The Impact of Government-Sponsored Refugee Resettlement: A Meta Study of Findings from Six Countries

December 2020
Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Service (RCPS)
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Geneva, Switzerland
The publication of this report was commissioned by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the support of the Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initiative (CRISP). The opinions and views expressed in this document represent the authors’ point of view, which are not necessarily shared by UNHCR or by the authorities of the concerned countries.

UNHCR’s Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Service (RCPS) is committed to realize the vision set out in The Three-Year Strategy (2019-2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways, and to promote and support an evidence-based narrative on refugees through the dissemination of data and evidence on the contributions of refugees arriving through resettlement and complementary pathways to political groups, policy makers and other key influencers.

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Acknowledgements

This report was written by Graeme Rodgers (International Rescue Committee, Technical Advisor, Research) and Jessica Porter (International Rescue Committee, Consultant). The authors acknowledge with appreciation the valued contributions and feedback from the following individuals: At UNHCR, Anna Turus, David Manicom, Joel Kinahan, Oliver Smith, Angela Murru, Campbell Macknight, Davina Gateley Saïd, Laura Cavicchioli, Rebecca Einhoff, Hannah Simon, Anne-Marie McGranaghan, Anna Greene, Noha Khalifa and Michael Casasola. At the IRC, Kristy Gladfelter, William Paja, Xinwei Zhang, Anjini Mishra, Robin Dunn Marcos, Jeannie Annan, Adrian Clarke, and Hans van de Weerd. Responsibility for the content of the reports remains solely with the authors.
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Executive Summary

This report examines findings from a meta-study of the integration outcomes and resulting impacts on receiving societies of government-led refugee resettlement across six country contexts, including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States. The study explores how specific program and contextual characteristics have both enabled and constrained the possibilities for high quality research that can inform improved policy responses and practices. Findings suggest that:

- Countries with larger and more established refugee resettlement programs facilitate a greater number of research studies that are of higher quality. Almost 80% of the relevant studies identified focused on the three largest resettlement countries considered here, namely the United States, Canada and Australia. Whereas Germany is a major refugee resettlement country, its current refugee resettlement program was established relatively recently, and a research-based understanding of its effects is still relatively nascent and undeveloped, at this stage.

- In some countries, the study of resettlement appears to be impacted by the scale and prominence of asylum. This was most evident in the case of Germany, where the arrival of unprecedented numbers of asylum seekers since 2015 has prompted the proliferation of new and exciting research on refugee integration. The scale of asylum, however, has largely eclipsed any clear focus on resettlement, leading to a dearth of research-based insights into the specific effects of refugee resettlement. A similar effect was observed in Sweden, which received the highest number of asylum seekers per capita of all countries considered. However, this was “offset”, to some extent, by a large and well-established resettlement program and an ability to clearly isolate and identify resettled refugees in immigration and census data.

- The study of resettlement appears to be facilitated directly by the availability of program and demographic data. Countries that collect and make relevant statistical data on refugee resettlement available for research are able to generate the strong insights into the question of impact. Canada and Sweden, for example, make available very detailed census and administrative data that preserves an ability to identify resettled refugees at the individual level. This facilitates powerful comparative analyses and diachronic measurement of the integration outcomes of resettled refugees. Whilst such fine-grained survey and administrative data is not as accessible in the United States, a growing body of statistically based research has drawn from general community census data, utilizing a method to impute refugee status using nationality and arrival datapoints. Whilst this introduces a risk of error, the method is considered to be reasonably reliable. In Australia, studies that rely on statistical analysis have tended to draw on field surveys rather than census and administrative data. This enables the pursuit of research questions that look beyond the constraints of existing datasets. However, studies are sometimes limited by small sample sizes, problems with representativity and cohort bias (for longitudinal surveys). Relevant research identified in New Zealand was generated exclusively through qualitative methods, which may reflect relatively low arrival numbers as well as small and dispersed refugee communities.

The studies that we identified addressed several of the integration dimensions recognized by the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (EGRIS)¹. These include: legal, civil, demographic and migration, economic, health, education, and social inclusion. Our review findings may be summarized as follows:

- We identified no relevant studies that considered the legal dimensions of integration for resettled refugees.

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• Studies of the civil dimension of integration focused on the question of naturalization for resettled refugees. Several studies across multiple countries showed that resettled refugees naturalize at higher rates than other immigrant groups, despite facing barriers. Limited research also suggests that the effects of refugee naturalization may strengthen a sense of belonging and associated commitments to citizenship.

• Studies related to demographics and migration focused on the issue of secondary migration of resettled refugees. Findings from Canada and Sweden suggest that resettled refugees may be slightly more likely to leave their initial destinations, compared to other migrant categories. This difference may be explained by variations in destination characteristics. In the US, rates of secondary migration may be slightly higher. We identified no evidence to suggest that secondary migration indicates a failure of resettlement integration. Future research is needed to consider the consequences of secondary migration on refugee integration more fully.

• Research conducted on refugee resettlement over the last two decades has focused strongly on the economic aspects of refugee integration. Findings from these studies did not suggest any significant adverse effects of resettlement. Results were relatively consistent in suggesting that the economic lives of resettled refugees improve over time, on average. Employment and income increase and tend to approach parity with other immigrants and the native population over the longer term. Importantly the fiscal costs of refugee resettlement appear to be outweighed by the economic contributions of resettled refugees. This milestone, however, may only be realized over several years or even decades.

• Studies of the effects of health on refugee resettlement and integration highlight the enduring significance of pre-arrival health status and access to post-arrival healthcare. Much of the literature focuses on the relationship between mental health and access to employment, services and other dimensions of integration. Post-arrival stresses of adjustment and integration are linked to poorer levels of health and lower integration outcomes. Similarly, language competency is linked positively to health-related outcomes.

• Research on the relationship between education and integration in resettlement contexts suggests that education prior to resettlement is a relatively poor predictor of resettlement outcomes. Refugees who resettle as young children are observed to graduate at similar or higher rates when compared to their peers. Those who resettle as older children may face significant challenges in accessing education and graduate at lower rates. Refugees who access tertiary education opportunities in resettlement have relatively high rates of graduation, which in turn is associated with increased rates of employment and income.

This meta study also considered research that examined the social and economic impacts of refugee resettlement on receiving communities. We identified a wide range of studies that focused on themes related to social inclusion. These include public attitudes to refugee and resettlement, poverty, racism and discrimination, the influence of social media, social isolation, and rates of home ownership. In contrast to the other integration dimensions, the vast majority of research related to social inclusion relied on data collected through qualitative methods. Their findings were therefore often highly context-specific and generally precluded meaningful comparison across different sites.

Overall, findings from this meta-study highlight the potential for comparative research to strengthen our understanding of the impact of resettlement on refugee integration. This is particularly important as more countries seek to expand their participation in refugee resettlement, through a research and evidence-based approach. The ability of authorities and communities to better predict and manage the socially and economically complex processes of resettlement and integration can be strengthened through improved research access to program and administrative data and greater harmonization of measures across resettlement contexts. The ability to clearly disaggregate data on refugees and immigrants, to identify those who arrived through resettlement programs, is critical to rendering their unique integration “pathways” more visible.
Introduction

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. Finding solutions that enable refugees to live their lives in dignity and peace is a core part of UNHCR’s work. Durable solutions include voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement.

There are approximately 20.4 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the world, about 1.4 million of whom are deemed to be in need of resettlement. Less than 5% of the refugees identified as in need of resettlement were resettled in 2018 and in 2019. The objective of resettling 70,000 refugees in 2020 was not met, as progress on immediate third country solutions for refugees across all pathways suffered a significant setback owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2021, the global resettlement needs as estimated by UNHCR have slightly increased to 1,445,383 persons, as compared to 2020, when 1,440,408 were estimated to be in need of resettlement, reflecting both protracted and more recent refugee situations in more than 60 countries of asylum.

In 2016, there was a surge in commitment for resettlement and complementary pathways, which was reinforced by the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and evidenced through the highest rate of resettlement departures in almost two decades. The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), which was affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2018, signaled strong commitment from the international community to strengthening solidarity with refugees and the communities hosting them. Recognizing that third-country solutions are tangible tools for solidarity and responsibility sharing, their expansion is one of the four objectives of the GCR.

The Three-Year Strategy (2019-2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways, which followed the GCR, is a key vehicle to increase the number of resettlement spaces, expand the number of resettlement countries, and improve the availability and predictability of complementary pathways for refugees. The Strategy recognizes successful integration as critical to establishing and growing sustainable resettlement programs and to increasing complementary pathways. Galvanizing public support is imperative to achieving and maintaining the expansion of third-country solutions. Data and evidence are needed to evaluate the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of resettlement programs. While protection of those most at risk remains primary, evidence-based approaches are essential to inform advocacy, policy-making and accurate communication to the public with regard to the social and economic contributions of refugees in receiving countries.

As part of the implementation of the Strategy, the Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Service of the Division of International Protection of UNHCR in Geneva contracted the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to undertake a meta study of available evidence related to the impact of government-led resettlement programs across six receiving countries. These countries include Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. Country case studies were selected to include two major resettlement

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countries each from the Americas, Europe and Asia Pacific, respectively. We also selected countries to include those with a strong tradition of research on refugees, including resettlement and integration.

This review covers the observable outcomes of resettled refugees in the receiving countries, including both positive and negative, intended and unintended, and costs and benefits. It addresses the following research questions:

1. What are the integration outcomes of resettled refugees and, in turn, the impacts on receiving societies (social and economic), in six receiving country contexts?
2. How do these impacts differ across the different case studies? What does the available empirical evidence suggest might be driving differences in resettled refugees’ integration outcomes?
3. Where meaningful comparisons are possible, how do resettled refugees’ socio-economic outcomes differ from other migrants and citizens across the six countries?

For the purposes of this study, “government-led resettlement” refers to policies and programs established and implemented by states, for the explicit purpose of advancing protection and durable solutions through resettlement. In most instances, the refugees selected for these programs are identified and referred by UNHCR. However, governments also select candidates for resettlement directly, based on their identified needs for protection. Others may arrive through programs that permit community (or private) sponsorship of refugees abroad or programs that enable family reunification for refugees.

This report was developed through a comprehensive desk-based process to identify and review relevant literature that met the following criteria for inclusion:

- Focus on the impact of government-led resettlement.
- Description or measurement of outcomes related to refugee integration.
- Geographical concern with at least one of the included countries.

Relevant studies were identified primarily through a systematic search of relevant online academic databases. The results of this were supplemented by additional studies identified manually. Our detailed search protocol is attached as Appendix 1. From an initial compilation of more than 1 300 studies, 142 met our criteria for inclusion. Unsurprisingly the majority (79%) of these focused on the three leading resettlement countries, namely the US (47), Australia (35) and Canada (30). Fifty four percent of studies drew on quantitative methods, compared to 39% that relied on qualitative methods and 7% that used mixed methods. It is notable that almost three quarters of the studies identified were published within the last quarter of the last two decades (the period under consideration). This suggests a significant growth in the academic study of refugee resettlement and integration in recent years. More details on the characteristics of the included studies are provided in Appendix 2.

Despite being a major resettlement country (see Figure 1, below) we were surprised to identify very few relevant studies of government-led refugee resettlement in Germany. Numerous (high-quality) studies of refugee integration were excluded, mostly because they did not consider the integration-related effects of resettlement in isolation from asylum—an issue that has exacted particularly strong research and policy interest in Germany in recent years. This underscores the importance of examining the study of resettlement in a broader context of asylum, migration and the institutionalization of government-led resettlement and integration. With this in mind, the section below outlines the major characteristics of the resettlement programs for each of the countries considered here as well as comparative data on asylum claims, before presenting our review of findings in more detail.
Country Case Studies

From 2003 to July 2020, 1,089,664 refugees referred by UNHCR departed for 45 countries. Of these, 88% resettled to the six countries considered here, as shown in Figure 1. These countries include the top four resettlement destinations, namely the United States, Canada, Australia, and Sweden:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country of Resettlement</th>
<th>UNHCR Global Departures (Total Persons)</th>
<th>UNHCR Global Departures (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>667,027</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>129,145</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>94,099</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>37,524</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>31,809</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22,846</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>15,743</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12,566</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>11,463</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11,390</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6,425</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>4,628</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3,535</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Rep. of Korea</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Liechtenstein</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,089,664</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our six country case studies were selected primarily for their strong commitment to resettlement and an expected concentration and availability of high-quality research outputs. Our selection therefore reflects a bias towards wealthy, Western countries with relatively well-developed resettlement programs, and recognizes a need for more research on refugee resettlement in non-Western, middle-income and other “non-traditional” resettlement countries seeking to expand resettlement programming in the future.

The sections below present a short historical summary and description of the resettlement programs for each of the case studies. Despite being shaped in different ways in the aftermath of the Second World War, all are rooted strongly in an obligation to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. More recently, these programs appear to be evolving in ways that not only recognize the importance of ensuring the successful integration of refugees, but also strengthening the communities within which resettlement occurs. In all cases, the programs were characterized by strong government-led support for initial adjustment and early integration, policy innovations in developing and expanding community sponsorship models, and delivery of support through stronger partnerships with local stakeholders.

Australia

Refugees are resettled to Australia through the Department of Home Affairs. The department was established in 2017. Prior to this, refugees were resettled through the former Department of Immigration, established in 1945. Settlement services and programs provided by the Commonwealth Government to newly arrived refugees and migrants have evolved over the post-war period to reflect changing commitments to various policies that pursued the ideals of assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism. Since the 1990s, specific services have been more targeted to high-needs groups of new arrivals. In 2000, the government introduced the Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy (IHSS), which was designed to offer intensive on-arrival assistance to humanitarian entrants. The IHSS was delivered through several programs, which included the Complex Case Support Program (CCS), the Settlement Grants Program (SGP), the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP), Translating and Interpreting Services National (TIS), and the Living in Harmony Program. During the mid-2000s, Australian policies and programs also started to incorporate the promotion of “Australian values” in an attempt to foster greater social cohesion, harmony, and security. Settlement-related services therefore aimed not only to help new arrivals to participate in Australian society, but also to integrate peacefully and harmoniously. These changes were a response to increased global concerns over the link between national security and migration.

Beginning in April 2011, the IHSS was replaced by Humanitarian Settlement Services (HSS), which incorporated the CCS, to identify and respond to needs in a more coordinated basis. The program was delivered through an “integrated case management approach”. Services delivered under HSS included: Case coordination; information and referrals; on-

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arrival reception and assistance; accommodation services; and initial assistance with food and household goods.

Humanitarian entrants to Australia are currently supported through the Humanitarian Settlement Program (HSP), which replaced HSS and the CCS and came into effect on October 2017\(^{11}\). The HSP is delivered by five service providers across 11 contract regions in Australia, on behalf of the government\(^{12}\). These organizations currently include the Australian Red Cross Society, Settlement Services International, Multicultural Australia, Melaleuca Refugee Centre, and AMES Australia. Those who have access to the HSP on arrival include refugees and certain individuals who arrive on a Global Special Humanitarian visa (subclass 202). Most refugees receive support from the HSP for between six and 18 months from arrival. The program assists new arrivals in building skills and knowledge to become active and self-reliant members of the community. The types of support may include:

- Airport reception.
- Short-term accommodation and assistance to find long-term accommodation.
- Initial help with food and other essential items.
- Referrals to services.
- Links to local community groups and activities.
- Help with accessing English language classes, interpreters, employment services, education, and training.
- Addressing immediate health needs.
- Providing instructions for emergencies.

In addition to the above, Specialized and Intensive Services (SIS) are available to refugees and other humanitarian entrants. These services include needs-based support that is available for up to five years post arrival. To be deemed eligible for SIS, refugees must demonstrate that they are unable to engage with appropriate supports and be affected by complex or multiple barriers. These may include: Disability; complex health needs (including mental health); housing instability or homelessness; domestic and family violence; relationship and family breakdowns; concerns around child and youth welfare; financial hardship; social isolation; and legal issues.

In addition to supporting resettled refugees, Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program supports those who seek asylum while in the country (onshore), as well as persons who arrive through the Special Humanitarian Program\(^{13}\). The Special Humanitarian Program assists people who are based outside of Australia and who are facing substantial discrimination that amounts to gross violations of their human rights\(^{14}\). Candidates for this program must be proposed by an Australia-based organization, an Australian citizen or permanent resident, or an eligible New Zealand citizen. Figure 2 below summarizes UNHCR departure figures for Australia by year alongside Australia’s Department of Home Affairs statistics on Humanitarian Program Visa Grants, from 2003 to 2019. The numbers of individuals who claimed asylum over the same period are included for comparison:

Canada

Canada has a long history of accepting those fleeing violence and persecution. The decades following the Second World War witnessed the introduction of Canada’s first Bill of Rights in 1960, which recognized the principle of human rights. The adoption of the Immigration Act of 1976 fulfilled Canada’s legal obligations to refugees and laid the foundations of certain aspects of the current refugee system. The Canadian refugee system comprises two components: The In-Canada Asylum Program, and the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program.

A number of settlement services are offered to all newcomers, including resettled refugees. These include: Language training in French and English; support to find employment; opportunities for forming community networks with established immigrants and long-time Canadians; and access to support services that provide help with childcare, using transport systems, locating interpretation and translation services, finding resources for people with disabilities, and accessing short-term or crisis counselling. Newcomers may also receive support through the Canadian Orientation Abroad program, which is delivered overseas and provides general information about life in Canada.

In addition to being eligible for the services outlined above, resettled refugees receive support through the Resettlement Assistance Program. The Resettlement Assistance Program offers three main pathways for refugees to be resettled to Canada. These include Government-Assisted Refugees, Privately Sponsored Refugees, and Blended Visa Office-Referred refugees. Government-Assisted Refugees (GARs) include refugees who are referred to Canada by either UNHCR or another referral organization. Their initial resettlement is supported entirely by either the Government of Canada or the Province of Quebec. Support is delivered by nongovernmental agencies, called service provider organizations, which are funded by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). GARs are eligible to receive support for up to one year from the date of their arrival in Canada or until they are self-supporting, whichever comes first. The support they receive includes being met at the airport, housing, clothing, food, employment assistance, and other resettlement assistance. The Canadian government also offers an Immigration Loans Program to refugees, to cover the costs of travel to Canada and to meet additional settlement costs, if needed.

Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) are refugees who are supported by private entities in Canada, known as “Sponsorship Agreement Holders” (SAH) or their Constituent Groups. Other groups of volunteers that sponsor refugees include “Community Sponsors” and “Groups of Five”. PSRs are entitled to receive support from their sponsors, including help with food, housing, and clothing, for the duration of the sponsorship period or until they become self-supporting (if this occurs during the sponsorship period). Most sponsorships last one year, but some may receive support for as long as three years.

The Blended Visa Office-Referred (BVOR) Program started relatively recently, in 2013. The program connects refugees who have already been screened and interviewed with private sponsors. BVOR refugees lessen the financial burden on private sponsors by including six months of government financial support and temporary healthcare benefits, until refugees become eligible for provincial or territorial health insurance. In turn, private sponsors are responsible for startup costs, up to six months of financial support, and up to one year of social and emotional support. Arrivals statistics for Canada are summarized in Figure 3 below, which includes statistics on asylum claims, for comparison:

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNHCR Departures</th>
<th>Government Assisted Refugees (GAR)</th>
<th>Privately Sponsored Refugee (PSR)</th>
<th>Blended Visa Office Referred (BVOR)</th>
<th>Asylum Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4 668</td>
<td>7 516</td>
<td>3 252</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31 872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5 279</td>
<td>7 417</td>
<td>3 118</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5 811</td>
<td>7 425</td>
<td>2 976</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19 748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5 218</td>
<td>7 327</td>
<td>3 338</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22 920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5 998</td>
<td>7 572</td>
<td>3 588</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5 663</td>
<td>7 296</td>
<td>3 512</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36 856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6 582</td>
<td>7 429</td>
<td>5 037</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6 706</td>
<td>7 266</td>
<td>4 833</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6 827</td>
<td>7 363</td>
<td>5 584</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4 755</td>
<td>5 426</td>
<td>4 227</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5 113</td>
<td>5 728</td>
<td>6 328</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>10 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7 233</td>
<td>7 626</td>
<td>5 072</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>13 442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>10 236</td>
<td>9 488</td>
<td>9 747</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>16 058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>21 865</td>
<td>23 628</td>
<td>18 642</td>
<td>4 435</td>
<td>23 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>8 912</td>
<td>8 638</td>
<td>16 699</td>
<td>1 285</td>
<td>50 389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>7 704</td>
<td>8 093</td>
<td>18 568</td>
<td>1 149</td>
<td>55 023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>9 031</td>
<td>9 951</td>
<td>19 143</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>64 050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127 601</td>
<td>145 189</td>
<td>133 664</td>
<td>9 003</td>
<td>500 685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: UNHCR Departures, Refugees Admitted as Permanent Residents and Asylum Claims in Canada: 2003-2019

Germany

Following the Second World War, the process of reconstructing the German State confronted a long history of defining national identity narrowly in terms of the principle of *jus sanguinis*, which limited the potential for immigration of all types. Germany’s first legislation relating explicitly to the refugee question came in 1966 and reinforced this principle, by allowing the migration of Eastern Europeans of German descent who were escaping...

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communism. Guest workers of non-German descent remained unable to naturalize. In the 1970s, however, the German government began to grant limited residence permits to refugees on an ad hoc basis. These included Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union, and refugees from Chile and Argentina. In response to the crisis in Southeast Asia, after the Vietnam War, Germany revised its humanitarian policy through the 1980 Quota Refugee Law. This allowed for the expedited entry of refugees from Southeast Asia. The liberalization of German naturalization laws in 1999, which allowed guest workers to obtain citizenship after 15 years of residency, facilitated an emerging discussion on refugee resettlement.

The German resettlement system is aligned closely with the key principles outlined by UNHCR. These include focusing on those most at risk in countries of first asylum, offering a durable solution through resettlement, and advancing international solidarity with countries of first asylum. The resettlement program was established by the Federal Government, in agreement with the Federal States.

As illustrated in Figure 4 below, Germany accepted low numbers of refugees on an ad hoc basis over much of the first decade of the 2000s. Since 2009, the number of refugees resettled shows a significant upward trend. Current resettlement procedures have been carried out in Germany since 2012. Pledges were set at 300 individuals per year from 2012 to 2014 (during a pilot phase) and increased to 500 for 2015, 1,600 for 2016 and 2017, and 2,000 for 2018 and 2019. The official resettlement quota of the German government was 500 per year from 2015, which was increased to 1,600 from the end of 2019. A separate legal basis for resettling refugees directly from countries of first refuge was established in 2015.

In addition to its resettlement program, other programs that have facilitated admission to Germany on humanitarian grounds have included:

- A Humanitarian Admission Program (HAP): Germany has been implementing humanitarian admissions sporadically since 1956. Between 2013 and 2016, the program enabled 20,000 people living in countries neighboring conflict to reside (temporarily) in Germany. Persons concerned were initially given residence permits for two years with the option to renew.
- Admissions Procedure for Afghan Local Staff: This program granted admission on a potentially permanent basis to Germany for up to 2,000 local Afghans who were deemed to be at risk due to their activities undertaken on behalf of the German authorities.
- Several programs implemented by Germany’s Federal Länder that enabled humanitarian admission for extended family members through private sponsorship: Sponsors were generally German and Syrian citizens who had been living in Germany for more than a year, who were seeking to bring relatives of the Syrian nationals into the country. Since 2013, more than 25,000 visa were issued in the framework of the programme.

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36 UNHCR, personal communication.
A humanitarian admission procedure for vulnerable Syrians or stateless individuals in Turkey was initiated in January 2017. Admissions took place as part of the quota of places for resettlement set by Germany for 2016/2017, 2018/2019 as well as 2020. Refugees received through this program were referred via UNHCR to Germany’s Federal Office for selection. The program will continue at least until the end of 2021.

The German government has also been piloting a Community Sponsorship of Refugees Program called NesT (or “New Start in a Team”) since May 2019. The aims of the NesT program explicitly include increasing reception capacity for resettled refugees and involving communities more closely in their reception. NesT will enable the resettlement of up to 500 vulnerable refugees, who will be provided with financial and social support through community sponsorship. In addition to sponsoring their accommodation for two years, sponsors also help refugees to assert their rights, access services, and become part of the local community. Sponsors are comprised of groups of at least five individuals, who constitute a local mentoring group. Mentors are expected to provide refugees with housing for two years after arrival, and to provide support in areas such as completing paperwork, interacting with government departments, opening bank accounts, enrolling children in schools, and forming contacts with sports associations for one year after arrival. Refugee arrival figures for Germany are summarized in Figure 4, below, alongside the number of asylum claims. Data summarized in Figure 4 is indicative of reported statistics on resettlement in Germany. It does not include the full scope of humanitarian admissions, for example under Sections 22-25 of the Residence Act. Data on family reunification were also not included in Figure 4, as we were unable to disaggregate refugees from non-refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNHCR Departures</th>
<th>Private / Community Sponsorship</th>
<th>Admission Procedure for Afghan Local Staff and family members</th>
<th>Asylum Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67 848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42 908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Zealand

New Zealand has resettled over 35,000 refugees since the Second World War. The Refugee and Protection Unit is responsible for promoting the interests of newly arrived refugees in New Zealand. Refugee Resettlement in New Zealand is guided by the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy (NZRRS). This offers a “whole of government” approach to newly-arrived refugees, helping them to integrate and become self-sufficient more quickly. The strategy focuses on five principal integration outcomes. These include self-sufficiency, housing, education, health and well-being, and participation. There are currently three government-led pathways for refugees to resettle to New Zealand:

- The Refugee Quota Program (RQP).
- The Refugee Family Support Category.
- The Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship Category (CORS).

The New Zealand government first established a formal annual quota for refugee resettlement in 1987. The Refugee Quota Program is a unit within Refugee and Migrant Services, which is part of Immigration New Zealand (INZ). Immigration New Zealand is located within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. The quota is determined in three-year cycles through agreement between the Minister of Immigration and Minister of Foreign Affairs. All refugees resettled through this program (except for nuclear and dependent family members of the principal applicant) are referred by UNHCR. Individuals who arrive through the Refugee Quota Program are granted permanent residence. Their first six weeks in New Zealand are spent at the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre (MRRC). This facility is managed by INZ in partnership with other

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46 UNHCR, personal communication.
47 According to UNHCR (personal communication) more than 25,000 private or community sponsorship visas were issued by 2020, suggesting these statistics represent an undercount. The program is ongoing in five Länder (Berlin, Brandenburg, Thuringia, Hamburg and Schleswig Holstein), with plans for the program to resume in Bremen in 2021.
government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, who help to run the six-week reception program. The main focus areas of the program include: Settlement planning; orientation and employment assessment for working-age individuals; health and mental health assessments, initial treatment and health promotion; and education, including preparing children to join the New Zealand classroom and English language training. Following the completion of this program, refugees are settled across eight regions throughout New Zealand. Quota refugees are then eligible for up to 12 months of settlement support. This includes a community orientation program and support to connect with local services that they may require. From July 2020, the annual refugee quota was increased to 1 500 places under the Refugee Quota Increase Program (RQIP)\textsuperscript{51}. Other projects developed under this program include: Improving approaches to community engagement; tackling refugees’ access to housing; the preparation of new settlement locations; and a new model for health screening, assessment and management.

The Refugee Family Support Category offers a limited number of places each year (currently 300) for eligible refugees who are residents in New Zealand to sponsor family members to join them\textsuperscript{52}. Sponsors register their application with New Zealand Immigration. Once their application is selected, family members may apply for New Zealand residence within 12 months. The initial visa is normally valid for two years following arrival, after which program participants may apply for a Permanent Resident Visa. The sponsor is responsible for ensuring reasonable accommodation for the first two years following arrival.

Finally, refugees may also be admitted to New Zealand under the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship Category (CORS). This is a new initiative that allows community organizations based in New Zealand to sponsor refugees for resettlement. As part of the initial pilot, 24 refugees were resettled to New Zealand by four approved community organization sponsors in 2018. The pilot will be extended for three years from 1\textsuperscript{st} July 2021 until 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2024, enabling up to fifty sponsored refugees to be resettled per annum. Arrivals from 2003 for New Zealand are summarized in Figure 5 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNHCR departures\textsuperscript{53}</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Refugee Quota arrivals\textsuperscript{54}</th>
<th>Refugee Family Support Category\textsuperscript{55}</th>
<th>Asylum Claims\textsuperscript{56}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>2015-16</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
<td>1 017</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
<td>1 020</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sweden

Sweden has been resettling refugees since 1950. The number of refugees accepted each year is determined by the Government and Parliament of Sweden. In 2019 and 2020, the number of quota refugees was set at 5,000.

Refugee resettlement is undertaken by the Swedish Migration Agency, which works with several partners to implement the program. This includes UNHCR, which refers cases for resettlement to the Swedish Migration Agency and helps with arrangements related to selection missions. Swedish embassies also play an important role in refugee resettlement, by issuing exit permits or emergency travel documents. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) organizes refugees’ travel to Sweden, and municipalities across the country play an important role in receiving and integrating newly arrived refugees.

Two categories of people in need of protection may receive a residence permit in Sweden, in accordance with the Aliens Act. These are individuals who meet the criteria specified in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection, who also face serious risks of harm. Decisions to admit persons through the resettlement program are made on the basis of the files provided by UNHCR and interviews conducted by Swedish Migration Agency officials. About 95% of cases considered receive residence permits.

Prior to departure, refugees receive written information about Sweden. Previously, individuals were able to learn about Sweden through the Cultural Orientation Program. Until recently, the full orientation program was delivered following selection interviews. However, the Swedish Migration Agency is now exploring alternative models of preparatory programs for those selected for resettlement.

The Swedish Migration Agency arranges refugees’ transfer to Sweden after they have received a permit and accommodation in a municipality. This is supported by UNHCR and the IOM, who make the necessary arrangements for refugees to leave the country of asylum. Refugees travelling to Sweden are generally accompanied by staff from the Swedish Migration Agency or the IOM. Upon arrival, refugees are met by the representatives of the municipality that agreed to receive them. After this, the municipality works closely with the Swedish Public Employment Service, as well as other partners that will support the newly arrived refugees.

During their first two years in Sweden, individuals who are granted asylum receive financial support from the state, provided that they follow their establishment plan made with the

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59 Migrationsverket, Swedish Migration Agency, This is How Resettlement Works, 9 March 2020, https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Our-mission/The-Swedish-resettlement-programme/This-is-how-resettlement-works.html
Swedish Public Employment Service\(^{61}\). They also receive Swedish language instruction, help with finding employment and supporting themselves, and public service information. Statistics on quota refugees, refugee family reunification and asylum claims are summarized in Figure 6 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNHCR Departures(^{62})</th>
<th>Quota Refugees(^{63})</th>
<th>Refugee Family Reunification(^{64})</th>
<th>Asylum Claims(^{65})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>4 763</td>
<td>31 355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1 645</td>
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<td>3 085</td>
<td>23 161</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1 190</td>
<td>1 263</td>
<td>2 004</td>
<td>17 530</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>1 571</td>
<td>1 626</td>
<td>3 799</td>
<td>24 322</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>1 772</td>
<td>1 845</td>
<td>7 691</td>
<td>36 207</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>1 558</td>
<td>2 209</td>
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<td>24 353</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1 880</td>
<td>1 936</td>
<td>9 297</td>
<td>24 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1 789</td>
<td>1 804</td>
<td>3 166</td>
<td>31 819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1 896</td>
<td>1 896</td>
<td>3 037</td>
<td>29 648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1 483</td>
<td>1 853</td>
<td>7 897</td>
<td>43 887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1 832</td>
<td>2 187</td>
<td>10 673</td>
<td>54 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1 812</td>
<td>1 971</td>
<td>13 100</td>
<td>81 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1 808</td>
<td>1 880</td>
<td>16 251</td>
<td>162 877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
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<td>1 889</td>
<td>15 149</td>
<td>28 939</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3 346</td>
<td>4 846</td>
<td>19 124</td>
<td>25 666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>4 871</td>
<td>5 217</td>
<td>16 627</td>
<td>21 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
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<td>7 350</td>
<td>21 958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 187</td>
<td>40 439</td>
<td>153 678</td>
<td>682 978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: UNHCR Departures, Refugee Arrivals and Asylum Claims in Sweden 2003-2019

United States

In the wake of the Second World War, the United States passed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948\(^{66}\). This was intended to address the migrant crisis in Europe, where millions had been displaced from their homes and could not return. The US had resettled over 400 000 persons under the Act by 1952. Over the decades that followed, the US continued resettling refugees through various legislative acts. These included the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the Fair Share Refugee Act of 1960. The US also used the parole authority of the


\(^{65}\) Migrationsverket, Applications for Asylum Received 2000-2019, [https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.4a5a58d51602d141cf41038/1580829734962/Application%20for%20asylum%20received%202000-2019.pdf](https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.4a5a58d51602d141cf41038/1580829734962/Application%20for%20asylum%20received%202000-2019.pdf)

Attorney General to accept over 38,000 Hungarians starting in 1956, and more than 1 million Indochinese starting in 1975. The Refugee Act of 1980 finally established a permanent formal refugee and asylum program, which has continued to guide policy and practice into the present context.

Most notably, the Act provides for an annual refugee admissions ceiling, which is established by the President in consultation with Congress. The US Refugee Admissions Program outlines the process for identifying individuals and prioritizing groups that are of interest to the United States and eligible to be considered for resettlement. These include:

- **Priority One (P1)** – individuals referred to the US by UNHCR, certain nongovernmental organizations, or a US Embassy.
- **Priority Two (P2)** – Groups of special humanitarian concern.
- **Priority Three (P3)** – Family reunification cases.

Before travelling to the United States, all applicants are pre-screened by a Resettlement Support Center, interviewed by a US Citizenship and Immigration Services officer, and are subject to multiple security checks and medical screenings. The IOM makes arrangements for the refugees’ travel, through a travel loan program67.

Applicants who complete the screening process successfully are assigned to one of nine national Resettlement Agencies, which are contracted by the State Department to assist with housing, employment and other services on arrival68. Initial services are delivered during refugees’ first 30 to 90 days in the US, through the Resettlement and Placement program (R&P). Once in the United States, refugees may also be eligible for suite of government support funded by the Office for Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Department of Health and Human Services. ORR works directly through states as well as nongovernmental organizations to provide refugees with a range of additional resources and services69. This may include short-term employment, language and social services, limited financial and medical support, and longer-term integration services.

The US Congress enacted legislation in 2008 and 2009 that provided Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to selected Afghans and Iraqis who were employed by or on behalf of the US government70. Afghan and Iraqi SIVs arrive to the United States outside of the annual refugee admissions cap and are not referred by UNHCR. For up to eight months after their arrival, recipients of SIVs are eligible for the same entitlement programs, resettlement assistance, and other benefits as refugees admitted as part of the US Refugee Admissions Program. Arrivals data for refugees, SIVs and asylum-seekers are summarized in Figure 7 below.

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67 International Organization for Migration, United States of America, Refugee Travel Loans, February 2016, [https://www.iom.int/countries/united-states-america#rtl](https://www.iom.int/countries/united-states-america#rtl)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNHCR Departures</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Refugee Arrivals</th>
<th>SIV Arrivals</th>
<th>Asylum Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>13 987</td>
<td>FY 03</td>
<td>28 403</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 09 004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>28 253</td>
<td>FY 04</td>
<td>52 873</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44 985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23 289</td>
<td>FY 05</td>
<td>53 813</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14 382</td>
<td>FY 06</td>
<td>41 223</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41 073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>32 007</td>
<td>FY 07</td>
<td>48 282</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40 417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>48 833</td>
<td>FY 08</td>
<td>60 191</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>62 011</td>
<td>FY 09</td>
<td>74 654</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38 055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>54 077</td>
<td>FY 10</td>
<td>73 311</td>
<td>2 108</td>
<td>42 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>43 215</td>
<td>FY 11</td>
<td>56 424</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>60 561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>53 053</td>
<td>FY 12</td>
<td>58 238</td>
<td>3 312</td>
<td>66 075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>47 750</td>
<td>FY 13</td>
<td>69 926</td>
<td>1 902</td>
<td>68 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>48 911</td>
<td>FY 14</td>
<td>69 987</td>
<td>10 240</td>
<td>96 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>52 583</td>
<td>FY 15</td>
<td>69 933</td>
<td>7 226</td>
<td>135 971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>78 761</td>
<td>FY 16</td>
<td>84 994</td>
<td>12 269</td>
<td>204 786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>24 559</td>
<td>FY 17</td>
<td>53 716</td>
<td>19 321</td>
<td>262 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>17 112</td>
<td>FY 18</td>
<td>22 517</td>
<td>10 230</td>
<td>205 887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>21 159</td>
<td>FY 19</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>7 593</td>
<td>256 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>663 942</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>948 485</td>
<td>74 920</td>
<td>2 095 169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: UNHCR Departures, Refugee, SIV and Asylum Claims in the US: 2003-2019

**Refugee Resettlement and Asylum Claims**

Data summarized in Figure 8 below considers the cumulative total of refugees resettled between 2003 and 2019 though UNHCR referrals (“UNHCR Departures”). Using World Bank population estimates for 2019 we are able to compare the per capita impact of resettlement for each of the five countries, for the time period under consideration. We did not include data for New Zealand as we were unable to identify a complete data set for the time period under consideration. Data on total asylum claims are also provided, for comparative purposes. These are indicative and reflect the limitations and concerns over completeness and accuracy, mentioned above. To ensure data consistency, we limited our variables to UNHCR departures and the best available statistics on asylum claims.

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72 Refugee Processing Center, Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS), Refugee Admissions by Region since 1975, 30 September 2020, [https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20by%20Region%20since%201975%20as%20of%202020.pdf](https://www.wrapsnet.org/documents/Refugee%20Admissions%20by%20Region%20since%201975%20as%20of%202020.pdf)

73 Refugee Processing Center, Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS), SIV Arrivals by Nationality, [https://www.wrapsnet.org/archives/](https://www.wrapsnet.org/archives/)

74 Asylum Applications, United States of America. UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, data extracted February 2020, [https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=E1ZxP4](https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=E1ZxP4). These data comprise affirmative asylum claims filed before the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) as well as defensive claims filed before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)/immigration court. Statistics are presented by calendar year. USCIS numbers are derived from data reported by case size rather than individual persons.

75 A comparable data set for New Zealand was not available.
## Synthesis of Findings

Refugee integration in its broadest sense may be defined as the “gradual inclusion of refugees, asylum seekers and other refugee-related groups in the host country.”\(^{78}\) Integration is a complex process that reflects the dynamic interaction between several social, economic, cultural, and political factors. There have been numerous attempts to conceptualize and theorize this process and to develop more standardized indicators to measure achievements in this area.\(^{79}\) There have also been recent calls to develop more

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**Table: Demographic Impact of UNHCR Departures and Asylum Claims: 2003-2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>UNHCR Departures</th>
<th>Asylum Claims</th>
<th>Est. Pop. (2019)</th>
<th>UNHCR Departures per capita</th>
<th>Asylum Claims per capita</th>
<th>Resettlement/Asylum Claim ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>93 142</td>
<td>202 945</td>
<td>25 364 310</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>127 601</td>
<td>500 685</td>
<td>37 589 260</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21 733</td>
<td>2 588 475</td>
<td>83 132 800</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>3.11%</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>36 187</td>
<td>682 978</td>
<td>10 285 450</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>663 943</td>
<td>2 095 169</td>
<td>328 239 520</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 shows that whereas the US may have resettled the highest number of UNHCR departures between 2003 and 2019, the per capita impact of this is notably lower than for Australia, Canada, and Sweden. Germany reflected the lowest per capita impact of resettlement, but alongside a relatively high per capita impact of asylum claims. Germany and Sweden were both characterized by relatively low ratios of resettlement-to-asylum claims, especially when compared to the US and Australia. Although not included in Figure 8, it is notable that the combined total of UNHCR departures and asylum claims amounted to 7% of the total estimated population for Sweden. This is markedly higher than similar totals for Germany (3.1%), Canada (1.7%), Australia (1.2%) and the US (0.6%).

It is important to keep in mind that the data summarized in Figure 8 does not include the total number of refugees resettled—a figure that is calculated differently by each country. Furthermore, it does not consider the decisions of asylum claims and the associated outcomes and consequences for claimants. These data should therefore be regarded as indicative of selective arrival trends since 2003, rather than as definitive measures of the demographic impact of refugees. For the purposes of this report, however, they offer relevant insight into how the historical and demographic dynamics of asylum and resettlement may intersect, to have important effect on the study of government-led resettlement. This includes shaping possibilities for research designs, methods and outcome measures related to integration, as well as research arising from policy priorities and public concerns.\(^{77}\) The following section expands on this discussion, to explore how the impacts of the integration outcomes of resettled refugees have been researched across the six country case studies.

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comparative approaches to the study of refugee integration and the effectiveness of resettlement programs. To measure and assess broad integration outcomes, UNHCR has focused on four broad “dimensions” of refugee integration. These include the legal, economic, social and cultural, civil, and political dimensions. The Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS) has recently expanded and developed these dimensions to consider integration under the following inter-related themes:

- Legal rights.
- Civil rights.
- Demography and migration.
- Economic.
- Health.
- Education.
- Social Inclusion.

Our synthesis of findings is organized and presented broadly in terms of these topic areas, paying specific attention to the levels of indicators suggested to measure the satisfaction of immediate and ongoing needs as well as progress over the longer term. As these dimensions and indicators are designed to capture the experiences of refugees and internally displaced persons under a wide range of circumstances, not all are applicable to resettlement contexts. For example, the legal dimension focuses on the recognition of refugee status and the legal basis for staying in-country. For the countries considered here, recognition of status and legal settlement is a defining principle or starting point of refugee resettlement. The legal rights of refugees are strengthened considerably through obtaining permanent resident status. In the United States, for example, more than 80% resettled refugees apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status within the first few years of becoming eligible. We did not identify any relevant resettlement-specific studies that addressed this dimension for the period under consideration. However, tensions between the respective levels of protection afforded by permanent residence and citizenship, which may arise in contexts where strict language or knowledge requirements are imposed as a condition for receiving citizenship, may encourage more research on the legal dimensions of resettlement in the future.

Civil Rights

The civil dimension of refugee integration in resettlement contexts is shaped strongly by the practices and possibilities of citizenship. Citizenship solidifies many important rights secured through resettlement, such as access to the labor market, rights to own property, rights to freedom of movement, eligibility for state benefits, and access to justice. Furthermore, citizenship represents an important measure of social inclusion, participation in decision making in society and the enjoyment of the unique forms of protection afforded to citizens by

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the State. Rates of naturalization for resettled refugees are therefore an important indicator of integration in refugee resettlement situations.

Findings from the United States suggest that resettled refugees naturalize faster and at a higher rate than other legal permanent residents. Comparative data from two US studies on differences in naturalization rates between refugees and other immigrants are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resettled Refugees</th>
<th>Non-Refugee Immigrants</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Analysis of census data that considered 2.3 million (likely) refugees who arrived in the US after 1975 and who had been living in the US for between 16 and 25 years</td>
<td>New American Economy, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>Naturalization rates at six years post arrival for the 2000 to 2010 arrival cohort, adjusted for differences in eligibility</td>
<td>Mossaad et al., 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different rates reflected in these two studies can be accounted for partly by different study timeframes. They both, however, point to higher rates of naturalization for refugees. Using linked administrative data, Mossaad et al. notes that, of the full population of refugees who resettled to the United States between 2000 and 2010, 66% obtained citizenship by 2015.

Similarly, high rates of naturalization are also observed among resettled refugees and protected persons in Canada, compared to other immigrant categories. A recent evaluation of Canada’s citizenship program examined all permanent residents admitted between 2005 and 2015, and showed that a higher proportion of refugees and protected persons received citizenship, compared to other immigrant categories. These findings are summarized in Figure 10, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration Category</th>
<th>Percentage of Immigrant Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Naturalized Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Immigration</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored Family Immigration</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled Refugees &amp; Protected Persons</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Immigration</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10 shows that whilst refugees and protected persons comprised approximately 10% of Canada’s total immigrant population (for those granted permanent residence between 2005 and 2015) they represent 12% of those who naturalized. This suggests that refugees in Canada may naturalize at a higher rate than other immigrant groups.

In the US, naturalization was conditioned by several background characteristics. Being female, being highly educated, and time since arrival were associated with increased likelihood of naturalizing. Female refugees were about eight percentage points more likely to

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85 “Determinants of Refugee Naturalization in the United States.”


87 Mossaad et al., “Determinants of Refugee Naturalization in the United States.”
naturalize than male refugees. Refugees who had been in the United States for between 13 and 15 years were about 26 percentage points more likely to naturalize than those who had been in the country for five years. Nearly half of the refugees who naturalized did so within one year of becoming eligible. The same study observed significant heterogeneity across resettlement locations as well as nationalities of origin. After controlling for other characteristics, it found that there was a 36 percentage point difference between those counties in the US with the highest rates for naturalization and those with the lowest.

Country of origin also predicted the likelihood of naturalization. Refugees from countries that were least likely to naturalize included Myanmar, Ukraine, Liberia, and Vietnam, whereas those with the highest probability of naturalizing originated from Iraq, Somalia, and Iran. The researchers conclude by recommending more targeted support for naturalization programs and more targeted placement of refugees in locations that would increase their likelihood of naturalizing.

In Canada, refugees may face barriers to naturalization that are related to costs and language requirements. For example, the majority of waiver decisions that are granted for citizenship application fees, and language and knowledge requirements, are issued to refugees. A recent study of Syrian refugees resettled to Canada has criticized the practice of linking civic education initiatives with language courses, arguing that a civic education course delivered in Arabic (in this case) would be more effective than when delivered in French or English.

Naturalization may have a strong effect on other dimensions of refugee integration. A 2012 study from Sweden suggests that refugees experience significant employment gains from acquiring citizenship. This effect was not observed within family class immigrants. In Canada a comparison of approximately 7,000 naturalized citizens, suggests that refugees may associate naturalization more strongly with a sense of belonging, volunteering, and group participation and membership, compared to other immigrants. These differences are summarized in Figure 11 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration measure</th>
<th>Resettled refugees and protected persons</th>
<th>Economic Immigrants</th>
<th>Family Sponsored Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group membership</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Naturalization and Selected Measures of Integration in Canada (Source: IRCC 2020)

Such findings suggest that the impact of naturalization extends beyond the formal rights associated with citizenship and may also strengthen shared values and social practices that lead to improved integration outcomes across other dimensions. In New Zealand, 90% of refugees naturalize within the first decade following resettlement. We did not identify any specific studies that examined the relationship between citizenship and the integration of resettled refugees in Australia and Germany. In Germany, this may be partly related to the availability of data. The statistics on naturalization for Germany do not differentiate between residence and protection status. However, country of origin information suggests that
naturalization rates for beneficiaries of international protection in general may be relatively low\textsuperscript{93}.

**Demography and Migration**

Refugees who resettle to countries where they have no existing social or family ties are typically placed in locations selected by government authorities. Decisions around placement may be highly considered, to ensure that arriving refugees have access to employment, housing, education and other services that they may need. Refugee placement policies and practices may also seek to ensure that the responsibilities to support refugee integration are shared across multiple locations. Additionally, such practices may reflect deliberate policies of dispersal of refugee and immigrant communities, in an effort to limit the development of "ethnic enclaves"\textsuperscript{94}. The prospect of refugees engaging in "secondary migration", by relocating from their initial destination soon after arrival, inevitably concerns over the effectiveness of refugee placement and settlement policies in resettlement contexts.

Several studies from Canada\textsuperscript{95}, Sweden\textsuperscript{96} and the United States\textsuperscript{97} have explored the effects of the secondary migration of resettled refugees from initial resettlement locations. An early study in Canada examined, qualitatively, why government-assisted refugees in Ontario engaged in seemingly higher rates of secondary migration compared to other refugee categories\textsuperscript{98}. Within this small study sample of secondary migrants (n=47), 40% stayed in their assigned destination for between two weeks and one year, 30% stayed less than two weeks, and approximately 25% changed resettlement destination immediately upon arrival in Canada. The study identified several reasons for the apparent mismatch between refugee-preferred and actual destinations. In some instances, refugee participants admitted that they were reluctant to express preferred destinations during resettlement interviews, out of fear that this might jeopardize their chances of being selected. Others did not know exactly where friends and family were located in Canada before they were resettled. Some relied on informal social and information networks in the lead up to their resettlement to decide where they wanted to settle but did not articulate these preferences to officials. Officials who were interviewed felt that some nationality groups that were "harder to resettle" tended to migrate in search of their ethnic communities. It should be borne in mind that the

\textsuperscript{93} Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Naturalization – Germany, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/content-international-protection/status-and-residence/naturalisation
\textsuperscript{98} Simich, Beiser, and Mawani, “Paved with Good Intentions.”
findings from this early study do not necessarily reflect current practices in Canada or recent improvements in refugee placement strategies.

Recent findings from the analysis of administrative data in Canada\textsuperscript{99}, which are broadly consistent with earlier observations from Sweden\textsuperscript{100}, suggest that policies of dispersal of resettled refugees do not induce secondary migration \textit{per se}. This study considered the propensity for resettled refugees to leave their destinations, compared to economic migrants\textsuperscript{101}. Examining detailed data from an extensive arrival cohort (2000-2014), it showed that refugees were only slightly more likely than economic migrants to engage in secondary migration during the first decade following their arrival. This difference could be explained partially by the fact that refugees tended to settle initially in smaller cities, when compared to economic immigrants. For privately sponsored refugees (PSRs) the difference was fully explained by the increased likelihood of PSRs settling initially in “non-gateway” cities, characterized by a stagnant economy and the absence of an immigrant community. When compositional, contextual, human capital and other demographic characteristics were controlled for, only government-assisted refugees were more likely than economic migrants to leave their initial destination. This led the study to conclude that unobserved (pre- and post-arrival) characteristics of GARs could account for this difference.

The same study was able to show further that in the aftermath of recent unemployment, GARs were as likely to migrate as economic migrants\textsuperscript{102}. Significantly, this propensity was not observed amongst PSRs to the same degree, suggesting that they remained more satisfied with their lives in their new communities, even under conditions of economic stress. Such findings led the study to conclude that: “…the effects of government [placement] allocation can be enhanced by contextual considerations such as local ethnic enclaves, religious communities, non-governmental organizations family networks and regional economy/labour markets”\textsuperscript{103}.

A longitudinal study of privately sponsored Syrian refugees resettled in Canada from 2015 offers additional insight into the links between such “contextual considerations” and access to employment and housing\textsuperscript{104}. Survey data collected from 626 Syrian refugees in Montreal suggests that belonging strengthened over time, and that few individuals remained socially isolated. The strongest form of social capital was bonding capital, as individuals connected through families, friendships, and religious activities. Findings also suggest that, on the basis of strengthening bonding capital, participants were also successfully beginning to establish stronger forms of bridging capital.

Data from the US also appears to suggest that resettled refugees may be more likely to move from their initial destinations compared to other immigrants\textsuperscript{105}. Analysis of combined administrative data that considered individual-level data for all refugees resettled to the US between 2000 and 2014 suggests that 17\% relocated to another state within two years of arrival. This was substantially higher than for non-citizens in general, where only 3.4\% reported moving to a new state within the previous year. Refugees who arrived in the US without existing social (of family) ties were 10 percentage points more likely to leave the


\textsuperscript{100} Åslund, “Immigrant Settlement Policies and Subsequent Migration.”

\textsuperscript{101} Kaida, Hou, and Stick, “Are Refugees More Likely to Leave Initial Destinations than Economic Immigrants?,” 2020.

\textsuperscript{102} Kaida, Hou, and Stick.

\textsuperscript{103} Kaida, Hou, and Stick, “Are Refugees More Likely to Leave Initial Destinations than Economic Immigrants?,” July 2020, 12.


\textsuperscript{105} Mossaad et al., “In Search of Opportunity and Community.”
state that they were resettled to, compared to those with US ties. However, the baseline rate of secondary migration was still relatively high (12%) for refugees who were resettled in close proximity to their US ties, compared to economic immigrants.

Whilst the data from Canada, Sweden and the US suggests that rates of secondary migration may be higher for resettled refugees when compared to economic migrants, the motivations and effects of this are not clear and represent a potentially fruitful area of future study. Anecdotal findings and case studies suggest that secondary migration is motivated by a range of individual and contextual factors. For example, a recent study of the migration histories of refugees who moved to the “meatpacking town” of Greely, Colorado illustrates the local social and economic complexity of the motivations, expectations and consequences of secondary migration. A survey of 92 refugees revealed that 85 (92%) had moved to Greely within five years of arriving to the United States, with almost half (43) moving within a year of arrival. Many forfeited welfare benefits when making the move, and about 56% of the sample stated that they moved to Greely specifically to work in the meatpacking industry. Of these, only 57 were employed at the time of the interview. The remaining 44% cited the benefits of the low cost of living in places like Greely, being close to family and friends, the weather, and the small-town “feel”.

Economic

Successful access to the labor market is critical to the economic integration of refugees. The literature suggests that newly arrived refugees, which include mostly asylum seekers, initially reflect low rates of employment and income when compared to other migrants and non-migrant citizens. The employment and income gap decreases significantly over time, but the extent to which refugees reach parity with other immigrant groups and non-immigrant citizens varies across contexts. Such variation is summarized well in a recent overview of the labor market integration of refugees in 10 high-income countries. Relevant findings from this study are summarized in Figure 12, Figure 13 and Figure 14 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Two Years Post Arrival</th>
<th>10 Years Post Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee Employment</td>
<td>Gap to Immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12: Refugee Employment Rates for Selected Countries, Compared to Immigrants and Natives, Two Years and 10 Years Post Arrival (from Brell et al. 2020)

Figure 12 compares the differences in employment rates between refugees, other immigrants, and natives two years and 10 years after arrival. The study did not consider New Zealand, and includes only partial data for Australia and Germany. This summary shows how, after two years, refugees are still employed at lower rates than other immigrants and natives. However, data for Canada, Sweden, and the United States shows that refugee employment improves significantly 10 years after arrival, and that the gap narrows

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106 Nelson and Marston, “Refugee Migration Histories in a Meatpacking Town.”
considerably. The United States was somewhat exceptional, insofar as the employment gap between refugees and other immigrants was almost closed after just two years, and refugees were employed at a higher rate than natives after 10 years. Figure 13 below illustrates the increasing rate of employment among refugees in further detail, by comparing employment growth rates from zero to five years and from five to 10 years. Overall, employment growth rates were substantially higher for refugees during both time periods, compared to other immigrant groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Zero to five years Post Arrival</th>
<th>Five to 10 Years Post Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Other Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13: Refugee Employment Growth Rates for Selected Countries, Compared to Other Immigrants, Zero to Five Years and Five to 10 Years Post Arrival (from Brell et al. 2020)

Whilst differences in rates of employment between refugees, other comparable migrants, and natives approach closure over time, an associated “wage gap” still appears to persist beyond 10 years. Figure 14 below summarizes the ratios of refugee wages to native wages, and of refugee wages to other immigrant categories’ wages. This data suggests that 10 years after arrival, refugee wages were still between 54% (United States) and 75% (Sweden) of native wages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Two Years Post Arrival</th>
<th>10 Years Post Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee to Native</td>
<td>Refugee to Other Immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14: Refugee Wages Compared to Other Migrants, Two Years and 10 Years Post Arrival (from Brell et al. 2020)

The review from which these figures are drawn considers refugees broadly and does not consider resettled refugees independently from those granted asylum. Studies that are able to disaggregate the “refugee” category in this way suggest that employment levels and incomes for resettled refugees may differ significantly from those granted asylum, particularly over the short term. Such observations raise questions about the fiscal impacts of refugee resettlement specifically and its effects on local labor markets. Observations of differences in outcomes across the countries considered here highlight further the effects of background characteristics, as well as local socio-economic and policy environments. The remainder of this section focuses on refugees who arrived through government-led resettlement.

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109 Brell, Dustmann, and Preston.
110 Brell, Dustmann, and Preston.
Rates of employment for resettled refugees generally start off very low but improve over time. This trend was observed consistently across the US, Sweden, Canada, and Australia. In Australia, data from the first three waves of the Building a New Life in Australia (BNLA) survey suggested that refugee employment improved from 7% at six months post arrival to 18% at one year post arrival, and 24% after two years in the country. Of those who were still unemployed two years after arrival, 33% were looking for paid work, compared to 18% at six months after arrival and 28% one year after arrival. Other studies suggest that five years after arriving in Australia, between 35% and 45% of refugees were employed.

(References)
In Canada, resettled refugees are observed to face barriers to accessing the employment market. Fuller and Martin show that refugees were 1.75 times more likely to experience delayed labor market entry compared to other immigrants\textsuperscript{118}. However, several studies report high levels of employment over the longer term\textsuperscript{119}. Lu and Frenette compared long-term labor market outcomes and reliance on social assistance among refugee claimants (asylum), Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) and Government-Assisted Refugees (GARs)\textsuperscript{120}. Refugee claimants were divided between those who received permanent residence (RC-PR) and those who did not (RC-NPR). Focusing on the 2003 arrivals cohort, the study estimated the changes in rates of employment over the 13 years that followed arrival. Differences in employment rates between 2003 and 2016 are summarized below in Figure 15:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee claimants - Permanent Residents (RC-PR)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>82.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee claimants - Non-Permanent residents (RC-NPR)</td>
<td>49.30%</td>
<td>approx. 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-Assisted Refugees (GARs)</td>
<td>46.70%</td>
<td>72.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs)</td>
<td>81.60%</td>
<td>approx. 80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 15: Refugee Categories in Canada and Employment: 2003 & 2016*

The study shows that whilst RC-PRs were less likely to be employed initially, their economic situation improved at a faster rate. After four years, their rates of employment and reliance on social assistance were similar to PSRs. This trend persisted over the remaining study period. Employment levels among GARs improved over time, but did not reach the levels of PSRs and RC-PRs. RC-NPRs reported the lowest outcomes. In 2016, the rate of “core-aged employment” rate in Canada, which includes those aged between 25 and 54, was 81.4% \textsuperscript{121}

Research from Sweden compared the employment outcomes of resettled refugees, asylum claimants, and family reunification (“relatives”) for arrivals prior to 2007\textsuperscript{122}. The findings highlight important differences in rates of employment, based on male and females aged 24-64 years. These differences are summarized in Figure 16 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled Refugees</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunification</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Claimants</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 16: Comparative Employment Rates (%) among Refugees in Sweden: 2007*

Overall, the study shows that the employment rates for all categories of refugees was substantially lower than the overall population (“Sweden”), for both men and women. It also

\textsuperscript{118} Fuller and Martin, “Predicting Immigrant Employment Sequences in the First Years of Settlement.”
\textsuperscript{120} Lu and Frenette, “The Long-Term Labour Market Integration of Refugee Claimants Who Became Permanent Residents in Canada.”
\textsuperscript{122} Bevelander, “The Employment Integration of Resettled Refugees, Asylum Claimants, and Family Reunion Migrants in Sweden.”
shows that resettled refugees had the lowest rates of employment compared to asylum seekers and family reunification. Importantly, there was some variation in this finding across different nationalities of origin and the differences in employment rates between the three refugee categories reduced over time. This suggests that resettled refugees “caught up” with the other two refugee groups. Employment rates were similar for both men and women across the three categories at 16 and 20 years post arrival. Regression analysis confirmed that admissions category had a strong effect on the probability of employment.\(^{123}\)

**Gender and Labor Market Access**

Several studies noted that females reflected lower employment rates and earnings compared to males.\(^{124}\)

Vijaya compared employment and earnings of refugee women who resettled to the United States between 2002 and 2016 with native-born and other immigrant women.\(^{125}\) Her results suggest that, over time, the labor force participation rates of refugee women surpass those of native-born and other immigrant women, when individual characteristics like education, English proficiency and home country labor force participation are controlled for. Such findings contribute to an emerging awareness that challenges assumptions about traditional gender roles and labor market participation in refugee resettlement communities. Vijaya’s study suggests that refugee women show increasing participation in the labor market over time and points to a strong potential for refugee women to contribute economically, especially over the longer term.\(^{126}\) Despite observing higher-than-expected labor participation rates, the study also points out that refugee women experience particular barriers and disadvantages. Compared to other immigrant women, refugees faced higher threats of unemployment and their wages tended to be lower. These observations support other findings that suggest that refugee women experience specific structural inequalities in the labor market.\(^{127}\)

Qualitative findings on the employment and entrepreneurial experiences of Syrian refugees in Canada suggest that the absence of family support networks, low language proficiency, and lack of prior work experience may increase barriers to employment access for resettled refugee women.\(^{128}\)

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\(^{123}\) Bevelander.


\(^{125}\) Vijaya, “Comparing Labor Market Trajectories of Refugee Women to Other Immigrant and Native-Born Women in the United States.”

\(^{126}\) Vijaya, 26.


The Effects of Education on Labor Market Access

Several studies note that the nationality of origin of resettled refugees may be strongly associated with differences in labor market access. This suggests the importance of pre-resettlement experiences in shaping the economic integration of resettled refugees. Several studies consider the role that pre-resettlement experiences, including education, language, and other types of human capital, play in affecting employment and income.

Data from Canada shows that there may be considerable differences in the educational characteristics of resettled refugees (Government-Assisted and Privately-Sponsored) and those who have obtained permanent residence through asylum (Refugee Claimants). To illustrate this point, the differences in education of individuals who either landed or submitted a refugee claim in 2003 is summarized in Figure 17, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Refugee Claimants (Asylum)</th>
<th>Government-Assisted Refugees</th>
<th>Privately Sponsored Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No post-secondary - zero to nine years of schooling</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No post-secondary - 10 to 12 years of schooling</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No post-secondary - 13 or more years of schooling</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade certificate</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Certificate or Diploma</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's degree</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17: Education Characteristics of Refugees who Landed in Canada in 2003

Refugee claimants in Canada were more likely to have post-secondary school qualifications compared to resettled refugees. The study also reveals important differences across refugee categories. For example, 40% of Government-Assisted refugees had received less than 10 years of schooling, compared to 26% of Privately Sponsored refugees. As one might expect, increased education upon arrival was associated with a reduced likelihood of claiming social benefits, an increased likelihood of earning income through employment, and an increased likelihood of earning a higher income. Findings from Sweden suggest a similar relationship between education and employment for resettled refugees. However, findings from other studies are mixed.

A survey of 222 refugees in Australia who originate from Ethiopia, Myanmar, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo suggests that education qualifications were associated with the likelihood of securing employment but also suggested that this relationship wasn’t linear. Rather, “moderate” levels of education appeared to optimize the chances of finding employment, compared to “high” or “low” levels of education. Another Australian study by Delaporte and Piracha suggested that that pre-migration education did not increase the

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130 Lu and Frenette, “The Long-Term Labour Market Integration of Refugee Claimants Who Became Permanent Residents in Canada.”

131 Lu and Frenette.


134 Khawaja and Hebbani, “Does Employment Status Vary by Demographics?”

135 Delaporte and Piracha, “Integration of Humanitarian Migrants into the Host Country Labour Market.”
probability of being employed for up to one year after arrival. Two years after arrival, only those who arrived with tertiary level qualifications were more likely to gain employment. This study also observed a strong “education-occupation mismatch” amongst resettled refugees, wherein refugees were either over-educated or under-educated for the positions that they occupied. This highlights what they called the “imperfect transferability of origin country human capital” in the Australian refugee resettlement context. This mismatch is most evident over the short term for those who are “over-educated”.

**Language Proficiency and Labor Market Access**

Along with length of stay, proficiency in the language of the receiving society seems to be one of the most important predictors of employment and income levels in refugee resettlement contexts in Australia. A relatively small study (n=56) conducted in Australia found that spoken English was the only factor that increased the odds of being employed. The study found no statistical significance between employment and demographic characteristics, length of residence in Australia, time spent in camps, literacy (reading, writing and numeracy), and level of education. Evidence for the effectiveness of language training for resettled refugees was also unclear. Refugees enrolled in English language education in Australia were less likely to be employed, leading the authors to suggest that participation in English classes may delay access to the labor market. There is evidence to suggest that many resettled refugees start to overcome the effects of a language deficit over time. Data from Canada suggests that knowledge of an official language on arrival was no longer strongly associated with employment prospects eight years after refugees arrived in Canada.

**The Effects of Social Networks on Labor Market Access**

Resettlement placement decisions have an important effect on processes of social and economic integration. While not one of the countries examined in the research, it is interesting to note that a recent study from Switzerland, for example, suggests that contrary to a widespread assumption, “ethnic clusters” are associated with higher rates of employment, which strengthens than impedes economic integration. An ongoing initiative by the Immigration Policy Lab (IPL) is currently exploring how placement decisions may be optimized by matching refugees using an algorithmic tool. Their early modeling suggests that refugee employment at 90 days post arrival could be improved by up to 40% in the US, relative to existing placement practices. This finding underscores the importance of location in shaping access to employment and income, and the potential for leveraging placement decision-making to improve integration outcomes.

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136 2501.
138 Hebbani and Preece, “Spoken English Does Matter.”
139 Delaforge and Piracha, “Integration of Humanitarian Migrants into the Host Country Labour Market.”
The role of social networks is central to the debate over the relationship between placement decisions and integration outcomes, over both the short and long term. Bankston and Zou have observed important socio-economic gains for Vietnamese refugees in the US which they attribute partly to patterns of social interaction and the effects of networks. Using resettlement agency administrative data from the US, Beaman suggest that the effects of social networks on the labor market outcomes of individual members are mixed, for refugees resettled in the United States. For example, an increase in the number of network members resettled in the same year or one year prior to arrival leads to a deterioration in the likelihood of employment. On the other hand, a larger number of “tenured network members” improves the probability of employment and is associated with an increased hourly wage. Dagnelie et al. have built on these insights to consider how entrepreneurs within refugee networks facilitate labor market integration. Their analysis suggests that the probability of a refugee being employed at 90 days post arrival is positively affected by the number of business owners in their networks, but negatively affected by the number of employees, against whom they compete. In Sweden, Andersson has observed that refugees who settle within ethnic enclaves characterized by high levels of self-employment were more likely to become self-employed. This, however, was also associated with lower levels of income over the longer term. Moreken and Skop’s qualitative study further highlights the importance of networks and the role for resettlement agencies in the US in promoting both bridging and bonding capital through these.

The Impacts of Refugee Program Characteristics on Resettled Refugee Employment

Resettlement policies and programs play a significant role in shaping the labor market integration of resettled refugees. These effects are strongly evident in studies that explore variations in the forms and extent of government support in comparison to community support or sponsorship. For example, one study on the integration of humanitarian migrants in Australia suggested that those who received help from organizations are less likely to be employed six months after arrival. However, those who relied more on help from relatives and friends were more likely to be employed. This effect, however, did not persist beyond six months. Reasons for this are not clear but it is possible that relatives of arriving refugees, in this case, may have been more effective in facilitating access to employment than resettlement workers.

The role of community support in Canada has been explored in depth by Kaida et al., who conducted an extensive comparative evaluation of Government-Assisted and Privately


144 “Involuntary Migration, Context of Reception, and Social Mobility.”

145 “Social Networks and the Dynamics of Labour Market Outcomes.”

146 “The Labor Market Integration of Refugees in the United States.”


149 Delaporte and Piracha, “Integration of Humanitarian Migrants into the Host Country Labour Market.”
Sponsored refugees in Canada. The study considers both the short- and long-term economic outcomes of resettled refugees that arrived through the two programs. The study draws on Canada’s Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), which contains the landing data and annual tax record of almost all immigrants who have arrived in Canada since 1980. This enabled the researchers to estimate incomes for up to 15 years after arriving in Canada whilst controlling for group differences in background demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Significantly, the study did not control for pre-arrival differences between these two arrival categories, which are likely to be significant.

The study determined that Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) experienced higher rates of employment and higher earnings when compared to Government Assisted Refugees (GARs). The authors attribute these findings to the social and community benefits related to the sponsor’s support. Such support may help refugees to find initial employment more successfully than GARs. The study also found that PSRs were more advantaged over the longer term with respect to income and earnings. This effect was strongest amongst refugees with less education, especially women. Well educated women who were GARs caught up with similar women who were PSRs between three and eight years after arrival. Importantly, only the least educated PSR women fared better than their GAR counterparts over the longer term. PSRs with advanced language skills in English and French fared notably better than similar GARs. Private sponsorship appeared to offer an advantage to those with strong language skills, by benefitting from a greater ability to interact with sponsoring organizations and communities. It did not appear to benefit those who did not know French or English on arrival.

The effects on integration of access to cash grants has been explored in resettlement contexts. Drawing on census data, LoPalo conducted a study that exploited variations in cash benefit levels over time and between US states, specifically for participants in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in the US. Many refugees who resettle to the United States are eligible for this form of assistance. Her analysis suggests that an additional $100 in cash benefits was associated with a 5-8% increase in wages. This increase in cash did not change the probability of employment, and the effects were observed most strongly among the most highly educated. Significantly, the estimated costs to achieve this effect were less than the overall increase in wages. This is potentially a highly significant finding. However, it assumes that the benefit of increased wages for refugees is the only outcome of interest and does not consider broader fiscal impacts and improved integration outcomes more broadly.

The Fiscal Impacts of Refugee Resettlement

One of the major potential impacts of refugee resettlement is the fiscal cost of resettlement to the receiving country. In the United States, this has been an area of considerable debate in recent years, particularly around the recognition and accounting of the full economic costs and benefits of resettling refugees. Several recent studies in the US suggest that the costs of refugee resettlement are outweighed by the benefits that refugees offer.

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151 Kaida, Hou, and Stick, “The Long-Term Economic Integration of Resettled Refugees in Canada.”
152 Kaida, Hou, and Stick, 1703.
153 LoPalo, 44.
particularly over the longer term. Evans and Fitzgerald argue that whilst resettled refugees are characterized initially by low levels of employment, high rates of welfare use, and low earnings, this situation changes over time. Six years after arrival, refugees are employed at a higher rate compared to non-immigrant citizens. However, they do not reach the same earning levels. Use of welfare also decreases over time. The authors estimate that after 20 years in the US, refugees pay approximately $21,000 more in taxes, on average, than they would have received in welfare benefits. A draft study prepared (but never published) by the US government’s Department of Health and Human Services suggested similarly that refugees who resettled in the US between 2005 and 2014 created a net fiscal benefit of $63 billion.

Building on these insights, the New American Economy examined the economic trajectories of approximately 2.3 million of the 3.4 million refugees resettled to the US between 1975 and 2017. The refugees in this study earned $77.2 billion in household income during 2015 and contributed $20.9 billion in taxes. Whilst the median household income was generally low for those who had been in the country for five years or less ($22,000), this more than tripled for those who were in the country for 25 years, to reach $67,000. This rate of increase in household income was higher than other foreign-born groups in the US, and the median income for refugees after living in the US for 25 years was $14,000 more than for households across the US overall.

Studies of more localized economic impacts of refugees in the US also suggest a positive effect. For example, in Franklin County, Ohio, 13.6% of employed refugees aged 16 and older were business owners compared to 6.5% for the overall population. An estimated 873 refugee-owned businesses employed about 3,960 workers.

In Australia, much of the current debate on the fiscal impacts of refugees is centered on the high cost of offshore processing and the detention of asylum seekers. We did not identify any detailed, clearly defined studies of the fiscal impacts of refugee resettlement, which tend to be subsumed into the broader impacts of immigration. However, a 2008 model predicted that refugee contributions would reach a net positive value approximately 12 years after arrival. Findings also show that, consistent with observations from the US, refugees in Australia relied more strongly on government support over the short term, compared to other migrant categories. For example, 43% of those on humanitarian visas received their main source of income from wages or salary, compared to 70% for skilled migrants and 58% for all migrants. Thirty nine percent of humanitarian migrants relied on a government pension or allowance, compared to 6% for skilled migrants and 16% for migrants overall.

A study of the fiscal impacts of refugee resettlement and asylum in Sweden, which has the largest per capita ratio of refugee immigration in the world, found that the cost of refugees, including both resettled refugees and asylum seekers, amounted to 1% of the GDP for the year 2007. Approximately 80% of this cost originated from lower public per capita revenue.
Bach et al. have attempted to model the economic impact of roughly 890,000 individuals who sought asylum in Germany in 2015, by simulating the macroeconomic and fiscal effects of refugees who entered the country after 1995 using 2013 data from the IAB-SOEO Migration Sample. More specifically, they considered the effects of increased investment in the labor market integration of refugees and asylum seekers, specifically in education and language acquisition. Their policy scenarios suggest that if the proportion of refugees who obtain a vocational qualification increased by 20%, the net fiscal effect on Germany would be reduced costs of approximately €500 million by 2030. If the share of refugees with “good” or “very good” German language skills increased by 20%, the fiscal deficit would be reduced by a further €190 million by 2030. Whilst these statistics do not reflect the economic impact of refugee resettlement per se, they illustrate how the impact of refugees is conceptualized and explored more generally in these resettlement contexts.

As the debate over the fiscal impact of refugee resettlement develops, the literature suggests two themes that are likely to continue to feature prominently. The first relates to the relatively modest cost of refugee resettlement programs to advanced economies, especially over the longer term. A 2019 study, for example, has modelled the potential fiscal consequences to the European Union of resettling all the refugees in Asia and Africa. The study found that the average annual cost over the lifetime of the refugees would amount to no more than 0.6% of the EU’s GDP. Second, the literature will likely continue to expand our understanding of the relationship between “front-loaded” costs of refugee resettlement and the recognition and measurement of economic benefits over the longer term.

The Impacts of Refugee Resettlement on Local Labor Markets

Studies from the US suggest that refugee resettlement does not appear to have adverse impacts on local labor markets. A working paper published in 2017 by the US Department of State found that refugees resettled to the US between 1980 and 2010 had no discernable negative impact on either the wages or levels of employment of local non-refugee workers. This finding held true for both high- and low-skilled refugee workers.

The impact of resettled refugees on local labor markets has been debated intensively in light of the Mariel boatlift in 1980, when 125,000 Cuban refugees were airlifted to Miami, increasing local labor supply by approximately 7%. Despite representing an unusually large shock to the local labor supply, compared to most localized resettlement contexts, there was no clear negative impact on the labor market. Following a lively academic debate, there is emerging consensus that any harmful impacts on non-refugee workers, including

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164 Ruist, “The Fiscal Cost of Refugee Immigration.”
166 Ruist, “The Fiscal Aspect of the Refugee Crisis.”
low-skilled and low-educated workers, were likely to be small\(^{169}\). These findings suggest further that refugee resettlement, as practiced currently, is unlikely to introduce supply shocks to local labor markets that will produce harmful consequences for local workers.

**Health**

Physical and mental health and access to adequate healthcare are critical to successful refugee integration in resettlement contexts\(^{170}\). Experiences of trauma and violence prior to arrival are recognized as making refugees more vulnerable to ongoing psychological disruption, affecting health-related outcomes in resettlement contexts\(^{171}\). In Sweden, a study of 1,215 Syrian refugees resettled between 2011 and 2013 found that depression and anxiety were the most common reported health problems (61.9\%)\(^{172}\). The study also reported a strong association between age, sex, education, residence, cohabitation, and Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL) scores. Being female, older, and more socially isolated was particularly associated with lower HRQoL scores.

Financial concerns in resettlement contexts were cited as a major source of stress that has been linked to adverse health outcomes in Australia\(^{173}\) and the US\(^{174}\). Ahmad et al.\(^{175}\) show a strong association between Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and unemployment in Canada.

Advancing age in resettlement contexts in Canada is also linked to lower health outcomes. Persons older than 45 years showed a prevalence rate of PTSD of 80\% compared to 36.8\% for those under 30\(^{176}\). A cross-sectional study of 259 Afghan refugees in the US considered how several factors related to distress were moderated by gender, family relationships, language, gender ideology, and dissonant acculturation\(^{177}\). These findings suggest that a wide range of background characteristics may be associated with health status in resettlement settings.

Strong social integration has been linked positively with improved health for resettled refugees in Australia\(^{178}\). Barriers to community integration, on the other hand, are recognized

\(^{169}\) Clemens and Hunt, “The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves.”


\(^{176}\) Ahmad, Othman, and Lou.


\(^{178}\) Chen, Ling, and Renzaho, “Building a New Life in Australia.”
as putting the health of resettled refugees at risk in the US\textsuperscript{179}. Survey data from more than 2,000 refugees in Australia suggests that financial hardship and not feeling welcome in Australia was associated with poor self-reported health outcomes. Improved self-sufficiency and language competency were associated positively with social integration\textsuperscript{180}.

Interventions to improve economic and financial situations may have important health benefits for resettled refugees. Praetorius et al.\textsuperscript{181} assessed the impact of a group-based financial education course (including financial literacy and social enterprise) for Bhutanese refugee women in the United States. They noticed improved levels of self-confidence, increased feelings of hopefulness about the future, and a stronger sense of group membership. Participants in this study reported the alleviation of symptoms associated with depression, including feelings of isolation and lack of purpose. A preliminary study in West African refugees in northern Sweden also highlights the psychology of hope in improving refugee reports of health and well-being\textsuperscript{182}.

Low levels of language competency in resettlement contexts are linked to poor health outcomes and represent important barriers to healthcare access in the US\textsuperscript{183}, Canada\textsuperscript{184}, Australia\textsuperscript{185}, and New Zealand\textsuperscript{186}. Chronically low levels of language competency in resettlement contexts may have serious effects on mental health and well-being. A study from Canada shows that the relationship between language and depression changes over time in ways that may not be linear\textsuperscript{187}. During the initial period of resettlement, the researchers did not observe any effect of English speaking ability on rates of depression. However, after living in Canada for a decade, English language fluency was a significant predictor of employment, which was linked positively, in turn, to mental health.

Several studies highlight the risks that resettlement poses to the mental health of refugee youth and adolescents\textsuperscript{188}. Baak et al. highlight the critical role played by schools in supporting young refugees who are at increased risk of mental health problems\textsuperscript{189}. They highlight further the importance of training school staff to understand behaviors, confront stigma and cultural and linguistic barriers.

\textsuperscript{179} Lee et al., “Community Integration of Burmese Refugees in the United States.”
\textsuperscript{180} Chen, Ling, and Renzaho, “Building a New Life in Australia.”
\textsuperscript{184} Edward Ng, Kevin Pottie, and Denise Spitzer, “Official Language Proficiency and Self-Reported Health among Immigrants to Canada,” Health Reports 22, no. 4 (2011): 15–23.
\textsuperscript{185} Chen, Ling, and Renzaho, “Building a New Life in Australia.”
\textsuperscript{189} Baak et al., “The Role of Schools in Identifying and Referring Refugee Background Young People Who Are Experiencing Mental Health Issues.”
Researchers from Canada\textsuperscript{190} and Australia\textsuperscript{191} have observed declining rates of self-reported health in refugee resettlement contexts over time. Dowling\textsuperscript{192} examined three waves of data from the Building a New Life in Australia (BNLA) survey in Australia and found persistently low levels of health for a period of two years following arrival. Self-reports of poor health were particularly strongly associated with being female, advancing age, being from the Middle East, and currently experiencing financial stress. On the other hand, having a university degree and the absence of chronic health complaints appeared to protect against declining general health.

Resettled refugees may be less likely to access healthcare, which could pose further risks to their health. Immigrants in general in Canada are less likely to be hospitalized than Canadian-born citizens. This is sometimes interpreted as immigrants being healthier than non-immigrants (the so-called “healthy immigrant effect”). This interpretation masks considerable heterogeneity across the immigrant population and reasons for low hospitalization rates. One study compared age-standardized hospitalization rates for select refugee populations (focusing on Vietnam, Poland and the Middle East) with other immigrants and the Canadian-born population\textsuperscript{193}. Results from this study are summarized in Figure 18 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration Status</th>
<th>ASHR per 10 000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic immigrant</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee immigrant</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family immigrant</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18: Age Standardized Hospitalization Rates by Immigrant Category and Refugee Group

The findings of the study suggest that, like other immigrants, refugees were hospitalized at much lower rates compared to Canadian-born citizens. However, this was partly due to refugee populations being younger, as age-specific hospitalizations rates were comparable to Canadian-born individuals\textsuperscript{194}. Other studies have pointed out that refugees and immigrants may be at increased risk of developing chronic health conditions as a result of lower rates of access to preventative healthcare\textsuperscript{195}. A qualitative study of Afghan refugee women in the United States considered the socio-cultural factors around screening for breast and colorectal cancer. The researchers found that socio-cultural factors reduced the likelihood of access to these services for some women. The study also found that women who were screened reported that they relied on particular forms of support to undertake the


\textsuperscript{192} Dowling et al.

\textsuperscript{193} Edward Ng, Claudia Sanmartin, and Douglas G. Manuel, “Acute Care Hospitalization of Refugees to Canada: Linked Data for Immigrants from Poland, Vietnam and the Middle East,” Health Reports (Statistics Canada, December 21, 2016), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/82-003-x/2016012/article/14688-eng.htm.

\textsuperscript{194} Ng, Sanmartin, and Manuel.

screenings. These included encouragement and reminders from providers, family support, and prayer.\footnote{Siddiq et al., “Beyond Resettlement.”}

**Education**

Education plays an important role in predicting outcomes associated with several integration dimensions, in addition to representing an important integration dimension in its own right. Access to education in resettlement settings is especially important for children. Their success in achieving gain in education appears to depend strongly on their age at arrival. Refugee children who arrive in the United States before the age of 14 have been observed to achieve similar educational levels as their non-refugee peers, as measured by rates of high school graduation.\footnote{Evans and Fitzgerald, “The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the United States.”} However, refugees who arrived at age 14 and older exhibited significantly lower graduation rates. This stark disparity in achievements may be attributed to language difficulties, and possibly the effects of extended disruptions to their education over a longer period.

Research that has examined the effects of the trauma of displacement and the stress of adjustment to school suggests that children and adults show remarkable resilience.\footnote{Hermeet K. Kohli and Susan Fineran, “If They Misbehaved, We Took a Stick to Discipline Them’: Refugee Mothers’ Struggles Raising Children in the United States,” *Child & Family Social Work* 25, no. 2 (2020): 488–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/cfs.12705; Alfred Mupenzi, “Educational Resilience and Experiences of African Students with a Refugee Background in Australian Tertiary Education,” *Australasian Review of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (December 2018): 122–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/17457823.2015.1073114; N. Shallow and V. Whittington, “The Wellbeing of Refugee Children in an Early Childhood Education Context: Connections and Dilemmas,” *Journal of Educational Enquiry* 13, no. 1 (2014): 18–34.} The studies that we identified highlighted the enduring effects of trauma and the stresses of adjustment on school performance and vocational training. Mupenzi highlights the concept of “educational resilience” as critical to confronting the “deficit logics” of the prevailing scholarship in this area.\footnote{Mupenzi, “Educational Resilience and Experiences of African Students with a Refugee Background in Australian Tertiary Education.”} Using the methodologies of life history and personal biography, he argues that several factors contribute to resilience in refugee students. These include supportive and caring families (immediate and extended), communities and teachers, as well as religious faith. In addition, the educational resilience that was strengthened by these factors was critical to confronting experiences of racism and discrimination.

Schools can play an important part in supporting refugee students and their families. A study of early childhood education experiences of refugees in Australia found that a school’s level of support for refugee children improved their sense of well-being.\footnote{Shallow and Whittington, “The Wellbeing of Refugee Children in an Early Childhood Education Context.”} The study identified practical connections between the school and the families as crucial to strengthening refugee integration. Emotional connections were found to be most challenging to establish, due to language and cultural barriers. Such barriers can lead to increased tension between schools and refugee families. Kohli and Fineran additionally examine how refugee approaches to the disciplining of their children can generate stress that threatens to disrupt their early education.\footnote{Kohli and Fineran, “If They Misbehaved, We Took a Stick to Discipline Them.”} The results of this study point to the importance of support for parents and positive parenting programs, to optimize integration experiences and outcomes. The support of parents and caregivers in facilitating participation in ethnic and community networks beyond the home was recognized as critical to educational success in resettlement contexts.\footnote{Santoro and Wilkinson, “Sudanese Young People Building Capital in Rural Australia.”}
Refugee access to post-secondary education opportunities is also an important measure of integration. A Canadian government study examined administrative data from the IMDB to compare the participation of refugees with that of individuals from other immigrant categories\textsuperscript{203}. The study notes that refugees participated in post-secondary training at a lower rate than economic migrants (Principal Applicants, Economic Class). Those who did participate, however, reported higher rates of employment and higher incomes. GARs and PSRs who participated in post-secondary education were over 30\% and 25\%, respectively, more likely to be employed than their counterparts who did not participate. Immigrants who entered Canada through either the Family Class or Economic Class and participated in post-secondary education after arrival were just 16\% more likely to be employed. The average eighth year earnings for refugees who participated in post-secondary education in Canada was $9,000 higher than refugees who did not participate. This difference was $10,000 for Family Class immigrants. Multivariate analyses suggested that participation in post-secondary training was associated with the highest percent increase in the predicted probability of employment for GAR women (76\%), Family Class women (30\%) and PSR women (26\%). The study highlights significant returns on investment in post-secondary education for resettled refugees, particularly among GARs and women.

Social Inclusion

Social inclusion in this context refers to a wide range of processes through which refugees are able to improve the terms of their participation in the communities that they resettle into. The research that we identified on the dynamics of social inclusion considered a range of themes. These included public attitudes, poverty, discrimination, social media, social isolation and housing.

The Impact of Public Attitudes to Refugees, Resettlement on Integration

Media representations and exposure to resettled refugees may play an important role in shaping public attitudes to refugee resettlement. Negative images of refugees have been shown increase xenophobic sentiments, whilst positive images reduce these\textsuperscript{204}. We identified just one study, from the US, which focused on public attitudes to refugee resettlement\textsuperscript{205}. The results of an online survey experiment (n=2,994) suggest that public attitudes to refugees may be influenced by media frames that represent refugee resettlement in either positive or negative terms. This study also recognized perceptions of proximity as an important consideration. Respondents were generally less supportive of resettlement when it was presented as “local”, compared to “national”. Respondents who were supportive of resettlement in principle were therefore not necessarily supportive of resettlement in their own communities. Importantly, respondents living in counties across the US that had received higher numbers of refugees historically were also more likely to be supportive of refugee resettlement. This led the researchers to suggest that exposure to resettled refugee communities may reduce feelings of public opposition.

The findings from research on public attitudes to refugees in general may apply to resettlement situations, since the distinction between resettlement and asylum is often not clear in media representations and public discourses on refugees. A survey conducted in Germany during March 2016, in the midst of an unprecedented asylum influx, found that 81\% of respondents (n=2,000) were in favor of Germany admitting refugees and those

\textsuperscript{203} Prokopenko, “Refugees and Canadian Post-Secondary Education.”


fleeing persecution. However, the majority (55%) were also in favor of refugees returning to their home countries when circumstances permitted. Only 28% of respondents were in favor of refugees remaining in Germany indefinitely, with 17% expressing a neutral perspective. Along with generally positive attitudes towards refugees, Germans have simultaneously expressed concern over the risks represented by refugees. This includes concerns over security, as well as the fiscal burden on social security. These views were reflected across income groups, except for high-income individuals, who were inclined to view refugees as representing less of a risk. In line with findings from the US, close contact and proximity was associated with a more positive attitude towards refugees. However, context is likely to play an important role in limiting such support.

Refugee Resettlement and Poverty

Whereas studies on refugee employment and income point to steady improvements over time, on average, there is still wide variation in the economic outcomes of resettled refugees. Tang documents the experience of poverty and social marginalization in considerable ethnographic depth, by focusing on Cambodian refugees’ experiences in New York City’s “hyperghetto”. Several other studies also highlight refugees as facing an enduring threat of poverty. The Bhutanese community, for example, has been recognized as a particularly vulnerable refugee group in the US. A case study of one Bhutanese community determined that 42% of the 55 Bhutanese households representing 270 individuals would be considered as living below the poverty line. Only three of 55 households (approx. 5%) reported incomes that placed them more than 200% over the poverty line, which is widely accepted as an eligibility threshold for many public benefit programs.

Griffiths and Loy attribute the vulnerability of their study participants in part to demographic factors and low levels of education. A relatively high number fell either among the youngest or the oldest, which are both recognized indicators of higher vulnerability. A high percentage of adults in their sample (59%) had no formal education. Almost 78% had not attended high school or its equivalent. Many refugees additionally reported poor health status, which was also partly linked to poor employment prospects. Several case studies of resettlement in the United States support this conclusion.

Discrimination and Community Cohesion

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208 Ferwerda, Flynn, and Horiuchi, “Explaining Opposition to Refugee Resettlement.”
211 Griffiths and Loy, “Primary Integration Outcomes in a Newly Resettled Bhutanese Refugee Community,” 1214.
212 Griffiths and Loy, 1220.
Several studies recognized the negative effects of racism, xenophobia, and discrimination on the integration processes of resettled refugees. In the United States, Minor and Cameo observed clear disparities in the starting wages of newly resettled refugees. The study showed clear differences in the wages earned by men and women, based on region of origin. These are summarized in Figure 19 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>$8.80</td>
<td>$9.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>$9.21</td>
<td>$9.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>$8.22</td>
<td>$8.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>$9.36</td>
<td>$9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>$8.92</td>
<td>$9.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8.94</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9.40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19: Wage Disparities Among Newly Resettled Refugees in the US

If region of origin can be interpreted as a proxy for measure of race in the US context, this finding suggests an effect of structural racism and gender bias. This study did not, however, control for the potential effects of differences related to education, language abilities, location, and other factors.

Several studies have reported on local initiatives to address racism and discrimination in the refugee integration process, through strengthening local community relations. One study in Australia examined an initiative that sought to partner a regional university, refugee resettlement organizations, and a local community that resettled refugees from various African nations. The study recognized that African refugees face particular challenges of social exclusion, which arise from racist attitudes. The program included various initiatives and events to promote the welcoming of refugees and a stronger sense of community belonging by enabling participants to “look beyond the refugee label”. Another initiative to advance the social inclusion of refugees in New Zealand used semi-structured interviews and collaborative painting workshops to explore sensory experience and memories of places and belonging. Although based on a very small sample (n=8), this study suggests that creating public places for refugees to express their multisensory experiences through taste, smell, sounds and colors may help to familiarize these and diversify shared sensory experiences more broadly.

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215 Minor and Cameo, “A Comparison of Wages by Gender and Region of Origin for Newly Arrived Refugees in the USA.”

216 Drolet and Moothri, “The Settlement Experiences of Syrian Newcomers in Alberta.”

217 Anderson, Cumings, and Gatwiri, “’I’m a Local...’,” 24.

A study of refugees from the Middle East in Melbourne highlights the impact that racism and structural inequality may have on health and well-being\(^{219}\). Alemi and Stempel examine how perceptions of discrimination among Afghan refugees in California represented a significant source of stress, particularly amongst individuals with a strong intra-ethnic identity and high rates of pre-resettlement trauma\(^{220}\). Similarly, experiences of discrimination by Sudanese refugees in Australia have been linked with poor mental health outcomes \(^{221}\). This contrasts the experience of refugees from former Yugoslavia, who expressed higher levels of life satisfaction in Australia that were at least partly attributable to their whiteness\(^{222}\).

Negative attitudes to refugees have also been observed through changes in home prices in response to refugee arrivals. A study in Gothenburg examined the effects of a decision to build 1 000 apartments on 12 sites, to temporarily house refugees who had fled the war in Syria\(^{223}\). Analysis of data on property sales in the area suggests that properties within 10 minutes (walking) of the planned refugee housing development sold for 4% lower than apartments located further away. House prices decreased especially strongly in neighborhoods with populations characterized by high levels of education. This was interpreted as possibly a response to a concern that an influx of refugees may lead to deterioration in the quality of local schools. Properties located a further five minutes' walk from the development did not experience the same loss of value.

### Social Media and Social Inclusion of Resettled Refugees

The role of communication technology and social media is starting to be examined in terms of its impact on refugee resettlement and integration. Despite a burgeoning literature on the importance of technology and social media for refugees, we identified just three relevant studies that examined the relationship between social media and refugee integration in resettlement contexts\(^{224}\). These included a "digital ethnography" of 12 refugees resettled in New Zealand, which explored the effects of social media on refugee experiences of integration and belonging\(^{225}\). As an essentially transnational practice, social media was recognized as playing a critical role in the social organization of difference. Although transnational networks are not a new phenomenon, the research concludes that the potential for social media to accelerate these relationships presents both challenges and opportunities. Depending on the nature of their interactions, social media may have an effect on people’s "commitment to local places and relationships"\(^{226}\). Another study of social media usage among young Syrian refugees in Canada points to the same tension between localized concepts of integration and the growing prominence of virtual communities and shaping identity and community\(^{227}\). The authors present social media as an important contact zone to bridge cultural differences, build social connections, and negotiate a sense

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\(^{220}\) Alemi and Stempel, “Discrimination and Distress among Afghan Refugees in Northern California.”

\(^{221}\) Murray, “Sudanese Perspectives on Resettlement in Australia.”

\(^{222}\) Colic-Peisker, “Visibility, Settlement Success and Life Satisfaction in Three Refugee Communities in Australia.”


\(^{225}\) Marlowe, “Refugee Resettlement, Social Media and the Social Organization of Difference.”

\(^{226}\) Marlowe, 289.

\(^{227}\) Veronis, Tabler, and Ahmed, “Syrian Refugee Youth Use Social Media.”
of belonging. Although both of these studies present very preliminary findings, they highlight the importance of re-examining place-based notions of "integration" and "belonging" in resettlement contexts.

**Social Isolation and Social Cohesion**

Several studies across multiple countries point to the accumulation of social capital as essential to reducing risks of social isolation\(^{228}\). Findings suggest that social ties built around friendships and support networks initially prioritize intra-ethnic ties (bonding capital), rather than connections with the broader community (bridging capital). Results from recent studies of Syrian refugee adjustment to life in Canada suggests that the ability to establish and sustain strong community ties, partly enabled through community sponsorship, plays an important role in strengthening an initial sense of social inclusion\(^{229}\). One study, on the other hand, found that privately-sponsored Syrian refugees faced resettlement challenges that were similar to government-assisted counterparts\(^{230}\).

Women and youth were highlighted as confronting particular challenges to accessing forms of social capital that protect them from social isolation\(^{231}\). Findings from Australia suggest that despite their subjectation to experiences of social marginalization, refugee youth show a strong preference for social integration\(^{232}\). Some of the factors associated with a subjective


sense of psycho-social well-being include previous exposure to education, moving house, self-esteem, and a positive social environment. These predictors are not unique to refugees and resonate strongly with the priorities of other minorities, including indigenous youth. Such insights underscore the value of effective policies to confront discrimination, racism, and Islamophobia at all levels.

The risk of social isolation for resettled refugees may also be associated with the structure of communities and the potential for social interaction. Hebbani et al. argue that the social structure of Australian suburbs stood at odds with refugee perceptions of close neighborliness, further limiting opportunities for the development of bridging capital.

Several studies suggest further that interventions to support resettlement may have important effects on strengthening social cohesion. Examples of such programs included extended case management services for recently arrived refugees and Photovoice program.

**Resettled Refugees and Home Ownership**

Ensuring housing for recently resettled refugees, especially in expensive urban markets, is a major challenge. Investment in home ownership may be considered an important measure of social inclusion in some resettlement contexts. Several studies point to increasing levels of home ownership by refugees following their resettlement. Home ownership among the Vietnamese refugee community in the United States, for example, increased from 34.7% in 1980 to 70.8% by 2015. In Australia, a study of Sudanese refugees revealed that rates of home ownership were very low initially, but increased significantly over time.

A Canadian government study compared rates of home ownership between refugees and Canadian-born families for 2016 in Vancouver and Toronto. Using data from the Canadian Housing Statistics Program (CHSP) and 2016 Census of Population data, the study shows that property ownership by refugees accounted for a small share of the total housing market – just 2% in Vancouver and 3% in Toronto. Approximately 50% of refugees settled in Toronto owned their own homes, compared to 61% of their Canadian-born counterparts. This varied across occupations, with refugees working in health, trades, and transport reflecting comparable rates of home ownership to similar non-refugees. This suggests that differences in home ownership rates are driven primarily by differences in income. When income was controlled for, rates of home ownership were higher for refugees in Toronto. Houses owned by refugees were 15% to 17% lower in value, on average, than houses owned by non-refugee residents.
A study of census data in the US suggested that 57.4% of refugees who resettled between 16 and 25 years prior to 2015 owned their own homes. This figure was similar to the home ownership rate of the overall US population\textsuperscript{240}. However, rates of home ownership among refugees have been observed to vary by nationality. One study suggests that 72% refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and 73% of refugees from Myanmar who have been in the US for more than 10 years own their own homes, compared to just 21% of Somalis\textsuperscript{241}.

**Discussion**

Focusing on six major resettlement countries, this meta study has identified and synthesized evidence related to the impact of government-led refugee resettlement and integration programs. The results of our literature review suggest increasing research interest and sensitivity to the distinctiveness of the integration experience for resettled refugees. Where available, comparative data suggests that integration pathways and experiences for resettled refugees may differ in important ways from those seeking asylum. Comparative analysis also highlights considerable heterogeneity across populations of resettled refugees, shaped by diverse background characteristics and exposure to different program inputs.

Our ability to compare differences in the social and economic impacts of resettlement across countries was inevitably constrained by uncontrolled variations in program and contextual characteristics, as well as inconsistencies in the type and availability of data. Anecdotally, however, most studies that examined the integration outcomes of resettled refugees and impacts on receiving societies of government-led resettlement suggested gradual advancements over time, across all sites and outcome areas. Analyses of large datasets in several country contexts suggest that the initial economic costs of refugee resettlement reduce over the longer term, to the point where resettlement frequently represents a net positive economic impact. For most refugees, this point may be reached between about 12 and 18 years after arrival. Variations in the rates of improvement of economic integration appear to be conditioned by several factors, including program characteristics, contextual attributes, and background characteristics of the populations concerned.

It was notable that community sponsorship programs and approaches were associated with stronger integration-related gains over the short term, when compared to similar government-assisted programs. Such measured differences in outcomes, however, may also reflect differences in the background characteristics of refugee participants in each program. Such findings do not suggest, therefore, that one model or approach is necessarily better or more effective than the other. Rather, they highlight an ongoing critical humanitarian role for government-assisted programs to ensure that resettlement opportunities remain available to the most vulnerable, who may be unlikely to be selected through pre-existing family or community ties. Such comparative studies also highlight growing awareness of the potential of local investments in receiving communities, to strengthen resettlement outcomes, for both government-assisted and community-sponsored refugees. Studies of secondary migration underscore the point that social and community factors play an important role in shaping economic outcomes for resettled refugees along with other immigrant groups and citizens alike.

Studies of the impacts of refugee resettlement on receiving communities did not suggest significant adverse social and economic effects that could be attributed to refugee resettlement. This may result from the relatively small contribution that refugee resettlement makes to immigration overall and the geographical dispersal of resettled refugees across

\textsuperscript{240} New American Economy, “From Struggle to Resilience.”

multiple sites. We found no evidence to suggest that resettled refugees disrupt local labor markets in ways that negatively affect receiving communities. Studies of local social networks, secondary migration, and placement strategies suggest strongly that the structure and social characteristics of receiving communities have a profound effect on social and economic prospects for resettled refugees and their potential to integrate successfully. Studies of public attitudes were difficult to interpret with respect to refugee resettlement, specifically. For example, two recent studies from Germany on the relationship between migration and refugee settlement on crime were excluded because they examined a response to the recent influx of asylum seekers rather than refugee resettlement per se\textsuperscript{242}. Preliminary findings from Sweden and the United States suggest that public attitudes to refugees are more likely to be positive for individuals with a greater probability or frequency of encountering refugees in their daily lives. Further exploration of this relationship is needed to understand the causal pathways that shape community attitudes to refugee resettlement, both locally and nationally. Recent research on public attitudes to immigrants and immigration suggest that individuals hold diverse and sometimes contradictory positions on immigration. Roughly half of residents of high-income countries are neither for nor against migration and efforts to changes attitudes seemed most effective when individuals are engaged on questions of values\textsuperscript{243}.

Our attempt to compare the study of resettlement across these six country contexts underscores the importance of considering refugee resettlement in the context of the broader global refugee crisis. Many high-quality studies were excluded from this review because they failed to clearly distinguish resettled refugees from those seeking asylum, or even immigrants in general. This represents a significant limitation, particularly in contexts defined by a low ratio of refugees to asylum seekers, such as Germany and Sweden. Canada appears to be an exception in this regard, where a recent increase in the numbers of asylum seekers in relation to resettled refugees has not appeared to overshadow or “contaminate” the study of resettlement. However, the Canadian refugee resettlement program is well established and strongly data-driven.

This report highlights the critical value of disaggregating the “refugee” label more carefully and deliberately, to illuminate the impact of resettlement with greater precision. Drawing from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey of 2014, Solheim and La Parra-Casado showed that the introduction of the “reason for migration” variable was associated with significant variations in outcomes, both within and across countries\textsuperscript{244}. Unfortunately, the six categories that were introduced to measure this variable collapsed refugees under “international protection or asylum”, which limits the identification of resettlement cases. Whilst administrative databases are more likely to retain the possibility to disaggregate refugees based on arrival, it surprising that relatively few studies outside of Canada have systematically and carefully considered the significance of this variable.

As the world begins to contemplate the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the international community will face a significant challenge to revitalize resettlement and regain the momentum needed to expand it, to realize the global ambitions outlined in the Global Compact and the Three-Year Strategy. Through mapping out the contributions, gaps, and limitations of the research conducted across these selected countries, this meta study adds


support for a more data-driven and evidence-based approach to refugee resettlement and integration.

References


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Appendix 1: Methods

This meta study was developed through a comprehensive search and review of relevant research studies and reports. It included a systematic exploration of the following academic databases:

- Scopus
- JSTOR
- EconLit
- Web of Science

The following search logics were developed, which appeared to produce optimal results:

1. “refugee*” AND “resettlement” AND “integration” AND (“United States” OR “Canada” OR “Germany” OR “Sweden” OR “Australia” OR “New Zealand”)

2. “refugee*” AND “Integration” AND (“complementary pathway” OR “humanitarian admission” OR “community sponsorship” OR “humanitarian visa” OR “family reunification”)

These searches yielded 1,320 records in total. Results were initially limited to English language records published from 2000 to mid-2020. After initial screening and review-for-eligibility of 206 studies, we identified just two relevant records for Sweden and zero for Germany. To address what seemed to be a clear effect of an English language bias, we conducted additional searches in German and Swedish, within Scopus, JSTOR, and Web of Science. As we expected fewer results from this search, we used a broader syntax, which extracted all studies that included the terms “refugee AND resettlement”. We identified an additional 68 potentially relevant studies in German and four in Swedish. A review of the studies’ titles and abstracts confirmed that only two from this search met our criteria for inclusion, one from each country. Our struggle to identify relevant studies for Sweden and Germany was partially alleviated through manual searching and reviews of reference lists, mostly using Google Scholar. This process identified 48 additional studies, of which eight were from Germany and 10 from Sweden. Figure 20 below illustrates our screening and selection process in terms of an adapted Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews (PRISMA) flowchart, based on Moher et al. (2009).
Figure 20: PRISMA Flow Diagram Outlining Search Process

A total of 142 studies met the following criteria for inclusion:

- An empirical research study that examines the impact of government-led resettlement.
- A focus on the description or measurement of outcomes related to integration.
- Reports on research findings from at least one of the included countries.

Included studies were categorized thematically and synthesized according to the broad outcome areas outlined in the 2018 report from the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (EGRIS)\(^{245}\). Where relevant, statistical data were extracted and summarized separately.

Appendix 2: Study Characteristics & Statistical Sources

The total number of included studies per country is summarized in Figure 21 below, highlighting the broad range of methodological approaches:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mixed Methods</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21: Included Studies, by Country Context and Research Method

Most studies relied on quantitative methods, notably from Australia, Canada, Sweden and the US. In contrast to the other country sites, a majority of studies from both Australia and New Zealand drew on qualitative methods. Whereas many studies in Canada, Sweden and the US drew from large census or administrative datasets, quantitative studies from Australia tended to rely mostly on field survey data and a range of qualitative approaches with small samples. Studies from New Zealand were almost exclusively qualitative and based on small samples.

Whilst we expected that Australia, Canada and the US (the three countries that have collectively resettled 82% of UNHCR refugee departures since 2003) would account for the bulk of the research that we identified (78% of studies), we were nevertheless surprised by a paucity of research studies on government-led resettlement in Germany. We believe that this is a relevant finding that reflects more than a limitation in our method. Whilst we certainly identified a rich body of high-quality research on refugees and integration in Germany that reflected a vibrant academic discussion, studies inevitably focused exclusively on “refugees” as an all-inclusive category, without drawing a distinction based on arrival circumstances or humanitarian status. Reasons for this may arise from the relatively nascent status and small scale of Germany’s current refugee resettlement program (see above), alongside the overwhelming public and policy interest in Germany’s remarkable decision to accept unprecedented numbers of asylum seekers from 2015. A proliferation of new research on the acceptance and integration of asylum seekers appears to have eclipsed the potential for a much narrower research focus on the integration experience of resettled refugees. There are signs that this may be changing, as Germany’s resettlement program develops and expands. For example, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees has recently conducted a study on resettlement and integration, which seeks to explore its impact since 2012.

It is notable that almost three quarters of the relevant studies that we identified were published within the last quarter of the last two decades. Figure 22 suggests evidence of a

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246 Dr Hanna Brenzel et al., “Flüchtlingsmonitoring: Endbericht” (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2019).
247 https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/ProjekteReportagen/EN/Forschung/Migration/resettlement-integration-shutzbeduerftiger-fluechtlinge.html
growing interest in research on the impacts of government-led resettlement in refugee integration:

![Figure 22: Number of Included Studies, by Date of Publication](image)

With regard to outcome area, as described by EGRIS (2018), our included studies were mostly concentrated around three integration dimensions, namely economic, health, and social inclusion, as shown in Figure 23 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Dimension</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil-political</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Inclusion</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 23: Number of Included Studies, by Country Context and Main Outcome Area](image)

A relatively high proportion of studies from Canada, Sweden and the US focused on the economic dimensions of integration compared to other countries. A large proportion of studies from all countries focused on social inclusion. This is not too surprising considering that a broad range of outcome measures are considered under the umbrella of social inclusion. Whereas research on education and health in refugee contexts are both highly developed fields of study in general, we identified relatively few studies that considered these outcome areas specifically in relation to integration in resettlement contexts.

Several studies examined here drew from important statistical sources. Some of these are listed in Figure 24 below, for reference:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Database</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Building a New Life in Australia (BNLA)</td>
<td>2013 - ongoing</td>
<td>Panel Survey</td>
<td>Approx. 2 400 refugees</td>
<td>Department of Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB)</td>
<td>1952 - ongoing</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>All immigrants</td>
<td>Statistics Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Survey Description</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Data Type</td>
<td>Sample Size/Details</td>
<td>Data Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC)</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Longitudinal Survey</td>
<td>All Immigrants</td>
<td>Canadian Research Data Centre Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAB-SOEP Migration Sample</td>
<td>1984-ong</td>
<td>Longitudinal Survey</td>
<td>Approx. 30,000 (2020)</td>
<td>German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>STATIV</td>
<td>1997-ongo</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>All persons resident in Sweden on 31st December each year</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geosweden</td>
<td>1990-2014</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>All residents</td>
<td>Statistics Sweden, Uppsala University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>American Community Survey (ACS)</td>
<td>2005-ongo</td>
<td>Census</td>
<td>3.5 million households per annum</td>
<td>US Census Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS)</td>
<td>1975-2020249</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Refugees resettled the US</td>
<td>US Dept. State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual Survey of Refugees (ASR)</td>
<td>2018-ongo</td>
<td>5-year cross sectional survey</td>
<td>1,500 households and 4,000 individuals (FY16)</td>
<td>US Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Immigrant Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Longitudinal Survey</td>
<td>900+</td>
<td>RAND, Princeton University, New York University, Yale University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 24: Selection of Statistical Sources on Refugee Resettlement

In addition to the above, the EU Labour Force Survey represents an important source of longitudinal data that combines survey data from across European member states and makes micro data available for analysis. Between 2008 and 2014 11 additional variables were added, which enable greater comparison between refugees and other migrant groups250. We did not, however, identify studies that have developed this potential to consider the specific effects of refugee resettlement.

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249 Public access to much of the data and reporting tools offered by this source was removed in October 2020.