I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report outlines activities undertaken since August 2005 by the Inspector General’s Office (IGO) within the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR or the Office). The IGO has three core functions:

- inspections of the quality of management of UNHCR operations;
- investigations of allegations of misconduct by UNHCR personnel; and
- ad hoc inquiries into violent attacks on UNHCR personnel and operations as well as into other incidents causing major losses or damage to UNHCR’s integrity, credibility or assets.

2. In light of the outcome of the informal consultative meetings on enhancing the independence of the IGO held by the Executive Committee in the first half of 2005, the High Commissioner on 5 November 2005 issued a directive promulgating revised terms of reference
for the IGO (Inter-Office Memorandum/Field-Office Memorandum (IOM/FOM) No. 054/2005 on *The role, functions and modus operandi of the Inspector General’s Office*). This Memorandum, in effect, constitutes the new charter for the IGO and addresses a number of concerns expressed during the informal consultative meetings. Its aim is to:

- strengthen provisions for assuring the independence of the IGO;
- introduce a policy of wider dissemination of inspection reports aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability; and
- update the IGO’s operational policies and procedures in line with relevant recent administrative instructions from the Secretary-General and in light of experience gained since the issuance of the preceding IOM/FOM.

3. Following the issuance of the above directive, the IGO has actively pursued the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) specifically aimed at enhancing cooperation and collaboration between the IGO and OIOS in the conduct of investigations and inspections. At the time of the writing of this report, the draft text was under consideration by OIOS.

II. INSPECTIONS

4. During the reporting period the IGO undertook a full schedule of inspections in accordance with its revised inspection strategy put in place in early 2005.

5. The Inspection Unit, previously comprising one Head of Unit, one Senior Inspection Officer and an Inspection Assistant, was strengthened by the creation of three additional posts of Senior Inspection Officer. Of the latter, one has specific responsibility for tracking and following up recommendations for remedial action emanating from inspections. Two of the new posts are filled; the third has been readvertised externally with a view to broadening the pool of applicants in the event that needed expertise cannot be identified internally.

6. Pursuant to the High Commissioner’s commitment to improve transparency and ensure fuller reporting on oversight activities to the Executive Committee, summaries of inspections conducted during 2004-2005 were made available to all staff on the intranet as well as to Executive Committee Members through UNHCR’s external “password-protected” website.

7. The full texts of reports of inspections carried out as of September 2005 are also being made available in the same manner. It should be noted, however, that the inspection process continues well after inspection missions are undertaken, and includes an extended period in which details are verified with inspected offices and concerned regional bureaux. Consequently, there is a considerable interval between the information-collection phase of inspections and publication of final inspection reports.

8. With the aim of strengthening its inspection capacity, the IGO developed an inspection training module and subsequently conducted two workshops in March 2006 to train a total of 35 staff in inspection methodology, including familiarizing them with inspection tools. The IGO now relies upon a roster of 30 staff, drawn mainly from the Division of International Protection
Services (DIPS), the Division of Human Resources Management (DHRM) and the Division of Operational Support (DOS). This better enables it to compose inspection teams with expertise that matches the varying conditions and challenges inspections pose.

9. In order to draw upon relevant expertise in national systems, the Inspection Unit has initiated discussions with the United States Inspector Generals’ Institute (School of Audit and Inspections) to arrange specialized training in inspection methods for both IGO and Inspection Roster staff.

10. While it is too early to gauge the impact of the changes introduced under the new strategy, a number of challenges should be highlighted.

11. The IGO has yet to fully meet the needs of the expanded inspection plan as initially conceived. In light of the organization-wide resource limitations, the 2006 inspection schedule has been reviewed and prioritized. Resources budgeted for IGO staff participants are also having to be used to fund participants from other functional units which are unable to meet the mission costs. This will affect the total number of inspections undertaken in 2006. In particular, additional funds to cover costs of non-IGO staff participants in inspection teams will be needed in order for the IGO to carry out its expanded inspection plan fully.

12. The new policy of publishing the full text of inspection reports (which came into effect for all inspections carried out after 1 September 2005) improved transparency but at the cost of introducing significant delays in the finalization and issuance of inspection reports. Previously the assumption that inspections focus mainly on identifying weaknesses in the management of an operation, with the aim of providing recommendations for corrective action where needed, was generally accepted. Under the new publication policy, however, inspected offices and concerned regional bureaux are taking issue with this approach, perceiving it as one that tends to cast operations in too negative a light. Increasingly, at the stage of review of draft findings – which involves detailed exchanges both with the inspected office and its Bureau – changes are sought not only to correct factual errors or omissions but to offset critical observations with more extensive and specific acknowledgement of strengths and achievements, or to delete such observations entirely. This, together with the IGO’s dependency on inspection teams that are mostly composed of staff who return to their own units immediately upon return from inspection missions, has made the post-inspection mission process substantially more difficult and time-consuming. It should be noted, however, that under the procedures in place during this period, inspection teams routinely briefed senior managers of inspected offices at the end of inspection missions, and inspected offices were in a position to begin addressing key inspection findings without having to wait for the final inspection report – and almost all did so.

13. The Inspection Unit’s efforts to address these problems include plans to provide additional training in inspection report writing, introduce report templates, and obtain the agreement of units that provide staff for inspection missions that these staff will be allowed to dedicate adequate time upon return from inspection missions to the task of formulating inspection findings and dealing with rebuttals from inspected offices.
14. Since the last report, the IGO has conducted standard inspections of UNHCR’s operations in Mozambique, Serbia and Montenegro (as it then was), Thailand, Cambodia, Iraq, Benin, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, and the Nordic and Baltic States. An ad hoc inspection was undertaken of UNHCR’s operations in Colombia. This represents a total of 13 inspection missions during the reporting period. Remaining inspections scheduled for 2006, include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Australia, and Afghanistan. In addition, a mission will be fielded to Botswana and Malawi specifically to check compliance with previous inspection recommendations.

15. During the period of 2004 – 2005, a total of 402 recommendations emanated from 21 inspections of field operations. These recommendations covered a wide range of operations and office management issues. In order to ensure that timely actions were taken on inspection recommendations, the Inspection Unit systematically followed up by requiring inspected offices to provide implementation reports at three and six month intervals following the issuance of the inspection report. The responses received were entered in the inspection database and used to track compliance rates.

16. The overall compliance rate for 2004 is 93 per cent as at 30 June 2006. The overall compliance rate for 2005 stood at 42 per cent at the time of this report. This is expected to increase when the outstanding implementation reports are received from the Field, some of which are not yet due.

### Inspections Conducted in 2005

**Implementation of Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau/Country</th>
<th>Number of Recommendations</th>
<th>Number of Recommendations In Progress</th>
<th>Implemented Recommendations</th>
<th>Percentage Implemented</th>
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<tr>
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<td>United Rep. of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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Inspections Conducted in 2005
Implementation of Recommendations

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<tr>
<th>Bureau/Country</th>
<th>Number of Recommendations</th>
<th>Number of Recommendations In Progress</th>
<th>Implemented Recommendations</th>
<th>Percentage Implemented</th>
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<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR overall</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>42%</td>
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</table>

*/ Implementation report not yet due.
/**/ Inspection report pending.
/***No implementation report received.

17. Inspections undertaken during the reporting period noted the persistence of weaknesses in certain areas of management that were the subject of previous inspection observations. Some of the main recurrent findings are outlined below.

A. Donor consultation

18. In most locations inspected during the relevant period, structured arrangements were in place for liaison with donor missions. While some country operations, particularly those engaged in local fund raising, organized regular briefings for donors, others maintained contacts through the provision of briefing kits and/or documents. The quality of information provided using these mechanisms was generally considered good and to the satisfaction of the concerned donor missions. Some country operations however still failed to engage donor missions effectively in substantive discussions on how to address the challenges facing the Office. Representatives of donor embassies were not informed of key policy decisions in a timely and reliable manner, in some cases becoming aware of them by chance or only after long delays and repeated requests. In those operations where such weaknesses were identified, UNHCR was clearly failing to seize opportunities for support in its advocacy efforts, in some cases on key protection issues.

B. Relations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

19. Inspection missions during this period noted improvements in field offices’ relationships with NGOs and civil society. However, while many offices were making concerted efforts to engage NGOs more constructively, the most critical external assessments of UNHCR still emanated from the NGO community. The quality of dialogue and interaction with UNHCR in some operations was linked to the level of funding provided by UNHCR. While NGOs operating independently of UNHCR funding often characterized their relationship with the
Office as good, in these situations there was also a tendency for UNHCR offices to shy away from close monitoring of these agencies so as to avoid tensions in the relationship which could adversely affect the implementation of activities for which UNHCR funding was unavailable.

C. In-country management and supervision

20. The overall quality of UNHCR operations was affected in a number of cases by the manner in which UNHCR deployed and engaged at the point of interface with refugee communities. Although variations between field offices were found, in the majority of field offices day-to-day responsibilities for dealing with refugee populations tended in large part to be carried by junior staff, dependent on and overseen by more senior experienced professional staff positioned in some cases in distant sub-offices and in other cases at the branch office level.

21. In a spreading pattern observed in many field operations in recent years, a number of inspected offices relied heavily on non-staff personnel and did so also for core UNHCR functions. In one operation, out of a total of 269 personnel effectively serving in the UNHCR operation, 38 per cent were found to be United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) or staff deployees in Temporary Assistance positions, not counting consultants, secondees or persons under service contracts.

22. With regard specifically to the use of UNVs, inspections noted that in a number of situations, critical frontline responsibilities for managing refugee camps or heading field and satellite offices had been assigned to such personnel. Moreover, these UNVs were frequently found to have received no or inadequate training, briefing or guidance prior to their deployment. Despite the existence of well-defined policies and procedures for the use of UNVs in UNHCR operations, it was observed that UNVs were, among other things, given project control functions and assigned to supervise national staff or to maintain a UNHCR presence at designated duty stations. In 2004 - 2005, UNHCR had over 700 UNVs working in its operations worldwide.

D. Programme planning and monitoring

23. UNHCR has begun to shift emphasis in programme planning from a resource-driven approach to one based on performance and results. Field offices are increasingly expected to plan their programmes in terms of the results they expect to achieve and to establish objectives as well as meaningful indicators to measure their attainment. A recurring general observation of inspection missions was that regardless of the planning parameters and guidelines given to field operations, resource availability was still the predominant determinant of actual planning and implementation.

24. Increased use of standards and indicators was observed in all operations. However, implementing partners who were asked to use the standards and indicators for planning assistance activities frequently pointed to a lack of consistency between UNHCR’s official guidance and its actual practices in programme management. Few offices had addressed the challenge posed by the practical application of standards and indicators in contexts of chronic resource shortages in a transparent and consensual manner with implementing partners.
25. At the same time, monitoring of implementing partners continued to be inadequate in many operations. In several cases, lack of monitoring resulted in significant divergences from required and feasible standards of UNHCR programmes and in waste or diversion, including payment for services and materials not actually or fully delivered to refugees.

E. Protection management

26. One area that has shown a marked improvement in recent years is protection strategy formulation. In many offices protection strategies were formulated during the annual strategic planning process and had contributed significantly to mainstreaming and operationalizing critical protection challenges. The inclusion of resettlement needs in the Country Operations Plan had also made protection planning more comprehensive. In two locations the inspection mission was shown multiple-year strategies and in one operation a five-year strategy. These served as extremely useful road maps for protection activities, also for identifying ways of dealing with existing constraints. In developing protection strategies, however, few offices ensured a broad participatory process which adequately involved field-level staff and all stakeholders, including the host government, implementing partners and refugees. In one country operation, where a well thought-out strategy had been formulated at the branch office level, field-based colleagues had been excluded from the process and as a result did not assume ownership of the final product. In another location failure to consult effectively on strategic directions for a specific caseload resulted in subsequent rejection of key aspects of the strategy by concerned staff within the operation.

27. In a number of operations excessive compartmentalization significantly impaired response to protection challenges. In particular, effective mechanisms were not in place to ensure a holistic approach and concerted action by staff responsible for programme, protection and community development. Some operations had formed Protection Working Groups to better facilitate communication and cooperation, but in others cross-cutting issues continued to be dealt with in a fragmented manner. In Headquarters, the restructuring of DIP and DOS, which has involved the relocation of the Community Development, Gender Equality and Children Section in the newly created DIPS, was an important step aimed at ensuring an integrated approach to addressing protection challenges. However, this approach is not yet routinely applied at the field level.

F. Performance appraisal and staff development

28. The Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) compliance rates of those countries inspected were found to be high (above 80 per cent). In some cases, however, managers were more focused on increasing compliance rates than on the purposes for which the PAR was intended, such as setting clear and achievable objectives and ensuring substantive and timely dialogue on performance between staff members and their supervisors.

29. The implementation of the career development components of UNHCR’s Career Management System (CMS) was a matter of general concern to many staff, both national and international. In operations where managers and staff in the field appeared ready and willing to devote sufficient time and attention to staff development, the amounts allocated for field-based
training were so paltry that no cost-effective or equitable use could be made of them. As a result some offices had decided to use the amounts available exclusively for some limited language training of international staff. Higher priority clearly needs to be accorded to field-level training needs.

G. Exercise of delegated authority

30. Inspections repeatedly noted that representatives or heads of field and sub-offices assumed financial and human resource management responsibilities without being adequately trained or without the necessary means to fulfil such responsibilities. Further delegation of authority from the representative to heads of field and sub-offices, and delegation from those officers to other staff, was frequently also not being carried out in a manner that ensured that staff members to whom the authority had been delegated were well informed or briefed. Inspections found situations where representatives were unaware of the full scope of authority vested in them or exercised authority without adequate training or in an *ad hoc* manner. Very few representatives had provided written delegation instruments to their subordinates.

H. Code of Conduct

31. The Code of Conduct had been introduced in all offices through facilitated sessions and most offices had also made progress in holding refresher sessions. New recruits were being asked to sign the Code, although many offices were not able to provide them – soon after recruitment – with the means and opportunity to become fully familiarized with its provisions. Inspections found that not all offices had posted the Code of Conduct in full view of the staff and refugees. Inspections also revealed a general lack of familiarity with UNHCR’s policy on conflict of interest in the workplace, as contained in the Code of Conduct.

32. Inspections also found that a small percentage of staff (15-20 per cent) expressed doubt that the introduction of the Code had made a significant difference; some provided examples of violations or unethical behaviour (real or perceived) which had not been dealt with by, or even reported to, the representative. In addition, a larger percentage of staff (some 30 per cent) indicated that they were not aware of how to report improper conduct.

I. Staff relations and the consultative mechanisms

33. Less than half of the offices inspected had properly established staff representative bodies. In view of the fact that over 70 per cent of all UNHCR staff work in the Field, a large number of staff may be excluded from effective participation in staff-management consultations on issues affecting staff welfare.

J. Best practices

34. It is standard procedure for inspections also to look for best practices and innovative approaches with a view to drawing lessons and facilitating their dissemination. A number were identified during the reporting period and highlighted in individual inspection reports. These
practices not only contributed to enhancing staff competencies and performance in a number of areas, but also improved service delivery to UNHCR’s beneficiaries. While efforts are underway to systematically compile these practices some examples are provided below.

35. In Benin, weekly training sessions are organized by heads of functional units (Programme, Protection) for the benefit of all staff. These meetings aim at increasing overall awareness of office policies, strategies, guidelines and rules and provide staff with informal learning opportunities while reinforcing team spirit and an integrated approach within the office. A “customer satisfaction survey” was carried out to address complaints from partners and persons of concern about reception and counselling services at the Regional Office. This survey, conducted through confidential questionnaires distributed to asylum-seekers and refugees at the reception, sought their comments on the quality of services provided by UNHCR in Benin as well as their recommendations for improvement. Several partners and refugees confirmed to the inspection team that reception and counselling services had greatly improved.

36. In Colombia, UNHCR developed a database to guide and promote consistency in the way field staff carry out their protection interventions. The database ensures institutional memory while providing guidance to staff and serves as well as a basis for the formulation of country of origin information including through the issuance of regular updates on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other human rights developments, which have proven very useful to offices in countries receiving Colombian asylum-seekers.

37. In Gambia, UNHCR developed an information booklet specifically for security personnel stationed outside the office. This explains UNHCR’s protection role and responsibilities and sets out expected standards of conduct in user-friendly language. This has helped to ensure that security guards understand and act in accordance with the mandate of the Office and thus appropriately treat persons of concern who approach the office for whom they are the first point of contact.

III. INVESTIGATIONS

38. Investigating the possible misconduct of UNHCR personnel remains a vital function of the Inspector General’s Office. Since its inception in 1997 and the eventual creation of the Investigation Unit in 2002, the IGO’s investigation capacity has been significantly enhanced. With a more established position in the organization, greater experience with complex cases and continuous refinement of its procedural standards consistent with internationally accepted best practices, the investigation function is increasingly effective.

39. The Investigation Unit of the IGO comprises a Head of Unit, four Senior Investigation Officers, (of which one post was created in 2005), one Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Associate Investigation officer, an Investigation Assistant and an Investigation Clerk.

40. The annual investigation caseload, in terms of reports of possible misconduct, declined by approximately 17 per cent from the prior year. During the same period, efforts to clear the backlog of cases reduced the total number of cases pending from previous years to one from 2003 and five from 2004.
41. The IGO continues to investigate a wide and varied range of possible misconduct with misuse of assets, refugee status determination (RSD) and resettlement (RST) fraud, embezzlement and abuse of authority constituting almost 50 per cent of the cases investigated. Those cases received by the IGO which fall outside its competence are immediately forwarded to OIOS. Three such cases were forwarded during the reporting period.
42. Reports of possible misconduct affecting beneficiaries or beneficiary communities continue to be investigated as a matter of priority. This includes fraud related to refugee status determination (RSD) and resettlement (RST), and cases of sexual exploitation. Two cases of possible resettlement fraud being investigated at the time of this report, one in Africa and one in the Asian region, illustrate the investigation challenges faced by the IGO. These cases are characterized by certain common factors, including the presence of an external broker, a local criminal enterprise, unidentified UNHCR personnel acting inside the organization, and large, complex resettlement caseloads.

43. Identifying collaborators inside UNHCR has presented difficult challenges. Attempts to identify perpetrators through approaches to brokers and the community exploited by the fraud have been only partially successful due to factors which include personal security, the evasive nature of resettlement brokering and the general criminality associated with this type of fraud.

44. The increasing complexity of investigations in this area indicates that efforts have succeeded in reducing the incidence of simpler schemes of resettlement fraud, both by sanctioning those responsible and deterring others. Investigations are increasingly concentrating on the more intractable cases involving determined perpetrators.

45. One significant, ongoing resettlement fraud investigation has already resulted in the removal of a service contract holder (non-staff personnel provided by another United Nations agency) during the reporting period. It is also worth noting that leads developed during this investigation revealed other unrelated incidents of resettlement fraud.

46. The IGO has observed that once a criminal enterprise is in place, eradicating resettlement fraud fully requires the active collaboration of DIPS and the relevant regional bureau. In a number of cases, the IGO has also sought such collaboration to ensure that investigation findings are also followed up with rigorous prevention efforts.

47. With regard to sexual exploitation, only two cases were investigated during the reporting period. The first case related to a staff member's admitted relations with a returnee whose exact age was in question. The second case investigated was the attempted molestation of a child and resulted in the staff member's summary dismissal. With only two investigations of sexual exploitation during this period, there are indications that the frequency of this type of misconduct is diminishing. This is partly attributable to the Code of Conduct and, in particular, the periodic refresher sessions held throughout the organization.

48. Fraud in the Medical Insurance Plan (MIP) for local staff persists, despite procedural changes following an IGO Management Implication Report (MIR). While there appears to be a lower rate of occurrence, the nature of the fraud has not changed. Although the complete elimination of fraud will always remain a challenge, the IGO has observed that chronic, recurring MIP fraud can be substantially reduced.
49. Overall, cases of recurrent misconduct, where the same type of offence is replicated by a number of people in the same location, appear to be declining. This is a result of the deterrent effect of investigations and disciplinary measures along with improved procedures. Since the total number of investigations has not substantially diminished, this trend also reflects a shift to cases arising from unique circumstances.

50. Integration of the investigation function has also led to an increased involvement of the IGO in policy development as well as in advising other functions such as mediation. The IGO has, for instance, contributed significantly to the development and implementation of policies and procedures for dealing with cases of sexual harassment. Few cases of this nature are handled through the informal process or reported to the IGO, giving rise to the concern that features of existing policies and procedures may be having a chilling effect on such complaints. The IGO’s involvement in this area has raised awareness that current emphases on offering alternatives to reporting misconduct, such as informal mediation of sexual harassment, may be confusing and even discouraging complaints.

51. The system of internal justice is adding to the complexity of investigations and placing greater demands on the investigation function. The Joint Disciplinary Committee (JDC) increasingly expects investigators to provide expert testimony, which is then subject to cross-examination during the review process. Moreover, recent United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) decisions have established additional conditions for the conduct of investigations, including elements such as the right of confrontation and the right of counsel which previously only came into play after a charge of misconduct had been made by DHRM. Further elaboration of investigation methods and procedures has been necessitated by these demands.

52. The IGO also collaborates with and/or extends support to national prosecution of criminal cases. The IGO had five separate cases requiring coordination with local law enforcement authorities during the reporting period. In situations where the conduct investigated is of a criminal nature, collaboration with local authorities is necessary both to take advantage of law enforcement capacity to gather certain evidence and to ensure effective local prosecution. Although there is no apparent increase in the occurrence of criminal conduct, investigation methods have been developed to facilitate coordination with local authorities. This includes organizing internal documents with due regard for the inviolability of UNHCR records, preparing staff for possible witness testimony, and liaising with local authorities.

53. With a view to making efficient use of available resources, the IGO continued its efforts to increase investigation capacity through the training of 80 UNHCR staff members in the Investigation Learning Programme (ILP) in 2005. The IGO now relies on a roster of staff trained in investigation procedures; these staff members actively support investigations in a variety of ways, including local fact-finding, taking statements and conducting interviews. The IGO is pleased with the positive collaboration provided by UNHCR offices in facilitating the participation of their staff members in investigations. It is anticipated that the ILP roster members will increasingly support the Investigations Unit. The significant cost savings realized through this arrangement will also contribute to the austerity measures the Office has been obliged to take in this period.
54. It should be noted that more complex investigations tend to place an unexpected burden on field office personnel. In the case of resettlement fraud, for example, increased vigilance in detection falls under the responsibility of the affected office. This can blur the line between investigations and normal office functions, particularly in the area of protection as regards resettlement fraud. Nonetheless, support of the investigation function is provided throughout the organization and, in particular, by representatives in the Field.

55. The maturing investigation function has placed UNHCR in a leading position in this area, with other international organizations often seeking advice and/or assistance in dealing with difficult investigations or other issues related to their investigation function. In addition, the IGO has developed collaboration with agencies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office to address possible fraud perpetrated by implementing partners.

V. INQUIRIES

56. The third part of the IGO’s oversight portfolio involves ad hoc inquiries. These are conducted when an attack on UNHCR staff, operations or premises causes fatalities, serious injuries or large-scale damage to the Office. Under this chapter there is also provision for the High Commissioner to request the IGO to conduct an inquiry, or review, into other types of incidents if they pose a risk to the Office’s mandated responsibilities, interests or operations.

57. Under this provision, during this period the IGO conducted a review of how UNHCR dealt with the situation leading up to the tragic events that took place near the UNHCR office in Cairo on 29 December 2005. This review, conducted at the request of the High Commissioner, focused on describing and assessing the Office's management of this specific situation.

58. The IGO also undertook an ad hoc inquiry into the attack on UNHCR’s compound in Yei, Sudan on 15 March 2006, which resulted in the deaths of one staff member and one local guard, with another guard receiving non-fatal gunshot wounds. The inquiry established the sequence of events leading to the casualties and the context in which those events unfolded. After analysing actions and decisions taken within UNHCR prior, during and after those events, the IGO was in a position to make a range of recommendations to improve on current practices.

59. A third ad hoc inquiry was carried out during the reporting period to establish the circumstances in which the Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and the Sudanese Commission for Refugees (COR) was negotiated, formulated and concluded. The inquiry also assessed the effectiveness and adequacy of supervisory controls and made recommendations accordingly.

60. Findings of ad hoc inquiries are contained in confidential reports submitted to the High Commissioner who then tasks concerned managers with appropriate follow-up.