The humanitarian hangover: transnationalization of governmental practice in Tanzania's refugee-populated areas

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Introduction

This paper traces shifts in governmental practice associated with the massive inflow of Burundian and Congolese refugees and international relief assistance into a remote, rural area of western Tanzania (Kasulu District). The ways in which the influx has induced the restructuring of relationship among citizens, and between citizens and the territory and the government of Tanzania is both surprising and counter-intuitive.

Many historical accounts (both institutional and sociological) suggest that crisis periods - a distinction for which the current period of humanitarian influx undoubtedly qualifies - are critical moments during which ‘state-building’ is likely to occur (see Silberman 1993, Mann 1984, 1993; Tilly 1985; Poggi 1978). My initial expectation was, therefore, that the ‘exogenous’ shock of more than 100,000 outsiders and millions of dollars rapidly introduced into a remote and poor district would induce the opening of new avenues for reconfiguring governmental practice.

While new avenues have indeed appeared, their form has been shaped, to a surprising degree, by existing practices. Rather than brushing away what was there before, the influx appears to have primarily taken a catalytic role. It has accelerated or magnified a number of already existing patterns while also producing novel orientations and practices. I expected that the government’s access to additional (international) resources, combined with increased citizen demands on state services as a result of this external shock would in some way bring Tanzanians ‘closer’ to the state.

This has not happened. Rather than bring the citizenry into a closer or more direct relationship with state actors and agents, residents have turned toward international actors, both inter and non-governmental, with their demands, expectations, and accusations. While such practices exist elsewhere in Tanzania, a country that has been acutely aid-dependent since its inception, their prominence and significance in refugee-populated areas demands careful consideration.

Perhaps even more surprising is that this turn away from the state has been accompanied by a reification of Tanzanian virtue and identity; two ideas themselves introduced by previous generations of state actors. This counter-intuitive response suggests the need to identify and explain citizens’ schema: how they interpret stimuli and how they order their priorities and demands. Such an explanation demands a historical excursion.

Recognizing the importance of past practice necessarily draws attention to the significant and continuing role of Tanzanian state strategies in this unfolding drama. It suggest, moreover, that despite the tremendous influence of international actors, sovereignty - defined here as authorship of governmental practice - has not necessarily been usurped.

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1 I would like to thank Keith Nitta, Ben Goldfank, Ken Foster, and Laura Henry for their comments on previous drafts of this paper.
2 The findings are based on 14 months of fieldwork (September 1999- November 2000) in two rural districts – one ‘refugee-populated’ (Kasulu) and one not (Mpwapwa). Please refer to the appendices to this paper for maps of the research sites.
Such a position stands in contrast to frequent assertions that (a) the Tanzanian state, like many of its continental counterparts, has all but vanished in its rural domains or (b) that the UNHCR and other transnationals have effectively usurped the administration of Northwestern Tanzania. What has disappeared, if it was ever there, was the effective coercive and regulatory mechanisms typically assumed to be at the foundations of modern state forms (see Weber 1978). What remains, institutionalized in perceptions and behavioral patterns (i.e. practices), are the legacies of rural economic and political policies now abandoned. Indeed, I would argue that it was primarily Tanzanian state policies - particularly those executed during the country’s socialist experiment - that provided the rules which determined how more recent stimuli and strategies have been received, formulated, and executed.

This should not, of course, discount actions undertaken by refugees, the agencies charged with their assistance (i.e., UNHCR and its implementing partners), or other international actors (e.g., the Burundian government and army). I wish only to draw attention to the fact that the Tanzanian state has long-been, and indeed remains, the single most important influence on the economic and political structures within its territory. Following a brief review of this essay’s theoretical impetus and architecture, I explain this historical process in more detail.

Theory, concepts, and methodology

In addressing this essay’s primary challenges - describing governmental practice before and after the influx and to explain the causal mechanisms linking the two - I draw on two primary sources of inspiration: ‘refugee studies’ and debates surrounding the nature and determinants of state-society relations. With regard to refugee or humanitarian studies, this essay is intended to at least partially address the ‘refugee-centrism’ that characterizes much earlier work (see Hyndman 1996, Malkki 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Zolberg et al 1989; Harrel-Bond 1986; Colson 1971).

The focus on refugees and the refugee experience has had both practical and conceptual implications. Practically, it led to a tendency to overlook the broader political context in which refugees operations took place (Stein 1986). It can lead, for example, to a kind of myopia which ignores links between refugees - which were to be apolitical as long as they remained in UNHCR administered camps - and the ongoing conflicts in their countries of origin.

Moreover, there has been a propensity to treat the politics of host countries as a priori hostile or hospitable to asylum-seekers. Recent research, including my own, suggests a need to understand that refugees and humanitarian actors help to shape the domestic politics and policy positions of host countries (see Schmidt 1998; Jacobsen 1996).

3 This latter position reflects a statement made during an interview with US Foreign Service Officer charged with managing refugee affairs (Jane Howell, Dar es Salaam: 19 October 1999).
4 Malkki speaks to when she writes that, for anthropologists at least, “the term refugees denotes an objectively self-delimiting field of study” (1995:496).
Humanitarianism must, this perspective tells us, be seen not only as the progeny of, but as an influence on, broader social and political currents and priorities (see Gorman 1993).\(^5\)

While there is a growing recognition of the need to overcome the refugee-centrism that characterized much past scholarship, efforts to address these concerns have tended to be overly materialistic in their focus (see Jacobsen 1997; Kuhlman 1994; Kok 1989; Hansen 1982). More recent work on host communities, notably by Whitaker (1999) and Waters (1999), has begun to challenge the assumptions of this materialist perspective on a number of fronts. Both authors call for disaggregation of the humanitarian influx’ material effects on host populations. Instead of assuming universal losses, they suggest that some locals (i.e., citizens of the host country) reap substantial benefits while others risk not only their economic, but also their physical and cultural survival.

From these disparate effects come, Whitaker argues, challenges to existing political practice. Waters concurs suggesting that such challenges alter not only politics, but lead to the reconsideration and renegotiation of identities and social structures. Working onward from this proposition, this essay documents which of these transitions and transformations can be attributed to the humanitarian influx and which are best credited to broader changes within the Tanzanian political economy.

My second source of inspiration - Joel Migdal’s (1994) call for scholars to undertake ‘anthropologies of the state’ - provides mechanisms with which to holistically, yet critically, analyze the humanitarian influx’ effects on the host community. The form of anthropology called for in his work, however, lacks the historical perspective needed to unmask the patterns and causal mechanisms of social change and transformation.

Through a combination of semi-structured citizen interviews, discussions with NGO and government employees (at local, district, regional, and national levels), and analysis of available current and archival records, I have endeavored to historicize my analysis of contemporary governmental practices. In doing so, I attempt what Nietzschean-Foucauldian refer to as a ‘genealogy’ or an archeology of the present (Nietzsche 1967; Foucault 1984). More pithily, this effort could be described as an archaeology of an anthropology; an identification of the historical precedents for current realities.

The processes discussed below are, for analytical purposes, structured around two metaphors, one representing contemporary realities (the anthropology), the other the changes that realize this reality (the archaeology). The first of these is Elias’ conception of the card game cum state, the second a self-constructed metaphor intended to provide insight into changing governmental practice.\(^6\) For Elias, the state does not substantively

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\(^5\) Probably the most important work in this regard, and certainly the most cited, in challenging academics’ refugee-centrisms is Chambers’ evocatively entitled “Hidden Losers: The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programs on Poorer Hosts” (1993).

\(^6\) Following Elias, if one wishes to speak of anything tangible: “we can say that the configuration formed by the players is as concrete as the players themselves. By figuration we mean the changing pattern created by the players as a whole, not only by their intellects, but by their whole selves, the totality of their dealings in their relationships with each other. It can be seen that this figuration forms a flexible latticework of
exist beyond the historically conditioned configuration of inter-dependent social and political actors that comprise it, what I am calling governmental practices.7

Within this perspective, rules may exist independently of a given individual or set of actors (i.e., where they structure action unattached from coercion), but their power cannot be accepted a priori. Rather, their influence and meaning comes only through iterative processes that cause them to become internalized, resisted, and rewritten by those whom they effect (see Mitchell 1991; DiMaggio 1991).

To take Elias’ metaphor a step further, the influx of refugees and humanitarian assistance may (under extreme circumstances) compared to the arrival of a set of ‘party crashers’ who demand inclusion in the game. As a result of this, the relationships among the original actors - hosts and state agents in this case - are substantially and forever altered. Identifying the rules and relationships that structure current actors’ behavior fulfils Migdal’s anthropological requirements. What remains is to reveal the foundations for these rules.

Following the ‘archeology’ metaphor, I see the construction of a regime of practice as a kind of layering in which new behaviors, actors, priorities, and challenges are formulated in response to and then laid atop those already inscribed. 8 With this overlaying, new actors or practices may be introduced and older (and potentially latent) practices may be highlighted or enhanced. Conversely, important players may lose their influence and essential elements of practice may become obscured.

For present purposes, the first of these ‘layers’ is roughly equivalent to governmental practice in pre-refugee/non-refugee-populated Tanzania. The second layer - which remains dynamic - has been brought about by the humanitarian influx. I take the amalgam of these two layers to represent the regime of governmental practices in Kasulu. Mpwapwa, on the other hand, still operates largely within a dynamic, but more institutionalized, set of practices inscribed in years past. I more fully elaborate the nature of this layering process and its implications in this essay’s concluding section.

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7 In describing his own work, Foucault writes that “the target of analysis wasn’t ‘institutions’, ‘theories’ or ‘ideology’, but practices – with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances – whatever roles these elements may actually play—but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence, and ‘reason’. It is a question of analyzing a ‘regime of practice’ – practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect” (1991: 75).

8 This perspective follows from Jessop’s assertion that the “state is a social relation which can indeed be analyzed as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies.” (Jessop 1990: 261).
Explaining the discursive state

The more actors initially involved in authoring governmental practices, the more complex and diffuse the resulting rules will inevitably be. The involvement of multiple protagonists will invariably result in a regime that serves no discrete ‘master’. Where no actor possesses anything approximating an effective monopoly on economic, normative, or coercive power, a ‘headless’ regime of governmental practice (heterarchy) is even more probable. This has most definitely been the case in Tanzania where the post-colonial state, while undoubtedly the strongest organization working in the given territory, did not control the means to establish and inscribe a regime of practices according to its own designs. Its leaders were, furthermore, not provided a tabula rasa but were rather asked to contend with practices already partially inscribed by colonial and pre-colonial strategies of domination. That said, the post-colonial administration employed what resources it had available and, especially in countries like Tanzania, effected considerable alterations in the governmental practices. It was, for example, effectively able to erode or destroy many of the practices on which pre-independence village life was based. It did not, however, provide an alternative, rationalized regime of practices.

Without passing judgment on the late Nyerere’s public career, nor ignoring the important effects of international environmental factors on domestic policy successes, there can be little debate that without him, Tanzania would not be what it is today. His monumental failure in achieving his most ambitious goal, the creation of a self-sustaining agrarian society based on state-planned, but largely self-sustaining, villages (ujamaa vijijini), left rural Tanzanian governmental practices a sometimes surprising mixture of tendencies and principles. The following paragraphs offer a stylized history of how these governmental practices developed. I have chosen to direct special attention to the rural districts of Mpwapwa and Kasulu in which I conducted the bulk of my investigations.

The development of the ‘standard’ regime of Tanzanian governmental practice can, for present purposes, be divided into three prosaically labeled phases: pre-independence (before 1961), Nyerereism (1961-1985), and post-Nyerereism (1985-Present). In the interest of clarity, I only discuss the latter two. While I have periodicized Tanzania’s political history by its changing leadership, I do not wish to disguise the extensive continuities existing between these phases, nor reify Presidents by ascribing them with the power to dictate governmental practice in remote rural areas.

I do, however, argue that the regime of practices in both Kasulu and Mpwapwa during the early 1990s (and what still largely remains in Mpwapwa) is a direct descendent of the Nyerere period despite the failures of Nyerere’s most ambitious programs and subsequent efforts at economic and political reform. For reasons that are clarified further in the

9 Tanganyika became the United Republic of Tanzania following the 1964 unification of the mainland territory with the former Sultanate of Zanzibar.

10 Tripp and Young write of Nyerere’s “extraordinary charisma and leadership skills... His charm, oratorical mastery, private austerity and integrity, and principled convictions sustained popular affection and admiration throughout most of his long tenure” (2001: 268).
following paragraphs, I have labeled this progeny or regime of practices a ‘discoursive state’ because the country’s territory, population, and governing institutions cohered primarily through symbolic, identitive, and discoursive (i.e., not material or instrumental) links. It was this ‘discoursive state’ that would come to structure both popular and elite response to the humanitarian influx.

**Nyerereism**

The earliest components of Nyerereism and the discoursive state were initially inscribed during the earliest days of the post-independence period. The 1961 election of Julius K. Nyerere as the first president of independent Tanganyika is critical in this regard as the first truly national political event. In both Kasulu and Mpwapwa, large numbers of people (especially men) voted for the first time in this election. While the electoral consequence of such participation was minimal (the results were predetermined, as they would be for many more years to come), the election was significant for other reasons.

Even though few respondents could provide specific instrumental or utilitarian reasons for voting, or even recall issues or candidates, the ways in which respondents justify their participation in the 1961 elections, and indeed in subsequent elections, speaks to the gesture’s symbolic weight. In casting a ballot, residents demonstrated to whomever was watching (most importantly themselves) a faith in the new government and its leadership; two entities that even today many see as inseparable.11 Such participation can also be said to have helped instill a significant sense of ownership and belonging to both the Tanganyikan territory and national population, making citizens out of subjects. Moreover, it instilled a deep and relatively uncritical affinity for the country’s first President.12

As the country’s second multi-party presidential election approached (October 2000), the pattern this national election established held true with a significant majority of informants indicated their intention to vote for the sitting president. This decision was rarely based on any sort of affection for or evaluation of his policies - for few had considered the alternatives. Similarly, few expressed a real desire to influence the

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11 During one interview, a question about current Members of Parliament elicited the following response from an otherwise coherent informant: “I don’t know about the parliamentarians. I do know that Nyerere is president, He died this year, but he is still president. Maybe Mkapa [the sitting president] is an MP or a minister.” This fusing of the role and the man is reflected in many people’s propensity to speak of the President, regardless of his name, as Nyerere, much as the Roman emperors were always Caesars. The country has, by this logic, been governed by three Nyereres. I would argue that these tendencies suggest a more widespread indifferentiation between the role of the person and the office. This conception fusion only furthers perceptions of the state as a distant, almost mythical creation that can talk to them through television or radio, but who cannot be expected to hear what they say.

12 This is not to ignore the pre-independence activities of either Nyerere’s Tanganyika African National Union (TANU, formed 1958) nor its direct predecessor, the Tanganyikan African Association (Formed 1954). Rather, it is meant to suggest only that these organizations—despite their nationalist claims—were not truly mass movements rooted in peasant activism. It is only with the first post-independence election that anything even approximating rural mobilization occurred and even this was of an extremely limited nature. For strains of this argument see Zolberg 1966.
outcome, which was all but predetermined. Rather, people voted to demonstrate their
continued commitment to the nation in some intangible sense. Some voters even
indicated that if and when the time came when they could not vote for the ruling
(Nyerere’s) party’s candidate, who they see as representing Tanzanian stability and
virtue, they simply would not vote.

With the declaration of *Ujamaa* (Tanzanian socialism) in 1967, the Tanzanian
government set out for the first time a coherent and distinctive set of ideological and
administrative principles. This manifesto brought about (or intended to) administrative
and political unification under the monopolistic supremacy of the ruling party. The
party’s quasi-Maoist approach to rural transformation placed the emphasis firmly on
agricultural development. While defecting from the Marxist-Leninist industrial telos, the
ideology of the party was still, however, very much based on modernist principles and the
notion of planned progress, passing through pre-determined stages, towards a utopian
goal. The most significant step on this route was to be the creation of thousands of
collectivized villages throughout the country.13 Although these villages did not provide
the ‘free haircuts’ offered by their Maoist correlates, they were intended to almost
entirely supplant existing settlement patterns by providing communal farming equipment
as well as health, education, and other social services.

Villagization also introduced, for the first time in Tanzanian history, a set of standardized
and centralized administrative structures intended to link the smallest ten-house cell with
the central government in Dar es Salaam (later moved to Dodoma). Depending on whom
you believe, such measures were either intended to structure democratic participation or
to control the population for the ruling party’s benefit. As part of this enterprise, each
district was hierarchically divided into wards and villages, and within the villages further
divisions were created down to the ten-house cell. Representatives (party members
selected for popular election by senior party officials) were put in place at all levels to
ensure the free flow of information from leaders to people and, ideally, from citizens to
the government.

While competitive elections for representatives at the local level were frequent, albeit
between two carefully chose party members, it is unclear to what degree elected or
administrative officials were ever responsive to citizen demands. Over time, unprocessed
demands and data tended to flow from citizens to accumulate at overburdened village or
district offices who were distracted by attempts to satisfy their superiors, grandees who
regularly returned commands, imperatives, and new - sometimes incomprehensible - sets

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13 The reach of this villagization is perhaps its most remarkable feature. With the possible exception of
those living in the relatively few wealthy urban areas (Arusha, Moshi, Bukoba and Mwanza) and the rich
coffee-growing lands on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, almost all of the Tanzanian population at one time lived
in an Ujamaa village. Even the new administrative capital in Dodoma was designed as a conglomeration of
these communities. Although many people in the marginally wealthier areas have left the villages, those
living in poorer districts, including both Kasulu and Mpwapwa, have chosen to remain in the ujamaa
villages, despite the decaying institutional and physical infrastructure.
of responsibilities. A correspondence between information submitted to the local government and decrees issued by the central administration appears to have been more a matter of coincidence than of careful consideration of local needs and interests. Indeed, a conscious effort was made to introduce broad sweeping (i.e., regional or national) schemes geared towards building a national economy rather than promoting local initiatives or responding to individual communities’ demands.

As ineffective as they may have been at realizing Nyerere’s socialist vision, personnel policies were centrally important in the bureaucracy’s role in bounding, if ‘departicipating’, a national population. To this end, district and regional officials were normally assigned to positions outside their home areas. Such policies were not only generally successful in thwarting localism and corruption, but they created a truly national Tanzanian administration and administrative corps. The sometimes violent relocation of persons into planned settlements and the initiation of local party offices served to further integrate the regime of practices, encompassing mainland residents and representatives of the national government, even if the two groups were not always on the best of terms.

Such proximity meant that residents became participants, however unwitting or passive, in a Tanzanian body politic that had previously not existed. One of the more ironic effects is that while the national party-government attempted to integrate and unify its administration, such unity became more symbolic than substantial. Despite the appearance of party flags and officers in every village, the lack of telecommunications and transportation infrastructure, combined with the relatively rapid rotation of district level officials, left a gap between the population and the administration (especially between villages and the district) that was bridged by words more than actions.

During the late colonial and early post-independence era, a number of factors contributed to forging this symbolic and discoursive linkage between residents and the national administration. The construction of primary and secondary schools is perhaps the singly most significant factors in this regard. Through control over the curriculum, the Nyerereist government was able to propagate Tanzanian ideology and language (i.e., Swahili) throughout the mainland.

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14 This practice continues in many government offices where a clerk is annually required to transfer all the names from the guest book—itself an artifact of a past age—onto a separate form and submit this list to their superior ministry in Dar es Salaam.

15 The concept of ‘departicipation’ comes from Kasfir’s (1974) work in which he traces how institutional formation in many African countries often tended to alienate citizens while simultaneously extending them membership in a national political community. Similar themes appear in works by Mamdami (1996) and Balibar (1991).

16 In a campaign stump speech, a soon to be defeated opposition candidate offered the following observation: “This district is poor, there can be no doubt about it. Today we have visited many villages, and in none of them have we found a secondary school, a dispensary, a veterinary clinic, or any other social services. But in every village we find flying high a CCM flag as big as a bedsheets” (Kasulu, October 2000)

17 Beyond its functional uses, Swahili carried with it strong nationalist overtones and played a key role part in Nyerere’s philosophy of freedom and unity (uhuru na umoja). By 1967, 90% of the population was able to communicate effectively in Swahili, up from 52% in 1942 (Tripp and Young 2001). Schools also served
While one may question the ebullience of official enrollment figures from this period, there can be no doubt that the schools were extremely effective in inscribing a sense of nation in a generation of the rural poor. As with other government employees, teachers were often assigned to villages far from their home areas to ensure the schools had a truly national character. The syllabus was standardized and lessons on citizenship, Marxist economics, and nationalist history were included. Although based on the English educational system (and almost all secondary and tertiary education is to this day conducted in English), the Tanzanian system was substantively oriented towards building a peasant-society along the lines dictated by state leaders.

To this end, the curriculum emphasized practical learning and the inculcation of a strong and relatively uncritical respect for public authorities. It also highlighted, in no uncertain terms, the perceived injustices of colonialism and the continued role of the European powers in the ‘underdevelopment’ of Tanzania and its African neighbors. While Pan-Africanism was also a strong tenet of Nyerere’s ideology and was taught in the schools, the result of these teachings seemed to do more to help enforce Tanzania’s separate identity than to foster a sense of belonging to an ‘African’ population. Perceived betrayal by Kenya’s capitalist leanings and war in neighboring countries (including war with Uganda), left many Tanzanians feeling that with their unity, peace, and equality, Tanzania - as represented by their government and leader(s) - was a moral and virtuous beacon for other African countries, if not the world.

While one should not underestimate the ruling party’s conscious, ‘positive’ efforts to reform and inscribe governmental practice, it is its negative functions - what it could not do and what it prevented others from doing - that are potentially more significant for the current study. In addition to abolishing the chiefs’ role in local government (another effort to modernize and build a national administration), the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Party of the Revolution, the ruling party) effectively prevented any community initiatives or political gatherings that had not been pre-ordained by the appropriate party leaders. To ensure equal development, local self-help schemes were all but prohibited and all foreign development assistance was directed through the national government. In place of locally directed organizations and initiatives, the party-government established a set of co-operative associations meant to ensure fair payment for agricultural products, to disseminate information, and to raise revenue.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^\text{18}\) In both Mpwapwa and Kasulu these cooperatives were particularly unsuccessful in meeting their economic objectives. In Kigoma, the government pushed cotton as a dominant cash crop and launched an ineffective extension-service campaign to convince farmers of its worthiness. In Mpwapwa, efforts were made to improve production of groundnuts, as well as maize and other subsistence crops. The success of these efforts can be judged by the fatal famines, which often afflict the district.
The expansion of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), a quasi-secret organization meant to collect information on citizens’ behavior and attitudes, only further served to ensure that the population did not get too querulous or too organized. At the height of its powers, rumors suggest that one out of three people were affiliated with the CID. While such speculation undoubtedly overstate the CID’s actual powers, arrests were sufficiently frequent and public that people were unlikely to take too many chances. Through its dislocation/relocation of the population, its extensive ideological propagation, the cooperatization of the economy, and creation of a feared semi-secret police, the party introduced a new series of disciplinary techniques that, building on existing perceptions and attitudes, had a dual effect: it simultaneously created and de-participated a national population. This process has subsequently influenced that population’s response to subsequent social, political, and economic circumstances. In this sense, one can suggest that the ruling party cum Tanzanian state did, in fact, effectively mobilize the population and introduce a new regime of governmental practices, of the state’s making, if not of its design.

Post-Nyerere Tanzania

By the mid 1980s, harsh economic realities (brought about by poor planning, a war with Amin’s Uganda, and falling agricultural commodity prices), low levels of popular participation, the conditionalities of international aid, and intragovernmental wrangling, began to quickly erode what administrative and economic linkages were formed during the Ujamaa period. The desiccation of the basis for this would-be social order left behind a sometimes uneasy mixture of social and administrative institutions and practices ultimately resulting in the ‘discoursive state’.

By the early 1980s, the East African Community had collapsed and the Tanzanian economy was following close behind. Even in Dar es Salaam, the country’s commercial capital, it became difficult to get staple foods, salt, or soap. Throughout the country, cooperatives that had been running for too long at a loss finally collapsed, as did much of what remained of the private sector. State-run social services also floundered, with medicines becoming largely unavailable and civil servants’ salaries delayed by months, if they arrived at all.

One might expect these schemes’ failures to induce considerable frustration and protest from people who had recently abandoned their former villages and village life as part of a

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19 In addition to arrests for overt political subversion, during the economic crisis of the early 1980s, everyday citizens were often brought up on charges of ‘economic sabotage’. Such indictments could be based on a violation as seemingly petty as ‘hoarding’ a two-kilogram bag of sugar when your neighbors were facing a shortfall.

20 Notably, many of those to leave their business enterprises were citizens of South Asian background. This is, perhaps, not surprising given that 97 percent of building seized under the socialist Acquisition of Building (1971) were of Asian ownership (Tripp and Young 2001: 269). If the businesses contained within these structures open or reopened, they were often done so under African ownership, albeit often Africans from other parts of Tanzania (Particularly Chaggas from Kilimanjaro region). The economic collapse may have, therefore, in some ways served to integrate the population.
state-initiated project. This was not, however, what transpired. Respect for the government remained strong and the level of social unrest or ethnic-tensions was limited to a few relatively minor incidents. This ‘non-reaction’ reveals much about the regime of governmental practices that existed at that time and indeed, reinforced the departicipation of the citizenry.

The planned and unplanned responses to the economic crisis, by both private and state actors, were significant and at times severe and the local effects on governmental practice would complete the creation of the discoursive state. Initially under Tanzania’s homegrown Economic Recovery Program and later under a World Bank/IMF directed Structural Adjustment Program, the rural incarnations of many formal governmental institutions were definitively dissolved. Even the ruling party, which remained the only legal party until 1993, scaled back its activities in order to fight internal corruption and administrative ineffectiveness. Loosening currency and exchange controls had the dual effect of undermining public services by devaluing the salaries of civil servants (including teachers, doctors, and administrators), while allowing the population to more readily employ the private sector in meeting their subsistence needs. The availability of goods in the markets removed yet one more function from governing institutions, further dissolving the practical/functional relationship between the population and public institutions.

Ironically, the (ongoing) reform process appears to have at least initially reinforced one of the long-standing tenets of Tanzania historiography: that of being a virtuous victim of circumstances. As indicated, most residents of both Mpwapwa and Kasulu remained subsistence farmers or petty-traders during the period of economic liberalization. The newfound availability of goods under the liberalizing economy (particularly during President Mwinyi’s first term) seems to have done a terrific amount to redeem whatever ills may have been attributed to the socialist regime while, as noted, providing a further ‘release valve’ for potential demands on public institutions.

Many respondents recounted stories of ‘halcyon days’ under Mwinyi’s regime when the shops were chock-full of affordable items. According to their accounts, it was only conditionalities of the IMF/World Bank assistance package that prices for necessities and remaining public services began to climb dramatically. This coincidence of (harsh) economic realities and interpretation (no doubt framed by the country’s political leaders) has helped inscribe a certain kind of transnationalism within the national regime of governmental practice: that the international community is responsible for the country’s ills and, consequently, has a moral responsibility for their remediation. The degree and nature of this responsibility is, however, geographically contingent as the following section demonstrates.

Because efforts to effect political and economic reforms continue, it is impossible to say that there is anything immutable about the practices discussed in the previous paragraphs. Indeed, political liberalization - specifically the shift to a multiparty system - is likely to induce significant renegotiations in current practice and spawn new ones throughout the country. It is my belief, however, that such renegotiations will not have standard
outcomes, but will be framed and conditioned by contemporary events now taking place at the local or district level. The roots of these variations are explored further in the following section’s discussion of the humanitarian influx. For the time being, however, I wish to briefly highlight what I see as the primary characteristics of the first ‘layer’ within Tanzania’s regime of governmental practice.

- national cohesion without effective national (formal) organization;
- popular de-participation and lack of critical public dialogue;
- discursive not material linkages;
- belief in Tanzania as virtuous victim;
- unity as justification for status quo; and,
- formalism within a modernist development teleology.

While these traits outlined above characterize a good deal of rural Tanzania, they are not necessarily endemic throughout the country. Nor do they describe the behavior of every individual. They are meant only as generalizations made for analytical purposes. One must also not assume that these traits became perpetually fixed; I only present them as such to clarify and contrast them with the second layer.

The humanitarian hangover: characteristics and explanation

Since 1993, Kasulu district’s political economy has been transformed by a massive influx of refugees from internal wars and rebellions in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Since 1995, close to 100,000 Burundian refugees have lived semi-permanently in a constellation of camps technically administered by the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs but serviced by a multi-million dollar international humanitarian effort.21

While official government policy dictates that refugees be contained within camp boundaries, neither the refugees nor their influence on the surrounding area have remained so localized. As per my original contention, the massive inflow of refugees and humanitarian assistance/actors has represented a kind of ‘shock’ or crisis that has introduced new actors while offering old actors novel opportunities and constraints. While the continued presence of refugees and humanitarian actors in Kasulu means that it is still too early to make any decisive statements about the long-term effects of the

21 The refugee-feeding operation, which covers both Kigoma and Kagera regions, is said to cost upwards of US$ 1 million per week. This is, perhaps, not surprising given the number of dependent persons living in the region. As of September 2000 there were 144, 464 officially registered refugees living in Kasulu’s camps alone. Throughout Kigoma region (Kigoma, Kibondo, and Kasulu districts) there were 350,693 refugees. While there is also an impressive Congolese camp in Kasulu (Nyarugusu), the Congolese are relative newcomers and tend to remain within their camps. For this reason, my discussion largely centers on the Burundians.
humanitarian influx on the localized transformation of governmental practices, certain preliminary conclusions may be proposed.22

The following discussion is organized to highlight both continuities with and disjunctures from the regime of governmental practices outlined in the previous section. My labeling of this emerging regime of practice as ‘the humanitarian hangover’ is not intended to ascribe a priori a negative valence, although many of those affected by it would find such implications quite appropriate. The neologism is meant, rather, to indicate three things.

First, by using ‘humanitarian’ instead of refugees, I wish to imply that the lingering effects are less the direct and necessary result of the refugees themselves and more the consequences (intended and otherwise) of a set of policies and actions engineered and undertaken in response to their presence. The progenitors of these policies are, moreover, not only the international community, but the Tanzanian state itself, past and present.

Second, I wish to draw attention to the likelihood that what reconfiguration in governmental practices has taken place during this crisis period will have effects that will outlast the refugee presence. New practices may fade, be obscured, or replaced, but within a short to mid-term time horizon, they are likely to influence, if not structure, government policy for the refugee-populated areas as well as popular responses and strategies. Third, much as people and organizations vary in their ability to deal with crisis, the concept a hangover suggests that every country, region, or community will respond differently to the exogenous shocks of a refugee influx. The ‘hangover’ from 150,000 refugees in Kasulu will, therefore, be considerably different than if those safe refugees had fled into South Africa or the United States.

In the list below, I present a condensed exploration of key traits comprising Tanzania’s humanitarian hangover, a spatially specific reworking of the regime of governmental practices unique to Tanzania’s refugee-populated areas. Where possible I contrast practices inscribed in Kasulu with those of Mpwapwa.

Reinforcement and revelation of the Tanzanian population and territory

Nowhere are the absurdities of colonial cartography and the utter artificiality of African political borders more apparent than in Kasulu. If historical accounts are to be believed, the Ha (now Tanzanians) and the Hutu (now Burundians) were at one time indistinguishable, each living under a Tutsi oligarchy reinforced by subsequent colonial governments (see Leakey 1929; Bagenal 1921). Although ensuing policies created the grounds for differentiation, the Ha and the Hutu actively continued to trade and relocate, inter-married, and even settle across the border until the mid-1990s. Hutu refugees from the 1972 massacres in Burundi had for a long time lived peacefully in western Tanzania

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22 Although a peace agreement to end hostilities in Burundi has been signed, sources close to the negotiations believe that, barring forced repatriation, the Burundian refugees are likely to remain in Kasulu for up to five years. The Congolese, who are more eager to return home, must also await the end of the seemingly interminable conflict in their home country.
and, while there have been long-standing tensions between the Tanzanian and Burundian governments, the cross-border relationships at a civilian level were congenial and utterly normal.

Today the condition is dramatically different. With the exception of a few elderly men who I interviewed, few people would admit the possibility that the two groups were once one. Whereas the Ha, as Tanzanians, claim to revere peace and unity, the Hutu are portrayed as crooks and murderers incapable of eliding their belligerent essence. Tenuous security conditions in the area surrounding the camps are often cited as irrefutable evidence of this. The Burundians are even accused of being uneducated peasant farmers, perhaps indicating the value Tanzanians place on their national education campaign.23 (Such a charge is somewhat farcical given that in Kasulu, current primary school attendance is somewhere near 30 percent.) Even the variances in their local language (Kiha or Kirundi, depending on whether one is in Tanzania or Burundi), which are roughly equivalent to those between Canadian and American English, is said to betray Burundians’ uncivilized nature.24

A number of factors may have contributed to this condition. First, and probably least significant, in the 1990s the Tanzanian government called for and implemented a trade embargo on Buyoya’s Tutsi dominated regime. Although the embargo was widely ignored by many neighboring countries, not to mention many Tanzanians, the embargo at least added symbolic weight to the border. Second, regular cross-border excursions by Hutu rebels groups brought both heightened insecurity and additional Tanzanian army troops to the border-zone. For perhaps the first time, the border took on real material significance.25 Even now that the trade embargo has been lifted, the border-zone remains dangerous and only the daring will cross it for purely social or economic reasons. Lastly, one might also cite the quest for ‘purity’ that often seems to emerge in communities facing what they perceive to be an external threat (see Evens 1975).

Although identitive links with a set of Tanzanian ideals certainly exists in Mpwapwa, these ties qualitatively differ. Whereas both Kasulu and Mpwapwa residents emphasize Tanzanians’ tranquility in response to questions about ‘good citizenship’, such peacefulness was qualitatively different in the two areas. In Kasulu, Tanzanians were portrayed as peaceful because they would not take up guns against other Tanzanians, the government, or their regional neighbors.26 In Mpwapwa, where it was often considerably more difficult to elicit a response, people often responded with answers more in tune with

23 Such a charge is somewhat farcical given that in Kasulu, current primary school attendance has declined to somewhere near 30 percent.
24 The fact that the Burundians rely on French rather than Swahili or English is also cited as proof of their long-standing differences.
25 There is a long and often furtive relationship between the Tanzanian government and the Hutu rebels. Although the Tanzanian government has dispatched the army to quell rebel activity in Tanzanian territory, it is not at all obvious that they are not passively assisting the combatants.
26 When asked if Tanzanians might not have been somehow involved with the district’s crime wave, people would suggest one of two things with almost equal frequency. First, that conditions had become so bad as a result of the refugees’ presence, that violent crime was all but a necessary survival strategy. Second, that Burundians had somehow corrupted the Tanzanian’s pacifism.
long-standing socialist rhetoric. In this context, a peaceful citizen was one that did not challenge the economic social order, was not too acquisitive or individualistic.

If pressed to identify what kind of people typically exhibited such characteristics, they would usually respond that it was not a single group but individual people (whereas in Kasulu it was always the Burundian others). If a group was identified, it was the country’s south Asian population; a group long demonized, in practice if not in official policy, by the central government. That Kasulu residents were more prepared to define what made a ‘good Tanzanian’, and that they did it with reference to another explicitly non-Tanzanian group, suggests a heightened awareness of their links to a national community. This is particularly surprising given long-standing ties to their Burundian neighbors. While identitive links exist in Mpwapwa, their definition, dormancy, and diffuseness suggest a significant and qualitative difference.

*Creation of a distinct sub-population and development ‘problematic’*

In the earliest days of the humanitarian influx into Kasulu, tens of thousands of refugees sought shelter in any available structure and consumed what food or fuel they could acquire. The immediate effects were dramatic and widespread. School buildings *cum shelters* were devastated. Desks and even doorframes were burned as fuel for cooking and boiling drinking water. Local food supplies were also decimated as asylum seekers took what they needed from neighboring fields. These short-term effects were undeniable and almost entirely negative. They could, however, also be easily remedied through materialistic solutions that did not challenge entrenched developmental thinking (e.g., building classrooms versus ensuring teacher attendance, supplying clinics versus health education, etc.).

The longer-term economic and physical impact of the humanitarian influx has been two-sided, providing opportunities for some while further impoverishing others. The intractability of these effects would also prove catalytic. Building on its success in eliciting donor assistance to repair damage easily attributable to the refugee-influx and the subsequent relief operation, the Tanzanian government - led by the Refugee Department, the Kigoma and Kagera Regional Commissioners, and sympathetic international organizations (particularly UNICEF and CARE) - proposed a broad reaching set of programs intended to mitigate the effects of the refugee presence. As it became formalized, this program was moved into the Prime Minister’s Office and renamed the Special Program for Refugee Affected Areas (SPRAA).

For those familiar with the UNHCR’s operations elsewhere in the world, it may be surprising to see that a mandated *relief* agency has become involved, even tangentially, in supporting efforts to promote development among the host community.27 In explanation,
I would suggest that while a number of the smaller NGOs had unilaterally begun programs to assist the host population for humanitarian reason, support by the UNHCR and other international agencies is based on considerably more instrumental concerns.

Sensing growing hostility towards refugees on the part of key players within the Tanzanian government, the international agencies have sought to coordinate a campaign that can, at least in symbolic terms, demonstrate that they are responding to Tanzanians concern. So, while UNHCR representatives are proud to speak of their efforts to encourage the developmental activities of their operational partners working in Kasulu, I spoke to no one within the UNHCR offices in either Kasulu or Dar es Salaam who has seriously considered the policy proposals outlined by the Prime Minister’s Office (see United Republic of Tanzania 1997b).

The largely instrumental reasoning behind the SPRAA may account for its diffuse nature and somewhat unsubstantiated claims. Apart from the aforementioned material effects, very little was in fact known about the effects of the humanitarian-influx on the host-population when the program was initiated. What was known seems, however, to have been based on the effects of the Rwandan refugees in Kagera region, not in Kigoma.

While there were claims that members of the local population were mobilizing politically on the basis that refugees were entitled to better services, free food and the like, it is not clear to what extent this indeed occurred. While resentment may have (and may continue) to be present in Kasulu, no one with whom I spoke (refugees and aid workers), could remember any instance of active protest or demand making. Indeed, and much to my surprise, the population of Kasulu appears to have remained remarkably passive in the face of what key members of the administration claim to be a great burden for the local population.

The lack of adequate empirical foundation meant that the SPRAA represents, therefore, a kind of wish list including all the development projects that the administration could not afford on its own. More significantly, it represents a large elite (governmental and donor) initiated program designating large tracts of land in Kigoma and Kagera for special assistance. Included among the more conventional small-scale village projects (water systems, dispensaries) there are calls for stricter environmental regulation and expanding the capacity of the local administration (this is to take place under the guise of the Austrian funded Kasulu District Development Program (KaDEP)).

The way in which this capability expansion is taking place is perhaps the most significant for present purposes as it represents a conscious effort to build administrative and regulatory linkages between government representatives and a particular ‘target’ population.28 I would suggest that the SPRAA does represent a conscious attempt on the part of sympathetic donors and the Tanzanian government to create a new way of viewing the long-standing and recently emerging development challenges facing the refugee-populated areas.

28 Fergusen (1994) makes a similar argument in his account of a World Bank project in Lesotho.
While SPRAA may ultimately turn out to be a stillborn program, and may provide little administrative foundation, its presence has definitely contributed to the way actors - especially donors - have conceptualized their activities in Western Tanzania. Not only is donor activity much less pronounced in Mpwapwa (there were only two international NGOs active in Mpwapwa, and one had started operations in 2000) but the ways in which both donors and the government address Mpwapwa’s acute poverty and environmental degradation is based on a problematic all but unchanged since the colonial era (see, for example, Tanganyika Territory 1926, Government of Tanzania 1964).29

**Acceleration of economic integration and differentiation**

The economic by-products of the humanitarian influx are considerably more complicated than short-term distortions in prices for food and other commodities. If nothing else, the Tanzanian experience demonstrates that subsistence farmers can exert a good deal of control over their relationship with the moneyed economy.

To be sure, there is nothing inevitable and linear about the process of marketization. Despite repeated attempts by the central government and international agencies, locals in Mpwapwa continue to rely primarily on their time-tested (if unreliable and environmentally destructive) farming practices. In Kasulu, however, a number of factors, some resulting from conscious policy decisions and others from the unintended effects of humanitarian policy, appear to be encouraging an ever larger number of people to participate (at least to some degree) in the cash economy.30 On the other hand, higher prices also seem to be have the counter-effect of driving those who can avoid the market, or are in no position to benefit from it, to remove themselves even further from the cash-based economy. The trading networks spawned by the World Food Program’s food-aid distributions (largely soya bean oil and yellow maize) are notable in this regard.

These new networks have drawn otherwise remote villages (e.g., Mugombe) into a national and potentially international trading regime. On distribution days, refugees stream from the camps on their bicycles carrying 100-200 kg sacks of maize destined for local buyers. Some of this food is then sold through local marketing mechanisms, but even larger quantities are immediately loaded onto lorries and carried to Mwanza or other regions where there are markets for wholesale foodstuff. If these marketing networks even approximate the more visible network for the sale of the now ubiquitous blue UNHCR tarpaulins, they are impressive indeed.

Pressure on existing food supplies appears to be encouraging many people to turn to the market for their nutritive needs. Such pressures arise from a number of different, if interrelated factors, all centering on the refugee presence. First the Burundi refugees are typically nonplused by the volume and content of the food-aid they receive and have, as

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29 The World Food Program (WFP) and their implementing partner, Norwegian People’s Aid, were also periodically involved in Mpwapwa as part of their famine relief operations. Their activities were, however, coordinated by the district or regional government.

30 That said, most retain their primary reliance on small-scale agricultural production.
such, turned to other means to get the bananas, cassava, white-maize meal to which they are accustomed. These are, however, the same foods typically consumed by the local population. Where one might expect the local farmers to simply expand their agricultural production to meet heightened demand (with the effect of keeping prices constant), the effect seems to have been quite the opposite.

While uncultivated land is by no-means scarce in Kasulu, farmers appear reluctant to use it. Many of the farms are, for example, located far from the security and surveillance of the villages. This has meant that much of the harvest has been stolen before it can be collected - an action attributed almost exclusively to the refugees. Naturally, this provides a very logical disincentive for expanding cultivation. A number of respondents also reported fear for their personal safety. As noted, the refugees have acquired a reputation for violence and barbarism. It is said that if you meet a refugee, or group of refugees, in the fields you are likely to be robbed or raped and, if you resist, murdered. For the poor women who comprise the bulk of the farmers, these concerns have been taken seriously. The farmers are now much less likely, it appears, to travel far distances from the village and when they do travel, will tend to go as a group, rather than as individuals. Both of these factors have limited the amount of land that the community can put under cultivation and has, therefore, limited the food supply.

More fundamental changes in the structure of the rural economy appear to be taking place as well. As the result of the humanitarian influx, the transportation infrastructure into Kasulu has already begun to improve substantially. Further road betterment projects now getting underway will, for the first time in recent memory, make the land route from Kigoma to Bukoba or Mwanza readily passable during the rainy season. Improved access to transportation will invariably lower transaction costs that have until now served as a serious deterrent for many would-be cash crop farmers. Opportunities for improved income through such sales are, of course, more open to those who have resources for investments of one kind or another.

Economic activity is, of course, not limited to food alone. Kasulu, an area that was once designated as a Labor reserve, has now become a major destination for Tanzanians from all over the country seeking waged employment with the international and non-governmental organizations. In a country where the minimum wage is officially US $30-40 per month, but in practice often much lower, even a night-watchman’s monthly salary of $110 offered by these agencies is a powerful draw. Many locals, especially those with English language skills, have also found work, primarily at entry-level positions. New houses and newly improved houses are conspicuous additions to the villages’ architectural landscape.

It is too early to tell how these new employment opportunities will influence the communities’ social fabric. Both the influx of workers from other regions and the newfound opportunities for locals to travel and interact with outsiders may help to further integrate the district into the national population and economy. It may also have the long-term effect of creating economic disparities within villages where such differentials were relatively limited. In an age where education and health services must be paid for out of
pocket, those now able to invest in their children or their farms may gain substantial relative advantages in the future.

This marketization can be seen as a threat to the long-standing socialist dictum of ‘equality produces peace’, a principle Tanzanians in Mwapwa cite for their acceptance of poverty. Economic differentiation will undoubtedly raise challenges, not only to principles of equality, but to the relative influence of state and party actors. Should the newly wealthy choose to run for local office, their capacity to self-fund their campaigns might provide a substantial challenge to the ruling party candidates. Given the semi- legality of these trading networks, it seems more likely those with newfound wealth will seek to protect themselves from state regulation, reinforcing the material disconnection between local state representatives and the citizenry.

Restructuring participation without accountability

As noted in the previous section, Tanzanian governmental practices include very few organizational/institutional conduits that can channel popular interests or demands into designated district, regional, or national administrative offices. Village level officials will invariably hear complaints and resolve petty local concerns, but even their ties to the district administration are irregular and their expectations for any response from their superiors, relatively low. In Mwapwa, for example, the district commissioner’s phone line had been cut for non-payment. To contact the regional office, the District Commissioner goes to the district council building or the police station. In Kasulu, only recently did the D.C. get a phone that could be dialed without using an operator. The surprise with which I have been greeted when I ask people their opinions on matters related to the role of government is only further evidence that making such enunciations is not a naturalized part of their routine.

On first examination, local reforms pushed through by an Austrian funded District Development Program (KaDEP) program that provided 80 percent of Kasulu district’s operating costs between 1998 and 2000, would appear to be effecting a dramatic shift in this configuration. There are now regular monthly meetings for village and district representatives organized by the UNHCR and most of the work being done in the villages is premised on an elaborate (or at least expensive and time-consuming) participatory rural appraisal (PRA) process. Understanding the implications of these new practices, however, requires going beyond (even if not by much) the justifications offered for their introduction.

Interviews with District officials suggest that the monthly coordinating meetings they have helped organize are dominated by either international or national officials, turning them into the same kind of site for information dissemination (not collection) that they were during the socialist period. On first glance, the institutionalization of the PRA as a means (or, perhaps, the means) of popular participation, might appear to modify the unidirectional nature of these meetings. I would suggest, however, that the
institutionalization of this new set of ‘participatory’ practices, introduced at donor demand, is more complicated, and more troublesome, than it first appears.

Implemented in an environment generally devoid of critical public dialogue or other formal linkages between government representatives and villagers, PRA appears more likely to serve a co-optive role that shelters, rather than exposes, district and regional administration from popular demands. While the PRA approach has invariably produced more information than was previously known, the questions asked are limited to those areas in which NGOs possess operational capacity. Not only are communities asked to choose their priorities out of a set list of services, but community members quickly learn what services they are likely to get.

If a community is asked to prioritize its needs, it will inevitably select those it expects are most likely to elicit an NGO response. Any further evaluation of community interests is, moreover, even further narrowed to those areas initially identified as top priorities. For those communities where no new projects are being implemented or considered, even this modicum of evaluation is absent. Perhaps more significantly, from both a practical and analytical perspective, communities participating in the PRAs are unlikely to raise their concerns with the village government, an organization.

Any public challenge to either the village government would only imperil a community’s chances of getting any assistance inasmuch as the village council is invariably included in the PRA and is invariably seen as an implementing partner. Channeling PRA-inspired projects through an administrative stratum that is both technically weak and generally unresponsive to local demands is unlikely to result in a constructive engagement of administrative and popular actors. What is perhaps most significant is the perception among many NGO employees and district level officials that the PRA process is an entirely adequate means of evaluating the needs and desires of the local population. Such a perception will likely preclude any further efforts on the part of either NGOs or government officials to induce popular participation in the governing process with subsequent implications for accountability. Material or instrumental relationships are, therefore, unlikely to change, while the population will, more than ever, remain a target to be acted upon.

Transnationalization of governmental practice

The actions of Kasulu’s new development and relief organizations are producing a dual effect regarding popular understanding of and relationships with governmental institutions. Despite a substantial increase in its operating budget, the district administration’s links - both material and identitive - to villages and villagers are being weakened. While there has been some improvement in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, both remain in poor condition and working vehicles are hard for government employees to come by. It is not uncommon, for example, to find a group of agricultural officers - ostensibly participating in the central government’s new
extension-service reform program - stranded in their office for weeks on end while they wait for their vehicles to be repaired or returned.\textsuperscript{31}

This pattern is repeated with tragi-comic frequency throughout the district government. In interviews, most villagers could recall being visited only once or twice over the past ten years by a government agent, be it an extension, health, agriculture, education or census officer. This number has not increased since the refugee influx. As a result, people have yet to see any reason to reconsider their limited expectations for the local government. If anything, the humanitarian influx has given cause to expect even less. While Mpwapwa residents were no less likely to visit villagers, their absence was not accented by the visibility of other, non-state actors.

Whereas representatives of the district or regional administration are seldom visitors to Kasulu’s villages, those people living on or near the main roads (linking Kasulu to Kigoma, Kibondo, and the camps) witness an almost constant stream of NGO and UN vehicles. Without exaggerating this traffic’s symbolism, the impression it has produced is undeniable. For many villages near the camps, these vehicles and their occupants have become regular visitors as the agencies involve themselves in local development initiatives or use the villages as supply stations or staff-residences for their relief activities.

At the time of the research, most respondents could easily name five or more international agencies or NGOs while struggling to name two or three governmental departments or ministries. In Mpwapwa, there was a slight bias in favor of government departments. Within Kasulu there was a popular impression (predictably refuted by district authorities) that during the five or six years the humanitarian agencies have been there, they had done more to help the local residents than the country’s Administration had done in the previous twenty (or indeed, the eighty) years. This perception has further depressed already low expectations for material government action while insulating state agents from citizen demands.

Repeating the paradox of the Nyerere regime, the current decline in expectations has not resulted in antagonism or derision towards public officials. Public agencies, especially national level organs, remain highly respected in the face of what might be good cause for protest. As part of the country’s economic reforms, primary school fees have been introduced throughout the country for the first time in recent memory. Similarly, inflation as a result of the devalued Tanzanian shilling has become endemic since the currency has been floated on the international markets. While inflation has, to a similar degree, negatively influenced purchasing power in both Kasulu and Mpwapwa, the perception in Kasulu is that increases in prices are attributable almost exclusively to the presence of refugees and highly paid humanitarian staff. The government has remained legitimate while complaints have been regularly leveled at the international organizations.

\textsuperscript{31} This does represent a certain modest improvement. Before the KaDEP, there were no working vehicles assigned to their office.
Although Mpwapwa residents are still unlikely to overtly criticize the government, considerably more people implicated the state in declining social services. These changing perceptions would appear as a practical realization of the widespread belief that the international community owes a debt to Tanzania. Building on existing ontological foundations which position Tanzania as the virtuous victim of circumstance and/or international conspiracy, the Tanzanian ministries responsible for refugee-related matters, as well as local government officers, have encouraged this strain of thinking.

The government has made repeated statements to the effect that Tanzania and Tanzanians have sacrificed to ‘do the right thing’ in helping the Burundian refugees and, as a result, that international community owes Tanzania for its altruism. Indeed, members of the government have implied (sometimes quite explicitly) that if the international community does not ante-up, the country’s long-standing hospitality may harden.

Whether government threats to close its borders to refugees are ever anything more than the snarling of a paper tiger, the concretization of these perceptions has some significant implications for governmental practice. First, it further serves to limit any popular checks on the actions of government officials. As noted above, most of the means of interest articulation are now being constructed by and funneled through international actors, limiting complaints and expectations for the district government. Second, while many NGOs and a number of agencies have publicly committed themselves to working in the refugee-populated villages, most of their funding is linked to the continued presence of the refugees themselves. It is unclear what will happen when the refugees (eventually) return to Burundi and the organizations withdraw their support. This may be seen as yet another betrayal by the international community. Third, this condition in which the national government provides only security while international actors provide social services raises interesting theoretical questions for the meaning of sovereignty within this border district.

The institutionalization of the un-rule of law

Throughout Western Tanzania, and especially in Kasulu, the humanitarian influx has induced a substantial increase in violent crime, something that has serious consequences.

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32 This is particularly pronounced in response to healthcare, an issue area in which Mpwapwa is experiencing its own AIDS related crisis. The popular impression (substantiated by statistical evidence) is that death rates are climbing and life expectancy shrinking. The coincidence of the AIDS epidemic with the introduction of hospital fees left a significant number of respondents with the sense that the government has abandoned them when they are most in need.

33 As the following paragraphs suggest, persuading the refugee-affected populations to adopt such a perspective may be something of a pyrrhic victory for the ministries involved as it may in time undermine their own authority at the level.

34 Such claims are particularly interesting when one considers that many of the negative effects being experienced by the local population are a direct result of a Tanzanian government decision to place the camps at their present location and to restrict refugee farming activities. Such decisions are, in turn, based on a long-standing history of refugee assistance in Tanzania and particularly state interests in Burundian internal affairs.
for the region’s physical security and governmental practices. Academic discussions of state-building suggest that it is during periods of physical uncertainty when citizens are most likely to turn to a super-ordinate administrative organization, inducing expanded regulatory practices and centralization of power and authority. One might therefore expect that in response to increases in crime, Kasulu’s Tanzanian residents, who had previously demanded little of the government, would now ask it to fulfill what many suggest is the state’s most basic function: the protection of life and property. Such expectations are not, however, being realized.

Rather than forging an institutionalized set of standardized, codified linkages between the citizenry and the police - through law, the courts, or investigative procedures - the state’s reaction appears to be having quite the opposite effect. Borne from incapacity and disinclination, the local administration’s response is further desiccating the non-discoursive links (both material and regulatory) between official and popular actors. While those naturally disinclined towards state action and control (see Scott 1998) might interpret this as a blow for freedom, the implications for those living under this new regime are considerably less sanguine. The following paragraphs explain why this is so.

The extant social service infrastructure has been severely strained and restrictions on refugee employment and farming, combined with easy civilian access to military weaponry,\(^{35}\) has led to massive increases in violent crime. Consequently, many citizens live in daily fear for their lives and property (see Appendix 5). This insecurity has induced a popular, but paradoxical and deeply problematic, official response. With support from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), heightened security measures have been introduced throughout the refugee-populated areas. This response has, however, only served to reveal the state’s incapacity to respond effectively within the proscriptions inscribed in both domestic and international law.

In a further irony, additional police round-ups and investigations have only further overburdened the courts and prisons, while doing little to curb the real crime rate. Rather than a transformation in governmental practice that sees the government and the population increasingly engaged in formulating and implementing mutually agreed upon laws, the government’s approach may institutionalize the un-rule of law. Through this, new sets of practices are being developed to address immediate problems, but they are spatially localized (either at a village or, perhaps, district level) and do not articulate a set of obligations for government actors. At the center of this drama are the district prisons – the most visible and physical expression of the state’s law enforcement mechanisms and the site of perhaps the most egregious human rights violations.

Prisons, operating within a legal framework, represent a site in which the state’s coercive mandate for the preservation of social order may be both exercised and constrained. Where such facilities, or their equivalents, operate without a clear legal basis, they will often become sites for direction-less and unchecked coercion. Western Tanzanian prison facilities, built almost exclusively during the colonial era, are now operating without such

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\(^{35}\) AK-47s and other sub-machine guns are readily available in the refugee-populated areas for between $US 10-20. Such weapons are also regularly found hidden in ‘the bush’ or in farmers’ fallow fields.
a foundation. The consequences for the governmental practice are significant, and worrisome.

While prison conditions throughout Tanzania, and indeed throughout much of Africa, are sub-standard by almost all measures, the refugee-influx has resulted in the additional and rapid deterioration of conditions for those condemned to live within Western Tanzania’s penal institutions. According to the International Committee for the Red Cross’ Kigoma Office, the Kigoma district prison housed 367 inmates, 303 over its capacity (October 2000). Almost half of these were refugees. Prison overcrowding has encouraged police and citizens to find ‘alternative means’ with which to respond to suspects and criminals: those accused of crimes are often brutally beaten or killed with semi-official sanction.

Such sanction, resulting in the disengagement of population and the police, delegitimizing the idea that the law could serve to control coercion and violence, by both the state and the citizenry. People are now free to determine standards of both transgression and punishment on an \textit{ad hoc} basis. Law enforcement (or more accurately, regulation or policing) has, ironically, become a practice that exists almost entirely beyond the rule of law.

In Mpwapwa, regulatory and coercive practices are far from institutionalized and police capacity no more pronounced, but the effect of this is to preserve the status quo rather than to transform existing practice. In Mpwapwa, law enforcement mechanisms (courts, police, prisons, and the law itself) have not ‘tested’ as they have been in Kasulu; there has been no cause to reconsider the role of the police and the law in sustaining social order, in enforcing the accepted ‘rules of the game’. So, while residents readily complained about corruption and delays in the courts, and the general ineffectiveness of the police in

36 Secondary sources suggest that many refugee prisoners are essentially forced to go without food. Under a peculiarity of Tanzanian law, food for remandees (those who have been arrested and are awaiting trial) must be provided by the inmate or the inmate’s family. While many Tanzanian remandees pay bail and never face this condition, refugees are denied employment and do not have easy access to the cash required either to post bail or pay for food. Moreover, their families are not allowed outside of the refugee camps, which may be 65 km or more away from the prisons, to provide food. This has resulted in both further overcrowding as remandees accumulate in prison while they wait for the overburdened district courts to hear their cases and considerable food scarcities within the prison walls. Apart from the nutritive health risks, food shortages aggravate violence within the prisons and inmates and remandees struggle for scarce resources.

37 At the end of September 2000, there were widespread rumors in the village that the District Commissioner, the highest-ranking government official in the district, had stated that he did not wish to hear of any additional robbers being brought to the district police. If he actually said this is immaterial as people widely interpreted as a mandate for their own brand of swift and severe justice. In a gruesome, but revealing, example of this, a suspected bandit from a village not far from the district headquarters was fatally beaten and then deposited on the threshold of the village government office. Crime data for Mpwapwa provided by Dodoma Regional Police Command, September 2000
responding to citizen needs, such frustrations are unlikely to delegitimize the idea of law and due process in the way it is in Kasulu.38

What is presented here is a stylized and somewhat speculative comparison of governmental practice in Kasulu and Mpwapwa. I have sought to highlight the ways in which remnants of the Nyerereist regime interact and influence popular and official responses to the humanitarian influx. Admittedly, I have offered only an incomplete, cursory articulation of these linkages. I hope, however, that this modest commentary points towards several conclusions.

First, that however diverse and inconsistent, material effects (economic, environmental, and infrastructural) are but one small part of the impact a humanitarian influx is likely to induce. Second, the humanitarian hangover is not something done to a population, but rather is the result of practices and responses in which that population (including citizens, officials, refugees, and other international actors) are directly implicated. Third, that the governmental practices of even those areas most influenced by international or transnational actors are not likely to be thoroughly reconfigured by their presence. A substantial and sudden humanitarian influx will invariably open or expand opportunities for actors to renegotiate their relationships with each other, but there are boundaries on the scope of these reconfigurations. In this case, the legacy of Nyererist regime of practices—what I have termed the discoursive state—is perhaps the single most important factor in shaping the ways in which actors interpret new stimuli and develop strategic responses to them.

A few additional comments are warranted on the concept of the humanitarian hangover, the institutionalized (or institutionalizing) legacy of disciplines and practices that trace their origins to the humanitarian influx. The ‘hangover’ I describe in the Tanzanian context is now way intended to be presented as ‘typical’. Indeed, I wish to assert quite the opposite. While it is quite likely that other countries or regions experiencing humanitarian inflows will experience affects in the same ‘realms’ of governmental practice—the role of law, sense of national identity, direction of demand articulation - the quality of these effects will be quite different. Were, returning momentarily to my original expectation, the influx to have occurred into a region (or a country) in which formal state institutions’ capacities were more pronounced, one would expect the degree of ‘transnationalization’ and disengagement would have been considerably less. This, however, is fundamentally an empirical question, and one requiring further exploration.

Changing governmental practice and transnationalization

Many writers presenting typologies and trajectories for ‘third-world political development’ have based their analyses on metaphors of building, growth, or taking-off. In some important ways, the metaphors upon which I rely are no exception. Like these

38 Given the remoteness of many villages, in both Kasulu and Mpwapwa, a number of days might elapse before the police could respond to the most serious of cases (e.g., rape, murder). Lesser offences were unlikely to draw much in the way of an official response.
authors, the conceptual and historiographical model I employ suggests a kind staged progression in which past experiences provide important foundations for present realities. I do not wish to imply, however, that there is a finite end to ‘political development’. Nor is there a predetermined trajectory. There is nothing constant nor immortal about a regime of governmental practices. While historical precedents cannot be ignored, a once universal (or at least national) regime may fragment when faced with new actors and strategies, diverging quite sharply in areas with similar backgrounds. Indeed, this has been the case in Kasulu and Mpwapwa. In the humanitarian hangover we see how the humanitarian influx, interacting with the ‘discoursive state’, has resulted in a sub-population even less firmly linked with the state’s formal institutions, but tied to a reified complex of national (i.e. Tanzanian) virtues.

In place of mechanic and unilinear models of change, I would suggest that the creation and shifts in Tanzanian governmental practice can be seen as a ‘palimpsest,’ a metaphor that incorporates patterns of change under both ‘normal’ and ‘crisis’ conditions. A palimpsest, in its literal definition, is a document (e.g., a parchment) which has been reused, but on which one can still see the traces of past transcriptions. It is my suggestion that this chimerical document, the palimpsest, be seen as the site in which the regime of governmental practices are inscribed, the de facto infrastructure underlying the politics of a given region or territory, the rules in Elias’ game.

For present purposes, one might see the pre-colonial inhabitants of what would become the Tanganyikan territory as those first to inscribe their governmental practices. Arab, German, and English activities would add to the document, partially erasing past practices and introducing new ones. Indeed, under the British colonial administration, the palimpsest’s heft would have gained considerably with the addition of new laws, codes, regulations, offices, and administrative institutions. This ‘normal’ process of gradual change might be described best as **agglutination** in which pieces are attached, not necessarily in any systematic way, to extant formations and passages.

The first real attempt to erase the document and inscribe a new system of rules came under the socialist government. While successful in many regards, the legacy of the colonial administration remained. Moreover, the socialist revision was a document written by committee and, like most works of this sort, all the various authors (including government elites, donors, and the general population) insisted on their own favorite passages while refusing to recognize and include phrases and clauses presented by others. The result was, therefore, an un-rationalized mixture of policies and reactions that would become what I have termed ‘the discoursive state’. (Indeed, even Tanzanian socialism (**ujamaa**) possessed something of an *ad-hoc* quality that lacked the bombastic elegance of other revolutionary manifestoes.) There was no master editor and no clear overarching logic, but by contributing, all who took part in its drafting implicitly agreed to live by its dictates.

When initiating my research, it was my expectation that the humanitarian influx would serve as a second, albeit localized, occasion for wiping away many of the words that had become inscribed in the ‘palimpsest’. As noted, this has only partially been the case.
Significant elements have been erased or reduced and new sections (i.e., governmental practices) have been introduced. In other areas, little change has occurred and strong elements of the discursive state persist. Had the shock been greater, perhaps more of the palimpsest would have been cleaned or more sections added. If there is anything that has already become evident it is, as was the case with the socialist experiment, that past words and patterns continue to bear considerable influence on the governmental infrastructure.

As noted in the introduction, the persistence of the ‘discursive state’ in the face of the humanitarian influx *cum* exogenous shock speaks highly of the now defunct socialist state’s ability to restructure the country’s regime of governmental practices. The changes that have occurred may, however, come to challenge key tenets of these practices. The inclusion of international actors, however short lived, in the network or expectations, norms, and activities has created a transnational, if transitory, regime of practices—what I am calling the humanitarian hangover.

The initiative of this new regime may act as a kind of historical node that will serve to structure future responses from both official and popular actors within Kasulu. Without a strong centralized state, such regional variations are likely to persist and be further institutionalized. If this is so, it may create a condition in which two once similar regions are, to stretch the metaphor inexcusably, no longer reading from the same page.
REFERENCES


Panel Conference on Forced Migration (IRAP), Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Gaza Strip (13-16 December).


Appendix One
Map of Tanzania Showing District and Regional Boundaries

Note: Research sites underlined.
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Surveys and Mapping Division, Dar es Salaam.
Appendix Two
Map of Kasulu District

Note: Interviews were carried out systematically in Mugombe and Kanazi villages as well as Kasulu town. Source: Planning Office, Kasulu District, Tanzania.
Appendix Four
Number of Refugees in Kasulu and Tanzania

Refugees in Kasulu District, Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtabila (I and II)</td>
<td>9,664</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>44,040</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>56,386</td>
<td>56,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyovosi</td>
<td>Not open</td>
<td>Not open</td>
<td>Opened Sept.</td>
<td>27,750</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>29,261</td>
<td>34,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyarugusu</td>
<td>Not open</td>
<td>Not open</td>
<td>Not open</td>
<td>39,211</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>56,598</td>
<td>51,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,175</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,400</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td><strong>111,001</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td><strong>142,245</strong></td>
<td><strong>142,886</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNHCR offices in Dar es Salaam and Kasulu. Figures are for July of each year.*

Indicative Number of Refugees in Tanzania by Country of Origin, 1990-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>154,690</td>
<td>148,700</td>
<td>149,500</td>
<td>444,870</td>
<td>202,740</td>
<td>227,220</td>
<td>385,450</td>
<td>459,420</td>
<td>473,770</td>
<td>498,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR of the Congo</td>
<td>15,940</td>
<td>15,960</td>
<td>15,980</td>
<td>16,030</td>
<td>16,050</td>
<td>16,020</td>
<td>55,210</td>
<td>74,310</td>
<td>58,280</td>
<td>98,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>72,190</td>
<td>75,150</td>
<td>48,670</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>33,200</td>
<td>33,200</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,010</td>
<td>51,940</td>
<td>626,200</td>
<td>547,980</td>
<td>20,020</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>4,760</td>
<td>20,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>4,830</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various/unknown</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>1,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>265,180</strong></td>
<td><strong>288,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>292,150</strong></td>
<td><strong>564,520</strong></td>
<td><strong>883,250</strong></td>
<td><strong>829,670</strong></td>
<td><strong>498,730</strong></td>
<td><strong>570,370</strong></td>
<td><strong>543,880</strong></td>
<td><strong>622,210</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNHCR offices in Dar es Salaam and Kasulu. Figures are for 31 December of each given year.*

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39 Mtabila I and II and Muyovosi camps are exclusively Burundian; Nyarugusu Congolese.
40 This total is for February 1994. There is no record of where those refugees who were not in Mtabila were staying.
## Appendix Five

**Crime Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crime (Kasulu)</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000 est.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>21 cases, 25 killed</td>
<td>20 cases, 20 killed</td>
<td>25 cases, 28 killed</td>
<td>34 cases, 37 killed, 46 killed</td>
<td>10 cases for value of 557,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Theft</td>
<td>22 cases for value of 550,000</td>
<td>25 cases for value of 999,000</td>
<td>40 cases for value of 2,217,100</td>
<td>31 cases for value of 250,000</td>
<td>10 cases for value of 557,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession of Marijuana or Intoxicating Drugs</td>
<td>21 cases for value of 11.625 kg</td>
<td>18 cases for value of 2,013 kg</td>
<td>17 cases for value of 4,200 kg</td>
<td>19 cases for value of 6,315 kg</td>
<td>44 cases for value of 10,600 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession of Weapons</td>
<td>4 including 1 SMG and 14 SMG bullets</td>
<td>10, no SMGs</td>
<td>11 cases, 17 SMG, 3 hand grenades and 212 bullets</td>
<td>8 cases, 5 SMG and 186 bullets</td>
<td>12 cases, 6 SMGs and 19 bullets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>184 cases for value of 21,486,000</td>
<td>220 cases for value of 20,161,433</td>
<td>236 cases for value of 43,600,500</td>
<td>276 cases for value of 52,852,500</td>
<td>186 cases for value of 21,034,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>18 cases</td>
<td>11 cases</td>
<td>20 cases</td>
<td>32 cases</td>
<td>32 cases (this includes rape and kunajisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnatural Acts/ Kunajisi</td>
<td>7 cases</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodomy</td>
<td>3 cases</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>21 cases for damage of 3,455,000</td>
<td>41 cases for damage of 2,688,270</td>
<td>46 cases for damage of 12,613,500</td>
<td>45 cases for damage of 9,845,500</td>
<td>62 cases for value of 2,225,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>14 cases for losses of 2,845,500</td>
<td>10 cases for value of 1,394,500</td>
<td>52 cases for value of 41,760,500</td>
<td>55 cases for value of 43,445,600</td>
<td>52 cases for value of 15,144,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Using Force</td>
<td>4 cases for value of 1,260,000</td>
<td>32 cases for value of 1,561,540</td>
<td>45 cases for value of 7,425,600</td>
<td>62 cases for value of 8,250,000</td>
<td>40 cases for value of 3,001,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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41 Provided by Kigoma Regional Police Command, October 2000.

42 This is an estimate based on doubling actual reports for Jan-June 2000. This projection may be somewhat low as crime incidents tend to peak near Christmas when families are under pressure to provide gifts, and they know that these may be available in others’ homes. Increases are also likely after June, as this is when food resources are most scarce. The reduction in numbers may also have increased do to assistance to the police force from UNHCR.
Possession of Illegal Local Brew

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N/A.</th>
<th>32 cases</th>
<th>22 cases</th>
<th>17 cases</th>
<th>20 cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Thefts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N/A.</th>
<th>157 cases for value of 11,755,100</th>
<th>92 cases for value of 6,548,000</th>
<th>84 cases for value of 4,648,960</th>
<th>N/A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Refugee Related Faults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>21 cases resulted in 34 arrests</th>
<th>N/A.</th>
<th>N/A.</th>
<th>N/A.</th>
<th>134 cases resulting in 156 arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Values of Goods Reported Stolen or Damaged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>29,596,000</th>
<th>38,559,843</th>
<th>114,65,200</th>
<th>119,292,560</th>
<th>41,962,990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Total Number of Cases Reported (not all categorized above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1265</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2162</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Note: Comparable data were not available for Mpwapwa District. The following table represents the information I was able to collect. Interviews suggest that while crime is increasing in Mpwapwa (although not at the same rate as in Kasulu), this has been largely in petty crime, much of which can be directly associated with the hardships brought about by el niño and la niña.43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Serious Offenses</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Minor Offenses</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>1499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Cases Reported</td>
<td>1729</td>
<td>1690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 Provided by Dodoma Regional Police Command, August 2000.