Group	Field Reference Group
Joel Nielsen	Senior Transition Coordinator, DHR Global Learning and Development Centre (former member of Change Team during D&R design)
Daisy Dell	Former Director of Change Management
Hanne Raatikainen	Chief Risk Officer, Enterprise Risk Management Service
Guillaume Hendriks	UNHCR Internal Audit Service of OIOS
George Woode	Senior Transition Coordinator, Office of AHC-O
Anthony Garnett and Marcel Grogan	Inspector General and Head of Strategic Oversight Service
Steven Corliss, Nadia Jbour, George Woode, Salam Shahin	Director for Change; Senior Adviser, TCS, Senior Transition Coordinator, Office of Assistant Office of High Commissioner Operations (AHC-O), Senior Executive Assistant, Office of Deputy High Commissioner (DHC)

Table 3: List of stakeholders consulted during the inception phase by Deloitte

Name	Role/Position
Arman Harutyunyan	Head of Transformation and Change Service (TCS)
Anne Marie Deutschlander	Deputy Director, Regional Bureau Europe
Hans Baritt	Director, Division of Financial and Administrative Management (DFAM)
Anthony Garnett	Inspector General
Olivier Madjora	Senior Oversight Officer
Daisy Dell	Former Director of Change Management
Yukiko Iriyama	Chief of Emergency Preparedness Section (DESS)
Robin Ellis	Deputy Director, Division of Emergency, Security and Supply (DESS)
Raouf Mazou	Assistant High Commissioner for Operations (A-HCO)
Ritu Shroff	Director, Division of Strategic Planning and Results (DSPR)
Tayyar Sukru Cansizoglu	Deputy Director, Head of Annual Review and Budget
Elizabeth Tan	Director, Division of International Protection

7.1.2 Stakeholders interviewed during the data collection phase

During the data collection phase, the evaluation team has conducted 123 interviews and 67 focus group discussions with 591 UNHCR stakeholders. Additionally, the evaluation team conducted 60 interviews with external partners.

In **Europe**, a total of **73** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of **20** interviews and **7** focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 4: List of stakeholders consulted in Europe during the data collection phase

Europe		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
Switzerland (Geneva RB)	27	Interviews: 7 Focus Groups: 3
Belgium (Brussels MCO)	25	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Spain (Madrid CO)	13	Interviews: 5 Focus Group: 1
Ireland (Dublin NO)	8	Interviews: 2 Focus Groups: 1

In **the Americas**, a total of **50** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of 10 interviews and 8 focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 5: List of stakeholders consulted in the Americas during the data collection phase

The Americas		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
Panama (RB)	17	Interviews: 3 Focus Groups: 3
Guatemala (CO)	13	Interviews: 2 Focus Groups: 2
Ecuador (Quito CO)	16	Interviews: 3 Focus Groups: 3
Ecuador (Guayaquil SO)	4	Interviews: 2

In **Middle East and North Africa**, a total of **132** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of 17 interviews and 14 focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 6: List of stakeholders consulted in MENA during the data collection phase

MENA		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
Jordan (Amman RB)	52	Interviews: 5 Focus Groups: 6
Jordan (Amman CO)	32	Interviews: 3 Focus Groups: 2
Jordan (Mafraq SO)	20	Interviews: 2 Focus Groups: 2
KSA (Riyadh MCO)	17	Interviews: 4 Focus Groups: 2
KSA (Dubai NO)	11	Interviews: 3 Focus Groups: 2

In **Asia and the Pacific**, a total of **63** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of 19 interviews and 8 focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 7: List of stakeholders consulted in Asia and the Pacific during the data collection phase

Asia and the Pacific		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
Thailand (Bangkok RB)	23	Interviews: 7 Focus Groups: 2
Indonesia (Jakarta CO)	21	Interviews: 3 Focus Groups: 3
Pakistan (Islamabad CO)	13	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Pakistan (Quetta SO)	6	Interviews: 3 Focus Groups: 1

In **Southern Africa**, a total of **108** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of 22 interviews and 12 focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 8: List of stakeholders consulted in Southern Africa during the data collection phase

Southern Africa		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
South Africa (Pretoria RB)	30	Interviews: 7 Focus Groups: 2
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa CO)	34	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Goma SO)	17	Interviews: 1 Focus Groups: 3
Angola (Luanda CO)	16	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Angola (Dundo FO)	11	Interviews: 2 Focus Groups: 3

In **East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes**, a total of **69** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of 16 interviews and 8 focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 9: List of stakeholders consulted in East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes during the data collection phase

East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
Kenya (Nairobi RB)	32	Interviews: 9 Focus Groups: 3
Uganda (Kampala CO)	17	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Uganda (Arua SO)	20	Interviews: 1 Focus Groups: 3

In **West and Central Africa**, a total of **96** stakeholders across hierarchies were interviewed. A total of 19 interviews and 10 focus group discussions were conducted.

Table 10: List of stakeholders consulted in West and Central Africa during the data collection phase

West and Central Africa		
Country	**# of Stakeholders**	**# of Interviews and # of Focus Groups**
Senegal (Dakar RB)	21	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Nigeria (Abuja CO)	24	Interviews: 6 Focus Groups: 2
Nigeria (Maiduguri SO)	23	Interviews: 1 Focus Groups: 2
Central African Republic (Bangui CO)	21	Interviews: 5 Focus Groups: 2
Central African Republic (Birao FO)	7	Interviews: 1 Focus Groups: 2

7.1.3 External partners interviewed during the Data Collection phase

In addition to interviews and focus groups conducted with internal stakeholders, the evaluation team also interviewed in total **55** external partners across 6 types:

In **Europe,** a total of 6 external partners were interviewed.

Table 11: List of external partners consulted in Europe during the data collection phase

Europe	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	1
Local NGO	1
Member States	2
Regional Intergovernmental Bodies	2

In **the Americas,** a total of 7 external partners were interviewed.

Table 12: List of external partners consulted in the Americas during the data collection phase

Americas	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	2
Local NGO	1
UN Partners	1
Member States	3

In **Middle East and North Africa,** a total of 6 external partners were interviewed.

Table 13: List of external partners consulted in MENA during the data collection phase

MENA	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	1
Local NGO	2
UN Partners	3

In **Asia and the Pacific,** a total of 11 external partners were interviewed.

Table 14: List of external partners consulted in Asia and the Pacific during the data collection phase

Asia and the Pacific	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	2
Local NGO	3
UN Partners	3
Member States	2
International Financial Institutions	1

In **Southern Africa,** a total of 12 external partners were interviewed.

Table 15: List of external partners consulted in Southern Africa during the data collection phase

Southern Africa	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	4
Local NGO	2
UN Partners	2
Member States	3
International Financial Institutions	1

In **East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes,** a total of 6 external partners were interviewed.

Table 16: List of external partners consulted in East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes during the data collection phase

East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	2
UN Partners	1
International Financial Institutions	1
Member States	1
Regional Intergovernmental Bodies	1

In **West and Central Africa,** a total of 7 external partners were interviewed.

Table 17: List of external partners consulted in West and Central Africa during the data collection phase

West and Central Africa	
Type of Partner	**# of interviews**
INGO	2
Local NGO	2
UN Partners	1
Member States	2

7.1.4 Stakeholders interviewed at Headquarters during the data collection phase

Table 18: List of stakeholders interviewed at Headquarters during the data collection phase

Name	Role/Position
Raouf Mazou	Assistant High Commissioner for Operations (AHC-O)
Sajjad Malik	Director of the Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRS)
Catty Bennet Sattler	Director of the Division of Human Resources (DHR)

Claudie Barrat	Head of HR Operational Partnership Service
Rewa El-Oubari	HR Coordinator
Mariam Kakkar	Head, Global Learning & Development Center (GLDC)
Hanne Raatikainen	Chief Risk Officer
Oscar Keeble	Enterprise Risk Management Advisor
Mark Manly	Head of Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization Service (DER Division)
Tiina Fris Hansen	Head of Private Partnership Service
Volker Schimmel	Head of Global Data Service

7.2 Documents

The desk review comprised many documents (+1000 documents) provided by the Evaluation Office, key informants and other UNHCR stakeholders in different functions.

The documentation was structured along the seven archetypes:

- **1. UNHCR background materials**
    - Large collection of all the internal documents related to D&R made available to EvO, including planning papers, policies, presentations but also emails.
- **2. External reading materials**
    - External background materials, including D&R literature, evaluation approaches and UN background materials.
- **3. Audits, Evaluations, Reviews**
    - Past audits, evaluations, reviews, and other oversight reports produced and found so far related to D&R (both from UNHCR and other organizations) and UNHCR's operations.
- **4. Organigrammes**
    - Collection of organization organigrammes to help trace the evolution of organizational structures as well as their intended forms
- **5. Data**
    - Data and other evidence collected on results of D&R including:
        - Staffing data
        - Budget data
        - Procurement data
        - Partnership data including local fundraising data, partnership agreements data and donor data
        - Speed of recruitment data
        - Stratified survey
- **6. UNHCR Corporate & other guidance documents**

- Collection of corporate strategy and other guidance documents

- **7. Documents received from divisions and Bureaux**
  - Documents deemed crucial to help guide the evaluation from focal points around the organization

These documents were utilized for several purposes, including:

1) **Understanding the context of the D&R reform:** The evaluation team conducted a critical review of the literature including previous evaluations, audits, and other D&R documents to gain an understanding of the nature, scope, objectives, and purpose of the reform, the ongoing implementation status, challenges, and opportunities. Additionally, these documents served as the foundation for conducting the KII interviews, ensuring the right questions were asked to gather as many useful insights as possible. Given the large number of documents, the evaluation team has concentrated on the most critical and high-priority documents.
2) **Informing the Evaluation Matrix:** The documentation enabled the evaluation team to develop the analytical framework and the Evaluation Matrix, outlining the areas of inquiry, the relevant sub-questions, the indicators and different data collection and analysis methods for assessing the D&R reform performance. This is crucial in ensuring that the Evaluation Matrix is comprehensive and aligned with the objectives of this evaluation.
3) **Providing valuable feedback**, **best practices and lessons learned** from similar reforms undertaken at UNHCR as well as key outcomes related to D&R, helping the evaluation team form the development of relevant approaches for this D&R evaluation.

Annex 8: Evaluation team & Management

On behalf of UNHCR Evaluation Office, David Rider Smith is the Evaluation Manager responsible for this evaluation under the leadership of Lori Bell, the Head of the Evaluation Office. The Deloitte Evaluation team is led by Nina Haelg, an expert in multilateral affairs and international migration, and overseen by Julius N. Hill, a senior partner for the international affairs and development sector based in Geneva, Switzerland.

The evaluation team is composed of seven core members and a pool of subject matter specialists at the global, regional, and local levels available upon which the core team can draw for additional subject matter expertise. The team comprises individuals from diverse nationalities across four continents, ensuring cultural diversity and enabling multilingualism in English, French and Spanish.

In addition, a core group, an Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) and Field Reference Group (FRG) have been established to guide the evaluation design and to contribute with their insights and expertise throughout the evaluation.

Figure 24: Evaluation team



Table 19: Deloitte Team experience and skills

Capabilities and Experience	Julius N. Hill Project Director	Nina Hälg Team Lead	Paul Okatege Senior Evaluator	Siddharth Shah Senior Evaluator	Fiona Deodato Research Assistant & PMO	Sahil Gupta Data Specialist	Anusha Gupta Evaluator	Jesse Gitau Evaluator
Experience within & expertise of the UN system	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Organizational design & strategy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reform evaluation & assessment	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Change management	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Systems theory approach/ behavioral science	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Data analysis (quantitative & qualitative)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Stakeholder management	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Digital transformations	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	

Annex 9: Evaluation approach and methodology

9.1 Evaluation approach

Figure 25: Evaluation approach



9.2 Analytical Framework

Figure 26: Analytical framework



9.3 Evaluation Matrix

Figure 27: Evaluation matrix

Sub questions	Eval criteria	Potential Indicators	Proposed data collection method	Data Analysis
EQ 1: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future? How effectively was it implemented?				
What was **the conceptual design of the reform, it's rationale and how clear, compelling,** and well aligned was it to the organization's strategy?	Relevance	• Articulation of clear and compelling rationale through presence of official documents, reports, and communications related to the D&R initiative, such as strategic plans, change management documents, organizational assessments, progress reports, and official communications from organizational leadership • Evidence of initially conceptualized design of key polices and processes that are part of the reform aligned to UNHCR strategic direction 2022-2026 • Implementation of measures to secure staff buy-in, including pre-engagement activities with staff, utilization of staff survey data, and readiness assessments to identify change needs and areas requiring attention • Presence of change initiative aligned with organization's strategic directions and priorities	• **Document review**: Evidence of the rationale in existing documents • **Semi-structured interviews**: Qualitative insights and understanding	• Document Analysis • Strategy analysis
To what extent was the approach taken demonstrably the most appropriate: Was relevant background research, including needs or capacity assessments made and taken into account? Were alternative options modelled? Were lessons from past reforms in UNHCR and from other agencies evidentially considered and learnt from in the design of this reform?	Coherence, Relevance	• Evidence of background research documents including option assessment of reasonable alternatives inspired by previous UNHCR reforms and reforms undertaken by other UN agencies • Evidence that KPIs selected for tracking the reform progress are relevant, reliable, and aligned with organizational objectives • Evidence of pre-engagement with staff, use of staff survey data and/or readiness and skills/capacity assessment illustrating regional/local capacity gaps • Evidence of organizational assessment indicating sufficient capacity and readiness for change • Evidence of assessment of the risks, considerations and likelihood of success to identify mitigation strategies	• **Document review**: Analyze background research, existing benchmarks and engagement evidence • **Semi-structured Interviews**: Assess stakeholders' perceptions on appropriateness	• Document Analysis • Strategy analysis • Policy or risk analysis
Through which means did the design principles consider overall **organization coherence while allowing for local flexibility & decision-making?** How effectively was the reform implemented according to its intended design, including the needs, risks and assumptions identified?	Coherence, Relevance Efficiency	• Evidence of standardized org. structures, processes or templates for requisitions • Evidence of clear and coherent organizational structures, roles and accountability frameworks (E.g., RAA, RAF, emergency preparedness) following coherent design principle across the functional areas • Evidence that design of specific entities (e.g. RBs) adhered to initial design (with flexibility to adapt according to regional contexts) • Extent to which legacy structures (Incl. division footprint) have been addressed • Extent to which new roles created in head office were originally envisaged • Increased involvement of country offices in planning process and challenges faced (e.g., potential delay) • Sustained monitoring effort through regular measurement/reporting of KPIs related to the reform • Funding support to operations without local fundraising options and any challenges faced in adopting the new Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) • Evidence of implementation of revised procurement processes with shortened approval timelines and challenges faced in emergency procurement • Evidence of comprehensive implementation of change management initiatives as per the intended design and timelines • Robust compliance mechanisms, internal audits, and assessments of risk management practices • Evidence of utilization of RAAs in day-to-day operations	• **Document review**: Background material and region wise assessment of reforms, existing documents (Audits, evaluations) on challenges faced in implementation of reforms, examination of internal controls and risk management • **Semi-structured interview**: Stakeholders' perspective on level of standardization or flexibility provided and insights on implementation effectiveness • **Focus group discussions:** Discussion with the RB and field operations staff to understand implementation progress and challenges	• Document analysis • Comparative analysis b/w different regions • Strategy analysis • Context analysis

How clearly and coherently has this reform fit and been sequenced with the wider set of corporate reforms and systems changes in working towards the organization's overall transformation? In what ways did external events such as COVID 19 influence the reform and what implications has this had in terms of its effectiveness?	Coherence, Relevance, Sustainability	• Alignment and coherence of D&R reform objectives with other internal and external transformations, demonstrating interconnectedness and mutual reinforcement • Evidence of institutional feedback mechanisms facilitating engagement and collaboration among diverse policy and operational units, including discussions on the interplay of ongoing corporate reforms • Incorporation of decentralization goals and principles into the structure and framework of subsequent systems, ensuring consistency with the reform's objectives • Inclusion of decentralized resource planning components within the enterprise resource planning system, enhancing the effective distribution and utilization of resources across multiple levels • Evidence of refinements and revised frameworks or policies in response to relevant internal and external changes • Evidence of D&R process benefiting delivery based on proximity during Covid-19 • Evidence of adaptability of the D&R reform with UN 2.0 reform • Evidence of linkages between new UNHCR initiatives (e.g., Innovation, Digital etc.) and changes to D&R related policies/procedures • Evidence of D&R reform adapting to scarcity of funds due to economic downturns in donor countries • Document review: Evidence through existing audits and evaluations • Evidence of dependencies identified between the various facets of the reforms • Evidence of concrete plan for mitigating risks associated with interdependencies • Evidence of level of collaboration and coordination across different reforms, ensuring cohesive approach • Evidence of feedback mechanism to report and address issues related to interdependencies	• **Document review:** Examine documents outlining alignment with other actions, evidence through existing audits and evaluations • **Semi-structured interviews**: Stakeholders' perspectives on alignment and qualitative insights on adaptability • **Walkthrough/observation of existing systems** • **Focus group discussions:** Group perspectives on agility and adaptation (HQ,RB, field operations) during external events such as Covid-19	• Document analysis • Strategy analysis • Context analysis • Participatory sense-making analysis
How has the organization addressed the intended changes in organizational culture and individual behaviour as requisites in achieving the reform outcomes? What have been the good examples of where this has taken place?	Effectiveness	• Evidence of a comprehensive communication strategy that effectively communicates the goals of the reform and fosters awareness among staff at all levels • Implementation of training initiatives aimed at building the skills and capacities required to adapt to new roles and responsibilities under the decentralization and regionalization reform • Positive examples of leadership actively modeling the desired cultural and behavioral changes, reinforcing the principles of decentralization • Existence of systems recognizing and rewarding individuals and teams that exemplify the desired cultural and behavioral changes associated with the reform • Regular feedback mechanisms and surveys capturing employee perceptions and attitudes toward the cultural and behavioral changes introduced by the reform • Evidence of improved collaboration and positive team dynamics as a result of the cultural and behavioral changes initiated by the reform	• **Document review:** Results from culture assessments, previously conducted surveys • **Semi-structured interviews:** Qualitative insights on behavioral changes • **Focus group discussions:** Group perspectives on cultural shifts (HQ, RB and field operations)	• Document analysis • Participatory sense making analysis
EQ 2: Reform Outcomes: have the intended results of the reform been realized?				
To which extent and where has the reform delivered on **establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), oversight and functions** placed at the right organizational level? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?	Effectiveness	• Increased involvement of RBs, COs in the planning process • Indications of quicker signing of partnership agreements due to greater authority to RBs/Cos • Evidence of increased local fund raising due to greater authority • Increase in number and value of procurement related decisions taken at regional level • Clearly defined policies and procedures demonstrating alignment with Localization, Legitimization, and Legalization principles of the 3L model • Clear relationship between bureau and country office size and function in each region in relation to need • Evidence of clear understanding of the revised RAAs, functional and managerial lines (covering flow of decision making from senior and middle management) and escalation procedures at all levels of the organization and clear delineation of authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities	• **Document review**: Existing data regarding effectiveness of RAAs, oversight mechanisms and functions • **E-survey**: Quantitative and qualitative data on perceived effectiveness • **Semi-structured interviews**: Qualitative insights on extent of achievement of reform outcomes • **FGD**: Qualitative data on perceived effectiveness	• Document analysis • Review of available data against baseline • Survey analysis • Cross-country case study analysis • Participatory sense-making analysis
To which extent and where has the reform delivered on providing **adequate resources and capacities** at the right organizational level? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?	Effectiveness	• Increased resource availability at country/local level due to local fundraising • Evidence that staffing positions are adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions • Evidence of localized hiring processes and financial authorities to enhance operational autonomy.	• **Document review**: Existing data regarding adequate resources and capacities placed at regional/ country level • **E-survey**: Quantitative and qualitative data on perceived effectiveness • **Semi-structured interviews**: Qualitative insights on extent of achievement of reform outcomes • **FGD**: Qualitative data on perceived effectiveness	• Document analysis • Review of available data against baseline • Survey analysis • Cross-country case study analysis • Participatory sense-making analysis

EQ 3: Organizational Outcomes: to which extent has UNHCR delivered on the key intended strategic vision and outcomes of the reform?				
To which extent has the reform better enabled UNHCR to support the goals of **one UN, and the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees?** How is this evident particularly at regional (inter-governmental, UN system engagement) national and sub-national (government, UN system engagement) levels? What factors have contributed to this?	Coherence, Effectiveness	• Better engagement with various stakeholders, including member states, governmental organizations agencies, NGOs, RLOs, whole of the UN system and private sector • Evidence that D&R has facilitated a shift in how and with whom UNHCR works (at regional and country level) • Evidence that more and/or new – traditional and non-traditional partners have been onboarded due to greater authority to RB/COs • Indications that post D&R, RBs and COs were provided with right capacity and skillsets to effectively engage with partners and maximize the impact of partnerships to achieve commitments of broader UN goals (GCR/SDGs/One UN) • Evidence of stronger engagement of UNHCR in the humanitarian/dev. nexus through stronger engagement and alignment with country strategies, UNCT and alignment of activities with UNSDF (e.g., joint fundraising efforts) post D&R	• **Document review**: Evidence of alignment with global goals • **E-survey:** Ground staff perspectives at regional level • **Semi-structured interview :** Interview with partners • **Focus group discussions**: Group perspectives on alignment with partners/HQ	• Document analysis • Context analysis • Participatory sense-making analysis • Survey analysis
Is there any evidence **of increased effectiveness of UNHCR's work at the point of delivery, or of it being on the path to achieve this?** To what extent has UNHCR been more **agile** and better able to respond to changing **regional and local contexts**? Are there examples of **faster, more flexible responses to large scale emergencies or unexpected needs at country level**? If so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?	Effectiveness	• Improved protection outcomes for People with and for whom UNHCR works , with specific metrics reflecting enhanced effectiveness at the point of delivery • Demonstrated adaptability in operational protocols, showcasing the flexibility to respond to diverse needs at the point of service as a result of the D&R reform • Efficiency gains in operational processes, reflecting improved effectiveness at the point of service due to the D&R reform • Evidence that communication tools ease communication flow between RBs and Divisions • Evidence that staff feels more empowered to make decisions and contributing to a more effective response at point of delivery (i.e., staff survey) • Evidence that RBs and CO's response are better aligned with the specific needs of forcibly displaced and stateless persons (continuous and meaningful engagement) • Indications of faster mobilization and response action to emergencies • Evidence of prompt decisions in response to emergencies by local offices/RBs , showcasing the effectiveness of decentralized decision-making • Successful examples of rapid needs assessments and subsequent adaptation of strategies to address unforeseen challenges, indicating agility at the country level • Evidence that RBs and Cos are better able to mobilize and allocate resources to address immediate needs • Evidence that COs staff are perceived as having the right skills and capacity to handle emergencies	• **Document review**: Evidence of increased effectiveness (through existing evaluations), quantitative data on agility of operations/speed of response to emergencies, if available; documentation on emergency policies and handbook to understand protocols • **E-survey:** Perceived improvement in service delivery and in agility of response • **Focus group discussions:** Group perspectives on effectiveness and evidence of streamlined functions (HQ,RB and field operations) • **Semi-structured interview:** Leadership perspective on improvement in delivery outcomes	• Context analysis • Participatory sense-making analysis • Survey analysis • Trend analysis • Cross-country case study analysis
EQ 4: Lessons and recommendations: where are the good practices that can built upon; the effective aspects of the reform and the possibilities not considered?				
Which lessons can we draw to inform UNHCR's **policies and processes** in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases?	Sustainability, Relevance	• Evidence of learnings from evaluations of implemented policies and processes by UNHCR • Evidence of successful policies and processes used by other UN organizations (As part of a successful D&R) • Capture different lessons learnt & good practices to strategically inform future support • Examples of lessons learned from implementation of prior reforms relating to D&R outcomes	• **Document review**: Existing audits and evaluations and UNHCR response to them • **Semi-structured interviews**: Insights on lessons learnt and outlook • **Focus group discussions**: Group perspectives on future improvements	• Lessons learnt from other UN agencies in past evaluations • Participatory sense making analysis • Validation/sense-making workshops
What steps are undertaken to ensure (to the extent possible) that outcomes are **sustainable moving forwards**?	Sustainability	• Evidence of reforms being institutionalized through the incorporation of changes into official organizational policies, ensuring sustainability • Continuous communication and change management initiatives to emphasize D&R understanding to sustain momentum • Implementation of effective monitoring mechanisms to regularly assess the performance and impact of decentralization, ensuring adjustments are made as needed • Regular solicitation of feedback from staff, local partners, and communities, with documented evidence of adaptations and improvements based on the received feedback • Evidence that UNHCR is continuously implementing improvement initiatives to refine the D&R reform • Evidence of an ongoing alignment between the D&R reform and UNHCR's mandate, strategic goals and wider UN priorities • Evidence of action on feedback and recommendations from evaluations to effect necessary changes for continuous improvement	• **Semi-structured interviews**: Insights on lessons learnt and outlook • **Focus group discussions:** Group perspectives on future improvements	• Participatory sense making analysis • Validation/sense-making workshops

9.4 Overarching approach

The overall approach for the evaluation has been grounded in a detailed review of the context and history of the reform which is based on the following two data sources:

- Existing documentation related to the reform, prior audits and evaluations, organizational data, academic literature *(refer to annex 7.2 for further details)*.
- KIIs conducted in the inception phase with selected stakeholders to provide contours for the detailed data collection phase *(refer to annex 7.1.1 for further details).*

The review of the reform has been designed to identify the situation prior to D&R, the reform intent and the initiatives taken as a part of D&R reform to achieve the intended objectives. It has also been designed to put relevant system boundaries, identify the right stakeholders for data collection in the next phase and identify complementary systems. The evaluation approach has been outlined using three key principles:

- **Participatory and formative:** The evaluation seeks to formulate its findings and recommendations in collaboration with the different actors involved in it, in order to foster ownership amongst those concerned by it, and to produce practical and actionable suggestions for a way forward.
- **Systems thinking**: Analyze interconnected components of a system to understand their interactions, dependencies, and outcomes, providing holistic insights for informed decision-making and sustainable interventions, avoiding treating issues and processes in silos.
- **Forward looking:** The evaluation is forward looking in its orientation, focusing particularly on best practices, adjustments and practical solutions to any issues identified, thus facilitating the successful implementation of the D&R reform going ahead.

9.5 Reform intent

The evaluation team found no single repository of the D&R reform intent or a consolidated D&R strategy across the different facets of the reform. Through the extensive desk review and discussions with stakeholders across the project, the evaluation team found broad D&R design principles which have evolved and been refined over the years to meet the demands placed on UNHCR for an agile, effective, and relevant humanitarian organization in the years to come. Rather than originating from one single place or origin, the D&R reform intent is captured across various documents which speaks to its cross-cutting and intersecting nature with other ongoing reforms at UNHCR. In order to assess these intentions and their fulfilment, the evaluation team identified specific intentions for each of the facets. Limitations for the evaluation in the absence of a detailed intent broken down into concrete objectives paired with an evolving design of the reform are further *discussed below in section 7.5.*

To achieve the reform intent, various initiatives, such as the launch of a revised RAF, new RAAs, and the regionalization of RBs, were launched. The evaluation aims to identify not only the effectiveness and challenges faced in the implementation of each of these initiatives separately, but also the interdependencies between them and the external factors that may have influenced them, including potential unintended consequences.

9.6 Risk and Limitations

Several assumptions and risks underlying the D&R reform and its design were also identified from the background documentation.

Assumptions:

- Those closest to the point of delivery are best placed to understand the needs of people with and for whom UNHCR works, and therefore to plan, decide and prioritize.
- Adequate resources for decentralization are available.
- Official shifting of decision making, and resource allocation power is vital for reaching true decentralization.
- Staff buy-in, continuous communication and cultural change is crucial for effective change to ensure cultural alignment and adaptability across RBs and COs.
- Repositioning of the RBs in the field is overall cost neutral.
- Seamless integration of technology is needed to support communication and collaboration across RBs, COs and HQ.

A total of nine limitations and risks to the evaluation have been identified below. None of the risks identified had a high impact on the results of the evaluation due to mitigation measures taken:

Table 20: Table outlining limitations and risks to the evaluation

Risk	Description	Mitigation	Likelihood	Impact
External factors				
Impact of COVID-19 on the efficacy of the D&R reform	The pandemic has affected COs throughout UNHCR to various degrees. Hence, the effects of D&R need to be considered against this external factor which made it unable to travel physically to many locations for up to 2 years and made it impossible to coherently roll out planned interventions/activities as part of D&R including data collection, feedback loops and KPI tracking.	The evaluation controlled for the external effects of COVID by a) contextualizing the impact of the pandemic on D&R and distinguishing related and unrelated causes and effects, and by b) creating a baseline comparison pre-pandemic to help isolate pandemic-related effects from other factors to arrive at an accurate assessment.	High	Medium
Ability to de-link D&R from other reforms and transformations within UNHCR	UNHCR has undertaken multiple transformation programs over the past few years including modernizing its legacy and introducing new technology platforms. Each transformation brings with it an	The evaluation framework and data collection tools were designed to enable greater specificity on the impact and efficacy of D&R (to the extent possible). The evaluation team outlined this risk in conversations with interviewees and stakeholders to ensure the inputs shared are restricted	High	Medium

	associated set of changes to processes and ways of working which will have intersecting impacts on the D&R reform. Consequently, there could be a challenge in ascertaining the degree of causality between D&R and evaluation findings	to D&R and its efficacy/impact. Hypothesis formulation, data collection and recommendation formulation process were cognizant of the need to find evidence to establish causality. The updated theory of change adopted a systems-based approach, ensuring to minimize the focus on individual contribution/causality.		
Methodological risks				
Absence of central strategy documentation on the intent of D&R	Risk of lack of conceptual clarity on the intent of the reform in view of the absence of one central document of truth. Given the evolving nature of D&R with various interlinked and parallel reform processes and key decision-making points through the period of 2017-2020, gaps in mapping arguments, decision-making and outcomes must be expected. A limited sample of key informants who were involved in the design of the reform may offer a biased view.	The evaluation team undertook a systematic desk review analysis to reconstruct the initial design plan/intent of the evaluation, drawing from extensive literature review of 1000+ documents to establish the baseline for the evaluation and methodologically gather scattered information from a variety of sources, filling in data gaps while validating and fact-checking information provided by key informants.	High	Medium
Inability to get consistent data/data gaps across different offices and functions of UNHCR	There is variance in data availability across the different areas of inquiry and the relevant dimension of analysis for the evaluation due to absence of a single source of truth amidst the BTP transformation.	UNHCR Evaluation Office has been supporting the evaluators to close as many data gaps as possible by obtaining all available information from different data custodians. Applying a variety of mitigation measures such as exploring the availability of alternative data sources when required, applying statistical methods of	High	High

	While KPIs of overall success indicators exist, there is the absence of one central repository or authority within UNHCR to ensure the collected data is complete, up-to-date, and accurate. Limited good quality data is available for a selection of country case studies due to the lack of a single repository of data across all regions.	triangulation, and using a mix between qualitative and quantitative data ensured that data gaps had as little impact as possible on the robustness of the overall of the evaluation. Data limitations included but were not limited to, potential biases from self-reported surveys, and variations in data quality, such as inconsistencies in reporting and data completeness. These limitations are further detailed within the report.		
Sampling Bias	The evaluation will be conducted based on a sample of countries jointly decided between the Evaluation Office and the evaluation team. The sample might not be a completely accurate global picture.	The country samples and vertical case study selection were decided in conjunction with the Evaluation Office with input from the core group and the FRG. The country sample included a diverse mix of countries based on geographical balance and coverage of diverse entity operational representativeness. To enlarge data collection beyond the country visits, a sample staff survey was conducted to capture the collective input of a broader global perspective of UNHCR staff. Similarly, the vertical case studies have been chosen applying a critical selection.	High	Medium
Availability of key stakeholders, including external partners	There will be certain restrictions regarding the availability of key stakeholders, in particular, key informants who have changed roles and status (e.g., retirement) since the initial D&R rollout	The evaluation team gathered a variety of perspectives from different stakeholders including UNHCR staff throughout all entities (RBs, MCOs, Country offices etc.), civil society networks, implementing partners to UNHCR, Member States, other UN agencies, IFIs, regional organizations and other strategic partners including private sector	Medium	Low

		partners to ensure a robust sample of evidence. While high staff rotation limited to some extent our ability to capture a before and after D&R perspective from some stakeholders, UNHCR staff who have held various roles in the organization at HQ and country were an additional asset as they were able to bring both perspectives to the evaluation. The same holds for external partners, with some even being unaware of the D&R reform altogether.		
Cultural/language barriers leading to misinterpretation of perspectives shared by respondents	Cultural bias or language barriers can lead to misunderstandings, misinterpretation of information presented during interviews ultimately leading to inaccurate or incomplete information.	The evaluation team composition has been carefully selected to ensure geographical and cultural balance including robust experience in understanding the context of UNHCR's work. Regional senior evaluators have been selected to ensure regional specificities including cultural and linguistic aspects are being taken into consideration	High	Low
Operational risks				
Security risks impede in-person visits to certain locations	Certain locations where an in-person visit would be desirable from a data sampling perspective may not be accessible due to security risks.	Remote consultations were conducted when in-person visits were not possible. This ensured a representative sample of country locations consulted.	High	Medium
Limited Survey Response Rate	Risk of low response rate to surveys floated due to a large number of ongoing surveys	The Evaluation Office and the evaluation team were aware of the risk of survey fatigue in the organization and applied a stratified sampling approach to maximize engagement and response rates.	High	Medium

Identification of potential risks in the inception phase itself has allowed the Evaluation team to identify potential mitigating steps and actions. These actions were contemplated into the evaluation framework and approach, to ensure recommendations are unbiased and actionable.

9.7 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation was initiated in December 2023 and will conclude in September 2024. The evaluation was divided into four distinct phases: inception, data collection, data analysis and reporting and finalization.

During the **inception phase**, the evaluation team conducted a comprehensive review of all relevant documents, desk research, and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) to inform the analytical framework. The evaluation team developed the Evaluation Matrix, including developing the areas of inquiry to guide the evaluation, developed key hypotheses to be tested against key dimensions and identified data sources (both qualitative and quantitative) for data collection and analysis *(refer to annex 9.3 for further details).*

In the **data collection phase,** the evaluation team undertook visits in the seven regions: Europe (EUR), East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes (EHAGL), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia and the Pacific (AP), West and Central Africa (WCA), Southern Africa (SA) and the Americas (AME).

In total **30 operations were visited 30 operations including RBs, MCOs, COs, NOs, SOs and FOs**: Indonesia, Pakistan, Uganda, Spain, Belgium, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Guatemala, Central African Republic (CAR) and Nigeria. Across the 30 operations, more than 600 UNHCR stakeholders have been consulted through KIIs and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). In addition, a total of 55 partner interviews including those of UNHCR's strategic, funded partners and its major donors were conducted. To capture quantitative data, a survey employing a stratified sampling method was carried out reaching 385 respondents *(refer to annex 10.3 for further details).* At the end of the data collection phase, sense making workshops presenting the preliminary findings and providing post-field mission debriefs have been held in each of the 30 operations and seven regions visited.

In phase three, **data analysis (both quantitatively and qualitatively)** was performed to inform key insights, themes, and findings of the evaluation. Several consultations took place to ensure that findings had been validated with relevant stakeholders ahead of any recommendations and the draft report.

In phase four, the evaluation team **finalized** the report and engaged in internal dissemination activities to present final recommendations.

9.8 Evaluation methodology

Document review

Throughout the evaluation, a systematic review and analysis of documents to furnish concrete and documented evidence in response to the evaluation questions was conducted. On a global scale, the team has scrutinized more than 1000 documents *(refer to annex 7.2 for further details)*. This review aimed to ensure a comprehensive understanding and evaluation of existing evidence related to each facet of the reform including its conceptual design, strategic plans, region-wise assessment of reforms, alignment with other programs, protocols (e.g., emergency policies and handbook), FTE data and overall budget documents, results from previously conducted surveys, prior issues identified in D&R (e.g., issues with effectiveness of RAAs, oversight mechanisms and functions, adequacy of resources and capacities placed at regional/ country level).

The different document analyzed includes:

- Internal background material including policy documents, D&R strategy, and implementation guidance, organigrammes, documentation of background research, and other key documents mentioned in the bibliography.

- Existing quantitative data related e.g., to tracked KPIs, headcount, budgets, procurement, resource allocation, emergency responsiveness.
- UNHCR and UN corporate documents.
- UNHCR evaluations, audits, and reviews. Evaluations, audits, and reviews of other organizations.
- Related academic papers, research reports and audits of other organizations.

Key Informant Interviews

During the inception phase, the evaluation team conducted 12 interviews with UNHCR stakeholders *(refer to annex 7.1.1)*. The KIIs have been conducted using a combination of virtual and in-person discussions. The purpose of the interviews was to gather initial perspectives on the D&R reform, clarify the evaluation objectives and scope, and identify key themes that have been revealed to be important for this evaluation regarding the D&R reform. Additionally, interview transcripts conducted pre-ToR by EvO were also summarized and analyzed to 1) avoid redundancy 2) allow for follow-up on previous discussions and crucial areas regarding D&R. The interview guide for KII in the inception phase was developed with tailored questions for each interviewee thereby ensuring relevance and depth while addressing interlocutor's specific experiences, insights, and roles held during the D&R reform. Questions were inspired by information gathered during the desk review, including internal and external documents. The interview comprehensively addressed all questions pertaining to the specific D&R facets areas of this evaluation and enabled to reveal several common themes, that are crucial for the evaluation and have helped shape and inform the analytical framework and the Evaluation Matrix. Many findings established in the desk review documentation, including external audits and evaluations, have been confirmed and further outlined by KIIs.

Focus group discussions

The principal aim of the FGDs was to gather perspectives on the perceived outcomes of the reforms among staff (e.g., familiarity with the RAAs framework, alignment with partners and HQ, adequate staffing and presence of context-specific functions, improvement in effectiveness of delivery, responsiveness and agility in response), implementation progress and challenges faced especially during external events such as Covid-19, inter-dependencies identified and extent of perceived changes in the organizational culture as enablers/obstacles to reform's success. The participants of FGDs include a mix of Professional (P) and General Service (G) staff in RBs, MCOs/COs and SOs/NOs/FOs across the seven regions. The selection of participants was particularly based on their experiences with the identified facet under evaluation and whether their specific function had been impacted due to the D&R initiative.

To steer these discussions, a facilitation guide, informed by insights from surveys, KIIs and document reviews, was created. This guide, with predefined topics and prompts, ensured that discussions remained focused and relevant *(refer to annex 10.4 for further details).*

Staff survey

In order to collect views on the D&R reform on a global level, a staff survey was launched. Instead of sending the survey to the entire UNHCR workforce, a statistically representative, stratified sample was randomly selected to receive it. This sample included a representative number of participants from each region and office type (HQ, RB, MCO/CO, below MCO/CO) and had a distribution of grades reflecting the overall distribution within the organization. The decision to use a random sampling approach was made for the following reasons:

- To ensure data representativeness so that the diversity within the organization, most notably across factors of interest to the evaluation (regions and office types) is accurately reflected within the responses received. This targeted approach guarantees that results can be safely extrapolated to the whole workforce, minimizes bias, improves validity, and provides a more accurate portrayal of the entire workforce's opinions and experiences.

- To optimize resources by reducing survey fatigue among employees who might otherwise feel inundated with requests for feedback.
- To allow for more nuanced analysis, as researchers can delve deeper into specific groups' responses, uncovering insights that might be obscured in a broader, less focused survey approach.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, the sampling approach was deemed reasonable, as an all-staff survey on a similar issue was launched just a few weeks before the foreseen survey launch date. Furthermore, many of the survey questions demand a comparison of the organization prior to and after D&R, which only a restrictive proportion of workforce are able to make based on their entry into service in UNHCR *(refer to annex 10.3 for further details on the stratified sampling approach).*

The survey was designed to elicit perceptions from UNHCR staff, specifically addressing key evaluation questions across facets. To ensure precision and manageability, the survey was designed to cover essential aspects of D&R, such as perceived effectiveness, field staff perspectives at field and regional level, perceived improvement in operational delivery, agility and responsiveness and perceived culture change. The survey aimed to gather both quantitative and qualitative insights, with a focus on identifying priority D&R impact areas, assessing improvement scope, and understanding staff perspectives in comparison with leadership's viewpoints.

The survey was created using Microsoft Form, an anonymous and secure online survey tool. Several important considerations were addressed to maximize survey response rates, including:

- The survey was anonymous.
- The survey contained clear, unambiguous, and precise questions.
- Universally intuitive design for diverse backgrounds and technological competencies.
- The survey was provided in English, French, Spanish and Arabic.
- The survey was open for a sufficient period, and a reminder message is sent.
- The survey emphasized data privacy and security measures.

For more detail on the survey method and sampling, please refer to Annex 10.3.

Country case studies

By conducting country case studies, the evaluation aimed to shed light on the different facets of the D&R reform across UNHCR's global presence. By doing so, the evaluation aimed to uncover both contextual specificities, as well as commonalities in the experiences with D&R across UNHCR's regions, thereby distilling most common issues and successes, but also contextual variations, adaptive behaviors, and potential best practices. It was also important to understand the different impacts that the reform had had on different types of offices (RBs, COs, MCOs, NOs, SOs) and operations with different focus areas (e.g., advocacy or fund-raising as opposed to emergency response).

Country visits were decided to be made to each of the seven RBs, two (Multi-)Country Offices within each region, and one SO or FO in each region. Two out of the COs were to be MCOs and in these cases an office under the MCOs was also to be visited. Visits were to be conducted physically and virtually, in order to enable the exceptionally large coverage in the short timeframe.

The sampling process for country case studies involved a collaborative approach among the evaluation team, EvO, Evaluation Core Group (ECG) and FRG. An initial classification of 144 countries based on four key criteria: size of operation (average of budget and workforce), emergency status (none, L1 or L2, L3), size of population with and for whom UNHCR works and number of UNHCR offices in the country (NOs, Liaison Offices, Chiefs of Mission, SOs, FOs, field units and “other” offices) was performed. Next, a screening exercise was conducted to determine the most apt country operations to include using three key criteria: operational representativeness based on the four categorization criteria, even geographical coverage of all seven Bureaux, and other considerations, including number of recent evaluations or audits and likelihood of best practice evidence. This narrowed down the list to 33 countries In parallel, an online survey to collect views on the sampling process for country case studies and gain an understanding of the countries that would pose as interesting case studies in regional and output contexts was rolled out to the FRG during the inception phase. The screened countries along with prioritized and de-prioritized countries were further presented to the ECG for a collaborative discussion and qualitative inputs resulting in a final selection of 14 countries including two MCOs. *For more detail on the sampling of country case studies, please refer to Annex 10.1.*

The methodology of the country case studies involved document reviews, including analysis of regional contexts, functional backgrounds (e.g., advocacy-focused, fund-raising focused) and relevant D&R focused impacts, KIIs, FGDs. After each mission, a debriefing with the respective RB Director and Country Representative was conducted and after a preliminary analysis of findings, a sense-making workshop was arranged for all involved staff in each region to assist the evaluation team in testing the consensus of global findings across regions, and to address any areas that may have been overlooked.

During field missions, the evaluation team conducted 190 KIIs and FGDs across seven regions, as well as 55 KIIs with external partners relevant to the evaluation. Additionally, key UNHCR stakeholders from HQ divisions were interviewed. The key stakeholders interviewed are:

- UNHCR staff at HQ, in particular DSPR, DIP, DESS, and DER. Other divisions such as DHR, DRS, GLDC, PSP, Global Data Service (DIMA) and Risk Management were also consulted.
- UNHCR RB Directors and staff, in particular the functions of Strategic Planning and Partnerships, External Engagement, Protection Coordination and Operations Support.
- Representatives and staff at different entities at national and sub-national levels including MCOs, COs, Sub-Offices (SOs), Field Offices (FOs), National Offices (NOs) etc.
- Strategic and funded partners and donors (International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO), Local Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), UN partners, Member States, Regional Intergovernmental Bodies)

This list includes an indicative mix of stakeholders across functions critical to D&R, such as strategic planning, external relations and partnerships, protection, emergency response, operations etc. The stakeholders interviewed across critical functions possess significant pre- and post-D&R experience or substantial over four years of service within UNHCR. This ensured a depth of knowledge and insights crucial for the evaluation. The interviews were semi structured using a semi structured interview guide informed by document reviews and KIIs during the inception phase. *The interview guides are featured in the annex 10.4.*

Vertical case studies

Four vertical case studies were conducted within the overall evaluation framework, in order to allow the evaluators to inquire deeper into specific areas of interest within UNHCR’s work and the effects that D&R had on those. These areas were to be chosen based on their relevance to D&R on the one hand, as well as their overall strategic importance to UNHCR and its mandate. To select the studies, a long list of topics was created and evaluated against the following criteria: strategic priority, vertical coverage, criticality for D&R, and measurability. In addition, a survey was conducted with the ECG and the FRG to gather their inputs. The four case studies selected were Protection, Emergency Response, External Engagement and Partnerships, and Strategic Planning. Within the Protection case study, a special focus was given to two sub-fields of protection work, in order to allow for a more detailed look into specialist areas and their workforce structures. Child protection and the field of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) were chosen for this purpose, however, they should be seen as examples from among a number of other specializations.

The vertical case studies adopted a standardized structure, assessing the intent, the initiatives undertaken, and the outcomes achieved (with qualitative and quantitative feedback) under D&R in the specific area of focus. A comparative analysis was conducted between the initial intent and outcomes to gauge effectiveness of the reform within the area at hand and broader conclusions were drawn on interlinkages with the organization's ways of working.

For more detail on the sampling of vertical case studies, please refer to Annex 10.2.

Data coding and evidence collation

The collected data has been categorized, coded, and organized using an Evidence Assessment Framework (EAF) carried out on an MS Excel document, imaging the structure of the Evaluation Matrix. The goal of this exercise was to amass evidence derived from primary data collection, establishing a firm foundation for subsequent triangulation and in-depth analysis across the areas of enquiry.

Data analysis

Analysis of primary and secondary data included the following steps: **Qualitative analysis of evidence from document reviews, KIIs and FGDs:** The evaluation team analyzed the qualitative evidence gathered from documents, stakeholder interviews and FGDs at global, regional, and country levels. The team validated the findings using triangulation, a methodological approach involving cross-verification of information from more than one source or method, in conjunction with the evaluation questions and sub-questions, to guide and support the relevant findings and lessons learnt. This included collation and comparison of evidence at all levels (global, regional, country) supported by techniques such as participatory sense-making analysis[15], maturity analysis[16] and strategy analysis[17].

Quantitative analysis of evidence from existing data, reports, and surveys: The team collated quantitative data from a number of sources, including existing organizational dashboards, documents, and direct focal points within the relevant services in the organization. These data were then used to perform trend analyses on various subjects, such as workforce, budgets, procurement lead times, speed of recruitment, amount of local fundraising and partnership agreements. In addition, the team analyzed results of the staff survey, which quantified perceptions on topics such as organizational hierarchy, culture, RAAs, process standardization, and reporting lines. It also allowed for a comparative analysis of perceptions across the different levels of the organization (HQ, regions, country operations) different regions and different hierarchy levels (e.g., P staff, G staff).

Synthesis

Findings have been synthesized using triangulated data, across different data sources, stakeholders, and locations. Synthesizing the findings allowed the evaluation team to 1) identify potential patterns, relationships, and trends and 2) inform new insights to derive meaningful conclusions and recommendations for a way forward. The evaluation team viewed the data synthesis stage as a dynamic and iterative process that involves several working

[15] Participatory sense-making analysis: To assess the collaborative and shared understanding among stakeholders.
[16] Maturity analysis: To assess the level of development or maturity of a process, system, or organization.
[17] Strategy analysis: To identify if a reform has been undertaken with clear definition of the end state aligned with the overall goals, vision and mission of the organization.

sessions. During these working sessions, the evaluation team drafted findings and mapped them against the Evaluation Matrix while considering input from the reference groups and the EvO. The evaluation synthesis has been used to generate a **summative performance analysis** of the success of D&R reform against the OECD DAC evaluation criteria cited in the Evaluation Matrix.

9.9 Ethical considerations & data management

The evaluation has been aligned with UNEG Ethical Guidelines and Code of Conduct, as well as UN Supplier Code of Conduct, and ensured compliance with these principles and guidelines throughout all phases of the evaluation. In addition, the evaluation complied with international ethical guidelines and best practices in quality assurance, evaluation processes and research. In addition, the evaluation took into consideration transparency; confidentiality and informed consent; independence; diversity and inclusion.

The key principles that guided the evaluation include independence, impartiality, credibility, and utility, which in practice, call for protecting sources and data; systematically seeking informed consent; respecting dignity and diversity; minimizing risk, harm, and burden upon those who are the subject of, or participating in the evaluation, while at the same time not compromising the integrity of the exercise.

The evaluation team signed UNHCR Code of Conduct, completed UNHCR's introductory protection training module, and has respected UNHCR's confidentiality, UNHCR Data Protection Policy, and UNHCR Age, Gender, and Diversity policy requirements.

9.10 Quality Assurance

The evaluation team followed a comprehensive approach to quality assurance from the project start to the delivery of the final evaluation report:

Step 1: Identification and assessment of the exact requirements for each organization, its context and needs from the evaluation, which informs the team composition with the required skillsets and diversity to conduct a robust evaluation.

Step 2: Implementation of **standard quality review process** through **multiple review levels** from survey interviewers/coders, senior evaluators, team lead to a review from two partners from Deloitte leadership. In addition, the project team has access to Deloitte's global network of subject matter experts whose knowledge can be drawn on throughout the project.

Step 3: Iterative review cycles among the evaluation team and the Evaluation Office have ensured continuous quality control. Key deliverables themselves were reviewed by the established Core Group and Reference Groups which enabled the evaluation team to proactively identify and mitigate challenges and obstacles that could affect the quality of the evaluation. Main quality assurance activities and review cycles by phase are illustrated below.

Step 4: As a final layer, an **internal global sounding board composed of two Deloitte partners** was established and provided quality assurance on the final deliverable before it is handed to UNHCR.

Data management and confidentiality were key considerations in conducting independent evaluations ensuring integrity and privacy of sensitive information. In this regard, Deloitte complies with its obligations under Data Protection Legislations ("DPL") in respect of personal data processed by it in connection with the Contract and the Services. The evaluation team will only process personal data to the extent necessary to provide the services and in accordance with the specific instructions given by the Evaluation Office and as required by any competent authority or applicable law (if appropriate). Adhering to UNHCR's evaluation quality assurance (EQA) guidance, all evaluation products were shared with an external quality assurance provider for their comment, in addition to being reviewed by the Evaluation Manager and Reference Group. Evaluation deliverables were not considered final until they have received a satisfactory review rating and have been cleared by the Head of the

Evaluation Office. The evaluation Manager has shared and provided an orientation to the EQA at the start of the evaluation. Adherence to the EQA will be overseen by the Evaluation Manager.

Annex 10: Data collection tools

10.1 Sampling process for country case studies

Figure 28: Country case studies sampling process



The table below lists the list of countries selected following the sampling steps outlined in this proposal. In total, the evaluation team has visited **30 operations** including **RBs, MCOs, COs, NOs, SOs and FOs**.

Table 21: Visited countries during the data collection phase

Region	Shortlisted countries
Asia and the Pacific	Thailand (RB), Indonesia (CO), Pakistan (CO), Pakistan Quetta (SO)
East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes	Kenya (RB), Uganda (CO), Uganda Arua (SO)
Europe	Switzerland (RB), Ireland (NO), Belgium (MCO), Spain (CO)
Middle East and North Africa	Jordan (RB), Saudi Arabia (MCO), Jordan Mafraq (CO), Dubai (NO)
Southern Africa	South Africa (RB), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (CO), DRC Goma (SO), Angola (CO), Angola (Field Office)
The Americas	Panama (RB), Ecuador (CO), Ecuador Guayaquil (SO), Guatemala (CO)
West and Central Africa	Senegal (RB), Nigeria (CO), Nigeria Maiduguri (SO), Central African Republic (CO), Central African Republic Birao (Field Office)

10.2 Sampling process for Vertical Case Studies

The evaluation has conducted four deep dive studies into four focus themes (Vertical Case studies). The selected four vertical case studies as well as the rationale for choosing them are as follows:

Table 22: Shortlisted vertical case studies with rationale

Vertical Case Study	Rationale
Strategic Planning and Resource Allocation Process	• Pivotal for alignment with org. goals, ensuring organizational coherence across various UNHCR operations and contexts. • Key role for performance and risk management. • Decision-making authority for resource allocation significantly affects ownership and impacts D&R adaptation to regional/local needs. • Allows for impact reporting and alignment to global frameworks (GCR/SDGs).
Emergency Response	• Agility of the organization is a key goal of D&R. • Local decision-making. • Core mandate/strategic importance for UNHCR as an organization within the broader UN system + humanitarian actors. • Direct impact on people UNHCR works for and with.
External Engagement and Partnerships (Funded, strategic partners, donors)	• Direct relevance by bringing UNHCR closer to its funded and strategic partners and donors, enabling cooperation with regional, inter-governmental org., governments, UN entities and NGOs incl. non-traditional actors. • Strategic partnerships strengthen UNHCR's competitive edge within UN system and impact resource mobilization. • Relevance to tap into the humanitarian-development nexus collaboration of UN system.
Protection Function	• Long-term resilient solutions (extent to which UNHCR works in the humanitarian, development, peace nexus) • Key mandate and key element of D&R success, ensuring decisions are made closest to the point of delivery (new ways of working with the protection pillar at RBs). • Direct impact on forcibly displaced and stateless people.

In addition to the topics listed above, a long list of other potential topics for Vertical Case Studies was also considered. This includes, 1) Supply and Procurement 2) Recruitment and Staffing 3) Leadership and Culture 4) Information System and Technology. The final shortlist of the top four was decided in collaboration with the Evaluation Office and Core Group with inputs provided by the Field Reference Group as well.

We have a global sample approach, where specific vertical case studies have been covered in specific locations based on the relevance of the theme in the specific operation and region. The coverage is detailed below:

Table 23: Coverage of Vertical Case Studies per Country

Vertical Case Study	Vertical Case Studies Coverage per Country
Strategic Planning and Resource Allocation Process	Indonesia, Thailand, Jordan (RB/CO/SO), Saudi Arabia, Pakistan (CO/SO), Uganda (CO/SO), Switzerland (RB), South Africa (RB), Angola (CO/FO), Panama (RB), Ecuador (CO and SO), Guatemala (CO), Nigeria (SO)

Emergency Response	Thailand, Kenya (RB), Jordan, Pakistan, Angola (FO), Dem Republic of Congo (CO)
External Engagement (Funded, strategic partners, donors)	Indonesia, Thailand, Jordan (RB/CO/SO), Saudi Arabia, UAE, Pakistan (CO/SO), Kenya (RB), Uganda (SO), Switzerland (RB), Belgium (MCO), Spain (CO), Ireland (NO), Dem Republic of Congo (CO/SO), Panama (RB), Ecuador (CO), Nigeria (CO)
Protection Function	Indonesia, Thailand, Jordan (RB/CO/SO), Saudi Arabia, UAE, Pakistan (CO/SO), Switzerland (RB), Belgium (MCO), Spain (CO), Dem Republic of Congo (SO), Panama (RB), Ecuador (CO, SO) Guatemala (CO), Senegal (RB), Central African Republic (CO/FO), Ireland (NO

10.3 Sampling process for staff survey

10.3.1 Background

One of the main challenges with any staff consultation is to ensure engagement and good response rate. When sending out surveys to all staff, response rates may often be so low, that the validity of the data generated is weak and findings become prone to selection bias, i.e., the fact that the persons who replied to the survey are likely to be different from those that did not reply, as they are such a small and specific group. Results obtained from them might thus not reflect opinions from the staff at large. For instance, the survey might only be taken by persons particularly angry about the topic asked about, thus skewing findings toward negative views as opposed to true average opinion.

All staff surveys also have the disadvantage of leading to survey fatigue among the organization's workforce, thus harming consistent data collection efforts in the long run.

Finally, surveyors have no control over the proportion of people responding to the survey from any given region, grade or office type, or the degree to which this is representative of the workforce at large.

Rather than sending an email to all staff to indiscriminately fill in a questionnaire, launching a staff survey based on a stratified sample offers numerous advantages:

- Firstly, it ensures data representativeness so that the diversity within the organization, whether it be across regions, office type, grade, or hardship working conditions is accurately reflected. This targeted approach guarantee that results can be safely extrapolated to the whole workforce, minimizes bias, and provides a more accurate portrayal of the entire workforce's opinions and experiences.
- Secondly, it optimizes resources by reducing survey fatigue among employees who might otherwise feel inundated with requests for feedback. By strategically selecting participants, survey administration process becomes more efficient and cost-effective.
- Lastly, the stratified sampling method allows for more nuanced analysis, as researchers can delve deeper into specific groups' responses, uncovering insights that might be obscured in a broader, less focused survey approach.

Employing a stratified sample approach enhances the survey's validity, efficiency, and analytical depth, ultimately leading to more actionable insights for organizational improvement.

10.3.2 Approach chosen

With these considerations in mind, the choice was made to apply a stratified sampling approach in the sample selection for the staff survey of the Global Strategic Evaluation of UNHCR's Decentralization and Regionalization reform.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, this approach was deemed reasonable, as an all-staff survey on a similar issue was launched just a few weeks before the foreseen survey launch date. Furthermore, many of the survey questions demand a comparison of the organization prior to and after D&R, which only a restrictive proportion of workforce are able to make based on their entry into service in UNHCR. Limiting the sample to persons who are able to reliably draw this comparison was thus deemed reasonable in order to avoid poor data quality.

10.3.3 Defining the universe

To pull a representative sample, the correct reference population – the so-called universe – needs to be defined as a first step.

An initial dataset including all UNHCR workforce was drawn from UNHCR Workday on the 26 of April 2024. This dataset includes a total of 20050 workforce members, including staff and affiliate workforce.

For the purposes of our evaluation, only workforce that has been in service since before 2020 was considered eligible, as they have a perspective on the conditions in the organization both before and after the reform. In addition, certain positions[18], were excluded from the universe, as their tasks were not seen as directly touched by the reform. The most senior leadership of the organization was equally excluded from the sample, as they are the major audience of the evaluation and intricately involved in the decision-making that has informed it[19].

The final universe after the exclusions included 8805 individuals. It should be noted that no affiliate workforce was included after the exclusion of workforce that had joined before 2020 and are therefore not represented in the final sample. The group has not been excluded for any other reason (please see figure 29 below).

[18] Full list of function titles excluded: Driver, Clerk, Telecoms, Transport, Electrician, Interpreter, Cleaner, Filing, Receptioninst, Guard, Messenger, Architect, Building, Translator.
[19] Positions in personal grades USG and ASG, reporting grade SG.

Figure 29: Grade profile and original hire date cut-off



10.3.4 Sample size and Stratification

Overall sample. A statistically representative sample for any given population can be determined using a standard formula:

n = [z2 * p * (1 - p) / e2] / [1 + (z2 * p * (1 - p) / (e2 * N))]

Where z stands for the level of confidence that you have that your sample is representative of the target population (expressed as a percentage; usually set at 95%), p stands for the percentage of a sample likely to choose a given choice (usually set at 50%), N stands for population size, and e stands for margin of error, that is the extent to which the outputs of the sample population are reflective of the overall population (usually set at 5%).

Using the above formula, we can calculate that an overall statistically representative sample of our population requires 385 participants to be surveyed. As people's responsiveness is not guaranteed, we add a 30% over-sampling coefficient to the formula, in order to ensure that we receive a sufficient amount of data, even if not everyone decides to answer our survey. This yields a final sample of 500 individuals.

Stratification. To make sure that our survey provides a representative point of view of all of UNHCR staff, including people from all regions, office types and positions, we will create a stratified sample that ensures that relevant population groups are reflected in the sample in the same degree as in the population.

In stratified sampling, there are different types of allocation methods used to determine the number of individuals to be sampled from each stratum, ensuring representative sampling across various subgroups within the population.[20] In the context of our staff consultation, we will opt for a proportional allocation approach.

There are **two main variables** of interest, which we wish to be accurately reflected in our sample: **office type and region**. Office type refers to the unit of organization which an individual works for and is divided in our case into Headquarters, Regional Bureau, Country Operations/Multi-County Operations[21] and offices below Country Office level, including Sub-Offices, National Offices, Liaison Offices, Field Offices and Field Units. Regions comprise the seven regions in which UNHCR has a Reginal Bureau and all staff working in offices under them, as well as headquarters as a separate location category[22]. Figures 30 and 31 below provide an overview of the distribution of staff in these categories within our sampling universe.

In the context of our staff consultation, we will opt for a proportional allocation approach.

[20] **Proportional Allocation:** in this method, the sample size allocated to each stratum is proportional to the size of the stratum relative to the total universe. For example, if a particular region constitutes 20% of the total workforce, then 20% of the sample would be allocated to that region. Proportional allocation ensures that each subgroup's representation in the sample reflects its importance in the population.
Equal Allocation: as the name suggests, assigns the same sample size to each stratum, regardless of the stratum's size or importance in the population. This method ensures that each subgroup has an equal opportunity to be represented in the sample, regardless of its size. However, it may not accurately reflect the population's diversity if certain subgroups are significantly larger or more important than others. In addition, this approach can also lead to substantive inflation of the total final sample.
Neyman Allocation: aims to optimize the precision of estimates by allocating sample sizes to strata in proportion to both their size and variability. This method considers both the size of each stratum and its variability in the target characteristic being studied. Neyman allocation typically results in a more efficient use of resources compared to proportional or equal allocation, as it prioritizes sampling from strata with higher variability but also implies some knowledge about the target characteristic.

[21] Including also Chiefs of Mission.

[22] Staff outposted in Regional Bureau but working for Headquarters are included in their respective Regional Bureau.

Figure 30: Division of UNHCR staff between regions within sampling universe



Figure 31: Division of UNHCR staff between office types within sampling universe



In addition to these two variables, we are interested in ensuring that all grade types within the universe are fairly represented in our sample. Comparisons between the answers coming from these groups however are less important for our evaluation design, and we wish to avoid overly complex stratification leading to an unrealistic number of strata to maintain in potential weighting of data in the analysis phase. Therefore, we will stratify the sample using these two variables, and will check that the distribution of grades across our samples matches the distribution in our population once the sample has been selected. In this way, we will ensure representativeness of different grades, while maintaining a relatively simple stratification approach.

The stratification of our sample based on 1) office type and 2) region yields 22 strata, each drawing on a population of 57 or more individuals and yielding a sample of 3 or more individuals per strata. Table 24 and 25 show the number of participants needed from each strata for a sample of 500 (the one we will draw) and 385 (the one we would at least need for statistical representativeness) respectively.

Table 24: Strata for sampling universe based on region and office type for a sample of 500

Strata for sampling universe based on region and office type (n =500)

Stratum	Frequency in universe	Proportion	Sample to draw
Eastern Horn & Great Lakes / Office.Field	1143	0.1298126	65
HQ / Office.Global	1065	0.1209540	60
MENA / Office.Operation	838	0.0951732	48
Europe / Office.Operation	777	0.0882453	44
Eastern Horn & Great Lakes / Office.Operation	651	0.0739353	37
MENA / Office.Field	634	0.0720045	36
West & Central Africa / Office.Field	519	0.0589438	29
Asia & the Pacific / Office.Field	488	0.0554231	28
Asia & the Pacific / Office.Operation	484	0.0549688	27
West & Central Africa / Office.Operation	390	0.0442930	22
Americas / Office.Operation	351	0.0398637	20
Southern Africa / Office.Field	250	0.0283930	14
Europe / Office.Field	248	0.0281658	14
Americas / Office.Field	224	0.0254401	13
Southern Africa / Office.Operation	193	0.0219194	11
Eastern Horn & Great Lakes / Office.Regional	114	0.0129472	6
Asia & the Pacific / Office.Regional	87	0.0098807	5
MENA / Office.Regional	83	0.0094265	5
Europe / Office.Regional	81	0.0091993	5
West & Central Africa / Office.Regional	69	0.0078365	4
Americas / Office.Regional	59	0.0067007	3
Southern Africa / Office.Regional	57	0.0064736	3

Table 25: Strata for sampling universe based on region and office type for a sample of 385

Strata for sampling universe based on region and office type (n=385)

Stratum	Frequency in universe	Proportion	Sample to draw
Eastern Horn & Great Lakes / Office.Field	1143	0.1298126	50
HQ / Office.Global	1065	0.1209540	47
MENA / Office.Operation	838	0.0951732	37
Europe / Office.Operation	777	0.0882453	34
Eastern Horn & Great Lakes / Office.Operation	651	0.0739353	28
MENA / Office.Field	634	0.0720045	28
West & Central Africa / Office.Field	519	0.0589438	23
Asia & the Pacific / Office.Field	488	0.0554231	21
Asia & the Pacific / Office.Operation	484	0.0549688	21
West & Central Africa / Office.Operation	390	0.0442930	17
Americas / Office.Operation	351	0.0398637	15
Southern Africa / Office.Field	250	0.0283930	11
Europe / Office.Field	248	0.0281658	11
Americas / Office.Field	224	0.0254401	10
Southern Africa / Office.Operation	193	0.0219194	8
Eastern Horn & Great Lakes / Office.Regional	114	0.0129472	5
Asia & the Pacific / Office.Regional	87	0.0098807	4
MENA / Office.Regional	83	0.0094265	4
Europe / Office.Regional	81	0.0091993	4
West & Central Africa / Office.Regional	69	0.0078365	3
Americas / Office.Regional	59	0.0067007	3
Southern Africa / Office.Regional	57	0.0064736	2

Once we have defined the stratification, the final stage is to draw the sample. To do so, we will use the method of Simple Random Sampling Without Replacement (SRSWOR)[23]. The sample generated includes 499 individuals stratified along 22 strata

[23] Methods available for the drawing of a stratified random sample:
1) Simple Random Sampling Without Replacement (SRSWOR): a sample is selected randomly from each stratum without replacement, meaning once an element is selected into the sample, it cannot be selected again. This method ensures that each unit in the population has an equal chance of being selected in the sample. SRSWOR is commonly used when the population size is relatively small compared to the sample size, and there is no need to consider replacement.
2) Simple Random Sampling with Replacement (SRSWR): a sample is selected randomly from each stratum with replacement, meaning that each unit in the population has the same probability of being selected at each draw, regardless of whether it has been selected before. This method allows for the same unit to be selected multiple times in the sample. SRSWR is often used when the population size is much larger than the sample size, and replacement does not significantly affect the sampling process.
3) Poisson Sampling: this involves selecting a fixed number of units from each stratum using a Poisson distribution. In this method, the number of units selected from each stratum follows a Poisson distribution with a mean determined by the desired sample size and the size of the stratum. Poisson sampling is useful when the population size is large and variable across strata, and when a fixed sample size is desired for each stratum.
4) Systematic Sampling: units are selected from each stratum at regular intervals, typically using a systematic pattern such as every kth unit. The first unit is randomly selected, and subsequent units are selected at fixed intervals thereafter. Systematic sampling can be more efficient than simple random sampling when there is a natural ordering of the population, and it is easier to implement than other sampling methods.

10.3.5 Sampling and Survey Distribution

To draw our sample, a random sampling code was written in RStudio[24] and performed on the data universe. Distributions of the two strata (office type and location) and third variable of interest (grade) were compared between the ensuing sample of 500 and the universe, in order to ensure that stratification had worked. Distributions of all three variables corresponded as intended (see figure 31, figure 32, and figure 33).

To request participation in the survey, an email was sent by the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations via a UNHCR Broadcast to all 500 colleagues, explaining the aim of the survey, the fact that colleagues had been specifically selected as part of a small and representative sample, and requesting their participation. Both the email and the survey were translated into four languages (English, French, Arabic, Spanish). After the two-week participation time, contrary to hopes, the survey had gathered 131 responses – much below the minimum 385.

To arrive at the required sample size, a second wave of sampling was thus performed. First, the persons drawn for the first sample were removed from the original universe and the sample size needed for each strata was adjusted accordingly. The rate of oversampling was adjusted to three times higher than in the first round, according to the expectation of about a third of the sample replying in the first round of sampling (131 out of 500).

The sampling strategy yielded a new sample of 1510 persons. Distributions of relevant demographic factors were examined and found to be in line with those of the universe and the first sample (see figure 32, figure 33, and figure 34). As the approach to survey distribution used in the first round of sampling had not appeared very successful, the approach in the second wave of sampling was changed; instead of a UNHCR internal party (the Assistant High Commissioner) sending the survey, it was sent directly by the external evaluation team. In addition to previous communication, the independence of the evaluation was highlighted in the communication. The request was sent out three weeks after the original one and stayed open for one week.

The final number of responses obtained included 409 respondents, representing about 20% of the sample the survey was sent to.

[24] R Core Team (2023). _R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing_. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. <https://www.R-project.org/>.

Figure 32: Distribution of grade categories between the sampling universe, the first sample and the second sample[25]



Figure 33: Distribution of regions between the sampling universe, the first sample and the second sample



[25] *Note.* The staff grades are grouped as follows: General Staff = GS1-GS8, FS1-FS8, National Staff = NOA-NOD, Professional Staff: P1-P4, Senior Leadership = P5-D2.

Figure 34: Distribution of office tapes between the sampling universe, the first sample and the second sample



10.3.6 Final Sample and Weighted Analyzes

The final sample obtained for the staff survey included 409 respondents. Although the sample of people to whom the survey was sent to was stratified along and distributions matched between our three variables of interest, a representative distribution of these variables was not guaranteed, given the low response rate of ~20%. For this reason, distributions between the universe and the final, obtained sample needed to be re-checked and analyses adjusted if needed, to ensure representativeness of the survey's conclusions.

Figure 35 and figure 36 show the distribution of our two strata (region and office type) in our population of interest (sampling universe), the sample drawn, and the final sample obtained. Figure 37 shows the same distribution for grade type.

Figure 35: Distribution of regions in sampling universe, the stratified sample drawn, and the final sample obtained



Figure 36: Distribution of office types in sampling universe, the stratified sample drawn, and the final sample obtained



Figure 37: Distribution of grades categories in a sampling universe, the stratified sample drawn, and the final sample obtained



As can be seen in the graphs, the distributions of the two strata of interest are not fully corresponding between the final sample drawn and the sampling universe. To ensure statistical representativeness of our results and any statistics drawn from them despite non-perfect alignment of distributions, we can re-align the stratification of our data during data analysis by data weighing.

Data weighing means that, during our data analysis, we assign weights to each response based on how well its group is represented in the data. Responses from under-represented groups receive a higher weight, effectively "boosting" their voices in the final analysis, while well-represented data remain at a neutral weighting.

This **post-stratification** was applied to all statistics drawn from the global survey responses and presented in this report, using the R package survey.[26] Weighted analyses were not performed on responses regarding a specific sub-field of work, as responses to these subfields were in either case not collected from all survey respondents[27].

10.4 Interview and focus group discussion guides

10.4.1 Interview guides

The evaluation team designed comprehensive interview and focus group discussion guides to gather insights from various internal and external stakeholders.

In total, the evaluation team designed nine individual semi structured interview guides for Regional Bureau Directors and Deputy Directors, Representatives, Head of Sub-Offices, Staff in Human Resources in RBs and field operations, Head of Specific Pillars (Strategic Planning, External Engagement, Operation, Protection) and external partners. These interviews were tailored to each stakeholder group to ensure that we were able to gather the most relevant and insightful information. Additionally, the team designed five focus group discussions for each vertical case studies and a generic one for G-staff.

Each interview and focus group discussion guide were mapped to specific evaluation questions, sub-questions, and indicators to ensure that the team was able to gather detailed and nuanced insights from participants. This comprehensive approach provided the team with a rich and diverse set of data to analyze and draw insights from.

Table 26: Interview guides for RB Directors, Representatives and Heads (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
General Questions	What were the pressing issues in the region that were sought to be addressed via D&R? What steps were taken to address these issues and what is the current progress on these issues?
	How has this reform fit, aligned and been sequenced with the wider set of corporate reforms objectives and systems changes in working towards the region's overall transformation?
	How were risks of the reform assessed in the RB? Any considerations and mitigation strategies that were put in place to ensure likelihood of success?
	How have RB's systems enabled or impeded the exercise of the new processes and authorities put in place by D&R?
	How have the changed budgetary authorities given to Directors and Representatives impacted your work and the operation of the office? Have there been any challenges faced in adopting your new budgetary authorities or the new RAF in the Country? Any apparent benefits, such as increased agility (e.g., through increased decentralized procurement decisions)?
	How has the reform impacted involvement of RBs in the strategic planning process (that of COs and region overall)?
	How has the reform delivered on establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), oversight and functions

[26] T. Lumley (2024) "survey: analysis of complex survey samples". R package version 4.4.
[27] The survey was divided into five sections: one section with questions for all, and four sub-sections on specific topics of interest (strategic planning and resource allocation, emergency response, external engagement, and protection). Respondents were asked to indicate within the survey if their work at UNHCR was related to each of these sub-fields. Questions related to each of the fields were only shown to them if they replied yes.

	placed at the right level? How are the new oversight and support structures between HQ, RB, and CO functioning (overhead view by HQ, immediate oversight, and support from RB)? Do they work according to the intended model? Does RB have independence from HQ in exercising its oversight? Do they ensure real accountability of the CO and the RB? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?
	How has the reform delivered on providing adequate resources and capacities at the regional level? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this? Have staffing positions been adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions post D&R?
	Has the reform improved onboarding, stronger engagement, alignment, and partnerships with partners in country, including UN sister agencies, development actors and other strategic partners? (Or local/implementing partners/donors)
	In what way did the reform impact the RB's agility and responsiveness to changing regional/ local contexts? Are there examples of faster, more flexible responses to large scale emergencies/ unexpected needs at country/ RB level as a result of decentralized decision making? If so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?
Culture / Ways of working	How appropriate was the approach taken to D&R in the RBs? Was relevant background research and needs/ capacity assessments made and considered? Were alternative options modelled? Were lessons from past reforms in UNHCR and from other agencies evidentially considered and learnt from in the design of this reform? Were risks assessed in the RBs, and considerations and mitigation strategies put in place to increase likelihood of success?
	Were there iterative change management tools (i.e., surveys, workshops readiness assessments etc.) available to help staff in the RB to easily adopt changes introduced through the D&R reform? If so, which ones? How useful were they? Were these aligned with the strategic direction of UNHCR?
	How were the inter-dependencies between the elements of this reform, other change processes, other different reforms, and the wider context and running of the organization mapped and managed throughout the implementation process in the RB? To what extent were unintended effects identified and addressed?
	How has the reform affected employee well-being and job satisfaction in the RB? Have considerations been made on the impact of cultural and behavioral shifts on overall workplace happiness?
KPI/Monitoring & Evaluation	What was the selection process for KPIs on tracking the reform progress in the RB? Were the selected KPIs relevant, reliable, and aligned with organizational objectives?
	What institutional feedback mechanisms were implemented in the RB to facilitate engagement and collaboration among

	diverse policy and operational units, including discussions on the interplay of ongoing corporate reforms? Have these feedback mechanisms been adopted and feedback incorporated?
	How aligned was the reform implemented in the RB to its intended design? What were the challenges faced during the implementation process? How have they been addressed? Is there any existing divisional footprint in the RB? Any particular rationale behind it? How do the outpost positions contribute to the overall design of D&R? What monitoring initiatives have been put in place to ensure regular measurement/reporting of KPIs related to the reform in the RB?
	What can you tell us about the effects of Covid-19 on the roll out of the RBs, and vice versa? Did Covid-19 impede/enable the roll out of the office? Did the rollout of the office impede/enable operational delivery during covid-19?
Overall	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?
	Which lessons can we draw to inform UNHCR's policies and processes in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases?

Table 27: Interview guide for Strategic Planning Focus (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Alignment of Goals, Vision, Mission of D&R with other UN reforms processes	Has the multi-year multi-partner planning approach impacted engagement of UNHCR in the humanitarian/dev. nexus? If yes, how? Did it result in stronger engagement and alignment with country strategies, UNCT and alignment of activities with UNSDF (e.g., joint fundraising efforts)?
	How is the alignment of the global results framework with global policy documents being ensured? How does UNHCR progress in aligning its operations' plans and multi-year results framework with internal strategic directions, Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and other UN agencies? Is the external reporting more in line with other UN agencies, GCR and overall strategic directions?
	Are the impact, outcome, and output areas for the global results framework, updated regularly to ensure ongoing alignment with D&R reform, UNHCR's mandate and wider UN priorities (e.g., UN 2.0)?
Strategic Planning Process	The Global Results Framework was supposed to increase flexibility for country operations to define indicators in line with the local priorities. Has this been achieved? What are the opportunities and weaknesses associated with this?

	Has the D&R reform led to simplification of the planning/reporting process? Has the reporting requirements for COs/MCOs increased post D&R?
	To what extent are the multi-year budgeting and partnership frameworks being in use so far? Has there been a mindset shift towards a longer-term multi-planning approach?
	How has the reform impacted involvement/authority of RBs, COs in the planning process? Do COs/MCOs engage in in-depth discussion with field, sub-offices/ national offices, and relevant partners in the planning process?
Resource Management	Have there been any issues associated with the implementation of the new RAF? Have there been any visible changes caused by it, such as increased incentives to raise funds locally due to increased freedom to allocate those funds, or increased agility in planning and resource allocation?
	In the absence of a central prioritization framework, how does the updated RAF impact prioritization of allocation or additional funding requests raised by operations?
	How aligned was the reform implemented in the RB to its intended design? What were the challenges faced during the implementation process? How have they been addressed? Is there any existing divisional footprint in the RBs? Any particular rationale behind it? How do the outpost positions contribute to the overall design of D&R? What monitoring initiatives have been put in place to ensure regular measurement/reporting of KPIs related to the reform in the RB?
	Has the increased authority for local hiring (Up to P4 level in RBs) led to a reduction in time required to fill vacancies?
Organizational Architecture	Has the physical relocation of RBs in the field and the establishment of strategic planning as a pillar in the organizational structure led to increased flexibility and agility in defining multi-year strategies for the operations? Are operations better equipped to make strategies tailored to their contexts?
	How is your operation set-up to work on strategic planning and resource allocation? Are you aware of any key differences across the seven regions? Do these differences affect planning outcomes?
	Is there a clear division of task between HQ divisions, RB and CO/MCO operations in the strategic planning and resource allocation process? Are functional and managerial lines clearly defined and enforced between different entities?
	Is there any existing divisional footprint in the RBs? Any particular rationale behind it?
Roles, Accountability and Authorities	Are you familiar with the RAAs (latest version of 2022)? Do you refer to them in your daily work? Are they useful to you? Are the RAAs between HQ and RBs clear and complementary? Are they utilized for day-to-day operations to guide responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities?

Functions and Staffing	Have staffing positions been adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions post D&R?
	To what extent RBs and COs have the right skills and capacity to develop theories of change, baselines, and targets for programming; making more use of the data generated from participatory assessments in planning and engage with partners in defining multi-year strategies? What initiatives have been identified to build capacity/right skillsets in regions?
Technical Support and Oversight	What role do HQ and RBs play in defining the right compliance mechanisms, internal audits, and assessments of risk management practices in Strategic Planning & Resource Allocation? What controls are in place to oversee the application of the RAF and ensure alignment with global policies and directions?
	Do RBs and COs receive adequate guidance and support from HQ/RBs? How successful have HQ/RBs been in achieving a balance between global consistency and local contextualization?
Technology Enablers	Is the new COMPASS system useful for stronger collaboration on strategic planning between operations, RBs and HQ?
	Is the COMPASS system completely aligned with the revised RAF and new results-based framework? Does it enable decentralized resource planning (incl staff requisitions) at the level of different operations
Overall	Which lessons can we draw from your experience with the decentralized/reformed strategic planning and resource allocation procedure so far? Can this be used to inform the planning and budgeting process in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases?
	Are lessons learnt from the previous years incorporated in current year plans (feedback loops?)
	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?

Table 28: Interview Guide for External Engagement/Partnership Focus (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Alignment of Goals, Vision, Mission of D&R with other UN reforms processes	What was the impact of the reform on coordination in efforts, joint initiatives, and agreements with sister UN agencies or GCR stakeholders?
	To which extent has the reform better enabled UNHCR to support the goals of One UN, and the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees? How is this evident particularly at regional (inter-governmental, UN system engagement) national and sub-national (government, UN system engagement) levels? What factors have contributed to this?

Resource Management	To what extent did the relocation of RBs in their respective regions, and empowering regional directors and representatives in COs to raise their budgets as a function of locally raised funds impact resource availability in partnership? Did it lead to an increase? Has the authority to increase allocations in RBs and COs enabled the cultivation of new funding/sources partnerships and the expansion of existing ones?
	How did Partnerships adapt during the reform process to scarcity of funds due to economic downturns in donor countries?
Partnership Management	As a result of the decentralization of authorities and accountabilities to RBs and COs, did we see a difference in the signing of partnership agreements? Has it resulted in quicker signing of partnership agreements (when faced with operational emergencies) due to greater authority to RBs/COs and better support and guidance from RBs to COs?
	Has the creation of a regionalized organizational layer to take ownership of relationships at the regional level (including inter-governmental bodies, sister agencies and other regional fora) and provide oversight and support to country operations in the field of partnership management helped improved onboarding, stronger engagement, alignment, and partnerships with sister agencies and other strategic partnerships?
	Has the location of RBs closer to the COs enabled greater flexibility to respond to diverse needs of implementing partners (operational protocols) and pressured situations?
	Has the increased authority for local hiring (Up to P4 level in RBs) led to a reduction in time required to fill vacancies?
Organizational Architecture	Does the decentralized and regionalized organizational architecture as it is now serving its purposes in the field of partnerships? Do you think that decentralized and regionalized structures reflect their original scope and purpose? Are they useful / not useful? Any examples of how they are useful/ not useful?
	How were legacy structures (including division footprint) in Partnerships addressed by the reform?
Roles, Accountability and Authorities	Are the RAAs between HQ and RBs and COs clear and complementary? Are they clear to partnership colleagues? Are they utilized for day-to-day operations to guide responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities?
	Are you familiar with the RAAs (latest version from 2022)? Do you apply them in your daily work? do you think others do? do the right people at the right levels of the organization have the right roles, accountabilities, and authorities at the moment? Has the reform delivered on establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), and functions placed at the right level in Partnerships? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?
	How much do RB oversee partnership selection from CO? Do COs receive adequate guidance from RBs? What kind of guidance and support do they get? (Implementation, selection etc.)

	Are the functional lines between the head of external relations in RB/COs and DER and IMAS clear and strongly enforced? Are managerial lines between the RBs and COs/MCOs clear?
Functions and Staffing	How has the reform, specifically through the relocation of RBs in the field and the addition of an external relation pilar in each RBs, delivered on providing adequate resources and capacities at the right level in Partnerships? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this? Are the functions in RBs and COs related to partnership staffed with the relevant skills to operationalize partnerships? Have staffing positions been adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions post D&R?
	To what extent were RBs and COs staffed with the right capacity and skillsets to effectively engage with partners and maximize the impact of partnerships to achieve commitments of broader UN goals (GCR/SDGs/one UN)?
Technical Support and Oversight	How were risks of the reform assessed in Partnerships? Any considerations and mitigation strategies that were put in place to ensure likelihood of success?
	How did the reform impact compliance mechanisms, internal audits, and assessments of risk management practices in Partnerships? What controls are in place to oversee the application of the RAF and ensure alignment with global policies and directions?
	Are the oversight responsibilities of RBs, including implementing partnerships, fundraising and use of earmarked funds in the country operations in their regions helpful in partnership management? Are these aligned with the intention of D&R?
	Did the establishment of RBs and their localization in the field enable more targeted solutions to region specific challenges, and hence, maximized localization efforts and achievements?
Technology Enablers	How have current and past Partnerships' systems (i.e., Roll out of PROMS) enabled or impeded the exercise of the new processes and authorities for partnership management put in place by D&R? Have there been specific issues? Any notable differences between the previous and current systems?
	Did PROMS help RB have a better oversight of partnership at local level? Did PROMS improve the collaboration with partners? What are some examples? Did PROMS improve collaboration between HQ, RB, and COs?
Overall	Which lessons can we draw from working in a decentralized and regionalized manager in the field of partnership so far? How can this inform partnership management in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases?
	Are lessons learned from the previous years incorporated in partnership policies, frameworks etc.? (Feedback loops?)
	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of

	the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?

Table 29: Interview Guide for Protection Focus (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Alignment of Goals, Vision, Mission of D&R with other UN reforms processes	To which extent has the reform better enabled UNHCR to support the goals of one UN, and the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees? How is this evident particularly at regional (inter-governmental, UN system engagement) national and sub-national (government, UN system engagement) levels? What factors have contributed to this? What are some good examples of how the increased collaboration has benefitted the people with and for whom UNHCR works?
Operational Delivery	To what extent has D&R facilitated the formulation of policy and guidance in the sub-area of child protection? Has it provided a useful framework to guide a viable approach, given mandate and resources?
	In what way did the reform impact Protection agility and responsiveness to changing regional/ local contexts? Are there examples of faster, more flexible, or more appropriate responses at country/ RB level as a result of decentralized decision making? If so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?
	How has the enhanced collaboration structure with HQ/ RB facilitated improved alignment of country strategies and synergies between the different levels of the organization, minimizing redundancy, and achieving greater outcomes with limited resources?
	Has there been an improvement in protection delivery (incl. advocacy efforts because of presence of technical and context specific skills at the regional/ local level?
Resource Management	Have there been any challenges faced in adopting the new RAF in protection? How did representation of HC Protection in resource allocation process affect budget allocation on protection?
	Has the increased authority for local hiring (Up to P4 level in RBs) led to a reduction in time required to fill vacancies?
Organizational Architecture	What are the key differences across seven regions within protection?
	Is there any existing divisional footprint in the RBs? Any particular rationale behind it? How do the outpost positions contribute to the overall design of D&R?
Roles, Accountability and Authorities	Do you know the RAAs (newest ones from 2022)? Is it clear to you, what your roles, authorities and accountabilities are under the RAAs? Are the RAAs between HQ, RBs and MCOs clear and complementary? Do you know when the CO, RB, and HQ, respectively, holds authority and accountability to specific tasks? Are they followed in day-to-day operations?
	How has the reform delivered on establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), oversight and functions placed at the right level in Protection? Is there a clear division

	of task between HQ divisions, RBs and CO/MCO operations? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this? How was the gap analysis/capacity assessment conducted in 2018 (regarding overlap between ARAs of DIP and RBs and lack of clarity who is accountable for what at regional or country level) being followed up on? Has it been followed through, why or why not? Challenges?
	What are the number of cases elevated from country level to RB/HQ? Does technical backstopping at the RB level enable country operations to make protection decisions on the ground?
	Is there clarity of functional and managerial lines between HQ, RB, and COs? Is adequate support and guidance provided by HQ to RBs and RBs to COs? How has it changed pre & post D&R (e.g., sufficient autonomy, involvement from RBs and HQ)
Functions and Staffing	How has the reform delivered on providing adequate resources and capacities at the right level in protection? Do the COs have enough staff? What about RBs? Do COs receive sufficient additional expertise from RBs when required? Do the COs receive additional expertise from RBs when required? What was the rationale behind the decision to deploy technical protection experts at RB level? Have staffing positions been adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions post D&R?
	To which degree is the distribution of human resources/capacity and skills within COs, MCOs, RBs and Sub-Offices strengthening the necessary expertise in response to growing needs in terms of child protection? How has this changed over time?
	Has the new authority allocated to Directors and Representatives to accommodate locally raised funds in their budget envelope led to increased resource availability at regional and country level? Has it increased? Has the local hiring positively impacted protection outcomes at local level?
	To which extent does the regional level protection expertise support better local protection solutions for people with and for whom UNHCR works? (Stronger rapid needs assessment and adaptation strategies in complex situations) To which extent are current capabilities and capacities on protection targeted to the needs/requirements at regional/ local level?
Technical Support and Oversight	How were risks of the reform assessed in protection? Any considerations and mitigation strategies that were put in place to ensure likelihood of success?
	To what extent did HQ/ RBs provide support and oversight at the country level to ensure that the COs were well positioned to deliver UNHCR's core protection mandate? How are the new oversight and support structures between HQ, RB, and CO functioning (overhead view by HQ, immediate oversight, and support from RB)? Do they work according to the intended

	model? Does RB have independence from HQ in exercising its oversight? Do they ensure real accountability of the CO and the RB? How do the RBs/ HQ ensure balance between support and oversight?
	What role do HQs and RBs play in defining the right compliance mechanisms, internal audits, and assessments of risk management practices in protection? What controls are in place to oversee the application of the RAF and ensure alignment with global policies and directions?
Technology Enablers	Is the new PROMS system useful for carrying out collaboration on protection with partners and within HQ, RBs and Cos? How does it compare to the earlier system? Would you say that these systems have impeded useful collaboration in any significant way?
	Is PROMS system completely aligned with the revised RAAs? Does it enable decentralized resource planning (incl staff requisitions) at the level of different operations
Overall	Which lessons can we draw from our experience with decentralized and regionalized working (in the field of child protection) so far? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases? What can we learn from this for the future?
	Are lessons learnt from the previous years incorporated in current year plans (feedback loops?)
	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?

Table 30: Interview Guide for Emergency Response Focus (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Alignment of Goals, Vision, Mission of D&R with other UN reforms processes	What was the impact of the reform on Emergency Response's coordination in efforts, joint initiatives, and agreements with sister UN agencies or GCR stakeholders? How is this evident particularly at regional (inter-governmental, UN system engagement) national and sub-national (government, UN system engagement) levels?
Operational Delivery	Has the reform resulted in quicker signing of Emergency related agreements due to greater authority to RBs/COs? Post reform, how do RBs support CO operations after expiration of an emergency declaration? How has this changed compared to how things were before the reform? Can this be enhanced? Post D&R, any challenges being faced in procurement and supply, and how can this be addressed? How does the functioning of these processes compare to prior to the reform? Do they work better/less well?

	How has D&R impacted Emergency Response's work at the point of delivery? Has this resulted in better adaptability in operational protocols? Has it improved flexibility to respond to diverse needs at the point of service with various stakeholders (including member states, governmental organizations agencies, NGOs, RLOs, whole of UN system and private sector)?
	In what way did the reform impact Emergency Response agility and responsiveness to changing regional/ local contexts? Are there examples of faster, more flexible responses to large scale emergencies/ unexpected needs at country/ RB level as a result of decentralized decision making? If so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?
	To what extent did the reform enhance needs assessments in Emergency Response and subsequent adaptation of strategies to address unforeseen challenges? Did it improve agility at the country level? Are contingency plans developed, tested, and updated regularly? How have the revised Emergency Preparedness Framework and Emergency Planning and Response been operationalized? Any challenges faced and how can they be addressed?
Resource Management	Have there been any challenges faced in adopting the new RAF in Emergency Response? Are funds allocated in line with emergency assessments and how can this be improved?
	To what extent did the central management/ oversight of the new RAF provide the right balance between direction and flexibility in Emergency Response? What was the level of empowerment/ involvement of Emergency Response RB/ CO staff in the Resource Allocation process? Did the revised RAF provide sufficient flexibility to utilize the Emergency related funds raised locally?
Organizational Architecture	Has the location of Regional Bureau (and MCOs) in the field borne any apparent benefit for emergency response? Any examples of emergency response work that is going better/worse because of their physical relocation?
	How did Emergency Response structures/ configurations change as a consequence of D&R? How has that facilitated or constrained agility in response to emergencies?
Roles, Accountability and Authorities	Do the right people have the right authorities to deliver in emergencies? Are those people accountable for their decisions? Do these authorities and accountabilities ensure agile and responsive action in emergency contexts? Was this different before D&R? Has this improved/worsened?
	Do you know the RAAs (newest ones from 2022)? Do you feel that you understand them and know how to use them during emergency responses? Would you say that in general colleagues know the RAAs and how to use them?

	Are the managerial and functional communication lines clear to you? Do you know how to use them in the context of emergency response? Do you know what the correct escalation procedures are in any given situation?
Functions and Staffing	How were legacy structures (including division footprint) in Emergency Response addressed by the reform? Have staffing positions been adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions post D&R?
	Has the reform delivered on providing adequate resources and capacities at the right level in Emergency Response? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?
	What was the rationale behind the additional functions and skillsets in Emergency Response at RB, CO level? Has a shift in priorities (more emergencies, Covid etc.) as a result of external events influenced functions/ staffing in Emergency Response?
	Post D&R, was Emergency Response provided with right capacity and skillsets to effectively engage with partners and maximize the impact of partnerships to achieve commitments of broader UN goals (GCR/SDGs/one UN)?
Technical Support and Oversight	How did the reform impact compliance mechanisms, internal audits, and assessments of risk management practices in Emergency Response? What controls are in place to oversee the application of the RAF and ensure alignment with global policies and directions?
	Are policies and procedures in Emergency Response clearly defined and aligned with Localization, Legitimization, and Legalization principles of the 3L model?
	Is there clarity on the required composition and distribution of oversight functions to provide checks and balances in the Emergency Response processes?
Technology Enablers	How has this reform fit and been sequenced with the wider set of corporate reforms and systems changes in Emergency Response?
	How have Emergency Response's systems enabled or impeded the exercise of the new processes and authorities put in place by D&R? In what way were decentralization goals and principles incorporated into the structure and framework of subsequent systems?
	What has been the impact of the reform on the (technical) systems used during Emergency Response? Has there been inclusion of decentralized resource planning components within the enterprise resource planning system? Has this enhanced the effective distribution and utilization of resources across multiple levels?
Overall	Which lessons from D&R can we have drawn from the experience with decentralized and regionalized emergency response so far? What lessons can we draw from this to inform UNHCR’s policies and processes in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases? What good practices in Emergency Response can be replicated in other divisions?

	What steps are undertaken in Emergency Response to ensure that reform outcomes are sustainable moving forward? Has there been incorporation of changes into official organizational policies?
	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?

Table 31: Interview Guide for Human Resources Focus (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Overall Questions	Any thoughts on your mind related to D&R before we start the interview?
Resource Management	Have there been any challenges faced in adopting the new RAF?
	Has the increased authority for local hiring (Up to P4 level in RBs) led to a reduction in time required to fill vacancies?
Functions and Staffing	What is the process for submitting requisitions for staffing needs between the COs, RBs and HQs? What kind of approvals or oversight is provided by the RB/HQs in hiring decisions?
	Have staffing positions been adequately staffed as per the revised roles and functions post D&R?
Roles, Accountability and Authorities	Are the RAAs between HQ and RBs and COs clear and complementary? Are they clear to human resources colleagues? Are they utilized for day-to-day operations to guide responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities?
	Are functional and managerial lines clearly defined and enforced between different entities?
	How has the reform delivered on establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), oversight and functions placed at the right level? How are the new oversight and support structures between HQ, RB, and CO functioning (overhead view by HQ, immediate oversight, and support from RB)? Do they work according to the intended model? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?
Culture / Ways of working	Were there iterative change management tools (i.e., surveys, workshops readiness assessments etc.) available to help staff to easily adopt changes introduced through the D&R reform? If so, which ones? How useful were they? Were these aligned with the strategic direction of UNHCR? How about trainings for outposted staff?
	How have the intended changes in organizational culture and individual behavior (less hierarchy, more collaboration with COs, more agile decision making etc.,) as requisites been addressed in achieving the reform outcomes? What have been the good examples of where this has taken place? Has the leadership actively modeled the desired cultural and behavioral changes, reinforcing the principles of decentralization?
	Have considerations been made on the impact of cultural and behavioral shifts on overall workplace happiness?

Technology Enablers	How have current and past Human Resources' systems (i.e., Roll out of Workday) enabled or impeded the exercise of the new processes and authorities for Human Resources put in place by D&R? Have there been specific issues? Any notable differences between the previous and current systems?
	Is the new COMPASS system useful for stronger collaboration between operations, RBs and HQ?
	Is the COMPASS system completely aligned with the revised RAF and new results-based framework? Does it enable decentralized resource planning (incl staff requisitions) at the level of different operations?
Overall	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?
	Which lessons can we draw from working in a decentralized and regionalized manager in the field of Human Resources so far? How can this inform Human Resources Management in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases

Table 32: Interview Guide for External Partners (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Overall Questions Strategic Partnerships	Are you familiar with the decentralization and regionalization reform that UNHCR underwent? Any thoughts in your mind before we start the interview?
	Can you describe any notable shifts in the nature or dynamics of your organization's engagement with UNHCR following the decentralization reform? Has there been a change in engaging with decision makers at local level in UNHCR (i.e., easy contact points)? Have your key contact points shifted?
Funded Partners	Have you experienced a change in your interaction with UNHCR as a result of the D&R reform (Post 2019) (i.e., Frequency of interactions)? Have there been any noticeable changes/opportunities/obstacles in the processes or procedures you follow when engaging with UNHCR?
	Would you say that UNHCR has become more flexible and quicker to respond to your needs as a result of greater local engagement and decision-making authority, also in pressured situations (emergency scenarios)? (i.e., better onboarding, stronger engagement, alignment, local partnership agreements, processing time for agreements, contact points etc.)
	Would you say that your organization's ability to apply for and be recognized as partner of choice has increased due to increased local UNHCR presence and better know-how on your organization by UNHCR staff?
	To what extent are your inputs gathered as part of the strategic planning process in UNHCR? Any difference pre and post D&R on this process?
Strategic Partnerships	To what extent has the decentralization and regionalization reform enhanced collaboration and joint coordination among the stakeholders involved at regional/local level? (i.e., joint advocacy campaigns)

	To what extent are your inputs gathered as part of the strategic planning process in UNHCR? Any difference pre and post D&R on this process?
	How do you perceive UNHCR's role in coordination meetings and other processes organized/launched by the RC/HC on UN Reform / involvement in UN country teams etc. Is there any noticeable different pre- and post D&R reform?
Donors	To what extent do you observe more joint initiatives (incl. fundraising proposals) of UNHCR with other UN system actors' workings towards the objectives of the GCR? How does this manifest at regional, local level?
	To what extent are you given more direct access to country operations (i.e., evaluations conducted, visibility of your funds at country level, shaping of program priorities)? Have you seen a change since the decentralization and regionalization reform? If so, in which way?
Private Sector Partnership	To what extent are you given more direct access to country operations (i.e., evaluations conducted, visibility of your funds at country level, shaping of program priorities)? Have you seen a change since the decentralization and regionalization reform? If so, in which way?
Overall	Would you say that your collaboration/engagement/cooperation with UNHCR has improved or declined since 2020/as an outcome of D&R? Why/Why not?
	What could be three things that UNHCR could do better / differently going forward?

Table 33: Interview Guide for Generic Focus Group (G-Staff) (with some nuances)

Facets	Questions
Overall Questions	What are the top three issues/challenges you face in fulfilling your day-to-day duties for UNHCR?
Operational Delivery	To what extent are you actively coordinating and collaborating with UN agencies, partners, and local actors to deliver work on UNHCR's mandate? Are you aware of any changes in the way this engagement is done/the amount of engagement now compared to before 2020? What are some of the challenges being faced? What are some good examples of how the increased collaboration has benefitted the people with and for whom UNHCR works?
	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?
Organizational Architecture	Do you feel that the (re)positioning of RBs closer to the field has led to better responsiveness in the field? Do you feel RBs are now more approachable since they are placed closer in the field?
	Do you have clarity in terms of a clear division of tasks and accountabilities between HQ, RB, and CO/MCO operations? Do you know whom to seek approvals/get guidance from to better perform your day-to-day duties?
Roles, Accountability and Authorities	Do you feel more empowered to fulfill your day-to-day roles and exercise your tasks post the D&R reform? Do you have a

	clarity on the roles, accountabilities, and authorities as per revised RAAs and do you utilize that on a day-to-day basis? To what extent it has impacted effective operational delivery at the country level?
Functions and Staffing	Has there been an improvement in availability of right resources and staffing in your operation post D&R? Do you have adequate capacity and skill sets to perform your functions? Do you receive adequate training and capacity-building opportunities to perform your operations effectively?
Culture / Ways of working	During the course of the reform, were efforts made (surveys, workshops etc.) to assess the needs on the ground and help you adopt the changes introduced through the D&R reform? Were your handheld through the changes with easy access to support/guidance whenever required?
	Can you provide examples of leaders within your operation who have actively modeled the desired cultural and behavioral changes (e.g., Entrusted with more decision-making power, increased responsiveness, accountability, non-complacency, non-hierarchical), reinforcing the principles of decentralization?
	Are you able to better collaborate with colleagues across different departments within and outside your operation? Has physical relocation of RBs played a role in the same?
Technology Enablers	Do you feel that you have the right technological tools to help you in your day-to-day work? Are these tools simple, accessible, transparent, and adopted by everyone?
	How would you say that technological tools enabled or embedded the new processes and authorities put into place by D&R? How has it addressed collaboration internally between the three different levels (HQ, RB, country)? How is this evident particularly at regional, national and sub national levels? What are some examples of this new way of collaboration? Positive or negative impacts?
Technical Support and Oversight	Do RBs/COs receive sufficient guidance and support from HQ/RBs, respectively? Is there a balance between support and oversight? How successful have HQ/RBs been in achieving a balance between global consistency and local contextualization?
KPIs	Are there any feedback mechanisms in place (e.g., Townhalls, official channels) to communicate any challenges being faced in implementation of any new reform or amendments to any existing ones?
Overall	All things considered; would you say that the effectiveness of the work of UNHCR has improved in your region as a result of the D&R reform? Why/why not? What results/evidence/indicators are you basing this view on?
	Which lessons can we draw to inform UNHCR's policies and processes in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases?

10.4.2 Probing questions for interviews and focus group discussions

In addition, an indicative set of questions were also utilized during interviews across the different facets of the reform. The objective of these probing questions is to drive discussion and get meaningful evidence through various data collection methods. The intent is not to answer each question in isolation but to answer the key areas of inquiry.

Table 34: Indicative set of questions across the different facets of the reform

1. Strategy
1.1 Vision, Objectives, Change Management
• *What elements of the D&R initiative were expected to bring better alignment with other UN reforms? Why?* • *Was there a clear rationale behind choosing D&R as the best option to better align with GCR and other sister UN agencies?* • *To what extent did relevant background research and assessment inform the appropriateness of the design?* • *To what extent have lessons learnt from past UN reforms taken into account?* • *How clearly and coherently has this reform fit and been sequenced with the wider set of corporate reforms and systems changes in working towards the organization's overall transformation?* • *What change strategies were introduced to respond to Covid-19? How successful were they in adapting to changes as part of D&R?* • *What was the extent to which possible changes in culture, processes and systems used to support D&R have increased the agility of the organization?* • *Is there any change management framework which is being followed in regard to D&R?* • *What were KPIs designed to be tracked as part of the D&R process?* • *What was the rationale behind choosing the KPIs?* • *To what extent was risk management considered in the design phase as an element of D&R?* • *Are the KPIs chosen the most appropriate to measure performance against the goals of D&R?* • *Are there adequate mechanisms for feedback to be captured and implemented to improve the D&R initiative?* • *Are we better able to track the progress of D&R initiatives across the key facets of the reform?* • *Have new and clarified RAAs contributed to stronger risk management?* • *Are there any quantitative indicators for increased authority at the country level, increased procurement, or budget approvals at the regional level?* • *How frequently are KPIs measured and reported? Which team is responsible for tracking KPIs?* • *Are feedback loops from KPIs built as a part of the strategic planning process?*
1.2 Strategic Planning Process
• *How was strategic planning process rethought to better guide prioritization and delivery?* • *What was the rationale behind a multi-year and multi-planning approach?* • *Was there any staff engagement/capacity assessment undertaken to define the best way forward?* • *To what extent has the involvement of RBs and COs increased in the planning process?* • *Has the authority devolved from the HQ?* • *Are lessons learnt from the previous years incorporated in current year plans (Feedback loops?)*

• *To what extent has the new strategy and planning processes improved the agility of the organization and its cooperation locally and regionally, while still retaining organizational cohesiveness* • *What are the challenges faced in multi-year planning? (E.g., potential delays, involvement of country offices etc.)* • *Are there adequate technology tools to enable collaboration and joint planning?* • *Is there regular monitoring of KPIs and data-driven decision-making to drive strategic planning*
1.3 Resource Management
• *What was the macro-picture of the intent behind the new approach to resource mobilization and allocation?* • *Was there any assessment regarding risks/rewards associated with a new RMA?* • *To what extent is UNHCR engaged in joint fundraising efforts with UN country teams to access human/developmental funding?* • *To what extent the changes to resource allocation and mobilization has improved the agility of operations (measured e.g., in the number of resources mobilized, or the appropriateness of budget structures for intended purposes.?)* • *How UNHCR has allocated resources to operations that do not have options for raising additional funding locally?* • *What are the challenges faced in adopting the new RAF?* • *Interdependency with oversight: The extent to which the central management/oversight of the new RAF provided the right balance between direction and flexibility?* • *Interdependency with Resource allocation framework: Did the revised RAF provide sufficient flexibility to utilize the funds raised locally?* • *Interdependency with Functions and Staffing: The extent to which the RAF matched the changes in functions/skills at different levels in the organization to further the objective of being more effective at the point of delivery?*
2. People, Organization and Governance
2.1 Organizational Architecture
• *What was the conceptual design (prototype) of the structures and core functions at the RBs, country, and HQ?* • *What was the rationale for the establishment of MCOs and the changes over the time period covered?* • *What was the rationale for physically relocating people on the ground?* • *What was the rationale behind the core design of the RBs (four functional pillars)?* • *To what extent have the COs been strengthened due to the physical relocation of RBs and creation of MCO?* • *How well was the organizational architecture/structure of Bureaux adapted and implemented across each region?* • *How well has the Three Lines Model worked and how well followed?* • *Did the relocation of RBs enable cost and efficiency gains in the medium/long term?* • *Interdependency with KPIs – Is there regular monitoring of KPIs and data-driven decision-making?*
2.2 Functions and Staffing
• *What is the core RBs functions (Four pillars)? What are some of the contextual roles and how this has varied across regions?* • *What is the rationale behind the additional functions and skillsets in the field operations (incl. RBs)?* • *Are sufficient measures undertaken by divisions to make evidence-based decisions including a mapping or quantitative analysis regarding the placement of additional technical and context-specific functions in CO and RBs?* • *Was the Change Advisory Team, comprised of DIP, DRS, DPSM the New York Office and the Change Team useful in providing technical and prioritization requirements?*

• *To what extent have HRBPs in the regions been able to make HR decisions?* • *What is the extent to which the right capacities are placed in the right places?* • *What is the extent to which divisional footprint has changed in regions?* • *What is the extent to which staff are better positioned to deliver work effectively?* • *To what extent has the relocation of staff enabled UNHCR to better support the goals of one UN?* • *Has the relocation of staff, including technical positions to the field, enabled UNHCR to become more effective at the point of delivery and with partners?* • *What is the extent to which changes in functions and staffing have increased organizational agility in terms of appropriateness of local and regional planning and responses and responsiveness at a country level and changes to the operational context?* • *Have adequate structures been developed and staffing completed based on the redistributed functions?* • *What were the challenges faced in fulfilling staffing/skill gaps as per the new roles?* • *How flexible were RBs in implementing country operation functions?* • *What is the extent to which there has been a redistribution of functions and staffing as a result of Covid-19?* • *Has there been a shift in priorities (more emergency etc.) as a result of external events influencing the type of functions/staffing?* • *Interdependency with RAAs – Impact of new functions and staffing on RAAs.* • *Interdependency with Change and ways of working – Change management support and training opportunities to relocated staff.* • *Interdependency with KPIs – Regular monitoring of KPIs and data-driven decision-making.* • *Interdependency with Organizational architecture – Impact of org. architecture on functions and staffing*
2.3 Roles, Accountabilities and Authorities
• *Is there sufficient staff buy-in regarding RAAs?* • *Have the issues of responsibility and accountability that preceded the reform been addressed through the reform or not? How well is it working?* • *What is the extent to which changes to RAAs have improved agility (measure e.g., in time taken to fill new positions/fulfil other administrative procedures such as supply?)* • *How well understood the RAAs are at all levels of the organization?* • *How is autonomy exercised and manifested?*
2.4 Technical Support and Oversight
• *What was the rationale or purpose of the 3L defense model?* • *Are there any alternative models/control frameworks to maintain oversight?* • *How well are internal controls working on minimizing the risks associated with issues with accountability and integrity as defined in RAAs?* • *What is the extent of oversight extended by RBs and HQ over day-to-day operations?* • *Has the 3L model impacted the agility or responsiveness of the field units?* • *Is there sufficient clarity on the required composition and distribution of oversight functions to provide checks and balances to the decentralization process?* • *How well is the 3L defense model adopted and working in practice?*
2.5 Culture and Ways of Working
• *Modes of engagement planned with the staff, pre and post D&R in order to get buy-in to the overall reform process?* • *Was there a clear rationale and strategy behind transitioning to a different way of working?* • *Was there any staff engagement survey undertaken with regard to D&R? Was the internal communication strategy appropriate?*

• *What was the extent to which staff were adequately trained to take on their new positions?* • *What was the extent to which possible changes in culture, processes and systems used to support D&R have increased the agility of the organization?* • *The extent to which culture change initiatives were conducted as originally envisaged?* • *What were the challenges faced during the reform process from a culture change perspective?* • *Were findings from the staff surveys incorporated in the refinement of policies or processes?* • *Has the transition been smooth for affected staff?* • *Was targeted career transition support provided? (Career transition workshops, webinars on career management, coping with change at the individual level)* • *What ways of working were implemented to work remotely?* • *Interdependency with RAA – How well did culture change programs help in driving the adoption of RAAs?* • *Interdependency with Functions and Staffing – Did affected staff receive ample support measures, including psychological assistance and retraining opportunities to meet the needs of their current role?* • *Interdependency with KPIs – Is there regular monitoring of KPIs and data-driven decision-making undertaken by the change team?*
3. Processes
3.1 Partnership Management
• *What was the rationale behind offering more accountability and authority to RBs/COs to undertake partnerships at regional levels?* • *Is the partnership management framework coherent across different regions? Are there any good examples of regional partners onboarded due to greater authority to RBs/COs?* • *What is the extent of local fundraising that has increased due to greater authority?* • *Has the effectiveness at the point of delivery improved due to better engagement with partners?* • *Are there examples of better mobilization of local partners as a result of increased authority as part of D&R? Are there any challenges in raising funds locally?* • *Did HQ and RBs provide ample support to engage with partners and onboard/increase the scope of partnerships?* • *Interdependency with Functions and Staffing – Are the functions related to partnership staffed with relevant skills to operationalize partnerships including with strategic partners and non-traditional partners?*
3.2 Operational Delivery
• *Were the revised thresholds defined for procurement the most appropriate?* • *Are there standardized templates and procurement thresholds being followed throughout the organization?* • *To what extent have the COs/RBs been able to make procurement decisions at a regional level?* • *Is there an improvement in response time to emergencies?* • *Are there examples of faster, more flexible responses to large-scale emergencies/ unexpected needs at the country level?* • *What are existing challenges regarding regional approvals for procurement especially in the context of emergencies?* • *Interdependency with Partnership – Did the revised partnership framework enable improved operational delivery?* • *Interdependency with Resource management – Did the revised RAF enable more authority for procurement decisions?*
4. Technology

4.1 Technology Enablers
• *To what degree have technology enablers been built to support the rollout of regionalization/decentralization org. reform?* • *To what extent have the subsequent systems been designed in such a way as to support centralized and decentralized data management, ensuring security and accessibility at all levels?* • *To what extent decentralized resource planning components were included within the enterprise resource planning system, enhancing the effective distribution and utilization of resources across multiple levels?* • *What key aspects of technology can be reviewed for better realization of D&R going forward?*

Annex 11: D&R facets mapped to evaluation questions

To accommodate for the breath of the evaluation, and while executing the evaluation in a structured manner, the team leveraged a well-tested operating model framework that describes the facets of change in an organization and customized it across 11 key facets to make it fit-for-purpose for UNHCR's D&R reform. The following table offers a mapping of evidence and recommendations across facets to each evaluation question to ensure traceability and ease of review.

Table 35: D&R Facets mapped to evaluation questions

#	Key Area of Enquiry	Sub questions #	Sub-Questions	Facet where this question is being addressed
1	**Design principles, approach, and implementation**: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future? How effectively was it implemented?	1.1	What was the conceptual design of the reform, it's rationale and how clear, compelling, and well aligned was it to the organization's strategy?	• Vision, Objectives and Change Management
1	**Design principles, approach, and implementation**: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future? How effectively was it implemented?	1.2	To what extent was the approach taken demonstrably the most appropriate: Was relevant background research, including needs or capacity assessments made and taken into account? Were alternative options modelled? Were lessons from past reforms in UNHCR and from other agencies evidentially taken into account and learnt from in the design of this reform?	• Vision, Objectives and Change Management • Culture and Ways of Working
1	**Design principles, approach, and implementation**: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future?	1.3	Through which means did the design principles consider overall organization coherence while allowing for local flexibility & decision-making? How effectively was the reform implemented according to its intended design, including the needs, risks and assumptions identified?	• Organizational Architecture • RAAs • Technical Support and Oversight

	How effectively was it implemented?			
1	**Design principles, approach, and implementation**: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future? How effectively was it implemented?	1.4	How clearly and coherently has this reform fit and been sequenced with the wider set of corporate reforms and systems changes in working towards the organization's overall transformation? In what ways did external events such as COVID 19 influence the reform and what implications has this had in terms of its effectiveness?	• Vision, Objectives and Change Management • Culture and Ways of Working
1	**Design principles, approach, and implementation**: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future? How effectively was it implemented?	1.5	How did UNHCR manage the reform with the aim of being cost neutral in the medium-to-long term? Have economies of scale been realized?	• Vision, Objectives and Change Management
1	**Design principles, approach, and implementation**: how relevant, appropriate, and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future? How effectively was it implemented?	1.6	How has the organization addressed the intended changes in organizational culture and individual behavior as requisites in achieving the reform outcomes? What have been the good examples of where this has taken place?	• Culture and ways of Working
2	**Reform outcomes:** have the intended results of the reform been realized?	2.1	To which extent and where has the reform delivered on establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), oversight and functions placed at the right organizational level? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?	• RAAs • Technical Support and Oversight • Strategic Planning Process

2	**Reform outcomes:** have the intended results of the reform been realized?	2.2	To which extent and where has the reform delivered on providing adequate resources and capacities at the right organizational level? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?	• Functions and Staffing
3	**Organizational outcomes:** to what extent has UNHCR delivered on the key intended strategic vision and outcomes of the reform?	3.1	To which extent has the reform better enabled UNHCR to support the goals of one UN, and the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees? How is this evident particularly at regional (inter-governmental, UN system engagement) national and sub-national (government, UN system engagement) levels? What factors have contributed to this?	• Partnerships • Operational Delivery
3	**Organizational outcomes:** to what extent has UNHCR delivered on the key intended strategic vision and outcomes of the reform?	3.2	Is there any evidence of increased effectiveness of UNHCR's work at the point of delivery, or of it being on the path to achieve this? To what extent has UNHCR been more agile and better able to respond to changing regional and local contexts? Are there examples of faster, more flexible responses to large scale emergencies or unexpected needs at country level? If so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?	• Technical Support and Oversight • Partnerships • Operational Delivery
4	**Lessons and recommendations:** where are the good practices that can be built upon; the effective aspects of the reform and the possibilities not considered?	4.1	Which lessons can we draw to inform UNHCR’s policies and processes in the future? Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases?	• All facets
4	**Lessons and recommendations:** where are the good practices that can be built upon; the effective aspects of the reform and the possibilities not considered?	4.2	What steps are undertaken to ensure (to the extent possible) that outcomes are sustainable moving forwards?	• All facets

Annex 12: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Repositioning in the field:

An independent evaluation of UNHCR's decentralization and regionalization reform

"If we are to integrate the lessons of past attempts at regionalization, we will have to do far more than reshuffle desks and relocate colleagues to the field. Key systems and processes will need to be simplified and tangible authority further extended to those working closest and most directly with populations of concern." *Repositioning UNHCR in the field: Key considerations to guide Decentralization and Regionalization. Part II, UNHCR 2018.*

UNHCR Evaluation Office
Evaluation Manager: David Rider Smith
ridersmi@unhcr.org

16 October 2023

12.1 Introduction

In 2016, the UNHCR High Commissioner set in motion perhaps the most far-reaching and consequential transformation in UNHCR's history[1]. The aim, by the start of 2020, was to put in place a new organizational design and way of working—with new Regional Bureaux moved to strategic locations in the field, restructured Divisions at HQs, new devolved authorities to senior managers in regions and Country Offices, supported by a range of decentralized, simplified systems and processes. This transformation aimed empower colleagues at every level to deliver on the High Commissioner's Strategic Directions (2017-2021) and engage more effectively with a range of traditional and new partners.

The independent Evaluation Office of UNHCR is commissioning this evaluation to take stock of the decentralization and regionalization (D&R) reform, from its genesis through to its design, implementation, and outcomes to date. It aims to look at what has been achieved, what has not, and the reasons why. Critically, it aims to outline where UNHCR needs to stay the course, and should corrective actions be necessary, what these may be. Through this, and in support of continuing reform efforts, the evaluation aims to maximize the benefits of the organizational change and help guide it in achieving its objectives of establishing a more agile, devolved organization which empowers operations to ensure more effective protection to forcibly displaced and stateless persons.

12.1.1 Operational context

This section provides the contextual framework, experiences and lessons that inform decentralization reforms. It outlines the conceptual underpinnings of decentralization as an approach to organizational change. It then draws on some of the practices, experiences, and lessons from organizational decentralization in the wider humanitarian and among UN system agencies. It concludes with some of the lessons and experience of UNHCR's previous relevant reforms.

12.1.2 Conceptual underpinnings

The case for organizational decentralization is a shift from a centralized structure - where decision-making is concentrated at the top of an organization, made by a smaller number of people to ensure consistency and control, but potentially leading to bottlenecks, lower agility and stifling of innovation - to one in which decision-making power is shared between the teams and management closer to the frontline, in theory enabling faster decision-making, adaptability, and agility, and greater responsiveness to the people the organization seeks to serve. This reflects the principle of *subsidiarity* - namely that tasks should only be performed at the appropriate level[2].

Figure 38 outlines some of the stylized characteristics of centralized and decentralized organizations, with the key facets of the latter being a flatter structure, distributed decision-making, employee autonomy and data-driven decision-making. Some of the disadvantages of a decentralized structure include economies of scale – noting that decentralization can run the risk of business units duplicating work or costs; reduced control – particularly where strict regulations are required; concerns over consistency across different operational units, and relatedly, the risk of organizational silos developing.

As noted in the literature, the right balance between decentralized functions and centralized controls starts with identifying and addressing the needs of the different business areas[3]. Not all corporate functions should be considered the same in this regard with areas such as payroll, information technology and accounting being examples where decisions will need to be made and whether functions can be aggregated to provide efficiencies of scale, or where they can be distributed within business units when needs are dissimilar.

Figure 38: Centralized versus Decentralized Organizations: what's the difference?

Centralized	Decentralized
Traditional/ hierarchical.	Flatter/distributed.
Decision-making is concentrated at the top of a hierarchical structure, typically with senior management.	Decision-making authority is distributed across various levels and departments within the organization.
Communication is top-down. Information cascades from senior managers, through middle managers, to lower-level employees. This can be slow.	Communication flows more freely – down, up and across. It can be faster but less structured. Centralized systems for sharing knowledge can support decentralization.
Employees have limited autonomy. Junior team members are responsible for executing strategies and activities assigned to them from higher up the chain.	Lower-level employees are granted more autonomy and responsibility for decision-making in their areas. They are empowered to act on their initiative, within guardrails.
Good for businesses and tasks that employ standardized processes, require a standardized approach and are subject to regulation and compliance requirements.	Good for organizations that value responsiveness and immediacy, and benefit from flexibility, adaptability and innovation.

Potentially relevant here is contingency theory, which notes that the best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment to which the organization must relate. This theory highlights the balance between internal needs and adapting to environmental considerations, while also aligning to the overall goals set out. It states that there is 'no one best way' - different situations call for different approaches to handle, manage, and solve issues as they arise. The theory describes management and organization as an 'open system' which has to embrace anomalies or challenges and requires adaptable and situational solutions[5]. The onset of COVID19 in 2020 is clearly one of these situations, and organizational models post COVID-19 have suggested that organizing by functions, products and services is becoming less relevant that delivering projects flexibly and through more temporary structures.

12.1.3 Context for decentralization in the UN system

Aligned with broader organizational trends, decentralization has been a consistent theme within UN, with the initial push to decentralize the economic and social sectors of the organization tracing back to 1977.[6] In 2006, following a recommendation by Member States, the "Deliver as One" approach was devised as an effort to improve cooperation and coherence of UN at the country level in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals[7] In 2019 a reform of UN Development System and its ensuing regional level organization took effect. The reform aimed to strengthen united UN presence in country level, by reinforcing the role of UN Resident Coordinators in countries and tightening cooperation between different UN agencies in support of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals."[8.] Specific initiatives were undertaken to enhance collaboration between different UN system entities at the regional and sub-regional levels and on realignment and repositioning[9]. Efforts continue, including the establishment of regional knowledge hubs to pool expertise, consolidating capacities, and looking at potential efficiency gains in administrative services through common back offices or co-location, where feasible. Regional issue-based coalitions led by UN entities and the regional economic commissions have also be created or expanded[10].

In the broader political and humanitarian context, the increased prevalence of protracted crises, and the exponential increase of people forcibly displaced started demanding new ways of working from humanitarian and development actors in the late 2010s.[11] In 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit and the ensuing Grand Bargain Commitments, as well as the New York Declaration emphasized the importance of international solidarity and a paradigm shift towards more coherence, efficiency, transparency and accountability in addressing refugee situations, an effort translated into the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

(CRRF). In 2018, this commitment was reinforced with the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and responsibility for pursuing these results was placed in the hands of UNHCR.[12] The broader humanitarian context thus presented both an opportunity and a necessity to start working in more cooperative and durable ways at country level and across different UN agencies.

12.1.4 Experience of other UN agencies

Decentralization has been found to lead to desired outcomes by increasing responsiveness and adaptability at country-level[13], improving partnerships, and understanding of national development contexts[14], increasing local resource mobilization[15] and resulting in clear roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities at each level of the organization with minimized conflicts of interest[16] . However, gaps in monitoring systems[17], insufficient realignment of headquarters[18], excessive reporting obligations[19], problems with systems at country level[20], lack of continuity in change processes and responsibilities[21] and continuing uncertainties about roles and capacities of regional entities[22] have been identified as challenges associated with decentralization.

Important lessons derived from these past experiences include the need to clearly define roles and responsibilities at each level of organization, to regularly monitor and assess results of restructuring, to have consistent change management support[23] and to rigorously realign headquarters functions in tandem with regionalization of other units. It has also been noted that the success of regional units can vary substantially based on both context and capacity, allowing regional structures to be adapted based on local needs, and to provide adequate capacity to all regional structures according to their geographical coverage. The cost implications of decentralization can also be unclear, as past experiences show that, despite expectations, the process is not necessarily cost neutral.

12.1.5 Prior reforms in UNHCR

D&R is not new to UNHCR either, featuring prominently[24] in many of the reforms of the past thirty years, as initiatives have aimed to bring services closer to persons UNHCR serves. Guidance and policies on management structures and regionalization have been issued since the 1990s[25], with the latest update being the Regionalization Policy in 2015[26]. Previous decentralization attempts have often built on regionalization: with the Middle East and North Africa, Africa[27], Europe and Americas Regional Bureaux each attempting to decentralize their structures via geographical relocation at different points in time[28]. One pillar of the latest UNHCR change process in 2006-2015 was, likewise, centered around regionalization, driven by a wish to re-balance funding from Headquarters to point of delivery and to increase costefficiency.[29]

Despite several attempts, reviews have concluded that decentralization initiatives have not been successful, as power dispensed to the respective regions has tended to gravitate back to the Headquarters[30]. New structures were found to end up forming “yet another layer in UNHCR’s decision making processes” with true authority remaining heavily centralized at Headquarters. This has been attributed to a lack of clarity about the division of roles, authorities, and accountabilities between different levels of organization, the lack of clear organization-wide strategies or coherent change management efforts to guide changes.

12.1.6 UNHCR’s decentralization and regionalization reform 2016 – to date

This section outlines the object of the evaluation – the reform itself. It first addresses the genesis of the reform. It then outlines the structure and implementation including the changes to organizational architecture, functions and distribution, people, financial architecture, roles, accountabilities and authorities, and ways of working. It details the change process and the link to other reforms and change processes underway in the organization.

12.2 Genesis of the reform

At the 2016 UNHCR Global Representatives Meeting (GRM), Country Representatives expressed concerns about bureaucratic complexity within UNHCR hindering effective fulfilment of its mandate. This led the High Commissioner to announce a review of headquarters in August 2016, aiming to align the organization with its strategic directions. The main goal was to ensure the continuous agility and adaptability of UNHCR to its context, to prioritize its support to country level, and to work more effectively with partners on all levels[31].

The reform process started with an external Rapid Organizational Assessment (ROA; 2017), which found that UNHCR would need to become more adaptable and responsive to remain fit for the future. The biggest weaknesses identified was the overly bureaucratic and process-heavy functioning of a highly centralized organization, which led to a blurring of accountability, a sense of complacency among staff, and a parallel culture of *"unofficial workarounds"*[32].

Of thirty recommendations emanating from the ROA, four addressed the regional structures of the organization. It is noteworthy, that the ROA did not recommend immediate decentralization and regionalization of the Regional Bureaux, but to first undertake other recommended reforms[33]. The recommendations on decentralization included a reconsideration of the number of Regional Bureaux and their country coverage, a new core design, structure and staffing plan of the Bureaux, and a clarification of the existing regionalization policy[34].

A change strategy[35] was released in January 2018, with five over-arching goals aligned with the Strategic Directions (2017-21); to better protect, respond, include, empower, and solve situations for the people we serve. Four change workstreams to reach these goals were identified, the last of which focused on "enhanced delegation/empowerment of the country level". This workstream formed the basis for the D&R reform and was to be undertaken as a second part of the change process[36.]

The conceptual model for the decentralized organization was founded on three, mutually reinforcing premises: a strong centre to drive the organization's mandate, strong operations management at country-level, and strong regional entities that provide management, oversight, and support to the country-level[37]. The aim of the design was to enhance UNHCR's agility in the field, strengthen its capacity to make decisions closer to stateless and forcibly displaced people and to better align with UN and national planning frameworks and processes on the ground[38]. Representation functions adopted at different levels of the organization were to enable adaptive engagement at all levels of the global organization[39].

In September 2018 and January 2019, a number of key decisions were taken, based on consultations, background research and external expert inputs to conceptualize and design the D&R component of the change process[40]. These decisions included to:

- Establish a new strategy and planning approach for the organization;
- Reposition seven new Regional Bureaux in the field[41];
- Restructure the staffing of the organization around strengthened Country Offices and functions moved from Headquarters to Bureaux;
- Move resource mobilization and allocation authority into regions and country level; and
- Amend UNHCR's accountability framework and the resulting reallocation of authority.

The organization's ways of working were identified as crucial enablers of these reforms. Firstly, organizational culture was recognized as one of the most significant factors to either enable or impede successful change from the very first moments of the change process[42]. Secondly, new support functions were recognized as a precondition of efficient decentralized operation. With changes expected to several central organizational processes, including planning and budgeting, supply, and resource and HR management, the decision was made to modernize the support functions used to carry them out, to make possible their seamless, decentralized functioning[43].

12.3 Facets of the reform

The D&R reform included changes to strategy and planning, organizational architecture, functions and people, financial architecture, roles, accountabilities and authorities, and ways of working. This sub-section outlines the rationale for and details of these changes. A Theory of Change building upon these facets will be addressed further.

Strategy and Planning

The Strategic Directions (2017-21) and the GCR (2018) signaled a major change not only in how UNHCR worked, but also where it works and how it positions itself to act as a meaningful catalyst to strengthen resilience and promote solutions. Key questions posed at the time included how strategic planning process should be rethought to better guide prioritization and delivery; how to address cascading global priorities versus contextual realities and needs (avoiding a ‘one size fits all’ approach); and the commitment to change and the incentives and instruments to achieve it.

At Headquarters, the Division for Strategic Planning and Results (DSPR) was established as a single entity to oversee how UNHCR strategizes, plans, budgets, implements and monitors its work and spending. At regional and local levels, colleagues were tasked with translating these into their respective contexts, a task supported by the 2021 introduction of COMPASS, a multiyear planning and results-based management approach supported by a cloud-based application.

Organizational architecture

In September 2018, UNHCR approved its plan for a new organizational architecture featuring seven new, outposted Regional Bureaux[44], which were to support and provide oversight to Country Offices and in turn be protected by a layer of checks and balances and normative support coming from a lean headquarters. The Regional Bureaux were to subsume prior regional platforms, and a number of functions previously carried out by HQ, thus moving the operational locus from headquarters to the field[45]. A prototype of the Regional Bureau and its functions was refined by January 2019 and by January 2020 seven new Bureaux[46] and fifteen Multi-Country Offices[47] had been relocated to the field[48]. The roll-out of this process in 2020-2021 was subsequently heavily influenced by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic[49].

The logic of the new architecture was to be informed by a flexible adaptation of the Three Lines of Defense Model *[Later re-termed ‘Three Lines Model]*, a common organizational framework aimed at assuring distribution of risk across an organization by dividing risk management across three levels – those who own and manage risks, those who oversee them, and those who provide independent assurance.[50] In UNHCR’s decentralized application of the model, Country Operations, as the first line of oversight, were to manage programmes on the ground. Regional Bureaux, in second line, were to set regional priorities and strategies, provide managerial oversight, identification of emerging risks, and support to Country Operations. Headquarters Divisions, in third line, were to provide checks and balances on Regional Bureaux and ensure the provision of normative guidance, sharing of information, and standard-setting[51].

The flow of information between the different levels of organization was to be ensured through the organization’s system of reporting lines. In this system, functional (green) lines connect experts in the Bureau with their counterparts in Headquarters Divisions, while managerial (blue) lines connect managers from country level to their Bureau and those in the Bureau to Headquarters. The aim of the green lines is to ensure coherence across functional areas throughout the organization[52]. Crucially, the model aimed to reduce the multiplicity of layers of authority and oversight that had caused confusion within the organization, ensuring that

Headquarters Divisions communicated with the country level through the Regional Bureaux, and not directly.[53]. Figure 39 illustrates the existing and envisioned architecture of the organization, presented in September 2018[54].

Figure 39: Intended architectural shift and simplification as of 2018



Functions and People

D&R implied the moving of certain functions (or parts of functions) and people from Headquarters to regionalized Bureaux and Country Operations. With this move, the organization was to transition from a staffing structure based on centrally located geographic portfolios and 'desk' management, to a function-based structure.[55]

A generic Bureau organigramme was developed to outline the core functions that should be included in each Bureau and the Country Operations under them. This organigramme was built around four functional pillars: strategy and partnerships, external engagement, protection, and operations management. Recognizing the importance of contextual adaptivity, Bureaux Directors were given the right to modestly adapt the core organigramme in their regions following some predefined principles[56]. Technical and context-specific staff was to be placed with priority given to Country Operations.

Several mapping exercises were undertaken to determine how best to distribute new functions within regions.[57] Staffing of these positions was then carried out as part of UNHCR's 2020 Annual Planning Review (APR)[58], while recognizing that durable strengthening of the country level would be a longer-term process[59]. In March 2019, seven contextualized Bureau organigrammes were approved and by autumn 2019 positions were advertised. More than 150 technical positions were created as part of the 2020 APR process,[60] while about 400 staff members had their positions discontinued.[61] In 2021, UNHCR Handbook for Designing Field Presences updated the 2008 Guidelines for Designing UNHCR's Presence in the Field to support continued decentralized human resource management globally[53].

On the part of Divisions, existing field support capacities were retained in the initial phases of the Bureaux transition. However, by mid-2020 restructured Divisions and HQ entities with duplicative capacities were to be realigned to ensure optimal support to Regional Bureaux.[62][63] It is important to note, however, that the restructuring of Headquarters was a fundamental part of the overall change process started in 2017, and that a number of important restructuring processes took place in HQ next to the changes brought about by D&R.

Financial architecture: resource mobilization and allocation

In order to shift financial resources, resource allocation and, in part, resource mobilization from headquarters towards the regions and Country Operations a new Resource Allocation Framework (RAF)[64] was created in August 2019[65], updating the organization's Framework for Resource Allocation and Management[66] and its amendments.[67] The new RAF devolved authority to country and regional levels in a number of ways, defining new decentralized practices for 1) resource mobilization and allocation, 2) procurement and supply, 3) Human Resources, and 4) planning and budgeting[68]. The new RAF came into force in January 2020.

The RAF was further adapted in October 2022[69] and again in September 2023[70]. The 2022 revision aligned the framework with the organizations updated financial rules and its new global results framework and aimed to further clarify and simplify the 2019 RAF, based on feedback gathered throughout the organization. For instance, descriptions of accountabilities and authorities were reformulated for easier comprehension, forms for several procedures were simplified, additional details on procedures to increase operating budgets were given, and minor changes to emergency reserve budgets were made. Some additional authorities related to positions management were delegated[71].

The 2023 revision of the RAF accompanied a new policy on resource allocation and management[72], which clarified parameters and communication processes for different budget lines and outlines key deliverables on expenditure analysis and reporting. The new RAF has first and foremost been adapted to be in line with the new policy and changes brought about by new cloud-based systems (to be addressed later)[73].

Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities

Decentralization of authority and accountability was officially formalized through a new framework for Roles, Authorities and Accountabilities (RAAs) released in November 2019. This was seen as crucial for ensuring a true decentralization of the organization, as opposed to a mere "shuffling of desks"[74].

Prior to the D&R reform, the main approach to accountability in UNHCR - as articulated in Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF) - was through attributing Accountabilities, Responsibilities and Authorities (ARAs) to all levels of the organization, from the structures down to individuals. In consultations for the ROA, staff expressed confusion regarding existing roles and accountabilities, especially in the regional bodies, where overlapping authorities led to lack of clarity over who was responsible and where.[75] Audits and advisories[76] had also pointed to weaknesses of the ARAs, which fed into the changes made.

In the new RAAs, published in November 2019, the approach to accountability was changed, by making roles a function of a collective (Country, Bureau, or Division/Entity), and accountabilities and authorities a function of the manager (Head of Sub-office, Country Representative or Director). Bureaux, as the significant providers of operations management and oversight envisioned by the ROA, were given a stronger role via Directors' accountability for operations and hiring decisions in their regions, among other things[77]. For Country Offices, the RAAs provided greater clarity on their first line roles – owning and managing risks, implementation of policies and procedures, and reaching out to Bureaux and Divisions. Representatives were accredited to the Governments of their respective host countries. Sub-Offices, which the ROA found to need greater autonomy in decision-making across structures, finances and staffing,[78] were also afforded a number of new roles, including management of their operations budget and partnerships with local actors[79].

An updated version of the RAAs was published in November 2022, based on feedback received from staff regarding their first experiences with the RAAs, and recommendations of independent oversight providers. Clarity was improved and new sections were added, i.e., on internal controls and oversight, fundraising, communication, data management and reporting. RAAs are intended to evolve with organizational changes and are expected to be further updated over time.[80]

Ways of Working

The ROA had noted that *"the success of the proposed changes in design depends significantly on the support from the organizational culture. Simply put, if the culture does not support the changes, the changes are doomed"*.[81] This statement emanated from a finding that a culture of complacency, unofficial work-around and strict hierarchical thinking was laying at the root of many of the organization's weaknesses. Particular importance was also placed on 'role modelling' by senior managers.[82]

The need to take culture change on board in the transformation process was thus recognized in the guiding documents of the change process[83]. The need to follow the new devolution of authority and to forge trust between leaders was highlighted, including in crises. A 2018 thought paper on culture change delved further into the issue and proposed a *"pragmatic, practical approach"* focused on the achievement of key organizational outcomes tied to new behaviors that buttress decentralization and enhance UNHCR's agility and effectiveness.[84] In order to support staff buy-in, particular attention was put on transparent updates on the reform[85], including a dedicated intranet page, regular Town Hall Meetings with Q&A, and support missions organized by the Division for Human Resources (DHR).[86]

Another factor that was recognized as crucial for sustainable implementation of the change process, was the seamless functioning of key support functions. In 2020, a broad reform of UNHCR systems and processes was launched bringing new, cloud-based systems for HR, results-based management, project reporting, finance, and supply chain and external engagement[87]. More about this can be read under heading Concurrent Change Processes.

12.4 The change process

A designated Director for Change Management and a Change Team took charge of the change process in 2017. Throughout the reform, designated task teams composed of colleagues from different services were established to inform individual processes[88]. Expert inputs were brought in to support the reform at different points of change process[89]. Many important decision moments[90], were supported by consultation processes, benchmarking of prior lessons learned, capacity and needs assessments, and other preparatory work.

During workforce restructuring, several support measures were offered to staff by DHR, including psychological support sessions and re-training. The Staff Council was actively included in the restructuring process and severance packages were offered to some staff[91].

A risk register was compiled in 2018. The analysis identified fragmentation of approaches and a loss of institutional coherence as key risks related to D&R. D&R has since been included in UNHCR's Annual Strategic Risk Register, with ineffective implementation of transformation listed as one of UNHCR main strategic risks. Seven key actions have been identified for the mitigation of the potential causes of these risks and five core indicators have been created to track progress on these[92].

To track D&R progress, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were developed in 2019[93]. The KPIs consisted of survey-based and non-survey-based measures, assessing staff attitudes and objective progress on D&R, respectively. The first iteration of the survey was launched in June 2019[94]. In September 2020, a quarterly tracking was relaunched[95] and a results tracking roadmap was developed in 2020[96]. In 2023, a number of qualitative and quantitative D&R performance indicators are tracked and can be consulted by staff on UNHCR SharePoint.[97]

Business continuity was set up in 2019 by the establishment of a Transition Task Team, who conducted bi-weekly monitoring and reporting of D&R activities, appointments, and expenditure[98]. Since the roll-out of the Regional Bureaux, the continued change process has been supported by a Transformation and Change Service and overseen by a Board. A Field Reference Group with representatives from all seven regions, has been set up to provide feedback on the ongoing D&R changes[99].

A number of audits, advisories and reviews have been undertaken since the initiation of D&R assessing the process from varying perspectives and geographies. Full documentation of these sources (internal and external) will be made available to the evaluation team.

12.5 Concurrent change processes

D&R was one of eight transformation streams that have been undertaken over the same period as part of UNHCR's broader transformation, including 1) the Global Compact on Refugees, 2) data and digitalization, 3) results-based management, 4) enterprise risk management, 5) business processes and systems, 6) United Nations reform, and 7) people management and human resources, 8) D&R[100].

The Business Transformation Programme (BTP), a reform of UNHCR systems and processes, was launched in 2020 to support UNHCR's change agenda through modernized cloud-based systems. In early 2021, the new multi-year planning and results-based management system COMPASS was rolled out. In 2022, the new cloud-based HR software Workday was launched. PROMS, Cloud ERP, Synergy and Link, for project reporting, resource planning, external engagement, and information management respectively, are foreseen to launch in 2023.

While these reform strands are distinct, they inevitably influence one another. The headquarters review was the initial stage of the reform process started in 2017 that later led to D&R, but realignment of headquarters to fit new regionalized structures is also an inherent part of well-functioning decentralization and regionalization. New systems and processes in turn are vital for enabling effective decentralized organizational operations. While these reforms can support each other, delays, or problems in one can also hinder or confound results in the other. Therefore, an evaluation of D&R will inevitably have to consider these other change streams.

12.6 Purpose, objectives, and scope of the evaluation

UNHCR Evaluation Office has commissioned this evaluation to study the appropriateness, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, and outcomes of UNHCR's D&R reform aimed at establishing a more agile, devolved organization which empowers operations to ensure more effective protection to forcibly displaced and stateless persons. Through this, it will provide evidence, lessons, and recommendations of what has worked well, what less so and the reasons why to point at where the organization should stay the course, and guide – as needed – any adjustments to structures, staffing, systems, and processes to realize the reform objectives. The evaluation aims to create a space for dialogue through the interactions with staff and partners during the study and provide an opportunity to reflect and share thoughts individually and collectively. Finally, it aims to provide evidence to account for the progress and outcomes of the reforms to date to the organization's stakeholders.

The primary audiences for this evaluation are the High Commissioner and the Senior Executive Team (SET), with the aim being to provide evidence for organizational learning and accountability, and to inform any course correction that may be required to deliver the reform outcomes. The Transformation and Change Service (TCS), DHR, the Regional Bureaux and Divisional Directors and Country Representatives are also primary audiences, as critical actors in this reform process. Secondary audiences include the member states of UNHCR and other stakeholders who provide financing and planning/budgetary oversight of the organization.

The objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

a. To ascertain the appropriateness of the design of the reform: the extent to which it delivered the best available approach to achieve the transformation outcomes.

b. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation process: including how well the organization followed through with the change as it was designed, including addressing opportunities, risks and assumptions, adaptation, and lesson learning where necessary (including from independent analysis and in the face of external factors, notably COVID-19) and efficient resource use.

c. To determine which outcomes, have and have not been achieved that are attributable to the reform, and the extent to which the intended results of working more effectively at the point of delivery, agility, and better supporting the goals of one UN and the GCR have or have not been achieved.

d. To outline the factors that have influenced the reform design, process and outcomes, unintended consequences and to highlight the specific issues and lessons to be addressed moving forwards.

e. To determine how best the organization leverage the positive experiences and course correct as needed in order to maximize the benefit of the change process moving forwards.

The scope of this evaluation will be delineated as follows:

- The evaluation will cover the period 2017 to 2023, from the High Commissioner's launch of the reform process in March of 2017 until December 2023, recognizing the ongoing nature of related reform initiatives. The focus will be particularly on the second half of this period, from 2019 to 2023, when the reform was launched and implemented. The prior period (2017-18) will be covered in less depth, drawing out the history and genesis of the reform.

- The evaluation will focus on six facets of the reform process[101] documented in section III (Part 2) of this TOR, with a view to how they were organized prior to the reform, what the reform intended in each dimension and what has been the result. It will look, from a systems perspective, at how aspects in each interact, producing intended and unintended consequences, and how effectively this has been managed towards the desired outcomes.

- In scope will also be the macro-level design and change process and factors that influenced implementation, and the effect of the reforms on the overall intended outcomes of effectiveness at the point of delivery; agility and responsiveness and better able to support the goals of one UN and a whole-of-society approach. The overall cost effectiveness of the change process will also be evaluated.
- The geographical scope will include Headquarters and all regions, with particular attention paid to sub-national (sub-office/ field office), national (representation), subregional (multi-country) and regional (Regional Bureaux) changes which are of central concern in this particular reform process. Headquarters realignment, while not central to this evaluation, will also be taken into consideration in the scope given the dependent relationship to the overall objectives.
- Other parallel reform strands, in particular the introduction of a new results-based management approach and system; HR systems and business process reforms under the Business Transformation Programme (BTP) are not in scope. However, the evaluation will – as appropriate – review the design of these systems and processes in relation to D&R and the extent to which they've begun to generate data of use to decision-making at different levels, as outlined under the facet on ways of working.

12.7 Approach, areas of inquiry and methodology

A systems approach[102] will be taken to this evaluation. This recognizes that the challenges that the organization face are often complex and require breaking-down into small parts owned by different strategic and operational units, with different views, workstreams and stakeholders. It views the challenge as a collection of these components that interact and change in response to different interventions. The overall organizational 'system' focuses on how these elements interconnect in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behaviour over time. The systems approach will allow for a close review of how the design and implementation of the reform has interacted with organizational, contextual, and other factors in striving to achieve the desired outcomes[103].

Within this systems approach, the evaluation will make use of theory-based analysis[104] to understand the reform's contribution to observed outcomes through a process interpretation of causation, rather than determining causation through comparison to a counterfactual. In theory-based analysis, the specific steps in a causal chain, the specific causal mechanisms, are tested. If these can be validated by empirical evidence, then there is a basis for making a causal inference. At the same time, theory-based analysis seeks to identify and assess any significant influencing factors (i.e., contextual factors) that may also play a role in the causal chain and thus affect the contribution claim. The theory of change is an initial framing of the inputs, outputs, drivers, and assumptions drawn from the documentary evidence on the design and implementation of the reform, and from consultations held during the initial scoping in the preparation of this TOR. It will be expanded upon and validated during the inception phase of the evaluation.

Alternative approaches to this evaluation, such as counterfactual analysis, are not considered viable given the lack of comparable units of analysis. While reforms are unique, and hence not strictly comparable, the evaluation will look for benchmarks from analysis of similar reforms in other UN agencies and the private sector, as appropriate. If these can be established, they may be employed for specific components of the evaluation.

12.8 Areas of inquiry

The areas of inquiry aim to respond to the objectives of the evaluation. They are intentionally high level and relatively few in number, but each one should be read in conjunction with the six facets of the reform process described in the scope above. As outlined, the evaluation will be approached from a systems perspective recognizing that the interconnections between the different aspects of the reform, with other change processes, the organization itself and the wider context within which UNHCR operates need to be mapped and understood if the evaluation is to provide insightful and useful recommendations going forwards. The evaluation should also have a strong focus on learning through the process of consultation so that there are clear proposals for the way forwards based on good practices and learning from challenges.

The areas of inquiry are grouped into three categories as per Figure 40. Each will be further developed during the inception phase of the evaluation to be refined, with further sub questions, metrics, and evidence sources in an evaluation matrix that that will guide the research.

Figure 40: Configuration of areas of inquiry



The questions are as follows:

a. **Design principles and approach: how relevant, appropriate and feasible was the design and planning approach taken in of the regionalization and decentralization reform and what can be learnt to inform the future?**

i. How clear and compelling was the rationale for this particular reform, designed in this way at this time?

ii. To what extent was the approach taken demonstrably the most appropriate: defined as which activities should be located centrally, regionally or at country level, based on scale or technical reasons - and cost-effective way to achieve the intended outcomes? Was relevant background research, including needs or capacity assessments made and taken into account? Were alternative options modelled? Were lessons from past reforms in UNHCR and from other agencies evidentially taken into account and learnt from in the design of this reform?

iii. How clearly and coherently has this reform fit and been sequenced with the wider set of corporate reforms and systems changes in working towards the organization's overall transformation?

b. **Reform Outcomes: have the intended results of the reform been realized?**

i. To which extent and where has the reform delivered on establishing the right authorities (with accountabilities), functions and resources placed at the right organizational level in accordance with the 3L model? Where are the good examples of this? What factors have influenced this?

ii. To which extent has the reform influenced decision-making amongst senior and middle management? What are the best examples of this? What factors have influenced it?

iii. How has the organization addressed the intended changes in organizational culture and individual behaviour as requisites in achieving the reform outcomes? What have been the good examples of where this has taken place?

iv. To which extent has the reform influenced and shaped the design of subsequent systems (results-based management, enterprise resource planning etc)?

c. **Organizational Outcomes: to which extent has UNHCR delivered on the key intended strategic vision and outcomes of the reform?**

i. To which extent has the reform better enabled UNHCR to support the goals of one UN, and the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees? How is this evident particularly at regional (inter-governmental, UN system engagement) national and sub-national (government, UN system engagement) levels? What factors have contributed to this?

ii. Is UNHCR more effective at the point of delivery (or demonstrably on the right path to do so) with a wide range of partners as a consequence of the reform? Does the model/ approach taken reflect and support operational realities? If so, in what ways? Are there regional differences and if so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?

iii. Is UNHCR being more agile and better able to respond at the outset of emergencies with decentralized authorities as a consequence of the reform? Are there examples of faster, more flexible responses to large scale emergencies/ unexpected needs at country level? If so, why? Which other factors have facilitated or inhibited this?

d. **Implementation processes and inter-dependencies: how UNHCR effectively and efficiently managed the reform process?**

i. How effectively was the reform implemented according to its intended design, including the needs, risks and assumptions identified?

ii. How effectively has UNHCR adapted throughout the reform process in respond to internal and external changes? What are the best examples of this? In what ways did external events, such as COVID-19, influence the reform and what implications has this had in terms of its effectiveness?

iii. How efficiently did UNHCR manage the reform with the aim of being cost neutral in the medium-to-long term? Have economies of scale been realized?

iv. How clearly were the inter-dependencies between the elements of this reform, other change processes and the wider context and running of the organization mapped and managed throughout the implementation process? To what extent were unintended effects identified and addressed?

v. How strategically has the organization managed to maintain the balance between the global corporate strategic directions and contextually driven and changing regional and country priorities and needs?

e. **Lessons and recommendations: where are the good practices that can built upon; the effective aspects of the reform and the possibilities not considered?**

i. Which lessons can we draw to inform UNHCR's organization structure and processes in the future?

ii. Where are the good practices, and what are the success factors in these cases? iii) What steps are undertaken to ensure (to the extent possible) that outcomes are sustainable moving forwards?

12.9 Methodology

UNHCR welcomes the use of diverse, participatory, and innovative evaluation methods. The methodology – including details on the data collection and analytical approach(es) used to answer the evaluation questions – will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase and presented in an evaluation matrix. In this context, and the proposed systems approach, tools drawn from systems thinking and appreciative inquiry should be considered.

The evaluation methodology is expected to refer to and make use of relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria such as those proposed by OECD-DAC; refer to and make use of relevant UN standards analytical frameworks; and be explicitly designed to address the key evaluation questions – considering evaluability, budget, and timing constraints.

Of the methods selected by the evaluation team, UNHCR suggests vertical case studies as one way to look at the extent to which there has been a basis for, and practice of, the right inputs and outputs placed at the right organizational level to achieve the desired outcomes. These case studies would, necessarily, cut across the six facets and look at what was set-up, where, and how it has changed over time (with, for example, decentralization and recentralization of some aspects of some functions as things have evolved). Possible examples considered in the preparation of this TOR include specific process-tracking with respect to financial management and control; human resource management; international protection, fraud, and external relations.

The evaluation should also look to employ a variety of means of engaging and consulting staff, partners, and the people UNHCR serves, individually (and as appropriate, anonymously) and collectively, around the themes, issues, and questions of the evaluation. These should be timed to occur at different phases of the evaluation, to illicit views and perspectives (during inception), ensure sensemaking of the data (during data collection) validation of the findings and a workshop to co-create the recommendations. The evaluation team should plan on a balance of physical and virtual missions to regional Bureaux and a sample of country operations (including at least one Multi Country Office), field and sub-offices. A sampling frame will be developed during the inception phase to address both geographic differentiation and balance, and to address specific issues and practices linked to the different functions and case studies discussed previously.

The evaluation team is responsible to gather and make use of a wide range of data sources and triangulate data (e.g., across types, sources, and analysis modality) to demonstrate the impartiality of the analysis, minimize bias, and ensure the credibility of evaluation findings and conclusions.

12.10 Ethical considerations

The evaluation process should support and respect ethical and meaningful participation of forcing displaced and formerly stateless persons and meet the standards and ethics of UNHCR and UN Evaluation Group. As the scope of the evaluation includes the participation of stateless persons, who are considered a vulnerable population, the evaluation protocol and tools pertaining to the collection and management of data pertaining to forcibly displaced and stateless persons may need to be reviewed by an institutional ethics review board (IRB) and receive clearance prior to commencing. The evaluation firm will also need to confirm and receive any necessary country-specific ethical review requirements in the case study countries.

In line with established standards for evaluation in UN system, UN Ethical Guidelines for evaluations, UNEG Guidance on Human Rights and Gender Equality and on Disability Inclusion, evaluation in UNHCR is founded on the inter-connected principles of independence, impartiality, credibility and utility, which in practice, call for: protecting sources and data; systematically seeking informed consent; respecting dignity and diversity; minimizing risk, harm and burden upon those who are the subject of, or participating in the evaluation, while at the same time not compromising the integrity of the exercise.

The evaluation team is required to sign UNHCR Code of Conduct, complete UNHCR's introductory protection training module, and respect UNHCR's confidentiality, UNHCR Data protection policy, and UNHCR Age, Gender and Diversity policy requirements.

12.11 Management, oversight, and conduct

UNHCR Evaluation Office will serve as the Evaluation Manager. They will be responsible for: (i) managing the day-to-day aspects of the evaluation process; (ii) acting as the main interlocutor with the evaluation team; (iii) providing the evaluators with required data and facilitating communication with relevant stakeholders; (iv) reviewing the interim deliverables and final reports to ensure quality – with the support from the internal 'Core Group' and an Evaluation Reference Group (ERG).

The internal 'Core Group' consists of a number of the key interlocutors on the D&R process within UNHCR, including, the Director of Change and his team, the Head and representatives from the Transformation and Change Service and the office the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations. This group provides access to information and data, suggestions on contacts, feedback on lines of inquiry and will also be key actors in following through on the recommendations from the study. The group will be convened by the Evaluation Manger with the Director of Change periodically throughout the evaluation, and the evaluation team will be invited to join as and were useful. Other internal mechanisms, such as the Field Reference Group[105] will be identified and drawn upon to engage with a wider range of staff to ensure adequate representation and effective consultation.

An ERG will be created comprising members from UNHCR (including a director from a regional bureau, a head of an MCO, a sub-office and a country representative), representatives of up to three member states[106], at least one organizational development expert from another UN agency, a resident coordinator/ humanitarian coordinator, and a representative from UNDCO. The main role of the Reference Group will be advisory: to provide strategic input and constructive feedback based on their organizational perspective during the inception and report review stages of the evaluation.

The evaluation team should be comprised of up to six members (excluding project director and manager), with deep skills and experience in organizational development, systems thinking and approaches, business analysis, end-to-end-project management, financial management and systems, strategic human resource management and systems, oversight systems and tools and change management. The team is also expected to have a solid understanding of UNHCR as an organization and specifically its protection mandate, and deep experience in public sector reforms processes, specifically within the United Nations system, including UN reform. Knowledge and experience of the dynamics of humanitarian response, and the organizational implications is also required. In addition to senior members, the team is expected to include data analytics skills to process and analyze particularly quantitative data on financial, results and HR trends. In addition to English, the team should, in aggregate contain language skills in French and Spanish given the geographic spread of the organization. The team is expected to produce written products in English of high standards, informed by evidence and triangulated data and analysis, copy-edited, and free from grammatical errors. The team composition should reflect a gender balance, is culturally diverse and has a productive mix of national and international evaluators.

The evaluation deliverables are expected to adhere with UNHCR's 'Evaluation Quality Assurance' (EQA) guidance, which clarifies the quality requirements expected for UNHCR evaluation processes and products. All evaluation products will be shared with an external QA provider for their comment, in addition to being reviewed by the Evaluation Manager and Reference Group. Evaluation deliverables will not be considered final until they have received a satisfactory review rating and have been cleared by the Head of Evaluation Office. The Evaluation Manager will share and provide an orientation to the EQA at the start of the evaluation. Adherence to the EQA will be overseen by the Evaluation Manager.

12.12 Expected deliverables and evaluation timeline

The evaluation should be carried out between December 2023 and September 2024 with management response and dissemination occurring October – December 2024 and will be managed following the timeline tabled below and will be contracted to an evaluation firm.

The key evaluation deliverables are as follows:

- Inception Report
- End of mission briefs (PPT) to each RB and CO visited
- Thematic (case study) evaluation papers (internal / TBD)
- Overall evaluation report
- Standalone Executive Summary (3 languages)

The Head of the Evaluation Office sent a formal communication in September 2023 to the Senior Executive Team and Senior Management Committee, announcing the commencement of the evaluation. The evaluation process will include an inception phase, a period for data collection followed by data analysis and a series of sensemaking and validation workshops with stakeholders at various levels of the organization. After the preliminary findings have been validated, the report will be drafted, reviewed for quality assurance, and finalized. A final presentation will be made to the Senior Executive Team of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the evaluation. The Head of Evaluation Office gives the final sign-off on the evaluation report; thereby, determining it as final. Additional information on each phase is provided as follows:

Inception phase: The evaluation team will conduct an inception mission to HQ Geneva to meet with the Evaluation Office and key internal interlocutors (outlined previously) to discuss the objectives, scope (including where to scope down and issues of evaluability) and approach of the evaluation and to validate expectations. It is important for the evaluation team to understand how UNHCR plans to use the evaluation, what mechanisms exist for engagement of staff throughout the process, and how the evaluation can benefit external stakeholders as a public good. The inception phase will also include document review, review, and update of the theory of change, preparation of analytical framework, including benchmarking as needed, case study identification and selection, sampling frame for missions (physical and virtual), key informant interviews and review of existing data sources internally and externally. The final deliverable from this phase is an inception report incorporating comments from the Evaluation Office, UNHCR core group and the ERG, including findings from the desk review, the revised scope, evaluation matrix, proposed data collection tools and analytical framework[107].

Data collection phase: The evaluation team will collect data and information at multiple levels of the organization. This will include gathering documentation from UNHCR HQ, Regional Bureaux, and a sample of Country Offices, Field Offices and Sub-Offices (based on the methodology determined); key informant interviews and focus group discussions with UNHCR staff, key partners and other relevant stakeholders at the global and regional levels including governments in the counties. The final deliverables for this phase are the completion of data collection will be PPT-based end-of-mission debriefs in countries and Regional Bureaux where missions have taken place; and to the Evaluation Manager and internal core group (virtually) on the initial findings and points for follow-up or further discussion.

Data analysis, sensemaking and co-creation phase: The evaluation team will then analyze the data and information collected based on their analytical framework, which was reviewed and discussed with the Evaluation Office. A series of sensemaking/validation and co-creation recommendation workshops will be held with different groups within the organization – based on the methodology (could be geographic, by thematic vertical case study area, a mix of both or other). These workshops are an important step in the evaluation process for confirming the interpretation of data and strengthening the evaluation's analysis and contextual understanding. This will help the evaluation to hone their findings, conclusions, and recommendations before they draft the evaluation report, helping to minimize low quality reports with weak analysis. The final deliverables in this phase are virtual sensemaking workshops completed with all country case studies and Reference Group along with meeting notes.

Report drafting and finalization: The primary output is a single, synthetic report. In addition, and depending on the approach taken, there may be secondary outputs, individual thematic papers based on different strands of the analysis. In this TOR, one proposal is vertical case studies on particular themes, but the team may choose a different approach. These individual papers will be secondary deliverables, with the overall report a synthesis product drawing from these papers. The primary report will have one substantive round of comments. The Head of Evaluation Office will provide final clearance on the report. The final deliverables include the evaluation report and an executive summary in English, French and Spanish. It is to be determined whether the thematic papers/reports will be kept internal or made public. The evaluation team will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Senior Executive Team based on a PPT slide-deck.

Communication: The evaluation and its findings will be communicated to a range of internal audiences and to critical and interested parties outside UNHCR. Evidence will be made available in formats and styles appropriate for each of the priority stakeholders. This 'repurposing and repackaging' will be mindful of the communications preferences of the target audience, and the efficiency and effectiveness of reaching and engaging priority audiences in different ways. A mix of analogue and digital products will be generated e.g., printed evaluation reports and separate executive summaries; hosted webinars and attendance at web-conferences; (potentially face-to-face) validation workshops; brown bag lunches etc.

Communication opportunities will be identified throughout the life of the evaluation, not just at the end. There will be engagement of key audiences around emerging findings to help with 'sensemaking' and ownership over the findings and to finetune recommendations in concert with those who will be expected to implement them. A suite of messages will be identified that resonate with the interests and priorities of our primary internal audience (those working on protection inside UNHCR) with a view to generating both visibility of and interest in the evidence generated. A detailed communication and engagement framework with a breakdown by audiences, methods of engagements and timing will be prepared by the Evaluation Office during the inception phase.

The finalized report will be published on UNHCR's external website and disseminated via relevant communities of practice. One brown bag presentation will be held—one for all-staff in HQs as well at least two regional webinars (recognizing time zone differences) for Regional Bureaux and Country Offices. The Evaluation Office will also present the findings to UNHCR Member States to disseminate findings and recommendations from the evaluation. Last, several digital communication products will be developed for different external audiences to share learning more broadly.

Management response: A management response will need to be completed within three months of receipt of the evaluation report by the SET. The Evaluation Office will then publish the response online together with the report. After a year, the Evaluation Service will follow up with the SET on the key actions that were listed in the response.

The indicative timeline for the evaluation process is outlined in the table below. The number of days proposed is indicative- both per phase and in total – as a guide to the evaluation firms as they prepare their bids.

Table 36: Indicative timeline for the evaluation

Activity	Deliverables	Indicative timeline	Indicative # of estimated days	Payment schedule
Evaluation ToR finalized and call for proposals issued	ToR and call for proposals	Mid-October 2023		
Selection process (bids evaluated, tender awarded)	Contract signed	Mid-October – Mid-December 2023		
Inception phase including: - Desk review - Revised theory of change - Analytical framework - Updated methodology including identification of case studies and missions; - Benchmarking framework etc. Circulation for comments (EQA) and finalization	Final inception report (max 25 pages excluding annexes)	Dec-Feb 2024	80	20%

Data collection - Primary – in person and remote interviews, group consultations, etc. - Secondary data collection from UNHCR systems - Review of background material, internal and external evidence - Data / evidence consolidation against evaluation matrix	Consultation presentations (various forms and locations as determined by inception report) Presentation of preliminary findings with UNHCR HQ (Potentially more than one)	Mar-May 2024	173	30%
Data analysis and reporting phase including: Stakeholder feedback and validation of evaluation findings, conclusions, and proposed recommendations. EQA review of draft report,	Draft Thematic (vertical case study) papers – Number TBD – for internal use Draft overall report and recommendations (for circulation and comments) Presentation of preliminary	June-July 2024	148	30%
Circulation for comments	Findings			
Finalization of Evaluation Report and executive summary.	Final Evaluation Report (including recommendations and executive summary) Max 60 pages excluding annexes Standalone Executive Summary (3 languages) Brownbag presentation (1) and regional webinars (2)	Aug-Sept 2024	40	20%

Bibliography

(Iod), I. O. (2023). *Evidence synthesis and readines review (Phase 1) of the evaluation of UNHCR's appaorch to Gender-Based Violence Protection, risk mitigation and response.*

African Development Bank. (2007). *Independent Evaluation of the Decentralisation Strategy and Process at the African Development Bank.*

Bank, A. D. (2007). *Independent Evaluation of the Decentralisation Strategy and Process at the African Development Bank.*

BoA. (2023). *Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2019 and Report of the Board of Auditors (A/75/5/Add.6, July 2023).*

BoA. (2023). *Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2021 and Report of the Board of Auditors (A/77/5/Add.6, July 2023).*

BoA. (2023). *Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2022 and Report of the Board of Auditors (A/78/5/Add.6, July 2023).*

Cepei. (2019). *A sustainable Regional UN.*

Deloitte. (2016). *Impact of Decentralization on Performance.*

Evaluation, I. D. (2023). *Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Decentralization programme.*

FAO. (2004). *Independent Evaluation of FAO's Decentralization.*

FAO. (2012). *Evaluation of FAO's Regional and Sub-regional offices for Europe and Central Asia.*

FAO. (2015). *Synthesis of the evaluations of FAO's Regional and Subregional Offices.*

Fund, T. I. (n.d.). Why do countries decentralise? . *2020*.

Government Office for Science. (n.d.). *Systems thinking: An introductory toolkit for civil servants.*

Group, U. N. (2020). *Reprofiling and restructuring of the regional assets of the United Nations - Roadmap for Implementation.pdf .*

HM Treasury. (2020). *Magenta Book 2020, Supplementary Guide: Handling Complexity in Policy Evaluation.*

IFAD. (2016). *Corporate-Level Evaluation of IFAD's Decentralization Experience.*

IFAD. (2021). *Second Corporate level Evaluation of IFAD's Decentralization Experience.*

IFAD. (2023). *Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's decentralization experience.*

Independent Development Evaluation. (2023). *Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Decentralization programme.*

JIU. (1992). *Decentralization of organizations within the UN system_Part 1_deconcentration and managerial processes .*

JIU. (1993). *Decentralization of organizations within the United Nations System. Part III, the world health organization.*

JIU. (2019). *Review of Change Management in the United Nations system.*

Laurén, O. (2020). *Making a Case for Decentralized Companies*. Retrieved from https://www.industryweek.com/leadership/article/21145316/is-decentralizing-right-for-your-company

Mannet. (2017). *Rapid Organizational Report. Unpublished Internal Document.*

MOPAN. (2024). *Main Report 2023 Assessment.*

Nations, F. a. (2015). *FAO Decentralized Offices - Where knowledge becomes action.*

Nations, G. a. (2012). *Evaluation of FAO's Regional and Sub-regional Offices for Europe and Central Asia.*

Nations, U. (2017). *UN System Leadership Framework.*

Nations, U. (2018). *Global Compact on Refugees Booklet.*

Nations, U. (2024). *UN Sustainable Development Group*. Retrieved from https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/leave-no-one-behind

OECD. (2020). *Regionalisation in the context of decentralisation reforms.*

OIOS. (2015). *MENA Bureau Audit 2015.*

OIOS. (2016). *OIOS Audit of the arrangements for procurement undertaken by partners using UNHCR funds.pdf.*

OIOS. (2021). *Advisory on Implementation of Decentralization and Regionalization in UNHCR.*

OIOS. (2023). *Audit of affiliate workforce arrangements in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.*

OIOS. (2023). *Audit of the UNHCR Regional Bureau for East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes (2023/025, July 2023).*

OIOS. (2023). *Audit of UNHCR Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (2023/059, December 2023).*

Organization, W. H. (2021). *Evaluation of WHO transformation.*

Programme, T. U. (2020). Regionalization for health improvement: A systematic review. Retrieved from https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0244078

Programme, W. F. (2017). *Report of the External Auditor on Decentralization.*

Programme, W. F. (2017). *Summary Review of Fit for Purpose Organization-Strengthening Initiative.*

Programme, W. F. (2020). *Strategic Evaluation of WFP's Capacity to Respond to Emergencies.*

Richardson-et-al. (2002). *does-decentralization-make-a-difference-for-the-organization-an-examination-of-the-boundary.pdf .*

Science, G. O. (n.d.). *Systems thinking: An introductory toolkit for civil servants.*

Scott, R. (1981). *Organizations Rational Natural and Open Systems.*

Summit, W. H. (2016). *Commitment to Action.*

The International Monetary Fund. (2020). *Why do countries decentralise?*

Treasury, H. (2020). *Magenta Book 2020, Supplementary Guide: Handling Complexity in Policy Evaluation.*

UN. (2017). *UN System Leadership Framework.*

UN. (2018). *Global Compact on Refugees Booklet.*

UN. (2024). *UN Sustainable Development Group*. Retrieved from https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/leave-no-one-behind

UN Women. (2016). *Corporate Evaluation of Regional Architecture UN Women.*

UN Women. (2020). *Audit Report on Governance, Risks and Controls.*

UNDP. (1999). *Decentralization - A Sampling of Definitions .*

UNDP. (2017). *Evaluation of UNDP's strategic plan and global and regional programmes.*

UNDP. (2020). Regionalization for health improvement: A systematic review. Retrieved from https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0244078

UNDP. (n.d.). *Evaluation of UNDP's strategic plan and global and regional programmes.*

UNFPA. (2013). *Audit of the global and regionak programme (GRP).*

UNFPA. (2013). *GRP audit report – Final.*

UNHCR. (2012). *A Framework for the Protection of Children.*

UNHCR. (2012). *Recommendations of the 2011 Staff Management Consultative Council (SMC) meeting. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2015). *Policy on Regionalization in UNHCR. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2016). *Broadcast, "Headquarters Review / Revue du Siège du HCR". Email from High Commissioner to All Staff at Headquarters and in the Field on 17 August 2016. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2016). *HC Launches change process. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2016). *Report on the Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit.*

UNHCR. (2017). *HCR Strategic Direction.*

UNHCR. (2017). *Headquarters endorsement of ROA - Message to all staff - moving to phase 2. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2017). *Strategic Direction 2017-21.*

UNHCR. (2018). *Broadcast, 2018."Change management update - regionalisation". Email from High Commissioner to All Staff at Headquarters and in the Field on 27 September 2018. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *Change management Team (2018). Regionalization and Decentralization: What will change? Presentation to SMC 21 September 2018. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *Decentralization and Regionalization project paper final. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *First draft revised ARAs. Unpublished.*

UNHCR. (2018). *Global Compact on Refugees.*

UNHCR. (2018). *GRM session on country-level identity and catalytic role. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *Preliminary Guidance on new Bureau Functions. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *Repositioning UNHCR in the field – Key Recommendations to guide Decentralization and Regionalization. Annex 3. Revised ARAS. Draft Proposals. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *Repositioning UNHCR in the field: Key considerations to guide Decentralization and Regionalization. Part I. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *The Case for Change - UNHCR Change Strategy. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2018). *UNHCR_AI_2018_5_Rev.1 Rules and Procedures of UNHCR Committees on Contracts. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Addendum 1 to the March 2019 Compendium – Special Vacancy Announcement - Decentralization and Regionalization positions. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Addendum 2 to the September 2019 Compendium – Special Vacancy Announcement - Decentralization and Regionalization positions. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Addendum 3 to the March 2019 Compendium – Special Vacancy Announcement - Decentralization and Regionalization positions. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Advisory on the implementation of the decentralization and regionalization process.*

UNHCR. (2019). *AI on New RAF Part 1 - Delegation Authority Implementation. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Annex 1: Delegation of Authority for Increase of Operating Level Linked to Local and Regional Fundraising from Select Public Sources. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Change Advisory Team Recommendations Americas. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Change Advisory Team Recommendations. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Change legacy piece. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Consolidated Recommendations of the Change Advisory Team. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Core Functional Organigramme for field-based Regional Bureaux. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Country Offices Roles, Accountabilities and Authorities. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Decentralization and Regionalization strategic map for KPIs. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Documents for Jan 2019 SMC Principals Meeting_Managerial and technical interfaces. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *DR strategic map for KPIs. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Draft Parameters Bureau Construction. Unpublished. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Draft TORs Bureau Transition Task Team.docx. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Evaluation Office - 2019-08-30 Update on UNHCR reform to SCM 76th meeting.pdf. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Evaluation Office - Change legacy piece.*

UNHCR. (2019). *Final Core Functional Organigramme. Unpublished.*

UNHCR. (2019). *Final Core Model RB Organigramme. Unpublished.*

UNHCR. (2019). *HQ Roles, Accountabilities and Authorities. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Parameters and Design Considerations for the Creation of New Regional Bureaux in the Field. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Quick Guide on Decentralisation Change Process. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *RA Delegation Authority Implementation. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *SGBV response, risk mitigation and prevention in humanitarian crises: A synthesis of findings from evaluations of UNHCR operations.*

UNHCR. (2019). *SMC Retreat Key Decisions Summary. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *UNHCR Main Risks of Decentralization and Regionalization Process. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *UNHCR's Transformation (2017-2019): Initial stock taking of what happened, when, how and why.*

UNHCR. (2019). *Update email from HC on final phase of change process.msg. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2019). *Update on UNHCR reform to SCM 76th meeting. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *Centralized Evaluation of UNHCR's Approach to Learning and Development. Unpublished Internal Document.*

UNHCR. (2020). *D&R KPI Overview.pdf. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *Draft ToR Field-Based Reference group on DR. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *DSPR creation and structure - Attachment to All staff broadcast.pdf. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *New multi-year strategic planning and operations management system. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *Paper on UNHCR’s new planning monitoring and reporting system. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *Policy on the Prevention of Risk Mitigation, and Response to Gender-Based Violence. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *Regional Refugee Response to the Venezuela Situation.*

UNHCR. (2020). *Survey findings- COVID-19 and D&R. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2020). *UNHCR’s new multi-year strategic planning and operations management system.*

UNHCR. (2021). *Administrative Instruction on Procurement. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2021). *Broadcast Email: How will the Business Transformation Programme impact you?. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2021). *Business Transformation Programme.*

UNHCR. (2021). *Emergency Preparedness from a Procurement Perspective. Unpublished Internal Document.*

UNHCR. (2021). *Evaluation of UNHCR’s Child Protection Programming (2017–2019).*

UNHCR. (2021). *Evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation.*

UNHCR. (2021). *Evaluation of UNHCR's L3 Emergency Response to Cyclone Idai.*

UNHCR. (2021). *HQ Realignment Bureau Consultation - Evaluation Office Input. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2021). *Overview of new 3L model. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2021). *The Advisory on the implementation of the decentralization and regionalization process.*

UNHCR. (2021). *The Three Lines Model in UNHCR. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2021). *UNHCR-AI-AI on Procurement.pdf, Emergency Preparedness from a Procurement Perspective. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *AI on COMPASS Rev 3. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *Country Strategy Evaluation: Ecuador.*

UNHCR. (2022). *Evaluation of UNHCR's response to multiple emergencies in the central Sahel region: Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali.*

UNHCR. (2022). *Global Results Framework.*

UNHCR. (2022). *Multi-Country Strategic Evaluation of UNHCR’s Operations in Northern Europe (Nordic and Baltic Countries).*

UNHCR. (2022). *RAAs COs and MCOs - Update. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *RAAs DER - Update. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *RAAs DSPR - Update. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *RAAs RBs - Update. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *RAF Revised. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2022). *SA Review Mission Report.*

UNHCR. (2022). *Saudi Arabia review mission.*

UNHCR. (2022). *Sudan Country Strategy Evaluation.*

UNHCR. (2022). *UNHCR Strategic Directions 2022-2026.*

UNHCR. (2022). *Update on UNHCR Structural and Management Reform VII. Management priorities. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *BTP systems Go-Live _ Go-Live des systèmes BTP.msg. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Comparative Table of UNHCR Emergency Levels. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Country Strategy Evaluation Mauritania 2020-2022.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Email announcing PROMS going live. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Emergency Preparedness and Response – Recurring Issues & Lessons Learned. Unpublished Internal Document.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 Emergency in Ethiopia 2021–2022.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Evaluation of UNHCR's Level 3 Regional Refugee Emergency Response to the crisis in Ukraine.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 Emergency in Afganistan 2021-2022.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Global Report. Strategic partnerships*.

UNHCR. (2023). *Guidance on Emergency Preparedness. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *MCO Argentina review mission report.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Policy on Emergency Preparedness and Response. Unpublished Internal Document.*

UNHCR. (2023). *Policy on Planning for Getting and Showing Results. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Policy on Resource Allocation and Management. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Procedures on Partnership management. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Rationale for Culture Assessment. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Resource Allocation Framework Administrative Instruction. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Terms of Reference. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *Transitioning to Workday Learning I Transition vers Workday Learning. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *UNHCR Country strategy evaluation: Ecuador 2019-2022.*

UNHCR. (2023). *UNHCR handbook for designing field presences. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2023). *UNHCR's response to Covid-19 Pandemic.*

UNHCR. (2023). *UNHCR-HCP-2023-01 Policy on Emergency Preparedness and Response.pdf.*

UNHCR. (2024). *Evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in situations of internal displacement.*

UNHCR. (2024). *Audit of the progress in implementing the Business Transformation Programme for the Office of UNHCR.*

UNHCR. (2024). *Management response to the Audit of progress in implementing the Business Transformation Programme for the office of UNHCR. Unpublished Internal Document .*

UNHCR. (2024). *Programme Glossary List for Partners.*

UNHCR. (2024). *UNHCR Supply Strategy 2024 - 2030.*

United Nations Sustainable Development Group. (2020). *Reprofiling and restructuring of the regional assets of the United Nations - Roadmap for Implementation.*

WFP. (2003). *Evaluation Office Review of WFP's Decentralization Initiative.*

WFP. (2014). *Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme Strategic Evaluation.*

WFP. (2017). *Fit For Purpose Review.*

WFP. (2017). *Report of the External Auditor on Decentralization .*

WFP. (2017). *Summary Review of Fit for Purpose Organization-Strengthening Initiative.*

WFP. (2020). *Strategic Evaluation of WFP's Capacity to Respond to Emergencies.*

WFP. (2022). *Evaluation Synthesis of WFP's Performance Measurement and Monitoring.*

WHO. (2021). *Evaluation of WHO transformation.*

Women, U. (2020). *Audit Report on Governance, Risks and Controls .*

World Humanitarian Summit. (2016). *Commitment to Action.*