



EVALUATION OF UNHCR'S RESPONSE TO THE 2019/20 Level 3 IDP EMERGENCY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

**EVALUATION REPORT
FEBRUARY 2022**

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UNHCR Evaluation Service

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List of abbreviations

ABOD	Administrative Budget and Obligation Document
CBP	Community-Based Protection
CBI	Cash Based Initiatives
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CO	Country Office
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DESS	Division of Emergency, Security and Supply
DIP	Division of International Protection
DRS	Division of Resilience and Solutions
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Coordination Team
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HR	Human Resources
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
L3	Level 3 emergency
KII	Key Informant Interviews
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
POC	People of Concern
(P)SEA	(Prevention of) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RB	Regional Bureau
TA	Temporary Assignment
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Executive summary

1. The recent history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is marred by wars, both those fought across its borders, as well as inside its territory. Though the internal conflicts have a variety of local causes and triggers the results are the same: successive periods of violence shifting to different regions.
2. In mid 2019, increasing violence in the three eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri led to massive displacements. By the end of 2019 an estimated 4,5 million people were internally displaced in East Congo.
3. UNHCR declared a Level 3¹ (L3) Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) emergency in Ituri, North, and South Kivu in November 2019 to enable the operation to increase staffing and receive the operational resources required to address the protection, assistance and coordination needs in the context of the rapidly deteriorating situation.
4. In addition to the internal displacements, the DRC continues to host over 524,000 refugees from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan. Multiple health crises present further challenges to the humanitarian situation in the DRC: Ebola, measles, the plague, cholera, and Covid-19. As a result of the recurrent internal displacements and influxes of refugees, the DRC has been in different humanitarian emergency situations for 9 out of the last 10 years. The impact of the continued instability and conflicts has placed a heavy toll on the population and the cyclical nature of the crises has pushed the limits of the capacities of the Government and humanitarian agencies in DRC.
5. In line with UNHCR's Emergency Policy², and Policy on Evaluation³, that stipulate a mandatory evaluation of all Level 3 (L3) emergency operations, this evaluation sets out to assess UNHCR's emergency response to the L3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) emergency in the DRC from November 2019 to November 2020, in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, for accountability and learning purposes. Given the state of recurrent emergencies in DRC, the evaluation seeks to build on previous evaluations – in particular the recent [2018 evaluation](#) of the last L3 response.
6. The evaluation has the following objectives:
 - To analyse the extent to which UNHCR provided a timely and effective response to the L3 IDP emergency in three eastern provinces in DRC, including enabling and constraining factors in this response.

¹ A level 3 emergency is activated in exceptionally serious situations where the scale, pace, complexity or consequences of the crisis exceed the existing response capacities of both the relevant country operation(s) and relevant Regional Bureau(x) and require a corporate, whole-of-UNHCR response.

² *UNHCR Policy on Emergency Preparedness and Response, 2017*

³ *UNHCR Policy on Evaluation, 2016*

- To provide insights on UNHCR’s operational role and ability to: fulfil its protection mandate in IDP emergencies (including the application of the 2019 IDP Policy); respond to particular IDP emergencies that require rolling response approaches and that occur simultaneously to refugee response situations, such as in DRC.
- To provide good practices and lessons learned, and recommendations on UNHCR’s emergency response capacity that can feed into the operationalization of the new Emergency Policy, due to be finalized before the end of 2021.

SUMMARY KEY FINDINGS

Design

7. The evaluation found the ‘IDP Policy’ to be relevant for the 2019/2020 DRC response and the DRC operation pro-active in adapting elements of the ‘IDP Policy’. A mission⁴ to DRC in September 2019 by senior staff from the Division of International Protection (DIP) and the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply (DESS) was instrumental in shaping the DRC-specific approach in the three provinces, resulting in the *Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC*⁵ (‘DRC IDP Framework’).
8. The global IDP policy was successfully contextualized by the operation and provided guidance during the L3 response. The operation, among other things:
 - 1) ensured protection considerations remained at the basis of the humanitarian response;
 - 2) provided a detailed protection analysis to guide the overall response;
 - 3) implemented a community-based approach, geared towards the identification of solutions.
9. However, the evaluation found there is an uneven level of knowledge amongst UNHCR staff with respect to UNHCR’s responsibilities towards IDPs, including of the ‘Global Policy’. Similarly, there is a lack of awareness of UNHCR’s role in IDP emergencies with partners, counterparts, and donors.
10. The DRC operation was found to be prolific in the tailored adaptation of UNHCR protection strategies to the DRC context. Strategies and concept notes were developed at national as

⁴ In line with UNHCR’s Emergency Policy, a Joint Senior Level Mission (JSLM), comprised of Deputy Directors of the Headquarters Division of International Protection (DIP) and the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply (DESS) provided support to the DRC operation. As the JSLM entered Goma Mount Nyiragongo, the volcano situated at 12 km from the city, is spewing smoke. The active volcano was a reminder of the varied causes of displacement in the DRC, and a herald of displacements as a result of an eruption 2 years later, during the conduct of this evaluation.

⁵ *Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC, September 2019, UNHCR internal document*

well as regional level⁶, including on the Prevention and Response to Gender Based Violence (GBV⁷), the approach to distributing Non-Food Items (NFI⁸), and Cash Based Interventions (CBI⁹). The operation did not appear, however, to have a consolidated approach to share the strategies and approaches with partners and counterparts, limiting their impact on the overall humanitarian response.

11. The relevance of the Emergency Policy for the response to the IDP crisis was found to be uneven. It was not clear to management in the operation how to activate a level 3 emergency response; including the thresholds to be used, the procedure to apply for additional support and the authority to decide on the declaration.
12. The Emergency Policy's prescribes standardized duration-, and budget- limits for all L3 emergency declarations, rendering the support provided through the Policy to appear arbitrary, particularly in the DRC context with recurrent displacement emergencies resulting in high levels of unmet humanitarian needs. The Emergency Policy's one-size-fits-all support-, and funding provisions limited its relevance, and impact. The level 3 response declaration did not come with (the requirement for) a tailored response plan guided by budgetary priorities, timelines, and result-based indicators, rendering the results of the response less visible, hampering (funding-) outreach and advocacy. The DRC operation did not develop a comprehensive contingency plan prior to the 2019 emergency.

Implementation

13. The Level 3 was declared 6 months after the increase in displacements mid-2019: an earlier activation would have allowed for a response aligned to the intensified displacements from June 2019 onwards. This would, however, not have significantly impacted the start of the IDP response. The operation had already started a response with funds held in reserve. The Level 3 funds only represented an incremental increase in support of ongoing interventions.
14. A number of UNHCR staff in the field had an uneven awareness of the budget available, or of the duration for emergency responses. Neither the transfer periodicity, nor the amounts, of the L3 budget disbursements appeared to be predictable. The evaluation team estimates that 33.5 million dollars of additional resources were provided for the L3 response in the east.
15. The increased resources as a result of the Level 3 emergency activation facilitated further scale up of activities. The scale up/response is credited for having saved lives; however, the activation of the Level 3 response mechanisms had limited impact on the response scope, timeliness, and effectiveness particularly in light of the scale of the crisis. Lack of access limited the reach of the assistance and made a substantive assessment of overall needs

⁶ UNHCR protection strategy for internally displaced persons response in the democratic republic of congo 2019

⁷ Stratégie GBV 2020 – 2021, UNHCR Sous-délégation de Goma.

⁸ Note sur le ciblage des bénéficiaires du cash en DI, Octobre 2020

⁹ Note d'orientation cash/Projet de protection communautaire IDPs 3 provinces, March 20

impossible. Nevertheless it is clear that the extent of the humanitarian needs exceeded the response capacity of all actors – which underscored the need for (strategic) planning/prioritisation of a tailored emergency response.

16. UNHCR's programs embodied a recognition that the participation of disaster-affected people and their capacities and strategies are integral to humanitarian response. Though confronted with numerous significant security and access restrictions, UNHCR's exemplary community engagement practices endeavoured to contribute to durable solutions.
17. An Emergency Response Team of 15 individuals was deployed (for 3 months) to East DRC, and 60 additional staff (23 international staff, 37 national staff) were recruited for the L3 response. Nevertheless, delays in procurement and staff recruitment impinged upon UNHCR's response. The response operations were further hampered by complex internal processes, limited decentralised contingency stocks, and limited in-country capacity to recruit national staff (which were the majority of the additional emergency related positions established). Nevertheless, the evaluation found a positive impact from the deployment of officers from UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (EPRS) and roster members from its Emergency Response Team (ERT) in scaling up operations in the initial months of the emergency.
18. The support provided by DESS was perceived as strong and appropriate with a good understanding of the complex challenges in a protracted crisis environment. Support from the Regional Bureau was perceived as comprehensive even if limited by the fact that the Regional Bureau was only operational in January 2020.
19. Unfortunately, the lack of M&E systems did not allow the evaluation team to adequately measure program performance and results or to assess the effectiveness of the response as a whole. See the next sections for sector specific results.

➤ **Protection**

20. The operation lacked a clear approach to ensure protection mainstreaming that was further hampered by limited sharing of strategies and approaches with partners and counterparts and the partial sharing of protection data with other Clusters. The evaluation found there to be diverging views within UNHCR as well as with counterparts to what extent UNHCR could be expected to act as a provider of last resort for the Protection Cluster.
21. The new approach to data collection and analysis, *Système de Réponse et d'Analyse*, (SAR) has as its main goal to support evidence based and targeted programming by all humanitarian actors in DRC. The reports, published on the Protection Cluster website, include interrelated (cross-sectoral) needs of all populations in an area and the reasons for displacement. The innovative approach to protection monitoring included the community-based identification of solutions. Both the protection data, as well as the identified solutions served to guide the response by humanitarian actors. Nevertheless, there were missed

opportunities in providing systematic protection data to other clusters/HCT, negatively affecting protection mainstreaming, and ultimately, advocacy.

22. Nevertheless the Level 3 response efforts strengthened existing protection monitoring, data collection, and community-based approaches. The evaluation found the data collection and analysis approach (SAR) to be in line with the responsibilities of UNHCR field operations outlined in the IDP Policy¹⁰, as well as the IDP initiative¹¹. Furthermore, protection-based data collection and analysis served to confirm the centrality of protection in the response and provided added value to the existing incident reporting carried out by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN peacekeeping mission *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo* (MONUSCO).
23. UNHCR piloted several different community-based protection projects focusing on existing community groups and supporting them in identifying needs and acting upon their priorities. As example, in Beni, through the 'Maire de Beni' project, authorities felt more empowered to identify and respond to localised crises. However, the scope of the community-based protection monitoring was limited to accessible areas in North Kivu and Ituri.
24. The capacity building of community actors and local authorities, and the involvement of PoCs in Community-Based Protection were seen as appropriate modalities in recurrent and protracted crises; however, they only addressed a small proportion of the needs. PoCs gave positive feedback on UNHCR's cash, co-habitation, and income generating activities.
25. The operation has identified GBV and SEA as priority protection risks. However, the response and follow-up to reports of GBV were uneven due to the lack of actors present in the areas of displacement. The operation did not have a consolidated PSEA strategy during the emergency.
26. Multi-purpose cash is assessed as an appropriate and effective assistance modality, allowing for targeted support to women and girls at risk. The scope and scale of the multi-purpose cash assistance was limited to areas where UNHCR and partners had access.

➤ **Shelter**

27. UNHCR's taking responsibility of the Shelter Cluster in the pre-L3 scale up had a direct and positive impact in the provision of shelter and settlements service to IDPs during the L3 response. The multi-pronged shelter strategy addressing the specific needs of a variety of PoCs was deemed appropriate and in line with the IDP Policy. However, prepositioned contingency stocks were deemed insufficient, and procurement procedures cumbersome.

¹⁰ Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, 18 September 2019

¹¹ 'UNHCR will ensure timely and impact-oriented assistance and protection for those displaced and affected. This will be enabled through sound protection monitoring, needs assessments, and analysis conducted, together with partners, including at all stages of internal displacement crises'. UNHCR's initiative on internal displacement 2020 – 2021

➤ **Camp Coordination and Camp Management**

28. The Level 3 activation successfully activated the Ituri CCCM working group and reinforced the CCCM Working Group in North Kivu. The evaluation found that the lack of CCCM ownership at national level and the 'working group' status resulted in missed opportunities in terms of effective coordination with partners, advocacy, and funding.

➤ **Coordination**

29. Coordination across Clusters led by UNHCR was limited as a result of an uneven presence of Cluster-, and Sub-cluster leads, particularly in Ituri and South Kivu. Case management and referrals were severely impacted.

30. Partners commended the coordination put in place by UNHCR in the protection, shelter and CCCM clusters, but observed that there was uneven and unpredictable provision of technical documents to guide partner's activities and to establish minimum standards. Coordinators at the hub level (Goma) "double-hatted" for an extended period of time (largely as a result of limited budget), which led to confusion on the part of sector members on their role as Cluster coordinator and their role as UNHCR staff.

31. Strong partnerships with local actors were developed but limited to the areas where UNHCR piloted operational modalities. Partnerships with development actors are not yet developed to ensure sustainability and scale up.

Impact of COVID-19 and Ebola on the Emergency Response

32. The Ebola epidemic and the Covid-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the operations, severely limiting the access to PoCs and subsequently the roll-out of planned interventions. Albeit on a limited geographical scale, UNHCR's community-based approach ensured continuity during periods of restricted access for humanitarian staff.

Results and Sustainability

33. Despite the many challenges posed by the context and scale of the IDP emergency, UNHCR was able to introduce partial aspects of the "rolling response approach" - a concept which emerged from the previous 2018 L3 response evaluation in the DRC¹². A rolling response refers to establishing a flexible, predictable, responsive emergency approach to recurrent crises, aimed at establishing long-term protocols for staffing, assistance, and collaboration modalities, and which:

¹² The "rolling response approach" emerged as a finding from the evaluation of the 2017 L3 IDP emergency in the Kasai region of DRC. This seems to an extent in line with the principles of 'adaptive management and programming' sourced from: <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/how-adaptive-management-is-challenging-the-monitoring-and-evaluation-of-complex>

- 1) uses agreed tools to address the issues raised by affected communities;
 - 2) supports local and national infrastructure to better respond to emergencies and invest in local staff;
 - 3) builds in-country expertise, including through an emergency roster system and training opportunities within the operation;
34. The deactivation of the L3 designation and related abrupt reduction in funds was detrimental to maintaining the minimum appropriate response capacity in this protracted crisis. The operation continues efforts to maintain emergency levels of response and essential operations and activities after the expiration of the L3 period.
35. Engagement with local authorities was strengthened at local level but remained reduced at provincial and national level. Strengthened engagement with local authorities is in line with the operation's efforts to build local capacities and infrastructure to enable authorities to better respond to future displacements. The IDP Policy requests operations to 'enhance national response capacity' to enable national actors to take over 'meaningfully' in order for UNHCR to be able to 'disengage responsibly'.¹³ The evaluation found that the recommendation in the "DRC IDP framework" for a rapid disengagement within a maximum of 6 months does not correspond to the condition in the IDP Policy related to the need for sufficient capacity with national actors before UNHCR can disengage.
- **Advocacy**
36. Despite elaborating a robust set of IDP-specific advocacy activities as part of its overall operation strategy, the operation's implementation of these advocacy activities was not systematically planned, documented, or reviewed and produced uneven and mixed results.
37. A key component upon which UNHCR's operational advocacy work was based was its provision of data, analysis and essential information to its partners and through the protection cluster portal. However, information sharing with local actors, community leaders and government officials was considered uneven.
- **Good Practises**
38. The operation has been commended by various key informants for the protection reports that provided detailed information on situations of conflict, protection incidents, rights violations and the resulting displacements in eastern DRC. The reports provided specific information on the population (e.g., numbers, location, ethnic background) being targeted in the violations, the type of violations, number of individuals affected, and the resulting displacement. The reports were widely seen as providing an added value to the more generic reports provided by the UN mission and IOM. The reports were made public on the

¹³ "UNHCR will disengage responsibly when local and national actors can meaningfully take over operational delivery, coordination and monitoring in relation to protection and solutions for IDPs. This will require UNHCR, from the outset of its involvement, to undertake interventions and measures aimed at enhancing national response capacity, including technical advice and support for national laws and policies on internal displacement, training, and capacity development".

Protection Cluster website and enabled a common analysis, as well as coordination on response with both humanitarian actors and authorities (one donor representative commended UNHCR for the efforts in providing all actors in DRC with an analytical baseline). Please refer to Annex 4 for an example of the report.

39. The detailed protection reports were largely made possible through the community-based protection monitoring structures the operation put in place. Community protection monitors among the IDP local populations, and local authorities were trained to identify protection risks and violations. This enabled a continuation of protection monitoring even when access for humanitarian staff was further curtailed. Local capacities were built to estimate the number of displaced persons in their area and to determine their needs and to report this information to authorities and humanitarian actors. The community monitors were also trained in identifying (local) solutions to the needs of the displaced.
40. The operation initiated income-generating activities (IGA), in particular for women, in endemically insecure areas. This provided a level of self-reliance that became apparent when access for humanitarian staff was curtailed as a result of COVID measures and the IGA continued and even adapted to the production of COVID masks and other items.
41. The DRC Operation has been very pro-active in the contextualisation of UNHCR's global strategies and approaches, including the new IDP Policy, in DRC specific strategies and approaches. The operation in doing so has made use of the information and analysis collected through the innovative and community-based protection monitoring approach, tailoring the strategies on GBV, CBI and local capacity building to the specific situation of displacement in eastern DRC.

Recommendations

1. The DRC operation and Regional Bureau, in light of the overwhelming needs and overall lack of humanitarian funding in the DRC, to establish an agreed position on the scope of UNHCR's priorities in the DRC and the related future budget allocation to enable long term planning and render the level of attainable priorities explicit.
2. The DRC operation should further develop its national/local advocacy strategy. Linked to this, the regional bureau is to reinforce a regional advocacy approach to ensure protracted crises, such as in DRC, receive the necessary media and donor attention.
3. The DRC operation as the protection cluster lead, and with the support of DIP, should formulate and implement, a protection mainstreaming approach, further developing GBV and PSEA strategies to guide the broader humanitarian response.
4. DESS to include M&E resources (tools and staff) as part of tailored Level 3 response plans.
5. DIP, with the support of the RB and the GLDC, to develop a supportive (phased) roll-out strategy for new/recent protection policies and approaches.

6. DESS and relevant units in DRS, DIP and DSPR to prepare actionable guidance for operations on the resources to support the continuation of an emergency response as well as the transition from an emergency response to durable solutions.

1. Introduction and background

1.1 Context

1. The recent history of DRC has been dominated by recurrent and successive conflicts. The conflicts in DRC have a variety of causes and triggers: including chronic political instability and weak governance, corruption and competition over resources and power, ethnic tension, poverty, unemployment, and regional instability.
2. The 'Congolese wars' of 1996 and 1998 involved multiple regional and internal actors. The 1998 war ended with the peace agreements of 2002. The agreements brought a tenuous stability to the country but did not address all the diverging interests and root causes of the conflicts. Conflicts continued and intensified in the eastern part of the country.
3. The political climate improved following elections in 2018 which saw a peaceful transition of power. However, while the scale of violence decreased in some regions, notably in the Kasai and Tanganyika areas, there was a sharp spike in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.
4. Since late 2017, armed groups, predominantly from the Lendu ethnic farming community, have committed deadly attacks in Ituri province. Initial targets were members of the neighbouring Hema community, who are mostly herders, and the Congolese armed forces. But attacks are now increasingly indiscriminate. The escalating violence has revived historical rivalries between the Hema and Lendu who fought each other during the 1999-2003 war. The involvement of actors from the adjacent province of North Kivu is a threat to the stability of the whole eastern region. The involvement of former rebel movements, such as the M23 group, further escalated the local conflicts.
5. In northern North Kivu Province the security situation continues to be marked by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and other armed groups' actions, as well as by the ongoing Government offensive against them. In the southern part of North Kivu, the security situation is marked by the militia groups that took control of land from which the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the National Council for Renewal and Democracy (CNRD) were chased by the national army (FARDC) during military operations in 2019 and 2020.

6. Those same operations also dislodged communities in northern South Kivu. In addition, intercommunity violence in the Highlands of South Kivu Province has led to widespread pendular displacement in Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira territories. Clashes between armed groups, such as the Mai Mai and the CNRD, and the national army have worsened since March 2019.
7. The insecurity in the eastern DRC and resulting indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population that caused massive displacements are the result of the proliferation of armed groups (currently there are 120 recognised armed groups, not including local self-defence groups) with constantly shifting alliances. Reports indicate the civilian population suffer from widespread violence and human rights abuses aimed at provoking fear among the population and which cause the population to flee.

Massive Internal Displacement

8. Recognising that official numbers are lower, a total of 6.6 million people are recognised by local authorities as being displaced within DRC—of these, almost 4.5 million are displaced in the eastern region.
9. 1.7 million IDPs are located in North Kivu Province according to the Comité de Mouvement de Population, a mixed committee made up of Government and the national and international humanitarian community. The vast majority (94%) live with host communities, while some 90,263 reside in 22 IDP sites coordinated by UNHCR or IOM, or in former sites managed by IDPs themselves with limited assistance.
10. 1.7 million persons are displaced in Ituri Province. The majority reside in host communities (80%), while some 220,000 have fled towards 87 displacement sites. Some 177,000 IDPs live in displacement sites coordinated by UNHCR or by IOM as co-leads of the CCCM Working Group.
11. Almost 1 million IDPs are located in South Kivu Province, according to OCHA. 97% of all IDPs reside in host families, while a minority have gathered in informal IDP sites (in Kalehe Territory).
12. UNHCR declared a Level 3 (L3) Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) emergency in Ituri, North, and South Kivu in November 2019 to enable the operation to increase staffing and operational resources to address the protection, assistance and coordination needs of the rapidly deteriorating situation—including an increasing number of IDPs. More than 2 million IDPs were newly displaced in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces in the 18 months leading up to the L3 declaration, and more than a million have been displaced since January 2020. The vast majority of the displaced persons are sheltering with host families (nearly 90%), with only a small portion of IDPs being hosted in sites / camps.

Multiple Populations of Concern

13. In addition to the internal displacements, DRC continues to host over 524,000 refugees from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan. At the time of the declaration of the L3 emergency in November 2019 UNHCR had assisted more than 527,000 refugees and asylums seekers, the majority of which came from Rwanda (more than 214,000) and the Central African Republic (more than 171,000).
14. Refugee populations are spread out through DRC” 99% of the refugees live in rural areas, almost 75% live outside camps or settlements. Most Rwandan refugees live in communities in the southern part of North Kivu and in northern South Kivu, now displaced alongside the communities in which they have lived for over 20 years. Recent displacement meant that the Commission Nationale pour les Refugees and UNHCR have better access to at least some of this population, so they are working on an overall mapping of their presence and on an updated plan for implementation of the cessation strategy.
15. Multiple health crises present further challenges to the humanitarian situation in DRC: Ebola, measles, and Covid-19. The outbreak of Ebola in August 2018 (northern Kivu and Ituri) resulted in an international public health scale-up protocol being declared (extended until February 2020). Simultaneously, a measles epidemic has led to the loss of thousands of lives.

National Legal Framework related to Internal Displacement

16. The DRC government ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (aka the Kampala Convention) in 2014. The government drafted legislation with support from UNHCR to be consistent with the Convention and took steps towards implementation: this remains pending. DRC is a member of the International Conference of the Great Lakes region, signing its protocols on internal displacement in 2006. It has since taken some steps towards drafting a national law protecting IDPs. There is currently no government strategy on internal displacement. The Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Social Affairs is in charge of humanitarian relief activities in the country. UNHCR, as the protection lead agency, collaborates closely with the Ministry of Interior and Security, which is responsible for all protection-related issues.


UNHCR in DRC


17. UNHCR has had an operational presence in DRC since 1975. Subsequent Representations have had multiple and connected objectives: preserving access to territorial asylum and international protection; improving the protection and solutions environment; achieving minimum standards in the provision of multi-sectoral assistance; fostering economic self-reliance and durable solutions; and promoting social cohesion and peaceful co-existence for refugees, IDPs, returnees, and host communities.

18. The Representation had 551 staff at the time of the L3 emergency (June 2019), including 60 additional positions to respond to the L3 emergency. The operation has a Country Office in Kinshasa, five Sub-Offices in Gbadolite, Goma, Aru, Kananga, and Lubumbashi, as well as 12 Field Offices/Units.

19. UNHCR’s Sub-Office in Goma covered North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri Provinces. In July 2020, the Bunia office was transferred to the management of the Aru Sub Office, bringing all offices in Ituri under the same wing. To meet growing needs in the northern part of North Kivu—including Ebola preparedness needs and emergency response—the operation opened a Field Unit in Beni in October 2019.

Timeline Important Events





Date d'impression: 15 Oct 2019 Source des données: CMP (Commission pour les Mouvements des Populations) Auteur: UNHCR - Kinshasa Feedback: codidrcim@unhcr.org

Map showing displacements during the L3 response period: displacements have continued since; source UNHCR

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

20. In line with UNHCR's emergency and evaluation policies, an evaluation of all Level 3 (L3) emergency operations is to be conducted within 18 months after the declaration of the L3 emergency. The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess UNHCR's response to the L3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) emergency in the DRC from November 2019 to November 2020, in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, for accountability and learning purposes.

21. The evaluation objectives are:

- **Objective 1:** To analyse the extent to which UNHCR is providing a timely and effective response to the L3 IDP emergency in three eastern provinces in DRC, including enabling and constraining factors in this response;
- **Objective 2:** To provide insights on UNHCR's operational role and ability to: fulfil its protection mandate in IDP emergencies (including the application of its 2019 IDP Policy); respond to particular IDP emergencies that require rolling response approaches and that occur simultaneously to refugee response situations, such as in DRC;

- **Objective 3:** To provide good practices and lessons learned and recommendations on UNHCR's emergency response capacity.

22. Minor adjustments were done to accommodate requests and availability of UNHCR staff: The scope was extended 3 months, until December 2020, to assess the impact of the L3 deactivation. While a phased approach was proposed, some phases ran in parallel to accommodate availability of staff to be interviewed and engaged in meetings.

3. Evaluation methodology

23. The evaluation is inductive and formative. The intent was to move from data to theory. A mixed-method approach was applied and provided the possibility of triangulation and synthesis across different resources of primary, secondary, qualitative, and quantitative data generated through a variety of methods. Lastly, the evaluation followed a phased approach: (1) inception, (2) qualitative data collection, (3) data analysis, (4) reporting, and (5) dissemination. Data collected was translated from theory to actuality by identifying a set of observations, which were then shaped into a more general set of findings about those experiences and perceptions.

24. The evaluation used the following criteria for humanitarian action from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coverage, and Impact¹⁴. An analytical framework was developed to structure the evaluation. Indicators were developed to evaluate performance under each criterion. The evaluation questions were mapped along four high-level areas of enquiry: 1/Design, 2/Implementation, 3/Results and Sustainability, and 4/Good Practices.

25. The evaluation methodology included an in-depth desk review, remote, semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KII) and group sessions, field-based, semi-structured KIIs with People of Concern (PoC) and Focus Group Discussion (FGDs), and quantitative analysis of M&E data. A field visit was not possible due to Covid-19 restrictions and security concerns. A validation and co-creation workshop was conducted with UNHCR staff. This enabled the Review team to complement KII and desk review data, validate findings, concisely formulate utility-based recommendations, provide nuance, and ensure that the recommendations provided could be adopted within UNHCR's capacity and the complexities of eastern DRC, while having an impact beyond DRC operations.

¹⁴ *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria: An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies.*

Table 1 - Data Collection & Sources

DATA COLLECTION	SOURCES
In-depth desk review	Internal and external documents were reviewed (see Annex 5)
Semi-structured KIIs	124 individuals were identified and 88 were invited for a remote KII 47 individuals were interviewed: 8 UNHCR HQ level, 18 UNHCR DRC Operation, 4 UNHCR Regional Level, 16 NGOs/UN agencies/Donors 60 PoCs interviewed locally
Focus group discussions	20 FGD conducted capturing the experiences and perceptions of 179 PoCs: IDPs (women, men, youth), IDP leaders, local community leaders, local NGO representatives, and local authorities.
Quantitative coverage	Quantitative data analysis was limited due to limited availability of secondary data through reporting, M&E systems, or data bases.
Participatory virtual validation and co-creation workshop	Validation of findings workshop was conducted on 18 June 2021, with internal UNHCR global, regional, and country office staff. The co creation of recommendations workshop was conducted on xxxxx.

26. The evaluation encountered several serious limitations:

- **The remote working modality limited access to field observations:** a field visit would have benefitted qualitative and quantitative data collection. The evaluation team recruited four national consultants across the 3 provinces (2 females, 2 males). They completed required UNHCR on-line trainings¹⁵, were briefed and trained on data collection methods, tools, and techniques, and conducted data collection mostly with PoCs.
- **The lack of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) information:** the evaluation’s findings remain triangulated mostly around desk review and KIIs. The evaluation team found there to be a general lack of both baseline and programmatic data and were not able to acquire logical frameworks (outlining project and program objectives, assumptions, indicators). This includes details on the emergency budget for the L3 response. Nor was it possible to obtain a Monitoring and Evaluation matrix.
- **Limited availability and response rates of stakeholders:** 124 informants were identified with the help of the operation and through networks cultivated by the evaluation team. 88 invitations resulted in 47 KIIs being conducted. The limited response was partly due to staff turnover, both within UNHCR and partner- and UN organisations. Government counterparts that were involved in the 2019-2020 response had been reassigned or dismissed following political changes and were no longer available for interviews.

¹⁵ ‘UNHCR Prevention and Exploitation and Sexual Abuse’ course and ‘UNHCR Protection Induction Program’ course.

- **Continuing large-scale displacements, serious security incidents, and the volcano eruption near Goma, rendered several stakeholders unavailable.** Several stakeholders indicated an interest in participating in the evaluation but were not able due to their continuing implication in the emergencies and in some cases evacuations. The above were also the reasons the minimum quorum for an Evaluation Reference Group could not be met.

4. Key findings

27. The below section will describe the overall findings along the three high-level areas of enquiry: 1/Design, 2/Implementation, and 3/Results. The majority of the findings are 'experiential'; derived from triangulating information provided via Key Informant Interviews and document review. The team employed the criteria developed by the OECD-DAC to organize and evaluate this information. These criteria were applied thoughtfully and were adapted to the context and needs of the stakeholders consulted.

4.1 Areas of enquiry 1: Design

4.1.1 Strategy, Planning and Operationalization of UNHCR's IDP Policy

28. The evaluation looked at the extent to which the new 2019 *Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement*, as well as existing policies and approaches on internal displacement, have shaped the strategy of the DRC operation and the response to the 2019 IDP emergency.

EQ 1: How relevant and useful are the emergency and IDP strategies to guide the response?

High level findings:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The IDP policy was to a large extent contextualized by the operation and provided guidance during the L3 response. • The DRC operation was pro-active in adapting central elements of the global IDP Policy, in particular introducing the goal of a <i>rapid</i> disengagement from emergency and other support to internal displacement crises. • The DRC L3 response did not come with a specific, tailored L3 response plan guided by budgetary priorities, timelines, and results-based indicators, rendering the results of the response less visible and hampering outreach and advocacy. • The DRC operation developed a range of approaches and strategy papers outlining the application of the IDP policy. The evaluation found that there was no concerted effort to introduce the approaches and strategies with partners.
EQ 1	

29. The emergency response, including responding to massive displacements in May and June 2019, preceded the issuance of the *Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of*

Internal Displacement in September 2019 ('Global Policy'). The evaluation found that the existing DRC *Protection Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons in the Democratic Republic of Congo* ('DRC IDP Strategy') used by the DRC operation to guide ongoing responses to internal displacement was already largely in line with the key objectives of the 'Global Policy'¹⁶.

30. The evaluation found that the operation did not, however, develop a comprehensive contingency emergency response plan prior to the 2019 emergency.
31. The evaluation found that the DRC operation was proactive in adapting the approach to internal displacement by including elements of the 'Global Policy' still in development. A mission to DRC in September 2019 by senior staff from the Division of International Protection (DIP) and the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply (DESS) was instrumental in shaping an updated approach: this resulted in the *Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the eastern DRC*¹⁷ ('DRC IDP Framework').
32. The DRC IDP Framework (as well as the previous DRC IDP Strategy¹⁸) is based on 3 key principles underpinning UNHCR's approaches to internal displacement: a rights-based approach, key to protection interventions through the inclusion of cross-cutting issues such as HIV, Gender, Protection Mainstreaming, Protection from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation; a community-based approach to seek the inclusion of all affected population groups and their participation in evaluations of their needs; and a solutions-based approach that promotes dialogue, peaceful co-existence and resilience of local communities that host IDPs or returning IDPs.
33. Document review and KIIs revealed that the DRC IDP Framework is also in line with the objectives and strategies of the Humanitarian Country Team¹⁹, which was revised in June 2019 to address the mass displacements.
34. The evaluation found that the operation's response approach, reflected in the 'DRC IDP Framework', successfully contextualized the key UNHCR strategies and policies of the

¹⁶ "UNHCR will seek to ensure that protection monitoring and community engagement mechanisms are established, as a means of identifying, preventing and mitigating conflict and violence, and their consequences, including forced displacement. We will also seek opportunities for partners to exchange information, mobilize resources and coordinate preparedness activities for protection, camp/site coordination and management and shelter".

"In its operational capacity, UNHCR will ensure a community-based protection approach and prioritize interventions to prevent, respond to and mitigate the most urgent and immediate protection risks and needs".

¹⁷ *Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC, September 2019, UNHCR internal document*

¹⁸ *UNHCR protection strategy for internally displaced persons response in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNHCR internal document, 2017*

¹⁹ https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/rdc_hrp_revised_juin_2020_vf.pdf

Global Policy (both the DRC IDP Framework and the Global Policy are based on key existing UNHCR strategic directions and policy approaches towards IDP emergencies²⁰):

- to support the centrality of protection in the humanitarian response to internal displacement²¹;
- to provide a sound protection and context analysis to support the overall response;
- to design, implement and sustain a meaningful, solutions-oriented operational response;
- to support global advocacy and resource mobilization.

35. Partly as a result of the operation's pro-active approach to conceptualising the response to massive internal displacement, DRC was selected as one of nine target countries of the IDP initiative²² (or 'Step-Up') with the aim to demonstrate good practices, heighten visibility and advocacy, and inform resource mobilization strategies and equitable resource allocation. A 'deep dive' review of the DRC response in July 2020²³ (part of the 'IDP Initiative') identified a number of key approaches by the operation that were in line with the 'Global Policy' and provided a series of recommendations, some of which are still pending.

36. The DRC operation further developed its vision and strategic approaches to the IDP emergency. Strategies and concept notes were developed, including Protection at national²⁴ and local level (i.e., Beni), as well as other thematic strategies and guidelines (i.e., on the Prevention and Response to Gender Based Violence (GBV²⁵), the approach to distributing Non-Food Items (NFI²⁶), and Cash Based Interventions (CBI²⁷). The evaluation was unable to determine the dissemination of the various concept notes and approaches among partners and relevant cluster members: key informant interviews and document review indicate there was no concerted effort by the operation to introduce the approaches with partners.

37. The emphasis by the operation was on exploring and developing different protection-related approaches to the displacements the CCCM cluster did not formulate a strategy-or contingency plan prior to the 2019 emergency. The 2017 Shelter Working Group Strategy was revised by the Shelter Cluster and validated on 31 August 2019; it included emergency response modalities.

²⁰ UNHCR's *Strategic Directions (2017-21)*²⁰, *UNHCR Interventions in Situations of Internal Displacement (The "IDP Footprint") 2016*²⁰, *the Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, 2009*²⁰, as well as the *OCHA 2004 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*²⁰.

²¹ IASC, *Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action, Statement of the IASC Principles, December 2013* <http://www.refworld.org/docid/52d7915e4.html>

²² UNHCR's *initiative on internal displacement 2020 – 2021*

²³ *IDP Step-Up Support: Democratic Republic of Congo, Principal Advisor on Internal Displacement's Deep Dive (10-24 July 2020)*

²⁴ *UNHCR protection strategy for internally displaced persons response in the democratic republic of congo 2019*

²⁵ *Stratégie GBV 2020 – 2021, UNHCR Sous-délégation de Goma.*

²⁶ *Note sur le ciblage des bénéficiaires du cash en DI, Octobre 2020*

²⁷ *Note d'orientation cash/Projet de protection communautaire IDPs 3 provinces, March 20*

38. The DRC IDP Framework and the Global Policy recognise the primary responsibility of the State—and where relevant, non-State actors—to prevent, respond to and resolve internal displacement. In line with the responsibility of national governments, and UNHCR’s support to enabling national actors to ensure IDPs enjoy their rights, a clear commitment to disengaging is part of the approach: *‘UNHCR will disengage responsibly when local and national actors can meaningfully take over operational delivery, coordination and monitoring in relation to protection and solutions for IDPs’*²⁸.
39. The evaluation found that UNHCR’s actions and approaches as outlined in the Global Policy, as well as the DRC IDP Framework, were not widely known by partners and counterparts, including donors. Although a number of UNHCR’s actions and responsibilities in the Global Policy are based on existing strategies and approaches, and therefore not new, the evaluation found the apparent lack of advocacy and visibility on the concept of ‘disengagement’ to be problematic.
40. The DRC IDP Framework differs from the Global Policy in that it stipulates a rapid disengagement by UNHCR from response programming: *‘Normally, prevention, preparedness and anticipation programming with a particular group or in a specific community should aim to take no longer than 6 months. Rapid response programming could last much less time’*²⁹
41. The evaluation found that the operation in 2020 did not prepare disengagement strategies with appropriate criteria and monitoring of outcomes for the response to the emergency in the three eastern provinces.
42. The 2019 DRC L3 declaration was the first time UNHCR declared an internal L3 for an IDP emergency. This declaration reaffirmed UNHCR’s commitment to engage in situations of internal displacement in humanitarian crises and ensured its leadership in protection, shelter and CCCM. The evaluation found the declaration to be in line with IASC guidelines and practises and to be appropriate in light of the scope of the emergency. The HCT declared a Level 3 response situation limited to the Ebola epidemic and the COVID pandemic (Scale-Up Protocol for the Control of Infectious Disease Events). The government was reported not to be in favor of declaring an IDP emergency, preferring to emphasize developmental needs.
43. The emergency support (budget, staff) by the organisation to the DRC emergency was a standard response in line with the Emergency Policy: there was no tailored plan or strategy that accompanied the emergency support. The L3-related additional budget was insufficient to cover operational needs. The funds were largely incorporated into ongoing

²⁸ *Policy on UNHCR’s Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, 18 September 2019*

²⁹ *Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC, September 2019, UNHCR internal document, page 8*

activities. This resulted in an incremental increase in the scope of the activities and interventions.

4.2 Area of enquiry 2: Implementation

44. This section presents findings on the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the emergency response in the sectors lead by UNHCR: Protection, Shelter and CCCM. The evaluation looked at: timeliness of the response, human resource and funding structures, coordination, and partnerships, as well as internal and external factors influencing the response. There was no specific ‘Level 3 response plan’, nor a baseline to serve as comparative benchmarks. The evaluation therefore focused on the extent interventions had an impact on the modalities of the response.

4.2.1 Implementation effectiveness

EQ 2: How effective was the L3 response in addressing the needs of IDPs in each of the different sectors: Protection, Shelter, CCCM?

EQ 3: To what extent were the Protection, Shelter and CCCCM components of the L3 crisis operationalised in line with the 2019 UNHCR IDP policy?

<p>High level findings:</p> <p>EQ 2</p> <p>EQ 3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased resources as a result of the L3 declaration facilitated scale up of activities; however, the activation of the L3 response mechanisms had limited impact on the response scope, timeliness, and effectiveness particularly in light of the scale of the crisis. • The capacity building of community actors and local authorities and the involvement of the PoCs in Community Based Protection were seen as very appropriate modalities in recurrent and protracted crisis, but only addressed a small proportion of the needs. • PoCs were particularly appreciative of cash, co-habitation, and income generating activities. • The extent of the IDP needs exceeded the response capacity of all actors; the lack of access limited the scope of the assistance and made substantive assessments of overall needs impossible.
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Implementation Approaches and Context

45. The evaluation found the Area Based Approach (ABA) that underpins the operation’s response planning to be appropriate to enable a comprehensive response to the multiple populations of concern that are present in an area; IDPs, IDP returnees, refugees, refugee returnees, and local population. The ABA is in line with the localised approach of the HCT planning and implementation, which is organised along existing government administrative areas (‘zones de santé’).

46. The evaluation found that all activities and interventions were severely impacted by a lack of access to areas and populations of concern. UNHCR- and partner staff were not able to work in the communities as a result of the COVID restrictions for most of the year. Additionally, continuing insecurity and violence further curtailed access and poor road conditions rendered even shorter missions impossible.
47. The Community-Based Protection activities, including the capacity building of local actors, had already started in 2019; however, the community consultation structures set up were not fully functional as a result of the COVID restrictions and risks.
48. During the emergency response UNHCR participated in joint multi-sector assessments. The assessments in the areas of mass displacement in Rutshuru and Pinga are good examples of a quick response to displacements. The evaluation found there to be uneven systematisation of outcomes, analysis, and prioritisation after the assessments. It was not always clear to what extent the missions informed the overall protection response. For example, at the onset of large displacements in Ituri, these assessments allowed for a rapid response and adjustments of activities. However, in other locations it took 2-3 months to implement a similar response.
49. The increased resources from the L3 activation contributed to a more effective IDP response, but only covered a very small proportion of the critical needs. Informants stated the enormous scale of needs made it challenging for UNHCR to remain operationally focused, consistent, and predictable in the response.
50. The standard L3 mechanisms and emergency funds were not seen as appropriate to protracted emergencies with multiple PoC populations and cyclic crises. In addition, country operations were structurally underfunded, especially in regard to IDPs. In light of the enormous needs in eastern DRC, both elements limited UNHCR's capacity to put its commitments into practice and at scale. Informants estimated UNHCR assistance only captured 20%³⁰ of the identified needs. Furthermore, access remained challenging due to logistical and security constraints. As a result, many areas of high concentration of IDPs were not covered.
51. The L3 contributed to reinforcing the capacity of local actors³¹. Partnerships shifted from large international NGOs to local NGOs, community-based actors, and local authorities. The scope of the interventions was limited due to insufficient resources and lack of access due to insecurity and Covid-19 restrictions.
52. UNHCR piloted several different community-based protection projects focusing on existing community groups and supporting them in identifying needs and acting upon their

³⁰ This percentage was reported in several KIIs, unknow source.

³¹ Strategic Objective 3 of the UNHCR's Framework for Engagement & Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC.

priorities. As example, in Beni, through the ‘Maire de Beni’ project, authorities felt more empowered to identify and respond to localised crises. UNHCR also provided access to economic opportunities, cash assistance and income generation activities. While these pilots were seen as commendable and very appropriate by the PoC’s, it is unclear to what geographical scope these can realistically be scaled up, the type of sustainable partnerships necessary to do so, and how to provide long-term solutions in this continuous changing environment.

53. The extent of the IDP needs exceeded the response capacity and resources of all humanitarian partners on the ground and this, together with the significant protection needs of all POCs, remained the biggest challenge in defining response focus and priority needs.

Protection

<p>High level findings:</p> <p>EQ 2 Protection</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The L3 response efforts strengthened existing protection monitoring and data collection activities: the operation introduced a community-based, participatory approach that provided real time information. • The innovative approach to protection monitoring included community-based identification of solutions. Both the protection data and the identified solutions served to guide the response by humanitarian actors. • The operation has identified GBV and PSEA as priority protection risks in both the monitoring and assistance efforts. The response and follow-up to reports of GBV are uneven due to the lack of actors present. The operation did not have a consolidated PSEA strategy during the emergency. • There were missed opportunities in providing systematic protection data to other clusters/HCT. This negatively affected protection mainstreaming and ultimately advocacy. • Protection monitoring provided comprehensive real time data in a number of accessible key locations; however, the analysis of the data was not systematic and this affected the ability to provide an appropriate response • The scope of the community-based protection monitoring was limited to accessible areas in the three provinces; accessibility affected by both insecurity and the COVID pandemic.
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54. The DRC operation is credited by counterparts and Persons of Concern alike to have implemented a community-based monitoring system and to have assisted in building local capacity to undertake assessments and raise emergency alerts. This approach was participatory and involved the community in the identification of solutions to different degrees.

55. The operation had introduced a new approach to data collection and analysis following the displacements in Kasai in 2018, based on the requests by partners, donors, as well as the

outcomes of the evaluation of the L3 in Kasai³². The new approach to data collection and analysis, *Système de Réponse et d'Analyse*, (SAR) has as its main goal to support evidence-based and targeted programming by all humanitarian actors in DRC. Partner staff, staff of other UN agencies, and local authorities are involved in the systematic collection and analysis of the interrelated (cross-sectoral) needs of all populations in an area, the reasons for displacement, as well as the identification of solutions. Prior to the full roll out of SAR in 2021, analysis was supported by reports from various monitors collected in KOBO.

56. The evaluation found the data collection and analysis approach (SAR) to be in line with the responsibilities of UNHCR field operations outlined in the IDP Policy³³, as well as the IDP initiative³⁴. The protection-based data collection and analysis served to confirm the centrality of protection in the response and provided add value to the existing incident reporting carried out by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN peacekeeping mission: *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo* (MONUSCO).
57. The monitoring reports included details on the protection incidents, the developments over time, an analysis of the causes/background and the related needs. The recommendations following from the analysis indicate what actions were to be taken and by which actors. The evaluation found that the response and follow-up to identified needs was uneven and not organised as a 'case-management' system. Roles and responsibilities were not clear with partners, leading to delays and gaps in the response. The reports resulting from the joint data collection and analysis were shared with partners and the HCT. The reports were furthermore published on the DRC Protection Cluster website. The public reports stopped in July 2020, limiting the impact of the protection analysis on the overall response.
58. Protection monitoring was scaled up in all three provinces, though more prominently in North Kivu, with implementing partner INTERSOS. AVSI provided community based protection activities in the three provinces. The partners conducted 83 protection monitoring missions in the three provinces. The missions targeted some hard-to-reach areas. There was enhanced real time sharing of protection incidents (a total of 61.295³⁵ protection incidents were reported by partners) to inform coordination and response to critical needs, which included Shelter, NFI, CCCM and Cash interventions. The operation reported 95 interventions by humanitarian actors that were the result of the protection monitoring.

³² *Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 Emergency in the Democratic Republic of Congo, December 2018, UNHCR Evaluation Service.*

³³ *Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, 18 September 2019*

³⁴ *'UNHCR will ensure timely and impact-oriented assistance and protection for those displaced and affected. This will be enabled through sound protection monitoring, needs assessments, and analysis conducted, together with partners, including at all stages of internal displacement crises'. UNHCR's initiative on internal displacement 2020 – 2021*

³⁵ *Annual 2020 reporting figures, including the L3 response*

59. The protection monitoring missions conducted participatory assessments, interacting with representative and inclusive focus groups. The missions included information sessions on available assistance and awareness building on protection risks and responses. The mission report covering the L3 period indicate 82,665³⁶ women in the 3 provinces benefited from awareness sessions on GBV.
60. The severe access limitations as a result of recurring violence, insecurity and the COVID related restrictions limited the scope of the planned roll-out of the community-based protection activities (including the capacity building of local actors and groups). The geographical scope of the protection monitoring activities described in this section was severely limited to a number of safe areas and urban zones. The majority of protection monitoring activities and reports, as well as capacity building efforts, took place in North Kivu. The operation used community radio programs to mitigate the lack of access: an estimated 130.000 persons were reached.
61. Although IDP populations in remote and insecure locations were not, or only partially, covered by the L3 interventions, the results of the monitoring, community consultations, and feedback provided by counterparts and persons of concern validate the approaches taken by the DRC operation in the areas that were accessible.
62. The evaluation was unable to determine the coverage of the capacity building of local actors across the three regions. An assessment of the coverage, as well as the level of local capacities, are key in a 'responsible disengagement from capacity building as foreseen in the IDP Policy'³⁷, as well as the rapid disengagement planned in the DRC IDP Framework³⁸ after 6 months of the start of emergency interventions.
63. Engagement with local authorities was strengthened at local level and was supported by coordination mechanisms and by different operational modalities within the limits of rapid disengagement, however, this remained limited at provincial and national level. The "IDP framework" recommends a rapid disengagement (of maximum 6 months), with different criteria than the IDP policy recommendations³⁹. This approach was not always supported by effective advocacy at all levels to promote the responsibility of the government to expand their role in IDP response in protracted crises by scaling-up or replicating successful community interventions.

³⁶ Annual 2020 reporting figures, including the L3 response.

³⁷ Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, 18 September 2019

³⁸ Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC, September 2019, UNHCR internal document

³⁹ "UNHCR will disengage responsibly when local and national actors can meaningfully take over operational delivery, coordination and monitoring in relation to protection and solutions for IDPs. This will require UNHCR, from the outset of its involvement, to undertake interventions and measures aimed at enhancing national response capacity, including technical advice and support for national laws and policies on internal displacement, training, and capacity development".

64. The operation, as well as the HCT humanitarian country plans, have identified the lack of capacity of local authorities and institutions as an obstacle to the effective roll-out of community-based initiatives. In a number of locations, the diverging ethnic and political backgrounds of displaced populations and local authorities in the areas of displacement were the basis for a lack of trust and limited inclusion of IDPs in local structures.
65. Protection monitoring also boosted the early warning system by reinforcing local capacity and mobilising external assistance⁴⁰. As alerts exceeded response capacity, UNHCR and partners agreed in systematising and prioritising the most crucial needs or focusing on situations where there were no implementing actors, following improved guidelines⁴¹. Although an analyses of protection trends was undertaken, and informants stated this was overall effective and timely, it proved challenging to define a systematic prioritization approach and to implement a timely emergency response based on the capacity of local partners, which was not always sufficient. Due to limited capacity of local actors, rapid emergency response was often limited to areas where UNHCR and partners had already a presence.
66. UNHCR improved protection response through a variety of programmatic modalities including community-based projects either via direct implementation or through partners (i.e., supporting the *synergies*⁴² and through Quick Impact Projects (QIP)). Informants and PoCs were very positive that these interventions contributed to reinforcing community mechanisms and resilience. UNHCR was reported to have a strong presence in some hard-to-reach areas, although it had very limited response capacity in areas with no prior presence. Community-based protection supported both displaced as well as to a lower degree host communities. Furthermore, it included training of local representatives and leaders to monitor and report on specific needs, alerts, delivered services and PoCs accountability through a feedback mechanism. There is evidence from various implementing partners (AIDES, ANPT-PP-Action and SOCOAC) that addressing identified vulnerabilities and protection needs through participatory approaches took place. However, interviewees indicated that protection as a concept was occasionally diluted by the practice of focusing on stand alone, small-scale, and time-limited projects with no prospect of replication or scale-up.
67. UNHCR's operational shift--devolving responsibilities towards the grassroots level by supporting community-based⁴³ monitoring, analysis, reporting, and protection-- assisted generating proximity and accountability towards internally displaced populations. This major step was not always been clearly communicated to all key stakeholders; this impacted the way it was understood or accepted. Some interviewees believed UNHCR still

⁴⁰ *Note sur le circuit de collecte, analyse et diffusion des alertes (UNHCR unknown date)*

⁴¹ *Plan d'Action Monitoring de Protection (UNHCR, Exercices 2019 and 2020)*

⁴² *'Synergies were developed, to integrating displaced population into local development plans; Note conceptuelle de mise en œuvre des Synergies avec partenaires locaux (Draft May 2020)*

⁴³ *"Host communities and provincial and local governments will plan for and manage the majority of conflict and human rights related crises" Vision, "IDP Engagement Framework".*

has a clear key role in emergency response (as either implementer or at least advocating for critical major gaps to be covered), while within the organization some find this to be an ambitious and unmanageable role to fulfil. This needs further clarity and clear delimitations, which need to be visualized. In addition, UNHCR's shift involves taking a remote approach as a step further; this was only tested during the L3 via some short and targeted projects, some of which are currently being evaluated. However, there is an initial indication that sounder risk analysis and prioritization may be required.

68. Key stakeholders indicated that protection mainstreaming was inconsistently implemented across the operation and that there were different expectations among informants as to what extent this was part of UNHCR's role. The 2019 UNHCR Protection strategy for IDPs⁴⁴ and the 2019 IDP policy state that protection should be mainstreamed in all sectors/clusters of the response. Informants external to UNHCR expressed the expectation that this was within UNHCR's responsibilities. Other UN agencies have different approaches to protection, which makes overall mainstreaming coordination and understanding challenging. The evaluation found that protection mainstreaming was well-established within the Shelter and CCCM clusters, and between UNHCR implementing partners. Notwithstanding the centrality of protection being the basis of the HCT 2020 response plan⁴⁵, the evaluation could not determine how this concept was being understood and implemented across other sectors. The evaluation could also not establish to what extent a number of protection approaches and strategies developed by the operation had been discussed or introduced with the HCT and other key stakeholders in DRC (i.e. donors).
69. Key informants beyond UNHCR's implementing partners stated that protection data was not systematically shared with other clusters, sub-clusters, and other organisations; this potentially resulted in lost opportunities to respond to protection needs.
70. The FGDs and KIIs undertaken by the evaluation team with PoC in the three provinces, including women and girls IDPs, revealed that GBV is seen as the highest protection risk for both displaced and host populations. In 2020, through its community-based protection monitoring activities, the operation has identified 5,818 incidents of GVB in the three regions in the East. Reported GBV incidence in DRC is generally considered to represent only a small fraction of the actual scope of the prevalence of GBV.
71. The referral and follow-up of GBV incidents reported through community-based monitoring was uneven and non-existent in large rural areas. The operation reported a serious lack of follow-up mechanisms for GBV survivors: in most areas, medical and legal services are very limited and psycho-social services are non-existent beyond the urban centers. To reinforce the existing GBV response, UNHCR conducted a review of GBV key referral

⁴⁴ UNHCR Protection Strategy for IDPs response in the DRC, 2019

⁴⁵ 'La centralité de la protection sera assurée dans toutes les interventions humanitaires'.


services (health, police, judicial), which was shared among community partners and *les synergies*. In addition they formed a WhatsApp group that included all GBV focal points of partners, community structures, committees of displaced people to follow trends, share good practices and coordinate urgent response with service providers. Across external informants there seemed limited understanding on what UNHCR’s role was vis-a-vis GBV in IDP situations versus in a refugee context.

72. The COVID restrictions impacted on awareness activities as well as response efforts. Large areas were not accessible (also reducing the availability of medical supplies such as PEP kits) and community-based activities were restricted as people were prohibited from gathering.
73. The operation has identified PSEA as a serious protection risk for IDP women and girls in the three regions. The prevention of sexual exploitation is included in awareness sessions delivered to the PoCs and training of protection monitors and local actors. Women and girls assessed as being at risk of GBV were targeted for cash assistance. This occurred at a limited (pilot) scale in areas where UNHCR and partners had access. The operation did not, however, have a consolidated strategy on PSEA. The lack of a PSEA strategy lead by the protection cluster limited the mainstreaming of prevention and response activities in the overall humanitarian response.

Shelter

<p>High level findings:</p> <p>EQ 2 Shelter</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNHCR’s taking responsibility of the Shelter Cluster in the pre-L3 scale up had a direct and positive impact in the provision of shelter and settlements service to IDPs during the L3 response. • The multi-pronged shelter strategy addressing the specific needs of a variety of PoC was deemed appropriate and in line with the IDP Policy. • Multi-purpose cash is assessed as an appropriate and effective assistance modality; it allowed for targeted support to women and girls at risk. The scope and scale of the multi-purpose cash assistance was limited to areas where UNHCR and partners had access. • Prepositioned contingency stocks were deemed insufficient and procurement procedures cumbersome; partially the result of a lack of timely funding.
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74. Historically, UNICEF ran the NFI working group in DRC with little focus on shelter. However, in the months leading up to the declaration of the L3, as the IDP crisis began to grow in scale UNHCR took responsibility for this working group, elevated its function to the Cluster level, and changed its focus to Emergency Shelter, as well as NFIs.
75. The shelter and NFI interventions were prioritized in the 2020 emergency response, as shown in the circle diagram below (*figures are annual, including the L3 response period*).



Source: UNHCR MSRP

76. Shelter Cluster Objectives:⁴⁶

- Access to dignified and decent housing is provided to improve the physical and mental protection, standard of living, well-being, health, and access to basic services of people affected by displacement.


⁴⁶ https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/20210419_strategie_clusterabris_1.pdf

- Immediate access to essential household items, including intimate hygiene kits, is provided to people affected by displacement to enable them to cover their vital needs that preserve their physical and mental integrity, reduce their vulnerability, and improve their living conditions.

77. The Shelter Cluster targeted 2 million (out of an estimated 5.5 million displaced persons) with an estimated budget of \$119 M USD. As of March 2021, sheltering agencies had constructed 27,561 shelters and assisted 164,393 people, or 8% of their goal.⁴⁷ Key partners included: REACH, ACTED, NRC, CR RDC, AIDES, ADSSE, AIRD, AVSI, CARITAS, CENEAS, CONCERN, CRS, DCA, CR-DRC, HELPAGE, LIDEAS, OIM, Helpage, CONCERN, and UNHCR.⁴⁸

78. The shelter strategy had 3 phases and was designed for 5 scenarios: Displaced persons living with a host family; Displaced persons in an urban setting; Returnees; Displaced persons in “en Centre Collectif” or in a site; and Host communities.

Le temps passe et les personnes mettent a niveau leurs abris



79. There was no dedicated Shelter Cluster Coordinator in place from September 2019 to August 2020; however, the Shelter Coordinators, when present, were commended for their skills. The staff that temporarily took on the Coordinator role necessarily took on double functions, were ‘double-hatted’: in addition to their roles as Shelter Cluster Coordinators, they also performed operational functions (whether for UNHCR or a partner agency).

80. Multiple stakeholders credit UNHCR’s taking responsibility for the Shelter Cluster as a watershed moment in the humanitarian response to the IDP crisis. Interviewees indicated that operational and Cluster funds were insufficient to meet the needs and that there were significant HR gaps (i.e., National Shelter Cluster Coordinator). However, they recognised the positive impact that experienced Shelter Cluster Coordinators and the corresponding

⁴⁷ <https://www.sheltercluster.org/response/democratic-republic-congo>

⁴⁸ https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/20210430_presence_operationnelle_nationale_t1.pdf

funding to strengthen the Shelter Cluster Team (approx. \$1 million USD) had on the efforts to provide shelter and settlements solutions for PoCs.

81. Interviewees consistently remarked that the Shelter Cluster was one of the best functioning clusters in terms of: 5Ws, IM, identification of gaps, needs, coverage, reporting on partner/NGO's sheltering activities, coordinating joint assessments, and elaborating sectorial strategies. UNHCR was commended for the significant amount of information sharing between the CCCM, Shelter and Protection Clusters. The training of its Shelter Officers was also highlighted; however, it was also noted that Shelter officers were often double hatted, which caused a lack of distinction between UNHCR's shelter operations and their role in Shelter Cluster Coordination. Interviewees reported that they also faced significant challenges in terms of producing technical documents and on occasion were not able to overcome barriers that limited the support they could provide to partners.
82. The evaluation team finds UNHCR's multi-pronged sheltering strategy (emergency and transitional shelter) to be in line with IDP policy and commends its tailored approach to address the different needs of the various PoCs.⁴⁹ The adaptable shelter strategy (change from plastic sheeting to mud bricks and local materials) resulted in construction of more sustainable shelters that offered families better protection than the original model. Implementing partners were able to rearrange agreements and to reprioritise so as to decongest sites and free up the schools. It was also noted that *les synergies* played a positive role in determining shelter strategy and implementing it.
83. The operation had a relatively large multi-purpose cash program to assist IDPs, as well as the host population. The multi-purpose cash programme targeted women and girls survivors of GBV or PSEA, and those assessed to be at risk of GBV or PSEA, as well as POCs with specific needs. In North Kivu and Ituri, 7611 households with women and girls at risk were supported with multi-purpose cash. Post-distribution monitoring showed POCs used the cash to cover basic needs as well as medical costs, and school fees. The cash assistance is limited in light of the assessed (and expressed) needs of the IDPs and the host populations. The coverage by cash assistance programs is further curtailed due to a lack of access, high levels of insecurity, and the lack financial service providers in hard-to-reach, and insecure areas.
84. The evaluation found UNHCR's implementing partners were unclear on the details of Cash Based Intervention (CBI) and that they showed inconsistent delivery capabilities in terms of time and quality. Specific to the DRC protracted crisis context, cash was found to be an appropriate⁵⁰ mechanism to break demand barriers and provide choice to populations, however implementation was challenging. There were several constraints

⁴⁹ 1. IDPs: a.Cash transfers for those paying rent; b. Emergency shelter material for those in sites; c. Cash/materials for IDPs with access to land; d. With host families; e. Recently displaced; f.Displaced for longer period of time; 2. Host families: transitional shelter assistance; 3.Host communities: multi-inhabitant "hangars"/community sheds belong to community when IDPs return.

⁵⁰ Also supported by the Grand Bargain commitments

that made cash assistance challenging: the mitigation of fiduciary risks, limitations in banking/network in accessing hard to reach populations: POCs reported that cash often came late, and amounts were below what was initially communicated. Despite this, the PoCs found in particular CBI an appropriate intervention to their needs. This was reported also by those not having benefitted from CBI interventions as those who benefitted shared with those who hadn't.

85. The evaluation found that the strategies of the overall emergency response showed little impact to address issues that require strong local governance (absent in large parts of eastern DRC), such as: ownership of land, loss of ownership, and the right to return. While, these issues could be potentially addressed via advocacy efforts, the environment during the L3 response was not favorable to such efforts.
86. Given the recurring nature of the IDP crises in DRC, while the prepositioned stocks in sub-delegation warehouses allowed for initial distributions, the evaluation found that prepositioning contingency stocks of emergency shelter items and NFIs and streamlining procurement and HR recruitment procedures are areas in which UNHCR could improve its operational capacity. Together with slow international procurement and poor infrastructure and access, this resulted in delayed and unpredictable Shelter/NFI assistance. In certain occasions IDPs had already moved by the time NFIs arrived.

Camp Coordination and Camp Management - CCCM

<p>High level findings: EQ 2 CCCM</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The L3 successfully activated the Ituri CCCM working group and reinforced the CCCM WG in North Kivu. • Nevertheless, a perceived lack of CCCM ownership at national level and the 'working group' status resulted in missed opportunities (in terms of effective coordination with partners, advocacy, and funding).
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87. Stakeholders reported CCCM to have limited buy-in from the HCT and ownership within UNHCR at national level that resulted in a lack of engagement and ground-level strategy development. Working in close collaboration with the governmental agency, Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés (CNR), CCCM aimed at promoting solutions to transition IDPs living in host communities or to provide return options⁵¹. The co-lead role with IOM resulted at times in reduced operational coherence and inconsistencies in communication to the HCT. Many informants stated that they did not see the clear added value of CCCM in the IDP context, which resulted in a lack of strategic buy-in. CCCM was not a formal cluster and was absent from the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and the HPR. The evaluation found that this resulted in irregular pathways to undertake programmatic decisions, conduct advocacy, or to inform financing. CCCM operations were limited by

⁵¹ A field visit was undertaken by the global CCCM Cluster in eastern DRC in July 2019 with the purpose to provide operational guidance.

unfilled positions during the L3, this resulted in constraints in terms of appropriate and timely expertise⁵², lack of data⁵³, as well as insufficient funding⁵⁴. The evaluation was not able to locate a L3-specific CCCM strategy and stakeholders expressed that a recently developed draft CCCM framework had limited buy-in within UNHCR. There is no CCCM working group in South Kivu.

88. The evaluation found that CCCM had been effective at integrating displaced communities in host communities, working across the shelter and protection clusters. CCCM is also reported as having been effective in the sites under UNHCR coordination. Interviewees indicated that these sites were managed in a way that facilitated assistance with UNHCR providing up-to-date information to partners on site structure, demographics, and vulnerabilities.

89. The evaluation found there were diverging views on whether CCCM should become a formal cluster and what role CCCM should take in IDP situations in Eastern DRC where most IDPs live within host communities. While some informants state that the formalisation of CCCM into an IASC Cluster would inform better strategy and approaches others felt CCCM should focus on a limited set of activities and needs. Despite technical support and training from the Global CCCM Cluster, staff from implementing partners as well as from UNHCR indicated they were unsure what the role of the CCCM cluster was.

Coordination and Partnerships

<p>High level findings:</p> <p>EQ 2 Effectiveness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination across all Clusters was limited as a result of an uneven presence of Cluster-, and Sub-cluster leads, particularly in Ituri and South Kivu. Case management and referrals were severely impacted. • The evaluation found there to be diverging views within UNHCR, as well as with counterparts, as to what extent UNHCR could be expected to act as a provider of last resort. • Protection coordination and mainstreaming were regarded as uneven and often limited to UNHCR partners and counterparts. • Strong partnerships with local actors were developed but limited to the areas where UNHCR piloted operational modalities. • Partnerships with development actors were not developed to ensure sustainability and scale up.
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90. Coordination is largely dependent on the presence of coordination lead agencies/staff in the areas of intervention. The lack of presence in (or predictable access) for humanitarian staff was a limiting factor for all organisations working in DRC. UNHCR, as the organisation with the largest presence in field locations, and OCHA, have been engaged

⁵² There is no technical unit in HQ and the WG CCCM coordinators report to the Deputy Representative, Protection

⁵³ There are no indicators in UNHCR results based management system (Compass) to measure CCCM

⁵⁴ Anecdotal evidence through interviews indicated the CCCM budget was limited to 5000 USD.

in efforts to mitigate the lack of presence by using local counterparts (national NGOs, local authorities, community leaders). In response to the IDP emergency in 2018, UNHCR and OCHA activated the Cadres Provinciales de Concertation Humanitaire (CPCH). The CPCH aimed at involving provincial authorities in the coordination of the humanitarian response and enhance coordination between humanitarian, as well as developmental, actors. UNHCR, as member of the technical secretariat of the CPCH, ensured the inclusion of protection principles in the coordination. Efforts to improve the implication of regional authorities in the coordination of humanitarian responses were only partially effective due to a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of ministries at national level. The government has no national strategy on internal displacement.

91. Sustained lack of access due to insecurity across the three provinces played a key role in limiting coordination efforts. The evaluation found that the limited and uneven presence of cluster, and sub-cluster leads (GBV cluster, Child protection cluster) in Ituri and South Kivu had a detrimental impact on the interventions of the protection cluster.
92. The evaluation found that UNHCR performed its IASC Cluster Coordination role solidly in the Shelter Cluster and the CCCM Working Group. Counterparts consistently praised UNHCR's Shelter Cluster Coordination team for its strong and experienced leadership, transparent collaboration, and the role it played in providing coherent and complementary responses amongst partners. Stakeholders commended the CCCM working group for its strong capacity to lead, however other stakeholders reported limited buy-in by partners and that the co-lead role with IOM resulted in confusion, reduced coherence in response and communication to the HCT. These stakeholders indicated that competition between IOM and UNHCR led to uncoordinated assessments, with each partner doing their own evaluations but using a different basis, which prevented the possibility of producing joint reports.
93. The evaluation found that protection coordination was perceived as uneven among key informants. Among the issues identified was that the efforts to advocate for political-level interventions to push forward protection issues and identify initiatives for humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy could have been strengthened. The evaluation was informed that at times there was a disconnect between the Protection Cluster and the other Clusters and Working Groups. Key stakeholders felt that the Protection Cluster played a key role in contributing to timely and informed decision-making by the HC and HCT through on-going monitoring, analysis, and information-sharing.⁵⁵ The evaluation found diverging views within UNHCR, as well as with counterparts, as to what extent UNHCR could be expected to act as a provider of last resort.
94. Coordinating the Protection Cluster is regarded as UNHCR's principal role by external partners. While the Protection Cluster appropriately coordinated assessments, stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team expressed concerns about Inter-Cluster

⁵⁵ IASC; 2016; *IASC Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action*


Coordination: the evaluation found that protection mainstreaming was seen as limited throughout the IDP response. The operation has conceptualised a number of approaches (see above), but it was not clear to what extent these approaches were introduced with the protection cluster members or the large humanitarian community. The absence of key protection strategies, such as on GBV and PSEA, could limit a lead protection role.

95. The L3 scale up was carried out with the support of local actors (local authorities, local organisations, and the local community) following UNHCR’s commitments to support the localisation agenda⁵⁶ as part of the IDP policy. The operation emphasized strengthening capacity via direct technical support, provision of materials, training, and coaching (“*accompagnement*”) aimed at providing a more sustainable programmatic approach. Certain modalities were piloted with a high degree of acceptability and engagement from PoCs and partners. As such, the “*synergies*”⁵⁷ were developed, which aimed at integrating displaced population into local development plans in locations like Beni. Other modalities via local partners were also tested, “*les champs communautaires*” in NK, promoting peaceful coexistence between all members of the community (host, displaced and ethnicities) while generating income activities. Replication and scale up of these initiatives are currently being assessed; however, it seems it would have been both financially and operationally challenging to expand these projects to a larger scale. Partnerships with development and peace actors, implementing agencies, donors, and cooperation with other UN agencies were limited. This would need to be explored as a key element in order to expand these initiatives in other areas and increase funding opportunities. UNHCR partnerships at local level were described as solid and UNHCR was a well-recognised assistance provider by the PoCs.
96. The evaluation found that several counterparts were not fully aware of UNHCR’s mandate and role in IDP emergencies. In addition, though protection-specific data and analysis was shared efficiently with direct implementing partners, it was not sufficiently shared with other counterparts, or across clusters.
97. Partners commended the coordination put in place by UNHCR in the Protection, Shelter and CCCM clusters; however, they observed that there was uneven and unpredictable provision of technical documents to guide partner’s activities and to establish minimum standards. Coordinators at the hub level (Goma) were double hatted; this led to confusion on the part of sector members on their role as Cluster coordinator and their role as UNHCR staff.
98. In line with the expanding Community-Based Approach and the efforts towards localisation and capacity building of national partners, the operation more than doubled its budget allocation to national NGOs between 2018 and 2020. The table below shows the relative priority given to supporting national NGOs within the increased budget.

⁵⁶ As defined by the Grand Bargain

⁵⁷ Note conceptuelle de mise en œuvre des Synergies avec partenaires locaux (Draft May 2020)

Proportional Increase Budget Allocation to National NGOs: 2018 - 2020



Source: UNHCR MSRP, figures 2020 include additional CERF funds

99. The operation worked with 17 partners in the response in the three regions. 9 national NGOs were almost exclusively financed by UNHCR. This limited the sustainability of their programs as well as cross-fertilization between programs and clusters. The limited exposure to comprehensive emergency interventions by national organisations resulted in uneven coordination between partners: this was an issue identified by the operation.

4.2.2 Implementation efficiency: timeliness and resources

EQ 2: How efficient was the L3 response in addressing the needs of IDPs in each of the different activities: Protection, Shelter, CCCM?

<p>High level findings:</p> <p>EQ 2 Efficiency</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The L3 could have been declared earlier and would have thus been better aligned to increased displacement around June 2019; however, this would not have significantly impacted the commencement of the IDP response. The operation had already started a response with funds held in reserve; the L3 funds only represented an incremental addition in light of the overwhelming needs. • The delays in supply and staff recruitment impinged upon UNHCR's capacity to respond in a timely manner. • UNHCR's operations were further hampered by complex internal processes, limited, decentralised contingency stocks, and limited in-country capacity to recruit national positions. • The deactivation of the L3 and the corresponding abrupt reduction in funds was detrimental to maintaining the minimum appropriate response capacity in this protracted crisis.
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100. The L3 could have been earlier declared and would have thus been better aligned to high intensity displacement around June 2019; however, this would not have significantly impacted the IDP response operations. Interviewees consistently cited a 2-to-3 month delay in the formal declaration of the L3 emergency, which occurred in November. There was a lack of clarity in decision making and administrative processes in how to move from the L2 level to an L3. Other factors were cited: how the L3 declaration would be received by the national authorities, and the fact that DRC is considered to be in state of chronic emergency, which made it more difficult to realize that the IDP crisis was really “not normal”. Additionally, the distinction between an L2 and an L3 emergency did not seem to be clear for a number of UNHCR staff.

101. Experience with the recurring, cyclical nature of violence and epidemics in DRC led key decision-makers to hold a portion of operational funds in reserve that were then used to jump start IDP operations in the months before the L3 was declared. Interviewees indicated, and the timing of the DESS/DIP Joint High Level Mission (with UNHCR's Shelter Cluster expert) confirms, that even 5 months before the declaration of the L3, UNHCR was aware of the growing crisis and actively prepared implementing plans to scale up operational capacity. Stakeholders indicated an earlier declaration would not have really changed the situation significantly. Despite the initial delay, funds arrived in December and January of 2021 and these were seen as largely insufficient to meet the needs of the PoCs.

102. There is no specific M&E framework to monitor and analyse outcomes or impact of the L3 response. The UNHCR M&E framework⁵⁸, with a scope beyond the L3, consists of clear output, outcome, and process indicators and includes set targets and baseline metrics. However, this framework has some shortfalls relating to adequacy, content reliability and appears to have been incompletely implemented. This framework was certainly underutilised for program adaptation purposes. The L3 did also not come with a specific Theory of Change and logical framework to plan and track activity implementation. The limited availability of quantitative data has been a limitation in conducting this evaluation.
103. Upwards reporting from implementing partners is done but seems inconsistent and does not clearly demonstrate how UNHCR keeps its implementing partners to account. It is also not certain how local level data is aligned to UNHCR data systems at regional or national level for aggregation purposes. This evaluation did not specifically assess the accountability and transparency mechanisms in place.
104. The operation reported to have conducted real-time self-evaluations including community-based pilot projects such as: the GBV response, the synergies projects, and other community protection modalities. They also kept track through thematic dashboards of training, on “accompagnement juridique”, shelter, GBV, protection monitoring outputs. These mid- and end-line self-evaluations were pertinent to monitor the pilot’s performance and results before scale up. It remains unclear how the results of the self-evaluations led to adjustments in implementation.
105. In general, existing aggregated data collection and analysis mechanisms were insufficient in demonstrating reliable program results. The evaluation team believes, however, that a field visit could potentially have generated more data and this has somewhat affected the evaluability. While some donors seem flexible on data requirements, other donors report this is an important shortcoming that risks to hamper future funding opportunities.

Supply and Human Resources

106. Procurement and supply chain inefficiencies were cited by many as impeding operational efficiency. Significant delays in procurement and supply (6-12 months) for shelter/NFIs hampered timely assistance to IDP populations in particular in relation to ‘pendulum displacement’⁵⁹. Limited emergency preparedness and access to decentralised stocks, international procurement and poor infrastructure and access resulted in delayed and unpredictable assistance. This included insufficient transport, lack of decentralised warehouse capacity outside of Goma and significant delays in filling orders for NFIs. This

⁵⁸ UNHCR Operational Plan 2019-2020

⁵⁹ ‘Populations victim to repeated displacements, including after initial return to their place of origin.’

was compounded by significant access issues due to insecurity and poor road conditions. The cumulative result prevented predictable, operational response time. Interviewees stated that there were limited decentralised, contingency emergency stocks in general and that in certain areas delivery of NFIs incurred delays of 4 to 6 months.

107. The evaluation found a positive impact from the deployment of officers from UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (EPRS) and roster members from its Emergency Response Team (ERT) in scaling up operations in the initial months of the emergency. Several interviewees indicated that it took time to fill some of these positions and that when their rotation length was finished (2-3 months) their departure left a gap in operational capacity that again took time to fill: the average time on the ground by the 15 ERT members deployed between September 2019 and August 2020 was less than 3 months. However, many of those interviewed by the evaluation team emphasized the inability of the "regular" recruitment process to meet the emergency Human Resources (HR) needs of the operation and opined that the L3 did not provide for the necessary HR surge support to fill these needed positions.
108. While the L3 resulted in many additional positions and the fast track recruitment supported by headquarters was timely and appropriate, there were inefficiencies around in-country recruitment influencing operations. The fast track recruitment of 23 international positions was seen as very efficient and provided strong and appropriate expertise to the response. For in-country recruitment, it seems that UNHCR does not have Standard Operating Procedures establishing a supplementary human resource (HR) team to support the additional recruitment burden. The evaluation team was told that there were 10,000 applicants for 13 national positions, with no additional HR capacity to streamline the additional recruitment. Many of these key HR positions arrived late, which impacted operations and coordination (i.e., shelter cluster and protection officer in Beni, 10 positions were delayed by one year). Extended gaps in HR (e.g., National Shelter Cluster Coordinator) necessitated that many UNHCR staff were "double-hatted", having to dedicate part of their time as a Cluster coordinator while simultaneously continuing their work as UNHCR staff.
109. The increased staffing across all three provinces enabled UNHCR to better meet the needs of IDPs. With a budget of \$5.4 million USD for L3 positions⁶⁰, UNHCR added 60 staff under the L3: 23 of these were international positions; 20 Professional Positions (P2/3/4) for Protection, Shelter and CCCM Cluster Coordination Staffing positions; and 3 Field Service Positions. 37 staff were recruited locally: 6 National Professional Officers and 31 General Service Staff.
110. The temporary solution of permitting the regularisation of Temporary Assignments (TA) filled some of the gaps and resulted in National Officer positions, increased local staff

⁶⁰ *Inclusive of Kasai. IDP Overview: Management Workforce: DRC, July 2020, PPT.*

at higher levels, offered career advancement opportunities, allowed for the creation of a new Field Office in Beni, and the expansion of the Field Office in Bunia. While this was seen as an appropriate process to gap-fill, provincial teams reported there was high turnover within the TA positions. Additionally, stakeholders consistently noted significant delays (up to 1 year) to recruit key positions, which impacted UNHCR's response capacity.

111. Other barriers to efficient scale up of HR included: the \$3.6 million USD staffing gap in IDP affected areas⁶¹, French language requirements, the hardship and non-family duty station. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted UNHCR's ability to deploy staff, and staff movements in general, resulting in staff having to stay prolonged periods in their duty stations.
112. A significant barrier to sustaining scale up is the time bound character of the L3. As a result, the budget for the emergency was reduced by 80% when the L3 was deactivated and many positions were discontinued, leaving the response understaffed compared to the scale of the needs.

Budget

113. The UNHCR's financial system shows significant program support; however, it enabled only limited disaggregation of financial data along the L3 timeline. This could be justified by the fact that the L3 IDP response in Eastern DRC was a scale up of existing programs. The evaluation has found that it was not possible to determine how much 'L3 money' went to particular programs or projects, nor to determine the precise provenance of funding for L3 related pilots, activities, and programs. The UNHCR programs budget was reported to be consistently insufficient to meet the high level of needs and maintain appropriate levels of programming, and the L3 budget increase is meant as a temporary top up.
114. The additional L3 budget from HQ is a standard, one-size-fits-all support: there is no direct correlation between the emergency needs of the DRC and the budget amount provided. The evaluation found that the amount as well as the duration of the L3 declaration could be considered arbitrary as these are set in the organisation's administrative rules of the Emergency Policy and are not based on an assessment of the (continuing) emergency needs, nor on the capacity of the DRC operation to resource additional funding to continue, or increase, the emergency response.
115. UNHCR staff in the field were not always aware of the budget, nor the duration, available for emergency responses. Neither did the transfer periodicity, or the amounts of the L3 budget disbursements appear to be predictable. An examination of the financial data available from the Regional Bureau shows the following disbursements to Kinshasa/Goma/Aru directly tied to the IDP crisis in the Kivus and Ituri.

⁶¹ *Inclusive of Kasai*

Disbursements related to the emergency response.

DATE	COMMENTS	OL TOTAL
12/7/2019	OL increase to cover Urgent IDPs needs in the provinces of Ituri and N. Kivu	5,826,516
12/9/2019	DIP to COD Pillar 4 for hosting the conference on durable solutions on IDPs	83,000
23/10/2019	OL increase (part of \$164 reserve funds) for Emergency protection and assistance to IDPs in Eastern DRC	3,719,672
9/12/2020	\$3.5M OL increase from Emergency Operational Reserve to address IDP crisis	3,500,000
26/12/2019	OL increase for DRC operation to address internal displacement situation (IDP response scale-up)	5,343,177
16/01/2020	IDP reserve funds: OL increase to adequately respond to emergencies on the ground in respect to the IDP situation	3,911,086
2/7/2020	\$3.4M OL increase: Strengthening the Protection Environment for IDPs & Host Communities in the N. Kivu, S. Kivu & Ituri Provinces, affected by Ebola virus Disease & Conflict	3,404,783
2/7/2020	\$4.8M OL increase: Protection of IDPs through community Protection approach, CRIs and Shelter	4,864,208
26/08/2020	\$2.86M EOR increase-related to the L3 Emergency: Provide urgent shelter & operational support to IDPs; improve living and security conditions in UNHCR guesthouse in Beni/Bunia offices; admin Goma, Beni and Bunia	2,863,107
		Total: 33,515,549

4.2.3 Support by the Regional Bureau and Headquarters

EQ 4: In the context of ongoing regionalisation, how have the Regional Bureau (RB) and Headquarters (HQ) been able to support the country office (CO)?

High level findings:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The support from the RB and HQ was described as appropriate and overall regarded as having had a positive impact. The HQ/DESS/DIP field visit in September 2019 was perceived as catalytic in providing better vision and strategy, but also in providing technical support and guidance.
EQ 4	

116. Support from the RB and the HQ was perceived as comprehensive and appropriate with an in-depth understanding of the local context complexities of the protracted crisis. The RB was only operational in January 2020 and this was perceived as a gap as well as an unfortunate coincidence. Support was efficient and included emergency cell meetings, analysis on critical needs, defining action points, mostly focussed on issues relate to staffing through the 'human resource cell meetings', and other resources like supply. Coordination with RB Pretoria was perceived as an improvement from the previous Kinshasa regional branch despite its lesser proximity to the field operations.

117. HQ/DESS support was perceived as strong and appropriate with a good understanding of the complex challenges in a protracted crisis environment. A fact-finding mission was conducted in June 2019 and supported the scale up of the IDP strategies from technical and strategic perspectives. A follow up mission was conducted in Feb 2021. Online technical trainings & online remote support, capacity building and a mentorship

officer for six weeks for trainings in different provinces all contributed to enhanced capacity and awareness of UNHCR IDP vision and strategy and how best to operationalise.

118. At country level, the UNHCR leadership was credited with prioritising efforts to review the approaches to the IDP response which contributed to improved vision and strategies.

4.2.4 Impact of COVID-19 and Ebola on the emergency response

EQ 5: In what ways have the outbreaks of Ebola, Covid-19 and other disaster impacted on the operation’s ability to respond to the IDP crisis?

<p>High level findings: EQ 5</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Ebola epidemic and the Covid-19 pandemic significantly impacted operations, severely limited access to PoCs, and subsequently the roll-out of planned interventions. Albeit on a small scale, UNHCR’s presence in hard-to-reach communities provided a network to continue its work.
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119. The Covid-19 impact on the emergency response (and overall interventions) was significant. The negative impact included: overall reduced access; difficulties for internationally recruited staff to reach their duty stations resulting in additional burden on the available teams; reduced mobility of field teams, and therefore low access to POCs; a risk of protection issues being poorly assessed and a reduction in the documentation of protection incidents. Difficulty in organizing briefings and coaching field teams as a result of social distancing measures resulted in reduced quality of information and, in the long run, the reliability of the protection monitoring products.

120. At the early onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, and across the three sectors (Protection, Shelter, and CCCM), UNHCR put in place risk mitigation measures⁶². UNHCR showed reactivity including putting in place WASH parameters, hygiene promotion campaigns, and income generating activities in the IDP sites for which UNHCR was responsible. Support was given to community-led Covid-19D prevention strategies, mass information, setting up isolation centres and soap & PPE distribution. Protection monitoring teams furthermore collected perceptions on Covid-19 to inform prevention activities.

121. Ebola impacted mostly the operations in North Kivu where assistance delivery was hampered by misperception, hesitancy, and lack of trust in the humanitarian community. However, the Ebola outbreak response and its strict measure on infection prevention facilitated a greater awareness of the impact of infection prevention and control (IPC), which was reported to have facilitated infection prevention and containment (IPC) measures for Covid-19 later on.

⁶² Plan d’action pour le Monitoring du protection 2019, 2020

4.3 Areas of enquiry 3: Results and Sustainability

122. This section explores to what extent the operation was able to render response activities and programs sustainable in order to continue the needed response after the L3 period and work towards durable solutions. The DRC operation identified a ‘rolling response approach’ to enable the operation to respond to recurrent and sustained displacements, including after/between L3 emergency declarations. As outlined in the description of the limitations encountered by the evaluation, the scope of the findings is constrained by the lack of monitoring and evaluation evidence available.

4.3.1 Rolling response and Advocacy

EQ 6: To what extent was UNHCR’s response able to introduce a rolling response approach to the recurrent IDP crisis in DRC? and what was its impact?

High level findings:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite the many challenges posed by the context and scale of the IDP emergency, UNHCR succeeded in introducing aspects of the “rolling response approach”.
EQ 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The lack of an adequate M&E systems does not allow for the collection and disaggregation of quality data that can be used to measure program performance and results in assessing the effectiveness of the response as a whole.

EQ 7: To what extent has UNHCR supported continued action by the DRC operations going forward (post L3)?

High level findings:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The operation continues efforts to maintain emergency levels of response and essential operations and activities after the expiry of the L3 period; however, the post-L3 reduction in funds and resources resulted in a dramatic decrease of vital humanitarian assistance to PoCs.
EQ 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNHCR’s programs embodied a recognition that the participation of disaster-affected people and their capacities and strategies to survive with dignity are integral to humanitarian response. Though confronted with numerous and significant security and access restrictions, UNHCR’s exemplary community engagement practices endeavoured to contribute to durable solutions in the longer-term. Despite elaborating a robust set of IDP-specific advocacy activities as part of its overall operation strategy, the operation’s implementation of these advocacy activities was not systematically planned, documented, or reviewed and produced uneven and mixed results. A key component upon which UNHCR’s operational advocacy work was based was its provision of data, analysis and essential information to its partners, local actors, community leaders and government officials.

123. The recurrent humanitarian crises and the subsequent responses, resulting from continuous massive internal displacement in the DRC, prompted the operation to mitigate the periodic ‘stop-gap’ quality of emergency responses (including the highest, Level 3

responses) and explore ways to include a more continuous, or ‘rolling response approach’ to emergencies.

124. There is no agreed definition of the ‘rolling response approach’; however this concept emerged as an agreed recommendation of the previous L3 response evaluations in the DRC⁶³. Rolling Response refers to establishing a flexible, predictable, responsive emergency approach to recurrent crises aimed at establishing long-term protocols for staffing, assistance, and collaboration modalities⁶⁴.

125. Despite the many challenges posed by the context and scale of the IDP emergency, UNHCR succeeded in introducing certain aspects of the “rolling response approach” to the operations. The analysis was not able to identify long-term protocols for staffing, assistance and collaborative modalities associated with this approach, or a plan to scale up or continue the interventions. However, the Synergies⁶⁵ exemplified durable and lasting successes in supporting local infrastructure to respond to emergencies, even in a context that lurches from one emergency to the next.

126. As an example, PoCs reported high satisfaction levels with resource generating activities, indicating that even in the eventuality that they are displaced again in the future that they would largely be able to duplicate these activities elsewhere. Trainings and peaceful coexistence projects were also cited as L3 projects which continued to bear fruit post L3. Host communities reported that the co-housing interventions can provide longer term prospects and support new cycles of displacements over time.

127. The evaluation found that UNHCR invested in local staff over the course of the L3 operations. This took the form of capacity development to support sustainable approaches to future emergencies. National positions were recruited to replace international staff. Similarly, in terms of coordination capacity, the in-country expertise in Shelter Cluster Coordination that was developed over the course of the operations (and which directly resulted from UNHCR taking over and transforming the Shelter Cluster) represents an actualization of the concept of the “rolling response approach”. Given the centrality of Shelter and Settlements to future emergency responses in the DRC, and UNHCR’s

⁶³ The “rolling response approach” emerged as a finding from the evaluation of the 2017 L3 IDP emergency in the Kasai region of DRC

⁶⁴ • uses agreed tools to address the issues raised by affected communities;
• supports local and national infrastructure to better respond to emergencies and invest in local staff;
• builds in-country expertise, including through an emergency roster system and training opportunities within the operation;
• builds on the community-based protection model being established in the Eastern region;
plans for emergencies less with classic centralised contingency plans but relies on the ability of local actors to take the lead in the local response plans based on a localised identification of needs and priorities; the operation would keep stocks of NFIs that can be distributed based on the locally identified need.

⁶⁵ (community level assemblages of local authorities, community leaders, NGOs, civil-society groups, and representatives of the various groups of PoCs)

expertise, prominent role, and commitment to Shelter Cluster Coordination, these efforts should provide a predictable approach tailored to local contexts and needs.

128. In the same vein, interviewees universally acclaimed UNHCR's community-based protection models. By utilizing existing community structures, UNHCR built on communities' capacities and established a foundation of trust and engagement. UNHCR's investment in consultative, community-based protection strengthened the very local resources that will be called upon to address future protection gaps these communities will face.
129. The IDP policy⁶⁶ calls upon senior management in operations "*to follow through on inter-agency commitments, to place protection at the centre of humanitarian action and to design, implement and sustain a meaningful, solutions-oriented operational response to internal displacement that is backed up by global advocacy and resource mobilization [...] with an expanding network of partners, including development and financial institutions*". The socio-economic inclusion of PoCs is to be supported by an area-based approach, integrated programming, the capacity building of local actors and the early implication of development actors and resources (the humanitarian--development NEXUS).
130. The operation has engaged actively with development counterparts in the DRC United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF⁶⁷), advocating for the inclusion of IDPs, refugees, returnees, and stateless persons. The evaluation could not establish to what extent the advocacy resulted in additional resources for sustainable solutions for IDPs, particularly for the populations displaced in the ongoing emergency.
131. The evaluation found that the operation engaged with the World Bank and other donors on the need to integrate humanitarian and developmental programming. These engagements resulted in pilot projects together with UNDP in North Kivu on improving local governance and community policing. The operation did not have a consolidated strategy on including potential nexus resources in the ongoing response or in the identification of sustainable solutions. This would be imperative to support a responsible disengagement, as foreseen in the IDP Policy.

⁶⁶ Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, 18 September 2019

⁶⁷ UNHCR DRC co-lead the development process of strategic result 3: 'Access to basic social services and to humanitarian assistances'. The operation advocated for the inclusion of those under its mandate in activities concerning peace-building, respect for human rights, protection of civilians, durable solutions, prevention of conflicts and peace building, social and democratic cohesion in the axis of inclusive economic growth, agricultural development, capture of the demographic dividend, social protection and sustainable management of natural resources.

132. The evaluation found an uneven knowledge and awareness with partners and donors on UNHCR overall roles and responsibilities towards IDPs, including of the IDP Policy, the IDP Initiative and the way the DRC operation incorporated the policy in the emergency response. The evaluation found diverse efforts by the operation towards donor reporting, public information (PI), and advocacy, but could not establish an overall advocacy or communication strategy related to the emergency response or UNHCR's IDP Policy.
133. Stakeholders agreed that the deactivation of the L3 resulted in reduced assistance to the populations of concern that were being served by UNHCR while needs persisted, and in some locations increased.
134. To the credit of its staff in the field, activities did not come to a sudden halt with the deactivation of the L3: UNHCR endeavoured to maintain the same structures and to continue the activities that had been put in place during the L3. Discussions were held with different partners about innovative ways to reduce costs while keeping the maximum of activities that respond to the needs of the communities. As noted in previous sections, the reduction in funding affected community empowerment initiatives. Several assistance programs could not be maintained; reductions in staffing and expertise resulted in a lack of continuity to put established strategies and projects in place. Beneficiaries' requests for an extension of cash, shelter and health care services could not be met.
135. Host communities were involved, received economic and psychological support, and participated in strengthening their reception capacities. Social cohesion and peaceful coexistence programs, as well as targeted Recovery assistance, whether via savings schemes, or assistance to open an artisanal bakery, or with necessary business implements (e.g., telephones, printers, etc.) were cited by key stakeholders as contributing to solutions that would better enable individuals and communities to endure future emergencies with dignity and resilience. Though the geographical area covered was vast, road conditions problematic at best, and security problems endemic in all areas, by working with the communities, community representatives were able to identify problems and provide initial solutions, responses, or interventions. Identifying needs at the community level enabled UNHCR and their implementing partners to respond to them, particularly through rapid impact projects.
136. There is strong recognition that UNHCR's programs demonstrated exemplary high levels of community engagement. UNHCR's commitment to community engagement begins with chairing the Community-based Protection Working Group. Community consultation—that recognized and involved existing community structures and key actors—started from the first assessment and continued throughout program implementation. Though the scale of the response was small (in comparison to the overall needs identified), IDP populations and local authorities were consulted, as were host communities (to a lesser degree): both groups were engaged in defining vulnerability

criteria, assistance identification and crafted the community sensitization campaigns.⁶⁸ An excellent example of this is how *les Synergies* in N. Kivu supported by UNHCR used their own data (via KoBo⁶⁹) for household vulnerability surveys and cash assistance prioritisation. Teams in all three provinces in question, worked with 107 community groups and government system '*les synergies*' to strengthen their preparedness. They are now assessing how to work further with development actors that will link these and future efforts with development planning.

"That's also part of the reason for insisting on the community-based approach (...). Because it is in recognition of the fact that these communities are experts in emergency response."

Key Informant

Advocacy

137. Though limited by a lack of funds and on occasion by the capacities of implementing partners, the continuous monitoring by UNHCR partners provided information necessary for advocacy efforts. Connections that were established with national organizations present in remote areas played a role in the timely provision of key information. Much work remains to be done to strengthen the engagement with the government at provincial and national levels. Yet, the establishment of North Kivu's '*les synergies*' (which strengthened collaboration between local authorities, PoCs, local communities, civil society and humanitarian action) and their continued functioning exemplifies how community engagement positively contributes to durable solutions. The reduction in funds that came with the deactivation of the L3 caused UNHCR and its partners to empower communities as much as possible. The concept behind community groups was developed partly so that they could implement responses without reaching out to humanitarian organizations, with their corresponding funding needs.

138. Despite elaborating a robust set of IDP-specific advocacy activities as part of its overall operation strategy, the operation's implementation of these advocacy activities was not systematically planned, documented, or reviewed and produced uneven and mixed results. Advocacy was an effective tool at an operational level, particularly in North Kivu, following the provision of data, analysis and essential information to partners, local actors, community leaders and government officials (i.e. activating response in hotspots, solving operational barriers, and implementing key protection activities). The limited scope of advocacy efforts to the areas where UNHCR had a stronger presence (North Kivu) was mirrored in protection mainstreaming being largely limited to the clusters for which UNHCR was the lead agency.

⁶⁸ Such as "Positive masculinity", which was carried out at different levels, e.g. theatre, demonstrations, etc.

⁶⁹ mobile data collection technology is used to increase the speed and accuracy of the data collection process. At present, Kobo is the preferred tool for mobile data collection through the UNHCR Kobo server (<https://kobo.unhcr.org>).

139. UNHCR prioritised an increased community lead response and resilience. Due to the scale of the crisis but also to financial and resource limitations, UNHCR and partners were only able to cover a small proportion of the critical needs during the emergency response. However, it was understood from stakeholders consulted that UNHCR still had a role to ensure that the remaining critical needs continued to be visible and acted upon, in particular related to mainstreaming protection into programming and emergency response. No documented strategic vision was in place to sufficiently contribute to the HRP overarching outcomes via the HCT and cluster system, influence the Government at national and provincial level to strengthen its engagement with host communities and be more accountable to affected displaced population and to mobilise others to respond in a timely manner and to scale.
140. A key component upon which UNHCR's operational advocacy work was based was its provision of data, analysis and essential information to its partners, local actors, community leaders and government officials. This information sharing was highlighted by various interviewees as playing a key role in facilitating direct assistance and in assembling both short- and long-term operational strategies. It is also credited with activating quick response in certain hotspots after displacement, and on several occasions, negotiating protection of civilians from armed groups and conflict. Additionally, UNHCR's partners highlighted the support and training that UNHCR provided local humanitarian organisations so they could access available UN humanitarian funds that enabled them to respond to the humanitarian needs according to their expertise and geographical area of coverage.
141. Stakeholders both internal to UNHCR and external (i.e., implementing partners, donors) consistently remarked that there was a lack of clarity towards UNHCR's mandate towards IDPs, including the IDP Policy and IDP Initiative, in terms of the operation's commitment to preparedness, response, and coordination. Those interviewed indicated that there are varying degrees of knowledge and/or acceptance at various levels within UNHCR about UNHCR's role in IDP crises —certainly not at the reflex level of assigning equal importance to IDP operations as to refugee operations.
142. The operation did report on several PI efforts towards UNHCR's role in the DRC IDP response: this took the form of emergency updates detailing the protection monitoring results and follow up. The updates were supported by web stories and briefing notes. The impact of the IDP crises in North Kivu and Ituri was furthermore captured in missions by a photographer at the end of 2020. A number of planned donor missions to the East were cancelled due to COVID related restrictions and high levels of insecurity.

4.4 Area of enquiry 4: Good Practices

143. The operation was commended by various key informants for the protection reports that provided detailed information on situations of conflict, protection incidents, rights

violations, and the resulting displacements in eastern DRC. The reports provided specific information: on the population numbers, location, ethnic background) being targeted in the violations and the type of violations, and number of individuals affected, and the resulting displacement. The reports were widely seen as providing an added value to the more generic reports by the UN mission and IOM. The reports were made public on the Protection Cluster website and enabled a common analysis as well as coordination on response with both humanitarian actors and authorities (one donor representative commended UNHCR for the efforts in providing all actors in DRC with an analytical baseline). Please refer to Annex 4 for an example of the report.

144. The detailed protection reports were largely made possible through the community-based protection monitoring structures the operation put in place. Community protection monitors among the IDP-, and local populations, as well as local authorities, were trained to identify protection risks and violations. This enabled a continuation of protection monitoring even when access for humanitarian staff was further curtailed. Local capacities were built to estimate the number of displaced persons in their area, to determine their needs and to report this information to authorities and humanitarian actors. The community monitors were also trained in identifying (local) solutions to the needs of the displaced. The persisting access restrictions due to insecurity and COVID related measures limited the scope of the local capacity building to areas to which UNHCR-, and partner- staff had access.
145. The operation initiated income-generating activities (IGA), in particular for women, in endemically insecure areas. This provided a level of self-reliance that became apparent when access for humanitarian staff was curtailed as a result of COVID measures and the IGA continued and even adapted to the production of COVID masks and other items.
146. The DRC Operation has been very pro-active contextualizing UNHCR's global strategies and approaches, including the new IDP Policy, in DRC specific strategies and approaches. The operation in doing so made use of the information and analysis collected through the innovative and community-based protection monitoring approach, tailoring the strategies on GBV, CBI and local capacity building to the specific situation of displacement in eastern DR Congo. An example is the swift adaptation of the new IDP Policy into the DRC specific 'Framework'⁷⁰ in which the Policy's stipulation for 'disengagement' from an emergency response to IDP displacement is converted to include a 'rapid disengagement' in the DRC context. As noted above, the dissemination of the different DRC specific strategies to partners and counterparts was uneven, limiting their exposure.

5. Conclusions

⁷⁰ ⁷⁰ *Framework for Engagement and Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC, September 2019*

1. The DRC operation successfully implemented a community-based approach; however, the efforts towards the POCs and authorities were severely curtailed by the lack of access as a result of insecurity and COVID-19 related restrictions.
2. The lack of a consolidated advocacy approach limited UNHCR's lead protection role for a timely and to scale emergency response and to mobilise others to address critical gaps. The Global IDP Policy, as well as the DRC IDP Framework, prescribe the organisation's rapid disengagement from emergency responses; this requires strong advocacy towards humanitarian-, and development actors.
3. The absence of a clear protection mainstreaming approach limited the impact of the various strategies developed by the operation and negatively affected protection case management and referrals. The lack of projected clarity on UNHCR's responsibilities as a provider of last resort diminished the organisation's perceived protection lead role.
4. The uniform budget and duration modalities in the Emergency Policy did not allow for a predictable and tailored approach to the specific support requirements in this emergency. The standardized period and budget, which are not based on situational analysis, appeared arbitrary and did not ensure the operation's ability to prepare for a continuation of the increased efforts.
5. The Global IDP Policy demonstrated its relevance for the DRC Level 3 response in that it improved prospects for sustainability through community-based approaches and the need to include a disengagement strategy from the onset. It responds to UNHCR's 2021 Strategic Risk Register that identifies the need to include a long-term solution focus.
6. The uneven understanding of UNHCR's role in IDP displacements with both staff and counterparts negatively impacted UNHCR's effectiveness, the perceptions of the organisation's responsibilities and mandate and, as a result, its reputation.

6. Recommendations

1. The DRC operation and Regional Bureau, in light of the overwhelming needs and overall lack of humanitarian funding in the DRC, to establish an agreed position on the scope of UNHCR's priorities in the DRC and the related future budget allocation to enable long term planning, and render the level of attainable priorities explicit.
2. The DRC operation should further develop its national/local advocacy strategy. Linked to this, the regional bureau is to reinforce a regional advocacy approach to ensure protracted crises, such as in DRC, receive the necessary media and donor attention.
3. The DRC operation as the protection cluster lead, and with the support of DIP, should formulate and implement, a protection mainstreaming approach, further developing GBV and PSEA strategies to guide the broader humanitarian response.

4. DESS to include M&E resources (tools and staff) as part of tailored Level 3 response plans.
5. DIP, with the support of the RB and the GLDC, to develop a supportive (phased) roll-out strategy for new/recent protection policies and approaches.
6. DESS and relevant units in DRS, DIP and DSPR to prepare actionable guidance for operations on the resources to support the continuation of an emergency response as well as the transition from an emergency response to durable solutions.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference



Terms of Reference

Key Information

Title of the evaluation:	Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 IDP Emergency in Democratic Republic of Congo
Type of evaluation:	Centralised
Time frame:	December 2020 - July 2021
Evaluation commissioned by:	UNHCR Evaluation Service
Evaluation Manager contact information:	Marcel van Maastrigt maastrig@unhcr.org
Date:	September 2020

Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 IDP Emergency in Congo

1. Introduction

1. The centralized evaluation of UNHCR's response to the emergency situation in three provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri is commissioned by UNHCR's Evaluation Service, in line with UNHCR's Evaluation and Emergency Response policies.
2. UNHCR declared a Level 3 (L3) Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) emergency in Ituri, North-, and South- Kivu in November 2019 to enable the operation to increase staffing and operational resources to address the protection, assistance and coordination needs of the rapidly deteriorating situation – including an increasing number of IDPs. More than 2 million IDPs had been newly displaced in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces in the 18 months leading up to the L3 declaration and more than a million have been displaced since January 2020.

3. The evaluation is intended to analyse the extent to which UNHCR is providing a timely and effective response to the IDP emergency in the 3 eastern provinces, taking into account the enabling and constraining factors in the DRC situation in 2020.
4. The evaluation will furthermore gather evidence to guide, and where needed, enhance UNHCR's response to complex and recurrent emergencies involving multiple populations of concern: IDPs, Refugees, Returnees, and others.
5. In 2019, UNHCR released an updated IDP Policy, which recommitted UNHCR to be a predictable and effective responder in situations of internal displacement both operationally and within inter-agency response mechanisms, in support of affected States and communities. The evaluation will also serve to support analysis of the implementation of the 2019 IDP policy, and support development of other efforts, such as the 2020 IDP Initiative and IDP Step-Up in the context of COVID-19.
6. The intended users of the evaluation are the DRC operation, DRC partners and counterparts, as well as the Regional Bureau, the Division of Emergency Security and Supply (DESS), Division of International Protection (DIP), Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRC), the Principal Advisor on IDPs, and Senior Management involved in IDP policies.

2. Background


7. The recent history of DRC has been dominated by recurrent and successive conflicts. The conflicts in DRC have a variety of causes and triggers; including chronic political instability and weak governance, corruption and competition over resources and power, ethnic tension, poverty, unemployment, and regional instability.
8. The 'Congolese wars' of 1996 and 1998 involved multiple regional and internal actors. The 1998 war ended with the peace agreements of 2002; the agreements brought a tenuous stability to the country but did not address all the diverging interests and root causes of the conflicts. Conflicts continued and intensified in the Eastern part of the country.
9. The political climate improved following elections in 2018, with a peaceful transition of power. However, while the scale of violence decreased in some regions, notably in the Kasai and Tanganyika areas, there was a sharp spike in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.
10. Since late 2017, armed groups, predominantly from the Lendu ethnic farming community, have committed deadly attacks in Ituri province. Initial targets were members of the neighbouring Hema community, who are mostly herders, and the Congolese armed forces. But attacks are now increasingly indiscriminate. The escalating violence has revived historical rivalries between the Hema and Lendu, who fought each other during the 1999-2003 war. The involvement of actors from the adjacent province of North Kivu is a

threat to the stability of the whole Eastern region. The involvement of former rebel movements, such as the M23 group, further escalate the local conflicts.

11. In northern North Kivu Province, the security situation continues to be marked by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and other armed groups' actions, as well as by the ongoing Government offensive against them. In the southern part of North Kivu, the security situation is marked by the militia groups that took control of land from which the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the National Council for Renewal and Democracy (CNRD) were chased by the national army (FARDC) during military operations in 2019 and 2020.
12. Those same operations also dislodged communities in northern South Kivu. In addition, intercommunity violence in the Highlands of South Kivu Province has led to widespread pendular displacement in Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira territories. Clashes between armed groups, such as the Mai Mai and the CNRD, and the national army have worsened since March 2019.
13. The insecurity in the East of DRC, and resulting indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population, causing massive displacements, are the result of the proliferation of armed groups (currently there are 120 recognised armed groups, not including local self-defense groups), with constantly shifting alliances.
14. Reports indicate the civilian population suffer from widespread violence, and human rights abuses, aimed at provoking fear among the population, causing the population to flee.

3. Massive Internal Displacement

15. Recognising that official numbers are lower; a total of 6.6 million people is recognised by local authorities as being displaced within DRC; of these almost 4.5 million are displaced in the Eastern region.
16. 1.7 million IDPs are located in North Kivu Province according to the Comité de Mouvement de Population, a mixed committee made up of Government and the national and international Humanitarian community. The vast majority (94%) live with host communities, while some 90,263 reside in 22 IDP sites coordinated by UNHCR or IOM, or in former sites managed by IDPs themselves with limited assistance.
17. 1.7 million persons are displaced in Ituri Province. The majority reside in host communities (80%), while some 220,000 have fled towards 87 displacement sites. Some 177,000 IDPs live in displacement sites coordinated by UNHCR or by IOM as co-leads of the CCCM Working Group.
18. Almost 1 million IDPs are located in South Kivu Province, according to OCHA. 97% of all IDPs reside in host families, while a minority have gathered in informal IDP sites (in Kalehe Territory).



4. Multiple Populations of Concern

19. In addition to the internal displacements, the DRC continues to host over 524,000 refugees from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan. At the time of the declaration of the L3 emergency in November 2019, UNHCR had assisted more than 527,000 refugees and asylum seekers, the majority of which came from Rwanda (more than 214,000) and the Central African Republic (more than 171,000).

20. Refugee populations are spread out through the DRC; 99% of the refugees live in rural areas, almost 75% live outside camps or settlements. Most Rwandan refugees live in communities in the southern part of North Kivu and in northern South Kivu, now displaced alongside the communities in which they have lived for over 20 years. Recent displacement meant that the Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés and UNHCR have better access to at least some of this population, so they are working on an overall mapping of their presence, and on an updated plan for implementation of the cessation strategy.

needs in the northern part of North Kivu – including Ebola preparedness needs and emergency response, the operation opened a Field Unit in Beni in October 2019.

6. UNHCR Response

25. UNHCR has been providing protection-, shelter-, camp, and cash assistance to the most vulnerable among the displaced populations in eastern DRC. The UNHCR operation also leads the coordination of the IDP sites hosting more than 267,000 IDPs.
26. The operation's required budget for 2020 is 168 million USD, with 56 million dedicated to the protection and assistance of IDPs. An additional 25 million USD has been allocated for the L3 emergency response activities. As of July 2020, only 29% of the needed budget was funded. In addition, the indicative operating level budget for next year (2021) has been reduced to below pre L3 levels.
27. As the protection lead agency, UNHCR undertakes protection monitoring and related analysis in main displacement and return areas. This analysis is a source of information for the humanitarian community to craft protection-oriented and inclusive responses. UNHCR's protection monitoring programme was reinforced with an added emphasis on quality of analysis, dissemination practice and more effective use of monitoring results for advocacy purposes.
28. UNHCR also strengthened its community-based protection work. A range of complementary community-based protection methodologies and tools were used in communities at heightened risk of displacement, and in displaced and hosting communities. This included accompaniment of community-based protection structures, quick impact projects, technical support to local authorities and other community leaders addressing displacement issues, and distribution of multipurpose cash assistance programming for women at risk of sexual exploitation.
29. UNHCR works with authorities to ensure the full restoration of the rights of IDPs. Emphasis is put on prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence (including through sensitization and advocacy), individual protection interventions such as the referral of victims to relevant legal, medical or psychosocial structures, and cash assistance for protection outcomes.
30. As the Shelter Cluster lead, UNHCR deploys three strategic shelter orientations for IDPs: to provide an emergency response, to support returns or local integration in displacement areas and to reinforce local capacities.
31. In terms of emergency responses, those sleeping in the open air, in public buildings and in host families are targeted. UNHCR promotes self-reconstruction and rehabilitation with local materials, and IDP's and host communities' effective participation. UNHCR prioritizes conditional cash transfers as a modality to support shelter construction and rehabilitation where possible, although the limitations of cash management partners mean that it cannot be the only modality.

32. UNHCR, together with IOM, supports the management of a number of official IDP sites including in North Kivu Province and Ituri Province. During the period of the L3, UNHCR co-lead the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Working Group in Tanganyika and North Kivu provinces jointly with IOM (IOM has since indicated that they will soon be pulling out). Since 2018, the CCCM strategy focuses on solutions and support to local communities.
33. UNHCR provided a protection and humanitarian response to the L3 IDP emergency in October 2017 in the Kasai region. This response was evaluated in 2018; the findings confirmed the need to adapt a 'rolling response approach' in which the relevant departments in the organisation prepare flexible and predictable responses to recurrent crises.
34. The current approach in the East by the DRC operation focuses on the perpetual character of the crises, and on establishing long-term response protocols, staffing-, assistance-, and collaboration modalities.
35. The approach has as objectives to:
 - a. Establish a predictable, responsive emergency approach that uses agreed tools to address the issues raised by affected communities.
 - b. Support local and national infrastructure to better respond to emergencies and invest in local staff. Build in-country expertise, including through an emergency roster system and training opportunities within the operation.
 - c. Building on the community-based protection model being established in the Easter region.
 - d. Plan for emergencies less with classic contingency plans and more with stocks of NFIs that can be used with agreed tools, and with relationships and roles that will have value in the long run.
36. To better protect IDPs and reduce risks of intercommunity conflict, UNHCR includes host communities into its programming. UNHCR reinforces local protection structures, and promotes peaceful coexistence, access to justice (for example, in case of conflicts over land and property – a major cause of conflict in DRC), and the participation of IDPs in decision-making.

7. Evaluation Scope and Preliminary Key Areas of Inquiry

37. The evaluation will include UNHCR's response to the Level 3 internal displacement emergency from November 2019 to August 2020, in Ituri, and North-, and South- Kivu provinces. The areas of inquiry will include the response to the internal displacement, and the context of the complex, and recurring emergencies involving multiple populations of concern, as well as the impact of health crises (COVID-19, Ebola, measles).

7.1 Preliminary Key Areas of Inquiry

1. How effective and timely was the operation's response in addressing the needs of the affected populations (IDPs, returnees, host population)?
 - a. In line with the 2019 IDP policy, how effective has UNHCR been in coordinating the Protection, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), and Shelter response?
 - b. To what extent has UNHCR effectively engaged with host communities to leverage and support a community-based, sustainable response?
2. In the context of ongoing regionalization, how have HQ and the RB been able to support the CO in the response?
3. How relevant and useful are the emergency and IDP strategies for helping to guide the response?
4. In line with the 2020 IDP Initiative; to what extent does the response support the development of good practices, advance advocacy on the impact of internal displacement, and inform equitable resource allocation within the DRC operation?
5. In what ways have the Ebola-, and Covid-19 outbreaks impacted on the operation's ability to respond to the IDP crisis – including on the staffing scaleup?
 - a. How effective have the feedback systems for IDPs been?
6. To what extent has the operation been able to introduce a rolling response approach to the recurrent emergencies, and what has been its impact?
7. Recognising that although the L3 expired once the operation scaled up to meet new needs in the Eastern DRC, the situation did not improve in that time and the needs continue to grow – to what extent has the Organisation supported continued action by the DRC operation going forward?

8. Approach and Methodology

44. UNHCR welcomes innovative and participatory data collection methods. Considering the continuing limitations in access to locations, and populations, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, evaluators will be asked to include alternative data collection methods in the submission, including (but not limited to) remote, or virtual data collection and use of national consultants to ensure effective engagement of both staff, partners and persons of concern in affected areas.
45. The evaluation methodology will include a mixed methods approach: review of internal UNHCR data, and review of external documents and reports by stakeholders and partners. The evaluation will include data collected through key informant interviews with UNHCR staff in Headquarters, regional-, and national offices. Interviews with partners, donors, government staff, as well as with displaced populations will add to the analysis. The evaluation will also include

analysis of secondary monitoring data provided by UNHCR, partners and other agencies. The findings are expected to be supported by both quantitative and qualitative data.

The methodology, including details on data collection and analytical approaches, and the final areas of inquiry and evaluation questions will be prepared by the evaluation team during the inception phase. The inception report will include a detailed description of the methods and data collection tools to be used, including.

46. The methodology is expected to:

- a. Reflect an [Age, Gender and Diversity \(AGD\)](#) perspective in all primary data collection activities carried out as part of the evaluation – particularly with persons of concern; IDPs.
- b. Refer to and make use of relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria such as those proposed by OECD-DAC and adapted by ALNAP for use in humanitarian evaluations⁷¹.
- c. Refer to and make use of relevant UN standards analytical frameworks.
- d. Be explicitly designed to address the key evaluation questions – considering evaluability, budget and timing constraints.

47. A Reference Group will be created, comprised of senior UNHCR staff (at country, regional, and HQ level), staff from relevant UN agencies, and partners. The Reference Group members will provide strategic input and constructive feedback based on their respective organisational perspective. The role of the Reference Group is particularly important during the review of the inception-, and draft- reports.

48. The evaluation will include validation workshops at country level, and possibly at regional level and HQ level to strengthen data interpretation and analysis. The format of the workshops will be agreed upon during the inception phase.

9. Ethical Considerations

49. The evaluation process should support and respect ethical participation of persons of concern; IDPs and meet the standards and ethics of UNHCR and the UN Evaluation Group. As the scope of the evaluation includes the participation of IDPs, the evaluation protocol and tools pertaining to the collection and management of data pertaining should be reviewed by an institutional ethics review board (IRB) and receive clearance prior to commencing.

50. The evaluation should adhere to UNHCR's [Data Protection](#) policy to ensure personally identifiable information is adequately safeguarded.

51. The Evaluation Team is required to sign the [UNHCR Code of Conduct](#), complete UNHCR's introductory protection training module, and respect UNHCR's confidentiality requirements.

⁷¹ See for example: Cosgrave and Buchanan-Smith (2017) [Guide de l'Evaluation de l'Action Humanitaire](#) (London: ALNAP) and Beck, T. (2006) [Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC Criteria](#) (London: ALNAP)

10. Evaluation Quality Assurance

52. In line with established standards for evaluation in the UN system, and the UN Ethical Guidelines for evaluations, evaluation in UNHCR is founded on the inter-connected principles of independence, impartiality, credibility and utility, which in practice, call for: protecting sources and data; systematically seeking informed consent; respecting dignity and diversity; minimising risk, harm and burden upon those who are the subject of, or participating in the evaluation, while at the same time not compromising the integrity of the exercise.
53. The evaluation is also expected to adhere with 'Evaluation Quality Assurance' (EQA) guidance, which clarifies the quality requirements expected for UNHCR evaluation processes and products. The Evaluation Manager will share and provide an orientation to the EQA at the start of the evaluation – including standards for the format and structure of key deliverables. Adherence to the EQA will be overseen by the Evaluation Manager.

11. Organisation, Management and Conduct of the Evaluation

54. UNHCR Evaluation Service will serve as the **Evaluation Manager**. They will be responsible for: **(i)** managing the day to day aspects of the evaluation process; **(ii)** acting as the main interlocutor with the evaluation team; **(iii)** providing the evaluators with required data and facilitating communication with relevant stakeholders; **(iv)** reviewing the interim deliverables and final reports to ensure quality – with the support from the country and regional offices, relevant HQ Departments Division and the Reference Group.
55. The language of work for this evaluation will be English and French. The deliverables will be in English. The final evaluation report will be in English and should include an executive summary in both English and French, to be provided by the evaluation team.

12. Expected Deliverables and Evaluation Timeline

56. The evaluation should be carried out between **December 2020 and May 2021** with management response and dissemination occurring June to July 2021.
57. Key deliverables include:
- a. Inception report (15-25 pages excluding annexes) and desk review (10 pages) - confirming the scope of the evaluation, the evaluation questions, methods to be used, all data gathering tools, as well as the analytical framework – and summarizing findings derived from a review of existing documentation;
 - b. End of mission initial debriefs after each mission (or remote data collection) including a ppt or aide memoire;
 - c. Workshops with relevant staff in HQ and Regional Bureaux, to validate the findings;
 - d. Draft and Final evaluation reports (40-50 pages), including a 5-page stand-alone executive summary;
 - e. Communications deliverables beyond the above reports, including:
 - i. Presentations tailored to specific audiences, including donors, partners and humanitarian country teams.

- ii. Presentations to be used for international conferences and meetings, to be determined.
- iii. A set of key messages (up to 5) to be used for external and internal audiences to reflect on the key findings of the evaluation
- iv. A one-page summary highlighting the key findings of the evaluation (format and details to be agreed with the Communications Specialist of the Evaluation Service)
- v. Quotes/examples from the field – personal testimonies of the returnees, refugees and people who were stakeholders of the programs under evaluation (details to be agreed) which help illustrate key conclusions of the evaluation.

58. The evaluation process will include an inception phase, a period for data collection followed by analysis and a series of sensemaking and validation workshops with stakeholders at various levels of the organization. The deliverables include a presentation on findings, conclusions and recommendations to senior management.

59. The evaluation is expected to be completed according to the indicative timeline below:

	Deliverables	Indicative timeline	# of estimated workdays*
Inception Phase 45 (total, all team members)			
Initial briefings with the Principal Advisor on IDPs, and Senior Management involved in IDP policies, the Department of Emergency, Security and Supply (DESS), Division of International Protection (DIP), Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRC) and other relevant staff at HQ. 5-day mission to UNHCR HQ in Geneva. Initial document review. Interviews with key stakeholders at HQ and country office.		December 2020	30
Submission of draft inception report,	Draft inception report, including desk review findings, refined key evaluation questions and relevant sub-questions; evaluation matrix, proposed detailed methodology, data analysis plan, workplan with deliverables, final report outline	End December 2020	10
Submission of final inception report. Presentation of key evaluation questions, methodology, data analysis plan to HQ units involved, Bureaux and Reference Groups	Final inception report – including methodology, refined evaluation questions, evaluation matrix, data analysis plan and draft outline of final evaluation report.	Early January 2021	5

Data Collection Phase			
90 (total, all team members)			
Stakeholder interviews and document review	Virtual data collection Document review Data analysis	January 2021	30
Field missions (or remote alternative)	Data collection at country level Debrief presentation in-country with UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders	January 2021- March 2021	60
Data Analysis and Sensemaking Phase			
30 (total, all team members)			
Data analysis and synthesis	Refined data analysis plan Data summary tables shared with UNHCR	April 2021	20
Data analysis and sensemaking meetings with UNHCR Evaluation Service and other relevant stakeholders	Meeting notes with further analysis needs identified and follow-up actions listed		
Virtual validation workshops of the preliminary findings for the country operation and Regional Bureau	PowerPoint presentations per case study	May 2021	5
Virtual workshop with the Reference Group of the preliminary findings	PowerPoint presentation; meeting notes	May 2021	5
Report Drafting and Finalization Phase			
50 (total, all team members)			
Submission of draft report	Draft report with executive summary: max 50 pages.	End of May 2021	30
Review of comments on draft		June 2021	5
Submission of final reports and Executive Summary	Report: max 50 pages. Executive summary in French and English	June 2021	5

Presentations or virtual webinars on findings to Regional Bureau(-x), Senior Executive Team, donors, UN agencies, UNHCR's implementing partners, etc.	Dissemination PowerPoint and evaluation brief (5-page summary of evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations)	July 2021	10
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*This is an estimate of minimum working days and does not equate to the intended number of total person days. Evaluation teams will need to specify the expected level of effort of each team member (person days) and calculate the total number of days worked for the team.

Functional requirements for the evaluation team.

The team should consist of 1 Team Leader, and 2 Team Members.

The evaluation team should be able to work in English, and French.

Diversity is expected in the team in terms of gender and nationality – with a strong preference for teams with experience in DRC and for senior experts from the region.

(1) Team Leader

- A graduate degree in International Affairs/Relations, Economics, Sociology or area related to the subject of the evaluation.
- Minimum of 15 years of experience conducting centralized evaluations of global, regional and country level initiatives.
- Demonstrated experience and understanding of UN or other large organizations/governments.
- Experience conducting evaluations in humanitarian settings, including in complex environments, involving multiple populations of concern.
- Proven experience in successfully leading an evaluation/research team and managing team members remotely.
- In depth knowledge of and proven experience with various data collection and analytical methods and techniques used in evaluation and operational research.
- Strong expertise in facilitating workshops aimed at sensemaking, data interpretation and synthesis across multiple data sources and types.
- Previous evaluation experience in a range of geographic regions.
- Experience leading a team comprising international and national team members.
- Strong facilitation/presentation skills with experience presenting to senior executives.
- High proficiency in English and French.

(2) Team Members

- A graduate degree in international refugee law or human rights and justice.
- Minimum of 10 years of experience conducting humanitarian research at global, regional and country levels.
- Proven experience working on humanitarian response issues, and complex humanitarian crises.
- Demonstrated experience and understanding of UN or other large organizations/governments.
- Working knowledge of internal displacement issues across geographic regions of the world.
- High proficiency in English and French.

Annex 2: Overview of the evaluation methodology

The methodology paid specific attention to minimising bias and prioritised that findings and lessons learned were evidence-based and validated. All evidence was then triangulated across data sources and stakeholder groups (including through an internal validation and co-creation workshop), and the strength of evidence was assessed based on the level of triangulation that was possible within each area of analysis. Table 2 presents our approach to ranking the strength of evidence, which is used throughout the findings section of this report. Where views of different groups diverged on a particular topic, we have endeavoured to make that explicit.

Table 2 - Strength of evidence for UNHCR monitoring and evaluation

RANK	JUSTIFICATION	
1	Evidence comprises multiple data sources (both internal and external, good triangulation), which are generally of decent quality. Where fewer data sources exist, the supporting evidence is more factual than subjective.	EQ2 on Shelter, CCCM
2	Evidence comprises multiple data sources (good triangulation) of lesser quality, or the finding is supported by fewer data sources (limited triangulation) of decent quality but that are perhaps more perception-based than factual.	EQ1, EQ2, EQ3 (overall)
3	Evidence comprises few data sources across limited stakeholder groups (limited triangulation) and is perception based, or generally based on data sources that are viewed as being of lesser quality.	EQ2 on Coordination EQ2 on Efficiency EQ4 on Regionalisation EQ5 on Impact of COVID EQ6 on Sustainability. Advocacy
4	Evidence comprises very limited evidence (single source) or incomplete or unreliable evidence.	

The evaluation consultants signed and adhered to the UNHCR’s Code of Conduct, UN Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations, and respected UNHCR’s confidentiality requirements. UNHCR’s introductory training modules were conducted by all international and national consultants. In addition, the team adhered to the UNHCR ‘Evaluation Quality Assurance’ (EQA) guidance. To ensure safeguarding of all data, the team respected conventional international standards, as well as adhering to UNHCR’s Data Protection Policy. Informed oral consent was obtained from all key informants. Data was stored on a secure data server (Sharepoint/Teams). Furthermore, this evaluation supported equity and inclusion by including participants from diverse backgrounds (gender, age, ethnicity, disability, religion, and geographic location). Selection of informants and evidenced-based analysis using a qualitative software tool to ensure that bias was minimised. Strength of evidence was used to identify recurring findings; this was supported by multiple data sources in order to maximise the evidence.

Annex 3: List of evaluation key informants

UNHCR DRC Operation

1. Representative
2. Deputy Representative
3. Deputy Representative, Protection
4. Head of Sub Office
5. Snr Protection Officer
6. Snr Protection Cluster Coord. Officer
7. Snr Field Coordinator.
8. Head of Field Office
9. Head of Field Office
10. Head of Field Office
11. National Shelter Coordinator
12. Cluster Officer (CCCM)
13. Shelter Officer (Cluster)
14. Assistant Programme Officer
15. Former Representative
16. Former Head of Sub-Office
17. Former Assistant Representative Programme
18. Former Shelter Officer

UNHCR HQ Staff

19. Deputy Director Division of Emergency, Supply, and Security (DESS)
20. Deputy Director Division of International Protection (DIP)
21. Principal Advisor on Internal Displacement
22. Chief Emergency Preparedness, DESS
23. Process Lead Officer Business Transformation Programme
24. Senior Emergency Policy Officer
25. CCCM Officer Rapid Response Team
26. Senior Resource Planning Officer

UNHCR Regional Staff

27. Bureau Director
28. Deputy Bureau Director
29. Bureau Head of Strategic Planning and Management
30. Regional Controller

Partners / Donors / NGOs

31. OCHA Head of Office
32. Senior Donor Representative
33. Senior Donor Representative
34. Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator

35. Head of Area Office WFP
36. Chef Field Office UNICEF
37. Head of Mission DRC MSF
38. Head of Mission OCG MSF
39. CCCM Coordinator IOM
40. Programme Coordinator INTERSOS
41. Chef de Project INTERSOS
42. CCCM Coordinator IOM
43. Project Manager AVSI
44. Chef de Project CARITAS
45. Chef de Mission Jesuit Refugee Service
46. Shelter Coordinator IDPs AIDES
47. Chef de Project SOCOAC-asbl

Annex 4: Example Protection Report



RAPPORT MENSUEL DE MONITORING DE PROTECTION

NORD KIVU | Novembre 2019

Chiffres clés

1 252 violations

962 victimes

Tendances mensuelles




Genre des victimes

Genres	Total	%
Hommes	660	69%
Femmes	227	24%
Garçons	56	6%
Filles	19	1%
Total	962	

Statut des victimes

Statut	Total	%
PDI Retournés	685	71%
PDI	214	22%
Resident(e)	28	3%
Rapatriés	33	3%
Total	962	100%


Violations par territoire



Catégorie de violations



Violations par auteurs présumés



Les données désagrégées par territoire, zones de santé, auteurs présumés et tranches d'âges sont disponibles en annexe.

RESUME

L'intensification de l'offensive des Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) contre les présumés éléments de l'Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) a suscité de meurtrières représailles de ces derniers sur la population civile de Beni (Ville et territoire).

Pour le seul mois de novembre 2019, **15 incursions ont été enregistrés et au moins 107 civils tués par les présumés ADF**, 28 incidents d'enlèvements, 21 cas d'incendies de maisons et 44 incidents de pillages ont été documentés. À la suite de ces massacres, les différentes corporations des jeunes ont organisé de violentes manifestations pour protester contre ce qu'elles qualifient la faible protection des autorités nationales et l'inactivité de la Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de la RDC (MONUSCO).

Par conséquent, **le bureau de la Mairie de Beni, les installations de la MONUSCO du Quartier Boikene et deux véhicules de cette mission ont été incendiés par les manifestants, 5 hommes civils ont été tués** par des tirs de sommation et toutes les activités sont restées paralysées durant plusieurs jours.

En territoire de Rutshuru, les FARDC poursuivent les opérations contre les Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Leur commandement a annoncé le décès du général Juvénal Musabimana, commandant des FDLR Rudi, tué le 9 novembre 2019 lors des affrontements au village Makoka. Rappelons que cette perte est la deuxième après celle du Général Sylvestre Mudachumura tué le 18 septembre 2019. Cette série d'assassinats augmente la crainte chez les réfugiés rwandais qui vivent dans les zones dont les FDLR auraient pris le contrôle. Le 10 novembre 2019, 10 ménages de 43 individus ont quitté la localité Kabuga-Mbingi pour chercher refuge en Ouganda.

Durant ce mois de novembre, **1252 incidents de protection ont été documentés** par les équipes protection sur l'ensemble de la Province du Nord-Kivu. Comparativement au mois d'octobre, au cours duquel 1221 incidents de protection avaient été documentés, **il se dégage une légère augmentation de 2%**.

Cependant, si globalement l'augmentation des incidents de protection a été faible, **le territoire de Beni a connu un accroissement exponentiel des incidents de protection passant de 163 en octobre à 443 incidents de protection en novembre**. La commune rurale de Oicha (chef-lieu du territoire de Beni) et ses environs a été la zone la plus touchée. **Le territoire de Beni reste le plus meurtrier: 76 % de meurtres documentés et 84 % d'incendies des maisons y ont été enregistrés. Les ADF constituent le groupe armé le plus mortel. En effet, 72% de meurtres, 84 % d'incendies et 18 % d'enlèvements leur ont été attribués.** Pour leur part, les groupes armés Mai-Mai se sont distingués dans la commission de travaux forcés, d'enlèvements (de courte durée), de viols et d'extorsions des biens. Ces violations sont commises dans le cadre de la recherche de la survie de ces éléments de ces groupes armés.

Lieux où ont lieu les incidents



Violations de la 1612

Violations	Oct	Nov
Viol ou autres actes graves de violence sexuelle	8	7
Enlèvement	6	21
Recrutement ou Utilisation d'enfants soldats	6	0
Attaque contre Ecoles ou Hôpitaux	2	2
Meurtre ou Mutilation	2	8
Refus d'Accès à l'Aide Humanitaire	0	0
Total	24	38

Evènements majeurs

- Du 2 au 28 novembre**
Territoire de Beni
 107 civils ont été massacrés, 35 enlèvements, 9 incendies des maisons par les ADF
- 9 novembre**
Territoire de Rutshuru
 Assassinat le 9 novembre 2019, par les FARDC, du général FDLR-Rudi, Musabimana Juvénal des FDLR avec ses 4 gardes de corps au Makoka dans le groupement Binza
- 13 novembre**
Territoire de Beni
 Environ 282 ménages du village Mambanike ont fait un mouvement vers les Quartiers de Oicha (Mbimbi, Pakanza, Bakaiku et Masosi) fuyant l'incursion des ADF
- 15 novembre**
Territoire de Masisi
 Plus de 50 combattants NDC/Rénové se sont rendus aux FARDC du 3410e régiment à Masisi avec plus de 45 armes
- 25 novembre**
Territoire de Beni
 Soulèvement de la population de Beni ville, manifestant son mécontentement suite aux tueries dont elle est victime par des présumés ADF
- 25 novembre**
Territoire de Beni
 Le bureau de la Mairie de Beni ville, les installations de la Monusco appartenant aux casques bleues Malawites du Quartier Boikene ainsi que deux de leurs véhicules, ont été incendiés par les manifestants

Mouvements de population

Villages d'accueil	Villages d'origine	Causes des déplacements	Personnes déplacées	Ménages
Les villages Bibwe, Mpati/Masisi	Villages Kitso, Kasaso, Kalumu, Rutunga, Ngimbiri/Masisi	Affrontement entre deux groupes armés	3628	941
Les villages Nganga, Mwanda, Kabingu et Shibo/Masisi	Le village Lukweti/Masisi	Affrontement entre deux groupes armés	2304	576
Tous ces ménages sont dans les familles d'accueil à Birambizo/Rutshuru	Groupements Kihondo et Bukombo/Rutshuru	Affrontement entre deux groupes armés	4055	800
Total			9987	2317

Protection de l'enfance

8% des incidents collectés ont été commis sur des enfants (filles et garçons de 2-17 ans). Par rapport au mois d'octobre, il y a une augmentation de 4% d'incidents. Il s'agit principalement d'arrestations arbitraires (9 cas), d'enlèvements (17 cas), de travaux forcés (16 cas), d'extorsions de biens (11 cas), de pillages (3 cas), de coups et blessures (26 cas), d'homicides (14 cas) et de viols (4 cas). 100 enfants (20 filles et 80 garçons) ont été victimes de ces violations. La majorité de ces violations a été documentée dans le territoire de Beni et de Rutshuru ayant pour principaux auteurs des membres de groupes armés parmi lesquels des présumés ADF.

40 incidents de violations graves aux droits de l'enfant (en rapport avec la résolution 1612) ont été documentés et partagés avec la coordination du mécanisme y relatif pour analyse et validation. Il s'agit de 21 cas d'enlèvements, 8 cas de viols ou autres actes graves de violences sexuelles, 9 cas de meurtres ou mutilations, 2 cas d'attaques contre écoles ou hôpitaux. Cela constitue une augmentation de 26 cas par rapport au mois d'octobre 2019. Les territoires les plus affectés restent Beni et Masisi.

Violences sexuelles et sexistes

41 incidents de violences sexuelles et basées sur le genre commis sur des femmes et des filles ont été documentés au cours de ce mois. Il se dégage une baisse de 17 cas par rapport au mois d'octobre où 58 cas avaient été documentés. Il s'agit principalement de viols (22 cas), d'agressions physiques (9 cas), d'agression sexuelle (5 cas), de déni de ressources (3 cas), de mariage forcé (1 cas) et de violence psychologique (1 cas).


Les territoires les plus affectés par les violences sexuelles et sexistes sont Rutshuru (14 cas dont 7 cas de viols), Masisi (12 cas dont 7 cas de viols), Lubero (12 cas dont 5 cas de viols), Beni (3 cas, tous des cas de viols). Les principaux auteurs présumés sont des civils qui ont commis 19 cas (soit 46%) suivis par les milices d'obédience ethnique autochtone qui en ont commis 16 et les FARDC, auteurs présumés de 6 cas.

Selon une évaluation rapide multisectorielle (ERM) menée dans le groupement Bashali Mukoto/Masisi du 19 au 23 novembre 2019, il a été relevé que **16 femmes avaient été violées aux villages Hembe, Luhanga et Karumu par les éléments d'un groupe armé entre le 1^{er} et le 16 novembre 2019**. Ces

incidents ont eu lieu pendant leur mouvement vers leurs zones d'origine. Ces viols constitueraient des représailles contre ce village pour avoir accueilli un autre groupe armé rival. Parmi les survivantes, 14 survivantes affirment avoir bénéficié de la prophylaxie post-expositionnelle (kits PEP) dans les 72 heures. Les deux autres ont accédé aux structures de soins après 72 heures parce qu'elles n'avaient pas d'information sur les services disponibles dans cette zone de déplacement pour les survivantes.

FOCUS SUR LA SITUATION DE PROTECTION EN TERRITOIRE DE BENI

Les opérations des FARDC contre les présumés ADF se sont intensifiées dans les profondeurs du Parc National de Virunga et l'armée de la RDC affirme avoir occupé plusieurs bastions des ADF (Mayangose, Kididiwe, Kadou et Mapobu/carrière et Mwalika). Conséquemment, les éléments de ce groupe armé ont multiplié et amplifié les attaques sur les populations civiles en guise de représailles. **107 cas d'homicides, 28 cas d'enlèvements, 15 cas d'incursions, 21 cas d'incendies de maisons et 44 cas des pillages des biens** ont été documentés en novembre 2019 dans plusieurs agglomérations (Masiani, Maleki, Kokola, May Moya, Mwalika, Tsotsota, etc.).



Carte de la ville de Beni

Consécutivement à cette dégradation de la situation sécuritaire, plusieurs manifestations populaires ont été enregistrées à Beni ville, à Oicha et à Butembo. Ces manifestations se sont soldées par des actes de violences.

Au total, 8 civils (7 Beni et 1 Oicha) ont été tués pendant la répression des manifestants par la PNC. Le Bureau de la Mairie de Beni ville, les installations de la MONUSCO du Quartier Boikene ainsi que deux de leurs véhicules ont été incendiés par les manifestants le 25 novembre 2019. Toutes les activités socio-économiques sont restées paralysées dans la ville.

Ce sentiment contre la MONUSCO s'est étendu aux agences des Nations Unies que les communautés locales associées à cette mission. **Par conséquent, l'accès humanitaire a été très réduit ; les personnes déplacées internes (concentrés à Oicha, Beni-Ville, Kasindi, Butembo, etc.) étant les plus affectées par cette situation car elles restent sans assistance.** Vers la fin du mois, cette tension a sensiblement baissé et toute activité humanitaire est redevenue possible. Par contre, au regard des confusions et des mauvaises informations sur les mandats des organisations humanitaires, il est urgent que les agences et organisations humanitaires renforcent la communication sur leurs mandats/activités respectifs et qu'elles consolident l'approche communautaire dans leurs interventions.

ACTIONS DE REPONSE ET ACTIVITES MENEES

Violations (Nombre de cas documentés)	Résultats obtenus				
	Victimes libérées	Accompagnement Psychologique	Administration de Kit PEP	Auteurs arrêtés	Soins médicaux
Viols (22)	0	2	6	0	2
Agression physique (9)	0	3	0	0	0
Arrestation arbitraire (121)	24	0	0	0	0
Enlèvements (141)	1	0	0	0	0
Mariage forcé (1)	0	1	0	0	0
Total	25	6	6	0	2

Résultats obtenus suite aux actions d'orientations et de suivi menées par les animateurs de protection sur le terrain

Quelques autres actions

- Une évaluation de protection a été menée à Nobili/Kamango, dans la Chefferie de Watalinga, du 25 novembre au 2 décembre 2019 par une équipe mobile d'INTEROSOS. Cette évaluation a indiqué un mouvement de retour des PDI vers Kamango et ses environs. 18.791 ménages de 146.738 PDI retournées sont signalés dans les groupements de Batalinga, Bahumu et Bawisa. Mais de l'analyse de la situation sécuritaire autour des zones de retour et de la progression des opérations militaires, **il s'avère que ce retour risque de ne pas être durable.**
- Dans le cadre de la célébration de la campagne des 16 jours d'activisme contre la violence faite à la femme, INTEROSOS et l'ONG Solidarité des Associations Féminines pour les droits de la femme et l'enfant (SAFDF) ont organisé des consultations populaires dans la chefferie des Baswagha (territoire de Lubero). Cette activité est menée en prélude de l'élaboration du plan d'action de cette entité pour la lutte contre les inégalités entre les sexes, stratégie qui sera annexée au Plan local de développement de cette entité coutumière.

	<p>Dans la chefferie Watalinga, il s'observe un mouvement de retour des PDI-de Nobili pour Kamango et environs. Depuis octobre, 4247 ménages de 38.706 retournés ont été enregistré par les autorités locales par l'entremise de la cellule de crise. Par ailleurs, 441 ménages de 5371 personnes ne sachant pas encore regagner leurs localités (Kitimba, Bovata, Mulopya, etc.) suite à la persistance de l'insécurité séjournent temporairement à Kamango.</p> <p>Il faut noter que, de l'analyse de la situation, il s'avère que ce retour risque de n'être pas durable car le risque d'attaques par les présumés ADF est toujours élevé. Bien plus, ce retour n'aurait été conditionné par les difficiles conditions de vie que les PDI mènent à Nobili.</p>	
<p>Rutshuru</p>	<p>Dans la chefferie de Bwito, les groupements Bukombo et Kihondo, sont affectés par des affrontements récurrents entre, d'une part les groupes armés et les FARDC, et d'autre part, les groupes armés entre eux. Au total, 5 principaux affrontements ont été documentés dans les villages Muhanga, Kakula, Luve, Katsiru et Kanyangohe dans la chefferie de Bwito.</p> <p>A la suite de ces affrontements, il s'observe d'abord des mouvements forcés des populations vers les villages Murambi, Birambizo et Bukombo-centre où elles vivent dans la promiscuité, dans un état de vulnérabilité.</p> <p>A part ces déplacements forcés, il s'observe des violations graves des droits humains (les viols, les meurtres, les pillages, etc.) commises à l'encontre de la population civile (victimes des affrontements ou des représailles). Les écoles (telles que Mashango, Mumba et Kabugu) sont fermées et d'autres sont délocalisées vers les villages Nyanzale, Kikuku, JTN, et Katsiru (en Territoire de Rutshuru) et aux villages Kashuga et Mweso (en Territoire de Masisi).</p> <p>Par ailleurs, les éléments des groupes armés tendent des embuscades aux usagers des routes reliant Mweso – JTN – Nyanzale, et Mweso – Katsiru – Birambizo etc., et ils procèdent aux pillages, coups et blessures, et enlèvements. Cela occasionne des restrictions de mouvements des populations vers les champs, les marchés, et les grandes agglomérations.</p> <p>En plus, les populations de cette chefferie sont soumises, depuis plusieurs mois, à une taxation illégale par les groupes armés qui y ont instauré un système de vente des jetons à la population. Ce jeton, vendu à cinq dollars américains par mois, est imposé à chaque ménage pour son accès aux champs.</p> <p>Cependant, avec l'intensification des opérations militaires en cours, les groupes armés ne parviennent à recouvrer facilement cette taxe. Afin d'assurer leur survie, ils s'adonnent à d'autres types de violations comme les pillages, les extorsions de biens et les kidnappings. Le 22 novembre 2019, trois civils hommes ont été enlevés dans la localité Busanza, en groupement Binza. Ils ont été relâchés après le paiement d'une rançon constituée d'une importante somme d'argent.</p> <p>En chefferie de Bwisha, il est fait mention de la présence d'un groupe armé dans le groupement de Jomba depuis le 24 novembre 2019. (Ce groupement était considéré comme le plus stable de la zone car il n'y avait pas l'activisme signalé des groupes armés). Deux cas de kidnapping de civils, attribuables à ce groupe armé étranger, ont été documentés dans cette zone et deux membres dudit groupe armé ont été arrêtés par les FARDC.</p>	

Analyse contextuelle, défis, perspectives et recommandations par territoire

Territoires	Analyse contextuelle et défis	Perspectives
<p>Masisi</p>	<p>Plus de 50 combattants d'un groupe armé, incluant le responsable du groupe armé Garuza, se sont rendus aux FARDC à Masisi. Cette reddition serait la conséquence des appels lancés par les FARDC et serait considérée par les populations locales comme un prélude à l'amélioration de la situation sécuritaire et de protection. Toutefois, aucun mécanisme d'encadrement n'est actuellement envisagé, les démobilisés sont directement renvoyés dans leurs familles/communautés avec un grand risque de rejoindre les groupes armés. Les membres du conseil local de sécurité estiment que l'augmentation des pillages et extorsions enregistrés ce mois dans cette zone serait liée à cette situation.</p> <p>Suite aux opérations militaires en cours dans la zone et les affrontements entre groupes armés, plusieurs personnes sont quotidiennement contraintes au déplacement forcé. En effet, en ce mois de novembre, le village Bibwe (groupement Bashali Mukoto) a accueilli 694 ménages de 2813 personnes¹ (479 hommes, 784 femmes, 889 filles et 661 garçons). Ces PDI vivent dans le site de Bibwe, à la paroisse catholique de Bibwe, dans les églises EBECO et CEPAC et d'autres dans les familles d'accueil. Ces ménages viennent s'ajouter aux 714 anciens ménages de 2859 personnes qui sont dans la zone depuis environ une année, après avoir fui les multiples affrontements entre les groupes armés.</p> <p>De plus, 247 ménages de 815 personnes² (151 hommes, 189 femmes, 259 filles et 216 garçons) ont été accueillis dans le village Mpati (groupement Bashali Mukoto). Certains de ces ménages vivent dans le site des PDI de Mpati et d'autres en familles d'accueil. Ce nombre s'ajoutent aux 1004 anciens ménages de 6016 personnes. Ces PDI sont dépourvus de moyens de subsistance. Ils ont été, pour la plupart, victimes des pillages de tous leurs biens dans leurs zones d'origine par les groupes armés (venus du Rutshuru).</p> <p>Pour assurer leur survie, les PDI effectuent des mouvements pendulaires vers leurs zones d'origine à la recherche des vivres malgré les risques élevés de viols, extorsions des biens, pillages et de coups et blessures auxquels elles sont exposées.</p>	<p>Le manque d'encadrement des démobilisés risque de contribuer à la dégradation de l'environnement de protection. Pour prévenir ce risque, il serait important que le gouvernement et ses partenaires mettent en place urgemment un mécanisme d'accompagnement de ce processus de démobilisation</p>
<p>Beni</p>	<p>Le territoire de Beni a été caractérisé par une augmentation en insécurité généralisée à Oicha et ses environs. Plus de 15 attaques et incursions des présumés ADF ont été enregistrées dans cette zone et ont été accompagnées d'énormes violations des droits humains : plus de 107 personnes ont été tuées, 28 enlevées et plusieurs personnes contraintes au déplacement forcé à Beni Ville, Butembo et dans les environs.</p> <p>Actuellement, les attaques des présumés ADF sont beaucoup plus enregistrées dans la partie ouest du territoire, zone à forte concentration des populations civiles et qui est resté le seul centre d'approvisionnement en produits vivriers.</p> <p>Ces attaques et massacres des présumés ADF sont commises pendant que les FARDC poursuivent les opérations dans ce territoire et affirment avoir conquis les localités considérées comme bastions de ce groupe armé (Kididibwe, Mayangose et Mapobu dans le Bambuba-Kisiki).</p> <p>Suite à cette situation, différentes corporations de jeunes ont organisé des violentes manifestations à Beni et Butembo, en ciblant principalement la MONUSCO qu'elles accusent d'inactive. Ainsi, le bureau de la Mairie de Beni et base de la MONUSCO du Quartier Boikene ont été incendiées par les manifestants, et toutes les activités humanitaires, socio-économiques et scolaires sont restées complètement paralysées durant cette période.</p>	<p>L'extension de l'activisme des présumés ADF dans la partie Ouest de OICHA pourra engendrer la pénurie de produits agricoles étant donné que les populations ne savent plus accéder à leurs champs.</p> <p>Cela pourrait augmenter la vulnérabilité des PDI et des communautés hôtes dans cette zone où l'accès humanitaire est fortement réduit.</p>

¹ Comité des PDI à Bibwe

² Président des PDI de Mpati

Violations par statut des victimes

	VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA LIBERTE					VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA PROPRIETE					VIOLATION DU DROIT A L'INTEGRITE PHYS					VIOLENCE SEXUELLE					CONFLIT FONCIER					Total		
	Arrestation Arbitraire	Enlèvements	Recrutement Forcé	Travaux Forcés	Extorsions de Bien	Incendie	Taxe illégale	Pillages	Occupation illégale	Dégâts matériels Forcés	Coups et Blessures	Homicides	Blessures ou morts du aux milles	Mutilation	Torture/Traitement inhumain	Viols	Agression Sexuelle	Agression phys (SGBV)	Marriage force	Deni de ressource	Violence Psychologique	Conflit des limites	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des terres	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des pâturages	Conflit lié à la destruction des habitations			Conflit lié aux champs abandonnés
PDIs retournes	72	118	0	66	177	20	5	150	0	0	157	91	0	0	3	10	5	6	1	3	0	3	0	0	0	7	894	77%
PDIs	39	23	0	28	51	5	0	22	0	0	61	48	0	0	0	7	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	286	23%
Residents	13	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	30	2%
Rapatrises	8	0	0	4	19	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	3%
Grand Total	132	141	0	98	251	25	5	176	0	0	227	141	0	0	3	22	5	9	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	7	1,250	

Tranches d'age des victimes par violation

	VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA LIBERTE					VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA PROPRIETE					VIOLATION DU DROIT A L'INTEGRITE PHYS					VIOLENCE SEXUELLE					CONFLIT FONCIER					Total			
	Arrestation Arbitraire	Enlèvements	Recrutement Forcé	Travaux Forcés	Extorsions de Bien	Incendie	Taxe illégale	Pillages	Occupation illégale	Dégâts matériels Forcés	Coups et Blessures	Homicides	Blessures ou morts du aux milles	Mutilation	Torture/Traitement inhumain	Viols	Agression Sexuelle	Agression phys (SGBV)	Marriage force	Deni de ressource	Violence Psychologique	Conflit des limites	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des terres	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des pâturages	Conflit lié à la destruction des habitations			Conflit lié aux champs abandonnés	
Femmes																													
0-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0%
5-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0%
12-17	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	7%
18-69	11	19	0	79	2	5	36	0	0	33	42	0	0	0	18	5	9	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	265	27%	
60+	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0%
Sous-total	11	20	0	1	81	2	5	39	0	0	40	49	0	0	0	22	5	9	1	3	1	1	0	0	1	291	23%		
Hommes																													
0-4	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0%
5-11	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	7%
12-17	9	12	0	13	9	0	0	1	0	0	20	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	70	6%
18-69	104	102	0	77	154	22	0	131	0	162	77	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	839	67%	
60+	8	3	0	5	7	1	0	5	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	42	3%	
Sous-total	121	121	0	97	170	23	0	137	0	189	92	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	6	961	77%		
Grand Total	132	141	-	98	251	25	5	176	-	-	229	141	-	-	3	22	5	9	1	3	1	3	-	-	-	7	1,252		

Tableaux croisés

Les matrices ci-dessous doivent être lues verticalement.

Ex. 76% des cas d'homicide ont été documentés dans le territoire de Rutshuru

A gauche répartition des violations par territoire, à droite, répartition par auteur présumé

Violations	Beni	Masisi	Rutshuru	Lubero	Weikate
Arrestation Arbitraire	53%	15%	15%	16%	1%
Enlèvement	20%	33%	16%	31%	0%
Travaux Forcés	62%	7%	26%	5%	0%
Extorsions de biens	17%	39%	33%	10%	2%
Incendie	84%	0%	0%	16%	0%
Pillages	25%	47%	21%	5%	3%
Coups et blessures	29%	31%	28%	9%	3%
Homicide	76%	12%	9%	1%	1%
Torture/Traitement inhumain	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%
Viol	14%	32%	32%	23%	0%
Agression sexuelle	0%	0%	60%	40%	0%
Agression physique	0%	44%	33%	22%	0%
Deni de ressources	0%	33%	0%	67%	0%
Violence Psychologique	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%

Violations	Mai Mai	ADF / NALU	Bandits	FARDC	PNC	Pop civile
Arrestation Arbitraire	26%	0%	0%	46%	19%	2%
Enlèvement	60%	18%	16%	1%	0%	0%
Travaux Forcés	65%	9%	0%	26%	0%	0%
Extorsions de biens	43%	0%	7%	44%	4%	0%
Incendie	16%	84%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Pillages	31%	24%	25%	13%	0%	0%
CoupBlessure	44%	5%	15%	20%	13%	0%
Homicide	13%	72%	7%	3%	1%	0%
Torture/Traitement inhumain	0%	0%	33%	67%	0%	0%
Viol	45%	0%	14%	14%	0%	18%
Agression sexuelle	0%	0%	0%	60%	0%	40%
Agression Physique	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	89%
Deni de ressource	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Violence psychologique	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

ANNEXES

#Violations par Territoire

	VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA LIBERTE				VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA PROPRIETE				VIOLATION DU DROIT A L'INTEGRITE PHYS				VIOLENCE SEXUELLE				CONFLIT FONCIER				Total								
	Arrestation Arbitraire	Enlèvements	Recrutement Force	Travaux Forcés	Expropriations de Bien	Incendie	Taxe illégale	Pillages	Occupation illégale	Déguerpissement force	Coups et Blessures	Homicides	Blessures ou morts aux mines	Mutilation	Torture/Traitement inhumain	Viols	Agresion Sexuelle	Agresion phys (SGBV)	Marriage force	Deni de ressource			Violence Psychologique	Conflit des limites	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des forêts	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des pâturages	Conflit lié à la destruction des habitations	Conflit lié aux champs abandonnés	
Rutshuru	20	23	0	25	82	0	0	37	0	0	63	13	0	0	0	7	3	3	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	279	22%
Masisi	20	46	0	7	98	0	0	82	0	0	72	17	0	0	3	7	0	4	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	369	29%
Lubero	21	44	0	5	24	4	5	8	0	0	20	2	0	0	0	5	2	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	151	12%
Beni	70	28	0	61	43	21	0	44	0	0	66	107	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	443	36%
Walikale	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	5	0	0	8	2	0	0	0												20	2%	
Total	132	141	0	98	251	25	5	176	0	0	229	141	0	0	3	22	5	9	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	7	1262	

#Violations par zone de sante

	VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA LIBERTE				VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA PROPRIETE				VIOLATION DU DROIT A L'INTEGRITE PHYS				VIOLENCE SEXUELLE				CONFLIT FONCIER				Total								
	Arrestation Arbitraire	Enlèvements	Recrutement Force	Travaux Forcés	Expropriations de Bien	Incendie	Taxe illégale	Pillages	Occupation illégale	Déguerpissement force	Coups et Blessures	Homicides	Blessures ou morts aux mines	Mutilation	Torture/Traitement inhumain	Viols	Agresion Sexuelle	Agresion phys (SGBV)	Marriage force	Deni de ressource			Violence Psychologique	Conflit des limites	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des forêts	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des pâturages	Conflit lié à la destruction des habitations	Conflit lié aux champs abandonnés	
Birambizo	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	11	6	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	3%
Bambo	5	4	0	3	14	0	0	14	0	0	20	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	66	5%
Kirotshé	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	0	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	1%
Masisi	10	16	0	0	17	0	0	27	0	0	24	5	0	0	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	106	8%
Katoyi	4	1	0	0	33	0	0	26	0	0	14	5	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	90	7%
Rwanguba	8	7	0	5	51	0	0	11	0	0	14	0	0	0	0												96	8%	
Mweso	5	20	0	5	35	0	0	5	0	0	17	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	92	7%
Pinga	0	9	0	2	11	0	0	20	0	0	11	1	0	0	0												54	4%	
Lubero	4	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0					1	2	1	1	2	0							14	1%	
Katwa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	1%
Oicha	0	23	0	4	0	20	0	44	0	0	9	38	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	16%
Binza	3	2	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	10	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	3%
Kayna	8	32	0	5	19	0	4	0	0	0	11	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	89	7%
Kibirizi	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	1%
Vuhovi	10	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	8	1	0	0	0												28	2%	
Beni	22	5	0	57	31	1	0	0	0	0	48	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	173	14%
Musienene	0	10	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0												16	1%	
Kibua	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	5	0	0	8	2	0	0	0												19	2%	
Butembo	7	0	0	0	4	0	0	6	0	0	6	0	0	0	0												23	2%	
Rutshuru	0	1	0	9	9	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	31	2%
Kyondo	38	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0												40	3%	
Alimbongo	2	0	0	0																							2	0%	
Kalunguta					2	0	0	0	0	0																	2	0%	
Total	132	141	0	98	251	25	5	176	0	0	229	141	0	0	3	22	5	9	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	7	1262	100%

#Violations par auteur presume

	VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA LIBERTE				VIOLATION DU DROIT A LA PROPRIETE				VIOLATION DU DROIT A L'INTEGRITE PHYS				VIOLENCE SEXUELLE				CONFLIT FONCIER				Total								
	Arrestation Arbitraire	Enlèvements	Recrutement Force	Travaux Forcés	Expropriations de Bien	Incendie	Taxe illégale	Pillages	Occupation illégale	Déguerpissement force	Coups et Blessures	Homicides	Blessures ou morts aux mines	Mutilation	Torture/Traitement inhumain	Viols	Agresion Sexuelle	Agresion phys (SGBV)	Marriage force	Deni de ressource			Violence Psychologique	Conflit des limites	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des forêts	Conflit lié à l'exploitation des pâturages	Conflit lié à la destruction des habitations	Conflit lié aux champs abandonnés	
ADF/NALU	0	26	0	9	0	21	0	43	0	0	11	102	0	0	0													212	17%
Autorité locale	1	0	0	0																								1	0%
Bandits	0	22	0	0	17	0	0	44	0	0	35	10	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	133	11%
FARDC	61	2	0	25	111	0	0	22	0	0	45	4	0	0	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	278	22%
Groupe arme inconnu	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0																	4	0%	
Inconnu	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	9	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	2%
Mai Mai	34	85	0	64	107	4	4	54	0	0	100	18	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	487	39%
PNC	25	0	0	0	9	0	1	0	0	0	30	1	0	0	0												66	5%	
Pop civile	2	0	0	0												4	2	8	1	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	23	2%
Autres	1	4	0	0							3	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0						13	1%	
ANR	8	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0																	13	1%	
FDLR	0	1	0	0							1	1	0	0	0												3	0%	
Total	132	141	0	98	251	25	5	176	0	0	229	141	0	0	3	22	5	9	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	7	1262	

Recommandations

Domaines	Recommandations	Acteurs ciblés	Niveau d'urgence
Protection	Renforcer l'analyse de protection du groupement Jomba à où l'on signale une présence inhabituelle d'un groupe armé.	INTERSOS	Permanent
Protection	Renforcer le monitoring de protection à Beni ville, Butembo, Kasindi, OICHA, etc. afin d'identifier les problèmes de protection et humanitaires des PDIs.	INTERSOS	Urgent
Protection	Analyser la possibilité d'offrir une assistance en vivres aux PDIs présentes à Bibwe et Mpati pour limiter leur mouvement vers leur zone d'origine	PAM	Dès que possible et suivant l'évolution contextuelle sécuritaire de la zone

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Annex 5: List of Documents consulted during the evaluation

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- Internal Audit - Democratic Republic of Congo, UNHCR 2020
- Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 Emergency in DRC, External 2018
- Mission Report, Global CCCM Cluster mission DRC, 29 July – 17 August 2019, UNHCR, 2019
- UNHCR Management Response: Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 Emergency, UNHCR, May 2019
- Policy on UNHCRs Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, UNHCR September 2019
- Guidance package for UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, UNHCR, September 2019
- UNHCR's Initiative on Internal Displacement 2020 – 2021, UNHCR 2020
- Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) DRC 2017- 2019, OCHA Updated 2019
- Plan de Réponse Humanitaire RDC 2020, OCHA, Révisé June 2020
- Submission by UNHCR to the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, UNHCR, May-2020
- Aperçu des besoins Humanitaires, UNHCR Décembre 2019
- Operations Plan DRC 2020, UNHCR 2020
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- IASC L3 protocols, IASC 2014
- UNHCR – OCHA Note on Mixed situations: coordination in practice, UNHCR – OCHA 2014
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- IDP Step-Up Support: DRC, Principal Advisor on Internal Displacement's Deep Dive (10-24 July 2020) Sumbul Rizvi, UNHCR July 20
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- Procedures Standard Operationelles sur le mecanisme de plaintes, UNCHR sous delegation de Goma, UNHC 2020
- Stratégie Multi-années du HCR en matières de Violence Sexuelle, et basee sur le genre, 2019-20, UNHCR June 2019
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- Paquet d'activités de protection à base communautaire 2020, UNHCR March 20
- Note d'orientation cash/Projet de protection communautaire IDPs 3 provinces UNHCR, March 2020
- Proposal projet protection communautaire Pilote N-Kivu IDPs, UNHCR, May 2020
- Note sur le ciblage des bénéficiaires du cash en DI 2020, UNHCR Octobre 20
- Note conceptuelle sur la mise en œuvre de projets a impact rapide, UNHCR May, 2019
- Plan d'actions Protection et Field- Urgence Beni, UNHCR, Fevrier 2020
- Plan d'Action Monitoring de Protection _Exercice 2019 (Collecte des incidents et les évaluations de Protection), UNHCR2019
- Rapports Mensuel Monitoring de protection (various documents, 3 provinces, various dates from November 2019- August 20)
- DRC Monthly Operations Updates, Various documents, from November 2020- February 2020
- DCR Emergency weekly updates, various documents, 3 provinces, various dates from November 2019- August 2020

- Note conceptuelle de mise en œuvre des Synergies avec partenaires locaux, UNHCR DRC, May 2020
- Stratégie Interne d'assistance et de réponse AMEs au profit des PDI du Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu et Ituri (2020 – 2021), UNHCR DRC June 2020
- High Alert List for Emergency Preparedness (HALEP) IDPs, UNHCR, August 2020
- Plan de travail et action nécessaires pour la mise en place du mécanisme de réponse aux urgences, situation des déplacés internes, UNHCR DRC, August 2020
- Framework for Engagement & Disengagement in chronic and repeated displacement situations in the Eastern DRC, UNHCR, Draft last updated February 2021
- Stratégie de protection de l'Equipe humanitaire du pays en République démocratique du Congo, UNHCT, Avril 2018
- IDP 2020 Priorities (NK, SK and Ituri), UNHCR DRC 2019
- Note d'Orientation 2019 Intervention de Protection pour les personnes déplacées internes (PDI), Nord Kivu, Sud Kivu et Ituri, UNHCR, DCR Octobre 2018
- DRC National protection strategy 2017-19, UNHCR 2017
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- Plan d'Action Monitoring de Protection-Exercice 2020, UNHCR DRC April 20, updated April 21
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- Note d'orientation : Cash pour la Protection, UNHCR DRC
- Projet de Monitoring de Protection, UNHCR DRC Juin 2020- Mars 2021
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- Plan de Protection Beni, UNHCR DRC, February 2020
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- OIOS Draft Report of an Audit of the operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, August 2020