The challenge of peace and the power of Rambo

Why do people need to be educated on how to be peaceful? Are human beings inherently violent and divisive? The challenge of peace is an ancient concern, one that has preoccupied religions across the world for millennia. The results of their efforts have been decidedly mixed. John Ferguson has observed that “Of the great religions Christianity and Buddhism have been the most clearly pacifist in their origins and essence”. Yet Ferguson also notes that even these religions “have been deeply involved with militarism from a fairly early stage in their history” (1978: 157). Such gaps between words and action have led some towards despair, among them religious studies expert Raimon Panikkar, who has concluded that “religions have contributed precious little to the keeping of peace” (1999: 187).

The quest for peace nonetheless continues. It has spawned, among other developments, a cottage industry of recent literature, manuals and initiatives, both secular and religious, designed to promote peaceful behaviour and resolve conflicts. But such efforts have been regularly confronted by more violence, in addition to waves of powerful messages of heroism and redemption through war and violence. In popular culture, just wars and righteous warriors are much more prevalent than peace and pacifists. As Joanna Bourke has commented, “Long before any prospect of real combat, boys and girls, men and women, create narratives of pleasure around acts of killing”, concluding that “it is not difficult to see the attraction of combat literature and films” (1999: 4–5).

But if “martial combat has become an integral part of the modern imagination” (ibid.), its impact on youth has proved particularly strong. Reflecting on African youth, Ali El-Kenz explains that, in the globalized modern world, “the frustration of the young is aggravated by imaginations which feed on television, radio and cinema”. He lists “Bruce Lee, Rambo and an infinite succession of James Bonds” as among their most

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2 It appears to have been a much more recent philosophical concern. Howard P. Kainz has noted that “elaborate and detailed philosophical thinking about peace comes to the fore primarily in the last five centuries”. He adds that, “It is probably no accident that the last five centuries have also witnessed the emergence to pre-eminence of that peculiar institution, the nation state” (1987: x).
popular icons (1996: 55). The Sierra Leone case, Paul Richards notes, documents the peculiar power of Rambo. There, youths have interpreted the movie character from the initial First Blood movie as “a trickster figure in the classic West African mould” (1996: 59) caught up in a conflict that “serves to wake up society at large to the neglected cleverness of youth” (ibid: 58). Richards further notes that Liberian and Sierra Leonean rebel leaders, “alert to the political potential of the Rambo message” (ibid.), regularly screened First Blood for their young captives.

In a world where attempts at cultivating cultures of peace are confronted by the fact that “it is a small step from the culture of violence to its actual practice” (El-Kenz, 1996: 55), refugees and other forced migrants, most of them victims of violence, struggle to re-establish peaceful lives. It is not an easy task, particularly for youth, who are frequently drawn into violent activities. Many aid agencies have responded by offering peace education programming. Examining some of these initiatives and considering the context of violence in refugee youth lives will be the subject of this report.
Introduction

This report will examine peace education concepts, assumptions and programmes for refugee populations that are being conducted by international humanitarian agencies. It will also investigate the lives of a primary peace education target group in refugee populations – refugee youth – to understand the violence they confront and their responses to it.

Since refugees constitute one of many groups involved with peace education activities, the report will review literature and knowledge about peace education to situate refugee experiences in a broader context. It will also examine literature and knowledge about refugee and other youth involved in violence.

Refugee youth have been highlighted as “the most explosive segment” of a population in conflict-related situations (Retamal and Devadoss, 1998: 87). In the highly influential report prepared by Graça Machel on children in armed conflict, education for forced migrant adolescents is recognized as “particularly effective in assisting [their] psychosocial wellbeing” and “keeping them out of military service” (Machel, 1996: 56). In addition to military recruitment, this population is also considered “at high risk of prostitution, indoctrination ... and criminality” (UNHCR, 1997: 18).

One of the central problems involving refugee youth is the wide variety of ways in which they are defined. Lowicki (2000) notes, for example, that the World Health Organization defines them as people between 10 and 24 years old. The Lutheran World Foundation in the Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya states that they range from ages 7 to 40. In some cultures a youth is anyone who is unmarried. For purposes of clarity, in this report “youth” will refer to people between the ages of 12 and 30. Although this definition is no less arbitrary than many others, it is an attempt reasonably to integrate the ideas of adolescence and young adults into one category.

A central component of this report will be findings drawn from a case study of an emerging peace education programme for refugees in Kenya and Uganda, most of whom were from Somalia and Sudan. This programme is run by UNHCR, whose experts have not only supervised implementing partners carrying out the programme, a role that UNHCR typically plays, but also spearheaded its development and execution, something UNHCR does not often do. Field research with peace education implementers and participants will be examined, together with findings drawn from interviews with refugee youth, women’s groups, religious congregations and leaders. Analysis of interviews with UNHCR officials about peace education, and with a selection of officials from other aid agencies involved with peace education, will also be included.

Among the primary target audiences for this report is UNHCR and its partners who are engaged in peace education activities. Accordingly, this report is designed to provide an enhanced understanding of critical issues surrounding peace education efforts and a primary target group, refugee youth. It will review lessons that can be drawn from present refugee and agency experience, recommend policy options for future action, and, additionally, consider how the report’s findings can be used to inform UNHCR’s educational policy and guidelines relating to peace education and related activities mentioned in UNHCR’s Revised (1995) Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees. The guidelines state that “education for peace, cooperation, conflict resolution and reconciliation” are all “prerequisites for the durable solution of voluntary repatriation and reconstruction” whose promotion can “avoid repetition of conflict by a new generation” (UNHCR, 1995: 53).
One caveat, however, requires mention. The breadth of peace education as field of endeavour has created an overlap between peace education and conflict resolution initiatives. Both address the themes of peace, cooperation and reconciliation, and train people in problem-solving skills. The terms “conflict resolution” and “peacemaking” can also be seen as complimentary if not interchangeable. But significant differences emerge at the operational level. Peace education initiatives tend to teach about how to prevent conflicts before they take place. Its teachers often present overarching peace-related themes to a wide range of students, from school-age children in formal schools to adults in non-formal settings. Conflict resolution initiatives, on the other hand, typically address specific, context-based issues about conflicts that already exist. Adults are the primary target audience. This distinction will be used to separate the focus of this report – peace education – from conflict resolution and conflict mediation-based programmes.

The report will first review some of the literature on peace education concepts and programmes, as well as those pertaining to refugee youth and violent youth more generally. It will then turn to the objectives, methods and findings drawn from the field research conducted in Kenya and Uganda. Interviews with officials at UNHCR’s headquarters office in Geneva, Switzerland, and with peace education experts will also be incorporated into this discussion. The report will close with a review of conclusions and recommendations relating to peace education and refugee youth.

The peace education world

“Peace” is a broad concept with spiritual and practical connotations. It can imply a state of inner calm or the end of a conflict. As Lincoln P. Bloomfield notes, “Peace is what you think it is (or want it to be)” (Bloomfield, 1986: 237). This expansive quality has led to misunderstandings about peace education. Some observers consider it vague, preachy, insubstantial and perhaps even a waste of time. This was certainly the impression of a number of humanitarian agency officials interviewed in east Africa. Many of those not directly involved with peace education programming displayed a poor grasp of its content and objectives. As a result, some were sceptical and even suspicious of it. One emergency education expert noted that this sort of reaction has fuelled an inherent tension over peace education programming for refugees. While many aid agency officials question the utility of peace education, “refugee communities like it, and the donors do, too”.

Donor support is, in fact, constrained by the hesitation of some donor agencies to support any education initiatives during humanitarian emergencies. One donor official explained that her agency did not “fund education because it’s not relief. It’s [a] development activity”. The tendency for relief agencies more generally to “see education as a development activity” (Foster, 1995: 20) is underscored by its absence from the areas covered by the Sphere Project. This groundbreaking initiative is spearheaded by a diverse array of humanitarian organizations, led by the humanitarian consortia (sometimes described as alliances or coalitions) Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and InterAction, with support from VOICE, the International Council of Voluntary Associations (ICVA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Sphere Project aims to provide “minimum acceptable levels” (Sphere Project, 2003).

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3 See, for example, Aline M. Stormfay-Stitz’ characterization of “the concept of teaching conflict-resolution or peacemaking skills to children and young people” (1993: 297).

4 This issue is detailed in the author’s “Emergency Education for Children” (Sommers, 1999).
1998: 2) of humanitarian assistance in five categories: water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and health services. The authors emphasize that these minimum standards “of what people have a right to expect from humanitarian assistance” (ibid.) are also “linked explicitly to fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles” (ibid: 1).

Two officials involved in the Sphere Project stated that education was considered as a potential category by Sphere’s authors but ultimately dropped because a majority of committee members did not view it as an essential emergency provision. Education’s exclusion highlights a widespread view of education as a secondary humanitarian concern. As one official who helped develop the Sphere standards observed, “Essentially we were looking at what had to be done in the first few weeks of an emergency to save lives”. But education may in fact be as vital to the preservation of human life as the five assistance categories addressed by the Sphere Project, as it has been widely cited as a basic protection tool for victims of humanitarian emergencies.5

Access to education, moreover, has also been identified as a fundamental human right. Article 28 of the United Nations’ 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that “Each child has the right to education” (CRC, 1989). Refugee children are covered by this treaty, since “all CRC rights are to be granted to all persons under 18 years of age (Art. 1) without discrimination of any kind (Art. 2)”. The Machel report notes that denying education to refugee children “clearly contravenes” Article 22 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (which states that refugees should receive “the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education”) in addition to Article 28 of the CRC, and urges that agencies and governments “ensure that education services are part of both relief and immediate reconstruction activities” (Machel, 1996: 57).

Peace education is a component of a child’s right to education. Section 1(d) of Article 29 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child addresses one aim of education that specifically applies to the subject of this report:

The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin.

Peace education, then, can be interpreted not only as an essential component of a child’s educational experience but an instrument for the promotion of peaceful, responsible, tolerant, equitable, friendly and free societies. The connection between teaching schoolchildren about peace and the cultivation of peaceful societies suggested here is one of the central assumptions of peace education, and will be among the assumptions considered here.

5 See, for example, Boyden and Ryder, 1996; Foster, 1995; Retamal and Aedo-Richmond, 1998; and UNHCR, 1994.
Thinking about peace and peace education

A split in approaches among peace researchers has created two concepts of significance to peace education: positive and negative peace. David Hicks explained the evolution of this divide in chronological terms. He noted that, beginning in the 1950s, “the initial emphasis in peace research was on direct (personal) violence” such as “assault, torture, terrorism, or war” (1988: 6). He further noted that the emphasis on conflict led peace to be defined “as merely the absence of war”, or negative peace (ibid.). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, definitions of peace emphasized violence that was indirect and structural in nature. This shift was directly influenced by Johan Galtung’s conception of “structural violence” (Galtung, 1969).

Galtung’s expansion of the definition of violence led to a changed definition of peace and non-violence. Accordingly, many peace researchers argued that the movement towards peace involved not simply eradicating war but “cooperation and non-violent social change, aimed at creating more equitable and just structures in a society” (Hicks, 1988: 6). Hicks termed this second approach positive peace. His diagram illuminates the difference between negative and positive peace (Figure 1).

Negative and positive peace, two concepts that were once thought to be in opposition to each other, are increasingly seen as complimentary. Kenneth Boulding, whom Betty A. Reardon identifies as a “leading opponent” of the positive peace–negative peace separation (Reardon, 1988: 11), attempted to unify these two concepts. Boulding’s idea, which he called “stable peace”, borrowed the notion of the absence of war from negative peace. Stable peace, he explained, “can be defined as a situation between two independent
nations in which neither has any significant plans to go to war with the other” (Boulding, 1991: 108). But Boulding also drew from the positive peace concept. Research on stable peace, he said, entailed exploring how social systems such as “religion or ideology” and economic behaviour “diminish or increase the chances of movement towards stable peace” (ibid: 111). The accent of his research is on education itself, for “the development of stable peace is fundamentally a learning process” (ibid.). Boulding also admits that the process itself remains largely unknown.

Figure 1: “Defining Peace”

Galtung takes a different approach. Where Boulding focuses his gaze on places where peace already exists, Galtung examines situations where it does not. Conflict is his starting point. In Galtung’s view, conflict is always present and cannot be permanently “(re)solved” (1996: 265). As a result, peace cannot be achieved by attempting to eradicate conflict. Conflict must be turned into a non-violent activity. As Galtung states, “Peace is what we have when creative conflict transformation takes place non-violently” (ibid.).

Here, Galtung seems to be a researcher from the negative peace fold. Conflict is a fact of social life. Peace is defined by the absence of violence. Yet his research approach crosses directly into areas Hicks identified as positive peace. He argues that the transformation from violent to non-violent conflict “should be peaceful in itself, meaning low on structural and cultural violence” (ibid.).

While the ideas of Boulding and Galtung suggest that the positive-negative peace dichotomy may ultimately be a false one, Reardon observed that many peace educators continued to emphasize the idea of negative peace because it was comparatively easy to teach. Most peace education teaching, she said, still “focused on negative peace – that is, on reducing the likelihood of war” (1988: 14). Positive peace, on the other hand, was still “not conceptually clear enough for curriculum-planning purposes” (ibid: 13).
The peace education field is still evolving. Many of the programmes to be reviewed here suggest that, like Boulding and Galtung, peace education is increasingly incorporating positive and negative peace components together, mixing, for example, discussions about values and rights connected to peace with the identification of factors that can lead to violence. One such approach is encompassed in an emerging field known as futures education, which, as one expert observed, focuses “on children’s dark or hopeful visions of the future”. Many futures educationalists, indeed, emphasize the need to bolster optimism and empowerment in children. Frank Hutchinson, for example, argues that “In too many cases, children’s hopes and fears are put at a severe discount, with a failure to address their concerns responsibly and in empowering ways” (1998: 133). A central question in futures education is how to “foster learning environments likely to enhance outcomes that actually benefit young people and empower them to change their situations” (ibid: 142). Implicit in this argument is that, should this occur, young people would steer clear of violence and direct themselves towards a peaceful and satisfying path of action.

If conceptual issues in the peace education field seem to be coming together, however, at least one important difference still divides the field. Peace education can be taught as an explicit course or module, such as the peace education package (PEP) developed for Somalia and described in Aguilar and Retamal’s UN discussion document (1998). It can also be infused into existing courses, which Hicks describes as “the creation of a dimension across the curriculum” (1988: 11) which incorporates skills (empathy, cooperation) and attitudes (a commitment to justice, respect for others and oneself) with knowledge (about conflict, peace, power). Some educators have further noted that the pedagogical approaches of teachers do not promote values relating to peace and non-violence. Under the section heading “Teaching as violence”, Barsh and Marlor argue that “authoritarian instruction is a form of domination, and implicitly legitimates domination”. Moreover, they contend that being taught about “how ‘they’ think and act, not how ‘I’ think and act ... denigrates the students’ own lives and experiences” (2000: 33).

Peace education as a formal subject, it must be said, has arisen primarily in the Western world. This hardly means that peace education was cultivated only in the West. But it does mean that the mainstream peace education field has cultivated assumptions that are grounded in Western traditions. Here are some prominent examples. First, most peace education approaches centre on schoolchildren. Yet in most poor, non-Western countries, significant numbers of children drop out of school, often early in the formal education process. Second, though it may be assumed that teaching methods are authoritarian, classrooms are often not as authoritarian as the work environments that school drop-outs face. Third, a number of peace education approaches highlight the significance of training teachers to teach differently. But teachers, whom Reardon, among many others, believes constitute “the very heart of the educational process” (1997: 56), are already, in many non-Western countries, poorly trained in the subjects they teach. Changing the way in which teachers are trained, particularly in resource-poor countries where training opportunities are already limited, may be viewed as unreasonable or practically impossible.

In addition to these realities, there is the challenge of national and regional examinations. In the many countries where examination results are used to gauge educational quality, any expansion of subjects (to include peace education), revision of existing curricula (to instil peace education themes, values and concepts into existing subjects) or reforms in pedagogy (to change the way in which teachers teach) might
not only call for increased investment levels that in many countries are unattainable but directly conflict with existing educational priorities. Decreasing classroom periods reserved for exam subjects, even in the cause of peace education, would no doubt cause some educators, students and, not least, parents, considerable concern.

**Peace education critiques**

The tone in most peace education literature is buoyant. Stomfay-Stitz, for example, observes that the development of peace education in the United States has been “embodied in a philosophy of hope in the future” in which “education is an instrument of [peaceful] change” (1993: 335). Such optimism is also central to the educational philosophy of Peace Education International, a US-based NGO. “Peace Education”, one article on their website states, “is the holistic umbrella that encompasses learning how to be a peacemaker and a peace builder based on the theories of non-violence and human behaviour.”

The emphasis on transforming the behaviour and attitudes of individuals is widely mentioned as a central objective of peace education and the peace-building process. Boyden and Ryder consider it the primary underlying assumption of peace education, which they state as follows:

> That conflicts are the result of learned attitudes and learned behaviour and that it is possible to change both attitudes and behaviour through educational interventions. (1996: 51)

This characteristic of peace education has attracted two primary criticisms which will now be examined. The first points out peace education’s generally poor evaluation record. The second calls into question the tendency of peace education programming to focus on children.

The implicit overarching goal of peace education – to replace violence with peace – is obviously a broad and daunting challenge. Violence is a component of human experience. For some observers, this turns the task of evaluating peace education into an unreasonable expectation. Consider former UNICEF staff member Anna Obura’s response to the following question:

> Is there any way of measuring the outcome of Peace Education? My own answer would be in the negative ... Just as Education cannot solve the problems of unemployment – that is the business of economic planners in a nation – so Peace Education cannot be expected to prevent war. (1996: 5)

Obura’s explanation underscores the lofty goals of many peace education programmes, making the success of any programme difficult to determine and hard to measure. As Aguilar and Retamal note, “no systematic evaluation has been carried out in order to assess the relevance of [peace education] experiences and the impact of their methodological approaches” (1998: 41). This state of affairs has created the same potential hazard that UNICEF’s Mary Joy Pigozzi warns has already arisen for emergency education: the fact that, without sufficient evaluation, “we ... run the risk of promoting activities that are not, in the long run, in a child's best interest” (1999: 19).
The question of children’s best interests, and those of the communities they belong to, lies at the core of the second peace education critique. Psychologist Ed Cairns has observed that “adults continue to pursue conflictive relations” while peace educators focus on changing the behaviour of children (Boyden and Ryder, 1996: 55). Peace education thus positions itself between schoolchildren and adults in the same community, making it “virtually impossible for education to inculcate peaceful values in children when adult role models are built on conflict”. In fact, cultivating a disjunction between values promoted at home and in school may cause “anxiety and distress in children” rather than optimism and peacebuilding (ibid.: 55–6).

This is a serious charge. If it is true, then educating school children about peace is counterproductive, as it serves to increase the distance between peace education’s work and its goals. But instead of addressing this criticism directly, peace educators tend to emphasize the universally commendable principles inherent in their work and the paramount importance of addressing children’s needs. To most, educating children about peace seems a manifestly logical starting place for cultivating peaceful change in society. Many, moreover, cite the fact that access to education, and, somewhat indirectly, peace education, are the rights of all children guaranteed by internationally sanctioned instruments.

As a result, the inspiring and hard-to-reach mission of peace education has led its implementers to view their methodologies uncritically: if peace is good then peace education must be good. The outcome can be fairly sentimental. At the end of her book on peace education, Stomfay-Stitz notes that “there is one common dream that could unite all – concern for children”. She adds that “children and young people should be the heart and core of peace education” (1993: 343–44). The introduction to a peace education manual for schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina is justified in a still more expansive fashion: “It is only by placing the struggle to understand the complexities of what it means to be a human being ... alongside the struggle to understand the world in which we all live, that people can begin to examine the separate strands that contribute towards existence” (Dulic and Chamberlain, 1998: v).

Good intentions, of course, do not guarantee good results. Patience and faith that positive outcomes will eventually arrive are ultimately insufficient. Galtung suggests that the connection between children and peace faces a fundamental challenge:

> If peace and war are, above all, [about] relations among states, and if peace education is something that takes place, above all, among teachers and pupils at school, then how are these pupils going to make use of what they have learnt? (1983: 282)

Boyden and Ryder go still further, calling the entire peace education approach into question:

> Since it is group identity and group behaviour, rather than inter-personal behaviour, that are determinant in armed conflict it is suggested that many of the premises upon which peace education and similar approaches are built are false. (1996: 56)

At the core of Boyden and Ryder’s criticism is peace education’s tendency to concentrate not simply on children but individuals instead of groups. This emphasis on individuals is an issue considered by An-Na’im in his analysis of international human rights. In both fields, individuals are the primary focus: the target for behaviour and attitude change in most peace education programmes and the primary optic of international
human rights instruments. But the strong emphasis on the individual, An-Na’im argues, is primarily based on a Western conception. In the case of human rights, Western elites have asserted their claim to “an exclusive right to prescribe the essential concept and normative content of human rights for all societies to implement” (1998: 8). An-Na’im considers the heavy influence of “Western civil liberties theory and practice” over the definition of human rights for all people to be inappropriate not simply because of an implicit power imbalance between Western and non-Western societies. The emphasis on the individual has also resulted in “the conceptual exclusion of collective rights as human rights” which are “essential for the majority of human societies and communities around the world”(ibid: 10–11).

This critique could be applied to many if not most peace education programmes. Paul Lederach supplies a response to An-Na’im’s concern over Western centrism, in this case regarding the conflict resolution field (a field related to peace education). Lederach argues that “we should not operate on the supposed, self-evident basis that conflict resolution, as we understand it in North America, is a good thing worthy of wide dissemination” (1995: 119). Culture (and non-Western cultures in particular) “should not be understood ... as a challenge to be mastered and overcome”, but instead should be “approached as a seedbed” that can be “excited, probed, and fed” (ibid: 120).

Many peace educators, together with experts in related fields, struggle to adapt their work to the cultural contexts in foreign settings. What role, if any, should cultural context play in a peace education programme and its evaluation? Will other cultures and their adherents ultimately turn out to be seedbeds for peace-building, or do peace education’s assumed universal principles ultimately transcend the values inherent in specific cultures?

The responses to these questions remain insufficient. Indeed, peace educators have yet adequately to address the most serious criticisms about their work. The field has yet to be adequately evaluated. The logic of targeting schoolchildren or individuals instead of adults or communities, respectively, remains largely unsupported, although, as will soon be discussed, changes in this approach are surfacing. And, as just mentioned, there is also the problem of the cultural relevance and appropriateness of peace education programming. Given these challenges to peace education, what has peace education accomplished thus far? Does it work?

While these questions will be explored shortly, here are two observations on the road that peace education has travelled thus far. First, there is the connection between women and peacemaking. Reardon admits that “most peace education is humanistic, and much of it claims to have as its goal the transformation of the human condition”. But she also maintains that feminism is the key, as it is “the most fully human current perspective on peace and peace education” (1988: 9–10). Stomfay-Stitz highlights the leading roles that women have played in the development of peace education in the United States.

Second, there is the suggestion that, if peace education aims lower, setting before itself smaller and more reachable goals, it can achieve more. As one peace education expert noted, peace education will work “depending on what you want it to do. Can peace education students improve their understanding of conflict, negotiation and mediation issues? Yes, if they’ve gone through a skill-based, problem-solving course”.
Peace education in the religious world

The criticism that peace education targets individuals instead of groups loses strength when it is applied to peace education programming conducted by religious organizations. In fact, the targeting of communities to receive peace education is one of the central strengths of religion-based programmes. For many religions, such tendencies emerge as natural applications of their philosophies. Consider the following comment about Islam: “In Muslim thought man is always a member of society, and thought of in relation to the community” (Ferguson, 1978: 129). Peace is also a vital spiritual concept in all the world’s great religions. As Appleby has noted, “Deep formation in the peaceable heart of a religious tradition is fundamental to the religious militancy that can serve conflict transformation” (2000: 286).

The dominance of the idea of peace in the religious world should not imply that religious people share similar approaches to it. Differences in perspective are widespread, such as the tension between the “just war” doctrine and pacifism in the Christian tradition, which is examined in more detail in the Appendix. Consider, for example, the following two Catholic viewpoints of peace and violence. In a book published by the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America (Maryknoll), John Dear states that “Non-violence ... offers a way to fight against injustice and war without using violence” (1994: 10). Alternatively, Smith noted that a number of Latin American Catholics who were “committed to revolution” concluded that “non-violent revolution, although morally preferable, does not work” (1971: 260). This led many to consider “violent action to overthrow tyranny” as a legitimate option against intractable cases of violence and injustice (ibid: 262).

Although such philosophical debates attract considerable attention among communities of believers, they may not spill into peace education work. There, issues of appropriate expressions of violence are sublimated to concerns about peace and justice. Religious approaches to peace education also tend to be holistic and targeted primarily at their own religious communities. Two Catholic examples illuminate this. “Confronting a culture of violence”, a US Catholic Bishops’ pastoral message (1994), provides American Catholics with an outline for action. The outline incorporates a number of activities, including: the significance of worship and preaching on peace-related themes; an emphasis on Catholic schools, where “basic values and conflict resolution” are taught; young adult and adult education programmes taking place in parishes where skills training on parenting and conflict resolution mixes with “spiritual development”; family and youth “ministry”, where programmes are offered on a range of issues, among them peaceful relationships and sports; and outreach with local Catholic charities.

Dwyer’s comments on peacemaking and education in the Catholic context combine themes similar to the bishops’ pastoral message with many found in secular peace education programming. In addition to mentioning a familiar peace education emphasis on reaching individuals (“The responsibility to foster peace ... entails a conversion within each human heart”), Dwyer’s attention turns to families and parish communities, describing the latter as “an important locus in which creative peace education can take place” (1999: 157). This she defines as a combination of a number of elements, among them “encourag[ing] the congregation to think about justice [as] the foundation of a true peace” and central to their spiritual lives, and providing workshops on non-violent conflict resolution. Finally, in another theme resonating through peace education literature, Dwyer emphasizes teaching in formal schools about an array of peace-related topics: peace, war, global interdependence, non-violent dispute resolution and an encompassing reverence for life that includes “the ecological wellbeing of the planet” (ibid.).
The peace education programming of religious groups does not often intersect with their secular-based counterparts. This disconnect is particularly notable in post-war situations. Prior research with religious groups in Rwandan refugee camps, for example, illuminated how Christian churches and Muslim mosques were at the forefront of peacemaking activities in camp communities even while their connections to humanitarian agencies in the camps were limited (Sommers, 1998). Such lack of interaction and coordination between religious and humanitarian worlds is not exceptional. But the distance between the two can limit or even undermine peace education’s effectiveness with forced migrants, as the two may create conflicting messages about peace and how to prevent or mediate conflicts. In such cases, it is quite possible that religion-based programmes and their messages will prove more influential among forced migrants, especially forced migrant children. After all, children go to churches, temples or mosques in addition to schools. And when they do, they join a community of believers who frequently learn about peace in an environment that can powerfully influence their ideas and behaviour.

A review of selected peace education programmes

Peace education programming takes many different forms in the humanitarian and development worlds. Some, like UNESCO’s Culture of Peace and the many peace education-related initiatives at UNICEF, are expansive and ambitious. Others, like the human rights-oriented programming of the Norwegian Refugee Council, are more targeted. These three programmes will here serve as examples of current peace education programme approaches.

UNESCO. UNESCO’s “Transdisciplinary Project” for a “Culture of Peace” is undoubtedly one of most ambitious secular peace initiatives ever attempted. Based on the Declaration on a Culture of Peace adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 September 1999,8 the UNESCO-led effort aims to foster and promote a culture of peace involving, among other things, education, economic and social development, respect for human rights, gender equity and democratic participation.

The declaration itself defines the “Culture of Peace” in fairly comprehensive terms: as a “set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life” based on a number of elements, including a set of principles (such as freedom, justice, solidarity existing “at all levels of society and among nations”), respect for life and the promotion of a variety of basic human rights. Five Culture of Peace projects are to be started in 2000–01. They will take place in the Russian Federation, Mali, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic and a selection of Arab states.

Given the lofty goals of the Culture of Peace initiative, it is perhaps not surprising that it “has often been criticized for its inability to move from concept to the concretization of the concept and to palpable and concrete actions” (UNESCO-PEER, 1999: 35). UNESCO’s Programme of Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER) has adopted the Culture of Peace framework to its work in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. This work includes a “Culture of Peace Network”, a regular series of conflict resolution workshops involving “nearly 80 organizations working with problems of conflict resolution through peaceful dialogue” (ibid: 36) and a variety of country-specific activities.

8 Noted as “A/53/243, Fifty-Third Session, Agenda Item 31, Culture of Peace”.

175
The peace education package, or PEP, is one such activity. This “self-contained package” comprises “all the software and the hardware” required to provide 40 schoolchildren with a year’s worth of activities (UNESCO-PEER n.d.: 2). Among the materials provided is an activity book which, like so many peace education approaches, focuses “on the role of the individual in bringing about peace” (Aguilar and Retamal, 1998: 44). There is also a songbook which, together with the activity book, address broad, peace-related themes. The book of stories, on the other hand, features Somali characters and concerns more directly.

UNICEF. UNICEF’s peace education work is actively world-wide in scope and shares many of the inclusive values and expansive goals expressed within UNESCO’s Culture of Peace initiative. UNICEF argues that “peace education is an essential component of quality basic education” (Fountain, 1999: 1). The organization contends that peace education provides “another lens or perspective through which to examine how peace can be ‘mainstreamed’ in basic education” (ibid: 7). Among the other lenses or perspectives are: children’s rights/human rights education; education for development; gender training; global education; life skills education; landmine awareness; and psychosocial rehabilitation. Taken together, this is a broad educational arc, but UNICEF is pushing still further. A UNICEF education official explained that “an issue we are pursuing is to get recognition that peace education is (among other things) a curriculum issue – not just for post-conflict societies, but for every education system”. Officials are also developing ways to evaluate peace education more effectively.

Within the realm of peace education, UNICEF differentiates between two kinds of settings for peace education (within schools and outside them) and develops country-specific programmes that are “highly responsive to local circumstances” (Fountain, 1999: 15). Although direct coordination between country programmes appears to be limited, different country programmes may share a number of general themes. The programmes may include the creation of interventions aimed at “improving the school environment so that it becomes a microcosm of the more peaceful and just society that is the objective of peace education” (ibid.); curriculum development, which usually consists of “activities around themes such as communication, cooperation, and problem solving” (ibid: 16); and teacher training that promotes interactive and participatory teaching methods and may address issues such as children’s rights and conflict resolution skills.

UNICEF’s peace education programming that takes place outside schools is diverse. It sponsors national peace campaigns, youth camps, groups and clubs, sports and recreation programmes, training and workshops for community leaders and parents, and a variety of youth public awareness and advocacy initiatives. Although it is not always clear how UNICEF’s school- and out-of-school-based programmes are connected, a UNICEF education official notes that efforts are under way to link “peace education in schools and peace building in the community” more directly.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The Norwegian Refugee Council has centred its peace education efforts within the realm of human rights education in the Caucasus. An NRC document notes that human rights education programming shares most of the same topics with peace and civic education programmes, such as “elements of tolerance and respect, conflict resolution or management, and reconciliation, rights and responsibilities” (Midttun and Brochmann, 1998: 2). The implication here is that conceptual differences between such programmes are minimal.

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9 Also known as the Peace Education Package for Somalia, or PEPS.
The emphasis on students and the school environment, common to most peace education programmes, is also present here. The two main target groups for NRC’s programme are teachers (and teacher trainers) and primary school students. The parents of students are informed of, but do not directly participate in, the programme. As one NRC education official observed, “We emphasize the involvement of the parents and brief them about the programme”. The programme is also developing an information brochure for parents.

Educating students and teachers about human rights is a process involving instruction about universal human rights instruments, a demonstration of “how individuals can take part in the realization of human rights ideals” and the development of skills to promote peaceful conflict management and the protection of human rights (ibid: 3). There is also an effort to train teachers to teach differently. NRC officials have found that, as one observed, “children do learn better if they’re not afraid”. As a result, the programme instructs teachers on how to curb the authoritarian tendencies present in their teaching methods.

The refugee youth challenge

Boyden and Ryder deliver a word of caution to those who consider education the most important remedy for youth problems:

Education delays participation in the world of adults and lengthens childhood dependence. This is bitterly resented by many youth. When it does not guarantee employment, education can also raise false expectations among young people. (1996: 12)

As field research for this report illustrates, youth resentments and false expectations often find expression through frustration and violence, and it does not seem to matter whether the youth are relatively well educated or not. But it is with this understanding of particular and frequently predominant youth difficulties that the following peace education programmes for youth should be examined.

Although youth who are not in school are often out of luck when target groups for peace education are considered, a number of youth programmes have been developed for them. Two will be briefly mentioned here. The first is a set of programmes sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in the US government’s Department of Justice. Among the initiatives is a Program for Young Negotiators (PYN) which targets troubled youth, together with their teachers and administrators, and “aims to teach individuals how to achieve their goals without violence” by using a “means of goal achievement and dispute resolution that has at its heart the practice of principled negotiation” (Crawford and Bodine, 1996: 15).

The second is the “Youth Peace Training Manual” developed by the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) in Nairobi, Kenya. With a range of tools and training modules, the programme aims to help youth “transform themselves from objects and subjects of war into agents of peace”. It expresses deep concern for the “culture of war” prevalent in Africa, and calls for “a change in the approach and content of peace building”. The training manual provides what it considers a new approach, one which is “deeply rooted in our African culture and guided by the Gospel” (AACC, 1999: xi-xii).
The UNHCR Peace Education Programme

The previous section reviewed the current state of the peace education field. This section will examine one peace education programme in detail. It will investigate how members of one implementing organization, UNHCR, view their agency’s peace education programme and consider the programme’s content and approach. It will also describe key contextual issues involving peace and violence in refugee communities in Uganda and Kenya, especially issues relating to refugee youth, and review the peace education programme’s implementation in both countries. Before turning to these concerns, however, a description of research methods is required.

Research methodology

Field research in Geneva (Switzerland), Kenya and Uganda in June 2000 was targeted at two interrelated concerns. First, it aimed to gather an understanding of the concepts, assumptions and methods of the UNHCR Peace Education Programme by investigating programme documents and interviewing participants, teachers and officials involved with the initiative. Second, it investigated the context of this programme through interviews with refugees and local government officials, with emphasis accorded to the perspectives and experiences of peace and violence among refugee youth. Findings about these two concerns were then used to develop an understanding of the Peace Education Programme’s perceived and potential impact by contrasting programme goals and actions with the challenges of peace confronting refugee communities in general and refugee youth in particular.
The field research was not intended as an evaluation of UNHCR’s programme. The programme was instead used as an example of peace education programming for refugees.

The research team consisted of four people: the author, who was the principal investigator and team leader; Mwachofi Singo, a field researcher, who assisted in carrying out interviews in the refugee camps in Kenya; and two research assistants, Betsy Mull and Alberta Addison, who carried out archival research and collected relevant peace education documents from libraries, organizations and the internet.

Over the course of more than three weeks of field research, the author visited Geneva, Uganda and Kenya to carry out interviews with more than 100 individuals and conducted group interviews with nearly 600 refugees. Mwachofi Singo conducted mainly group interviews with an additional 183 refugees. Both researchers also observed several peace education workshops and school classes in the refugee camps. Among those interviewed were: UNHCR officials in Headquarters (Geneva) and in branch offices and sub-offices in Kenya and Uganda; peace education experts; officials from the governments of Kenya and Uganda; and officials from local and international NGOs and UN agencies. Those interviewed from the refugee population centred on: peace education teachers, facilitators and programme participants; primary school teachers and headmasters; settlement, clan and religious leaders; and members of church congregations, an array of youth groups, women’s groups and in-school and out-of-school youth. The author also carried out telephone interviews with peace education experts.

Interviews with organization officials concentrated on their understanding and views of UNHCR’s and other peace education programmes and their perceptions of peace and violence within refugee populations. Interviews with refugees and non-refugees directly involved in UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme attempted to gather a broad understanding of how the programme worked and what its impact might be. Interviews with refugee leaders (camp, clan, religious, women’s) focused on how refugees solved their own problems and promoted peaceful relations within refugee societies, and on what factors, UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme among them, affected their work and the climate of peace and violence in the refugee camps. Interviews with refugee youth aimed at investigating the range of activities they were involved in, the kinds of frustrations and difficulties they confronted, how they sought to address major frustrations and difficulties, and what role, if any, peace education played in their lives.

Most of the field research took place in refugee camps in northern Kenya and northern Uganda. The Kenya sites were chosen because they comprise the initial sites where the UNHCR-led peace education project was first piloted. The peace education programme in Ugandan refugee camps began more recently and is still in the formative stage. Together, these two sets of refugee camps – one where peace education activities are established and one where they are getting started – provided a comparative framework for analyzing the peace education programme and key peace and violence issues in different refugee camp populations.

UNHCR and peace education programming

Peace education programming is at once popular and controversial. Most would agree that the objectives of promoting peace to prevent violence and of empowering people to solve conflicts peacefully are laudable. But promoting peace and preventing conflict are difficult to do. Expectations of programme success can be unreasonably high. Transforming uplifting ideals into concrete action is complicated. And, of course, measuring the success of peace education has proved a difficult, long-term process.
As a result of these factors (in addition to a handful of bureaucratic and personality concerns), many UNHCR staff members were sceptical about their agency’s new peace education programme. Some of the questions raised were fundamental. One staff member wondered, for example, why agencies should “teach peace to victims of aggression and not to their aggressors”, since refugees are, by definition, victims of violence and justifiably fearful of persecution.

Others wondered about the cultural context and applicability of peace education. “Africans commonly refer to themselves with the pronoun ‘we’ instead of ‘I’”, one official commented. Another added that there was a disjunction between Westerners, who spearheaded the development of the programme and whose culture “focuses on nuclear families”, and Africans, whose culture “focuses on extended families”. A third official emphasized how “keeping people busy can keep them out of trouble”, a perspective suggesting that other ways of promoting peace exist besides peace education.

Still others focused on results, something that was particularly true of personnel in the field offices, who are responsible for reporting to donors and colleagues on the effectiveness of their activities. This was also a concern of local government officials, including one Ugandan official who remarked that “human and financial resources are scarce, so the question is how should they be used?” “Don’t assume that peace education needs to be done,” he added.
One peace education expert responded to this tendency towards scepticism over peace education by asserting that those refugees involved with peace education programming usually liked it, and that the real problem lay with two sets of “enemies of peace education” in the humanitarian world. The first set are officials who contend that peace education distracts agencies from the challenge of providing basic education to refugee children. The second set are those officials who believe that focusing only on the refugees’ essential needs (food, clothing, shelter and protection, but not education) is both sufficient and appropriate.

One of the primary problems about UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme centred on its name. Including “peace” in the title implied that “peace” was the programme’s goal. This either raised expectations that the programme would lead directly, and perhaps fairly quickly, towards peace or that the programme seemed so idealistic that any impact would ultimately prove inconsequential.

Even those directly involved in the programme considered the title misleading. The programme, one of its developers remarked, is “skill-based and cross-cultural” in approach and has a problem-solving framework with an orientation towards conflict prevention. The programme, another added, “doesn’t really look at violence but at conflict with a small ‘c’”. It brings a practical orientation to the adult workshops and school classrooms where it operates, and it does not provide psychosocial training or sports activities like other, more holistic peace education programmes.

Were there better titles available, such as Life Skills, Basic Skills, Coping Skills or perhaps Tolerance Education? Perhaps. But in the end, it was decided that Peace Education, given the title’s popularity with programme donors and refugees, should be maintained.

The Peace Education Programme began in Kenya as a pilot project, starting simultaneously in two refugee camps in Kakuma, in the north-western part of the country, and expanding to three refugee camps in Dadaab, located in north-eastern Kenya near the border with Somalia. Preliminary research began in 1997 in both Dadaab and Kakuma with the purpose of initiating a peace education programme for primary school students. The intention, one official noted, was to “meet with every [refugee] group that there was to see what they needed in peace education”. Those refugees who were consulted included community, women, religious and youth leaders, refugees who worked for NGOs and nationality and ethnic groups, all of whom indicated that they should receive peace education training in addition to refugee school children.

From the outset, the programme developers accorded cultural relevance a high priority:

After initial review of existing materials it was felt that these were not necessarily culturally appropriate. Indeed it could not be assumed that even the concept areas are universal. For example, most [peace education] programmes start with self-esteem; but “self” as a core concept belongs to those societies that are individualistic – this is not valid for many traditional societies and it is not generally valid for many groups for whom the project is designed. In addition, the programmes investigated were not adequately cross-cultural. (Baxter, 1998: 20)

Here, it is suggested that the Western orientation towards individuals, a common feature in peace education programming, should be sublimated to local, and therefore non-Western, cultural priorities. The resulting focus on collective and not individual concerns is a prominent feature of UNHCR’s programme.
From these early stages, other important programme features surfaced.

- The emphasis on refugee “ownership” of the programme and a high degree of refugee involvement aligned with the elicitive, culturally sensitive approach endorsed by Lederach and An-Na’im. But it also had the indirect outcome of limiting the participation of humanitarian agency officials. As a result, a finding arising in the programme’s preliminary research phase was frequently noted during the field research for this report: that refugees, while learning problem-solving skills in the peace education programme, consistently mentioned problems between refugees and UNHCR, its NGO implementing partners and the local government that they could not resolve.

- The assumption, widely held in the international humanitarian community, that refugee leaders adequately represent the views of nearly all refugees and are reasonably efficient at accurately communicating messages to the larger refugee community, also applied to the UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme, although to a greater extent in Uganda than Kenya. The refugee leaders played an important role in the development and guidance of the programme.

- The initial emphasis on starting peace education programming for primary school students led the programme to be, as one UNHCR official observed, “skewed toward conflict prevention”; this was a fairly logical approach for children. Conflict resolution (or transformation) thus became a secondary programme concern. This was particularly true for the programme in Kenya.

- Peace education materials are currently written in English, the language of educated refugees. Programme materials have recently been translated into French and Swahili.

The number of UNHCR staff directly involved in the programme never expanded beyond six (in 1998). The current staff level is three, none of whom is working in Uganda. The number of refugees involved in the programme, however, is much higher. They include:

- Peace education teachers, who are refugee school teachers working in camp primary schools who have been trained to teach peace education to their students 1–2 times a week;
- Facilitators, who have been trained to lead peace education workshops designed as twelve half-day sessions;
- Translator/assistants, who translate facilitator instructions and participant responses during workshop sessions.

The Uganda programme differed from the Kenya programme in fairly significant ways. First, two of UNHCR’s NGO implementing partners play significant roles in the Uganda programme, which is not the case in Kenya. Second, unlike the programme in Kenya, where scarcely any Kenyans are involved, Ugandan nationals are directly involved in the programme as facilitators, participants and programme staff. This is a reflection of the generally closer relations between refugees and host populations in Uganda. Third, and as noted above, the Uganda programme does not yet have a primary school component. This originally arose in part because, as one UNHCR official noted, community leaders “can be very demanding”. The programme thus “focused on people who have a specific role in the community first”. Among those trained were refugees and Ugandan nationals who work for NGOs. It was felt that workers who regularly dealt with refugees and their problems would be able to put the skills learned in the peace education workshops to immediate and good use.
Finally, there is also a noticeable accent on transformation in the Uganda programme which was not as prominent in the Kenya programme and is not a feature of the programme’s overall design. But signs of its presence are nonetheless notable in the refugee camps near Pakelle and Adjumani, where the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) serves as the NGO implementing partner. This sort of transformation does not refer to changing violent into non-violent conflicts, as Galtung suggests. Instead, the focus is on transforming communities and, by extension, their cultures. As one peace education official in Pakelle/Adjumani observed, “We try to give them values and attitudes so they can accept where they are wrong.”

Programme materials

Among the findings from the preliminary research in Kenya was the identification of the following ambitious list of programme objectives:

- Skills

  Communication:
  - better listening
  - understanding perceptions and misperceptions
  - understanding emotions and their effect on communication
  - understanding the other person (empathy)
  - being fair to all sides
  - understanding of bias
  - understanding of stereotypes, discrimination, prejudice

  Appropriate assertiveness:
  - understanding of self
  - understanding of others
  - similarities and differences
  - assertion, aggression and submission

  Cooperation:
  - understanding of own and others’ strengths and weaknesses
  - trust

  Critical thinking:
  - analysis
  - fact vs. opinion (impartiality and bias)
  - problem solving

  Conflict resolution:
  - negotiation
  - mediation
Knowledge

*Understanding of:*
- peace and conflict
- justice
- human rights and responsibilities
- gender issues
- interdependence

Values and attitudes

*Promotion of:*
- self-respect and respect of others
- trust
- social responsibility
- open-mindedness
- tolerance

*Source: Baxter, 1998*

“Once these areas were defined”, an early report noted, “a series of support materials were developed for the different components of the programme” (ibid: 6).

While the range of materials for classroom teachers and their students and community workshop facilitators and their participants, respectively, is too wide to give in detail in this report, here are some general observations:

- One of the main developers of the UNHCR programme emphasized that it “is extremely structured because of the training limitations of the teachers and facilitators”. It is also “extremely pragmatic and tells [teachers and facilitators] how to put the [information] into action”.

- For the most part, refugees (and, in Uganda, some Ugandan nationals) served as peace education teachers and workshop facilitators. In both Kenya and Uganda, expatriate UNHCR and partner NGO staff led the introductory and teacher training sessions during the early programme stages.

- There is a clear awareness of the limited training that most teachers and facilitators have previously received. In addition, teachers and facilitators were being asked to use new teaching methods. The most significant of these new methods was leading discussions on questions that have no precise answer instead of providing factual information through lectures.

- The breadth and detail of materials is impressive. The teacher activity book, for example, contains lesson plans for all eight primary school grade levels. There are a number of other detailed training and curriculum materials (such as a training manual and resource notes for primary school teachers and a lesson plan guide and training manual for community workshop facilitators) in addition to several supplementary materials, provided for use as “discussion starters”, role plays and content-related singing.
The materials were developed by UNHCR peace education experts, but in collaboration with the teachers and facilitators who used the books.

Some of the supplementary materials are potentially powerful learning tools, not only for refugees involved in the courses but for those working with refugees as well. The poetry book, for example, contains poems written by workshop participants that are revealing of refugees' thoughts and lives. In one poem, entitled “Life in War” (UNHCR, 2000: 29–32), a 20-year-old youth (Majok Peter from Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya) describes how he learned to be “independent of mind” and able to cook, clothe, shelter and defend himself after becoming an orphaned refugee at the age of six. The survivor ethic described here (“so learn to be men and women in war or in peace!”) is not necessarily attached to peaceful behaviour but is a portrait worthy of reflection and discussion.

More specific commentary on primary, workshop and evaluation materials will now follow.

**Primary school materials.** The central curriculum concern for the primary school component is that it is cyclic, which is defined as teaching “the same concepts ... year by year through different activities so that the children develop the concept for themselves” (Baxter, 2000b: 4). This idea of cultivating conditions where students can develop an understanding of difficult concepts (such as empathy, analysis, conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation) and be able to use them underscores the focus on empowerment in the overall course. It also sheds light on the tall task that the programme has set before it.

The instructions to teachers illuminate an approach that is envisaged as conducive to learning about peace education. “Peace education”, the teacher activity book reminds teachers, “is an attempt to change attitudes and behaviour and to develop constructive attitudes and behaviour for use in everyday life” (Baxter, 2000b: 7). It thus reminds teachers to replace rote learning methods with more open-ended discussion about complex ideas. The implicit power relations between teacher and student are also addressed. “Do not use a stick, cane or pointer”, the activity book instructs. “These are weapons ... [and] if the only motivation is fear, the children will learn nothing about what peace really is” (ibid: 5). Positive reinforcement should also replace criticism or punishments. Finally, teachers are asked to recognize that becoming a peace education teacher transforms them into role models who must demonstrate good listening, communication, observation and other skills taught in the course.

The course employs several teaching methods, all of which were found to be outside the everyday methods that teachers normally employed at the primary schools visited. Instead of providing detailed lectures to students, teachers were encouraged to stimulate group discussions and facilitate dramatic role-plays and games among students.

**Community workshop materials.** The peace education workshops were designed as “empowerment course[s]” (Baxter, 2000a: 2). Far more than the expectations of primary school teachers, the workshop facilitators were expected to be role models before their adult peers, and even directly connect “the skills of a good teacher, trainer or facilitator” to those of a “peace maker” (ibid.). The implicit idea that facilitators, and sometimes even workshop participants, may be seen as community “peacemakers” was in evidence in the refugee camps, particularly in Kenya.
The Community Workshop materials, intended for adults (most of whom were literate), were significantly more complex than those designed for primary school teachers and students. Facilitators were taught about developmental psychology (including Maslow’s “Hierarchy of needs”), education theory, and peace and conflict theory. The Community Workshop Manual is dense with detail. There are complicated concepts – such as the idea that assertive behaviour is “functional” while aggressive and submissive behaviour are both “dysfunctional” – which call for a considerable degree of instruction and explanation from the facilitators. Group discussions, however, are also part of every lesson.

**Evaluation materials.** As with most peace education programmes, the programme’s self-evaluation tools were weak because what was evaluated was the peace education course itself rather than whether or how effectively the course’s objectives were practised.

Workshop participants were the primary evaluators. They completed questionnaires that were routinely provided at the end of each workshop course. These questionnaires produced overwhelmingly positive responses about the courses they participated in (such as: “All workshop participants said the course was interesting and useful”). While this is not, of course, an insignificant finding, it cannot be seen as an adequate measure of a peace education programme’s effectiveness.

The insular evaluation focus has produced one significant and positive outcome. Course materials have been regularly evaluated and revised. This has been the product of observations of course presentations and of discussions between UNHCR and NGO implementing partner officials and the peace education teachers and workshop facilitators. There has also been a detailed analysis of the *Teacher Activity Book* by an outside evaluator which recommended, among other things, either revision or deletion of the 23 per cent of the school lessons that were difficult to teach (Robinson 2000). Many of the recommendations have been accepted, and the *Teacher Activity Book* has recently been revised.10

**Field research: The Kenya programme**

There were significant differences between the Kenya and Uganda programmes. Differences also existed within each country, particularly between the refugee camp areas of Kakuma and Dadaab, in Kenya. Findings from Kenya will first be described because it was the initial site of the Peace Education Programme.

The situations for of Dadaab and Kakuma are similar in a number of important ways. They are both located in resource-poor desert areas where potable water is a perennial problem. Situated near the borders across which most refugees have fled but far from concentrated population areas, the camps in both locations serve simultaneously to isolate refugees from Kenyans while facilitating cross-border communication and travel between refugee camps and the refugees’ countries of origin.

The Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps are also true encampments: refugees are not allowed to farm inside the camps, and the Kenyan government does not permit refugees to leave them (one important exception exists for Dadaab, where refugees are permitted to collect firewood outside the camps, an issue which will be examined below). Children are allowed to attend primary school, but they can only learn the

10 It is also expected that an impact evaluation of the Kenya programme will take place in the future.
Kenyan curriculum. Geography classes consequently teach students about the Rift Valley and other notable Kenyan features. Students learn about the Kenyan political system and Kenyan history, and so on. Primary school, in short, provides young refugees with a foundation for host country integration, which they are strictly forbidden to practise.

Security is the dominant concern for refugees in both areas, and one which Jeff Crisp elaborates in chilling detail:

The refugees are obliged to remain in areas which have traditionally been insecure, where the rule of law is weak and where the perpetrators of violence can act with a high degree of impunity. The refugees themselves are obliged to live in very trying circumstances – circumstances which increase their propensity and vulnerability to violence. Originating from countries which have experienced protracted and very brutal forms of armed conflict, they find themselves without freedom of movement, with few economic or educational opportunities, and with almost no immediate prospect of finding a solution to their plight. (1999: 2–3)

The camps in Dadaab and Kakuma are multinational, but the security issues primarily arise from within the main nationality group in each set of camps. The three Dadaab camps largely contain Somali refugees, while Sudanese refugees predominate in the three Kakuma camps. The configuration of the main conflicts, however, differs. The Kakuma camps are plagued by fighting mainly between various combinations of Dinka and Nuer sub-groups and ethnic groups from Equatoria Province in southern Sudan. The central problem in the Dadaab camps is violence between Somali refugees and Somalis who are Kenyan nationals. But violence within the Dadaab camps is thought to be particularly significant, and security restrictions are numerous and strict. Humanitarian aid and Kenyan officials move between the camps in heavily armed convoys and can only visit refugee housing areas under escort. These two restrictions made Dadaab the most challenging field site for this research.

The dependence of refugees on humanitarian aid is another vexing and seemingly intractable problem for aid officials and a subject of considerable debate between refugees and officials. Refugees freely admit that they depend on aid agencies for a variety of basic needs. They also regularly complain about the type and amount of water, food rations and a host of other supplies and services (including the insufficiency of peace education programming). In both areas, but especially in Kakuma, even firewood is a regular component of refugee rations.

Kakuma

The refugee camps of Kakuma (Kakuma I was established in 1992, Kakuma II in late 1997 and Kakuma III in early 1999) are, without a doubt, unique. Where refugee camps are usually dominated by women and children, most refugees in Kakuma are male youth. While most refugee camps offer at least some formal primary schooling, Kakuma offers youth a wide range of educational opportunities, most of which are entirely free. Kakuma also has extraordinary diversity in the refugee population: refugees come from nine countries (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, “Kenya/Stateless”, Rwanda, Somalia and Uganda, in addition to Sudan) and more than 20 ethnic groups. Almost three-quarters of the overall population (73.6 per cent) are from Sudan. The majority of each national population is male (the Sudanese contingent is nearly 60 per cent male).
The camps’ orientation to refugee male youth and their needs is directly connected to the presence of some of Kakuma’s first residents. The famous “lost boys of Sudan” whom Refugees International has described as “a unique phenomenon in the world”, comprised some 17,000 boys who in 1987 began fleeing the fighting in southern Sudan and entered Ethiopia. In 1991, however, the Ethiopian government closed the refugee camps, forcing the “lost boys” back towards the battle zone in their own country. Some 10,500 of this original group eventually arrived in Kakuma the following year (Refugees International, 1998: 1).

Inspired by this initial, and much publicized, male youth influx into Kakuma, youth programming is remarkable and extensive (the definition of a refugee youth in Kakuma, it should be noted, is all refugees between the ages of 7 and 40). UNHCR reports that 28 per cent of the total refugee population – more than 25,000 out of a total population of nearly 93,000 – attend schools in the camps. In addition to primary school, there are pre-school, secondary and vocational schools. Youth (of whom there are nearly 65,000) comprise 70 per cent of the total population; more than 19,000 (29 per cent) of them are part of a Youth and Culture Programme led by the Lutheran World Federation that provides organized activities such as fine arts, drama, music, cultural dances, debate, leadership training, exchange visits and educational tours. Ninety per cent of all youth involved in these programmes, according to one UNHCR official, speak English. There are 700 refugee youth sports teams in Kakuma. As for the original “lost boys”, preparations are being made to resettle them in the United States.
Peace education programming. UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme was first piloted in, and received the most enthusiastic support from, the UNHCR Sub-Office in Kakuma. All pilot programmes benefit from favourable conditions, and all of these elements contributed to the successful launch of the peace education programme in Kakuma. As one UNHCR official proudly commented, “the famous euphoria of Peace Education started here”.

The euphoria he referred to was not within UNHCR, its implementing partners or host government officials but within refugee communities. As in Dadaab and Uganda, the Peace Education Programme officially closed down for a number of months (that is, no UNHCR peace education staff and limited or no funding was present), and the Kakuma programme was officially frozen for eight months beginning in mid-1999. However, again as in the other two sites, this did not stop refugees involved in the programme from continuing it. Strong, enthusiastic refugee support for the programme remains one of the most important existing indicators of peace education’s impact.

Early in the pilot process, which began in 1997, there was an attempt within UNHCR to attach the Peace Education Programme to the Protection Unit instead of to the Community Services Unit. This was a novel and intriguing idea, and there were at least two important reasons for considering this. First, as one UNHCR official explained, in the Protection Unit “we implement protection”, while Community Services monitors but does not implement programming. Second, “peace education teaches the core principles of UNHCR”, the official continued. Refugees should “know their rights and obligations”, and this could be integrated into the peace education curriculum.

A powerful logic supports this argument – peace, problem-solving and refugee rights and obligations all support protection concerns and potentially counteract violence and lack of refugee protection. But institutionally the argument was considered weak. Peace education is seen predominantly as an education programme within UNHCR. The idea of directly linking peace education to the Protection Unit was ultimately dropped.

Among the first refugees associated with the Peace Education Programme was a group of church leaders who were involved in resolving a violent conflict involving Sudanese Dinka and Nuer youth. Members of this group (who originally received support from the Jesuit Refugee Service) were some of the first refugees to be trained as facilitators and teachers during the pilot phase. A member of this original church-based group continues to associate the Peace Education Programme with Christian values. “I like this programme very much,” he said, because I’m a Christian ... We see a world full of conflict, especially in Africa. So to live together and solve problems peacefully is the only way [we Africans] can solve our problems on our own.

The inclusion of religious leaders in the peace education facilitator and teacher faculty seemed an appropriate and even natural fit to many of those involved. For them, and for so many other refugees in Kakuma, Dadaab and northern Uganda, the Peace Education Programme aligned and supported the values and mission of churches and mosques, whose leaders are regularly called on to help resolve outbreaks of violence between refugees.

Four implications of this alignment between religious leaders and the Peace Education Programme will be noted here:
First, the training represented a form of enhanced recognition and empowerment for facilitators, teachers and adult participants alike. Although this was most pronounced in Dadaab, where the sense that those involved in the Peace Education Programme became “peacemakers” was widespread, it was also present in Kakuma as well as northern Uganda. At all three sites workshop graduates and some primary school students routinely formed peace education groups and many peace education teachers, but especially facilitators, were called on to help refugee community leaders and elders attempt to resolve conflicts. The results of this impact, it should be noted, are not necessarily positive, but may well be. In any event, this constitutes an important indicator of impact that the programme itself has yet to monitor, document and evaluate systematically.

Second, the attention paid to religious leaders is among the factors limiting the involvement of women refugees. “Some peace education workshops have no girls at all,” one male youth graduate of a peace education workshop observed. He was a member of “The Peace Education Union”, a self-styled male youth group organized by workshop graduates. A Peace Education Programme official acknowledged the lack of many women teachers, facilitators and participants to be a deficiency that is now being addressed.

Third, at all three peace education sites (Kakuma, Dadaab and Uganda), far more men than women know English. This is not an impediment to access to peace education in primary schools, but is for the adult workshops. Religious and other leaders, as well as other well-educated refugees, naturally become candidates for peace education programming, and most of these people are men. This is also the case with refugee youth, since, as one refugee involved in the Peace Education Programme noted, “most girls don’t know English”.

Fourth, although this was not true for all teachers and facilitators, there were strong indications that, in Kakuma and elsewhere, the “natural” connection between peace education and religious values affected the way in which peace education was taught. This was particularly evident with primary school teachers, when the method of instruction sometimes resembled sermons. “Let us bring peace to the society here, so we can plant peace”, one teacher exhorted his students. Another reminded his students that they “should not exclude [others]. As God is our creator, don’t discriminate by tribe, nationality, colour, race or geographic location”. A third explained that “the peace education approach to peace is related to the religious [approach] in many ways”. This final implication, it should be remembered, must be taken in context. Peace Education Programme training has been limited (some teachers reported having been trained for a month), but the training that most refugee teachers had received to become teachers was also limited.

Refugee youth. Despite the wealth of youth activities and the availability of free education, many refugee youth in Kakuma drop out of school and participate in few or no youth activities. These marginalized youth lack representation in the larger refugee community, a fact repeatedly made clear by refugee leaders, who were often called to resolve violent conflicts involving marginalized refugee youth. Many leaders confessed that they do not understand the youth known as “Drop-outs”, who routinely ignore their advice.

If marginalized youth (most of them allegedly male) in Kakuma ignore refugee leaders – a tendency also found in Dadaab and northern Uganda – what does this say about the influence of refugee leaders and the institutions, such as UNHCR and host government officials, who work with refugee leaders? Regarding
the Peace Education Programme, the implication is fairly clear: apart from the primary school component, only those refugees who are already peaceful (and influential) tend to become involved in the programme. Those refugees who are not peaceful do not.

The problem that “Drop-outs” represent is a matter of general concern in the Kakuma camps. They are perceived as being difficult, quarrelsome outcasts. “These Drop-outs”, an educated youth explained:

They do nothing, they don’t have jobs, they are idle without anything. They are frustrated. Drop-outs can be robbers, in breweries. They are never allowed into [our] traditional dances. Peace education is for the most peaceful youth, not the Drop-outs, who are in the majority.

According to this youth, Drop-outs are not entitled to receive peace education training. This may add to the frustration that already characterizes the lives of Drop-outs, who are also often living on their own. Young men become Drop-outs, another youth commented, “due to frustration. Without food at home, with hunger, they can’t understand what they’ve learned [in school]”. There is also the issue of trauma. “Some people do not understand [Drop-outs],” another youth explained. “They are not well because they saw killing, looting, and so on during war, so they’re still disturbed.”

Frustration was a characteristic of the lives of nearly every refugee youth interviewed for this report. For refugees from Sudan and Somalia – the refugee majority in Kakuma, Dadaab and northern Uganda – peace in and repatriation to their countries of origin seemed a long way off. War and instability had lasted for years and was showing few signs of letting up. In this situation, even education was thought to be only a temporary relief from idleness. Many thought it would be useful one day, but employment opportunities for primary, secondary and vocational school graduates were severely limited in both countries. As a result, as one Sudanese youth related, “there’s no way to use our education”.

Given the fact that education does not necessarily facilitate advancement and the time required to meet essential needs, education became, for many youths, an optional activity or perhaps simply a diversion. One Sudanese male youth explained that there were “two kinds of boys: those who like to attend school and the people who don’t like to attend school”. Another youth explained his fate in the following way: “I’ve failed education and I’ve failed getting a job. I’m just idle.” In such a circumstance, beer is useful: “If I stay two days without food, beer becomes a medicine and you forget about hunger.”

Few female refugee youth in Kakuma were involved in the Peace Education Programme or, in fact, most other programmes. Sudanese girls are reportedly routinely driven out of school in the higher primary grades, often by male students in their grades who do not want girls receiving higher examination grades than they do. Others were married, often not by choice and frequently to older men. These circumstances – girls leaving school early and marrying early – were commonplace in Sudan as well. But in Kakuma, it was also commonplace for male and female youth to mix with people of other countries. This could lead to violence, but did not necessarily do so. As a women’s group leader observed, “the youth mix between cultures, but elders rarely do. Youth are more dynamic and outgoing”. “These ‘youth outside of society’,” another women’s group member added, “still have their own peer groups.” Collectively, the membership of these youth peer groups may well comprise the majority of all refugees in Kakuma I, II and III.

11 The attraction to training and working with refugee leaders is not specific to the Peace Education Programme, and will be addressed in the Uganda section below.
Dadaab

There are more than 120,000 refugees in the three refugee camps in the Dadaab area, which began to host refugees in 1991. By June 2000, Ifo camp had nearly 45,000 refugees, Hagadera 44,408 and Dagahaley 33,455. The camps are overwhelmingly Somali in composition, ranging from 96 per cent (in Ifo camp) to 99.5 per cent in Hagadera camp. Small numbers of Sudanese and Ethiopians also reside in the camps, with still smaller numbers of Congolese, Ugandans and Eritreans.

The Dadaab refugee camps are hot, dry, remote, grim, confining and, above all, dangerous. The dominant problem for refugees in Dadaab is rape. “Of the main two issues in Dadaab”, one UNHCR official commented, “the problem of sexual violence is the highest priority” (the other priority problem was banditry). During the month prior to the field visit (May 2000), for example, there were ten reported rapes, or about one every three days. The number of unreported rapes may have been significantly higher, since “if a rape is reported by a woman, the rapist is likely to cause more problems” for his victim. The problem has had a profound cumulative effect on Somali refugee women: members of the Anti-Rape Committee asserted that “if six of seven women go to fetch firewood, maybe five have [already] been raped” at least once.

Somali women also tend to view rape, and fear of rape, as the predominant problem in the camps. They must collect firewood outside the camps almost daily, where they regularly confront ethnic Somali “bandits”. Somali men generally refuse to collect firewood for their families. The role is considered part of
the women’s domain, even by many women, and “a part of our culture”. There is also a widely held view that “women will get raped but men will get killed” if they confront bandits. Given the choice, in other words, rape is preferable to death. A component of this debate, however, was the fact that Somali men regularly ventured into the “bush” surrounding the camps with donkey carts to cut firewood for sale. But during interviews with Somali men, it was clear that they were not prepared to budge from their position of not accompanying Somali women into the bush. It was also clear that they had become accustomed to discussing the firewood issue with foreign researchers.

Somali men and women both maintained that the “bandits” who carried out these crimes (with virtual impunity) were Kenyans of Somali ethnicity who were members of rival clans or sub-clans. Members of the Somali leadership (all men) reported that all the violence in or near the camps was caused exclusively by these “bandits”. Aid agency and Kenyan security officials felt that refugees were also involved in criminal activity in the camps. Many refugees supported the officials’ view. One woman, for example, explained that, in the camps,

There are four kinds of Somali refugees: [those from the] Harwiye and Darod clans, minorities (Afars, Issas, Madibau, Tumal, Midgan, Boon, and so on), and Somali Bantu. The Harwiye and Darod are dominant. The Somali Bantu can’t marry [members of] the other three groups, so they rape women from those three groups. The minority groups can’t marry [Harwiye and Darod], so they rape their women. I [also] suspect that Somali clan members are raping the unmarried [virgin women] of other clans to prevent them from marrying. In the refugee camps, [Somali men] rape. This is their chance for revenge.

All in all, given the situation, it was not surprising to hear one Somali woman conclude that, “Somali men are the source of all [Somali women’s] problems”.

The Dadaab camps, unlike Kakuma, were not dramatically skewed towards males over females. The proportion of refugees who were youth appeared to be statistically very significant, however, something the aid officials and refugees alike supported. Precise numbers were unavailable both because the definition of youth varies across (and sometimes within) cultures and UNHCR’s statistical age categories split what many would think of the youth population into two larger age groups (refugees aged 5–17 years and those aged 18–59). A smaller proportion of refugees participated in educational activities in the Dadaab camps than in Kakuma, but it was still a considerable proportion: 23 per cent of the population participated in pre-school, primary school, secondary school, vocational school, special education and adult literacy classes. What follows are key findings and analysis arising from the fieldwork.

Peace education programming. A meeting with community and religious leaders in Ifo camp revealed how the peace education programme related to traditional methods of problem solving. Somali elders described a collaborative internal framework. “We use four problem-solving groups,” one leader explained.

First, religious leaders solve problems through Sharia [Islamic] law. Second, clan leaders solve problems according to their culture. Third, youth group leaders also participate in finding solutions for problems. Fourth, Peace Education Programme facilitators contribute.

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12 Some officials also wondered whether some Somali women were reporting rapes that didn’t occur in order to receive consideration for third country resettlement or increased firewood rations.
The integration of refugee facilitators into the problem-solving mix indicates the degree of acceptance accorded the Peace Education Programme. A second Somali elder explained why the programme had been so widely accepted.

The first time people entered the programme, they were confused. But when [programme] teachers and facilitators taught us, we realized that these are the same skills which our ancestors were using. Before, we were only taught to solve problems through our brainwork. But now, there is the paperwork approach of peace education. So we’ve appreciated the UNHCR approach.

A significant proportion of Somalis interviewed indicated that the “modern” techniques inherent in the UNHCR Peace Education Programme approach – men as well as women, older adults in addition to youth – were thought to complement traditional problem-solving approaches. One elder noted that:

In the old days, the first guns had only one bullet. Nowadays, people can be bombed. So, although our ancestors had ways to solve problems, peace education is also connected to the modern world.

A group of refugee youth supported this view. One male youth commented that “the advanced people in the world are the peaceful people. So we want to be like them”. For this group of youth, and for many other graduates of peace education workshops in Dadaab, building on their programme training seemed like a good starting place for connecting to the “advanced” or “modern” world.

It is hard to underestimate the enthusiasm of refugees in Dadaab for UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme. Refugees who had participated in the programme clamoured for more training and support while others sought access to the training. Youth graduates from the workshops formed large peace education groups that regularly circulated in their neighbourhoods, calling themselves “peacemakers” and “professors of peace”.

It should also be noted, however, that meetings with refugee leaders and peace education participants revealed how equity was more often defined in terms of refugee nationality than gender (this finding applied to Kakuma as well). This was demonstrated in the participation levels at peace education workshops. While many nationalities were regularly represented, there were relatively few female participants.

Gender equity, it must be said, is frequently difficult to achieve. The problem is specific neither to refugee camps nor to the Peace Education Programme. But the Peace Education Programme does instruct refugees on such issues as bias, empathy and perceptions. Given the daily threat of rape, the disjunction between what peace education taught and the predominance of male participation in training was not lost on Somali women. Members of the Anti-Rape Group were particularly frustrated over their treatment:

People like you come and listen to our problems and then leave, with no help for us. What will come of your report?

They also associated peace education, as a UNHCR programme, with their criticisms of UNHCR more broadly. As one woman said, “UNHCR talks of human rights but they don’t practise it. UNHCR is biased [since] women being raped are not being assisted”. Even seemingly small steps, some women indicated, would be beneficial, such as balancing attendance ratios to peace education workshops, so that, as one woman suggested, “Somali men and women could go to the Peace Education Programme together”.

195
**Refugee youth.** Just about every young refugee man interviewed expressed tremendous frustration about his living situation. As in Kakuma, marriage opportunities for many young men were, at best, distant. Tensions over limited opportunities for employment or productive activities generally were high. “Persuade the Kenyans to let us integrate,” one refugee youth implored. Often male youth violence exploded as they waited in line for water or food. Some responded to the situation by chewing the bark and leaves of a plant known as chat or miraa. This fairly mild narcotic is popular with many Somali men and some women. Crisp notes that chat addiction among Somali men is connected to domestic violence (Crisp, 1999: 23). The broader issue of male youth frustration is also connected to rape. One youth stated, “If I don’t have a wife, I have to rape.” Another explained how access to peace education courses helped to relieve the tensions that young men endured. “If you have the knowledge of peace”, he said, “it helps. Without it, you begin raping someone because you are frustrated”.

The combination of violence, boredom and tremendous tension had led some to seek out new ways to solve their problems. Some described the significance of “video parlours” – small theatres in the camp run by refugee entrepreneurs – in their lives. The most popular videos address the two themes that haunt male youth lives: sex and violence. Videos with live war action seemed particularly popular – two examples were news videotapes of Gulf War bombing and the war in Kosovo. But young refugees didn’t just attend the video parlours (also popular with boys and young men in Kakuma). They studied them carefully. Detective films, one youth explained, “help us understand how to identify and solve problems”.

**Field research: The Uganda programme**

More than 150,000 Sudanese refugees occupy a series of refugee settlements in the northern Ugandan districts of Adjumani, Moyo and Arua (Adjumani district hosts more than 70,000 refugees, Arua more than 50,000 and Moyo more than 35,000). The refugee settlements in these districts are somewhat different. The settlements in Adjumani and Moyo are small and numerous, particularly in Adjumani, where there are 22 different refugee settlements. Arua district, in contrast, has two: Rhino camp and Imvepi. Many thousands more Sudanese refugees are spontaneously settled in the area, and particularly in Arua district, which is by far the most urban and densely populated of the three.

In most respects the refugee situation in these Ugandan districts differs dramatically from those in Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya. The Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda are surrounded by a host population that is not only friendly but, in the case of many, speak the same language and may even be related. Familiarity between the host population and the refugees in Uganda was enhanced by the fact that people living near the northern Uganda–southern Sudan border have either become or received refugees, or both, for decades. Merkx notes that refugee movements across the border began in 1955. As many as 250,000 Ugandans fled to southern Sudan in 1979–83 (Merkx, 1999). Many Ugandans, back in their homeland, proudly state that they have not forgotten the hospitality they received from the Sudanese. Some of those who were refugees in Sudan are now members of the Ugandan government.

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13 The places where refugees live are called settlements instead of camps because “the refugee programme has evolved from emergency assistance to local settlement” (UNHCR Uganda and the Office of the Prime Minister, Government of Uganda, 1999: 8).
The Ugandan response to the Sudanese refugees has been unusually charitable, and serves as a striking contrast to the Kenyan government policy towards refugees:

It is remarkable that the government of Uganda was willing to allow refugees to occupy large areas of the north. The land itself was made available to the refugees by local communities, represented by elders and the local councils. (Merkx, 1999: 18)

Merkx also notes, however, that the Ugandans, while obviously generous, opened up farmland to refugees in a somewhat calculated fashion: “Land was still abundant [in northern Uganda] and in many areas the local population was not interested in settling [on land offered to Sudanese refugees] because of its isolation and because of security problems” (Ibid.).

The settlements themselves are not nearly as dangerous as the Kakuma and Dadaab camps. However, serious insecurity problems near the settlements began in 1996 and regularly threaten host and refugee populations. The West Nile Liberation Front rebel group attacked some refugee settlements. More recently, banditry and abductions of children by members of the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) regularly plague the area. Based to the east and south of the settlements, the LRA remain dangerous for refugees and Ugandans alike, particularly those residing in Adjumani and Moyo districts.

The relationships between refugees and Ugandan nationals, but especially between refugees and both humanitarian agencies (UNHCR in particular) and the Ugandan government, are changing. This is by intention. The Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) was adopted by UNHCR and the Ugandan government’s Office of the Prime Minister in 1998 and is entering an implementation phase scheduled to last through 2003. Reduced donor funding, concerns over refugee dependency on humanitarian assistance while repatriation to Sudan remains a distant goal, and enhancing the Ugandan government’s authority over all residents in the northern districts appear to be the chief motivating factors for developing the SRS. Merkx, who was “directly involved” in developing the SRS, explains the overall reasoning of the strategy in the following terms: “by targeting assistance programmes to refugee hosting areas the impact could be more sustainable” (1999: 22–23).

The overall goal of the SRS – “to improve the standard of living of the people in Moyo, Arua and Adjumani districts, including the refugees” – is embodied in two objectives. The first is to “empower refugees and nationals in the area to the extent that they will be able to support themselves”. The second is to “establish mechanisms which will ensure integration of services for the refugees with those for the nationals” (UNHCR Uganda and the Office of the Prime Minister, Government of Uganda, 1999: 8). The formulators of the strategy envisage that refugees will soon be able “grow or buy their own food, access and pay for basic services and maintain self-sustaining community structures” (ibid.).

Refugees themselves are far less confident about the outcome of this strategy. They feel abandoned by UNHCR (although the agency will retain a presence and limited mission in the area) and unsure about their future relationship with the Ugandan government, whose officials will, under the SRS, assume greatly enhanced responsibilities for refugees in their districts. While this issue will be returned to below, two comments are given here. First, the Sudanese refugees in Kakuma are far more dependent on outside assistance than their comrades in Uganda, and their dependence on UNHCR shows no indications of waning. Much of this is unavoidable, given the Kenyan government’s policy to contain refugees inside camps, but it is an issue not lost on Sudanese refugees in Uganda. Second, it should be noted that UNHCR’s Peace
Education Programme, especially the adult workshop course that aims to enhance the problem-solving skills of its participants and is regularly offered to refugee leaders, is not a featured component of the Self-Reliance Strategy, even though refugees and local Ugandans (residents and officials alike) might all benefit from programme training workshops, given that they will be working together more closely from now on. What follows are key findings and analysis arising from the fieldwork.

**Peace education programming.** UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme in Uganda started later than the Kenya programme (in mid-1999) and is far less developed. There is no primary school component, although some UNHCR officials connected to peace education stated that this was a future intention. UNICEF officials, who are currently developing a peace education programme for Ugandan primary schools with the Ugandan government, were not aware of UNHCR’s activities or of its interest in providing peace education programming for refugee students. One UNICEF official commented, however, that this was not unusual, since “the nature of the business is not to coordinate peace education work”.

The process of programme development included seven five-day awareness workshops to introduce refugees to the course. This was followed by three “training of trainers” workshops (one each in Arua, Adjumani and Moyo districts). These trainers were then expected to lead workshops for refugees and Ugandans working with refugees (trainers in the Uganda programme were known as facilitators in the Kenya programme). Peace education was thus designed “to enhance the community’s awareness about elements of peace, through the existing structure of community workers” (Freeman, 2000: 1). The intention, in other words, was to equip existing community workers (many of whom were refugees and Ugandans working for UNHCR’s NGO implementing partners and Ugandan government offices) with peace education skills so that they could serve the community’s needs more effectively.

There has been additional training of trainers since this initial set of workshops. One of the workshop organizers related that “most of those trained were Ugandan local government officials who are responsible for both refugees and Ugandans”. Some of those trained were also from southern Sudan and would return there following the training.

A number of constraints have hampered programme development. “The greatest hurdle now”, one NGO official stated with regard to the programme, “is the problem of trainees focusing on food instead of the training”. Issues of trainer incentives and provisions of food and per diems to workshop participants plague the programme. This might be expected, given the uneven history of programme management. UNHCR hired a consultant to start up the programme beginning in mid-1999. Problems involving contract extensions ensued in early 2000 and the consultant was only able briefly to visit the northern Ugandan districts during that time. The consultant’s contract was not renewed.

Working with limited direction from UNHCR, NGO implementing partners in northern Uganda nonetheless kept the programme going. The peace education programme is popular with refugees and Ugandans, but it is especially popular during the “hungry season” when food supplies run low. Food, indeed, was a main issue of discussion for most refugees interviewed in Uganda, since the SRS policy had begun to reduce food rations. Refugees were supposed to supplement rations with crops they grew on their settlement farms.

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14 The recollections of UNHCR officials suggested otherwise. They explained that peace education workshops and meetings were held with UNICEF and officials at Uganda’s Ministry of Education, and samples of UNHCR’s materials were shared. Due to interruptions in staffing at UNHCR, however, no follow-up ensued.
The programme remains a small-scale endeavour. The workshops themselves are well attended, but they last half the time of workshops in Kenya (three full days instead of twelve half-days). The budget allocated to the Jesuit Refugee Service for peace education for the year 2000 is US$13,000. UNHCR’s support for the programme is weak. As one UNHCR official observed, “Peace education is always the first thing to be cut in the budget”.

There is also the problem of overlap and poor coordination with other workshop-based programmes. “I believe in peace education”, one UNHCR official explained. “But my problem is we have so many peace-related activities already going on.” The official listed some examples of workshops that have taken place in refugee settlements in recent months: children’s rights, gender awareness, girls’ education, leadership and domestic violence. “And the same refugees go to all of the workshops”, the official added.

Refugees who might be considered leaders or community workers – officials in the refugee settlement structure, those working with NGOs, teachers and other educated professionals – confirmed that members of this elite refugee group attended the varieties of workshops periodically offered to them. Some admitted that while many of the workshops addressed similar issues – the one most often mentioned was communication – they sometimes did so in conflicting ways.

One set of leaders, however, was not considered part of this elite group: clan leaders. “What is happening now”, one refugee clan leader explained, “it that most problems are tackled according to the judiciary, the laws” by refugee community leaders (who are part of an official organized refugee structure containing Welfare Council, Block and Cluster leaders) and Ugandan authorities. “The religious leaders settle other issues in a religious way.” Clan leaders are under attack (“the religious leaders say that our traditional ways are sinful”).

Significantly, however, a number of refugees who were involved with the Peace Education Programme believed that the problem-solving methods they learned in the programme resembled the clan leaders’ approach, which tends to focus on reconciling the parties in conflict. One participant said that, whereas the refugee Welfare Council, Block and Cluster leaders “act like government officials” and decided who was right and who was at fault, “the clan leaders want to decide problems peacefully”. The idea here, another participant who was also a refugee religious leader explained, was that “sometimes we decide things too administratively”, like the Welfare Council, Block and Cluster leaders. But like the clan leaders’ methods, peace education “helps us to listen to each side” in a conflict “to know how the conflict started”.

Refugee youth. Officials with the Office of the Prime Minister, which is largely responsible for refugee affairs in the Ugandan government, described how as many as “70–75 per cent of all [Sudanese] refugee youth go to secondary school”. A corrective to this statistic was suggested by a UNHCR education official, who estimated that 20 per cent of Sudanese refugee youth attend secondary school, provided “you define youth as [aged] 13–18”. The official also surmised that the far higher figure provided by government officials may be a result of three factors: the fact that although a high number of refugee youth are in school, most attend primary schools; that many refugee youth not in school leave the settlements for lengthy periods; and that perhaps two-thirds of all refugees who qualify for secondary school subsequently attend one.

Government and aid agency officials share the same perspective about Sudanese attitudes to education. As one government official observed, “The Sudanese like education so much.” In the districts hosting refugees, the official added, “more refugees than Ugandans are in secondary school”. This fact should not imply, however, that the citizens of northern Uganda are uninterested in school. Sudanese refugees may
Sudanese refugees at an outdoor classroom. Fugnido Camp, Gambella Region, Ethiopia. UNHCR/02.2001/B. Neelmann
have a zest for education, but their fees are also subsidized, although not as much as are those of refugees in Kenya’s Kakuma camps. Ugandan students, by comparison, receive no such support. This arrangement is due to change once the SRS is fully implemented.

Many male Sudanese refugee youth make a connection between the ready availability of secondary school education in Uganda and the porous border between Uganda and Sudan. That some Sudanese refugee youth return to Sudan after receiving their education is common knowledge. Some reportedly commute to the camps when food rations are handed out. Others use the education they received in Ugandan settlements to search for work either with international humanitarian agencies working in southern Sudan or with the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) as military officers. As one youth observed, “If you have education, you can go and fight”.

Not all male youth are so mobile. As with youth in Kakuma and Dadaab, frustration and idleness are common themes in their lives. A number of refugees and officials working with refugees mention the incidence of refugee youth suicides. The rate of actual and attempted suicides was seen to be on the increase. In interviews, Sudanese refugees spoke often of the night-time “disco dances” that refugee youth regularly attended. These involve not only dancing but drinking alcohol and, frequently, violent clashes. Some female youth told of rapes that took place near discos. “Our parents don’t want us to go to the discos,” one refugee youth explained, “but for us, it’s one of the only refreshing and entertaining things to do. At discos we can make friends with our brother and sister [youth].”

For female youth, the connection between education and marriage was strong. At all times, the girls are reminded to stay away from the “Drop-out” boys. Male youth who have left school early often seek to marry soon afterwards. Some of these boys, one teenage schoolgirl remarked, “rape us when we are alone with them”. They also regularly harass their female peers who have remained in school. The girls understand that the best way to avoid an early marriage to these “Drop-outs” is to attend secondary school. Secondary school fees, however, although subsidized, are still prohibitive. Some girls (as well as boys) consequently work as day labourers during school vacations to save money for school fees. If they are unable to save enough money, and if their families cannot provide sufficient support, they may be unable to continue their schooling. Refugee teachers and parents explained that when this occurred, the likelihood of early marriage for the girls dramatically increased.

**Conclusion**

“Peace,” a Sierra Leonean refugee once explained to me, “is a dangerous idea in my country.” His brother had participated in demonstrations calling for a peaceful resolution to the current civil war in Sierra Leone. Many had interpreted this support for peace as an endorsement and acceptance of the rebel forces, whose combination of child exploitation and atrocities had made them profoundly unpopular and militarily successful. “My brother was killed for supporting peace,” he said.

Peace is an idea with a wealth of different interpretations, some of which are reflected in the unwieldy subject known as peace education. Certain general aspects of the peace education field, however, are apparent. It is popular but hard to define. Its values are widely embraced but its implementation inspires
scepticism. It espouses universal ideals that are often interpreted according to Western cultural notions of universality. It preaches acceptance, communication and inclusion, while programmes relating to it may actively resist collaboration and coordination with each other. Its programmes are usually targeted at people who are already peaceful. And peace educators strongly endorse its expansion while claiming that its results cannot be easily assessed.

Peace education, in short, is a field that does not at first appear to take itself very seriously. This is not the case. Many peace educators are dedicated to enhancing the prospects of peace: the Somali refugee youth “professors of peace” in Dadaab are but one example of such dedication. And while the major criticisms of peace education are valid and important, it is also true that few in any field succeed at turning violent conflict into non-violent conflict.

Peace educators address an important need when they address issues of peace, particularly for people plagued by violence. At the same time, the weaknesses in peace education’s approach are considerable and are not being sufficiently addressed. It is necessary to examine peace education’s successes and shortcomings in more detail by commenting in particular on UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme.

The strengths of the UNHCR Peace Education Programme are many. It promotes refugee empowerment and self-sufficiency. It appears to have been reasonably successful in bridging cultural gaps in Kakuma and Dadaab by means of carrying out its initial research and development phase. Its practical orientation and objectives naturally and appropriately connect to the objectives and values inherent in refugee protection and education. It takes significant strides in translating its materials into other languages. The problem-solving skills it teaches have the potential to support both peaceful refugee repatriation and stable resettlement. It is also popular with refugees: a measure of its success lies in the fact that refugees in the programme not only continued but sometimes even expanded the programme during periods when UNHCR peace education personnel were not present. Finally, it is cost-effective.

Such inherent programme potential makes the consternation over the Peace Education Programme within UNHCR unfortunate and troubling. Peace education seems a bother to many officials, and scepticism about the programme appears to be widespread. A degree of this attitude towards peace education can be explained. Officials in field offices need to know what a programme can do and how it can provide them with tangible results that they can report to their superiors. As with any new programme, peace education’s success will partly depend on addressing adequately this institutional preoccupation.

The argument that peace education is primarily an education programme and therefore should not be expected to provide regular indicators of its effectiveness is not a sufficient argument against evaluation. Evaluation in the peace education field is generally poor, partly because it is scarcely attempted and partly because the goals of peace education programmes are often unreachable. If Boulding is correct in stating that we are not sure of just how peace is achieved and maintained, then how can peace educators reasonably claim that their work contributes to peace?

Nonetheless, it is possible if not probable that the sort of tangible results UNHCR and other institutions normally require of programming can, to some degree, be achieved for peace education programming – provided that the programmes have tangible, concrete aims. One possible evaluation approach is briefly outlined in the ‘Recommendations’ section below.
The following programme weaknesses considered here are not specific to UNHCR’s programme but are reflections of weaknesses in the broader field:

1. Training leaders (in this case, refugee leaders) to solve problems, while useful, is an inadequate means of addressing issues of serious violence. Since refugee leaders in most cases do not represent refugees directly involved in violence, their ability to promote peace may be severely constrained. This problem is particularly applicable to the Uganda programme, where the focus is on training community workers and leaders. But in Kenya as well, while the programme is not restricted to refugee leaders, they comprise an important component of the peace education trainee group. In Kakuma, refugee leaders lack the credibility, and perhaps even the access, to the primary perpetrators of violence: marginalized male youth. And in Dadaab, the problem of rape is so divisive and serious, and the indications that refugee leaders are not working purposefully to address it so apparent, that targeting leaders for peace education might even prove counter-productive.

2. Training is a form of empowerment. Targeting refugee elites – most of whom are male and educated – instead of the most vulnerable and violent may strengthen the existing power structure and contribute to the frustrations, and perhaps the violence, of the marginalized.

3. Peace education, like the concept of peace, is inherently symbolic. For UNHCR’s Peace Education Programme, the symbolism of the language of instruction was powerful because it often limited access rather than demonstrated the importance of inclusion. English was the language of refugee elites in Uganda and Kenya. This was a logical starting point for the two programmes. But expanding access to the programme requires translation of all peace education materials into local languages, an effort that is well under way for UNHCR’s programme in Kenya. Carrying out this slow and complicated task will be an important programme advance because it can ensure that the meanings of critical peace education concepts (bias, empathy, etc.) are preserved following translation, something that is difficult to do now in the simultaneous translations that may take place during the workshops themselves.

Expanding a programme’s credibility would also be demonstrated by coordinating programmes in both conceptual and regional terms. An opportunity exists to act on peace education principles in east Africa, for example, where UNICEF and UNESCO are working on peace education alongside UNHCR. The coordination is limited. Coordination appears to be equally limited within UNHCR regarding the many workshops and courses provided for refugees. Workshop training could ultimately prove counterproductive if it addresses similar issues in different ways while regularly targeting the same refugees.

4. The real and perceived threat of violence in the refugee camps blurs the distinction between conceptions of conflict prevention and conflict resolution in peace education work. A more important distinction is prioritizing those who could make the best use of peace education training. Clearly, the limited participation of marginalized “Drop-out” youth in the programme limits the programme’s potential to transfer needed problem-solving skills to refugees who could benefit from the experience. The “Drop-outs” are marked by frustration and a tendency towards involvement in violent activities, and peace education alone cannot solve these significant problems. These youth need jobs and the sort of productive activities that very few seem to be receiving. But peace education may help.
5. The proportion of female youth in the programme is alarmingly small. Their problems and frustrations are as significant as those of their male counterparts, although their lives are quieter. The regular threats of rape and other forms of violence offered to this population are alarming, particularly in Dadaab. These young women are not often targeted for programme participation, and they should be.

6. The possibility of peace education becoming counter-productive when it is taught to children and not to their parents or guardians is a serious consideration that peace education programmes must address more forcefully. The UNHCR programme in Kenya has taken the important first step of inviting parents and guardians to workshops, but more should be done to incorporate parents and guardians into programme activities.

Recommendations

If peace education is to become an effective tool for peace, it will have to address the important criticisms of its detractors head-on. It will have to consider the impact of targeting schoolchildren for peace education highlighted by Boyden and Ryder, particularly those children whose homes are plagued by domestic violence or whose lives are surrounded by actual or potential violence. School-based activities should thus become but one component of community-based programming that includes in the educational process the students’ parents and guardians.

With this in mind, the concept of community, and the implications of crossing cultures with peace education concepts, must also be carefully considered. If the existing programme emphasizes individual concerns and the culture within which it will be taught emphasizes community concerns, then the programme should be adjusted accordingly. UNHCR’s programme demonstrated that this sort of adjustment is attainable and appropriate.

At the same time, since the impact of conflicts is regional, peace education programming in conflict and post-conflict zones should also aim to be regional. Such an approach will never be feasible until coordination between peace education programmes in a given region is accorded a high priority. Steps should be taken, by the relevant implementing organizations in addition to donor and local governments, to ensure that appropriate and similar programming is being provided by different organizations working with related populations (refugees and internally displaced persons of the same nationality, for example). As one NGO education expert observed, “effective programmes that deal with conflict have to be regional, not community by community”.

Addressing the problem of evaluation will require investments of time, money and, not least, patience. In order to be able actually to measure the impact of peace education, programmes must focus on practically applicable concepts and skills that students can absorb and use. Measuring the impact of programming must begin before peace education takes place. Case studies could be developed to examine

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A UNICEF education consultant observed: “Possibly the greatest obstacle to doing the kinds of evaluations of peace education projects that are currently needed is the fact that behaviour change of this complexity takes time; and project officers report that many of these projects are donor-driven. If donors want to see significant results within a relatively short time span, perhaps six months to a year, that is not long enough to do a meaningful evaluation study. Some good ‘education’ of donors on behaviour change processes in peace education is needed in order to obtain support for longer-term studies of how these projects impact behaviour, and whether those changes are sustainable.”
how people struggle to solve problems before and after they receive the training. The role of peace education personnel who become conflict mediators should, without question, also be evaluated.

The tendency for peace education programmes to target already peaceful people is a significant weakness of the field. While reinforcing the skills of already peaceful people is a valid programme objective. Particularly, as a starting place for a programme, the fact remains that those people who need the peace education skills and understandings most – marginalized refugee youth and rape victims in Kenya and Uganda, for example – rarely receive the training, and they should.

UNHCR's Peace Education Programme in Kenya has a strong foundation. The programme in Uganda does not. Both are under-supported, under-utilized and should be carefully expanded. In addition to considering application of the general recommendations mentioned above, here are some specific, UNHCR programme-related recommendations:

1. Calls by refugees for two levels of peace education courses should be heeded. This would allow for a review of the existing material, which is challenging and requires more teaching and discussion time to be absorbed and used by refugees.

2. A far greater selection of refugees should be trained. Survey research is needed to determine who would most benefit from the adult workshops and what measures need to be taken to ensure their attendance. In the refugee camps and settlements of Kenya and Uganda, this will be a long list. But certain groups could certainly be targeted for training now, such as victims of rape (including the Anti-Rape Committee in Dadaab), “Drop-outs” (male and female), women's groups such as the Girls' and Women's Support Group of Kakuma, the parents, guardians and companions of schoolchildren (especially in homes where severe domestic violence is present), and so on.

3. To reach those most in need of peace education in refugee communities, the issue of the language of instruction is critical. The Peace Education Programme's steps in translating materials should be supported. Indeed, materials translation should be steadily expanded to address within reason the language needs of all refugees where the programme is operating. This will take careful planning to ensure that the original concepts and pedagogy are consistently preserved and culturally appropriate following translation. It will also require the increased involvement of refugee (and national) staff in evaluation.

4. Appropriate peace education programming necessarily incorporates both protection and education concerns. Accordingly, institutional and curriculum revision measures should be explored to ensure that the programme is not only coordinated between but connected to the Protection and Community Services Units of UNHCR.

5. Since UNHCR's Peace Education Programme is a problem-solving training and education programme, it should regularly be applied to help solve pressing problems. One example of possible application would be developing workshops where the misunderstandings and fears of refugees in Ugandan regarding the Self-Reliance Strategy, when refugees and Ugandan government, UNHCR and NGO officials could jointly participate. Another would be to address Somali responses to rape in Dadaab.

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16 UNHCR's Peace Education Programme, it should be noted, did carry out baseline studies in Kenya and Uganda in advance of their work, but did not conduct case studies that were monitored over time.
The comments of too many young refugee men about rape were alarming, and the victimization of too many refugee women, young women in particular, to sexual violence was equally troubling. Such population groups could be targeted for peace education training. A third would be to engage youth involved in specific violent events or facing potentially explosive situations, such as the thousands of frustrated Sudanese refugee youth who have been encamped in the Miriye transit camp in Adjumani District, Uganda for years. And so on.

6. Coordinating with other peace education programmes in the region should be given a high priority. Refugees in Kenya and Uganda should know when peace education is also being offered in their countries of origin. Expanding existing coordination between UNHCR, UNESCO and UNICEF should be enhanced, particularly when the agencies are working with people of the same nationality. Partnerships should be considered with relevant peace education NGOs (such as CECORE in Uganda). Coordination between religious groups involved in peacemaking and peace education programmes should also be undertaken whenever appropriate. Additionally, lessons learned from programming for disadvantaged and violent youth in non-refugee settings should be researched and applied to refugee programmes.

7. Coordination should also take place within UNHCR to ensure that the various workshops (such as Life Skills, Communication Skills, Gender, etc.) on peace education-related issues work well together. These workshops should also be used to target the most appropriate refugee groups, and evaluations should be conducted to determine the impact of the various kinds of training on refugee lives.
8. The wealth of “peace groups”, particularly those involving youth in the Dadaab camps, that have arisen among those who have received the peace education training is a welcome indicator of peace education’s acceptance in communities. Very small requests for support for these emerging groups have been made. They should be supported.

9. The issue of incentives, meals and per diems, which were mentioned in every field site visited (but particularly in northern Uganda), is a complicated one. Teachers and facilitators in the programme are being expected to provide professional (and important) services. Recognizing their work by means of increased incentives seems reasonable and appropriate, provided that it does not upset the existing incentive scales. In Uganda, the question of food and per diems is a particularly sensitive issue, because the programme is still so new and it arrived while reductions in food rations were sending shockwaves through refugee communities. It is also sensitive with aid agency officials. But the potential significance of the workshops themselves calls for the food and per diem issue to be appropriately addressed.

10. The Uganda programme is lurching ahead. It has limited and unenthusiastic support from UNHCR. Its workshops are too short and probably should not be run as all-day training. While current efforts by NGO implementing partners are generally commendable, particularly given the small budget allotments they receive, UNHCR’s programme management in different districts is uncoordinated; the overall Uganda and Kenya programmes are also uncoordinated. The accent on cultural transformation should be avoided, as should expansion into primary schools, unless they are carried out in collaboration with UNICEF and the Ugandan government, which are already involved in peace education in the primary schools. The programme should be restarted from within UNHCR and connected with the Kenya programme more directly, so that lessons learned from the Kenya programme’s pilot phase can be better applied to the Ugandan context.

Peace education, finally, should be accorded a specific set of stand-alone guidelines for educational assistance to refugees by UNHCR. These should state that peace education should build on and adapt the existing model it has already developed in Kenya; that new initiatives should be carefully researched and managed, initially as pilot projects to ensure that they are applied in culturally relevant ways and only when the refugee communities are receptive to it; that it should focus on practically applicable skills and concepts; that it should be targeted at communities in a way that promotes the involvement of the marginalized as well as the leadership; that the curriculum and management be coordinated with both the Community Services and the Protection Units; and that evaluation and monitoring procedures should start at the outset of the pilot phase.
Appendix


Although learning about and practising peace in a religious context is a subject reaching well beyond the scope of this report, some consideration of the religious world of peace education is useful. The example of Christian thought and action on the issues of peace, violence and justice will thus be briefly reviewed here.

Peace, Gilligan reminds us, is a central tenet in Christian thought: “Jesus explicitly rejected violence and urged his disciples to turn the other cheek, to return good for evil, to bless their enemies and persecutors rather than curse them” (1990: 16).

Following Jesus’ death, Ferguson notes, “the simple fact is that for something like a century and a half after the ministry of Jesus, Christians would not touch military service” (1978: 103). In fact, for nearly three centuries the early Christians were “regarded as unfit for military duty because of their exotic attitudes toward violence and warfare” (Gilligan, 1990: 16).

In AD 313, Christianity’s relationship with the state dramatically changed. Instead of its continuing as an outcast religion, the emperor Constantine, a Christian convert, declared that Christianity would be the Roman Empire’s official religion. The resulting “Constantinian bargain” was clear: “the Church received the protection and patronage of the emperor, and in return [Constantine’s] military campaigns and designs were pronounced in advance to be part of the divine plan for the triumph of justice” (ibid: 17).

From that point onwards, Christians were faced with “the problem of reconciling the teachings of the Prince of Peace with the perceived need for the use of armed force” (Gilligan, 1990: 17). Additionally, as Ferguson observed, “the fortunes of the Church were now tied up with the fortunes of the state” (1978: 105).

Over time, a theory or doctrine of Just War arose, which accepted violence if it was carried out in the pursuit of justice: “The undergirding notion [of Just War] is that while violence against one’s fellow human beings is reprehensible, it is essential that justice prevail in human society lest the weak and the innocent suffer at the hands of the violent” (Gilligan, 1990: 17).

Ferguson points out two central problems with Just War doctrine. First, “no objective tribunal” exists that can “declare a cause just”. This gives the doctrine “a veneer of self-justification but not an atom of legality”. Second, “it seems to have very little to do with the Christian faith” itself, since, in Ferguson’s view, “the arguments of Augustine and Aquinas [two leading contributors to the development of Just War doctrine] are a replacement of the teaching of the New Testament by Greek philosophy or Roman law” (1978: 111).

Tensions arising in the Christian tradition regarding peace and violence surfaced not only in the development of pacifist churches such as the Mennonites, Friends and Amish. It also sparked successions of debates between members of various Christian denominations. This tendency was particularly notable when wars took place. As Johnson observed, “wartime tends to divide the ranks of the proponents of peace” between those supporting a war as appropriate and necessary and others who oppose all wars (1987: 226).
References


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**Additional reading**


**Articles and journals**


Selected Websites on Peace Education

AED publications: www.aed.org/publications
Balkan Flowers: www.balkanflowers.org
CARE: www.care.org
Character counts: www.charactercounts.org
Community of Caring: www.communityofcaring.org
Conflict Web/USAID: www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb
Cooperation and Tolerance: www.peacesite.org
Facing History and Facing Ourselves: www.facinghistory.org
GINIE (Global Information Networks in Education): www.ginie.org
International Youth Foundation: www.iyfet.org
Justice and Peace Studies/Links/ Georgetown University: www.georgetown.edu/departments.pjp/programs
Lutheran Immigration & Refugee Service: www.lirs.org
Oregon Peaceworks Fund: www.teleport.com/~opw/frontdoor.html
Peace Work: www.afsc.org/peacewrk.html
ProMotion Alliance for Justice: www.afj.org
Co/Motion Project: www.comotionmakers.org
Refugee Youth Summer Enrichment: www.hcs.harvard.edu/~ryse/
Refugee Project: www.refugeeproject.org
UNESCO/Culture of Peace: www.UNESCO.org
United Nations Development Fund for Women: www.unifem.undp.org
EmpowermentResources.com: weblinks: www.empowermentresources.com
Youthlink.org: www.youthlink.org